

Cresswell, T. (2008) '*Place: a short introduction.*' Blackwell. Oxford.

Chapter 2: The Genealogy of Place pp. 15-51

concern the connections between place, identity and power they use place in radically different ways and from different political perspectives.

Finally in Chapter 5 I provide an annotated bibliography and lists of key readings and texts, a survey of web resources, pedagogical resources and possible student projects.

2

The Genealogy of Place

Place has always been central to human geography and has been an object of enquiry since at least the First Century AD. The history of geography has taken as one of its central objects the common-sense experienced differences between portions of the Earth's surface. As Carl Sauer wrote in his seminal paper 'The Morphology of Landscape' 'the facts of geography are place facts' (Sauer and Leighly 1963, 321). Or as Richard Hartshorne wrote in *Perspectives on the Nature of Geography* 'The integrations which geography is concerned to analyse are those which vary from place to place' (Hartshorne 1959, 159). A quarter of a century later Allan Pred asserted '[S]ettled places and regions, however arbitrarily defined, are the essence of human geographical inquiry' (Pred 1984, 279). There is probably not much that these three geographers would agree on but they could agree on the importance of place to the subject of geography.

The word 'place' hides many differences. One confusing aspect of the genealogy of place is that place stands for both an object (a thing that geographers and others look at, research and write about) and a way of looking. Looking at the world as a set of places in some way separate from each other is both an act of defining what exists (ontology) and a particular way of seeing and knowing the world (epistemology and metaphysics). Theory is a way of looking at the world and making sense of the confusion of the senses. Different theories of place lead different writers to look at different aspects of the world. In other words place is not simply something to be observed, researched and written about but is itself part of the way we see, research and write. Towards the end of this chapter we will see how geographers and philosophers have sought to show how place is

a way-of-being. Here, place is deeply metaphysical and a long way from the simple distinction between one place and another.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of the approaches taken to place by geographers (and selected others) through the history of the discipline. Place has also been discussed and used in many other disciplines and walks of life. Architects and urban planners try to evoke senses of place, ecologists and green activists talk of ecological places they call 'bioregions', artists and writers attempt to reconstitute places in their work. As this is a 'short introduction' there is no room to survey all of this literature. The genealogy of place extends well beyond human geography but here we will stick close to the discipline. Some readings and resources from elsewhere are included in the final chapter. The chapter is broadly arranged chronologically to give a sense of the historical progression of an idea. Towards the end however there are many competing definitions of and approaches to place that exist simultaneously. The starting point, however, is regional geography.

Regional Geography

The agreement on the centrality of place to geography between Sauer, Hartshorne and Pred reflects the common-sense notion that geography is a reflection of people's curiosity about the differences between parts of the Earth's surface. It also reflects a history of geography which had seen its practitioners focusing largely on the description of 'regions.' Much of human geography before the 1960s was devoted to specifying and describing the differences between areas of the earth's surface. This 'regional geography' was *ideographic* which is to say that it reveled in the particular. Why was the South of the United States different from the North? How many regions could be identified in England? The central word was region rather than place. The characteristic mode of operation for regional geographers was to describe a place/region in great detail, starting with the bedrock, soil type and climate and ending with 'culture'. A great deal of time was spent differentiating one particular region from others around it – in other words, in drawing boundaries. Some geographers referred to this practice as 'chorology' a spatial version of 'chronology'. While chronology refers to the study of time, chorology refers to the study of regions/places. The origins of chorology date back to the Greek geographer Strabo (First Century AD) who described it as the description of the parts of the earth. The case for geography as chorology has been argued by Richard Hartshorne (Hartshorne 1939).

One influential tradition in human geography was the French tradition of *la géographie humaine* associated with Vidal de la Blache at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Although the word place was not its central object its focus on *genre de vie* (ways of life) in particular regions produced work which was remarkable in the way it captured the complicated interplay of the natural and cultural worlds in particular parts of France. *La géographie humaine* succeeded in emphasizing the distinctiveness of particular places in a way which later inspired humanistic geographers (Buttimer 1971; Ley 1977).

Early American cultural geographers also used the term 'region' in their descriptive work on the cultural landscape. In the well known and influential text-book *Readings in Cultural Geography* (Wagner and Mikesell 1962) the editors present what they saw as the main themes in American cultural geography in 1962. The central figure in the text is Carl O. Sauer who had, like de la Blache, rejected the simplistic determinism of the environmental determinists such as Ellen Semple and Ellsworth Huntington who had argued that the characteristics of human settlement (culture) were largely a response to environmental imperatives. In other words environment determined society and culture. Rather than seeing culture as determined by the natural environment, Sauer and his followers asserted the importance of culture in transforming the natural environment. In the work of both de la Blache and Sauer culture is given explanatory power. It is no longer simply a result of natural forces. The key themes Wagner and Mikesell identify as central to cultural geography are culture, culture area, cultural landscape, cultural history and cultural ecology. Culture, they argue, rests on a geographical basis in that 'habitual and shared communication is likely to occur only among those who occupy a common area' (Wagner and Mikesell 1962, 3). Cultural geography, therefore, rested of the ranking and classifying of 'culture areas' (these spaces of cultural communication) and an analysis of the ways in which cultural groups affect and change their natural habitats. Again 'place' is not a central concept here but the emphasis on shared cultural spaces suggests the importance of meaning and practice in a given location.

Regional geography was the predominant way of doing geography in Britain during the first half of the century. Approaches ranged from the attempts by Herbertson to show how unique regions emanated from variations in the natural environment (Herbertson 1905) to Fleure's equally ambitious desire to delineate 'human regions' defined by the anthropological particularities of their inhabitants (Fleure 1919 (1996)). In each case the focus was on differentiating one clearly

defined region (place) from the next and explaining the logic of the definitions. While Herbertson looked to nature for this logic, Fleure looked to human characteristics.

The importance of regions as places is a theme that still warrants the attention of geographers. Recently, geographers have explored the way regions have been deliberately produced through the activities of formal and informal politics in order to institutionalize particular ideas about government and governance at regional levels. Here the focus is very much on the production of regions rather than the search for regions that already exist (MacLeod and Jones 2001; Paasi 2002). A different argument is made by Nick Entrikin (1985, 1991) as he traces some of the strands of thought in North America which have argued that the stability of democracy is based on an attachment to place and local community. Such 'sectionalism' would, it was hoped, mitigate against 'mass society'. Such views were clearly held by the grandfather of cultural geography Carl Sauer in his defense of traditional ways of life in the face of modern industrialism. To Sauer, an ecologically informed naturalistic philosophy pointed towards the increasing diversity of forms of living, with each community becoming recognizably separate. Activities and forms of human life and culture which threatened regional and place-based distinctiveness were thus a threat. In the conclusion to his book Entrikin suggests that scientific geography – and the fascination with abstract space – had diminished the importance of the particular and that the particular needs to be reclaimed through a narrative understanding of place.

Discovering Place: Humanistic Geography

Given this history and the comments of Sauer, Hartshorne and others it is, as Relph was to remark in 1976 in his book *Place and Placelessness*, surprising that very little attempt had been made to actually define place and distinguish it from its sister concepts of region and area. Place remained a largely common-sense idea. Perhaps the most insistent attempt to come to terms with the concept in the 1960s was made by Fred Lukerman. Echoing the earlier comments of Sauer and Hartshorne, Lukerman had argued that 'Geography is the knowledge of the world as it exists in places' (Lukerman 1964, 167). Lukerman understood places as integrations of nature and culture developing in particular locations with links to other places through the movement of goods and people. This understanding of place is suggestive but also evasive. The words 'culture' and 'nature' are, as Raymond

Williams has reminded us, two of the most complicated words in the English language each of which has many possible meanings (Williams 1985). This definition hardly applies to the corner of a child's room. It also remains unclear how place might be different from area, locality or territory.

Lukerman's interventions aside, the 1970s had not proved promising for the development of a thorough understanding of place. It was largely in this decade that geographers became dissatisfied with geography as an ideographic pursuit. Proper *scientific* disciplines, it was pointed out, liked to generalize and make laws that could be applicable anywhere – not just in Southern California or the South of France. Thus spatial science was born and the concept of region was replaced by the concept of space as a central focus of human geography. The term *space* appeals to the *nomothetic* or generalizing impulse of science. Within spatial science a place was simply a location. Central place theory was the only area in which the term 'place' was often used and here it described locations where particular functions, services and populations were concentrated (Lösch 1954; Christaller and Baskin 1966).

As Arturo Escobar has recently written:

Since Plato, Western philosophy – often times with the help of theology and physics – has enshrined space as the absolute, unlimited and universal, while banning place to the realm of the particular, the limited, the local and the bound.

(Escobar 2001, 143)

Since *the particular* had no place in the hierarchy of values developed in the post-enlightenment world studies of place were often relegated to 'mere description' while space was given the role of developing scientific law-like generalizations. In order to make this work people had to be removed from the scene. Space was not embodied but empty. This empty space could then be used to develop a kind of spatial mathematics – a geometry. But this idea of place as a fascination with the particular and the study of place as 'mere description' depends on a particular naïve view of places as given parts of the human landscape. In the 1970s humanistic geographers began to develop notions of place which were every bit as universal and theoretically ambitious as approaches to space had been.

The development of humanistic geography was, in part, a reaction to the new emphasis on space in spatial science. Central to this enterprise was 'place' which, for the first time, explicitly became the central concept in geographical inquiry. Place, to geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan (1977; 1974b), Anne Buttimer and David Seamon (1980) and

Edward Relph (1976) was a concept that expressed an attitude to the world that emphasized subjectivity and experience rather than the cool, hard logic of spatial science. But unlike the ongoing traditions of regional and (American) cultural geography, the humanist engagement took a distinctly philosophical turn looking (in what is now a familiar gesture) to continental European philosophy for inspiration. The philosophies of phenomenology and existentialism were central. As we shall see it would be wrong to think of the focus on place as a return to the ideographic concerns with *particular* places that were central to human geography in the first half of the century. Rather place was seen as a universal and transhistorical part of the human condition. It was not so much places (in the world) that interested the humanists but 'place' as an idea, concept and way of being-in-the-world.

The two geographers who have developed this new approach to place most thoroughly are Yi-Fu Tuan and Edward Relph. Yi-Fu Tuan's books *Topophilia* (1974) and *Space and Place* (1977) have had an enormous impact on the history of human geography and, more specifically, the development of the idea of place. Tuan argued that through human perception and experience we get to know the world through places. The term 'topophilia' was developed by Tuan to refer to the 'affective bond between people and place' (Tuan 1974b, 4). This bond, this sense of attachment, is fundamental to the idea of place as a 'field of care'. Tuan defined place through a comparison with space. He develops a sense of space as an open arena of action and movement while place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved. While space is amenable to the abstraction of spatial science and economic rationality, place is amenable to discussions of things such as 'value' and 'belonging.'

This kind of discussion of place is clearly much more than a discussion of location or region. Because place is a product of a 'pause' and a chance of attachment it exists at many scales: 'At one extreme a favorite armchair is a place, at the other extreme the whole earth' (Tuan 1977, 149).

Place can be as small as the corner of a room or as large as the earth itself: that the earth is our place in the universe is a simple fact of observation to homesick astronauts ... It is obvious that most definitions of place are quite arbitrary. Geographers tend to think of place as having the size of a settlement: the plaza within it may be counted a place, but usually not the individual houses, and certainly not that old rocking chair by the fireplace. (Tuan 1974a, 245)

Writing in 1974 (before humanistic geography was well known) it is obvious that Tuan was struggling with the abstractions of spatial

science. 'Unlike the spatial analyst, who must begin by making simplifying assumptions concerning man, the humanist begins with a deep commitment to the understanding of human nature in all its intricacy' (Tuan 1974a, 246). Spatial science simply missed out too much of the richness of human experience for Tuan and despite the lip service paid to 'place' in definitions to geography no-one was really bothering to figure out what it was. It could not be measured or mapped and laws could not be deduced about or from it.

Edward Relph's approach to place was more explicit in its philosophical commitments to phenomenology. In *Place and Placelessness* (1976) Relph builds on what he describes as our practical knowledge of places – the very everyday and mundane fact of our knowing where to enact out lives. We live in one place, work in another, play football in another. But we are also willing to protect *our* place against those who do not belong and we are frequently nostalgic for places we have left. These human responses, for Relph, reveal the deeper significance of place to human 'being'.

As with Tuan, Relph utilizes the comparison of place with space to make an argument for the significance of place to human life:

Space is amorphous and intangible and not an entity that can be directly described and analysed. Yet, however we feel or explain space, there is nearly always some associated sense or concept of place. In general it seems that space provides the context for places but derives its meaning from particular places. (Relph 1976, 8)

The continuum which has place at one end and space at the other is simultaneously a continuum linking experience to abstraction. Places are experienced (Tuan's *Space and Place* is subtitled *The Perspective of Experience*).

Relph explicitly builds on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger's work *Being and Time* and particularly the notion of *desien* (approximately 'dwelling'). *Desien*, for Heidegger was the very essence of existence – the way humans exist in the world. Heidegger used the illustration of a farmhouse in the Black Forest to make his point:

Here the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and heaven, divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into things, ordered the house. It places the farm on the wind sheltered slope looking south, among the meadows close to the spring. It gave it the wide overhanging shingle roof whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, and which, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long winter nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and the 'tree of the dead' – for

that is what they called a coffin there; the Totenbaum – and in this way it designed for the different generations under one roof the character of their journey through time. A craft which itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its tools and frames as things, built the farmhouse. (Heidegger 1971, 160)

Place as dwelling, then is a spiritual and philosophical endeavor that unites the natural and human worlds. A properly authentic existence to Heidegger is one rooted in place. If place is broadly analogous to this concept of dwelling then to think of places as simply points on a map or even as 'Toronto' or 'Bombay' is a very shallow conception of place indeed. Note, though, how Heidegger chooses as his example a farmhouse in a forest. It is relatively straightforward to portray such a place as rooted as if in the soil. How this might apply to a modern place in an urban environment is a little harder to imagine. Heidegger's vision is very romantic and nostalgic.

By developing the ideas of Heidegger, Relph sought to escape from simplistic notions of place as location. Relph quoted the philosopher Susanne Langer (also a favourite of Tuan's) noting that place, in the deeper sense, need not have any fixed location at all.

A ship constantly changing its location is nonetheless a self-contained place, and so is a gypsy camp, an Indian camp, or a circus camp, however often it shifts its geodetic bearings. Literally we say a camp is *in* a place, but culturally it *is* a place. A gypsy camp is a different place from an Indian camp though it may be geographically where the Indian camp used to be. (Susanne Langer 1953 quoted in Relph, 1976: 29)

Location, then, is not a necessary or sufficient condition of place. Relph works through a list of characteristics of place including their visuality (places have landscapes – we can see them), the sense of community that place supposedly engenders, the sense of time involved in establishing attachment to place and the value of 'rootedness' but none of these, he argues, are enough to explain the deeper importance of place to human existence and experience. To get at this Relph returns to phenomenology.

The philosophy of phenomenology was developed by Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl in the nineteenth century and its central concern is with what philosophers call '*intentionality*.' The word intentionality refers to the 'aboutness' of human consciousness. That is to say we cannot (the phenomenologist would argue) be conscious without being *conscious of something*. Consciousness constructs a relation between the self and the world. Relph's argument is that consciousness is not just of something – but something

in its place. The only way humans can be humans is to be 'in place.' Place determines our experience.

The basic meaning of place, its essence, does not therefore come from locations, nor from the trivial functions that places serve, nor from the community that occupies it, nor from superficial or mundane experiences ... The essence of place lies in the largely unselfconscious intentionality that defines places as profound centers of human existence. (Relph 1976: 43)

Essence is a key word here. Phenomenologists saw as one of their principle tasks the discovery of essences. An essence is what makes something what it is. So rather than asking what this place or that place is like, the phenomenological approach to place asks what makes a place a place? What is it that the corner of a child's room shares with an urban garden or Kosovo? Clearly this is not an interest in the particular but a rather grand investigation of a central component of the human world.

At heart this phenomenological enterprise involved the acknowledgment that to be human is to be 'in place.' To the humanist ontological priority was given to the human immersion in place rather than the abstractions of geometric space. As the philosopher of place Edward Casey has put it 'To live is to live locally, and know is first of all to know the place one is in' (Casey 1996, 18). This phenomenological focus on place as experience echoes an earlier observation by Lukerman.

The study of place is the subject matter of geography because consciousness of place is an immediately apparent part of reality, not a sophisticated thesis; knowledge of place is a simple fact of experience.

(Lukerman 1964, 168)

Place is therefore a pre-scientific fact of life – based on the way we experience the world.

The humanistic strand in human geography is a continuous one that informs contemporary debate in many ways. Robert Sack (1992) has written of the connections between place and morality, arguing that in the (post)modern world the primary form our relationship to place takes is often one of consumption. We are sold products in consumption places and they are advertised with reference to a variety of fantastic contexts. The net result of all of this, he argues, is a diminished sense of the consequences of our actions. Morality, to Sack, is based on a knowledge of the consequences of what we do. Consumption, through the disguise of production processes hides the consequences of our purchase and thus creates an amoral consumer's

world. A key part of this equation is the spatial scope of such consequences. Hypermodernity is characterized by a characteristic globalism that makes each local action potentially global in its consequences. Its all too much for the individual to process. In the background to Sack's consumer's world lies the alternative of place-based actions where morality is possible due to the close proximity and accountability of the producers of goods. Note how this story of place insinuates the dangerous character of flows and dynamism which disconnect people from place boundedness. This theme, the threat of mobility, is one we shall return to later.

Place as Home?

For many, the most familiar example of place and its significance to people is the idea of home. It is the first example of place in this book. For Tuan, geography is the study of Earth as the home of people (Tuan 1991). By transforming the Earth into home we create places at a myriad of different levels. Tuan argues that the making of places at all scales is seen as the production of a certain kind of homeliness. Home is an exemplary kind of place where people feel a sense of attachment and rootedness. Home, more than anywhere else, is seen as a center of meaning and a field of care. David Seamon (Seamon 1979) has also argued that home is an intimate place of rest where a person can withdraw from the hustle of the world outside and have some degree of control over what happens within a limited space. Home is where you can be yourself. In this sense home acts as a kind of metaphor for place in general.

The centrality of home to humanistic approaches to place owes much to both Heidegger's focus on 'dwelling' as the ideal kind of authentic existence and to the work of another continental phenomenological philosopher – Gaston Bachelard (1994). In Bachelard's book *The Poetics of Space* he considers the house/home as a primal space that acts as a first world or first universe that then frames our understandings of all the spaces outside. The home is an intimate space where experience is particularly intense. To Bachelard the interior arrangement of the house constitutes not one homogeneous place but rather a series of places with their own memories, imaginings and dreams. Thus Bachelard distinguishes between the attic and the basement where the attic is a place of the intellect and rationality and the basement is the place of the unconscious and of nightmares – 'The unconscious cannot be civilized. It takes a candle when it goes to the cellar' (Bachelard 1994, 19). To Bachelard, then, the

house/home is a particularly privileged kind of place that frames the way people go on to think about the wider universe.

This idea of home as a fundamental place has been questioned by feminists. The feminist geographer Gillian Rose has considered the role of home as place in geography. In her account of humanistic geography (a chapter titled 'No Place for Women') Rose finds much to applaud in the efforts of Tuan, Relph and others. Their willingness to introduce issues of home and the body, for instance, share much with the concerns of feminist geographers. What she finds troubling, however, is the way the idea of place as home is discussed in humanistic geography.

Although it was often noted that home need not necessarily be a family house, images of the domestic recur in their work as universal, even biological, experiences. Tuan remarked that 'human identification with the familiar, nurturing place has a biological basis'. This enthusiasm for home and for what is associated with the domestic, in the context of the erasure of women from humanistic studies, suggests to me that humanistic geographers are working with a masculinist notion of home/place.

(Rose 1993, 53)

Rose points out that many women do not share the rosy view of home/place that humanistic geographers place at the center of the discipline. Communities can be stifling and homes can be and often are places of drudgery, abuse and neglect. Many women, Rose argues, would not recognize a view of home/place that is 'conflict-free, caring, nurturing and almost mystically venerated by the humanists' (Rose 1993, 56).

So, to white feminists who argue that the home was 'the central site of the oppression of women', there seemed little reason to celebrate a sense of belonging to the home, and even less, I would add, to support the humanistic geographers' claim that home provides the ultimate sense of place.

(Rose 1993, 55)

While humanists claim that place is a universal experience (while at the same time using the word 'man' as the universal person) they fail to recognize the differences between people and their relation to place. In the search for 'essence' – 'difference' has no place.

Not all feminists share Rose's view although most would share her suspicion of the idea of home as always warm and caring. The black feminist author bell hooks has written of home as a place of resistance (hooks 1990; Young, I.M. 1997). As a black child growing up in a starkly segregated society hooks experienced her home as a place of

care and relative freedom from the oppression black people suffered in the world outside and, especially, in the homes of white people where they worked as domestic servants. To hooks, home and the activities that go into making home can have significance as forms of resistance in an oppressive white world. Home may indeed act as a particular kind of safe place where (some) people are relatively free to forge their own identities. For hooks, homeplace is an empowering place.

Radical Human Geography and the Politics of Place

Discussions of place as home begin to reveal some of the political issues that surround place. While the geographical engagement with phenomenological enquiry rescued the notion of place from oblivion it simultaneously constructed a notion of place which some see as essentialist and exclusionary, based on notions of rooted authenticity that are increasingly unsustainable in the (post)modern world. Heidegger, just like de la Blache and Sauer, tended to focus on rural images and places in order to make their arguments about regions and place. At the beginning of the twenty-first century it is very hard to see how these observations can be applied even to modern rurality let alone the modern metropolis. This has led geographers informed by Marxism, feminism and post-structuralism to shy away from place as a concept. When they have engaged with place it has been in a critical mode – pointing out how places are socially constructed and how these constructions are founded on acts of exclusion.

David Harvey, for instance, has recently argued that the significance of place has increased under the conditions of flexible accumulation, postmodernity and time-space compression (Harvey 1996). He suggests this because, as he sees it, places are under all kinds of threats from variously; the restructuring of economic spatial relations at a global level, the increased mobility of production, capital, merchanting and marketing and the increasing need to differentiate between places in order to compete. Place, in Harvey's lexicon, is a form of fixed capital which exists in tension with other forms of mobile capital. The tension between the fixed and the mobile produces cycles of place investment and disinvestment which contributes to an unstable process of uneven development across the globe. In the story that Harvey tells, place has a more ambivalent role than in the celebrations of humanism. Place is certainly threatened by the hypermobility of flexible capital, mass communications and transportation. Political struggles over place, therefore, often

provide opportunities for resistance to the mobile forces of capitalism. But struggles for place identity also appeal to the parochial and exclusive forces of bigotry and nationalism. The identification of place usually involves an us/them distinction in which the other is devalued (see Chapter 4 for an extended discussion of this theme).

Around the late 1980s geographers began to seriously engage with the wider fields of social theory and cultural studies. The distinction between so-called humanistic geographers on the one hand and radical geographers on the other began to break down and a new cultural geography informed by Raymond Williams, Antonio Gramsci and the work of the Birmingham school of Cultural Studies emerged. On both sides of the Atlantic geographers began to confidently assert the importance of geography to critical theory. Class, gender, and race have so often been treated as if they happened on the head of a pin. Well they don't – they happen in space and place. By taking space and place seriously, it was argued, we can provide another tool to demystify and understand the forces that effect and manipulate our everyday lives.

It was in this context that I wrote *In Place/Out of Place* (Cresswell 1996). In this book I argued that people, things and practices were often strongly linked to particular places and that when this link was broken – when people acted 'out of place' – they were deemed to have committed a 'transgression'. I used the examples of graffiti artists in New York City, the peace campers of Greenham Common (UK) and new age travellers in the British countryside. In each case people and practices were considered (by the media, government, etc.) to have transgressed the supposedly common-sense link between place and the things that go on it. The purpose of this work was to show how place does not have meanings that are natural and obvious but ones that are created by some people with more power than others to define what is and is not appropriate. It also showed how people are able to resist the construction of expectations about practice through place by using places and their established meanings in subversive ways. Throughout issues of age, gender, class, lifestyle, sexuality and ethnicity were at the fore. All of these had been largely ignored by traditions such as regional geography and humanistic geography. We will return to these themes of exclusion and transgression in Chapter 4.

Critical cultural geographers began to use place in a myriad of ways which revealed the complicated connections between place, meaning and power. Benjamin Forest, for instance, considered how the gay population of West Hollywood in California successfully mobilized symbols of gay identity such as creativity and progressive politics during the campaign to incorporate West Hollywood in 1984 (Forest 1995). He argued that having a politically constituted place as a

geographical focus of gay identity allowed the gay community to construct an identity based on more than sexual acts. Through attachment of place, Forest argued, gay identity could be seen as a kind of ethnicity rather than as a sickness or perversion. In other words place acted to normalize and naturalize the identity of gay people.

Another example of the critical cultural approach to the production of places is Kay Anderson's examination of the construction of Chinatown in Vancouver, Canada (Anderson, K. 1991). Anderson asks how it is that a place known as Chinatown has come to exist in major cities across the world. Many people, she argues, see the existence of Chinatown as evidence of a naturalized connection between Chinese culture and the places that Chinese people settle in around the world. In other words Chinese people arrive and they construct a place full of Chinese restaurants, grocery stores and pagodas. Anderson's argument is that these places cannot simply be read as symbols of essential Chineseness but rather that such places are ideologically constructed as places of difference. In the case of Vancouver she traces the arrival of the Chinese in the west of Canada in response to the discovery of gold and their subsequent work on the railroads, in stores and laundries. Over time they were subjected to a set of discourses among white people about the supposed 'nature' of the Chinese as irredeemably different and inferior. After some time Chinese immigrants began to settle in one area of Vancouver and this clustering alarmed white onlookers. White elites portrayed the Chinese as a form of pollution and disease that threatened white racial purity. By the late 1880s people began to use the word 'Chinatown', a term imported from San Francisco.

Well before any substantial settlement of Chinese was identified as such in Vancouver, a 'place' for them already had a distinct reality in local vocabulary and culture. 'Had Dante been able to visit Chinatown, San Francisco', said Secretary of State J. Chapleau in 1885, 'he would have added yet darker strokes of horror to his inferno'. (Anderson 1996, 219)

As Chinese people began to gather around Dupont Street this new 'Chinatown' began to be seen as a natural center of vice and depravity full of dirt, disease and moral failure (opium dens, gambling and prostitution). The racial designation 'Chinese' was seen as synonymous with moral failure and a particular place – Chinatown. For many years the place was put alongside water, sewage and infectious diseases under the responsibility of the municipal sanitary officer.

Anderson shows how 'Chinatown' was not simply a natural reflection of Chinese culture but the result of negotiation with those

with the power to define place (the media, government, etc.). More recently this socially constructed place has become a tourist attraction where white tourists can visit the 'exotic other' and enjoy the old ideas and vice and depravity in a sanitized form. Despite the fact that the place is now seen as safe and even as attractive it still serves to reaffirm a moral order of 'them' and 'us'.

Forest's paper on West Hollywood and Anderson's consideration of Chinatown feature the idea of place at the heart of their analyses. They are not simply papers about particular places – though we do learn about Vancouver and West Hollywood by reading them – but they are about the way place works in a world of social hierarchies. In the case of West Hollywood, place plays a positive role of affirming gay identity through its inscription in place. Here the linking of place and identity is a political choice of self-affirmation. In the case of Chinatown, place plays a negative role of naturalizing white Western views of Chinese immorality and inferiority by attaching a particular white view of Chinese culture to a place known as Chinatown.

Place for critical cultural geographers from the late 1980s onwards was a concept that needed to be understood through the lens of social and cultural conflict. Issues of race, class, gender, sexuality and a host of other social relations were at the center of this analysis. Place was not simply an outcome of social processes though, it was, once established, a tool in the creation, maintenance and transformation of relations of domination, oppression and exploitation. By fixing Chinese identity in place the cultural and social elites of Vancouver were able to more easily cast Chinese culture and the Chinese themselves in a negative light. By successfully lobbying for the incorporation of West Hollywood, gay people were able to produce an affirmative vision of their own lifestyle.

Place as 'Being-in-the-World' versus Place as Social Construct

Recently Robert Sack, and the philosophers of place Edward Casey and J.E. Malpas, have sought to reinstate a much more fundamental role for place in social life. Their approach can best be explained by contrasting it to the following claim by David Harvey:

Place, in whatever guise, is like space and time, a social construct. This is the baseline proposition from which I start. The only interesting question that can then be asked is: by what social process(es) is place constructed?

(Harvey 1996, 261)

The assertion of the importance of talking of places as socially constructed nicely outlines the dominant approach to matters of place in

contemporary critical human geography. To say a place is socially constructed is to say that it is not natural and given that human forces made a place then human forces can equally importantly undo it. This approach is favored by those with a progressive political agenda as it indicates that if things are one way now, they might be entirely different later. It is the approach taken by the critical human geographers in the previous section. To say something is socially constructed is to say that it is within human power to change it. So what is it that is socially constructed about place? Two things stand out: meaning and materiality.

If we say that New York's Lower East Side is a social construct we are saying that the way we experience that place, the meanings we ascribe to it, come out of a social milieu dominated by Western cultural values and the forces of capitalism. They are also produced by the media, by politicians and by the people who live there. We might have read in the paper about riots in Tompkins Square Park and be (unreasonably) afraid to go there. We might see the graffiti, murals, cafes and shops and think it's an invigorating and diverse place to be. Whatever meaning it appears to have there is little doubt that it comes from 'society'.

To say a place is socially constructed is also to say that the materiality – the very fabric of a place – is a product of society too. The buildings, the parks, the trees that have been planted, the roads and restaurants have literally been built – often for the production of profit but also for a range of other reasons. The community gardens are not 'natural' but have been put there by the tireless efforts of local residents. It is hard to believe that anyone, in a place like the Lower East Side, could think of the place as anything other than a social construct.

In many ways these points seem obvious and we may wonder why Harvey bothers making them at all. But there is another profound way of thinking about place that sees it as something much deeper than a social construct as something irreducible and essential to being human.

Sack, in *Homo Geographicus*, makes the following claim:

Indeed, privileging the social in modern geography, and especially in the reductionist sense that 'everything is socially constructed,' does as much disservice to geographical analysis as a whole as has privileging the natural in the days of environmental determinism, or concentrating only on the mental or intellectual in some areas of humanistic geography. While one or other may be more important for a particular situation at a particular time, none is determinate of the geographical. (Sack 1997, 2)

Sack clearly thinks that Harvey is wrong when he asserts that 'the only interesting question that can then be asked: is by what social process(es) is place constructed?' To Sack, place's role in the human world runs a lot deeper than that – it is a force that cannot be reduced to the social, the natural or the cultural. It is, rather, a phenomenon that brings these worlds together and, indeed, in part produced them.

Sack is not the only one to make this point. Consider the words of philosopher J.E. Malpas:

The idea of place encompasses both the idea of the social activities and institutions that are expressed in and through the structure of a particular place (and which can be seen as partially determinative of that place) and the idea of the physical objects and events in the world (along with the associated causal processes) that constrain, and are sometimes constrained by, those social activities and institutions. There is no doubt that the ordering of a particular place – and the specific way in which a society orders space and time – is not independent of social ordering (inasmuch as it encompasses the social, so place is partially elaborated by means of the social, just as place is also elaborated in relation to orderings deriving from individual subjects and from underlying physical structures). However this does not legitimate the claim that place, space or time are *merely* social constructions. Indeed the social does not exist prior to place nor is it given expression except in and through place – and through spatialised, temporalised ordering ... It is within the structure of place that the very possibility of the social arises. (Malpas 1999, 35–36)

Note that Malpas, and Sack for that matter, do not deny that specific places are the products of society and culture. They insist, however, that place, in a general sense, adds up to a lot more than that. They point out that society itself is inconceivable without place – that the social (and the cultural) is geographically constructed. On the face of it this does not seem a lot different from the claim that the social and the spatial are 'mutually constitutive' – a claim which is central to some forms of social constructionism. But the claims of Sack and Malpas are different from that because of their claim that the realm of the 'social' has no particular privilege in discussions of place. Malpas looks once more to Heidegger's philosophy of place in which human beings are characterized in terms of their 'being in the world'. This relation between humans and place, Malpas argues is not like apples being in a box but a sense of necessary relation – it is how we are.

Place is instead that within and with respect to which subjectivity is itself established – place is not founded *on* subjectivity, but is rather that *on which* subjectivity is founded. Thus one does not first have a subject that

apprehends certain features of the world in terms of the idea of place; instead, the structure of subjectivity is given in and through the structure of place. (Malpas 1999, 35)

This is quite different from the claims of the social constructionists that humans construct both the meaning of place and the material structure of places. Malpas and Sack are arguing that humans cannot construct anything without being first in place – that *place is primary to the construction of meaning and society*. Place is primary because it is the experiential fact of our existence.

The problem for students of place with this view of the world is that it is rather short on empirical detail. If you read the work of Sack, Malpas and Casey you will find few extended accounts of particular places. Because they are talking about place in general it is hard to use specific examples to make the case. Indeed, like Heidegger and his Black Forest Cabin, they tend to use imagined and idealized examples or 'thought experiments'. So what might such a view tell us if we returned to New York's Lower East Side?

First of all it clearly would not tell us much about the processes that went into making the place what it is. It would have more or less nothing to say about the processes of gentrification or the construction of parks in urban areas or the presence of Puerto Rican restaurants. It would not be able to explain the social unrest that has periodically rocked the area. These are all the kinds of things that a Marxist geographer like David Harvey seeks to explain by his insistence that places are socially constructed. But are these, as he claims, the only interesting questions? The place-centered approach of Sack, Malpas and others would suggest that what is going on in the Lower East Side, or anywhere else for that matter, is simply an example of what is going on in all human life – a struggle over the very basis of human experience – the need for place as a bedrock of human meaning and social relations.

These complicated arguments are important and necessary for a thorough understanding of the idea of place in human geography. Perhaps it helps to reconsider the notion of social-construction. All kinds of things are socially constructed – ideas about space and time, particle physics, brain surgery, toothpaste, nuclear bombs, television and fashion are all, with different degrees of obviousness, constructed within particular societies with particular, usually hierarchical, social relations. Some things clearly (at least to this author) are equally clearly not social constructions – gravity, the planet Earth, life and death, glacial moraines. All of these things have socially constructed meanings without which it is impossible to talk about them but the

things themselves are there whether we construct them or not. So what kind of thing is place? Place, some would argue, is neither like toothpaste (which once did not exist and in the future will be redundant), nor gravity (which exists completely free of human will or consciousness). It is a construction of humanity but a necessary one – one that human life is impossible to conceive of without. In other words there was no 'place' before there was humanity but once we came into existence then place did too. A future without place is simply inconceivable (unlike a future without toothpaste). Although the social construction of place is not the main theme of Sack and Malpas their arguments suggest that place is a kind of 'necessary social construction' – something we have to construct in order to be human. This is not to say that we have to construct the Lower East Side, Kosovo or the Millennium Dome in all their particularity but that in their absence place would still exist – just different ones.

Place, Practice and Process

Tuan and Relph were not the only geographers who looked to phenomenology in order to develop notions of place. Other 'humanistic' geographers, such as David Seamon were keen to arrive, through phenomenological enquiry, at the essence of geographical phenomena. Place was the central concept but, in Seamon's case, bodily mobility rather than rootedness and authenticity, was the key component to the understanding of place. Following the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Seamon fixed on the 'everyday movement in space' – 'any spatial displacement of the body or bodily part initiated by the person himself. Walking to the mailbox, driving home, going from house to garage, reaching for scissors in a drawer – all these behaviours are examples of movement' (Seamon 1980, 148). As a phenomenological geographer, Seamon was keen to discover the essential experiential character of place through movement. He wanted to transcend specific examples and provide a general account of place as it is embodied.

Phenomenology ... asks if from the variety of ways which men and women behave in and experience their everyday world there are particular patterns which transcend specific empirical contexts and point to the essential human condition – the irreducible crux of people's life-situations which remains when all non-essentials – cultural context, historical era, personal idiosyncracies – are stripped bare through phenomenological procedures. (Seamon 1980, 149)

Seamon believed that most everyday movement takes the form of habit. People drive the same route to work and back everyday without thinking about it. People who have moved house find themselves going to their old house and only realise it when they arrive at the door. People reach for scissors in the drawer while engaging in conversation. Such movements appear to be below the level of conscious scrutiny. The body-subject knows what it is doing – there is an:

inherent capacity of the body to direct behaviors of the person intelligently, and thus function as a special kind of subject which expresses itself in a preconscious way usually described by such words as 'automatic,' 'habitual,' 'involuntary,' and 'mechanical.' (Seamon 1980, 155)

Seamon invokes the metaphor of dance in order to describe the sequence of preconscious actions used to complete a particular task such as washing the dishes. He calls such a sequence a body-ballet. When such movements are sustained though a considerable length of time he calls it a 'time-space routine.' This describes the habits of a person as they follow a routine path through the day – driving to work, leaving the kids at school, going to lunch, etc. Seamon also looks beyond the individual body movement to group behavior. When many time-space routines are combined within a particular location a 'place-ballet' emerges which generates, in Seamon's view, a strong sense of place. The mobilities of bodies combine in space and time to produce an existential insideness – a feeling of belonging within the rhythm of life in place.

A 'place-ballet' is an evocative metaphor for our experience of place. It suggests that places are performed on a daily basis through people living their everyday life. Seamon, clearly shares with Relph the notion of being an 'insider' or 'outsider' in a place but the way someone becomes an insider is more specific. It is through participating in these daily performances that we get to know a place and feel part of it. It also suggests that those who do know the routine will appear clumsy and 'out-of-place' simply through the non-conformity of their bodily practice.

One thing that appears to be missing from Seamon's work is any sense of the constraints on people's performances that we would all recognize in places. The fine balancing of constraint and freedom became the subject of geographers influenced by structuration theory – particularly the work of Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. In his paper 'Place as Historically Contingent Process' (Pred 1984) Allan Pred announces his dissatisfaction with the prevailing notions of place

at the time. He argues that place is too often thought of (by some) in terms of fixed visible and measurable attributes (this many houses, that population, these amenities). As such they become 'little more than frozen scenes for human activity' (Pred 1984, 279). Humanistic geographers do not escape his critical comments as they too 'conceive of place as an inert, experienced scene' (Pred 1984, 279). Pred argues instead for a notion of place that emphasizes change and process. Places are never 'finished' but always 'becoming.' Place is 'what takes place ceaselessly, what contributes to history in a specific context through the creation and utilization of a physical setting' (Pred 1984, 279). This approach is informed by structuration theory – a set of ideas primarily associated with the British sociologist Anthony Giddens. Structuration theory attempts to describe and understand the relations between the overarching structures that influence our lives (ranging from big structures such as capitalism and patriarchy to smaller scales structures such as national and local institutions) and our own ability to exercise agency in our everyday lives. Structurationists say that our actions are neither determined by structures above and beyond us, nor are our actions completely the product of free will. Structures depend on our actions to exist and our actions are given meaning by the structures that lie beyond them. Think of language for example. A language such as English clearly provides a structure of vocabulary and grammar. Stray too far from these rules and we cease to make sense. Having said that no use of language is entirely the product of rules. People use language in different ways. Sometimes these uses do not comply with rules. If this happens enough the structure of language itself begins to change. Without the structure, the individual use of language would have no meaning – in this sense structure enables. Without people practicing the language the structure would be no structure at all – it would be a dead language.

Now think of this in terms of place. We clearly inhabit material landscapes that (excepting rare instances) we had little say in constructing. These landscapes have walls, doors, windows, spaces of flow (roads, paths, bridges, etc.) that we have to negotiate in order to live. We cannot walk through walls and we are unlikely to wander down the middle of the road without endangering our lives. Places also have less concrete structures. Laws and rules pervade place. We cannot park on a double yellow line without risking a fine. We cannot enter private property at will. We are supposed to be at work by nine o'clock. And there are also sets of cultural and social expectations that pervade places. We should not talk loudly to ourselves in public. Women are discouraged from walking alone down dark alleys at night. Young men are not supposed to gather at street corners. All of

these structures vary from place to place and when we travel we are expected to familiarize ourselves with them.

At a given moment in time, place provides a geographically specific set of structures. But even with layer upon layer of structuring conditions no-one can safely predict what you or I are going to do. We might skip work (or a lecture) and call in sick. The places we have to negotiate are the result of the practices of those who were here before us but this place in the future will be different. It is not a once and for all achieved state. Think of a new green rectangle of lawn in a town of city somewhere. Trees are planted in the middle and two footpaths meet in the exact center to divide the lawn into four smaller rectangles. The lawn is surrounded by roads and buildings. To get across the lawn to the opposite corner the pedestrian is supposed to either walk around the rectangle or use the paths through it. Invariably some people will simply walk across the lawn diagonally. After a few weeks a path will appear – a mud path which becomes the material manifestation of people's desire to take short cuts. Imagine the planners and architects have also provided benches around the circumference as well as steps and a piece of public art in the middle. Soon homeless people use the benches for a night's sleep and skateboarders use the art as an obstacle course. The point is that human agency is not so easily structured and structures themselves are made through the repetition of practices by agents.

Take the place of the university as another example. Universities clearly have a number of more or less established meanings as centers of learning, culture, objectivity, humanistic endeavor and reflection. These have been produced through a long history of learning and institution building going back to the Middle Ages. Over time these places developed separate faculties of arts, sciences, law, medicine, business and others. A way of establishing the authority of 'professors' was devised and built into the structure of lecture halls (with seated students facing a standing professor on a heightened platform). The university you have inherited is, in other words, the product of hundreds of years of the practice of education in particular ways.

Most modern institutions of education, despite the apparent neutrality of the materials from which they are constructed (red brick, white tile, etc.) carry within themselves implicit ideological assumptions which are literally structured into the architecture itself. The categorisation of knowledge into arts and sciences is reproduced in the faculty system which houses different disciplines in different buildings ... moreover, the hierarchical relationship between teacher and taught is inscribed in the very layout of the lecture theatre with the seating arrangements ... dictate the flow of information and serve to naturalise professorial authority. Thus a whole range of

decisions about what is and is not possible within education have been made, however unconsciously, before the content of individual courses is even decided.
(Hebdige 1988, 12–13)

But it would be wrong to think of the university as a finished place. The traditional arrangement of furniture in the lecture theatre for instance is frequently ignored in small classes where dissatisfied students or a professor rearrange chairs into circles or other more inclusive spatial arrangements. Over time this might mean that more and more university rooms are built with increasing amounts of moveable furniture. Perhaps even more revolutionary are the opportunities provided by the Internet and 'distance learning' that makes formal 'placed' education increasingly redundant. The university as a place, then, is not complete. In general places are never complete, finished or bounded but are always becoming – in process.

It is this sense of process and the relations of structure and agency in place that is the subject of Pred's (1984) paper. Places are never finished but always the result of processes and practices. As such places need to be studied in terms of the 'dominant institutional projects', the individual biographies of people negotiating a place and the way in which a sense of place is developed through the interaction of structure and agency. In terms of our imaginary park suitable empirical studies might include an examination of the intentions and practices of those who made the park in the first place, the way in which skateboarders, the homeless or the local office workers who eat lunch there use the place and the way in which the meanings of the park change and are negotiated over time.

The work of Nigel Thrift has continued to develop notions of process and practice in human geography. Along with Allan Pred and Derek Gregory he was instrumental in introducing structuration theory to geography (Thrift 1983; Gregory 1998). More recently Thrift has developed what he calls 'non-representational theory' (Thrift 1997; Thrift 1996) – an approach which emphasizes events and practices rather than the more orthodox focus (within cultural geography) on interpretation and representation. Like David Seamon before him Thrift leans on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in suggesting that the body has for too long been subordinated to the head in social and cultural geography (as well as the wider social sciences). If we focus on the way we do things, Thrift argues, we get at a primal relationship with the world that is more embodied and less abstract. Place, then, needs to be understood as an embodied relationship with the world. Places are constructed by people doing things and in this sense are never 'finished' but are constantly being performed.

A related way of looking at a place and practice is given by Edward Soja. Soja has developed his notion of the 'trialectics of spatiality' by developing the work of the French theorist Henri Lefebvre (Soja 1989, Soja 1999, Lefebvre 1991). His starting point is a critique of the binary notions of spatiality which have been at the center of geographical discourse. These include the oppositions of objectivity versus subjectivity, material versus mental, real versus imagined and space versus place. To challenge all of these binaries he writes of 'thirdspace.' Thirdspace is lived space and it interrupts a distinction between perceived space and spatial practices. Firstspace is the term he uses to describe empirically measurable and mappable phenomena. This is the traditional domain of human geography – the spatial outcome of social processes. Secondspace is conceived space – space which is subjective and imagined – the domain of representations and image. This corresponds to many people's notion of place – a felt and cared for center of meaning. Secondspace therefore, corresponds to the humanist critique of positivist conception of space. Soja and Lefebvre's critique is that these two ways of thinking, that correspond to the binaries of objective/subjective; material/mental; real/imagined and so on have tended to be seen as the whole story. Thirdspace, or lived space is therefore a different way of thinking. Thirdspace is practiced and lived rather than simply being material (conceived) or mental (perceived). This focus on the lived world does seem to provide theoretical groundwork for thinking about a politics of place based on place as lived, practiced and inhabited space.

In these terms places are never established. They only operate through constant and reiterative practice. Universities, to return to our example, are both produced and producing. Universities would be nothing if they were not inhabited by people conforming to expectations about what people do at university – visiting the library, taking exams, attending class. Indeed they are performed. Every single day, everywhere, universities, like all places, need to be reproduced. On the other hand we do not perform our practices in vacuums. We are surrounded by the material form of places and their contingent meanings. There is nothing natural or immutable about them – they are social products but they do provide the context for our practice. It would be crazy for us to walk down the middle of a busy street or talk loudly to ourselves in the library.

One of the books that has proved most useful in thinking about the issue of practice in relation to space and place is Michel de Certeau's account of *The Practice of Everyday Life* (de Certeau 1984). Confusingly for geographers de Certeau uses space and place in a way that stands the normal distinction on its head. To de Certeau place is the empty

grid over which practice occurs while space is what is created by practice. The central tension in de Certeau's work is between a systemic grammar of space – an order that we inhabit and is not constructed by us – on the one hand and our ability to use this grammar in ways which are not predetermined. The guiding metaphor here is language. While we have to use the rules and structures of language to make sense – the ways we do this in practice are almost infinite. The same applies to place. While we live in places that come pre-structured – embedded with particular interests in the context of unequal power relations – those places are not operational without practice in them. Think of a pedestrian. Pedestrians do not walk through walls but they do behave in unquantifiable ways. In de Certeau's terms they fill the streets with the 'forests of their desires and goals' (de Certeau 1984, xxi). Practice is thus a tactical art that plays with the structures of place that are provided. The mobile world of practice tears apart place in its orthodox form.

The work of Seamon, Pred, Thrift, de Certeau and others show us how place is constituted through reiterative social practice – place is made and remade on a daily basis. Place provides a template for practice – an unstable stage for performance. Thinking of place as performed and practiced can help us think of place in radically open and non-essentialized ways where place is constantly struggled over and reimagined in practical ways. Place is the raw material for the creative production of identity rather than an *a priori* label of identity. Place provides the conditions of possibility for creative social practice. Place in this sense becomes an event rather than a secure ontological thing rooted in notions of the authentic. Place as an event is marked by openness and change rather than boundedness and permanence.

Place, Openness and Change

The kind of place at the center of much of humanistic geography is very much a place of rootedness and authenticity. In Harvey's discussion of place this meaning is retained but becomes a symbol of reactionary exclusivity. As long as place signifies a tight and relatively immobile connection between a group of people and a site then it will be constantly implicated in the construction of 'us' (people who belong in a place) and 'them' (people who do not). In this way outsiders are constructed. In Harvey's work this produces a fairly damning critique of place as it is normally understood (see Chapter 3 for more on this).

But place need not be thought of in such introverted and exclusionary terms. Doreen Massey rejects this notion of place in her development of the idea of a 'progressive' or 'global' sense of place. She has encouraged us to think of place in a way that combines bodies, objects and flows in new ways. As Arturo Escobar has argued 'places gather things, thoughts, and memories in particular configurations' (Escobar 2001, 143). Place in this sense becomes an event rather than a secure ontological thing rooted in notions of the authentic. Place as an event is marked by openness and change rather than boundedness and permanence. This significantly alters the value put on place as it is constructed from the outside rather from the inside. We will consider Massey's important definition of a 'global (or progressive) sense of place' in the next chapter in more depth. But she is not the only one considering how places are constructed by objects and processes from outside.

The artist and commentator Lucy Lippard has made similar observations in her book *The Lure of the Local*.

Inherent in the local is the concept of place – a portion of land/town/cityscape seen from the inside, the resonance of a specific location that is known and familiar . . . Place is latitudinal and longitudinal within the map of a person's life. It is temporal and spatial, personal and political. A layered location replete with human histories and memories, place has width as well as depth. It is about connections, what surrounds it, what formed it, what happened there, what will happen there. (Lippard 1997, 7)

Here Lippard agrees with Massey's contention that places are 'about connections' but makes more of the layering of histories which sediment in place and become the bedrock for future action.

Environmental historians have also developed ways of thinking about place that mesh well with Massey's progressive sense of place. William Cronon's book *Nature's Metropolis*, for instance, reveals how Chicago was constructed through its relationship with a rural hinterland (Cronon 1991). Cronon traces the voyages of corn, timber, meat and other products from the countryside into the metropolis and shows how the movements in and out of place produce both new material landscapes, new sets of social relations and new relations between people and 'nature.' He performs a similar analysis of a small ghost town in Alaska in a wonderful essay called 'Kennecott Journey: The Paths out of Town.'

In his essay Cronon visits Kennecott, a long deserted town north of Valdez in South Central Alaska. He described the ruins of place in great detail – particularly its huge, spectacularly rambling crushing mill that provided so much employment for its earlier residents.

It is a ghost factory in a ghost town, yet its haunting could have almost have begun yesterday. In the bunkhouse where the millmen slept and ate, linen is still on the beds, and plates are still on the cafeteria tables. Open account books lie scattered around the store-rooms and offices, protected from decay only by the coldness of the northern climate. Even the machinery is remarkably well preserved: Lift the gears of the sifting mechanisms, and beautifully clear oil still bathes the gears with lubricant. (Cronon 1992, 30)

Cronon's essay explores what made this place a booming and vibrant town for a little more than thirty years and what subsequently led to its downfall. In order to do this he traces the links between Kennecott and other places. Between 1911 and 1938 Kennecott thrived because of the copper that had been discovered there – the richest vein the world had ever seen. The 1930s saw the bottom fall out of the copper market and the rich vein of copper was, anyway, beginning to yield less material. In 1938 the Kennecott Copper Company closed all its Alaskan mines and moved operations to other sites in North and South America.

'What' Cronon asks 'is one to make of this place and of the memories that lie so visibly on the landscape?' (Cronon 1992, 32). His answer is to trace the connections between Kennecott and the rest of the world. These connections include 'the ecology of people as organisms sharing the universe with many other organisms, the political economy of people as social beings reshaping nature and one another to produce their collective life, and the cultural values of people as storytelling creatures struggling to find meaning of their place in the world' (Cronon 1992, 32).

As we seek to understand Kennecott, the questions we ask must show us the paths out of town – the connections between this lonely place and the rest of the world – for only by walking those paths can we reconnect his ghost community to the circumstances that created it. (Cronon 1992, 33)

There are many 'paths out of town'. One is that produced by the need to eat food in a place that does not provide much sustenance. As soon as there were significant numbers of non-native people in Kennecott then food had to be imported.

When people exchange things in their immediate vicinity for things that can only be obtained elsewhere, they impose a new set of meanings on the local landscape and connect it to the wider world. These increase the chance that the local environment will begin to change in response to outside forces, so that trade becomes a powerful new source of ecological change. (Cronon 1992, 37)

Kennecott soon became part of ever-wider networks of exchange. Russian traders started to operate along the coast of Alaska and thus integrated even interior Alaska into a large Eurasian market for furs.

Trade linked the resources of one ecosystem with the human demands of another. Alaskan villages that had not sugar, alcohol, or tobacco obtained such things by trading with communities that had no furs. The net result was to redefine the resources of the Alaskan landscape, pushing them beyond the needs of the local subsistence into the realm of the market, where any good could be transformed into any other. At the same time the act of economic consumption came to be increasingly separated from the place of ecological production, distancing people from the consequences of their own acts and desires. (Cronon 1992, 38–39)

Cronon traces the development of trade between the native population and the arriving military expeditions. The key resource, of course, was copper. While the native population of Kennecott saw copper as interesting for its color and the fact that they could make it into weapons, tools and jewelry they were not aware of its ability to conduct electricity and had little idea of its value to American industry. The huge mines of Kennecott and the town that surrounded it were focused on this resource. Along with the new population came new foods and plant species such as turnips and cabbages. Local game was soon hunted to exhaustion. Food was a problem. In order to supply the growing population with nutrition a railroad was built. In order for the new population to mine the copper they had to import new definitions of property – thus a legal landscape was imported along with the turnips. The native population had no concept of static property or place. They were nomadic and would move according to the availability of resources. This lifestyle, Cronon writes, 'left them little concerned with drawing sharp property boundaries upon the landscape' the newcomers 'had in mind a completely different way of owning and occupying the terrain. And therein lay the origin of the community called Kennecott' (Cronon 1992, 42). So the irony of Kennecott – a place produced by its connections – was that the idea of place itself was imported from outside. Place based on property and boundaries.

To understand the place called Kennecott – and by extension any place – Cronon argues, we must pay attention to its connections. Kennecott became possible at the moment it appeared because connections made it possible. Everything the residents consumed depended upon a prior history in other places from the development of salmon canneries on the Alaskan shoreline to the coffee and sugar

trade with the tropics. 'At no prior moment in the history of the West would it have been possible for capitalists in New York to hire engineers and workers in Alaska to construct a railroad, mine, and crushing mill deep in the interior of that remote territory so that the nation's cities could purchase a metal they hardly knew they needed just a half century before' (Cronon 1992, 49). Similarly the demise of Kennecott owes everything to the emergence of cheaper copper industries in South America and the dictates and foibles of a truly global economy.

Cronon's work is not written as theory. Like many environmental historians he uses narrative to make us think about the issues at hand. But what his journey to Kennecott tells us is that places need to be understood as sites that are connected to others around the world in constantly evolving networks which are social, cultural and natural/environmental. Places need to be understood through the paths that lead in and out. Similar stories could be written about many, if not all, places around the world and geographers have begun to think in very similar terms. Matthew Gandy has explored how New York City has been constructed through its relationship to nature (Gandy 2002) and Dan Clayton has explored the construction of British Columbia through the passages of a whole array of imperial and local travelers to and through the place (Clayton 2000).

The End of Place?

The very processes Cronon writes about – the way in which places are tied into global flows of people, meanings and things – has led some to perceive an accelerating erosion of place. A combination of mass communication, increased mobility and a consumer society has been blamed for a rapidly accelerating homogenization of the world. More and more of our lives, it has been argued, take place in spaces that could be anywhere – that look, feel, sound and smell the same wherever in the globe we may be. Fast food outlets, shopping malls, airports, high street shops and hotels are all more or less the same wherever we go. These are spaces that seem detached from the local environment and tell us nothing about the particular locality in which they are located. The meaning that provides the sense of attachment to place has been radically thinned out.

This issue of the erosion of place was a central theme of humanistic geographer Edward Relph's book *Place and Placelessness*. Relph, you will recall, was one of the geographers who brought the issue of place to the attention of geographers in a sustained way. Bear in mind that

he was writing long before the level of geographical homogenization we (in the West) now experience was quite so ubiquitous. Relph was concerned that it was becoming increasingly difficult for people to feel connected to the world through place. Relph makes the distinction between the experience of insideness and outsideness in the human experience of place. 'To be inside a place is to belong to it and identify with it, and the more profoundly inside you are the stronger is the identity with the place' (Relph 1976, 49). At the opposite extreme, existential outsideness involves the alienation from place which is the antithesis of an unreflective sense of belonging that comes from being an existential insider.

A key term for Relph (developing Heidegger's notion of 'dwelling') is 'authenticity'. Authenticity means a genuine and sincere attitude, 'As a form of existence authenticity consists of a complete awareness and acceptance of responsibility for your own existence' (Relph 1976, 78). An existential insider has an authentic attitude to a place which is likely to be authentic. An inauthentic attitude to place, on the other hand:

is essentially no sense of place, for it involves no awareness of the deep and symbolic significances of places and no appreciation of their identities. It is merely an attitude which is socially convenient and acceptable – an uncritically accepted stereotype, an intellectual of aesthetic fashion that can be adopted without real involvement. (Relph 1976, 82)

In the modern world, Relph argues that we are surrounded by a general condition of creeping placelessness marked by an inability to have authentic relationships to place because the new placelessness does not allow people to become existential insiders.

An inauthentic attitude towards places is transmitted through a number of processes, or perhaps more accurately 'media', which directly or indirectly encourage 'placelessness', that is, a weakening of the identity of places to the point where they not only look alike and feel alike and offer the same bland possibilities for experience. (Relph 1976, 90)

The processes that lead to this are various and include the ubiquity of mass communication and culture as well as big business and central authority. Tourism, Relph writes, is particularly to blame as it encourages the disneyfication, museumization, and futurization of places.

One of the main culprits here is mobility. Relph makes a direct connection between inauthentic placelessness and mobility by claiming that the mobility of American homeowners (changing home

every three years) reduces the significance of home and thus plays a major role in the growing problem of placelessness in the (American) modern world. Another factor in the creation of placelessness is, in Relph's view, modern travel/tourism which encourages a fascination with the 'machinery and paraphernalia' of travel ... itself. In short, where someone goes is less important than the act and style of going' (Relph 1976). A place like Disneyworld represents the epitome of placelessness constructed, as it is, purely for outsiders and now reproduced across the globe in France and Japan.

Superhighways also play their part in the destruction of place as they do not connect places and are separated from the surrounding landscape – they 'start everywhere and lead nowhere' (Relph 1976). Before the highways the railways were the culprits destroying authentic senses of place:

Roads, railways, airports, cutting across or imposed on the landscape rather than developing with it, are not only features of placelessness in their own right, but, by making possible the mass movement of people with all their fashions and habits, have encouraged the spread of placelessness well beyond their immediate impacts. (Relph 1976, 90)

Relph connects various forms of increased mobility to what he calls 'mass culture' and mass values which again dilute authentic relations to place. Places become 'other directed' and more alike across a globe of transient connections. Mobility and mass culture lead to irrational and shallow landscapes.

In a similar way the anthropologist Marc Augé has argued that the facts of postmodernity (he refers to supermodernity) point to a need for a radical rethinking of the notion of place (Augé 1995). Place, he argues, has traditionally been thought of as a fantasy of a 'society anchored since time immemorial in the permanence of an intact soil.' Augé's argument is that such places are receding in importance and being replaced by 'non-places.'

The multiplication of what we may call empirical non-places is characteristic of the contemporary world. Spaces of circulation (freeways, airways), consumption (department stores, supermarkets), and communication (telephones, faxes, television, cable networks) are taking up more room all over the earth today. They are spaces where people coexist or cohabit without living together. (Augé 1999: 110).

Non-places are sites marked by their transience – the preponderance of mobility. Augé's use of the name non-place does not have the same




Figure 2.1 Disneyworld, Orlando, Florida. Authors have argued that tourist places such as Disneyworld are not real places but 'placeless' places or 'pseudo-places' with no real history and no sense of belonging. (Photo by author)

negative moral connotations as Relph's 'placelessness.' By non-place Augé is referring to sites marked by the 'fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral.' Non-places include freeways, airports, supermarkets – sites where particular histories and traditions are not (allegedly) relevant – unrooted places marked by mobility and travel. Non-place is essentially the space of travelers. Augé's arguments force theorists of culture to reconsider the theory and method of their disciplines. While conventionally figured places demand thoughts which reflect assumed boundaries and traditions, non-places demand new mobile ways of thinking.

Tuan too reflected on the effects of a mobile world on the experience of place in modernity. He picks out the figure of the business man as a symbol of this new world:

He moves around so much that places for him tend to lose their special character. What are his significant places? The home is in the suburb. He lives there, but home is not wholly divorced from work. It is occasionally a showplace for the lavish entertainment of colleagues and business associates. ... The executive takes periodic trips abroad, combining business with pleasure. He stays at the same hotel, or with the same friends, in Milan, and again in Barbados. The circuits of movement are complex.

(Tuan 1977, 183)



Figure 2.2 A village in Dartmoor, England. When people think and write about place they often fix on old small places that seem 'authentic' such as this village in Dartmoor. Think, for instance, of the way Heidegger wrote about a cabin in the Black Forest to make his argument about 'being-in-the-world'. (Photo by author)




Figure 2.3 Baltimore-Washington International Airport. Airports, by contrast are frequently described as non-places or placeless. They do not appear to have histories and are marked by transience and mobility. (Photo by author)

This kind of life, Tuan goes on, leads inevitably to a superficial sense of place:

Abstract knowledge *about* a place can be acquired in short order if one is diligent. The visual quality of an environment is quickly tallied if one has the artist's eye. But the 'feel' of a place takes longer to acquire. It is made up of experiences, mostly fleeting and undramatic, repeated day after day and over the span of years. (Tuan 1977, 183)

Nigel Thrift describes mobility as a structure of feeling that emerged with modernity and has attained new characteristics as we approached the twenty-first century. The focus of his argument is on developing technologies and 'machine complexes' starting with the stage coach and ending (provisionally) with the Internet. By 1994, when he wrote the essay, developments in speed, light and power had reached such a point that they had combined and fused with people and changed everything. Towards the end of his essay he lays out some of the consequences of this structure of feeling for human geography. One of these concerns place.

What is place in this 'in-between' world? The short answer is – compromised: permanently in a state of enunciation, between addresses, always deferred. Place are 'stages of intensity'. Traces of movement, speed and circulation. One might read this depiction of 'almost places' ... in Baudrillardian terms as a world of third-order simulacra, where encroaching pseudo-places have finally advanced to eliminate places altogether. Or one might record places ... as strategic installations, fixed addresses that capture traffic. Or, finally, one might read them ... as frames for varying practices of space, time and speed. (Thrift 1994, 212–13)

Gone are the implicit moral judgements of inauthenticity and lack of commitment. At worst this reading of mobility and place is neutral and at best it is a positive celebration of mobile worlds. Thrift sees mobility as a mark of all of life in an increasingly speeded up world. The study of the modern world is a study of velocities and vectors. Rather than comparing mobility to place, mobilities are placed in relation to each other. Place in this world seems increasingly redundant.

Or perhaps not. Just as place (at least in the form of relatively stable wholes firmly rooted in the past) appears to be more or less irrelevant it seems to be the word on many people's lips. Advertisers sell us places or ways to make places. Travel brochures encourage us to get to know places. Politicians and artists lament the loss of place and strive to produce new ones. Urban dwellers leave the city to look for a place

in the country where life will slow down and they can raise some chickens. Perhaps, In Joni Mitchell's words 'we don't know what we've got 'till it's gone, they paved paradise and put up a parking lot'.

Clearly if place is the very bedrock of our humanity, as some have claimed, then it cannot have vanished because it is a necessary part of the human condition. Places have certainly changed though and this has produced anxiety. Lucy Lippard, a thoughtful writer on place, has reflected on what place might mean in the speeded up world we inhabit. Here the effect of mobility on place is less extreme than the likes of Relph, Augé and Thrift, from their varying perspectives would have us believe.

Most of us move around a lot, but when we move we often come into contact with those who haven't moved around, or have come from different places. This should give us a better understanding of difference (though it will always be impossible to understand everything about difference). Each time we enter a new place, we become one of the ingredients of an existing hybridity, which is really what all 'local places' consist of. (Lippard 1997, 5–6)

Here Lippard suggests that mobility and place go hand in hand as places are always already hybrid anyway. By moving through, between and around them we are simply adding to the mix. She suggests that the 'pull of place' continues to operate in all of us as the 'geographical component of the psychological need to belong somewhere, one antidote to a prevailing alienation' (Lippard 1997, 7). Even in the age of a 'restless, multitrade people' she argues, and 'even as the power of place is diminished and often lost, it continues – as an absence – to define culture and identity. It also continues – as a presence – to change the way we live' (Lippard 1997, 20).

Conclusions: Versions of Place

In this chapter we have explored the changing role of place in human geography and beyond. We have seen how place, in a common-sense way, has always been central to the discipline but relatively undeveloped as an idea until the 1970s and the emergence of humanistic geography founded on phenomenology. Writers such as Tuan and Relph, and later Sack and Malpas, developed the idea of place as a central meaningful component in human life – a center of meaning and field of care that formed the basis for human interaction. Critical human geographers, informed by Marxism, feminism and cultural studies

were keen to show how places were socially constructed in contexts of unequal power relations and how they represented relations of domination and exploitation. Throughout these debates geographers such as Seamon, Pred, Thrift and Massey have insisted that places should not be thought of in terms of stasis and boundedness but are instead the product of processes that extend well beyond the confines of a particular place. Sometimes, though, these processes, particularly the mobility of people objects and ideas, appear to undermine place and produce a kind of placelessness or non-place. Yet still place seems to be an important factor in our experience of the world.

Place is clearly a complicated concept. It is all the more confusing because, at first glance, it appears to be obvious and common-sense. It is worth thinking back over the various approaches to place in this chapter to consider the different ways different geographers have written about place. In many ways they appear to be writing about quite different things. Regional geographers talk about places as discrete areas of land with their own ways of life. Humanists write of place as a fundamental way of being in the world. Radical geographers investigate the way places are constructed as reflections of power. Those involved in variations of structuration theory see places as parts of the process of the reproduction of society. Is it possible that they all hold nuggets of value for contemporary human geography? Or do they cancel each other out? Is there one 'place' at the center of the debate?

The central argument about place in geography and beyond seems to be between those who write of place in terms of individual places – their locations, their boundaries and their associated meanings and practices (regional geographers, specific accounts of the politics of particular places, etc.) – and those who want to argue for a deeper primal sense of place (humanistic geographers, philosophers of place). Maybe both exist. The kinds of places we inhabit – favorite rooms, neighborhoods, nations – are all indeed analysable as social products – as political outcomes and tools in the ongoing struggles between sectors of society. And, indeed, they are all describable in the way regional geographers have described them in the past. But perhaps these places are all instances or examples of a deeper sense that humanity has to exist in place. It would be wrong to romanticize this sense of place as always rosy and 'homelike' (in the idealized sense of home). Some places are evil, oppressive and exploitative. But they are still the way we experience the world – through and in place. And perhaps it is because place is so primal to human existence that it becomes such a powerful political force in its socially constructed forms. It is impossible, after all, to think of a world without place.

Through the history of the idea of place it is possible to see (at least) three levels at which place is approached.

1. A descriptive approach to place. This approach most closely resembles the common-sense idea of the world being a set of places each of which can be studied as a unique and particular entity. This *ideographic* approach to place was the one taken by regional geographers but continues to the present day. The concern here is with the distinctiveness and particularity of places. A geographer taking this approach might want to research and write about 'The Geography of the North of England' or 'The Soul of San Francisco'.
2. A social constructionist approach to place. This approach is still interested in the particularity of places but only as instances of more general underlying social processes. Marxists, feminists and post-structuralists might take this approach to place. Looking at the social construction of place involves explaining the unique attributes of a place (say the Docklands of London or the Baltimore harbor) by showing how these places are instances of wider processes of the construction of place in general under conditions of capitalism, patriarchy, heterosexism, post-colonialism and a host of other structural conditions (Anderson, K. 1991; Clayton 2000; Forest 1995; Till 1993).
3. A phenomenological approach of place. This approach is not particularly interested in the unique attributes of particular places nor is it primarily concerned with the kinds of social forces that are involved in the construction of particular places. Rather it seeks to define the essence of human existence as one that is necessarily and importantly 'in-place'. This approach is less concerned with 'places' and more interested in 'Place'. Humanistic geographers, neo-humanists and phenomenological philosophers all take this approach to place (Sack 1997; Malpas 1999; Casey 1998; Tuan 1974a).

These three levels should not be seen as discrete sets as there is clearly some overlap between them. Broadly speaking they represent three levels of 'depth' in approaches to place with the level one representing a concern with the surface of the world as we see it and level three representing a deep universal sense of what place means to humanity. It would be wrong however to think that these correspond in some easy way to 'importance'. Research at all three levels (and the ones in between) are important and necessary to understand the full complexity of the role of place in human life.

Bibliography

- Agnew J 1987 *The United States in the World Economy* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Agnew J A 2002 *Place and Politics in Modern Italy* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London.
- Aitken S C and Zonn L eds. 1994 *Place, Power, Situation, and Spectacle: A Geography of Film* Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
- Anderson B R O G 1991 *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* Verso, London, New York.
- Anderson K 1991 *Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875–1980* McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal.
- Anderson K 1996 Cultural Hegemony and the Race-Definition Process in Chinatown, Vancouver: 1880–1980 in Hamnett C, ed. *Social Geography: A Reader* Arnold, London 209–235.
- Appleby S 1990 Crawley: A Space Mythology *New Formations* 11, 19–44.
- Augé M 1995 *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* Verso, London, New York.
- Bachelard G 1994 *The Poetics of Space* Beacon Press, Boston.
- Barnes T J and Gregory D eds. 1997 *Reading Human Geography: The Poetics and Politics of Inquiry* Wiley, London, New York.
- Bauman Z 1995 *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality* Blackwell, Oxford.
- Bell D and Valentine G eds. 1995 *Mapping Desire: Geographies of Sexualities* Routledge, London, New York.
- Bell D, Binnie J, Cream J and Valentine G 1994 All Hyped up and No Place to Go *Gender, Place and Culture* 1, 31–47.
- Bird J, Curtis B, Robertson G and Tickner L eds. 1993 *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change* Routledge, London, New York.
- Brown M P 2000 *Closet Space: Geographies of Metaphor from the Body to the Globe* Routledge, London, New York.
- Burgess J A and Gold J R eds. 1985 *Geography, the Media & Popular Culture* Croom Helm, London.

- Buttimer A 1971 *Society and Milieu in the French Geographic Tradition* Published for the Association of American Geographers by Rand McNally, Chicago.
- Buttimer A and Seamon D eds. 1980 *The Human Experience of Space and Place* St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Carrington D 1984 *Granite Island: A Portrait of Corsica* Penguin, London.
- Casey E 1996 How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time in Feld, S. and Baso, K. eds. *Senses of Place* School of American Research, Santa Fe 14–51.
- Casey E S 1987 *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
- Casey E S 1998 *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Charlesworth A 1994 Contesting Places of Memory: The Case of Auschwitz *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 12:5, 579–593.
- Christaller W and Baskin C W 1966 *Central Places in Southern Germany* Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
- Clayton D W 2000 *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* UBC Press, Vancouver.
- Cloke P, Milbourne P and Widdowfield R 2000 Homelessness and Rurality: 'Out-of-Place' in Purified Space? *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 18:6, 715–735.
- Cosgrove D 1984 *Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape* Croom Helm, London.
- Craddock S 2000 *City of Plagues: Disease, Poverty, and Deviance in San Francisco* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- Cresswell T 1994 Putting Women in Their Place: The Carnival at Greenham Common *Antipode* 26:1, 35–58.
- Cresswell T 1996 *In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology and Transgression* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- Cresswell T 2001 *The Tramp in America* Reaktion, London.
- Cresswell T and Dixon D eds. 2002 *Engaging Film: Geographies of Mobility and Identity* Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
- Cronon W 1991 *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* Norton, New York.
- Cronon W 1992 Kennecott Journey: The Paths out of Town in Cronon, W., Miles, G. and Gitlin, J. eds. *Under an Open Sky* Norton, New York 28–51.
- de Certeau M 1984 *The Practice of Everyday Life* University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
- de Lauretis T 1990 Eccentric Subjects: Feminist Theory and Historical Consciousness *Feminist Studies* 16:1, 115–150.
- Desforges L & Madder J forthcoming Front Doors to Freedom, Portal to the Past: History at the Ellis Island Immigration Museum, New York *Journal of Social and Cultural Geography*.
- Deutsche R 1988 Uneven Development: Public Art in New York City *October* 47, 3–52.
- Douglas M 1966 *Purity and Danger; an Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* Praeger, New York.
- Duncan N 1996 Renegotiating Gender and Sexuality in Public and Private Spaces

- in Duncan, N. ed *Bodyspace* Routledge, London 127–45.
- Edensor T 2002 *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life* Berg, Oxford, New York.
- Enriken J N 1985 Humanism, Naturalism and Geographic Thought *Geographical Analysis* 17, 243–247.
- Enriken J N 1991 *The Betweenness of Place: Towards a Geography of Modernity* Macmillan, London.
- Escobar A 2001 Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and Subaltern Strategies of Localization *Political Geography* 20:2, 139–74.
- Fleure H 1919 (1996) Human Regions in Agnew, J., Livingstone, D. and Rogers, A. eds. *Human Geography: An Essential Anthology* Blackwell, Oxford 385–387.
- Foot K E 1997 *Shadowed Ground: America's Landscapes of Violence and Tragedy* University of Texas Press, Austin.
- Forest B 1995 West Hollywood as Symbol: The Significance of Place in the Construction of a Gay Identity *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13:2, 133–157.
- Gandy M 2002 *Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York City* MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Giordano B 2000 Italian Regionalism or 'Padanian' Nationalism – the Political Project of the Lega Nord in Italian Politics *Political Geography* 19:41, 445–471.
- Gregory D 1998 *Explorations in Critical Human Geography: Hettner-Lecture 1997* Department of Geography University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg.
- Hartshorne R 1959 *Perspective on the Nature of Geography* Published for the Association of American Geographers by Rand McNally, Chicago.
- Hartshorne R 1939 *The Nature of Geography; a Critical Survey of Current Thought in the Light of the Past* The Association, Lancaster, PA.
- Harvey D 1989 *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Harvey D 1996 *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference* Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA.
- Harvey D 2000 *Spaces of Hope* University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Hayden D 1995 *The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History* MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Hebdige D 1988 *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* Routledge, London.
- Heidegger M 1971 *Poetry, Language, Thought* Harper & Row, New York.
- Herbertson A 1905 The Major Natural Regions: An Essay in Systematic Geography *Geographical Journal* 25, 300–312.
- hooks b 1990 *Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics* South End Press, Boston, MA.
- Hoskins G forthcoming A Place to Remember. Scaling the Walls of Angel Island Immigration Station *Journal of Historical Geography*.
- Hubbard P 1997 Red-Light Districts and Toleration Zones: Geographies of Female Street Prostitution in England and Wales *Area* 29:2, 129–140.
- Hubbard P 1998 Community Action and the Displacement of Street Prostitution: Evidence from British Cities *Geoforum* 29:3, 269–286.
- Hubbard P 2000 Desire/Disgust: Mapping the Moral Contours of Heterosexuality *Progress in Human Geography* 24 191–217.

- Jackson J B 1997 *Landscape in Sight: Looking at America* Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Jackson P 1989 *Maps of Meaning* Unwin Hyman, London.
- Johnson N C 1994 Sculpting Heroic Histories: Celebrating the Centenary of the 1798 Rebellion in Ireland *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 19:1, 78–93.
- Johnson N C 1996 Where Geography and History Meet: Heritage Tourism and the Big House in Ireland *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 86:3, 551–566.
- Johnston R J 1991 *A Question of Place: Exploring the Practice of Human Geography* Blackwell, Oxford.
- Kearns G and Philo C eds. 1993 *Selling Places: The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present* Pergamon Press, Oxford, New York.
- Kitchin R 1998 'Out of Place', 'Knowing One's Place': Space, Power and the Exclusion of Disabled People *Disability and Society* 13:3, 343–356.
- Lefebvre H 1991 *The Production of Space* Blackwell, Oxford, UK.
- Ley D 1977 Social Geography and the Taken-for-Granted World *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 2:4, 498–512.
- Leyshon A, Matless D and Revill G eds. 1998 *The Place of Music* Guilford Press, New York.
- Lippard L 1997 *The Lure of the Local: Senses of Place in a Multicultural Society* The New Press, New York.
- Lösch A 1954 *The Economics of Location* Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Lukerman F 1964 Geography as a Formal Intellectual Discipline and the Way in Which It Contributes to Human Knowledge *Canadian Geographer* 8:4, 167–172.
- MacLeod G and Jones M 2001 Renewing the Geography of Regions *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 19:6, 669–695.
- Malkki L 1992 National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees *Cultural Anthropology* 7:1, 24–44.
- Malpas J E 1999 *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Martin B and Mohanty C 1986 Feminist Politics: What's Home Got to Do with It? in de Lauretis, T. ed *Feminist Studies/Cultural Studies* Indiana University Press, Bloomington 191–212.
- Massey D 1997 A Global Sense of Place in Barnes, T. and Gregory, D. eds. *Reading Human Geography* Arnold, London 315–323.
- May J 1996 Globalization and the Politics of Place: Place and Identity in an Inner London Neighbourhood *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 21:1, 194–215.
- May J 2000 Of Nomads and Vagrants: Single Homelessness and Narratives of Home as Place *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 18:6, 737–759.
- Meyrowitz J 1985 *No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Newman O 1972 *Defensible Space* Macmillan, New York.
- Paasi A 1996 *Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of*

- the Finnish-Russian Border* J. Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
- Paasi A 2002 Place and Region: Regional Worlds and Words *Progress in Human Geography* 26:6, 802–811.
- Parr H and Philo C 1995 Mapping Mad Identities in Pile, S. and Thrift, N. eds. *Mapping the Subject* Routledge, London 199–225.
- Philo C 1987 'The Same and the Other': On Geographies, Madness and Outsiders Loughborough University of Technology Department of Geography Occasional Paper 11.
- Philo C 1992 The Child in the City *Journal of Rural Studies* 8:2, 193–207.
- Philo C 1995 Animals, Geography, and the City: Notes on Inclusions and Exclusions *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13:6, 655–681.
- Pratt G 1999 Geographies of Identity and Difference: Marking Boundaries in Massey, D., Allen, J. and Sarre, P. eds. *Human Geography Today* Polity, Cambridge 151–168.
- Pred A R 1984 Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of Becoming Places *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 74:2, 279–297.
- Raban J 1999 *Passage to Juneau: A Sea and Its Meanings* Pantheon Books, New York.
- Reid L and Smith N 1993 John Wayne Meets Donald Trump: The Lower East Side as Wild Wild West in Kearns, G. and Philo, C. eds. *Selling Places: The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present* Pergamon, Oxford 193–209.
- Relf E 1976 *Place and Placelessness* Pion, London.
- Rose G 1993 *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge* Polity, Cambridge.
- Sack R 1992 *Place, Consumption and Modernity* Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Sack R 1997 *Homo Geographicus* Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Sassen S 1999 *Guests and Aliens* New Press, New York.
- Sauer C O and Leighly J 1963 *Land and Life: a Selection from the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer* University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Seamon D 1979 *A Geography of the Lifeworld: Movement, Rest, and Encounter* St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Seamon D 1980 Body-Subject, Time-Space Routines, and Place-Ballets in Buttner, A. and Seamon, D. eds. *The Human Experience of Space and Place* Croom Helm, London 148–65.
- Sibley D 1981 *Outsiders in Urban Societies* St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Smith N 1991 *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space* B. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Smith N 1996 *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City* Routledge, London.
- Soja E W 1989 *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* Verso, London.
- Soja E 1999 Thirdspace: Expanding the Scope of the Geographical Imagination in Massey, D., Allen, J. and Sarre, P. eds. *Human Geography Today* Polity, Cambridge 260–278.
- Taylor P J 1999 *Modernities: A Geohistorical Interpretation* Polity Press, Cambridge.

- Thrift N 1983 On the Determination of Social Action in Time and Space *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1:1, 23–57.
- Thrift N 1994 Inhuman Geographies: Landscapes of Speed, Light and Power in Cloke, P. Ed *Writing the Rural: Five Cultural Geographies* Paul Chapman, London 191–250.
- Thrift N J 1996 *Spatial Formations* Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Thrift N 1997 The Still Point: Resistance, Expressiveness Embodiment and Dance in Pile, S. and Keith, M. eds. *Geographies of Resistance* Routledge, London 124–151.
- Till K 1993 Neotraditional Towns and Urban Villages: The Cultural Production of a Geography of 'Otherness' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 11:6, 709–732.
- Till K 1999 Staging the Past: Landscape Designs, Cultural Identity, and Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin's Neue Wache, *Ecumene* 6:3, 251–283.
- Tuan Yi-Fu 1974a Space and Place: Humanistic Perspective *Progress in Human Geography* 6, 211–252.
- Tuan Yi-Fu 1974b *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values* Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
- Tuan Yi-Fu 1977 *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- Tuan Yi-Fu 1991a Language and the Making of Place: A Narrative-Descriptive Approach *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81:4, 684–696.
- Tuan Yi-Fu 1991b A View of Geography *Geographical Review* 81:1, 99–107.
- Tuitt P 1996 *False Images: Law's Construction of the Refugee* Pluto Press, London.
- Valentine G 1993 (Hetero)Sexing Space: Lesbian Perspectives and Experiences of Everyday Spaces. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 11:4, 395–413.
- Valentine G 1997 Angels and Devils: Moral Landscapes of Childhood *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 14:5, 581–599.
- Veness A 1992 Home and Homelessness in the United States; Changing Ideals and Realities *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 10:4, 445–468.
- Wagner P L and Mikesell M W eds. 1962 *Readings in Cultural Geography* University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- White A 2002 Geographies of Asylum, Legal Knowledge And Legal Practices *Political Geography* 21:8, 1055–1073.
- Williams R 1960 *Border Country* Chatto and Windus, London.
- Williams R 1985 *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Young C 1997 Political Representation of Geography and Place in the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Bill (1995) *Urban Geography* 18:1, 62–73.
- Young I M 1997b *Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy, and Policy* Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Index

- agency 36
- Agnew, John 7–8, 99–100
- Alaska 40–2
- anachorism 103
- Anderson, Kay 28–9
- Angel Island Immigration Station 91–3
- animals 103
- architecture 96–7
- asylum seekers 120–1
- Augé, Marc 45–6
- Auschwitz 87–8
- authenticity 44, 96
- Bachelard, Gaston 34–5
- Baltimore 55–6
- being-in-the-world 303
- bioregion 134–5
- body 34–7
- body-ballet 34
- boundaries 69–70, 73–4, 83
- Brown, Michael 104–5
- capital 57–9, 63
- Casey, Edward 23, 32, 86, 87
- Charlesworth, Andrew 87–8
- children 103
- Chinatown 28–9
- chorology 16
- city 113
- Clayton, Daniel 43
- closet 104–6
- Columbia 83–5
- community 63–4, 68
- community garden(s) 3, 30
- consumption 23–4
- Crawley 97–9
- Cresswell, Tim 27, 103, 115
- critical theory 27
- Cronon, William 40–2
- cultural ecology 84
- cultural geography 17
- cultural studies 27
- de Certeau, Michel 38–9
- desien (dwelling) 21–2
- disability 104
- Douglas, Mary 103
- Ellis Island (NY) 87, 91–2
- Entrikin, J Nicholas 18
- environmental history 40–3
- epistemology 15, 110
- Escobar, Arturo 19, 40, 83–5
- essence 23
- existentialism 20
- feminism 25–6, 83, 109
- feudalism 111
- Fleure, H J 17–18
- food 41–2
- Foote, Kenneth 90
- foreigner(s) 118
- Forest, Benjamin 27–9
- Gandy, Matthew 43
- gated communities 55–6