

The Gnostic of Shiraz: Mullā Ṣadrā and His Transcendent Wisdom¹

As is commonly known, Ṣadrā's philosophical system, Transcendent Wisdom (or Supreme Wisdom, *al-ḥikma al-muta'āliya*), rests on three pillars: principality of existence, systematic ambiguity of existence, and substantial motion. Ṣadrā believes that existence, which is a genuine reality rather than a mentally posited affair, is capable of intensification, whereas the difference between its instances occurs owing to their different essential intensity and weakness. Since existence accepts an intensifying motion, substance is capable of an essential transformation.

¹ Apparently, the term *al-ḥikma al-muta'āliya* was first used by Ibn Sīnā in his *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt*; see Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt, ma'a sharḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī*, 3 vols., ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo, 1960), vol. 3, p. 401. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in his commentary explains the term as follows: "The wisdom of the Peripatetics is a purely discursive (*baḥṭhiyya*) one, but, in such issues, the truth is established through combining discourse (*baḥṭh*) and theoretical inquiry (*naẓar*) with unveiling (*kashf*) and tasting (*dhawq*). The wisdom which includes all of them is superior (*muta'āliya*) to the first one (i.e. the discursive wisdom)"; see *ibid.* For a thorough analysis of Ibn Sīnā's use of the term and its implications in the context of Avicennan thought, see Dimitri Gutas, 'Avicenna's *al-ḥikma al-muta'āliya*. Meaning and Early Reception', in Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci, eds., *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Physics and Cosmology* (Berlin, 2018), pp. 25–41. Rüdiger Arnzen (in his article "The Structure of Mullā Ṣadrā's *al-Ḥikma al-muta'āliya fi'l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a* and His Concepts of First Philosophy and Divine Science. An Essay", *Medioevo* 32 [2007], p. 200, footnote 1) correctly notices that Ṣadrā uses the term *al-ḥikma al-muta'āliya* primarily as a methodical or systematic characteristic of his philosophy (and therefore proposes to render it as the 'wisdom progressing upward', *ibid.*, p. 199). However, I would add that, by using the term, Ṣadrā also refers to the status of the objects discussed (cf. footnote 3 to the Conclusion, pp. 229–230).

Şadrā's doctrine of substantial motion is, primarily, a psychological and eschatological (and, hence, gnostic) teaching, based on the assumption that, through the increase of its intensity, the lower/weaker level of existence, or the effect, can ascend to the higher one (the cause), uniting with it. Since nature, soul, and intellect, to Şadrā, differ from each other primarily in terms of the intensity of their existence, nature can become (and *in potentia* is) soul, and soul, intellect. At its birth, the human being emerges as a physical entity. The progress he makes during his lifetime must be viewed as a substantial motion, in the course of which his existence gradually becomes stronger and more refined. This process, which can be described as a psychic origination, results in the emergence of a psychic human being. The evolution of most human beings stops there. However, in some cases, the psychic existence is further transformed into an intellectual one, which results in the emergence of an intellectual human being. Substantial motion is experienced by the individuals as well as by the entire physical world, and apparently stops upon reaching the threshold of the realm of the Intellect. One is tempted to assume that, not unlike the Stoics, Şadrā believes in the periodical destruction of the world, through its absorption in God (or the Intellect, or the World Soul) and its subsequent re-emergence from Him. If so, in Şadrā thought, we encounter a Stoicizing teaching on providence which, on different levels, manifests itself as intellect, soul, and nature.

However, in the discussion on causality, Şadrā appears to reduce the systematic ambiguity of existence in terms of intensity (which, speaking in Kantian terms, pertains to the phenomena but not to the noumenon) to the individual unity/oneness of existence, favoured by the Sufis, according to which there is only one real existent, identical with the reality of existence, while all other beings are its manifestations and extensions, or 'illuminative relations' (*al-iḍāfāt al-ishrāqiyya*), according to Şadrā's terminology. If 'all is one', there cannot be a substantial motion of the ray towards its source, even in a metaphorical sense – rather, the self-perceiving subject (the reality of existence) remains unaware of its illuminations and rays it irradiates.

As I will show, Şadrā's teaching was perceived by the philosophers of Isfahan as predominantly gnostic; its key principles were dismissed by them as philosophically inconsistent.

1. The Life of Mullā Ṣadrā

Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. Yaḥyā Qawāmī Shīrāzī, often referred to as Mullā Ṣadrā or Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, was born into an aristocratic family in Shiraz, the capital of the Fārs province, in 979/1571–1572. His father, Ibrāhīm b. Yaḥyā Qawāmī Shīrāzī, was a minister (vizier) of the ruler of the town. Ṣadrā was his only son. In all likelihood, he received his elementary education in Shiraz and, in his early youth, probably started to read some philosophical works on his own. Apparently, he then left his native town in search for further education; it is difficult to restore his itinerary, but Qazvin, Kashan, and Isfahan must have been on his route.

In the capital cities of Qazvin and Isfahan,² he apparently studied with Shaykh Bahā'ī (transmitted sciences) and Mīr Dāmād (philosophy),³ although there is no extant *ijāza* given to Ṣadrā by either of them, nor was one probably ever issued. According to Ṣadūqī Suhā,⁴ who allegedly consulted the family chronicle⁵ compiled by Fayḍ Kāshānī's son 'Alam al-Hudā (1039–1115/1629–1703), before coming to Isfahan and becoming a student of Mīr Dāmād, Ṣadrā spent some time in Kashan, where he studied with Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd Rāzī, known as Ḍiyā' al-'Urafā'. Apparently, Ṣadrā married one of his teacher's daughters, becoming his son-in-law. Another daughter of Ḍiyā' al-'Urafā' was married to Fayḍ's father, Shāh Murtaḍā Kāshānī (d. 1009/1600), so Ṣadrā and Shāh Murtaḍā became brothers-in-law.

² It is often claimed that the capital of the Safavid state was moved from Qazvin to Isfahan in 1006/1597–1598. As Haneda and Matthee have shown, this claim is based on the fact that in that year Shāh 'Abbās I gave the orders to erect in Isfahan a number of magnificent edifices; see Massashi Haneda and Rudi Matthee, 'Isfahan VII. Safavid Period', *EIr*, vol. 13, pp. 650–657. In reality, in Safavid Iran, Isfahan (or any other city) became the capital city only when the shāh was staying there – typically, this happened for two months in a year.

³ Sajjad H. Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 10–11.

⁴ Manūchīhr Ṣadūqī Suhā, *Taḥrīr-i thānī-yi tārikh-i ḥukamā' wa 'urafā'-i muta'ākhir* (Tehran, 1381 Sh./2002), p. 10.

⁵ Now transferred to the library of Āyat Allāh Mar'ashī in Qum.

Şadrâ had six children, three sons and three daughters,⁶ but none of them became a famous scholar or public figure.

According to Taqī al-Dīn Kāshānī,⁷ Ḍiyā' al-'Urafā' himself studied with Abū al-Ḥasan Ābiwardī (or Abāwardī, d. 966/1558 at the age of thirty)⁸ and Ḥabīb Allāh 'Mīrzājān' Bāghnawī Shīrāzī (d. 995/1587),⁹ who was a student of Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shīrāzī (d. 962/1554), himself a student of Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī (d. 908/1502), probably the most important representative of the philosophical school of Shiraz – hence, Şadrâ can be considered a student of Davānī with three intermediaries.

If the information found by Şadūqī Suhā in the family chronicle compiled by 'Alam al-Hudā is correct, Şadrâ must have arrived in Isfahan as an accomplished, or almost accomplished (at least in his own view), *hakīm* and *'arif*. This explains why Mīr Dāmād had only a superficial influence on him. It seems that Şadrâ's studies with Mīr Dāmād did not last for more than a couple of years, after which he apparently left Isfahan.¹⁰ It is not known to where he went from there,

⁶ Sajjad Rizvi, 'Mollā Şadrâ Shīrāzī', *EIr*, online: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/molla-sadra-sirazi> (accessed on 7 May 2021).

⁷ Taqī al-Dīn Kāshānī, *Khulāṣat al-ash'ār*, quoted from Şadūqī Suhā, *Tahrīr-i thānī-yi tārikh-i hukamā'*, p. 11.

⁸ Ābiwardī wrote glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī's (d. 766/1365) commentaries on Najm al-Dīn Kātibī's (d. 657/1276) *al-Risāla al-shamsiyya* and Sirāj al-Dīn Urmawī's (d. 682/1283) *Maṭālī' al-anwār*, and several other glosses and superglosses on works on logic and mathematics, as well as a treatise *Ithbāt al-wājib*. On him, see Muḥammad Muḥsin Āqā Buzurg Ṭihrānī, *Ṭabaqāt a'lām al-shī'a*, ed. 'Alī Naqī Munzawī (Tehran, n.d.), vol. 7, pp. 7–8.

⁹ Ḥabīb Allāh 'Mīrzājān' Bāghnawī compiled numerous glosses and superglosses on the logical, philosophical, and theological works of his predecessors, such as Sirāj al-Dīn Urmawī, Sa'd al-Dīn Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), Sharīf Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) and 'Alā' al-Dīn Qūshchī (d. 879/1474); but his most significant work was a set of glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī's *al-Muḥākamāt*. On him, see Reza Pourjavady, 'Bāghnawī, Ḥabīballāh', *EI3*, online: http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/baghnawi-habiballah-COM_24272?s.num=5&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.cluster.Encyclopaedia+of+Islam&s.q=qutb+al-din+razi (accessed on 24 July 2018). Cf. Mudarris Muṭlaq, *Maktab-i falsafī-yi Işfahān*, pp. 91, 94.

¹⁰ Even during his stay in Isfahan, Şadrâ might have spent more time at the feet of Shaykh Bahā'ī, studying transmitted sciences. Hence, it is not without reason that Mudarris Muṭlaq describes him primarily as a student of Shaykh Bahā'ī rather than of Mīr Dāmād; see Mudarris Muṭlaq, *Maktab-i falsafī-yi Işfahān*, p. 93.

but it may have been either his native Shiraz or Qum. He may have had a conflict with the ‘*ulamā*’ in one of these towns, in the result of which he may have retreated, or been exiled, to the countryside for several years. He must then have spent at least eight years (1030–1038/1621–1628) in (or near) Qum studying ‘branches of esoteric science’ (*funūn-i ‘ilm-i bāṭin*) with Fayḍ Kāshānī,¹¹ before returning to Shiraz around 1040/1630, spending the last years of his life teaching at the *madrasa* built by the former governor of Fārs, Allāhwirdī Khān.

Ṣadrā died in Baṣra in 1045/1635–1636 during a pilgrimage to Mecca. Five years later, in 1050/1640, his relatives moved his body to Najaf and buried it in the precincts of the shrine of Imam ‘Alī.¹²

1.2. Mullā Ṣadrā, the Scholar

It can be safely assumed¹³ that Ṣadrā studied Ibn Sīnā’s logical and philosophical works (in particular, *al-Shifā’* and *al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt*) which had become a core part of the *madrasa* curriculum in the 5th/11th century. Since the end of the 13th century, *al-Ishārāt* was typically studied together with Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s commentary *Ḥall mushkilāt al-ishārāt*.¹⁴ Ṭūsī’s own *Tajrīd al-‘aqā’id* (sometimes also called *Tajrīd al-i’tiqād*, the full title *Tajrīd al-kalām fī taḥrīr ‘aqā’id al-islām*) became a textbook of Twelver Shi‘i theology around the same time (late 13th century) and was studied in both Shi‘i and Sunni *madrasas*. During the next few centuries, about a dozen commentaries on it were written, the most important of which apparently were those of ‘Allāma Ḥassan Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Qūshchī. The

¹¹ [Mullā Muḥsin] Fayḍ-i Kāshānī, ‘Risāla-yi sharḥ-i ṣadr’, *Jilwa* 16 (Bahman 1324 Sh./February 1945), p. 403. Cf. Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 17.

¹² Ṣadūqī Suhā, *Taḥrīr-i thānī-yi tārikh-i ḥukamā’*, pp. 14–16, where further references to the family chronicle by ‘Alam al-Hudā and the poem by ‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī are provided.

¹³ See e.g. Gerhard Endress, ‘Reading Avicenna in the *Madrasa*. Intellectual Genealogies and Chains of Transmission of Philosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East’, in James E. Montgomery, ed., *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank* (Leuven, 2006), pp. 397–415; cf. idem, ‘Philosophische ein-Band-Bibliotheken aus Isfahan’, *Oriens* 36 (2001), pp. 10–58.

¹⁴ Endress, ‘Reading Avicenna’, p. 415.

aforementioned works of Ibn Sīnā and Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī were the core texts in philosophy and theology, respectively, studied in the Iranian *madrasas* of the early Safavid era.¹⁵ From Ṣadrā's discourse in the *Aṣfār*, it is evident that, in his lifetime, these texts and commentaries were studied together with the glosses added by certain recent scholars – in particular, Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī.

How exactly did this tradition of reading and interpreting the philosophical texts in the *madrasas* of late Timurid, Qoyunlu, and early Safavid Iran influence Ṣadrā? The previous generations of scholars – in particular, the representatives of the old school of Shiraz, such as the Dashtakīs (father and son), Davānī, and Shams al-Dīn Khafri – had highlighted certain important philosophical issues. Typically, each of these issues contained an aporia, to which one or more tentative solutions were proposed. At the philosophy classes in *madrasa*, these aporias and their possible solutions were discussed in detail. It can be argued that Ṣadrā matured as a philosopher by examining these aporias and working out his own solutions of them.

Thus, one notices that Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī makes a number of ontological and epistemological claims with which Ṣadrā strongly disagrees. Probably, the most important of them is the claim that existence is an abstract affair, void of reality and lacking any referent outside, which Davānī makes in line with his *ishrāqī* belief in the principality of quiddity. This claim is unacceptable to Ṣadrā, who dismisses it in accordance with his own belief in the principality of existence.

Another claim made by Davānī is that mental forms of external things, at least in one aspect, are the qualities of the soul, and, as such, have an existential status that is entirely different from that of their

¹⁵ It is not clear whether any of Suhrawardī's works can be added to this list of core texts. The existence of two commentaries (by Davānī and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī) on his *Hayākil al-nūr*, pertaining to the late Timurid era, suggests that it might have been the latter work (i.e. the *Hayākil al-nūr* rather than the *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*) which was typically studied in *madrasa* at that time. On Safavid *madrasas*, their curriculum, and the system of transmission of knowledge in Safavid Iran, see Maryam Moazzen, *Formation of a Religious Landscape: Shi'i Higher Learning in Safavid Iran* (Leiden, 2018) and Mūsā al-Riḍā Bakhshī Ustād, 'Ta'thīr-i jarayān-hā-yi fikrī bar āmūzish-i falsafa dar madāris-i 'aṣr-i ṣafawīyya', *Tārīkh-i falsafa* 5/4 (Spring 1394 Sh./2015), pp. 67–84.

counterparts outside the mind. For example, the substance which exists outside the mind exerts a certain influence (leaves a certain 'trace') on other substances, whereas the substance that exists in the mind does not exert such influence/leave such a 'trace'. Davānī concluded that this implies that one and the same thing, depending whether it exists outside or in the mind, possesses two different realities. Ṣadrā's proposed solution of the problem rests on the distinction between two different kinds of predication: the primary essential predication (*al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī*) and the common extensional predication (*al-ḥaml al-shā'ī al-ṣinā'ī*) – while the substance in the mind and the one outside it are identical with each other according to the first type of predication, they differ from each other if considered in terms of the second one.¹⁶

Ṣadrā also criticises certain tenets of Davānī's contemporary and rival Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī, in particular his (borrowed from the earlier *mutakallimūn*) principle of 'deserving more' (*awlawayya*), according to which the possible existent by its very essence deserves existence more than non-existence (in which way, its coming into existence and/or subsistence is explained), without this 'deserving more' reaching the degree of necessity.¹⁷

Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī also argued that the rational soul has two kinds of connection with the physical/material body – the primary one, which is its connection with the vaporous animating spirit that flows through the arteries, and the secondary one, which is the connection with the denser bodily parts. To Dashtakī, this secondary connection of the soul with the material parts of the body precludes the emergence of another soul in this particular mixture of the bodily parts upon the Resurrection.¹⁸ Ṣadrā dismisses this claim by pointing out that the second connection, being a concomitant of the primary and real one, is purely incidental and accidental and, hence, cannot subsist on its own if the primary connection ceases to exist.¹⁹

¹⁶ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 1, p. 306.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 199–206.

¹⁸ Sadra, *The Wisdom of the Throne*, p. 169.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 170–174.

1.2.1 Students

Ṣadrā's two principal students (and his sons-in-law) were Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī and Mullā ʿAbd al-Razzāq Lāhījī. Fayḍ Kāshānī (1007–1091/1598–1680), the son of the jurist and theologian Raḍī al-Dīn Shāh Murtaḍā (950–1009/1543–1600), was an Akhbārī *muḥaddith*, theologian, jurist, and gnostic, who also had some acquaintance with philosophy. Fayḍ focused mainly on the transmitted sciences, in particular Shiʿi *ḥadīth*, which he studied with Mājīd b. Hāshim Baḥrānī (d. 1028/1619), Shaykh Bahāʾī, and Muḥammad b. Ḥasan ʿĀmilī (d. 1030/1621).²⁰ In 1069 or 1070/1652, Fayḍ hesitantly accepted the invitation of Shāh ʿAbbās II (r. 1052–1077/1642–1666) to lead the congregational prayers in the royal mosque in Isfahan, thus becoming the *shaykh al-islām* of the capital city. Upon the death of Shāh ʿAbbās II in 1077/1666, he resigned and returned to Kashan.²¹

Fayḍ authored around 120 works on different sciences (mostly transmitted and gnostic ones). In his works on *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*, Fayḍ shows a distinct Akhbārī proclivity, whereas in his gnostic oeuvre he by and large follows Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Muḥyi al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī. His most important works are *ʿIlm al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* and *ʿAyn al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*²² (both completed in 1042/1632, on *kalām*), *al-Wāfi* (a monumental collection of Shiʿi *ḥadīth*, completed in 1068/1657),²³ and *al-Ṣāfi* (a commentary on the Qurʾān, completed in 1075/1664).²⁴

²⁰ Muḥsin [Fayḍ] al-Kāshānī, *ʿIlm al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Muḥsin Bīdārfarr, 3rd ed. (Qum, 1392 Sh./2013), pp. ix–x. Cf. Mathieu Terrier, 'Anthropogonie et eschatologie dans l'oeuvre de Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī: L'ésotérisme shīʿite entre tradition et syncrétisme', in Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi et al., eds., *L'Ésotérisme shīʿite: Ses racines et ses prolongements. Shiʿi Esotericism: Its Roots and Developments* (Turnhout, 2016), p. 747.

²¹ al-Kāshānī, *ʿIlm al-yaqīn*, pp. xi–xiv; Andrew J. Newman, 'Fayḍ al-Kashani and the Rejection of the Clergy/State Alliance: Friday Prayer as Politics in the Safavid Period', in Linda S. Walbridge, ed., *The Most Learned of the Shiʿa: The Institution of the Marjaʿ Taqlid* (Oxford–New York, 2001), pp. 40–45; Terrier, 'Anthropogonie', p. 747.

²² [Muḥsin] al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, *ʿAyn al-yaqīn al-mulaqqab biʾl-anwār waʾl-asrār*, 2 vols., ed. Fātiḥ ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-ʿAbidī, 2nd ed. (Qum, 1428/2007).

²³ Several editions, the most recent apparently being al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, *Kitāb al-wāfi*, 26 vols., ed. Kamāl al-Dīn Īmānī, 2nd ed. (Isfahan, 1430/2008).

²⁴ Several editions, the most recent apparently being al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, *Tafsīr al-Ṣāfi*, 5 vols., ed. Ḥusayn al-Aʿlamī, 3rd ed. (Tehran, 1379 Sh./2000).

Fayḍ's most significant work on gnosis apparently is the (relatively short) treatise *al-Kalimat al-maknūna* (completed between 1057 and 1060/1647 and 1650).²⁵ Although his attitude towards philosophy was reserved, Fayḍ composed several philosophical works, the most important of which is the *Uṣūl al-ma'ārif*, an epitome of the Transcendent Wisdom of Mullā Ṣadrā.²⁶ Remarkably, while focusing on the doctrine of Ṣadrā (some points of which he criticises),²⁷ Fayḍ occasionally also refers to the tenets of Mīr Dāmād,²⁸ some of whose works he must have studied.

Fayḍ's most important disciples were Ni'mat Allāh Jazā'irī (a moderate Akhbārī *faqīh* and *muḥaddith*, 1050–1112/1640–1700), Qāḍī Sa'īd Qummī (d. after 1107/1696) and his own son 'Alam al-Hudā.

Qāḍī Sa'īd Qummī, while primarily a philosopher, gnostic, and exegete of Shi'i *ḥadīth* (his *magnum opus* being the commentary on Ibn Bābawayh's *Kitāb al-tawḥīd*,²⁹ and his most important philosophical work, the commentary on the *Uthūlūjiyā* of (Pseudo-)Aristotle³⁰), he also positioned himself as the rectifier and perfecter of Ṣadrā's teaching – or as the creator of Transcendent Wisdom in its true sense. It can be claimed that Fayḍ and Qāḍī Sa'īd created a new version of Transcendent Wisdom (note Qāḍī Sa'īd's frequent use of the expression *al-ḥikma al-muta'āliya*!³¹),

²⁵ Several editions, the most recent apparently being Fayḍ-i Kāshānī, *Kalimāt-i maknūna*, ed. 'Alī 'Alizādah (Qum, 1390 Sh./2011). Dīnānī's commentary on the book, based on his lectures, has been published recently; see Ghulām Ḥusayn Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī, *Sharḥ bar al-Kalimāt al-maknūna Fayḍ-i Kāshānī* (Tehran, 1397 Sh./2018).

²⁶ Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ [Kāshānī], *Uṣūl al-ma'ārif*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, 2nd ed. (Qum, 1375 Sh./1996).

²⁷ See e.g. *ibid.*, p. 101, where Fayḍ proposes to speak of two facets or aspects of the same nature, instead of two natures (one of which obeys the soul willingly, and the other against its will, by compulsion) as Ṣadrā does.

²⁸ See e.g. *ibid.*, p. 118 for the discussion on the traversal motion and flowing instant; and p. 121 for the dismissal of the theory of the illusory time that allegedly existed before the inception of the world.

²⁹ The modern edition of the work is Muḥammad Qāḍī Sa'īd al-Qummī, *Sharḥ Tawḥīd al-Ṣadūq*, 3 vols., ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran, 1415–1416/1994–1995).

³⁰ In Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, ed., *Muntakhabātī az āthār-i ḥukamā'-yi ilāhī-yi Īrān*, 4 vols., 3rd ed. (Qum, 1393 Sh./2014), vol. 3, pp. 79–294.

³¹ E.g. in Muḥammad Qāḍī Sa'īd al-Qummī, *al-Arba'iniyyāt li-kashf anwār al-qudsiyyāt*, ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran, 1381 Sh./2002), pp. 123, 128, 134, 137, 139 (qualified as '*yamāniyya*'), 142, 330 and *passim*.

which represents a further development of the tendency to reinterpret/reshape the *falsafa* in accordance with the patterns of thought typical of speculative theology and gnosis (for example, converting the Neoplatonic triad *One-Intellect-Soul* into the *kalāmī*/*irfānī* one, that of God's essence, names/attributes, and actions), while dismissing the core principles of Sadrian doctrine, the principality and intensification of existence and substantial motion.

Ṣadrā's second important disciple was the Shi'ī *mutakallim* Mullā 'Abd al-Razzāq b. 'Alī Lāhijī (d. 1072/1660), nicknamed 'Fayyāḍ' by Ṣadrā. Originally from Lahijan in northern Iran, he spent most of his life in Qum, where in his youth he studied with Ṣadrā (most likely, around the same time as Fayḍ, i.e. in the 1030s/1620s), and apparently at some point during his studies married Ṣadrā's daughter Umm Kulthum (1019–1090/1610–1679), known for her erudition in different sciences.³² He may also have spent some time in Isfahan, studying with Mīr Dāmād.³³ Lāhijī's theological works show him to be a skilful compiler who adds little of his own content to the recycled one. While he occasionally refers to the tenets of Ṣadrā (sometimes dismissing the opinion of his teacher),³⁴ he focuses on the views of Ibn Sīnā, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and the post-Avicennan *mutakallimūn* – probably because he believed these to be more suitable for the audience he was dealing with. Remarkably, he repeatedly asserts that there is no essential difference between philosophy (*ḥikma*) and theology (*kalām*).³⁵ Lāhijī's most important works are *al-Kalima al-ṭayyiba* (completed between 1050 and 1058/1640 and 1648),³⁶ *Gawhar-i murād* (after 1052/1642),³⁷ and *Sarmāya-i imān* (between 1052 and 1058/1642 and 1648),³⁸ three

³² Ḥassan al-Amīn, *Mustadrakāt a'yān al-shū'a*, 8 vols. (Beirut, 1418/1997), vol. 3, p. 43. Cf. Ḥamīd 'Aṭā'ī Naẓarī, 'Muqaddima-yi taḥqīq', in Mullā 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī, *al-Kalima al-ṭayyiba*, ed. Ḥamīd 'Aṭā'ī Naẓarī (Tehran, 1391 Sh./2012), p. 21.

³³ Ḥamīd 'Aṭā'ī Naẓarī, 'Muqaddima-yi taḥqīq', p. 21.

³⁴ See e.g. Lāhijī, *Shawāriq al-ilhām*, vol. 5, pp. 243–246, where he dismisses Ṣadrā's criticism of Ibn Sīnā's teaching on formal knowledge ('ilm ḥuṣūlī).

³⁵ See Ḥamīd 'Aṭā'ī Naẓarī, 'Muqaddima-yi taḥqīq', p. 69.

³⁶ See footnote 32.

³⁷ Mullā 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī, *Gawhar-i murād*, ed. by a collective of scholars from Imam Sadiq Research Institute, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1388 Sh./2009).

³⁸ Mullā 'Abd al-Razzāq Fayyāḍ, *Sarmāya-i imān*, ed. Ṣādiq Āmulī Lārījānī (Qum, 1372 Sh./1993).

theological and/or philosophical summae of different length and of various levels of sophistication; and the *Shawāriq al-ilhām*, a monumental commentary on Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-kalām*.³⁹

‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī's most important disciple was his eldest son, Mīrzā Ḥassan Lāhijī (1045–1121/1635–1709), often referred to by his pen name *Kāshifī*, who wrote around thirty theological treatises (mostly in Persian – among them, *Āyina-yi dīn*, or *Sham‘ al-yaqīn*, *Āyina-yi hikmat*, *Hadiyat al-musāfir* etc.).⁴⁰

Ṣadrā's other known students were Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Riḍā b. Āqājānī (d. after 1071/1660), whose only surviving work is his commentary on Mīr Dāmād's *Qabasāt* (partially published by Āshtiyānī),⁴¹ and Ḥusayn Tunikābunī (d. ca. 1105/1693), who also studied with ‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī – two of his short treatises are published by Āshtiyānī,⁴² while most of his works⁴³ remain in manuscripts.

2. The Works of Mullā Ṣadrā

From the formal point of view, Ṣadrā's works can be grouped into the following categories:

- independent books and treatises (29 items)
- commentaries, glosses, and addenda (8 items)
- poetry (*mathnawīs*, *qaṣīdas*, and *rubā‘īs*)

³⁹ Lāhijī, *Shawāriq al-ilhām fī sharḥ tajrīd al-kalām*, 5 vols., ed. Akbar Asad ‘Alī-zādah, 3rd ed. (Qum, 1433/2011).

⁴⁰ Ḥassan b. ‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī, *Rasā’il-i fārsī*, ed. ‘Alī Ṣadrā’i Khū’i (Tehran, 1375 Sh./1996). Cf. Ḥamid ‘Aṭā’i Naẓarī, ‘Muqaddima-yi taḥqīq’, p. 22.

⁴¹ Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Riḍā b. Āqājānī, ‘Sharḥ al-Qabasāt’, in Āshtiyānī, *Muntakhabātī*, vol. 2, pp. 303–430. See also Nariman Aavani, ‘Platonism in Safavid Persia: Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631) and Āqājānī (ca. 1661) on the Platonic Forms’, *Ishraq: Islamic Philosophy Yearbook* 8 (2017), pp. 112–136.

⁴² Shaykh Ḥusayn Tunikābunī, ‘Risālat fī ṣunūf al-nās ‘inda rujū‘ahum ilā dār al-baqā’, in Āshtiyānī, *Muntakhabātī*, vol. 2, pp. 436–438; idem, ‘Risālat waḥdat al-wujūd’, in Āshtiyānī, *Muntakhabātī*, vol. 2, pp. 439–444.

⁴³ E.g. the treatise *Ithbāt ḥudūth al-‘ālam* and commentary on Maḥmūd Shabistarī's *Gulshan-i rāz*.

- letters (to Mīr Dāmād, 4 items)⁴⁴
- permissions to teach and endorsements (the exact number unknown)

In what follows, I will provide a brief account of Ṣadrā's works (omitting letters, permissions, and some minor or spurious treatises), grouping them in terms of their content: philosophy and theology, hermeneutics and exegesis, and gnosis.

2.1. Philosophy and Theology

2.1.1 Independent Works

1) *al-Ḥikma al-muta'āliya fi'l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a* ('The Transcendent Wisdom [Exposed] in the Four Intellectual Journeys'), usually referred to as the *Asfār* ('Journeys').⁴⁵ The work, which was written between 1015 and 1037/1606 and 1628, represents a philosophical summa, divided into four parts – or 'intellectual journeys', which, according to the tenets of Islamic gnosis, a knower (*'ārif*) must accomplish.⁴⁶ The first part, which, allegedly, represents the journey from the creation to the Real (*al-safar min al-khalq ilā al-ḥaqq*), deals

⁴⁴ These four letters were published, respectively, in: 1) Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, *Sharḥ-i ḥāl wa āra'-yi falsafī-yi Mullā Ṣadrā* (Mashhad, 1342 Sh./1963), pp. 225–228, and *Nāma-yi āstān-i quds* 9 (1340 Sh./November 1961), pp. 59–62; 2) *Rāḥnamā-yi kitāb* 8–9 (1341 Sh./1962), pp. 757–765; 3) and 4) *Farhang-i Īrānzamīn* 13/1–4 (1966), pp. 84–98.

⁴⁵ Three reliable editions of the work exist: 1) the edition by 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'i (Qum, 1378–1389/1958–1969); 2) the edition by Riḍā Luṭfī, Ibrāhīm Amīnī and Faṭḥallāh Ummīd (Beirut, 1981; 3rd print). It includes the glosses of Mullā 'Alī Nūrī, Āqā Mudarris 'Alī Zunūzī, Ḥājj Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī, Muḥammad Hidaḡī, and 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'i (all subsequent references, unless stated otherwise, are to this edition); 3) the edition by Ghulām Riḍā A'awānī, Maqṣūd Muḥammadī, Riḍā Muḥammadzāda, Aḥmad Aḥmadī, 'Alī Akbar Rashād, and Riḍā Akbariyān, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'i (Tehran, 1380–1383 Sh./2000–2005).

⁴⁶ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 1, p. 13. Notably, Ibn 'Arabī speaks of three journeys only (to the Real, from the Real, and in the Real) and says nothing about the fourth journey, added by Ṣadrā (the journey with the Real in the creation); see Muḡyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī, *al-Isfār 'an natā'ij al-asfār*, ed. M. F. al-Jabr (Damascus, 2000), pp. 38–39.

with general metaphysics (namely, the nature of existence and its essential accidents). It consists of two sub-parts, or paths (*masālik*), the first of which, in turn, consists of six chapters, or way stations (*marāhil*), and the second, of four. The chapters are further divided into subchapters, or roads (*manāhiḡ*), and those, into sections (*fuṣūl*). The first path deals with the epistemes (*ma'ārif*), which are the prerequisites of all types of human knowledge. Its six chapters discuss the concept of existence, the systematic ambiguity of its predication to the instances, the principality of existence, the simplicity of the reality of existence, the copulative being (*al-wujūd al-rābiṡ*), modes of existence (necessity, possibility, and impossibility), mental existence, existence/being as a copula, the reality of the making/instauration (*ja'l*), the possibility of the change of intensity (strengthening and weakening) of existence, quiddity and its concomitants, causality, and unity and multiplicity. The four chapters of the second path deal with potency and act, motion, inception and eternity, and the intellect and intellection.

The second part, which, according to the author's intention, corresponds to the gnostic's journey in the Real through the Real (*fi'l-ḡaqq bi'l-ḡaqq*), deals with physics and is divided into ten chapters, or sciences (*funūn*), three of which discuss the accidents (quantity, quality, correlation, place, position, time, habitus, action, and affection), and the remaining seven, the substance and its properties.

The third part, corresponding to the gnostic's journey from the Real, through the Real, to the creation (*min al-ḡaqq bi'l-ḡaqq ilā al-khalq*), deals with metaphysics in the specific sense (namely, with the essence, attributes, and acts of the Necessary Existent) and consists of ten stations (*mawāqif*). Inter alia, it posits the identity of the Necessary Existent's existence and quiddity, and the principle, 'the thing which is simple in its reality is all things' (*basīṡ al-ḡaqqīqa kull al-ashyā*).⁴⁷ It also discusses the so-called 'path of the sincere' (*ṡarīḡ al-ṡiddīḡin*).

⁴⁷ As it is known, early Neoplatonic texts in Arabic (typically, paraphrases of Plotinus), describe the Intellect (rather than God/the Necessary Existent) as 'all things'; see e.g. Badawī, *Uthūlūḡiyā*, p. 185. This view, ultimately, goes back to Plotinus himself, who claims that 'the substance which is generated [from the One] . . . is the form . . . of everything (ἐἶδος παντός)'. See Plotinus, *Enneads* V.5 (32).6.2–4; the passage is not present in the *Uthūlūḡiyā*.

The fourth part, which corresponds to the gnostic's journey through the Real in the creation (*bi'l-ḥaqq fi'l-khalq*), consists of eleven chapters, or gates (*abwāb*), the first seven of which deal with psychology (*'ilm al-nafs*), and the remaining four, with metempsychosis (*tanāsukh*) and spiritual and corporeal resurrection.⁴⁸

Five modern and/or contemporary Iranian scholars, Ṣadr al-Dīn Ḥāṭilī Kūpā'i (1301–1372/1883–1952), 'Abd Allāh Jawādī Āmulī (b. 1312 Sh./1933), Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī (b. 1307 Sh./1928), Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (1298–1358 Sh./1919–1979), and Muḥammad Taqī Mišbāḥ Yazdī (b. 1313 Sh./1934), have produced (complete or partial) commentaries on the *Asfār* in Arabic and Persian.⁴⁹

The most important and comprehensive glosses to the work are those of Ḥājj Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī (d. 1289/1873), covering the entire work, except the second part (the discussion on substance and accidents); Mullā 'Alī Nūrī (d. 1246/1831); Āqā Mudarris 'Alī Zunūzī (d. 1307/1889–1890); Mullā Ismā'īl Darb-i Kūshkī (d. 1277/1860); Muḥammad Hīdajī (1270–1314/1853–1897); Abū al-Ḥasan Rafī'ī Qazwīnī (1315–1395/1897–1975); and 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'i (1321–1402/1904–1981).

⁴⁸ On the structure of the *Asfār*, see Arnzen, 'The Structure of Mullā Ṣadrā's *al-Ḥikma al-muta'aliya*', pp. 199–239; Heidrun Eichner, 'Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics: From Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā al-Shīrāzī', *Medioevo* 32 (2007), pp. 142–144 and 190–195; Ibrahim Kalin, 'An Annotated Bibliography', pp. 46–48.

⁴⁹ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Ḥāṭilī al-Kūpā'i, *Shurūq al-ḥikma fi sharḥ al-asfār wa'l-manẓūma*, 2 vols., ed. Majīd Hādizāda (Tehran, 1396 Sh./2017) and 'Abd Allāh Jawādī Āmulī, *Raḥīq-i makhtūm: Sharḥ-i ḥikmat-i muta'aliya*, 10 vols., ed. Ḥamid Pārsāniyā, 2nd ed. (Qum, 1382 Sh./2003; 1st ed., 1375 Sh./1996), cover the first and the second volumes of the *Asfār*; Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, *Sharḥ-i fārsī-yi al-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn-i Shīrāzī*, 7 vols. (Qum, 1387–1394 Sh./2008–2015), covers the entire work; Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *Darshā-yi Asfār*, 6 vols., 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1384–1384 Sh./2005–2006), covers the discussion on potency and act; Mišbāḥ Yazdī, *Sharḥ-i jild-i awwal wa hashtum al-asfār al-arba'a*, 7 vols., ed. 'Abd al-Rasūl 'Ubūdiyyat and Muḥammad Sa'īdī (Qum, 1380–1395 Sh./2001–2016), covers vols. 1, 2, and 8 of the work.

There is a useful, but not always precise, Persian translation of the entire work by Muḥammad Kh^wājavi.⁵⁰ The fourth part was translated into English by Latimah-Parvin Peerwani.⁵¹

2) *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya fī'l-manāhij al-sulūkiyya* ('The Witnesses of Lordship on the Paths of [Spiritual] Wayfaring').⁵² The work was completed before the death of Mīr Dāmād in 1631 – he is mentioned as being alive, with the expression *adimat ḡilālahu* ('may his shadow prevail [over us]!'), and is referred to as *ustādhunā al-sharīf sayyid akābir al-muḥaqqiqīn* ('our noble teacher, the lord of the greatest of the Realisers').⁵³ It consists of five parts, or places of witnessing (*mashāhid*), that are divided into chapters, or witnesses (*shawāhid*), which, in turn, are further divided into sections, or illuminations (*ishrāqāt*). The first part deals with the issues of general metaphysics – such as existence in the general sense, mental existence, the Necessary Existent (its rank, unity, and attributes), priority and posteriority, unity and multiplicity, types of opposition (*taqābul*), causality, potency and act, necessity and possibility, the states of quiddity and the aspects in which it can be considered (*i'tibārāt*). The second part deals with metaphysics in the specific sense – namely, God's existence and creation. Inter alia, it includes a detailed discussion on Platonic forms. The third part is devoted to psychology and the spiritual, or noetic, return/resurrection. The fourth part deals with the corporeal return. Its first chapter provides a philosophical proof of the bodily resurrection, whereas the second discusses the states of the hereafter. The third chapter, in turn, presents the theory of the three worlds (this

⁵⁰ Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī [Mullā Ṣadrā], *al-Ḥikma al-muta'aliya fī'l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a*, translated into Persian by Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1389–1392 Sh./2010–2013).

⁵¹ Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, *Spiritual Psychology: The Fourth Intellectual Journey in Transcendent Philosophy: Volumes VIII and IX of The Asfār*, tr. Latimah-Parvin Peerwani, with a foreword by Sayyed Khalil Toussi (London, 2008).

⁵² There are two editions of the work: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya fī'l-manāhij al-sulūkiyya*, with the addenda of Ḥājj Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī, ed. Sayyid Jalāl Āshtiyānī (Mashhad, 1346 Sh./1967; 2nd edition, Qum, 1382 Sh./2003); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya fī'l-manāhij al-sulūkiyya*, ed. Muṣṭafā Muḥaqqiq Dāmād (Tehran, 1382 Sh./2003).

⁵³ Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya*, ed. Āshtiyānī, p. 74; cf. Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 59.

world, the world of reward, and the world of peace and nearness to God), and examines different types of gathering, or assembling (*hashr*). The fifth part deals with prophecy and sainthood.

Ḥājj Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī compiled addenda to the work (published in Āshtiyānī's edition). There is an annotated Persian translation of the book by Jawād Muṣliḥ.⁵⁴ The contents of the book have been meticulously examined by Cécile Bonmariage.⁵⁵

3) *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād fi'l-ḥikma al-muta'āliya* ('The Origin and the End According to the Transcendent Wisdom').⁵⁶ The work was completed in 1015/1606,⁵⁷ and, in broad lines, reproduces the structure of Ibn Sīnā's work which bears the same title (however, Ṣadrā's work provides many additional details, and, therefore, is of a much larger size). It consists of a short introduction and two parts, or sciences (*funūn*). The first part deals with the issues of the Lordship (*rubūbiyya*) and the knowledge of the First Real (*al-ḥaqq al-awwal*). It consists of three articles (*maqālāt*), or chapters, the first of which refers to some matters of general metaphysics and establishes the principle of existence, the second discusses the attributes of this principle, and the third deals with its acts. The second part examines the issues related to return, or Resurrection, and the hierarchy of the resurrected existents. It consists of four articles, or chapters, the first of which deals with psychology, the second with corporeal resurrection, the third with the gnostics' views on the corporeal resurrection, and the fourth, with prophecy.

⁵⁴ Jawād Muṣliḥ, *Tarjuma wa-tafsīr-i al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, athar-i Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn* (Mullā Ṣadrā) (Tehran, 1366 Sh./1987).

⁵⁵ Cécile Bonmariage, 'Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī's (d. 1635) Divine Witnesses', in El-Rouayheb and Schmidtke, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*, pp. 465–487.

⁵⁶ There is a 14th/19th-century lithographic edition (1314/1896); a non-critical Āshtiyānī edition (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī [Tehran, 1355 Sh./1976]), which includes Ḥājj Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī's and Āqā Mudarris 'Alī Zunūzī's glosses; and a recent critical edition by Dhabīhī and Shāhnaẓarī (Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād fi'l-ḥikma al-muta'āliya*, 2 vols., ed. Muḥammad Dhabīhī and Ja'far Shāhnaẓarī (Tehran, 1381 Sh./2002).

⁵⁷ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 64.

There is a (useful, but often too free) Persian translation by Aḥmad Ḥusaynī Ardakānī.⁵⁸

4) *al-Ḥikma al-‘arshiyya* (‘The Wisdom of the Throne’).⁵⁹ Completed between 1041 and 1044/1631 and 1634.⁶⁰

It consists of two chapters, or places of illumination (*mashāriq*). The first of them deals with the knowledge of God, His attributes, names, and signs; it consists of thirteen principles (*qawā‘id*). The second chapter deals with psychology and eschatology; it consists of three sections, or ‘illuminations’ (*ishrāqāt*). The first of them deals with the knowledge of the soul, the second discusses the reality of return and the nature of the assembling of the bodies, and the third describes the states of the hereafter.

Aḥmad Aḥsā’ī⁶¹ and Mullā Ismā‘īl Iṣfahānī ‘Wāḥid al-‘Ayn’⁶² wrote commentaries on the treatise (the latter being a refutation of the former). It was translated into Persian by Ghulām Ḥusayn Āhanī (whose translation, however, should better be described as a paraphrase), into English by James Winston Morris,⁶³ and into Russian by Janis Esots.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, *al-Mabda’ wa’l-ma‘ād*, translated into Persian by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī Ardakānī, ed. ‘Abd Allāh Nūrānī (Tehran, 1362 Sh./1983).

⁵⁹ There is one lithographic edition: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Mashā‘ir wa’l-Ḥikma al-‘arshiyya*, lithographed by Shaykh Aḥmad al-Shīrāzī, ed. Muḥammad Bāqir Kāshānī (Tehran, 1315/1897), pp. 110–210; and three modern editions of the text: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-‘arshiyya*, ed. Ghulām Ḥusayn Āhanī (Isfahan, 1341 Sh./1962; 2nd ed., 1361 Sh./1982) (an unreliable edition of the Arabic text that comes together with a Persian paraphrase, ornamented with quotations from the poems of Nāṣir-i Khusraw); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-‘arshiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Khalīd al-Labūn and Fu‘ād Dakār (Beirut, 1420/2000); 3) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, ‘al-Ḥikma al-‘arshiyya’, ed. ‘Alī Aṣghar Dādbih, in Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī*, 4 vols., under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene‘ī, (Tehran, 1391 Sh./2012), vol. 4, pp. 1–194. The third one is by far the most reliable.

⁶⁰ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 62.

⁶¹ Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsā’ī, *Sharḥ al-‘arshiyya* (Kirman, 1361/1942; reprinted in Kirman in 1361–1364 Sh./1983–1985 and in Beirut in 2008).

⁶² Mullā Ismā‘īl al-Iṣfahānī ‘Wāḥid al-‘Ayn’, *Sharḥ al-Ḥikma al-‘arshiyya, ma‘a risāla al-Ḥikma al-‘arshiyya, ma‘a ta’līqāt Mullā ‘Alī al-Nūrī*, ed. Muḥammad Mas‘ūd Khudāwirdī (Tehran, 1391 Sh./2012).

⁶³ Sadra, *The Wisdom of the Throne*.

⁶⁴ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-‘arshiyya*, translated into Russian by Janis Esots as Престольная мудрость (Moscow, 2004).

5) *al-Mashā'ir* ('Perceptions').⁶⁵ Completed in 1037/1628,⁶⁶ it consists of an introduction and eight chapters, or perceptions (or penetrations, *mashā'ir*), dealing with the reality, the states and the concept of existence (which is impossible to define), the existence's encompassment of all things, its objectivity, the predication of existence to quiddity, the instances of existence, its being the essential object of making, or instauration (*ja'l*), the nature of making and correlation, and the unity of the Maker.

Aḥmad Aḥsā'ī,⁶⁷ Mullā Muḥammad Ja'far Langarūdī Lāhijī (student of Mullā 'Alī Nūrī, d. 1265/1848),⁶⁸ Mīrzā Aḥmad Yazdī Ardakānī,⁶⁹ Mullā Zayn al-'Ābidīn Jawād Nūrī,⁷⁰ and Sayyid Ḥassan Amīn⁷¹ wrote commentaries on the treatise; and it was glossed by Mullā 'Alī Nūrī, Mullā Ismā'il Iṣfahānī 'Wāḥid al-'Ayn', Mīrzā Abū al-Ḥasan Jilwa,⁷² 'Abd al-Razzāq Big Danbalī Tabrīzī (d. 1243/1827), and Muḥammad Tunikabānī.⁷³

⁶⁵ There are three reliable editions: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Mashā'ir wa'l-Ḥikma al-'arshiyya*, ed. Shaykh Aḥmad al-Shīrāzī (Tehran, 1315/1897), lithograph edition, pp. 1–109; 2) Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī [Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī], *Le livre des Pénétrations métaphysiques (Kitāb al-Mashā'ir)*, *texte arabe publié avec la version persane de Badi' ol-Molk Mirza 'Emadoddawleh*, ed. and tr. Henry Corbin, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1982); 3) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, 'al-Mashā'ir', ed. Maqṣūd Muḥammadī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 4, pp. 307–425.

⁶⁶ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 66.

⁶⁷ Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsā'ī, *Sharḥ al-Mashā'ir*, 2nd ed. (Kirman, 1366 Sh./1977; reprinted in Beirut in 2007).

⁶⁸ Mullā Muḥammad Ja'far Lāhijī, *Sharḥ Risālat al-Mashā'ir ta'līf-i Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Mashhad, 1342 Sh./1963; 2nd ed., Tehran, 1376 Sh./1997).

⁶⁹ Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Yazdī Ardakānī, *Nūr al-baṣā'ir fī ḥall mushkilāt al-mashā'ir*, ed. Raḥīm Qāsimī (Tehran, 1396 Sh./2017).

⁷⁰ Partially published in Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Mashā'ir wa'l-Ḥikma al-'arshiyya*, ed. Shaykh Aḥmad al-Shīrāzī (Tehran, 1315/1897), lithograph edition, pp. 1–109. A recent modern edition: Mullā Zayn al-'Ābidīn Jawād Nūrī, *Ḍaw' al-manāẓir fī sharḥ al-mashā'ir*, ed. Muḥammad Mas'ūd Khudāwirdī and Amīr Ḥusayn 'Ābidī (Tehran, 1396 Sh./2017).

⁷¹ Sayyid Ḥassan Amīn, *Bardāshṭī az Mashā'ir Mullā Ṣadrā* (Tehran, 1351 Sh./1972).

⁷² Their glosses appear on the margins of the lithographic edition; see Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Mashā'ir wa'l-Ḥikma al-'arshiyya*, ed. Shaykh Aḥmad al-Shīrāzī (Tehran, 1315/1897), pp. 1–109.

⁷³ MS Majlis 1485; the glosses have not been published as yet.

The Qajar prince Badi' al-Mulk Mīrzā 'Imād al-Dawla (Badi' ol-Molk Mirza 'Emadoddawleh, d. after 1324/1906), a grandson of Fath 'Ali Shāh Qājār, rendered the treatise into (simple, but philosophically precise) Persian, adding to Ṣadrā's text a number of explanatory passages of his own⁷⁴ (wherefore his work combines the features of a translation and commentary). Ghulām Ḥusayn Āhanī published a Persian paraphrase of the text.⁷⁵ Henry Corbin rendered the treatise into an elegant philosophical French, providing the translation with a detailed introduction and a commentary.⁷⁶ Parviz Morewedge translated the treatise into English at the end of the 20th century (his translation gives an adequate general impression about the work, but, unfortunately, is often unreliable when it comes to fine points).⁷⁷ A much more reliable English translation of the work was recently published by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, with the assistance of Ibrahim Kalin.⁷⁸

6) *al-Masā'il al-qudsiyya* ('The Holy [Metaphysical] Issues').⁷⁹ Incomplete, one draft dated 1034/1624;⁸⁰ the last version probably dated 1049/1639.⁸¹ Although the authenticity of the treatise is sometimes questioned, as shown by Āshtiyānī⁸² and Ṣadūqī Suhā,⁸³ it appears to be

⁷⁴ Mīrzā 'Imād al-Dawla, "Imād al-ḥikma: tarjuma wa sharḥ-i fārsī-yi kitāb-i Mashā'ir Ṣadr al-Dīn-i Shīrāzī", in Shīrāzī [Shīrāzī], *Le livre des Pénétrations métaphysiques (Kitāb al-Mashā'ir)*, pp. 73–220.

⁷⁵ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Mashā'ir*, paraphrased into Persian by Ghulām Ḥusayn Āhanī (Isfahan, 1340 Sh./1961; 2nd ed., 1361 Sh./1982).

⁷⁶ Shīrāzī [Shīrāzī], *Le livre des Pénétrations métaphysiques (Kitāb al-Mashā'ir)*, pp. 1–242 (of the French text).

⁷⁷ Mullā Ṣadrā, *The Metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā*, tr. Parviz Morewedge (Binghamton, NY, 1992).

⁷⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā, *The Book of Metaphysical Penetrations (Kitāb al-Mashā'ir)*, tr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ed. Ibrahim Kalin (Provo, UT, 2014).

⁷⁹ There are two editions of the text: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, 'al-Masā'il al-qudsiyya', in idem, *Se risāla-yi falsafī*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, 2nd ed. (Qum, 1378 Sh./1999), pp. 183–254; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'al-Masā'il al-qudsiyya', ed. Manūchihr Ṣadūqī Suhā, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 4, pp. 195–306.

⁸⁰ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 101.

⁸¹ Nasr, *Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī and his Transcendent Theosophy*, p. 44.

⁸² Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, 'Muqaddima-i muṣaḥḥih', in Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, *Se risāla-i falsafī*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, pp. 17–18.

⁸³ Manūchihr Ṣadūqī Suhā, 'Muqaddima-i muṣaḥḥih', in Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 4, pp. 201–205.

an important genuine work of Şadrā. It discusses some metaphysical issues, concerning which Mullā Şadrā appears to have held an original opinion that differed from the commonly accepted one (usually posited by Ibn Sīnā and his school). The treatise consists of an introduction and one part (*jumla*),⁸⁴ which is divided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with existence and its properties; the second examines the properties of the concept of the Necessary Existent; the third discusses mental existence. An additional section is devoted to the refutation of the possible objections by the ‘common philosophers’ (i.e. the followers of Ibn Sīnā) to Şadrā’s views on knowledge and mental existence.

7) *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya* (‘The Witnesses of Lordship’).⁸⁵ A short late work (not to be confused with 2, above), in which Şadrā lists his original contributions to different philosophical issues. It consists of 186 articles, which corresponds to the self-estimated number of his contributions, some of which are of principal character (dealing with such issues as systematic ambiguity of existence, substantial motion, and corporeal return), while the others concern the implications of these principles and/or minor details. Āshtiyānī questions its authenticity; however, the editor of the only modern edition, Hāmid Nāji, believes it to be the work of Şadrā.⁸⁶

8) *Ittiḥād al-‘āqil wa’l-ma‘qūl* (‘Unification of the Intellecter and the Intellected’).⁸⁷ The treatise posits the principle of the unification of the intellecting subject and the object of intellection, providing the proofs

⁸⁴ Apparently, Şadrā considered the possibility of adding a second part, but it appears to have never been written.

⁸⁵ Şadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, ‘*al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya*’, in idem, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Şadr al-Muta’allihīn*, ed. Hāmid Nāji, 3rd ed. (Tehran, 1385 Sh./2006; 1st ed., 1375 Sh./1996), pp. 283–342.

⁸⁶ Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, ‘Muqaddima’, in Şadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Ākhund*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Mashhad, 1393/1973; 2nd ed., Qum, 1362 Sh./1983), p. 70; Hāmid Nāji, ‘Muqaddima’, in Şadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Şadr al-Muta’allihīn*, ed. Nāji, p. xxxv.

⁸⁷ There are two editions: 1) Şadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, ‘*Ittiḥād al-‘āqil wa’l-ma‘qūl*’, in idem, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Şadr al-Muta’allihīn*, ed. Nāji, pp. 61–103; 2) Şadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Risāla fī ittiḥād al-‘āqil wa’l-ma‘qūl*, ed. Buyūk ‘Alizāda, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene’ī (Tehran, 1387 Sh./2008). The latter edition (pp. 91–172) includes a selection of passages from the *Asfār*, related to the discussion.

of its veracity. Ṣadrā bases his argumentation on the passages and remarks of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Pseudo-Aristotle, and Porphyry (genuine or attributed to them), known to him in Arabic translation/paraphrase, simultaneously attacking the dismissive position of Ibn Sīnā. The treatise consists of an introduction and two chapters, or articles (*maqālāt*). The principal first chapter, which consists of six sections, deals with the principle of unification in detail, providing the premises and refuting the objections. The supplementary second chapter, which consists of three sections, discusses the identity of the simple intellect with its objects of intellection, and the soul's unification with the Agent Intellect at the act of intellection.

The treatise was translated into Persian by Ḥasanẓāda Āmulī and 'Alī Bābā'ī,⁸⁸ and into English by Ibrahim Kalin.⁸⁹

9) *al-Taṣawwur wa'l-taṣdīq* ('Conceptualisation and Assenting').⁹⁰ A short treatise on logic; it consists of six sections. In terms of the content, it greatly depends on a treatise of Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī with the same title and, via the latter, on the logical works of Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī and Ibn Kammūna.⁹¹ The first section establishes the definition of knowledge. The second deals with its division into conceptualisation and assenting. The third examines the four famous opinions on assenting. The fourth discusses the extant opinions on the divisibility of all knowledge into parts, conceptualisation and assent. The fifth section inquires whether conceptualisation must be accompanied by assenting. The final sixth

⁸⁸ Ḥasan Ḥasanẓāda Āmulī, *Durūs-i ittiḥād-i 'āqil bih ma'qūl* (Tehran, 1364 Sh./1985; 5th ed. Qum, 1386 Sh./2007); Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Risāla-yi ittiḥād 'āqil wa-ma'qūl*, translated into Persian by 'Alī Bābā'ī (Tehran, 1386 Sh./2007).

⁸⁹ Ibrahim Kalin, tr., 'Treatise on the Unification of the Intellector and Intelligible (*Risālah fī ittiḥād al-'āqil wa'l-ma'qūl* Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Yaḥyā al-Qawāmī al-Shīrāzī)', in idem, *Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā on Existence, Intellect and Intuition* (Karachi, 2010), pp. 256–291; earlier, on pages 159–165 of the monograph, Kalin discusses the issue in some detail.

⁹⁰ Lithographical edition on the margins of Ḥillī's *al-Jawhar al-naḍīḍ* (Tehran, 1311/1893). Modern edition in Mahdī Shari'atī, ed., *Risālatān fī l-taṣawwur wa'l-taṣdīq, ta'līf al-Quṭb al-Rāzī wa'l-Ṣadr al-Shīrāzī* (Qum, 1416/1995; reprinted in Beirut 1425/2004), pp. 45–103.

⁹¹ See the discussion in Joep Lameer, *Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī. Al-Risāla fī l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq* (Tehran, 2006), pp. 72–81 and 92–98.

section represents a short catalogue of objections to certain points made by Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī.

The treatise has been meticulously examined by Joep Lameer, whose monograph also includes an annotated English translation.⁹²

10) *Ajwibat masā'il Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Jilānī* (Mullā Shamsā) ('Answers to the Questions, Posed by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Jilānī [Mullā Shamsā]).⁹³ Mullā Shamsā (d. before 1064/1654), a student of Mīr Dāmād, questions some elements of Ṣadrā's thought from the positions of the doctrine of Mīr Dāmād. The treatise contains Ṣadrā's answers to the following five questions:

- i. What is the moving thing in quantitative motion, and what is its substrate?
- ii. Is the vegetative soul imprinted in matter or separated from it? If it is, at least partially, separated from it, does it perceive anything?
- iii. How are the [ten Aristotelian] categories present in mind – as realities and universal natures, or as instances of these realities (as is the case in the external/material world)?
- iv. The particular perceptions of both man and other animals are instances of knowledge, and knowledge cannot rest on anything material – rather, every knower must be separated from matter. This apparently entails the existence of the immaterial soul in the case of all animals – and, hence, their return/Resurrection. [What are your thoughts on this?]
- v. Several Qur'anic verses, a number of *ḥadīths*, and some sayings of the Sufi masters appear to indicate that the human soul was not created simultaneously with the body [whereas you teach that it is originated together with the body]. How exactly should these transmitted testimonies be interpreted (i.e. reconciled with your own eschatological teaching)?

⁹² Lameer, *Conception and Belief*, the English translation on pp. 99–185.

⁹³ A lithographic edition on the margins of *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*, 1314/1896, pp. 340–359. The two modern editions of the work are: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn*, ed. Nājī, pp. 107–122; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Risāla fi'l-quṭb wa'l-manṭaqa*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥasan-zāda Āmulī; and *Ajwibat al-masā'il al-naṣiriyya, al-'awīṣa wa'l-jilāniyya*, ed. 'Abd Allāh Shakībā, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1378 Sh./1999), pp. 67–84.

According to Ṣadrā's student 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī, who copied the oldest extant MS, the treatise was completed in 1034/1625.⁹⁴

11) *Ajwibat al-masā'il al-kāshāniyya* ('Answers to the Questions of Mullā Muẓaffar Ḥusayn Kāshānī'⁹⁵) or *Ajwibat al-masā'il al-awīṣa* ('Answers to [Five] Aporia [about the Soul, Posited by an Unnamed Scholar]').⁹⁶ The questions/aporia posited are:

- i. Does the soul receive its knowledge of itself, its powers, and the universal and particular forms through the mere presence of these forms in itself, or through the mediation of another form, which represents a perceptual likeness that emerges in the soul?
- ii. Some bodily powers and tools can obey or disobey the soul. Rather, they would perform their specific actions regardless of the soul's wish and will. (This is the case, for example, with the digestive power and imagination.) Hence, it appears that such powers are sovereign rulers in their realm. This, however, ruins the unity and natural harmony of human being, and invalidates the claim of the philosophers that the soul alone governs the human being, while the bodily powers obey it.
- iii. The unique forms and shapes of the bodies of plants and animals point to the fact that their agent/creator is not void of knowledge and awareness. Such agent/creator cannot be the vegetative or animal soul, which is not aware of itself, in the first place.
- iv. The transformation of the nature in the semen and the seed testifies that it is not impressed in their matter. Hence, all powers that act in the semen and the seed – such as vegetative, formative, and digestive – are nobler than imagination and estimation, which, as proved by the philosophers, are imprinted in the bodily matter. How, then, can imagination and estimation govern the (higher) animals, except the human being?

⁹⁴ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 102.

⁹⁵ A student of Mīr Findiriskī; see Nājī, 'Introduction', in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn*, ed. Nājī, p. xxiv.

⁹⁶ The two modern editions are: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 'Ajwibat al-masā'il al-kāshāniyya', in idem, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn*, ed. Nājī, pp. 123–160; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Ajwibat al-masā'il al-awīṣa', ed. 'Abd Allāh Shakibā, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1378 Sh./1999), pp. 23–66.

- v. The subsistence of the human souls leads to the conclusion that the human soul is more perfect and nobler than the celestial souls, and even than the Universal Soul, since what is merely immaterial is not necessarily more perfect than what is related to matter and administers it.

12) *Ajwibat al-masā'il al-naṣīriyya* ('Answers to the [Three] Questions Posited by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī [to Shams al-Dīn al-Khusrawshāhī]').⁹⁷ The treatise consists of Ṣadrā's answers to the following three questions, posited by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī to his contemporary Shams al-Dīn al-Khusrawshāhī (d. 652/1254); his response, if ever given, does not survive.

- i. Apparently, it is impossible for an individual motion to exist without possessing a certain speed. The quiddity of the speed cannot be defined without considering it in relation to time. Hence, time is one of the causes of an individual motion. How, then, can a definite motion be a cause of time?
- ii. How can the axiom of the (corporeal) inception and (spiritual) subsistence of the human soul be proven to be valid, given that whatever lacks the subject to which the possibility of its existence and non-existence can be predicated, cannot come to exist after its non-existence and cease to exist after its existence? If we consider the body as the subject of the predication of the possibility of the soul's existence, then what prevents us from considering that body also as the subject of the predication of the possibility of its non-existence? If we suppose that, because of the soul's separation from the locus in which it inheres, the subject of the possibility of its non-existence becomes non-existent, why does not the subject

⁹⁷ There are two lithographical editions: 1) on the margins of *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*, 1314/1896, pp. 373–392; 2) on the margins of *Sharḥ al-Hidāya al-athīriyya*, ed. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Shīrāzī (Tehran, 1313/1895; facsimile reprint, Qum, 1998), pp. 383–393. Two modern editions are: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 'Ajlwibat al-masā'il al-naṣīriyya', in idem, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn*, ed. Nājī, pp. 161–177; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Ajlwibat al-masā'il al-naṣīriyya', ed. 'Abd Allāh Shakībā, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'i (Tehran, 1378 Sh./1999), pp. 1–21.

of the possibility of its existence also disappear (thus making its existence, after its being non-existent, impossible)?

- iii. If the cause of multiplicity in what issues from a single cause is the multiplicity present in the essence of the first effect (i.e. the presence of necessity and contingency, and the intellection, in it), how does that multiplicity appear? If it issues from the cause, this can happen either simultaneously or in a certain sequence. In the first case, the issue of multiplicity cannot be reduced to the multiplicity present in the first effect. In the second case, the first effect cannot be considered as the first effect anymore. Furthermore, if multiplicity does not issue from the first cause, it does not depend on the latter in any way, which is impossible. How can one solve this difficulty?⁹⁸

13) *al-Tanqīḥ fī ‘ilm al-manṭiq* (‘Extracting the Marrow of the Science of Logic’), also known under the title *al-Lama‘āt al-ishrāqiyya fī’l-funūn al-manṭiqiyya* (‘Illuminating Flashes Concerning the Science of Logic’).⁹⁹ The treatise represents a brief and comparatively simple introduction to logic, allegedly focusing on its Illuminationist variety.¹⁰⁰ It consists of nine chapters, or illuminations (*ishrāqāt*), dealing with such issues as conceptualisation (*taṣawwur*) and assenting (*taṣdīq*), universal and particular, modes of the existence of thing, aspects of proposition, types of syllogism, induction and analogy, demonstration and fallacies.

The treatise was translated into Persian by ‘Abd al-Muḥsin Mishkāt al-Dīnī under the title *Manṭiq-i nawīn*.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), ‘Ajwibat al-masā’il al-naṣiriyya’, ed. ‘Abd Allāh Shakībā, pp. 5–7.

⁹⁹ The two modern editions are: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Manṭiq-i nawīn, mushtamal bar al-Lama‘āt al-ishrāqiyya fī’l-funūn al-manṭiqiyya*, ed. ‘Abd al-Muḥsin Mishkāt al-Dīnī (Tehran, 1347 Sh./1968; 2nd ed., Tehran, 1362 Sh./1983); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, ‘al-Tanqīḥ fī ‘ilm al-manṭiq’, in idem, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn*, ed. Nājī, pp. 193–236; 3) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *al-Tanqīḥ fī ‘ilm al-manṭiq*, ed. Ghulām Riḍā Yāsipūr, with an introduction by Aḥad Farāmarz Qarā Malikī, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene’ī (Tehran, 1391 Sh./2012).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. the opinion of Rizvi in his *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 108.

¹⁰¹ al-Shīrāzī, *Manṭiq-i nawīn*.

14) *Hudūth al-‘ālam* ('The Inception of the World').¹⁰² The treatise deals with the world's essential and temporal inception (importantly, not even mentioning perpetual inception, postulated by Mīr Dāmād). Ṣadrā posits the self-renewing nature, in its universal and particular aspects, as the pivotal principle of the physical world, and the substantial motion of physical bodies, its concomitant and manifestation. The treatise consists of an introduction; twelve chapters (*fuṣūl*), which discuss necessity and contingency, potency and act, nature as the mover of physical bodies, time, relation of the eternal and the originated, and the active intellects; a conclusion, which contains a detailed account on the opinions of the ancients on inception (based mostly on Shahrastānī's *al-Milal wa'l-niḥal*); a supplement (*tatimma*), which continues the account, dealing with those opinions of the ancients that require an esoteric interpretation; and an addendum (*takmila*) on the motion of the celestial spheres.

The text of the treatise closely matches the discussion on inception in the fourth chapter of the second part of the *Asfār*.¹⁰³

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Gīlānī in his treatise *Hudūth al-‘ālam* criticised Ṣadrā's theory of inception¹⁰⁴ – in particular, the claim, which Ṣadrā makes in Chapter 10, that the agent intellects are eternal and existentially united with the divine essence.

The treatise was translated into Persian by Muḥammad Kh^wājavi¹⁰⁵ and into German by Sayyed Bagher Talgharizadeh.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² There are three lithographic editions: 1) in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i Ākhund* (Tehran, 1302/1884); 2) on the margins of Ḥillī's *Kashf al-fawā'id* (1305/1887); 3) on the margins of *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād* (1314/1896). The two modern editions of the work are: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Hudūth al-‘ālam*, ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984; 2nd ed., 1366 Sh./1987); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Risāla fī hudūth al-‘ālam* (*Hudūth al-‘ālam*), ed. Sayyid Ḥusayn Mūsawiyān, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1378 Sh./1999).

¹⁰³ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, (Mullā Ṣadrā), *al-Hikma al-muta'āliya fī'l-asfār al-‘aqliyya al-arba'a*, 9 vols. (Tehran, 1380–1383 Sh./2000–2005), vol. 5, ed. Riḍā Muḥammadzāda, pp. 205–246.

¹⁰⁴ Mullā Shamsā al-Gīlānī, *Hudūth al-‘ālam*, ed. 'Alī Riḍā Aṣgharī and Ghulām Riḍā Dādkhāh (Costa Mesa, CA, 2015), p. 158–175.

¹⁰⁵ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Āfarīnīsh-i jahān* (*tarjuma-yi Hudūth al-‘ālam*), translated into Persian by Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984).

¹⁰⁶ Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī [aṣ-Ṣīrāzī], *Die Risāla fī l-hudūt*, translated into German and annotated by Sayyed M. Bagher Talgharizadeh (Berlin, 2000).

15) *Risālat al-ḥashr* ('Treatise on the Gathering/Assembling').¹⁰⁷ The treatise deals with the issue of the gathering, or assembling (*ḥashr*), of different types of existents to their source and principle (i.e. demonstrates how the ἐπιστροφή works on different strata of the cosmos). It consists of an introduction, eight chapters, and a conclusion. Each chapter discusses the gathering of a certain type of existents – the intellects, the rational human and irrational animal souls, the vegetative faculties and natures, the minerals and elements, and the prime matter. The gathering, or return, of the existents is necessitated by their inherent substantial motion, directed towards the principle and source of the relevant existent.

The treatise was completed in Rajab 1032/May 1623.¹⁰⁸ It was translated into Persian by Muḥammad Kh^wājavi¹⁰⁹ and into French by Christian Jambet, who also devoted a special monograph to it.¹¹⁰

16) [*al-Risāla*] *al-ḥashriyya* ('The Gathering/Assembling [Treatise]').¹¹¹ Similar in name to the *Risālat al-ḥashr*, but different from it in content, this treatise examines the states and phenomena that occur/are experienced by the human soul between the physical death, or 'the lesser rising' (*al-qiyāma al-ṣughrā*), and 'the greater (i.e. psychic) rising'

¹⁰⁷ There are three lithographic editions: 1) in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i Ākhund*, pp. 341–370; 2) on the margins of *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*, pp. 184–231; 3) on the margins of Ḥillī's *Kashf al-fawā'id* (1305/1887). The two modern editions are: 1) Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī (*sic*), *Risālat al-ḥashr yā kitāb-i rastākhīz-i jahān*, edited and translated into Persian by Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984; 2nd ed., 1377 Sh./1998); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Risāla fī ḥashr al-ashyā', ed. Sa'īd Naẓarī Tawakkulī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī, 4 vols. (Tehran, 1389 Sh./2010), vol. 2, pp. 1–201.

¹⁰⁸ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 100.

¹⁰⁹ Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī, *Risālat al-ḥashr yā kitāb-i rastākhīz-i jahān*.

¹¹⁰ Christian Jambet, *Se rendre immortel, suivi du Traité de la résurrection de Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī* (Montpellier, 2000). The second, significantly revised, edition of the monograph and translation appeared recently: Christian Jambet, *La fin de toute chose: Apocalypse coranique et philosophique, suivi de L'Épître du rassemblement de Mullā Ṣadrā* (Paris, 2017).

¹¹¹ There are two modern editions: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 'Al-Ḥashriyya', in idem, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn*, ed. Nājī, pp. 237–279; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'al-Risāla al-ḥashriyya', ed. 'Alī Aṣghar Ja'farī Valanī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 2, pp. 203–272.

(*al-qiyāma al-kubrā*); the concept of the ‘greatest (i.e. noetic) rising’ (*al-qiyāma al-‘uẓmā*) is also introduced, without discussing it in detail. The treatise consists of nine sections (*fuṣūl*), dealing with such topics as the suffering of the Grave, the reality of the gathering, the path, the weighing and the registers of the deeds, the ranks of the people of the reckoning, the classes of the creatures on the Last Day, the guardians of the Garden and the Fire, and the states that occur upon the Rising.

Sajjad Rizvi questions the authenticity of the treatise, describing it as ‘an epitome culled from Ṣadrā’s other works’, which might have been compiled by one of his students.¹¹²

17) *Khalq al-a‘māl* (‘The Creation of the Actions’), also known under the titles *Jabr wa-tafwīd* (‘Compulsion and Relegation’) and *al-Qadar fī’l-af‘āl* (‘The Measuring Out of the Actions’).¹¹³ The treatise examines the opinions of different schools of thought in early Islam (Mu‘tazila, Jabriyya, Ash‘ariyya, and ‘those deeply rooted in knowledge’¹¹⁴ [Imāmiyya?]) on free will and predestination. The author associates himself with the opinion of the last school, which identifies freedom of choice with compulsion and vice versa. While Zayd is an actually established entity, he is also one of the aspects of the manifestation of the Real. Likewise, while Zayd is the actual agent of his action, that action is also performed by the Real Himself.

According to Rawḍātī,¹¹⁵ the discussion of the opinions of the four schools represents a paraphrase of a section from Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī’s *Risāla fī’l-af‘āl al-ikhtiyāriyya*.

¹¹² Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 105.

¹¹³ The two lithographical editions are: 1) ‘al-Qadar fī’l-af‘āl’, in *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i Ākhund*, pp. 371–377; 2) on the margins of Ḥillī’s *Kashf al-fawā’id*, pp. 146–158. The five modern editions are: 1) [pseudo-]al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, ‘Khalq al-a‘māl’, in *Kalimāt al-muḥaqqiqīn* (Qum, 1315/1897), pp. 503–508; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, *Risāla jabr wa-tafwīd ma‘rūf bi-khalq al-a‘māl*, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad ‘Alī Rawḍātī (Isfahan, 1381/1961); 3) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Khalq al-a‘māl: al-band al-awwal li-mushkilat al-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar*, ed. Yāsīn al-Sayyid Muḥsin (Baghdad, 1978); 4) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, ‘Khalq al-a‘māl’, in idem, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn*, ed. Nāji, pp. 269–279; 5) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), ‘Khalq al-a‘māl’, ed. Mahdī Dihbāshī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī*, vol. 2, pp. 273–326.

¹¹⁴ A reference to Q. 3:7.

¹¹⁵ Shīrāzī, *Risāla-yi Jabr wa tafwīd*, ed. Rawḍātī, p. vii; cf. Ḥāmid Nāji’s remark in *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn*, p. xxxiii.

18) *Sarayān al-wujūd* ('The Flow of Being'), also known as *Sarayān nūr al-wujūd fī'l-mawjūdāt* ('The Flow of the Light of Being in the Existents'), *Sarayān wujūd al-ḥaqq* ('The Flow of the Being of the Real'), *Sarayān nūr al-ḥaqq* ('The Flow of the Light of the Real') and *Ma'īyyat al-wājib bi'l-mawjūdāt* ('The Witness of the Necessary with the Existents').¹¹⁶ The treatise claims that, in the case of the Necessary Existent, the referent of existence is its essence, whereas in the case of the contingent existents, the referent is their essence taken in its relation to the true existence, namely, the Necessary Existent – this position can be traced back to the view of Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī. Furthermore, the existence is predicated to the contingents in a different degree/measure – this appears to be the personal opinion of the author.

If this work belongs to Ṣadrā, it must have been written in his youth (most likely, before 1008/1600).¹¹⁷ The treatise was translated into Persian by Sayyid Maḥmūd Yūsuf-i Thānī.¹¹⁸

19) *al-Maṣāḥir al-ilāhiyya fī asrār al-ʿulūm al-kamāliyya* ('The Loci of Divine Manifestations Concerning the Secrets of the Sciences of Perfection') – a perfect example of Ṣadrā's method of the synthesis of philosophy and gnosis. According to Khāmeneʿī, the book represents an abridged version or summary of *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*, and was written after Mīr Dāmād's death in 1040/1631.¹¹⁹ There is an old lithographic edition (on the margins of the text of *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*, 1314/1896) and two modern editions, by Āshtiyānī¹²⁰ and

¹¹⁶ There is one lithographical edition, 'Sarayān al-wujūd', in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i Ākhund*, pp. 132–148. The modern editions are: 1) 'Kayfiyyat ma'īyyat al-wājib bi'l-mawjūdāt', ed. Khadija Muqaddas-zāda, in *Ganjina-i Bahāristān: Hikmat I*, ed. 'Alī Awjabī (Tehran, 1379 Sh./2000), pp. 281–299; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Sarayān al-wujūd', ed. Sayyid Maḥmūd Yūsuf-i Thānī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmeneʿī, (Tehran, 1389 Sh./2010), vol. 1, pp. 155–224 (Arabic text, pp. 157–183; Persian translation, pp. 185–209).

¹¹⁷ See the discussion in Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 97.

¹¹⁸ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Sarayān al-wujūd', translated into Persian by Sayyid Maḥmūd Yūsuf-i Thānī, in idem, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 1, pp. 185–209.

¹¹⁹ Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmeneʿī, 'Editor's Introduction', in Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Maṣāḥir al-ilāhiyya fī asrār al-ʿulūm al-kamāliyya*, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmeneʿī (Tehran, 1378 Sh./1999), p. 294, see the last paragraph, esp. footnote 2.

¹²⁰ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Maṣāḥir al-ilāhiyya*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl Āshtiyānī (Mashhad, 1340 Sh./1961; reprinted in 1377 Sh./1998).

Khāmene’ī.¹²¹ The treatise consists of an introduction, two chapters, or sciences (*funūn*), each of which, in turn, consists of eight *mazāhir* (‘loci of manifestation’), whence the title of the book,¹²² and a conclusion. The first chapter deals with the issues related to the properties of the ultimate principle, or origin, and the furthest goal, its unity, names, and acts – in particular, the creation of the world. The second chapter discusses affairs pertaining to the return and Resurrection, with an emphasis on the corporeal resurrection, the reality of death, the Grave, reward, Resurrection, and the gathering. The conclusion examines the states that occur upon the Rising.

There is a complete English translation by Fazel Asadi Amjad and Mahdi Dasht Bozorgi.¹²³ Mohamad Nasrin Nasir has translated the section ‘On God’s Names and Attributes’.¹²⁴

20) *al-Ma’ād al-jismānī* (‘Corporeal Return’), also known as *Zād al-musāfir* (‘The Provision of the Traveller’).¹²⁵ The treatise represents an exposition of the twelve premises (repeated, with minor variations, in several other works) on which Mullā Ṣadrā builds his proof of the corporeal resurrection.

Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī wrote a detailed commentary on the treatise (about 500 pages).¹²⁶

¹²¹ al-Shirāzī, *al-Mazāhir al-ilāhiyya*, ed. Khāmene’ī.

¹²² Khāmene’ī believes that the eight *mazāhir* refer to, or represent, the eight gates of paradise; see Khāmene’ī, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p. ccxcvi.

¹²³ Sadr al-Din Shirazi, *Divine Manifestations Concerning the Secrets of Perfecting Sciences: Being a Translation of al-Mazāhir al-Ilāhiyyah fī Asrār al-‘Ulūm al-Kamāliyyah*, tr. Fazel Asadi Amjad and Mahdi Dasht Bozorgi, with the foreword by David B. Burrell (London, 2010).

¹²⁴ Mohamad Nasrin Nasir, ‘On God’s Names and Attributes: An Annotated Translation from Mullā Ṣadrā’s *al-Mazāhir al-Ilāhiyya*’, *Journal of Islamic Philosophy* 5 (2009), pp. 59–74.

¹²⁵ There are two modern editions: 1) ‘Zād al-musāfir’, ed. Kāzīm Mudīr Shānāchī, *Nashriyya-yi dānishkada-yi ilāhiyyāt wa-ma’ārif-i islāmī-yi dānishgāh-i Mashhad* 2 (1351 Sh./1972), pp. 134–144; 2nd ed., under the title ‘al-Ma’ād al-jismānī’ in Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī*, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene’ī, vol. 2, pp. 509–564; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), ‘Zād al-musāfir’, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, in Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, *Sharḥ bar zād al-musāfir-i Mullā Ṣadrā: ma’ād-i jismānī* (Tehran, 1379 Sh./2000; 2nd ed., Qum, 1381 Sh./2002; 3rd ed., 1385 Sh./2006).

¹²⁶ Āshtiyānī, *Sharḥ bar zād al-musāfir-i Mullā Ṣadrā*.

21) *al-Wāridāt al-qalbiyya fī maʿrifat al-rubūbiyya* ('What Comes into the Heart Concerning the Knowledge of Lordship').¹²⁷ Consists of forty sections, or emanations (*fuyūd*), the first sixteen of which deal with the macrocosm and the last twenty-four, with the microcosm, or human being. The sections on macrocosm discuss such issues as existence as a primary conceptualisation, God's perfect knowledge of both universals and particulars, the Necessary Existent as the principle of all effusion and existence, the order of creation, the characteristics of the immaterial intellects, celestial souls and celestial matter, and the necessity of a small evil for the sake of a great good. The sections on the microcosm examine such questions as the outer and inner parts/aspects of the human being, the types of perception, the essential relation of the human soul to the world of the immaterial intellects, and the character features of God's friend (i.e. perfect human being).

A relatively early work, completed in 1023/1614.¹²⁸ Translated into Persian by Aḥmad Shafī'ihā¹²⁹ and into Russian by Janis Esots.¹³⁰

22) *Ittiṣāf al-māhiya bi'l-wujūd* ('Attribution of Existence to Quiddity').¹³¹ The treatise examines how existence is predicated of quiddity. In a way, it represents a reply to Davānī, who famously believed that the existence of the contingent affairs consisted in their relation to the reality of existence/the Necessary Existent: Ṣadrā points out that such view presupposes that the quiddity is somehow 'affirmed'

¹²⁷ A lithographical edition in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i Ākhund*, pp. 238–277. The only modern edition is: Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, *al-Wāridāt al-qalbiyya fī maʿrifat al-rubūbiyya*, ed. Aḥmad Shafī'ihā (Tehran, 1399/1979; reprinted in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'i [Tehran, 1389 Sh./2010], vol. 3, pp. 309–464).

¹²⁸ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 98.

¹²⁹ al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 3, pp. 399–456.

¹³⁰ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Wāridāt al-qalbiyya fī maʿrifat al-rubūbiyya*, translated into Russian by Janis Esots as 'Приходящее в сердце о познании Господствия', *Vostok-Oriens*, 2000/2, pp. 109–132, and 2000/5, pp. 109–127.

¹³¹ There are two lithographical editions: 1) in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i Ākhund*, pp. 110–119; 2) on the margins of *Risāla al-taṣawwur wa'l-taṣdīq* (published as an appendix to Ḥillī's *al-Jawhar al-naḍīd* [Tehran, 1311/1983]), pp. 1–23. The only modern edition is: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Ittiṣāf al-māhiya bi'l-wujūd', ed. Sayyid Maḥmūd Yūsuf-i Thānī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 1, pp. 1–64.

(*thābit*), or exists, before the relation between it and the true/necessary being is established, which leads to an infinite chain of existences. He then proposes three solutions: 1) the predication of existence to quiddity represents a different type of predication, in which the predicate realises/establishes the subject (rather than depending on the latter); 2) attribution of existence to quiddity means establishing/affirming the essence itself, not affirming something in relation to that essence; 3) what is essentially found in every entity is its existence, not its quiddity (i.e. the referent of each concept is a certain type of existence, and not a quiddity).

Not an early work, as it mentions the *Aṣfār*.¹³² The treatise was translated into Persian by Sayyid Maḥmūd Yūsuf-i Thānī (the translation was published together with his critical edition of the Arabic text).¹³³

23) *Risālat fi'l-tashakhkhuṣ* ('The Treatise on Individuation').¹³⁴ Attempts to establish whether individuation is a mentally posited (*i'tibārī*) or real affair. Ṣadrā opts for the latter option, identifying the individuation of a thing with its external existence that can be ascertained only through the presential witnessing (*al-shuhūd al-ḥuḍūrī*). It also includes a critique of Davānī's and Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī's views on the perception of universals and particulars, and an overview of the views of earlier philosophers on individuation. Parallels to the discussion can be traced in most of Ṣadrā's major works.

The modern edition divides the treatise into an introduction and three chapters. Translated into Persian by Yūsuf-i Thānī.¹³⁵

24) *Iksīr al-ʿārīfīn fī maʿrifat ṭarīq al-ḥaqq wa'l-yaqīn* ('The Elixir of the Gnostics Concerning the Knowledge of the Path of Truth and

¹³² Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 95.

¹³³ al-Shīrāzī, *Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil-i falsafī*, vol. 1, pp. 31–48 (Arabic text); 49–64 (Persian translation).

¹³⁴ There is a lithographical edition in *Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil-i Ākhund*, pp. 120–132. The only modern edition is: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Risālat fi'l-tashakhkhuṣ', ed. Sayyid Maḥmūd Yūsuf-i Thānī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil-i falsafī*, vol. 1, pp. 65–138.

¹³⁵ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil-i falsafī*, vol. 1, pp. 91–116 (Arabic text); 119–138 (Persian translation).

Certainty').¹³⁶ An adapted Arabic paraphrase of Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī's (d. ca. 610/1213–1214) *Jāwidān-nāma*,¹³⁷ on knowledge, its principles, goals, and locus. Consists of an introduction and four chapters (*abwāb*). The first chapter deals with the classification of sciences, the second with the soul as the locus of knowledge, the third with the principles of knowledge, and the fourth with its final goals.

A relatively early work (completed in 1031/1621)¹³⁸ – note the denial of the possibility of substantial motion in the third section of the third chapter.¹³⁹

Translated into Japanese by Shigeru Kamada, into English by William Chittick, and into Persian by Sayyid Yaḥyā Yathribī.¹⁴⁰

25) [*Risāla fī*] *al-Qaḍā' wa'l-qadar* ('[The Treatise on] the Decree and the Measuring Out').¹⁴¹ In terms of its structure, it partially follows a similar treatise by 'Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (d. 736/1336),¹⁴² but the discussion (parallels to which can be found throughout the *Asfār*)¹⁴³ is

¹³⁶ A lithographical edition in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i Ākhund*, pp. 278–340. Modern editions: 1) Shigeru Kamada, ed., *Morrā Sadorā no reikonron* [Mullā Ṣadrā's Theory of Soul], introduction, Arabic edition, and annotated Japanese translation of the *Iksir al-ʿarīfīn* (Tokyo, 1984); 2) Mullā Ṣadrā, *The Elixir of the Gnostics: A parallel English-Arabic text*, tr. William C. Chittick (Provo, UT, 2003); 3) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Iksir al-ʿarīfīn fī ma'rifa ṭarīq al-ḥaqq wa'l-yaqīn', ed. Sayyid Yaḥyā Yathribī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 3, pp. 1–295 (Arabic text, pp. 67–214; Persian translation [by Sayyid Yaḥyā Yathribī], pp. 215–295).

¹³⁷ For a detailed analysis of the differences between *Jāwidān-nāma* and *Iksir al-ʿarīfīn*, see Chittick's introduction in Mullā Ṣadrā, *The Elixir of the Gnostics*, pp. xviii–xx; xxxii–xxxv.

¹³⁸ al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 3, p. 35; Mullā Ṣadrā, *The Elixir of the Gnostics*, p. xx; Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 94.

¹³⁹ al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 3, p. 135.

¹⁴⁰ See footnote 86.

¹⁴¹ A lithographical edition in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i Ākhund*, pp. 148–237. The only modern edition is Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), 'Risāla fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar', ed. Mahdī Dihbāshī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 2, pp. 331–510.

¹⁴² 'Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, 'Risāla fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar', in idem, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il wa muṣannafāt*, ed. Majid Hādizāda (Tehran, 1380 Sh./2001), pp. 565–593. Cf. Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 98.

¹⁴³ In particular, see Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 7, pp. 55–139.

more extensive and conducted in a more philosophical vein. It consists of a short introduction, six chapters (*fuṣūl*), and a conclusion. The first chapter establishes the meaning of providence (*‘ināya*), decree, and measuring out. The second deals with the locus of decree and measuring out. The third argues for the perfect structure of the created world. The fourth examines if and how evil enters God’s decree. The fifth discusses the actions performed by free choice and investigates how the human being can be simultaneously free and compelled in his/her choice. The sixth examines the benefits of obedience to God and the usefulness of prayer.

26) *al-Mizāj* (‘The Mixture’).¹⁴⁴ The treatise represents a corrected and improved version of sections 14–17 from the sixth chapter (‘On the Principles and Causes of Natural Affairs’) of the second part of the *Asfār*.¹⁴⁵ The modern edition divides it into six sections: on the definition of the mixture, on the impossibility of the actual obtainment of the elements in the mixture, on the opinion of Ibn Sīnā and its refutation, on the precedent of the claim in Aristotle, on the demonstration of the proposed postulate (that the elements do not exist *in actu* in any mixture composed of them).

2.1.2 Commentaries

27) *Sharḥ al-Hidāya al-athīrīyya* (‘Commentary on *al-Hidāya al-athīrīyya*’).¹⁴⁶ A commentary on the parts of physics and

¹⁴⁴ The modern edition is Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, ‘*al-Mizāj*’, in idem, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn*, ed. Nāji, pp. 369–392, reprinted with minor changes as Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), ‘*al-Mizāj*’, in idem, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī*, ed. Nāji, vol. 1, pp. 431–492.

¹⁴⁵ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 5, pp. 320–342. Cf. the editor’s remark in footnote 2 in Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn*, ed. Nāji, p. 371, and Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 107.

¹⁴⁶ Lithographical editions: 1) Lucknow, 1262/1846 (with the glosses of ‘Abd al-‘Alī Baḥr al-‘Ulūm); 2) Madras, 1270/1854 (with the glosses of Sa’d Allāh Rāmpūrī); 3) Hyderabad, 1291/1875 (with the glosses of Abū al-Ḥasan Lakḥnavī, Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ḥayy, Irtiḍā ‘Alī Khān, and Muḥammad Sa’d Allāh); 4) Lucknow, 1291/1875 (with the glosses of ‘Abd al-Ḥayy Lakḥnavī); 5) Delhi, 1916; 6) Lucknow, 1921; 7) ed. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shīrāzī, Tehran, 1313/1895 (facsimile reprint, Qum, 1998). Modern editions: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Sharḥ al-Hidāya al-athīrīyya*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Fūlādkār (Beirut, 1422/2001); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad

metaphysics¹⁴⁷ in Athīr al-Dīn Abharī's (a student of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, d. ca. 663/1264) *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* ('Guidance to Wisdom'), a textbook on philosophy for students of intermediate level. A relatively early work: first recension ca. 1024/1615; second 1029/1620¹⁴⁸ (the *Asfār* is mentioned a number of times, but these references may have been added later).

In terms of structure, it follows Abharī's work, consisting of an introduction, two parts, and a conclusion. The first part, on physics, is divided into three chapters (*funūn*): on the characteristics possessed by all bodies, on the celestial bodies, and on the elemental ones. The second part, on metaphysics, is divided into three chapters: on the divisions of existence, on the knowledge of the Creator and His attributes, and on the angels (who are identified with the immaterial intellects). The conclusion deals with eschatology, endorsing the views of Ibn Sīnā, without criticising or modifying them.

For more than two centuries, it was part of the *Dars-i Nizāmī* curriculum of the seminary in Lucknow and was used as a textbook in the *madrasas* of the subcontinent, replacing the previous commentaries by Mīrak Muḥammad Bukhārī (d. ca. 880/1440) and Mīr Ḥusayn Maybudī (d. 910/1504) (whence the abundance of manuscripts and lithographical editions of this text in India and Pakistan).

Translated into Persian as *Mir'āt al-akwān* by Aḥmad Ḥusaynī Ardakānī (1185/1771–after 1242/1826).¹⁴⁹

28) *Ta'liqāt 'alā Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* (Addenda to [Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī's] *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*).¹⁵⁰ A collection of 669 addenda

al-Shīrāzī, *Ḍawābit al-ma'rifa, al-musammāt Sharḥ al-hidāya*, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥīm Sāyih and Tawfiq 'Alī Wahba (Cairo, 2008); 3) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Sharḥ al-Hidāya*, 2 vols., ed. Maqṣūd Muḥammadī, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1393 Sh./2014), a reliable (though not critical) edition, based on four manuscripts preserved in Iran.

¹⁴⁷ Omitting the first part, on logic.

¹⁴⁸ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 70.

¹⁴⁹ Aḥmad Ḥusaynī Ardakānī, *Mir'āt al-akwān (Taḥrīr-i Sharḥ-i Hidāya Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī)*, ed. 'Abd Allāh Nūrānī (Tehran, 1375 Sh./1996).

¹⁵⁰ Lithographical edition on the margins of *Sharḥ 'Allāma Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī 'alā Ḥikmat al-ishrāq lil-Suhrawardī*, ed. Asad Allāh Hirātī under the supervision of Sayyid Ibrāhīm Ṭabāṭabā'ī (Tehran, 1315/1897). There are three modern editions (complete or partial): 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Addenda on the Commentary of the*

(*ta'liqa*): 640 of them pertain to Suhrawardī's text, while only twenty-nine (twenty-seven on metaphysics and two on logic) are related to Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī's commentary.¹⁵¹ Apparently a rather late work, because it appears to contain all important elements of Ṣadrā's doctrine. Remarkably, on a number of issues, Ṣadrā criticises Suhrawardī harshly; he accuses him of invalidating the providence through his hierarchy of lights.¹⁵² The form of the species, he claims, is nothing other than its specific nature, which is fluid in its existence and permanently renewing in its essence¹⁵³ (whence one can conclude that Suhrawardī's understanding of the physical world was wrong, because he did not endorse substantial motion, and nature as its mover/driving force).

However, the work was definitely commenced (and probably even completed) during the lifetime of Mīr Dāmād (d. 1040/1631), who is mentioned as being alive.¹⁵⁴

Partially translated into French and annotated by Henry Corbin.¹⁵⁵

29) *Ta'liqāt 'alā al-Ilāhiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā'* ('Addenda to the Metaphysics of [Ibn Sīnā's] *Book of Healing*').¹⁵⁶ Covers the first six

Philosophy of Illumination. Part One. On the Rules of Thought (al-Ta'liqāt 'alā sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq), ed. Hossein Ziai (Costa Mesa, CA, 2010); 2) Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ-i Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, bi-inḍimām-i ta'liqāt-i Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn*, 2 vols., ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Mūsawī (Tehran, 1388–1389 Sh./2009–2010; 2nd ed., 1394 Sh./2015); 3) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq-i Suhrawardī bā sharḥ-i Quṭb al-Dīn-i Shīrāzī wa-ta'liqāt-i Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn*, 4 vols., ed. Ḥusayn Ḍiyā'ī Turbatī and Najafqulī Ḥabībī, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1392 Sh./2013).

¹⁵¹ Whence, as Najafqulī Ḥabībī justly remarks, it is more appropriate to call them addenda to Suhrawardī's work, rather than addenda to the commentary on it (i.e. *Ta'liqāt 'alā ḥikmat al-ishrāq* rather than *Ta'liqāt 'alā sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq*). See al-Shīrāzī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq-i Suhrawardī*, vol. 1, p. xxv.

¹⁵² al-Shīrāzī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq-i Suhrawardī*, vol. 4, p. 162.

¹⁵³ Ibid., vol. 4, p. 199.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., vol. 4, p. 76.

¹⁵⁵ Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī [Shihāboddīn Yaḥya Sohravardī], *Le Livre de la Sagesse Orientale: Kitāb Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, tr. Henry Corbin, with an introduction by Christian Jambet (Lagrasse, 1986; 2nd ed., Paris, 2003), pp. 439–666.

¹⁵⁶ Lithographic edition, as a supplement to the Metaphysics of the *Shifā'* (Tehran, 1303/1885; offset printing, Qum 1991). Modern edition: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Sharḥ wa ta'liqa-yi Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn bar Ilāhiyyāt-i Shifā' shaykh al-ra'īs Abū 'Alī Ibn Sīnā*, 2 vols., ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1382 Sh./2003).

books (of ten) of Ibn Sīnā's work. Composed between 1041 and 1044/1631 and 1634¹⁵⁷ (it mentions *al-Ḥikma al-ʿarshiyya*, completed in the aforementioned period),¹⁵⁸ apparently with the goal to facilitate the understanding of the Avicennan text for the students (rather than to expose the commentator's own views on the discussed issues). Short guidelines/inventories of the discussed topics are provided at the beginning of most sections. Rather than criticising them, Ṣadrā usually defends Ibn Sīnā's views (the objects of his critique typically being Suhrawardī and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī); whenever he dismisses Ibn Sīnā's opinion, Ṣadrā refers the reader to the relevant section(s) of the *Asfār*.¹⁵⁹

2.2. Exegesis and Hermeneutics: Tafsīr and Ḥadīth

1) *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān* ('Commentary on the Qur'an'; there are two editions – by Muḥammad Kh^wājavi¹⁶⁰ and by Kh^wājavi, Bīdārfarr, Pīshwā'ī, Ṭāhirī, and Maʿrifat, under the supervision of Khāmene'ī¹⁶¹). At a rough estimate, the Qur'anic commentaries constitute some twenty percent of Ṣadrā's writings. If considered as a single piece, Ṣadrā's *tafsīr* (which, in its modern edition, forms seven or eight volumes) is his second biggest work after the nine-volume *al-Asfār al-arba'a*.

It consists of the following parts:

- i. Commentary on *Sūrat al-Ḥadīd* (Q. 57, 'The Iron'); composed between 1010 and 1014/1602 and 1606.

¹⁵⁷ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 75.

¹⁵⁸ See Ḥabībī's considerations in al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ wa ta'līqā-yi Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn bar Ilāhiyyāt-i Shifā'*, vol. 1, pp. xvi–xvii.

¹⁵⁹ See Ḥabībī's analysis in Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ wa ta'līqā-yi Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn bar Ilāhiyyāt-i Shifā'*, vol. 1, pp. xix–xx.

¹⁶⁰ Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn al-Shīrāzī, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Karīm*, 7 vols., ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Qum, 1366 Sh./1987).

¹⁶¹ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Karīm*, 8 vols., ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi, Muḥsin Bīdārfarr, Muḥsin Pīshwā'ī, Ṣadr al-Dīn Ṭāhirī, and Muḥammad Hādī Maʿrifat, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1389 Sh./2010). For a short overview of Ṣadrā's Qur'anic hermeneutics, see Janis Esots, 'Speech, Book and Healing Knowledge: The Qur'anic Hermeneutics of Mullā Ṣadrā', in Sajjad H. Rizvi and Annabel Keeler, eds., *The Spirit and the Letter* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 375–394.

- ii. Commentary on *Sūrat al-A‘lā* (Q. 87, ‘The Most High’); between 1030 and 1032/1621 and 1623.
- iii. Commentary on *Āyat al-Kursī* (Q. 2:255, ‘The Throne Verse’); ca. 1022/1613).¹⁶²
- iv. Commentary on *Āyat al-Nūr* (Q. 24:35, ‘The Light Verse’); 1030/1621.
- v. Commentary on *Sūrat al-Ṭāriq* (Q. 86, ‘The Night Star’); 1030/1621.
- vi. Commentary on *Sūrat al-Sajda* (Q. 32, ‘The Prostration’); between 1027 and 1029/1618 and 1620 (?).
- vii. Commentary on *Sūrat Yā-Sīn* (Q. 36, ‘Y-S’); 1030/1621.
- viii. Commentary on *Sūrat al-Wāqī‘a* (Q. 56, ‘The [Terrible] Event’); between 1030 and 1032/1621 and 1623 (?).
- ix. Commentary on *Sūrat al-Zilzāl* (*al-Zalzala*) (Q. 99, ‘The Earthquake’); between 1030 and 1032/1621 and 1623 (?).
- x. Commentary on *Sūrat al-Jum‘a* (Q. 62, ‘The Congregation’); in 1038–39/1629–30, or between 1041 and 1044/1631 and 1634.¹⁶³
- xi. Commentary on *Sūrat al-Ḥamd* (‘The Praise’) or *al-Fātiḥa* (Q. 1, ‘The Opening’); between 1029 and 1032/1620 and 1623 (?), definitely before 1041–1044/1631–1634.¹⁶⁴
- xii. (An incomplete) commentary on *Sūrat al-Baqara* (Q. 2 [only verses 1–65], ‘The Heifer’); between 1041 and 1044/1631 and 1634.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² This commentary has been carefully examined in Jambet, *La gouvernement divin*, pp. 171–230.

¹⁶³ There is a separate edition by Muhammad Kh^wājavi, together with the Persian translation: Ṣadr al-Muta‘allihīn Shīrāzī, *Tafsīr Sūrat al-Jum‘a*, ed. and tr. Muhammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1362 Sh./1983).

¹⁶⁴ The commentary on this *sūra* was examined in detail in Mohammed Rustom, ‘Qur’anic Exegesis in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā’s *Tafsīr Sūrat al-Fātiḥa*’ (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2009) and subsequently in Mohammed Rustom, *The Triumph of Mercy: Philosophy and Scripture of Mullā Ṣadrā* (Albany, NY, 2012).

¹⁶⁵ The four following scholars have attempted to establish the chronology of Ṣadrā’s Qur’anic commentaries: Muhammad Kh^wājavi, see his ‘Muqaddima’ in Sadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Karīm*, vol. 1, pp. cvii–cx; Sajjad Rizvi, see his *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, pp. 77–87; Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene‘ī, see his *Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy* (Tehran, 2004), p. 116; and Mohammed Rustom, see his ‘The Nature and Significance of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Qur’anic Writings,’ *Journal of Islamic Philosophy* 6/2010, pp. 129–130. Kh^wājavi and Rizvi date only some of them. Khāmene‘ī’s chronology is comprehensive but lax. Rustom attempts to give a comprehensive list of dates, relying on Rizvi. When the date of the composition is given by only one of the researchers (usually, Khāmene‘ī), I have put a question mark after it.

2) *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* ('The Keys of the Unseen').¹⁶⁶ Intended to serve as an introduction to the commentary on the Qur'an. Consists of twenty chapters, or keys (*mafātīḥ*). The first two chapters lay out the principles of Ṣadrā's allegedly gnostic hermeneutics. Chapters 3–6 discuss the meaning of knowledge, the kinds of revelation and inspiration, the science of Lordship, and the concept of balance. Chapters 7 and 8 deal with God's essence, attributes, and actions. Chapter 9 discusses angels, or psychic powers/faculties of the universe and man. Chapter 10 examines the types of bodies and their states. The eleventh chapter is devoted to the noetic substances, and the twelfth, to the temporal inception of the world. Chapters 13 and 14 deal with the spiritual, or psychic, world and man's journey to his Lord. The fifteenth chapter examines the quiddity of human being; the sixteenth deals with the celestial souls. Chapters 17 and 18 are devoted to the noetic, psychic, and corporeal return/resurrection. The nineteenth chapter discusses the states of the Rising. The final twentieth chapter deals with ascetic exercises.

Mullā 'Alī Nūrī wrote addenda to the book.¹⁶⁷ There is an old (Qajar era) translation of the introduction and the first chapter (incomplete).¹⁶⁸

3) *Asrār al-āyāt wa-anwār al-bayyināt* ('The Mysteries of the [Qur'anic] Verses and the Lights of Evident Indications').¹⁶⁹ It consists of an introduction and three parts, or sides (*aṭrāf*), which are further divided into chapters, or loci of witnessing (*mashāhid*), and those, in turn, into sections, or rules (*qawā'id*). The first part, which deals with the science of Lordship (*ilm al-rubūbiyya*), consists of three chapters, discussing God's unity, His attributes and acts, the perpetuity of His

¹⁶⁶ Two modern editions exist: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, with the addenda of Mullā 'Alī Nūrī, 2 vols., ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Beirut, 1419/1999); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran, 1386 Sh./2007).

¹⁶⁷ Published in al-Shīrāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, ed. Kh^wājavi, vol. 2, pp. 785–881.

¹⁶⁸ Mahdī Muḥaqqiq, 'Mafātīḥ al-ghayb-i Mullā Ṣadrā', *Maqālāt wa barrasihā* (*Dānishkada-yi ilāhiyāt wa-ma'ārif-i islāmī dānishgāh-i Tihārān*), vol. 2 (1349 Sh./1970), pp. 56–79.

¹⁶⁹ There are two modern editions: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Asrār al-āyāt*, ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1360 Sh./1981); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Asrār al-āyāt wa-anwār al-bayyināt. Risāla mutashābihāt al-Qur'ān*, ed. Muḥammad 'Alī Jāwidān and Sayyid Muḥammad Riḍā Aḥmadi Burūjirdi (Tehran, 1388 Sh./2009).

divinity, and the way He creates the world. The second part deals with God's acts, their emanation from Him and return to Him. It consists of four chapters, discussing the inception of the world, its annihilation upon reaching its desired goal, the fate of different types of beings during their ascent to God, and prophecy. The third part, which consists of twelve chapters, deals with the corporeal return, or resurrection, and the states of the hereafter.

The treatise was translated into Persian by Muhammad Kh^wājavi.¹⁷⁰

4) *Mutashābihāt al-Qur'ān* ('The Obscure Verses of the Qur'an').¹⁷¹

The treatise consists of an introduction and five chapters (*fuṣūl*), which deal with some fine points of the revealed sciences, the absurd implications of the assumption of God's absolute transcendence and His complete abandonment of the world, as well as with the impossibility to limit the meanings of the words and expressions of the Qur'an solely to their literal sense.

5) *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfi* ('Commentary on [Kulīnī's] *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*').¹⁷²

Composed between 1035 and 1044/1625 and 1634,¹⁷³ Ṣadrā's commentary deals with the first three (of eight) books of the *uṣūl* part – *Kitāb al-'aql wa-faḍā'il al-'ilm*, *Kitāb al-tawḥīd*, and *Kitāb al-ḥujja* (the commentary on the last one being unfinished).

¹⁷⁰ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Asrār al-āyāt wa-amwār al-bayyināt*, translated into Persian and annotated by Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984; reprinted 1380 Sh./2001).

¹⁷¹ There are two modern editions: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 'Mutashābihāt al-Qur'ān', in idem, *Se risāla-i falsafī*, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, 2nd ed. (Qum, 1378 Sh./1999), pp. 77–181; 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Asrār al-āyāt wa-amwār al-bayyināt. Risāla mutashābihāt al-Qur'ān*, ed. Muḥammad 'Alī Jāwidān and Sayyid Muḥammad Riḍā Aḥmadī Burūjirdī, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1388 Sh./2009).

¹⁷² Lithographical edition: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfi*, in one volume with *Maḥāṭib al-ghayb* (Tehran, 1282/1865; reprinted 1391/1971). Modern editions: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfi*, 4 vols., ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1370 Sh./1991; reprinted 1383 Sh./2004); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Kāfi*, 5 vols., ed. Riḍā Ustādī, Maḥmūd Fāḍil Yazdī Muṭlaq, Sayyid Mahdī Rajā'ī and Subḥān'ālī Kūshā, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1384–1387 Sh./2005–2008).

¹⁷³ I date the work on the basis of two remarks found in the text of Ṣadrā's commentary: 1) 'I have become fifty-six' (vol. 3., p. 180) – assuming that Ṣadrā was born in 979 or 980 AH, this refers to 1035 or 1036 AH; 2) 'written by the hand of . . . Ṣadr al-Shīrāzī . . . in the year 1044 AH' (vol. 4, p. 1326).

Like his *tafsīr*, in terms of its method and contents, Ṣadrā's commentary on *al-Kāfi* is heavily influenced by al-Ghazālī. In all likelihood, it is based on the lecture notes of Ṣadrā's classes on the exegesis of Kulīnī's work – a course which he may have taught at the Imām Qulī Khān Madrasa in Shīrāz, presumably, to undergraduate students (judging from the relative simplicity of the discourse, although some passages deal with more sophisticated philosophical and/or theological issues).

The discussion – which, from the formal point of view, follows the structure of the relevant books and chapters of *al-Kāfi*, and, within that framework, the content of the relevant *ḥadīths* – is dominated by a few recurrent principal themes: the nature and manifestation of God's unity, His essential and active attributes, creation and inception of the world and its constituents, the systematic ambiguity of existence, substantial motion (as the pivotal feature of the corporeal and psychic world), human knowledge and its salvatory role, prophethood, and imamate.¹⁷⁴

Mullā Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Māzandarānī (d. 1086/1675) in his commentary on *al-Kāfi*¹⁷⁵ criticises some philosophical aspects of Ṣadrā's interpretation.

2.3. *Gnosis* ('irfān)

1) *Īqāz al-nā'imīn* ('Awakening of the Sleepers').¹⁷⁶ Some sections have parallels in the second part of the *Asfār*.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, Sajjad Rizvi

¹⁷⁴ Some aspects of this work have been examined in Jambet, *La gouvernement divin*, pp. 231–260 and 266–275; idem, 'Religion du savant et religion du vulgaire: Remarques sur les intentions du commentaire du *Livre de la preuve* par Mullā Ṣadrā', *Studia Islamica* 109/2 (2014), pp. 208–239; Janis Esots, 'Transzendente Weisheit als Methode der Exegese oder Ṣadrās Kommentar zu Kulainīs *Kitāb al-Kāfi*', *Spektrum Iran* 31/2 (2018), pp. 55–62; Jari Kaukua, 'The Intellect in Mullā Ṣadrā's Commentary on the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*', in Saiyad Nizamuddin Ahmad and Sajjad H. Rizvi, eds., *Philosophy and The Intellectual Life in Shī'ah Islam: Symposium 2015* (London, 2017), pp. 158–183.

¹⁷⁵ Mullā Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Māzandarānī, *Sharḥ 'alā al-Uṣūl wa'l-Rawḍa al-Kāfi, ma'a ta'ālīq Abū al-Ḥassan al-Sha'rānī*, 12 vols., ed. 'Alī Akbar al-Ghaffārī (Tehran, 1382–1388/1962–1968).

¹⁷⁶ There are two modern editions: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn), *Īqāz al-nā'imīn*, ed. Muḥsin Mu'ayyidī (Tehran, 1361 Sh./1982); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Īqāz al-nā'imīn*, ed. Muḥammad Kh^wānsārī (Tehran, 1386 Sh./2007).

¹⁷⁷ Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, p. 87.

justly questions the authenticity of the treatise: in his opinion, its ideas 'are more akin to Sufi thought than philosophy and Ṣadrā is quoted by name with his works, a practice of self-reference in the third person that one does not find in other texts by him'.¹⁷⁸ I agree with Rizvi and believe that, in all likelihood, this work was composed by an unknown scholar during the Qajar period.

2) *Kasr aṣnām al-jāhiliyya* ('Breaking the Idols of Ignorance').¹⁷⁹ A critique of the contemporary pseudo-Sufis, whom Ṣadrā attempts to separate from the genuine gnostics ('*urafā*'), the followers of the teachings of Ibn 'Arabī and his school; the text is mostly based on al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* (about two-thirds of the text appears to be a paraphrase of different passages from it).¹⁸⁰ It consists of an introduction, four chapters (*maqālāt*), each of which is divided into several sections, and a conclusion. The introduction describes the specific characteristics of the state of the gnostics. The first chapter extolls the importance of the knowledge of God's essence, attributes, and actions, and praises the divine knower. The second chapter establishes the acquisition of knowledge as the ultimate goal of all kinds of bodily worship and ascetic practices. The third chapter analyses the attributes of the pious and those acting in a righteous manner, whose rank is below that of the ones drawn near to God. The fourth chapter represents a collection of excerpts from philosophical sermons and of rational advice, reproaching this world and its inhabitants. The conclusion explains the purpose of the composition of the book, briefly outlying the principles of spiritual journey and admonishing against following pseudo-Sufis.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ The three modern editions are: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, *Kasr aṣnām al-jāhiliyya*, ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dānishpazhūh (Tehran, 1340 Sh./1961); 2) Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Kasr aṣnām al-jāhiliyya*, ed. Muḥsin Jahāngirī, under the supervision of Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'ī (Tehran, 1381 Sh./2002; reprinted, omitting the editor's extensive introduction in Persian, in Beirut, 1428/2007); 3) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, *Kasr aṣnām al-jāhiliyya fī radd 'alā al-ṣūfiyya*, ed. Ḥusayn al-Ṭaqash (Beirut, 2004).

¹⁸⁰ See the respective analyses of the editors: Dānishpazhūh (in al-Shīrāzī, *Kasr aṣnām al-jāhiliyya*, ed. Dānishpazhūh, pp. 28–30), and Jahāngirī (in al-Shīrāzī, *Kasr aṣnām al-jāhiliyya*, ed. Jahāngirī, pp. xxxvi–li).

The treatise was completed in 1027/1618.¹⁸¹ It has been translated twice into Persian (first, by Muḥsin Shafī'ihā,¹⁸² and then, Muḥsin Bīdārfarr¹⁸³) and into English (by Mahdī Dasht Buzurgī and Fāḍil Amjad Asadī).¹⁸⁴

3) *Sih aṣl* ('Three Principles').¹⁸⁵ An ethical and gnostic treatise which attacks the three obstacles that prevent most people from accessing the hidden esoteric meaning of the Qur'an and the *ḥadīth*. These obstacles, according to Ṣadrā, are: 1) ignorance of the true character of the soul (in which the reality of the human being consists); 2) craving for an elevated social position and wealth, and inclination towards lust and (material and this-worldly) pleasures; 3) the temptations of the (lower) soul that urge one to commit evil and the deception of the Satan, which presents evil as good and good as evil.¹⁸⁶

The treatise consists of an introduction and fourteen sections. The first three sections examine the aforementioned principles or obstacles. Sections 4–6 discuss the (negative) impact and influence of each of the three principles. Sections 7 and 8 provide guidance on how to avoid and overcome these obstacles. Sections 9 and 10 establish the nature of true faith. Section 11 explains how to prepare/purify one's heart in order to receive the light of true faith. Section 12 discusses the two journeys, from the creation to God and from God to the creation. Section 13 deals with the issues pertaining to the hereafter. The final fourteenth section investigates how to recognise a proper action and a profitable knowledge.

¹⁸¹ Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 88.

¹⁸² Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Kaṣr aṣnām al-jāhiliyya*, translated into Persian by Muḥsin Shafī'ihā (Tehran, 1405/1984).

¹⁸³ Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *ʿIrfān wa-ʿarīf namāyān*, tr. Muḥsin Bīdārfarr (Tehran, 1366 Sh./1987).

¹⁸⁴ Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *Breaking the Idols of Ignorance: Admonition of the 'Soi-Disant' Ṣūfī*, tr. Mahdī Dasht Buzurgī and Fāḍil Amjad Asadī (London, 2008).

¹⁸⁵ There are two modern editions: 1) Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Risāla-yi sih aṣl, bi-inḍimām-i mathnawī wa-rubāʿiyyāt-i ū*, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Tehran, 1340 Sh./1961; 2nd ed., Tehran, 1390 Sh./2011); 2) Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī, *Risāla-i sih aṣl*, ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1376 Sh./1997).

¹⁸⁶ Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Risāla-i sih aṣl*, ed. Nasr, 2nd ed., p. 12; cf. p. xxxiii of the Introduction.

2.3.1 Poetry

Ṣadrā wrote a modest amount of poetry in Persian: several *qaṣīdas* and short *mathnawīs* (altogether around 700 *bayts*), as well as about a dozen *rubāʿīs*.¹⁸⁷ His poetry is of gnostic (*ʿirfānī*) character in terms of its content (not dealing with specifically philosophical issues), and of medium quality in terms of its form and style (perhaps slightly surpassing the poetry of Mir Dāmād in this aspect, but by no means reaching the ranks of a masterpiece). Apparently, the poems were collated into a *dīwān* by Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī.¹⁸⁸

3. Key Elements of Mullā Ṣadrā's Doctrine

3.1. The Principality of Existence in Respect to Quiddity

Already Aristotle distinguished between 'what the thing was' and 'that it was' – in other words, between the thing's quiddity/essence and its existence.¹⁸⁹ Porphyry, Boethius, and, in the Islamic world, Ibn Sīnā, elaborated on this distinction: the latter viewed the issue in the context of his classification of the existents as either necessary or possible.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ A selection of Ṣadrā's poetry was published by Seyyed Hossein Nasr as an appendix to his edition of the *Sih aṣl*, see Shīrāzī, *Risāla-i sih aṣl*, pp. 119–145. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi published a collection of all Ṣadrā's surviving poetry, see Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī, *Majmūʿa-yi ashʿār*, ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Tehran, 1376 Sh./1997).

¹⁸⁸ Nasr, *Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī and his Transcendent Theosophy*, p. 40.

¹⁸⁹ 'Anyone who knows what "man" or any other thing is must also know that it is' (Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 92b8); and, perhaps more importantly, 'we must inquire whether the essence (τὸ ἐκάστῳ εἶναι) is the same as the particular thing (ἐκάστος) or different . . . a particular thing is considered to be nothing other than its own substance, and the essence is called the substance of the thing (καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἢ ἐκάστου οὐσία)'; see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII.6. 1031a15–19, tr. by Hugh Tredennick as Aristotle, *The Metaphysics. Books I–IX* (Cambridge, MA, 1933; reprinted 2003), p. 331. Cf. Pierre Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols. (Paris–Turnhout, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 359 and 491.

¹⁹⁰ See, inter alia, Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of The Healing*, tr. Michael Marmura, p. 24 (I.5.10–11). The issue is discussed in great detail in Goichon's doctoral dissertation: Amélie-Marie Goichon, 'La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne)' (University of Paris, 1937); cf. Bonmariage, *Le Réel et les réalités*, p. 31.

After Ibn Sīnā, the question of the relationship between existence and quiddity, in terms of their priority and principality, became the subject of heated discussions among the Muslim philosophers. Toshihiko Izutsu claims that the professors of the 'principality of quiddity' based their philosophical position 'on an eidetic intuition of eternal archetypes, a mystical experience of the trans-sensible essences of the things'¹⁹¹ – that is, on an intuition of the eternal ideas of things. In turn, the professors of the 'principality of existence', whom Izutsu describes as the possessors of 'a dynamic intuition of a dynamic reality',¹⁹² based their philosophical doctrines upon the intuition of the all-encompassing flow of the primordial creative energy (the cosmic Life).¹⁹³ They believed that this dynamic creative reality or energy manifests and existentiates itself in an infinite number of phenomenal forms, which the intellect converts into static and fixed entities, which are referred to as 'quiddities' (*māhiyāt*). To Izutsu, the entire history of metaphysics can be regarded as a dialogue between these two basic intuitions – the intuition of immutable essences and the intuition of the flow of existence.

A different approach is taken by contemporary Iranian scholar Mudarris Muṭlaq, who describes the principality of existence as the position of the gnostics and the principality of quiddity as the position of the philosophers.¹⁹⁴ According to Mudarris, gnostic knowledge is ontological by its nature and can be acquired only through witnessing the flowing ipseity, whereas philosophical knowledge is the knowledge of quiddities and concepts.¹⁹⁵ It appears that these two types of knowledge cannot be properly combined.

In any case, Ṣadrā's position on the relationship between existence and quiddity is best summarised in his statement, 'quiddity is an imitation (*ḥikāya*) of existence'.¹⁹⁶ In modern terms, he might have

¹⁹¹ Toshihiko Izutsu, 'Mīr Dāmād and His Metaphysics', in Mīr Dāmād, *al-Qabasāt*, pp. 11–12 (of the Introduction in English).

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Muḥammad 'Alī Mudarris Muṭlaq, *Naẓariyya-i aṣālat-i huwiyyat [yā] al-Lawāmi' al-ghaybiyya fī ithbāt aṣālat al-huwiyya* (Isfahan, 1380 Sh./2001), p. 149, footnote 1; p. 236. The author proposes the principality of the ipseity (*aṣālat al-huwiyya*) as the solution of the problem.

¹⁹⁵ Mudarris Muṭlaq, *Naẓariyya-i aṣālat-i huwiyyat*, p. 189.

¹⁹⁶ See e.g. Ṣadrā, *Mashā'ir*, p. 7.

described quiddity as a mental photograph of the infinite flow of *wujūd*, or existence, which registers the parameters of the latter at a particular point/moment.

3.2. Systematic Ambiguity of Existence

At the heart of Ṣadrā's philosophy lies the teaching on the predication of the reality of existence in different measure to different degrees of intensity of existence (*tashkīk fī ḥaqīqat al-wujūd bi'l-shidda wa'l-ḍa'f*), or the modulation of existence, *ishtidād wa-taḍ'īf al-wujūd* (literally, 'strengthening and weakening of existence'). According to this teaching, existence potentially possesses an infinite number of degrees of intensity, to the effect that every higher degree relates to every lower one as cause to effect; and the doctrine of substantial motion (*al-ḥaraka al-jawhariyya*), according to which, the physical and psychic worlds are in permanent flux and all physical and psychic beings are processes (rather than fixed entities).

Ṣadrā's theory of the systematic ambiguity of the reality of existence in terms of strength and weakness (*tashkīk fī ḥaqīqat al-wujūd bi'l-shidda wa'l-ḍa'f*) must be considered in the context of the reception of Plato's doctrine of the eternal ideas and/or forms.¹⁹⁷ In Islamic philosophy, this theory was preceded by Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī's theory of the systematic ambiguity of light (*tashkīk al-nūr*) and can be viewed as a modification of the latter.

According to Suhrawardī, God is 'the Light of Lights' (*nūr al-anwār*). He is inaccessible and infinite in His intensity; in turn, the world consists of the hierarchy of lights, which are either pure (*maḥḍ*) and disengaged (*mujarrad*) or accidental (*'āriḍ*) – by the latter, Suhrawardī means physical lights, which, to him, are shapes or forms of something else (i.e. higher spiritual lights), whereas pure spiritual lights are lights in themselves. There is a latitudinal (*'araḍī*) and longitudinal (*tūlī*) organisation present in the hierarchy of lights. The first one concerns

¹⁹⁷ It is meaningless from the standpoint of those philosophers (Aristotle and some of his followers) who grant universals only mental existence. Incidentally, in his *al-Mubāḥathāt*, Ibn Sīnā mentions once 'the difference in terms of strengthening (*ta'akkud*) and weakness (*ḍa'f*)'; see Ibn Sīnā, *al-Mubāḥathāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfarr (Qum. 1413/1993), p. 41.

the ‘lords of species’ (*arbāb al-anwāʾ*), i.e. their angels or luminous archetypes. These archetypes or angels do not relate to each other as causes and effects, which is the case with the parts of the longitudinal order. Different levels of the longitudinal order, from the Light of Lights to the weakest possible light, share in the reality of light (*ḥaqīqat al-nūr*), but differ from each other by the degree of intensity which this shared reality possesses in every particular case. This difference, allegedly present in the single reality of light, is called ‘the systematic ambiguity of light’ (*tashkīk al-nūr*).

In two of his works – namely, *al-Mashārīʿ waʾl-muṭārahāt* (‘Paths and Havens’) and *Talwīḥāt al-lawḥiyya waʾl-ʿarshiyya* (‘Intimations of the Table and the Throne’) – Suhrawardī provided several proofs of this principle, refuting Ibn Sīnā’s objections against the systematic ambiguity of the quiddity/essence of the thing. In his *Asfār*, Ṣadrā repeated Suhrawardī’s arguments in favour of the systematic ambiguity in terms of intensity and weakness almost verbatim, only replacing *nūr* (‘light’) with *wujūd* (‘existence’). Ṣadrā’s four main arguments in favour of the systematic ambiguity of *wujūd* (the actual author of which, as mentioned above, was Suhrawardī) can be summarised as follows:

1) The essence and the essentials can be predicated of their instances in a systematically ambiguous manner. Suhrawardī and Ṣadrā both claim that the sages of Fars (i.e. Iran) and the ancients in general held that some of the luminous substantial lights were causes of the others in respect of their simple (non-compound) substantiality.¹⁹⁸

Attempting to refute the objections of Ibn Sīnā, who, in a number of his writings,¹⁹⁹ rules out the possibility of the systematic ambiguity of

¹⁹⁸ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 1, pp. 432–433. The postulate appears to be based on the Neoplatonic view on causality as participation, which is succinctly explained in Proclus’s *Elements of Theology*, esp. propositions 56–65 in the section ‘On the Grades of Causality’.

¹⁹⁹ In the *Maqūlāt* (‘Categories’) of the *Shifāʾ*, Ibn Sīnā writes:

I do not mean that one quantity is not greater or smaller than another one; what I mean is that one quantity is not stronger and greater in its being a quantity than another one, which shares with it [the concept of quantity], although the former is greater [than the latter] in respect of the correlative (*iḍāfi*) meaning – I mean the correlative length.

Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifāʾ: Qāṭiqūriyās*, ed. Ibrahim Madkour (Cairo, 1378/1959), p. 142; cf. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 1, pp. 434–435. A few lines later, he adds:

the nature and substance of the thing in terms of intensity and weakness (according to him, it is possible in accidents only), Ṣadrā claims that, in a mental operation, carried out with the assistance of the estimative faculty (*wahm*),²⁰⁰ a more intense instance is perceived as a paradigm (*mithāl*) of a weaker one, together with something added to it – not as an increase of the intensity of the universal nature in some instances or as a greater degree of manifestation of its traces in some instances.²⁰¹

In the *Mashārīʿ*, Suhrawardī attempts to demonstrate the validity of the systematic ambiguity of the essence and the essentials. He argues that the difference between two magnitudes is in the magnitude itself and, hence, the difference between two blacknesses is in the very blackness. From accidents and shapes, Suhrawardī then moves to substances. He argues that the Peripatetics deny the systematic ambiguity of substance in terms of intensity and weakness due to an inherent fault in their definition of substance: they define it as ‘an existent which does not abide in a substrate (*mawḍūʿ*)’. Without proposing an alternative definition of substance, Suhrawardī points out that, since the corporeal substances are shadows (images) of the

Know that ‘many’ without relation is number and ‘many’ in relation [to something] is an accident of number. Likewise, the nature of blackness and temperature is identical in all black and hot things, respectively. Indeed, the diversity occurs in regard to specific features of instances, not due to the substance of the shared quiddity and its root.

Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifāʾ*: *Qāṭiqūriyās*, p. 142; cf. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 1, p. 435. Elsewhere in the *Categories*, he remarks:

The true blackness does not become more intense or weaker, but what is blackness in comparison with one thing, is whiteness in comparison with another. Whatever kind of blackness is supposed, it does not become more intense or weaker as regards its selfhood, but this happens when it is considered in comparison [with something].

Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifāʾ*: *Qāṭiqūriyās*, p. 230; cf. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 1, p. 435.

²⁰⁰ The estimative faculty is an ability to perceive an intelligible meaning, simultaneously attributing it to a particular sensed thing.

²⁰¹ As a result, when the Peripatetics consider two blacknesses of different intensity, they deny that these blacknesses differ in something common. Instead, they establish in each of them the constituent through which the difference occurs, namely, the species-forming differentia. Moreover, they detect in two bodies – strongly black and weakly black – the concept in which the difference lies: according to them, it is the concept of ‘black’ (*aswad*); and, they claim, one of them possesses that characteristic which is called ‘blackness’ in a greater degree than the other.

intelligible ones, it is impossible that the former might equal the latter in substantiality; he claims that, according to the teachings of Plato, the substantiality of the cause is prior to that of the effect.²⁰²

However, Suhrawardī fails to refute Ibn Sīnā's objections against the systematic ambiguity of the sensible and corporeal essence and the essentials. He also fails to provide a better definition of substance in place of the rejected Avicennan one. Such refutation and an alternative definition is also not given by Ṣadrā (who limits himself to a succinct reference to the beliefs of the ancients).²⁰³

2) Systematic ambiguity in terms of intensity and weakness does not necessitate a specific difference (*al-ikhtilāf al-naw'ī*) between the instances of the nature in which the difference occurs. Ṣadrā believes that the Stoics have successfully proved that the instances of the reality of existence do not differ from each other by their differentiae, despite their diversity in terms of intensity and weakness. He points out that the Peripatetics themselves have established the (fact of the) increase and decrease of the intensity of qualities, such as temperature and blackness, in respect of the degrees of qualities as regards the motion of a corporeal object. Besides, the Peripatetics also admit that a single motion is an individual affair, possessing a connective ipseity from the beginning to the end. Hence, holds Ṣadrā, it is evident that intense and weak degrees of blackness, in respect of their blackening the body, share in their specific quiddity.

3) Diversity in respect of quality and diversity in respect of quantity represent the same kind of systematic ambiguity. The rules of common usage (*'urf*) in Arabic employ the terms 'strength' (*shidda*) and 'weakness' (*ḍa'f*) for qualities only, while, in turn, the terms 'increase' (*ziyāda*) and 'decrease' (*nuqṣān*), and 'manyness' (*kathra*) and 'fewness' (*qilla*) are applied only to quantities. However, a sage and philosopher is not concerned with the observance of the rules of common usage.

²⁰² See Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī [Shihāboddīn Yaḥya Sohravardī], *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, 3 vols., ed. Henry Corbin, 2nd ed. (Tehran–Paris, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 297–302.

²⁰³ Ṣadrā's information about the exact views of the ancients is limited; for example, he seems to be unaware of the Platonists' refusal (based on *Timaeus* 27d6–28a1; cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.3 (44).4.1–4) to recognise sensible instantiations of intelligible forms as substances.

Some commentators of Ibn Sīnā tried to distinguish intensity from greatness in magnitude by claiming the increase in the intensity of quality to be limited, while alleging the increase in quantity to be unlimited; but, according to Ṣadrā, the acceptance of the statement does not necessarily lead to the establishment of two different kinds of systematic ambiguity pertaining to quality and quantity, respectively.

Another attempt to distinguish between strength/weakness and greatness/ smallness in magnitude was made by those followers of Ibn Sīnā who asserted that something is called great or small in magnitude when it is possible to point to the exact magnitude in which two things equal each other and to establish the additional magnitude, i.e. the magnitude by which one thing exceeds the other. To refute this assertion, Suhrawardī and Ṣadrā argue that the reality of every number is constituted not by other numbers, but by 'one' repeated a certain number of times. Therefore, every number is a simple species. Thus, 'four' is not constituted by 'three' and 'one', nor is 'three' constituted by 'two' and 'one'. When the intellect divides any number into parts, the form of that number disappears and another form comes into existence.

4) The difference in terms of intensity and weakness and perfection and imperfection is not limited to the accidents of quality and quantity, as the Peripatetics assert, but also applies to the substance. This fourth principle is perhaps the most important and controversial one because it deals with the issue of the limitations of systematic ambiguity.

Suhrawardī,²⁰⁴ and Ṣadrā who repeats him verbatim, point out that the limitation of intensity and weakness to the categories of quality and quantity contradicts the views of the ancients, in particular Empedocles and Plotinus, who regarded the substances of this lower world as the shadows (images) of the substances of the higher world. Ṣadrā explains that this means that the ancient sages treated the substances of the higher world as causes, and those of the lower one as their effects that participate in the causes to a certain extent, since the substantiality of the cause is by necessity fuller and more complete than the substantiality of the effect. He adds that, to him, intensity has no other meaning except this one, i.e. the fact that some substances are more intense and stronger in their substantiality than others.

²⁰⁴ See Suhrawardī [Sohravardī], *Oeuvres*, vol. 1, p. 13.

Ṣadrā converted Suhrawardī's teaching on the systematic ambiguity of light into the doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of the reality of existence in terms of intensity and weakness (*tashkīk ḥaqīqat al-wujūd bi'l-shidda wa'l-ḍa'f*). According to this doctrine, the *wujūd* of the existential cause (*al-'illa al-wujūdiyya*) is stronger than that of its existential effect (*al-ma'lūl al-wujūdī*).

Ṣadrā calls the relation which is established between the existential cause and its effect the 'illuminative relation' (*al-idāfa al-ishrāqiyya*). According to him, the illuminative relation is the relation which, properly speaking, consists of one part only because the presumed other part is unable to subsist on its own, representing nothing but an emanation and manifestation of the former. Ṣadrā refers to the relation that exists between the sun and its ray as the most illustrative example of this kind of relation: the ray, he argues, has no true existence of its own, hence must be considered exactly as the sun's illuminative relation.

The relationship between the universal existence and particular existences, in Ṣadrā's view, must be considered in the context of the *tashkīk al-wujūd*. In spite of Ṣadrā's forceful assertion that existence cannot be considered as a genus, it seems that the principle of existence, which embodies the fullness of existence (being the Sadrian analogue of the Suhrawardian *nūr al-anwār*), might still be viewed as a quasi-genus: 'the whole which is prior to its parts, [and which] remains unaffected by any procession of the genus and is the power, the *dunamis* of its species'.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ This relationship might be understood better if considered against the background of certain passages from Plotinus's *Enneads* VI.2.20, dealing with the relationship between the universal and particular intellects – in particular:

[the Universal Intellect] is actually all things at once, but potentially each particular [intellect] separately, and the particular intellects are actually what they are, but potentially the whole . . . And [the Universal Intellect], in that it is the genus, is the potentiality of all species under it and none of them in actuality, but in that it is actually what it is before the species, it belongs to non-particulars. But certainly, if the intellects in specific form are going to exist, the activity proceeding from the Universal Intellect must be the cause.

See Plotinus, *Enneads* VI. 1–5, tr. Arthur Hilary Armstrong (Cambridge, MA–London, 1988), pp. 166–168. Substitute 'intellect' with 'existence' or 'being' and see if and how it works. Cf. Antony Charles Lloyd, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism* (Oxford, 1990), p. 81.

In general, Ṣadrā's ontology can be described as a variety of Platonism, modified in accordance with the implications of the doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of existence. Ṣadrā shares the common opinion of the Platonists, in which the sensible *wujūd* is a shadow of the imaginable one, which, in turn, itself is a shadow of the intelligible *wujūd* – hence, what is truly real is only the intelligible *wujūd*, whose intensity is infinite, while imaginable and sensible *wujūd* (especially the latter) is a metaphor and/or an imitation of it. However, unlike Ṣadrā, the ancient Platonists did not distinguish the world of imagination as a separate level of reality between the world of the Intellect and that of the sense. Ṣadrā's approach is made even more problematic by his claim that there is no clear border between intelligible, imaginable (psychic), and sensible *wujūd*, since various degrees of *wujūd* differ from each other only in terms of their strength and weakness: he argues that the same (level of) *wujūd* can be viewed as a weak intellect and a strong imagination, or as a weak imagination and a strong sense (thus de facto dismissing the key principles of Plato's doctrine, imitation and participation).²⁰⁶ Needless to say that by so doing he also eliminates the difference between the intelligible paradigm and its sensible image, which is crucial for the Platonists. Hence, upon a closer examination, one establishes that Ṣadrā's

²⁰⁶ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 101. Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.7.7: εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταύτας ἀμυδράς νοήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἐκεῖ νοήσεις ἐναργεῖς αἰσθήσεις ('these acts of sense-perception are faint acts of intellection, whereas the acts of intellection in the intelligible world are clear acts of sense perception'), Plotinus, *The Enneads*, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson et al. (Cambridge, 2018), p. 811; and the *Uthulūjiyā: nasifu tilka al-ḥasā'is fa naqūlu: innahā 'uqūl ḍa'īfa wa-nasifu tilka al-'uqūl fa naqūlu: innahā ḥasā'is qawiyya* ('we describe these sensed [affairs] and say: "they are weak intellects"; and we describe these intellects and say "they are powerful sensed [affairs]"); see Badawī, *Uthulūjiyā*, p. 147. Ṣadrā appears to discount (or be unaware of?) the deliberate looseness of Plotinus's comparison, which must be considered in the context of the paradigm-image relationship between the intelligible and the sensible affairs, outlined by Plato (e.g. the line analogy, see *Republic* 509e–510a3, and the allegory of the cave, see *Republic* 514a–520a). This outline rules out the identification of the sensible image with its intelligible model, or the latter's ascending to the former, otherwise than metaphorically. Plotinus explicitly dismisses the possibility that the paradigm and its image might belong to the same genus; to him, this amounts to including in the same genus Socrates and his portrait; see *Enneads* VI.2 (43).1.25–26.

ontology, which pivots around the concept of *tashkīk al-wujūd*, a modification of Suhrawardī's *tashkīk al-nūr*, represents a vague and distorting reinterpretation of Platonism.²⁰⁷

3.3. Substantial Motion

Another key element of Ṣadrā's thought is his theory of substantial motion (*al-ḥaraka al-jawhariyya*). As it is known, following Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā limited motion to four of ten categories: place (or 'where',

²⁰⁷ Note that Ṣadrā dismisses Suhrawardī's postulate that a simple thing may have a composite cause; see Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination: Hikmat al-ishrāq*, ed. and tr. John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Provo, UT, 1990) p. 67, § 96. According to this postulate, each light, except the Light of Lights or the principle of light, is formed by a synthesis and interaction of higher lights (the number of which, at least theoretically, can be infinite). This allows for the interpretation of every light as something that is formed by its participation in the higher lights, which, in respect to the latter, can be regarded as its collective cause/cluster of causes.

Also note the difference in the understanding of *tashkīk* between Ṣadrā and Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī: the latter, in his *al-Risāla al-hādiya* ('Guiding Treatise'), reduces all kinds of *tashkīk* to the difference in manifestation of a certain reality, which, in turn, according to him, boils down to the difference in the preparedness/capacity (*isti'dād*) of the particular loci of manifestation.

If a reality differs in [respect of] its being stronger, more prior, more intense, or more preferred, in the view of a verifier, all this comes down to [difference in] manifestation, not to plurality (*ta'addud*) occurring in the manifested reality, whatever reality it be – knowledge, existence or other one. A [certain] receptacle may be better prepared [to serve as a receptacle] for the manifestation of a [certain] reality than another receptacle, although the reality is one in all cases. Ranking in excellence (*mufāḍala*) and difference occur between its manifestations in accordance with the manifesting affair (*al-amr al-muḥḥir*), requiring [such] entification of that reality that differs from its entification in another affair.

See Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, 'al-Risāla al-hādiya al-murshidiyya', in idem and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *al-Murāsālāt*, ed. Gudrun Schubert (Beirut, 1416/1995), p. 166; also quoted in 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī, *al-Durra al-fākhira*, ed. Nicholas Heer and 'Alī Mūsawī Behbahānī, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1382 Sh./2003, pp. 4–5).

Qūnawī's point can be explained by imagining a number of metallic mirrors – some of which are well-polished, but the others rusty – which reflect one and the same object. Obviously, the better polished the mirror, the brighter the reflection of the object (which is what systematic ambiguity in terms of intensity and weakness, according to Qūnawī, is about). However, the reflected images also differ from one

πού/ayna), position (κείσθαι/waḍ'), quality (ποιόν/kayf), and quantity (ποσον/kamm).²⁰⁸ Regarding substance (οὐσία/jawhar), Ibn Sīnā's view was that it does not experience motion. Although generation (*kawn*) and corruption (*fasād*) of substance outwardly resemble motion, they cannot in fact be regarded as such because they occur instantaneously, not gradually.²⁰⁹

Ṣadrā describes motion as 'a flowing state, which exists between pure potentiality and pure act, and whose concomitant is a finite gradual continuous affair which has no existence that is described with presence and all-comprehensiveness (*jam'iyya*) elsewhere, except in the estimative faculty (*wahm*)'.²¹⁰ Technically, this definition represents a combination of two Avicennan definitions of two aspects of motion. In the first definition, Ibn Sīnā describes motion as 'a continuous intelligible affair, pertaining to the object, moving from the place of the beginning [of its movement] to the place of its end'.²¹¹ This definition pertains to the traversal (*qaṭ'iyya*) movement, which exists only in our mind (*dhihn*) or estimative faculty (*wahm*), but is not found in the outside, 'among the entities' (*fi'l-a'yān*). Notice that Ṣadrā treats it as the concomitant of the real (i.e. medial) motion that exists in the outside.

The second definition describes motion as

an existential affair [that exists] outside the mind and which consists in the body's being in an intermediate position between

another in shape and size, this latter kind of difference being caused by the difference in shape and size of the mirrors (e.g. some of them are big and others small; some are convex, and others concave etc.) Certainly, this latter kind of difference cannot be removed by polishing.

Hence, the verdict of Islamic gnosis on the doctrine of the *tashkik bi'l-shidda wa'l-ḍa'f* is that it is able to provide only a simplified picture of reality – first of all, because, in this doctrine, there is no place for the crucial Sufi teaching on the Real's names and attributes as the cause of the diversity of the phenomena of the witnessed and the absent domains.

²⁰⁸ Ibn Sīnā, *Najāt*, pp. 204–208.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 205.

²¹⁰ Ṣadrā, *Aṣfār*, vol. 3, p. 59.

²¹¹ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā': al-Ṭabī'iyyāt: al-Samā' al-ṭabī'i*, ed. Sa'īd Zāyid, under the supervision of Ibrahim Madkour (Cairo, 1969), p. 84, ll. 1–2; cf. Ṣadrā, *Aṣfār*, vol. 3, p. 31.

the place of the beginning [of its movement] and the place of its end, so that whichever point between these two is taken, its [the body's] 'before' and 'after' is not in it [the supposed point]. This state lasts as long as the thing continues to be moving.²¹²

This is the definition of the medial movement (*al-ḥaraka al-tawassuṭiyya*), described by Ṣadrā as a 'flowing state' (*ḥāla sayyāla*) between potentiality and actuality. Despite Ṣadrā's criticisms of the above quoted Avicennan definitions²¹³ (which result from his extreme existentialist position and refusal to grant any reality to quiddity), one cannot fail to notice that his own teaching on motion represents nothing but a slightly modified version of Ibn Sīnā's doctrine: Ṣadrā treats the medial movement, understood as a flowing affair, as a reality which exists in the outside, while he views the traversal one as a concomitant of the former, which exists only in the estimative faculty. In other words, he sees the traversal movement as a mental shadow of the medial one.

If we consider motion as the thing's state of being moved (*mutaḥarrikiyyat al-shay'*), it is nothing but a self-renewal (*tajaddud*) and passing (*inqidā'*). Its proximate cause, by necessity, must also be an affair which is not stable in its essence – otherwise, the parts of the movement would not become non-existent. We can say that motion is an essential concomitant of this affair, which is fixed in its essence and self-renewing in its existence. The accompanied affair, whose concomitant is motion, is nature (*ṭabī'a*).

The proximate cause of every species of motion is nature,²¹⁴ and it is the substance which constitutes the body and through which the body is actualised as a species, and it [and not motion!] is the first perfection of the natural body in the aspect of its actual existence. Hence, it is established and confirmed that each body is an affair which is self-renewing in its existence and flowing in

²¹² Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā': al-Ṭabī'iyyāt*, p. 84, ll. 12–14; cf. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 3, p. 32. For a detailed discussion of Ibn Sīnā's treatment of two aspects of motion, see Hasnawi, 'La définition du mouvement', pp. 228–239 and 244–246.

²¹³ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 3, pp. 32–37.

²¹⁴ Cf. the view of late Plato that the principle of motion is the soul; see *Phaedrus* 245c–e; *Laws* X 896b.

its ipseity, although it is fixed in its essence, and owing to this, it differs from motion, because the meaning of the latter is self-renewal and passing.²¹⁵

In other words, there is no such a thing as a stable body, as far as its existence is considered. Each body should be considered as a particular aspect of the flow of existence – an aspect, whose apparent stability results from an error of our sense perception. Motion is not external to such a body and is not predicated to it from outside. Rather, this is a certain quiddity which is predicated to one or another aspect or level of existence.

The principles of Peripatetic philosophy require an unchanging substrate for every change. In Sadrian philosophy, where body is viewed as an existentially self-renewing and flowing affair, it apparently cannot serve as such substrate. Šadrā attempts to solve the arising difficulty by stating that the requirement for the stability of the substrate applies only to those motions which are not existential concomitants of nature (such as passing from one place to another, transmutation and growth). As Ṭabāṭabā'ī remarks in his gloss, this statement testifies that Šadrā believes that all categories move through the movement of the substance, which is their substrate. Ṭabāṭabā'ī also notes that non-concomitant movements, which occur in the categories of place, position, quality, and quantity, do not directly depend on the nature of the moving substance, but, nevertheless, the furthest limits of these non-concomitant movements are the concomitant ones, which directly depend on the nature of their substrate.²¹⁶

Another difficulty concerning the substrate of movement lies in the fact that, according to Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā, it consists of something potential and something actual. Šadrā's response is that the postulate of the existence of two different affairs – one of which is potential and another actual – is a product of mental analysis (*taḥlīl 'aqlī*), while in reality the potential and the actual is one and the same thing and belong to one existential direction. The fixity, or permanence, of movement manifests itself as its self-renewal, and, likewise, the fixity of that through which movement occurs (i.e. nature generated in the bodies) manifests

²¹⁵ Šadrā, *Aṣfār*, vol. 3, p. 62.

²¹⁶ Ibid., vol. 3, p. 62, note 2.

itself as its essential self-renewal. But how does this fixity-and-self-renewal function? According to Šadrā, it is based on the possibility of preparedness (*imkān isti'dādī*), and the self-renewal of nature manifests itself as 'dressing after dressing' (*al-labs ba'd al-labs*). As Fazlul Rahman aptly remarks, the self-renewal is perceived by Šadrā as an 'essentially evolutionary and unidirectional individual process-entity'.²¹⁷

To understand this properly, we must keep in mind that the reality of prime matter is nothing else than potentiality and preparedness, while the reality of form is nature with its self-renewing temporal origination. Through its evolving preparedness, the prime matter receives a new form in every instant, each form having a different matter, which necessarily accompanies it. In turn, this matter is prepared to receive another form, different from that which necessitated it (matter) through preparedness. Thus, the form is prior to matter in essence, but the form's individual ipseity is posterior to matter in time. Hence, form and matter enjoy self-renewal and perpetuity owing to each other. The popular belief, according to which the form of a simple body always remains identical to itself and never changes, arises from the similarity of the changing forms, claims Šadrā. In fact, these forms are one by their definition (*ḥadd*) and meaning, but they are not one in number because they are renewed and replaced with each other in every instant, in a continuous manner.²¹⁸ This claim made Ṭabāṭabā'ī conclude that Šadrā saw existence as a continuous flowing affair, from which hypothetical limitations (i.e. the intelligible quiddities, such as those of man, animal, plant etc.) are abstracted by the mind.²¹⁹

There is one continuous individual existence, which has infinite limitations in potential in respect to the instants, hypothesised in its time, and [therefore] in it exist an infinite number of species – *in potentia* and in meaning, not *in actu* and in [actual] existence.²²⁰

The difficulty of the apparent absence of an unchanging and persisting substrate (*mawḍūʿ*), to which Ibn Sīnā pointed, is resolved if

²¹⁷ Fazlul Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mullā Šadrā* (Albany, NY, 1975), p. 100.

²¹⁸ Šadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 3, pp. 63–64.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 64, note 2.

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 86.

we agree to treat substance not as a static entity, but as a dynamic affair and an individual process.²²¹

Although it is necessary that the substrate of every movement subsists through its existence and individuation, in the individuation of a corporeal substrate, it is sufficient that there is matter which is individuated through the existence of some [sort of] form, quality, and quantity, and it [matter] can change in respect to the particularities of each of them (i.e. form, quality, and quantity).²²²

In other words, the subsistence of the substrate is achieved through the existence of matter and some indeterminate form, quality, and quantity. As Fazlul Rahman observes, this indeterminate form, quality, and quantity behaves vis-à-vis the progressively emerging infinity of determinate forms, qualities, and quantities 'as a genus does vis-à-vis concrete species'.²²³ Hence, the persisting substrate is an unqualified body (*jism muṭlaq*), i.e. a body-in-general, not a particular body, while the unity of the moving substance is one of the process-entity or the event-structure.²²⁴

On the other side, as Ṭabāṭabā'ī remarks, if the movement lacks unity of continuity, the subsistence of substrate alone does not provide the unity of movement. Moreover, according to Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the subsistence of substrate is a necessary precondition of the accidental movements (such as the movements in quality, quantity, position, and place), because they are accidents whose existence is only possible in substrate and whose individuation takes place through it; however, this is not the case with the material substance which exists owing to itself and, in its individual unity, does not require anything else apart from its own existence, which is identical with its individuation.

The material substance, says Ṭabāṭabā'ī, insofar as it is considered as the possessor of substantial motion, is both the movement and the moving one because its selfhood, which is movement, is attributed to its selfhood, which is substance. In short, accidental movements in respect of their unity and individuality require a substantial substrate,

²²¹ See Rahman, *Philosophy*, p. 100.

²²² Ṣadrā, *Aṣfār*, vol. 3, pp. 87–88.

²²³ Rahman, *Philosophy*, p. 100.

²²⁴ Ṣadrā, *Aṣfār*, vol. 3, pp. 92–93; cf. Rahman, *Philosophy*, pp. 100–101.

a possessor of unity and individuality, as a root and basis of their flowing unity and individuality.²²⁵ While accidents need substance as their substrate and cannot exist without it, the substance has no need in a substrate other than itself. Since Ṣadrā views every corporeal and psychic substance as an evolutionary and unidirectional process, its actual substrate is nothing else than the continuity of this process.²²⁶

Does Ṣadrā's theory of substantial motion, as a gradual and evolutionary unidirectional movement towards perfection, constitute a revolutionary new teaching, at least in the context of Islamic philosophy? It does not. The idea, apparently stemming from the Neoplatonic concepts of *processio* and *reditus*, had previously found its expression in the well-known teaching of *scala naturae*, which was equally popular in medieval Europe and the medieval Muslim East.²²⁷ The uninterrupted chain of being, which ascends from the lowest and simplest to the highest and most complex creatures, was viewed as the product of a gradual emanation and the natural increase of the perfection of the things. Among the first Muslim philosophers who discussed the issue in their treatises in detail were the Brethren of Purity (*Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*). Thus, they wrote:

Know, o brother, that the sublunary beings begin from the most imperfect and lowest states and then ascend towards the most perfect and eminent state. This occurs with the passage of time and with every instant, since their nature does not receive the emanation from the spherical forms at a single instance, but gradually.²²⁸

²²⁵ See Ṣadrā, *Aṣfār*, vol. 3, p. 87, note 1.

²²⁶ See Rahman, *Philosophy*, p. 100.

²²⁷ On *scala naturae*, see Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, MA, 1936; 2nd ed., 1961) and Lia Formigari, 'Chain of Being', in Philip P. Wiener, ed., *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, 4 vols. (New York, 1973–1974), vol. 1, pp. 325–335; online at: <http://xtf.lib.virginia.edu/xtf/view?docId=DicHist/uvaBook/tei/DicHist1.xml;chunk.id=dv1-45;toc.depth=100;toc.id=dv1-45> (accessed on 2 January 2019).

²²⁸ Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', *Rasā'il*, 4 vols. (Beirut, 1957), vol. 2, p. 183; the English translation quoted from Daniel De Smet, 'The Sacredness of Nature in Shi'i Isma'ili Islam', in Klaas van Berkel and Arjo Vanderjagt, eds., *The Book of Nature in Antiquity and Middle Ages* (Louvain, 2005), p. 87, note 8. Cf. Marquet's French translation in Yves Marquet, 'La détermination astrale de l'évolution selon les Frères de la Pureté', *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* 44 (1992), p. 129.

Şadrā's merit lies in attempting to discuss this Neoplatonic theory in Peripatetic terms and in interpreting the material substance as a continuous flow and an evolutionary process, instead of viewing it as a static and unchangeable entity. Even more importantly, while the *Ikhwān al-Şafā'* focus their attention on the universal chain of being, Şadrā's concern lies with a particular corporeal or psychic substance. It is not mineral's becoming plant and plant's developing into animal that concerns Şadrā, but body's becoming soul and soul's becoming intellect, and, ultimately, this world's growing into the other one (the hereafter) and the transformation of the first (corporeal) configuration (*al-nash'a al-ūlā*) into the other (spiritual) one (*al-nash'a al-ukhra*). His concern is primarily an eschatological one: this-worldly life is regarded by Şadrā as a preparatory stage and shadow of the other-worldly one, as is the case with its events and phenomena.

In the world of nature, all substances are subject to substantial motion because, to Şadrā, the existence of a material substance – regardless of the corruptibility (in the case of elemental bodies) or the incorruptibility (in the case of celestial ones) of its matter – can only be envisaged as a unidirectional evolutionary process. More precisely, in respect to its existence, every material substance is an individualised unidirectional evolutionary process. During its development, this substance becomes subject to an infinite number of changes and alterations, 'dressing after dressing', which means that, in order to assume a new and higher form, it does not need to discard the previous lower one (e.g. in order to assume the form of the animal soul, the substance does not need to abandon the form of the vegetative one). Quite the opposite, in order to be able to receive a higher form, the substance must first receive the lower one and keep it (thus, in order to be able to receive the form of the animal soul, the respective substance must first receive that of the vegetative one). Şadrā calls this rule 'the principle of the lower possibility' (*al-imkān al-akhaṣṣ*) (which is to be understood as the necessity to previously actualise the lower possibility in order to allow the actualisation of the higher one) and, by treating it as the counterpart of the rule of 'the nobler/higher possibility' (*al-imkān al-ashraf*) (according to which, the actualisation of the lower possibility is only possible through and after the actualisation of the

higher one),²²⁹ makes it the organising/structural principle of the ascending arc. Furthermore, the existence of the natural body is only possible and can be conceived of as substantial motion and as stability in flow. The particular evolutionary path taken by a certain aspect of the flow of material existence (thought of in terms of substantial motion) is determined by its particular principle, referred to as its individual nature (*ṭabīʿa shakhṣiyya*). This particular principle or nature of the body is, in fact, nothing but a tenuity (*raqīqa*) that links the reality (*ḥaqīqa*), or the immaterial paradigm of the thing, with its material images or shadows. Although nature is the proximate cause of substantial motion, the ultimate goal of the latter is to bring the substance out of the world of nature, placing it among the inhabitants of the world of command – that is, to increase the intensity of its existence to the level characteristic of the existence of pure intellect or pure disengaged dominating light (*nūr mujarrad qāhir*).²³⁰

3.4. Substantial Motion and New Creation

During the 20th century, it became almost a commonplace belief among the experts that Ṣadrā's theory of substantial motion represents a philosophical demonstration of Ibn 'Arabī's teaching on new creation (*khalq jadīd*) – an expression that Ṣadrā himself employed a number of times in his discourses on substantial motion.²³¹ But is this really the case, or is Ṣadrā's usage of the aforementioned Qur'anic and Sufi term a rhetorical technique, designed to intrigue the audience?

²²⁹ Apparently, this principle is based on *Timaeus* 30a6–7. Cf. proposition 28 of Proclus's *Elements of Theology*: 'Every producing cause brings into existence things like to itself before the unlike'; see Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, p. 33; also cf. *Theol. Plat.* III 3, 24–25; Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, tr. Henri Dominique Saffrey and Leendert Gerit Westerink, vol. 3, book 3 (Paris, 2003; 2nd print), p. 13.

²³⁰ Two recent accounts on Ṣadrā's teaching on substantial motion are given in 1) Mahdī Dihbāshī, *Pazhūhishī taṭbīqī dar hastī-shināsī wa-shinākht-shināsī-yi Mullā Ṣadrā wa 'Whitehead', fiṣṣūfān-i mashhūr-i falsafa-yi pūyishī-yi sharq wa gharb* (Qum, 1398 Sh./2019), pp. 45–50, a short but sound discussion, parallels with Whitehead's process philosophy and quantum theory, pp. 201–210; and 2) Firiyāl Iskandarī, *Nigarishī-yi jadīd bar ḥarakat-i jawharī bā ithbāt-i ittifāq-i ārā'-i Aristū, Ibn Sīnā wa Mullā Ṣadrā bar ān* (Ilam, 1397 Sh./2018), in which the author claims that substantial motion was endorsed by Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā.

²³¹ See e.g. Ṣadrā, *Asrār*, pp. 63, 86.

As Ibn 'Arabī himself acknowledges, his theory of the constant renewal of creation was, at least partially, inspired by the Ash'arī teaching on substances and accidents. The Ash'arites believed the world to consist of immutable substances and ever-changing accidents. Their famous axiom was, 'the accidents do not remain for two moments' (*al-a'rāḍ lā tabqā zamānayn*). While the Ash'arites viewed substance as the underlying substrate of accidents, they understood the substances of which the world consists to have no independent existence in themselves, but rather they wholly depend on God's power, which continually recreates the world at every instant.²³² In the twelfth chapter of the *Fuṣūṣ*, which contains one of the most important discussions on *khalq jadīd*, Ibn 'Arabī admits that two groups – the Ash'arites and the Relativists (*ḥisbāniyya*) – have approached the understanding of the mystery of permanent creation, but, he states, both have failed to penetrate to its core. As for the Ash'arites, they have grasped the incessant renewal of some of the existents, namely the accidents, but they have not realised that the world in its entirety represents nothing else than the totality (*majmū'*) of accidents, for which reason it entirely changes in every moment. In turn, the Relativists have apprehended that the world incessantly changes in its entirety, but they have failed to notice the oneness of the entity of the substance which receives the form of the world and which does not exist otherwise than through it (whereas the form also cannot be conceived otherwise than through this substance).²³³

Importantly, in this discussion Ibn 'Arabī defines the new creation as the 'self-renewal of the affair with every breath' (*tajdīd al-amr ma'a al-anfās*),²³⁴ which is necessitated by the fact that 'God manifests Himself [anew] in every breath'²³⁵ and that 'a [particular] self-disclosure is never repeated'.²³⁶

²³² See S. van den Bergh, 'Dhawhar' (II.493a), *EI*2.

²³³ See Ibn 'Arabī, *Fuṣūṣ*, vol. 2, p. 125.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 125.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 126.

²³⁶ Ibid. However, Ibn 'Arabī's commentator Mu'ayyad al-Dīn Jandī remarks that the Real's essential self-disclosure is one and eternal, and, if considered without any relation, it never changes in any way. The constant change and alteration of the Real's self-disclosures witnessed by certain strata of gnostics are occasioned by the change of the preparedness of the receptacles; see Mu'ayyad al-Dīn al-Jandī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, ed. S. J. Āshtiyānī, 2nd ed. (Qum, 1381 Sh./2002), pp. 494–495.

One notices that, at every moment, a new creation is necessitated by and depends on a new breath. These breaths represent fragments or instances of the all-encompassing Breath of the Merciful (*nafas al-Raḥmān*). It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the never-ending inception, in a way, results from the fragmentation of the Breath of the Merciful in respect to its particular receptacles, which, due to their limitations and difference in preparedness, cannot receive this all-encompassing breath in its entirety at one time, but are only able to do this gradually, dividing it in different directions and aspects according to the division that exists between God's names. Hence, in the same way that no human being, due to the narrowness of his breast, can partake of the Breath of the Merciful otherwise than through a series of subsequent breaths, our gnostic intuition cannot conceive of creation otherwise than as of an (infinite) chain of self-disclosures, every link of which simultaneously marks the appearance of a new form and the disappearance of the previous one. Thus, we can conclude that Ibn 'Arabī's teaching of the new creation deals primarily with the relationship between the qualified and unqualified existence.

Likewise, a number of passages in the *Futūḥāt* testify that the continuous new creation of the world is necessitated by the narrowness of the receptacle. However, to Ibn 'Arabī, this receptacle is existence itself.

Within the Treasuries are found the individuals of genera. These individuals are infinite, and that which is infinite does not enter into existence, since everything confined by existence is finite.²³⁷

The possible things are infinite, and there cannot be more than the infinite. But the infinite does not enter into existence at once (*dafʿat^{an}*); rather it enters little by little, without an end.²³⁸

Even more importantly, to Ibn 'Arabī the new creation is not a unidirectional and evolutionary process, i.e. the subsequent form is not necessarily more perfect in any aspect than the previous one. Furthermore, in the new creation, through assuming a new form, the

²³⁷ Muḥyi al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya* (Cairo, 1911), vol. 3, p. 361; the English translation quoted from William Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany, NY, 1989), p. 96.

²³⁸ Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūḥāt*, vol. 2, p. 482; Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 96.

(material) existence abandons the previous one, wherefore the process must be described as ‘dressing after undressing’ (*al-labs ba‘d al-khal’*), not as ‘dressing after dressing’ (*al-labs ba‘d al-labs*), as it is with substantial motion. This, apparently, is the most important difference between Ibn ‘Arabī and Ṣadrā’s teachings on *khalq jadīd* and *ḥaraka jawhariyya*. Ibn ‘Arabī focuses on the everlasting renewal of the world, which can probably be characterised as the attempt of the finite to grasp the infinite, and of the limited to take grip of the unlimited – a task which can never be completed. Ṣadrā, in turn, envisages the material world as a flowing substance which, in its every part and by every instant, moves one – albeit tiny – step closer towards perfection.

Hence, the new creation, as it is understood by Ibn ‘Arabī, i.e. the attempt of the limited to express and manifest the unlimited, takes place in keeping with a certain regular pattern (a likeness is normally replaced with a likeness, not with its opposite) – the pattern which is cyclically repeated and recreated. For this reason, it can be described as a cyclical affair and presented graphically as a circular motion.

In turn, substantial motion as envisaged by Ṣadrā, i.e. a unidirectional evolutionary process and gradual intellectualisation of material existence, occurring due to the increase of the latter’s intensity, can be graphically presented as a half of the circle, i.e. as its ascending arc. But what happens to the moving substance once it has reached the summit of the arc? According to Ṣadrā, it remains with the Godhead, existentially uniting with its noetic archetype (the respective dominating light).²³⁹

²³⁹ Remarkably, in his commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides*, Damascius developed a teaching on the substantial change of the soul. In a nutshell, he claimed that ‘the soul preserves the form of its existence (εἶδος τῆς ὑπάρξεως) but changes the form of its substantial participation (τῆς οὐσιώδους μεθέξεως)’; see Damascius, *De Primis Principiis, in Platonis Parmenidem*, ed. C. E. Ruelle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1889), vol. 2, p. 272, ll. 28–29; the English rendering in Carlos Steel, *The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus* (Brussels, 1978), p. 109. In other words, Damascius believed that the soul changes according to its participation in either luminous/heavenly, or dark/earthly affairs, owing to which its essence becomes stronger or weaker/more or less perfect, without changing its structure; see the discussion in Steel, pp. 93–116, esp. pp. 110–116. However, he viewed this as rise and fall, or as fluctuation and oscillation, not as a unidirectional perfectional motion (as Ṣadrā did).

This difference in approaches results from a more fundamental difference between the visions of the two thinkers: to Ibn ‘Arabī, the presence or absence of existence does not change the respective fixed entity and its status in God’s mind, while to Ṣadrā, there is no such thing as an externally non-existent entity, eternally present in God’s mind. Rather, the existence is the only thing which is/exists, whereas entities/quiddities are nothing else than its potential limitations, which do not really exist, but are abstracted by the mind from the abiding flow of existence.

In sum, when Ṣadrā employs the term *khalq jadīd*, he does it either to designate the self-renewal of (bodily) nature in general²⁴⁰ or to point to the ultimate limit of this self-renewal – i.e. the transformation of the configuration of this world into that of the other one, the hereafter.²⁴¹

3.5. Eschatology

The soul pre-exists the body as the effect pre-exists itself in/through its cause. This pre-existence bears an essential (not a temporal) character and comprises at least two existential modalities – the noetic, or intellectual, and the psychic, or imaginal. The soul, though it is a shadow of its noetic cause and principle, pre-exists the natural body as a more intense light pre-exists a weaker one. This body, then, is the effect of the soul, and the soul, being its cause, brings it to perfection, which eventually allows it to enter the world of separated intellects and subjugating lights. The intellect, which subjugates the soul, in turn, uses the body as a tool to bring the soul itself to the highest possible perfection, which results in its becoming an actual intellect. Since this actualisation cannot take place otherwise than by means of the natural body, the latter is originated in order to ensure the possibility of the soul’s progress towards perfection. Hence, the natural modality is an indispensable stage of the soul’s journey towards perfection, while the natural body is nothing else than a specific level of the soul.

Ṣadrā denies the possibility of metempsychosis, or the transmigration of the soul (*tanāsukh*), if the soul is understood as the principle of bodily faculties and the governor of a particular material body, because such possibility is in complete contradiction with his teaching on the

²⁴⁰ See e.g. Ṣadrā, *Asrār*, pp. 63; 86–87.

²⁴¹ See e.g. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 8, p. 17.

substantial motion of the soul.²⁴² To him, the soul, in the aspect of its being the perfection of a material body and its governor, is the specific form (*ṣūra naw'īyya*) of that body and the formal cause of the quiddity of the obtained psychic species. In turn, the body, in the aspect of its being the body, is the matter of the soul that is essentially connected with it and the material cause of the species. Therefore, in respect to the soul's natural affective connected existence (*al-wujūd al-ta'alluqī al-infi'ālī al-ṭabī'ī*), its subsistence without a natural body is impossible. But, unlike other souls, human souls have another kind of existence apart from the bodily one. In respect to its separated existence, the soul cannot be connected with a material body, be it either the one in which it used to reside before the separation or another.

Whereas metempsychosis in the sense of the transfer of the soul from one elemental or natural body to another (regardless of whether it be more or less perfect) is impossible, the transformation of the soul from its this-worldly natural and bodily configuration to the other-worldly one and its assuming an other-worldly form (imaginal body), in conformity with its this-worldly states and habits,²⁴³ is necessary

²⁴² 'The soul has an essential connection with the [natural] body, and their composition is a unified [and] natural one, and each of them performs a substantial essential motion together with the other'; see Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 2.

²⁴³ Cf. Porphyry, *Sentences*, 29:8–15:

... once [the soul] has departed from its solid body, that pneumatic vehicle follows along with it which it has gathered together from the heavenly spheres. But since in consequence of its attraction to the body it has projected from itself a particular reason-principle, in virtue of which it has acquired a relationship to a body of a certain type in which it lives, from this attraction an imprint deriving from its imaging faculty rubs off on its pneumatic vehicle, and thus it comes to be dragging along its shade; it is said to be "in Hades", because its pneumatic vehicle is of an "invisible" and murky nature.

See the English translation by John Dillon in Brisson, ed., *Porphyre Sentences*, vol. 2, pp. 805–806. Cf. also Hadot, *Porphyre*, vol. 1, p. 182, n. 1. There is no evidence of Ṣadrā's acquaintance with Porphyry's text, but the quoted passage provides an illustration of what information he might have received, from gnostics like Ibn 'Arabī and Qūnawī, about the subtle body or 'vehicle' (ὄχημα) of the soul, and its descent to, and ascent from, the world of matter. Muslim gnostics often described the latter (ascent) in terms of the *mi'rāj*; see e.g. Qūnawī's *al-Risāla al-hādiya* in al-Qūnawī and al-Ṭūsī, *Murāsālāt*, pp. 160–161.

and inevitable. There are four principal paths which can be taken by the soul in its essential development in the other (imaginal) world. It can assume a luminous angelic form if it fears God and strives to be virtuous, or a devilish one if it chooses the path of evil and wickedness. If it makes no conscious choice, but follows its animal passions, the soul takes either the form of a predatory beast, if the habitude of wrath (*ghaḍab*) predominates over that of the appetite, or the form of a lustful brute, if the appetite, or lust (*shahwa*), predominates over wrath.²⁴⁴

In respect to this other-worldly form or imaginal body the soul does not act as the governor and mover. Rather, this imaginal body is its shadow and concomitant (*lāzim*), to which the soul pays little or no attention.²⁴⁵ Naturally, the owner of the shadow cannot use the shadow as means for achieving perfection, nor can the shadow influence or change the owner's state in any way.

The situation is more complicated if the soul has acquired a number of intense virtues and vices. Ṣadrā supposes that the imaginal body of such soul successively assumes a number of different angelic and animal forms in keeping with the presently predominant virtue or vice. If one or several evil passions developed in the soul during its natural life gradually fade away and disappear in the afterlife, the relevant imaginal form (of a certain animal which symbolises that passion) gradually becomes less and less intense, until it is replaced with another imaginal animal form, which symbolises a different passion. This change of the soul's imaginal bodies, to Ṣadrā, is a true and undeniable affair in the eyes of the folk of revealing, but, as he asserts, it cannot be treated as metempsychosis because it simply reflects the change of the soul's inner state.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Perhaps an echo of the Stoic treatment of virtues and vices as perceptible bodies; see e.g. fragment 85 in Johannes von Arnim [Ioannes ab Arnim], *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1903–1924), vol. 3, p. 21; cf. Jacques Brunschwig, 'La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne', in Jonathan Barnes and Mario Mignucci, eds., *Matter and Metaphysics, Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum* (Naples, 1988), p. 72.

²⁴⁵ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 19.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 9, pp. 30–31.

To this, one can probably object that, according to the principle of systematic ambiguity of existence, sense (*ḥiss*) can be treated as weak imagination (*khayāl ḍaʿīf*). Hence, the natural sensible body also is a mirror (though less perfect than the imaginal one) of the soul's inner state(s). If we admit that sense and imagination differ from each other only in the degree of intensity, what can prevent the soul from changing its sensible (i.e. low-intensity imaginable) body according to its newly acquired inner state? Ṣadrā holds that the preventing affair is the specific preparedness possessed by the matter of a particular body; but the transformed soul (or, say, the transformed individual spirit) can have an influence upon it.

On a pre-discursive level, Ṣadrā's denial of metempsychosis is rooted in his dominant intuition of the perfectional flow of existence and its intensifying movement (*al-ḥaraka al-ishtidādiyya*). Absorbed by this intuition, he believes all affairs that entail regress or weakening of existence, after becoming strong, are in disagreement with the universal principles of his thought (which, in fact, are the product of his reflection upon the consequences of the aforementioned intuition) and, therefore, impossible and absurd.

One particular group of human beings – the divine sages or 'those perfect in knowledge' (*al-kāmilūn fī'l-ʿilm*) – according to Ṣadrā, become free from both this-worldly physical and other-worldly imaginal (*khayālī*), or imaginal (*mithālī*), bodies through unification with the Agent Intellect (*al-ʿaql al-faʿāl*).²⁴⁷

3.5.1 Spiritual and Corporeal Return

As it is known, the *mutakallimūn* distinguished between corporeal return (*maʿād jismānī*) and spiritual return (*maʿād rūḥānī*), treating the first as the Resurrection of material bodies and the second as the restoration of spirit in the latter. None of the two kinds of *maʿād*, in their traditional theological sense, is compatible with the principles of Peripatetic philosophy, therefore the *falāsifa* dismissed the possibility of the occurrence of corporeal return altogether and reinterpreted the spiritual return in accordance with the underlying intuition of their

²⁴⁷ Ibid., vol. 9, p. 6. The Neoplatonists, such as Iamblichus or Proclus, most likely, would have dismissed such possibility (to become free from both physical and imaginal bodies) even in the case of divine sages. Cf. note 182 to chapter 1.

doctrine. This intuition can be broadly defined as an ardent desire to intellectually flee from the sensible world, tainted with evil, towards the intelligible one, which is perceived as pure good – or the closest attainable degree to it.

Šadrā's doctrine on *ma'ād rūḥānī* is, apparently, one of the least original components of his philosophy. Although in its most mature version, presented in the *Asfār*, Sadrian teaching on spiritual return differs from the Avicennan one on some important points (in particular, in the understanding of the substance and role of the Agent Intellect); on the whole it represents a slightly modified version of the latter, with a good deal of Šadrā's discourse consisting of paraphrased passages from Ibn Sīnā's writings.²⁴⁸

In view of this, I shall first give a succinct account of Ibn Sīnā's teaching on spiritual return, as it is presented in his *al-Mabdā' wa'l-ma'ād*, and then examine the points in which Šadrā's treatment of the subject differs from that of Ibn Sīnā.

According to Ibn Sīnā, the spiritual return of the human soul consists in its theoretical faculty's (*al-quwwa al-naẓariyya*) attainment of the acquired intellect (*al-'aql al-mustafād*) through establishing a contact (*ittiṣāl*) with the Agent Intellect. The Agent Intellect, as he explains, is that of the separated intellects which is the nearest to us. (The Greek term *νοῦς ποιητικός* was first introduced by Aristotle in his *De Anima*, III.5.15,²⁴⁹ where he used it to refer to the active part of the

²⁴⁸ Cf. Šadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 124 and Ibn Sīnā, *Mabdā'*, pp. 111–112; *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 135, and *Mabdā'*, p. 113.

²⁴⁹ 'Mind [i.e. intellect] has another aspect in that it makes all things (ὁ δὲ τῶ πάντα ποιεῖν)'; see Aristotle, *On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath*, with an English translation by W. S. Hett (London–Cambridge, MA, 1957), pp. 170–171. It seems that Aristotle was referring to the active part of the rational human soul, which actualises its passive counterpart. Due to the obscurity of the passage, the opinion of the commentators was divided: while Alexander of Aphrodisias believed the *νοῦς ποιητικός* to be an entity outside the human soul, Themistius might have viewed it as (becoming) part of the human soul. 'The productive [Agent] intellect'. . . settles into the whole of the potential intellect, as though the carpenter and the smith did not control their wood and bronze externally but were able to pervade it totally'; see Themistius, *On Aristotle On the Soul*, tr. Robert B. Todd (London, 2013), p. 123 (99, 11 [430a12–13, 14–15, 18–19]); cf. Malcolm C. Lyons, ed., *An Arabic Translation of Themistius Commentary on Aristoteles 'De Anima'* (Oxford, 1973), p. 179. However, cf. Schroeder and Todd's opinion, according to which, 'Themistius . . . establishes a gulf

human soul. Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on the passage described the Agent Intellect as God²⁵⁰ – apparently because he perceived νοῦς ποιητικός as a logos which, through its self-contemplation, brings into existence the world below it.)

Behind this Avicennan theory of spiritual return/resurrection as connecting the theoretical faculty of one's rational soul with the Agent Intellect, apparently, lies the intuition that, in the true sense, the cosmos does not exist otherwise than as the Intellect. The theoretical faculty of the soul – the only part of it, which, to Ibn Sīnā, survives the natural death – is nothing else but perception and awareness *in actu*. To enjoy genuine happiness in this life and the afterlife, it must separate itself from the impurities of prime matter, becoming pure intellection (*ta'aqqul/idrāk 'aqlī*) – which, to Ibn Sīnā's belief, is the very mode of the existence of the eternal intellects.

In Ibn Sīnā's opinion, the existents which pertain to the domain of sense cannot be truly perceived and do not deserve to be called 'perceived affairs' (*maḥsūsāt*). What can be truly and really perceived are the Pure Good and the spiritual substances (i.e. the intellects or the intellections).

The perceived (*mudrak*) and the received (*munāl*) is not the eaten [thing], or the scent, or what is similar to them, but the thing which is pure splendour and sheer good – the one from which effuses every good, every order (*niẓām*), and every pleasure, and

between God and the soul-related productive intellect, and represents the latter as occupying a suprahuman noetic realm that acts as the guarantor of human reasoning'; see Frederic M. Schroeder and Robert B. Todd, tr., *Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect: The De Intellectu Attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius' Paraphrase of Aristotle De Anima 3.4–8* (Toronto, 1990), p. 38.

²⁵⁰ See Fazlul Rahman, "Akl' (V.892.b), *EI2*. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, 89.21–91.6; see Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *De l'âme*, ed. and tr. M. Bergeron and R. Dufour (Paris, 2008), pp. 210–213, esp. 90.11–91.6. Richard Walzer believes that the connection between man's acquired intellect and the transcendent Agent Intellect which al-Fārābī discusses in sections 5.15.10–11 of his *Mabādi' ārā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍilah* might be described as 'union by supposition' (*kath' hypothesin*) but not as a substantial self-identification. See Walzer's commentary on sections V.15, 7–11 in al-Fārābī, *On the Perfect State*, tr. Walzer, pp. 442–443, where Walzer also remarks that *ittiṣāl* represents the Arabic rendering of Greek *synapheia*.

what counts as the angelic spiritual substances – those which are the essentially beloved ones.²⁵¹

The theoretical faculty of the rational human soul is originated together with the body as pure potentiality of intellection. In this purely potential state, it is referred to as ‘the potential intellect’ (*al-‘aql bi’l-quwwa*) or ‘the material intellect’ (*al-‘aql al-hayūlānī*). The name is given to it due to its similarity to the prime matter of bodies, which, not possessing any form in itself, is capable of assuming every sensible form: not having any intelligible form of its own, the potential or material intellect has a capability to assume every intelligible form.²⁵² This potential intellection is defined by Ibn Sīnā as ‘the predisposition of the soul’ (*tahayyu’ li’l-nafs*)²⁵³ or ‘a pure (i.e. undelimited) preparedness (*isti’dād*) of the soul to assume all forms’.²⁵⁴ This potentiality of intellection is actualised by the Agent Intellect whose activity should be understood as its being the intellect (intellection) *in actu* (*al-‘aql bi’l-fi’l*), and whose being the intellect does not differ from its being the intellected (*ma’qūl*).

The first thing originated by the act of the Agent Intellect upon the material intellect is the habitual intellect (*intellectus in habitu*; *al-‘aql bi’l-malaka*). It represents the form of the primary intelligibles (*al-ma’qūlāt al-uwla*), i.e. axiomatic truths (some of which – e.g. ‘The whole is greater than its part’ – are actualised without recourse to reasoning and practice, and others – e.g. ‘Every terrene body is heavy’, through recourse to practice). The theoretical faculty of the soul ‘follows’ (*tabi’a*) these forms and ‘submits’ (*khaḍa’a*) itself to them in order to obtain other, more abstract, ones (i.e. the secondary intelligibles). The actualisation of the habitual intellect enables the soul to produce a definition (*ḥadd*) and a syllogism (*qiyās*). However, the conclusions drawn by means of syllogism and definition are accepted as true and valid only due to the effusion of the light of the Agent Intellect.

When the soul actualises in itself the acquired intelligibles – though without their actual occurrence in it – it becomes the actual intellect

²⁵¹ Ibn Sīnā, *Mabḍā’*, pp. 111–112.

²⁵² Ibid., p. 97.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 96.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 97.

(*intellect in actu*; *al-‘aql bi’l-fi‘l*), which means that the soul becomes able to intellect them whenever it wishes, without having to seek them anew. When, in turn, the actual existence of these intelligible forms in the soul is considered, these intelligibles are collectively called ‘the intellect that is acquired (or obtained) from outside’ (*al-‘aql al-mustafād min al-khārij*) – that is, from the Agent Intellect, through demand (*ṭalab*) or device (*hīla*). Therefore, it can be called the ‘actual intellect’ in respect to itself and the ‘acquired intellect’ in respect to its agent.²⁵⁵ The only intelligible form which is essentially perceived by the acquired intellect is that of the Agent Intellect; all other intelligible forms are perceived through the latter, in an accidental manner.²⁵⁶

Thus, to Ibn Sīnā and his followers (including Mullā Ṣadrā), the spiritual return/resurrection means the unification of the theoretical faculty of the rational human soul with the Agent Intellect (the nearest of the separated intellects in respect to the inhabitants of the sublunary sphere). Through this unification, it permanently perceives the Sheer Good and the Necessarily Existent, the separated intellects and its own essence. This pure unalloyed intellection, together with the awareness of it, necessitates the soul’s eternal intellectual bliss.

This takes us to the issue of the bliss and misery of the soul. While the soul resides in the natural body, it can enjoy two kinds of bliss: one of which pertains to the theoretical faculty and the other to the practical one. The theoretical bliss is the perfection of the soul’s essence considered without relation to the body, and it consists in the soul becoming a knowing (*‘ālim*) and intellectual (*‘aqlī*) substance. Practical happiness is the perfection of the soul considered in the aspect of its connection with the body and consists in its possessing the property of

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 99.

²⁵⁶ ‘It was explained [earlier] that ... the [individual] intellect abstracts the intelligibles from the sensible affairs and makes itself similar to the former, and that it intellects through a habitude acquired from the thing which is the intellect in its essence and intelligible in its substance – not that kind of intelligible which is abstracted by the intellect from a non-intelligible shape, thus becoming [accidentally] intelligible. And it is more proper for such a substance to be the principle (*mabdā’*), so that the rest, which is not intelligible in its essence, might be intellected through it. And this is so because the thing which is something in its essence is the principle in respect to every thing which is not the aforementioned thing; see Ibn Sīnā, *Mabdā’*, p. 102.

subjugating the latter. After the natural death (the soul's separation from the body), only theoretical bliss persists.

It is important to note that pleasure which accompanies perception does not result from the acquisition of perfection. Rather, it consists in the perception of the agreeable (*mulā'im*). The agreeable for the rational soul is the intellection of the Sheer Good, the existents that are engendered from it in a hierarchical order (i.e. the separated intellects) and its own essence. Its pleasure, therefore, consists in its perception (awareness) of this (theoretical) perfection.

Two kinds of obstacles – essential and accidental ones – can prevent the soul from the attainment of intellectual happiness and make it suffer. Essential imperfection consists in conscious partiality and denial, while possessing yearning for intellectual perfection, and in forsaking the attempt to acquire the actual intellect. Ibn Sīnā qualifies this as an incurable disease, which, after the natural death, results in an everlasting intellectual suffering, incomparably more intense than any kind of physical pain.²⁵⁷ In the *Asfār*, Ṣadrā identifies the souls which possess the potentiality of intellectual perfection but do not actualise it, and consciously neglect it, as the 'hypocrites' (*munāfiqūn*).²⁵⁸ Due to these acquired habits, their souls experience a painful suffering, being 'tied up' and 'shackled' by 'the shackles of material affections' (*'alā'iq al-hayūlā*) in the darkness of this-worldly desires (*shahawāt al-dunyā*).²⁵⁹

In turn, accidental imperfection consists in the soul's assuming bodily shapes (*al-hay'āt al-badaniyya*) due to its habit to submit to the wishes of the body. These acquired bodily shapes remain in the soul after its separation from the material body through physical death, preventing it from experiencing intellectual happiness. Since they are

²⁵⁷ See Ibn Sīnā, *Mabdā'*, p. 113.

²⁵⁸ 'The miserable ones divide in two groups . . . one of which consists of the inhabitants of this world, and the universal veil [which is] cast on their hearts . . . and another group, which consists of the hypocrites (*munāfiqūn*) – those who possess preparedness and, in respect to their innate nature (*fiṭra*) and first configuration, receive the light of true knowledge (*ma'rifa*), but go astray from the path, and whose hearts become veiled by the veil, obtained because of the acquisition of vices through committing the acts of disobedience and performing the actions of brutes and predatory beasts, and plotting devilish schemes, until dark shapes and gloomy habits take root [in them]'; see Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 132.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 9, p. 132.

alien to the substance of the soul, their presence in it causes it to suffer. However, Ibn Sīnā is inclined to think that, after a certain period of time, these shapes fade away and perish.²⁶⁰ It is not unlikely that Ṣadrā's teaching on the suffering of the Grave (*'adhāb al-qabr*) was inspired by this Avicennan (but ultimately, Plotinian) idea of the temporally accidental suffering of the soul due to its associating itself with the natural body.

The above discussed true (intellectual) happiness and suffering, however, is the share of a small number of human souls. As for the majority of them, in whom the yearning towards intelligibles does not develop expressly and with certainty, Ibn Sīnā believes them to possess a certain illusory (*wahmiyya*) or suppositional (*ẓanniyya*) happiness or suffering. He refers to the opinion of al-Fārābī (?) that, after their natural death, these souls, due to their yearning for the natural body, might somehow relate themselves to celestial and atmospheric bodies, which could serve as the loci of manifestation (*maẓāhir*) for forms, created in their imagination. According to al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, both imagination (i.e. creating images, *takhayyul*) and estimation (attributing a particular illusory meaning to a certain image, *tawahhum*) require a corporeal substratum – a postulate which will be vigorously attacked by Ṣadrā.²⁶¹

As Ṣadrā himself states on a number of occasions,²⁶² there is no disagreement between him and the earlier Muslim philosophers on the issue of spiritual – or, to put it more precisely, intellectual (*'aqlī*) – return. In his earlier works, such as *al-Mabdā' wa'l-ma'ād* and *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya*, the chapters on *ma'ād rūḥānī* represent, by and large, compilations of paraphrased passages from the writings of Ibn Sīnā. In some later works (e.g. the *'Arshiyya*), Ṣadrā does not discuss the topic at all, only making a brief statement about his full agreement with his predecessors, whereas he discusses the corporeal return in great detail. It is probably only in the tenth chapter of the fourth journey of the *Asfār*²⁶³ where the spiritual return is treated by

²⁶⁰ See Ibn Sīnā, *Mabdā'*, p. 113.

²⁶¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 114–115.

²⁶² See e.g. Ṣadrā, *'Arshiyya*, p. 245.

²⁶³ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, pp. 121–184.

him both in detail and with some originality. This originality, however, has more to do with the style and less with the subject matter – namely, Ṣadrā quotes certain Qur’anic verses and employs Qur’anic images, outwardly attempting to demonstrate the complete agreement between revelatory wisdom and philosophical intuition, but, in actual fact, interpreting the Qur’anic text in accordance with his philosophical concern of the attainment of intellectual perfection.

In the thirtieth chapter of the fourth journey of the *Asfār* (‘On the determination of the locus of suffering and punishment in Fire’), Ṣadrā clarifies his position to the effect that the rational soul (the divine spirit, the locus of wisdom and knowledge, and an intellectual substance perceiving the purely intelligible forms) is blissful in this world and in the hereafter, since, in actual fact, it never leaves its noble place (the world of the Intellect), and does not belong to the world of misery in any aspect (Ṣadrā must have been aware of Plotinus’s teaching on the higher [aspect] of the soul which always remains with the intellect).²⁶⁴ This soul, however, is not found in most human beings.²⁶⁵ What does not exist cannot experience either pleasure or pain. On the other hand, wrath (*ghaḍab*) and appetite (*shahwa*) are natural perfections of the animal soul and are the means through which the animal soul lauds and praises God. Whatever the animal soul does, driven by wrath and appetite, is its natural act, and natural acts are not liable to punishment.

Hence, the real locus of suffering, argues Ṣadrā, must be an affair which represents a mixture of the rational and animal souls: to him, it is the rational soul in the aspect of its connection with the animal soul. This mixed affair is like an isthmus, bringing together both sides. In the aspect of its being the animal soul, it is the object of punishment; in the aspect of its being the rational soul, it perceives the pain.²⁶⁶ According to this theory, the punishment is inflicted upon the animal soul for its disobeying the commands of the rational soul. However, the animal soul seems to be unaware of its being punished because the

²⁶⁴ See e.g. Plotinus, *Enneads* II.9 (33).2.4–6; III.8 (30).5.10–15; IV.7 (2).13.12–13; IV.8 (6).8.1; V.1. (10).10.22–30.

²⁶⁵ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 372.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 9, p. 371.

awareness of punishment and reward are the manifestations of the rational soul. Therefore, it appears that the rational soul, attempting to punish the animal soul, in fact punishes itself. The above theory is likely to originate in the teachings of certain Ash'arī *mutakallimūn* (probably al-Ghazālī or Rāzī). There is a trace of incompleteness, perhaps even absurdity, to it.

Furthermore, since true bliss pertains to the rational soul proper and consists in its witnessing the Sheer Good, even a total obedience of the animal soul to the rational one cannot give it more than an illusory happiness. Therefore, the unhappiness and misery, caused by disobedience, must also be a metaphorical and illusory affair. Hence, the above discussed kind of misery cannot be regarded as true and real misery. To summarise, while true (intellectual) happiness is reserved for a tiny minority of people – namely, those who have fully actualised the theoretical faculty of the rational soul, attaining unification with the Agent Intellect – true misery, for the above stated reasons, cannot exist at all. Therefore, the condition of the overwhelming majority of human beings in the hereafter is an imaginational affair – either an imaginational bliss or an imaginational misery.

3.5.2 Corporeal Resurrection

To Ṣadrā, the difference between the kinds of perception (sense, imaginational, and intellectual) is a difference in the intensity of existence. Like Plotinus, he believes senses to be weak intellects, and intellects, strong senses.²⁶⁷ If so, his claim that most human beings do not experience spiritual (i.e. intellectual) return should be understood to the effect that they do experience it, but that their experience is weak, wherefore it should be better described as an imaginable one. The usage of the traditional theological terms *ma'ād rūḥānī* instead of *ma'ād 'aqlī*, and *ma'ād jismānī* instead of *ma'ād khayālī*, is only for the sake of convenience and in order to avoid undesired problems with exoteric scholars.

Therefore, while Ibn Sīnā is vague about the *ma'ād* of those human beings who fail to come in touch with the Agent Intellect, Ṣadrā is very certain that they do experience it, though it is an experience of a lesser

²⁶⁷ Ibid., vol. 9, p. 101.

intensity than the spiritual return. The necessity of the imaginal *ma'ād* is thus dictated by the principles of the principality and systematic ambiguity of existence.

3.5.3 The Grave and the Awakening

Although Ibn 'Arabī's teaching on the *barzakh* ('isthmus')²⁶⁸ influenced Ṣadrā's conception of the Grave (*qabr*) considerably, it seems that its principal source must be sought in Ibn Sīnā's formative remarks on the bodily shapes or predispositions (*al-hay'āt al-badaniyya*) that inhere in the soul due to its habit to obey the wishes of the body, wherefore the soul identifies itself with the latter. After the soul's separation from the natural body, these shapes remain in the soul, causing accidental suffering due to the presence in it of what is alien to its essence.²⁶⁹ To Ṣadrā, it is this habit of the soul to identify itself with the natural body that causes it to suffer or to experience bliss in the Grave.

When the spirit abandons the natural body, it retains some sort of connection with this body – not with its material parts, as some of the recent [scholars] have thought²⁷⁰... – but with the body in its entirety in the aspect of its [the body's] form and the shape of its frame (*haykal*), which remain in its [the soul's] memory. And the soul, when it abandons the body, carries with it the estimative faculty, which perceives particular meanings through its essence and corporeal [i.e. imaginal] forms – through imagination.

... when a human being dies and imagines his essence as [something] separated from this world, and [wrongly] identifies

²⁶⁸ See e.g. Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūḥāt*, vol. 1, pp. 304–307 and vol. 3, pp. 249–250.

²⁶⁹ See Ibn Sīnā, *Mabdā'*, p. 113.

²⁷⁰ Apparently, Ṣadrā refers to the theory of Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī (828–903/1425–1497), discussed in the latter's *Risāla fi'l-ma'ād*, on the twofold connection of the soul with the natural body – through the animal spirit and directly with parts of the body. While the first connection is destroyed by the natural death, the second, according to Dashtakī, remains intact. Dashtakī believes that every particle of the natural body is somehow 'branded' by the soul during their coexistence. By this 'brand', different parts of the destroyed body will recognise each other upon the Rising, coming together and restoring the decayed shape, after which the soul will return to it; see Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 205.

himself as that very human being which is dead and buried – the one which died in his form – [in the same manner as in dream visions he witnesses himself in the same form in which he exists in this world, and witnesses the affairs by true witnessing through his inner sense]²⁷¹ – and finds his body in the Grave, and perceives the pain that afflicts the body as sensible punishment, in keeping with what the true Laws tell us, this is the suffering of the Grave (*‘adhāb al-qabr*). But, if he is a blessed one, he imagines what is promised by the Law in an agreeable form, in conformity with the objects of his beliefs, such as gardens, rivers, parks, pageboys, houris, cups of the allotted [substance] (i.e. wine), and this is the reward of the Grave (*thawāb al-qabr*) . . . and the true Grave consists of these shapes.²⁷²

The Grave is the first other-worldly stage of the soul's substantial evolution, at which the soul continues to identify itself with its natural body, in spite of its actual separation from the latter, and imagines that through this natural body it receives sensible reward and sensible punishment for its this-worldly acts performed in conformity with its beliefs or contrary to them. Thus, 'the Grave', 'reward' and 'punishment' are illusory affairs that exist only in the consciousness of the soul. Had the soul not identified itself with the natural body and not believed in posthumous reward and punishment, it would not have experienced them. Experiences of the Grave result solely from our estimations.

Gradually, the intensity of the images of the Grave fades away and the soul becomes aware that its estimative faculty has made an error, identifying itself with the physical shape of the dead body. It realises that, as a non-compound spiritual affair, it is all things that its scope of intensity allows it to encompass. This gradual decrease of the intensity with which the soul perceives itself as its former natural body is called 'Sending Forth', or 'Awakening' (*ba'th*), and 'coming out of the Grave'.

Awakening consists of the soul's coming out of the dust of these shapes, like an embryo comes out of its strong dwelling, and the difference between the state of the Grave and the state of

²⁷¹ Şadrā, *Mafātīh*, vol. 2, p. 726.

²⁷² Şadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 219. According to Kh^wājavi, the last paragraph is a paraphrase of a passage from al-Ghazālī's *al-Maḍnūn bihi ‘alā ghayr ahlihi* ('What Must Be Kept from the Unworthy'); see Şadrā, *Mafātīh*, vol. 2, p. 726.

Awakening is like the difference between man's state in the womb of his mother and that of his coming out of it, and, indeed, the state of the Grave is a harbinger of the states of the Rising.²⁷³

When the Rising comes, man wakes up from the sleep of the Grave and, willingly or not, directs himself towards God. Rising from the Grave, i.e. ceasing to identify oneself with the natural body and its wishes and appetites, is one of the essential stages of the soul and an indispensable phase of its substantial development. Since it is an essential affair, its occurrence cannot be prevented by accidental obstacles (i.e. bodily predispositions). However, the presence of the latter in the soul can make it perceive the Rising (and substantial motion in general) as something unpleasant and painful. Once the soul emerges from the Grave, it ceases to identify itself with the shape of its natural body, but its previous bodily affections remain in it, therefore it is qualified (*muqayyad*) in its creative activity and can only produce images of the objects of its affections. Such relative captivity of its imaginative faculty can be described as 'imaginational Fire (Hell)', while the relative freedom of this faculty in producing forms may be considered as 'imaginational Garden (Paradise)'.

3.5.4 Rising

According to Ṣadrā, rising (*qiyāma*) proper (i.e. the 'greatest rising') is a state of consciousness and a stage of perceptual existence (*al-wujūd al-idrākī*) at which a complete destruction of habitual this-worldly images and manifestations of existence occurs. He believes that the Qur'anic verses which describe the events of the Last Day should be understood as allusions to such transformation of consciousness; for example, 'When the sight is dazed, and the moon is buried in darkness, and the sun and the moon are joined together' (75:7–10); 'and the heavens shall be opened as if there were doors, and the mountains

²⁷³ Ṣadrā, *Aṣfār*, vol. 9, p. 219. Cf. Ibn 'Arabī's statement: 'The period of *barzakh*, in relation to the last configuration, corresponds to the woman's carrying the embryo in her womb'; see Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūḥāt*, vol. 3, p. 250; the English translation quoted from William Chittick, *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-'Arabī's Cosmology* (Albany, NY, 1998), p. 351. Cf. the discussion about Ḥamīd al-Dīn Kirmānī's treatment of the issue in Maria De Cillis, *Salvation and Destiny in Islam: The Shi'i Ismaili Perspective of Ḥamīd al-Dīn Kirmānī* (London, 2018), pp. 170–174.

shall vanish, as if they were a mirage' (78:19–20); 'when the sun is folded up, when the stars fall, losing their lustre' (81:1–2). The focal point of this transformation is witnessing the unqualified existence.

For Ibn 'Arabī and his school, rising is equivalent to the Real's essential self-disclosure (*al-tajallī al-dhātī*) – the disclosure in which it manifests itself as the Unqualified Existence (*al-wujūd al-muṭlaq*). This essential self-disclosure destroys the locus of its manifestation, i.e. the 'mountain' of the soul's ipseity, wherefore it ceases to perceive itself as an individual with a set of specific characteristics and, instead, becomes aware of itself as the whole of existence (just like a drop comes to perceive itself as the ocean). Following the '*urafā*', Ṣadrā describes this transformation of consciousness as 'the return of the soul's [specified] existence to the existence of the Real through abandoning its delimited existence'.²⁷⁴

As Ṣadrā puts it, 'when the manifestation of the light of oneness grows strong, the shadow of frames is lifted from the world'.²⁷⁵ According to him, the experience of coming in touch with Pure Existence (witnessing the essential self-disclosure of the Real) brings the awareness of existence as a flow and, hence, the apprehension of the instability and illusory character of all existential images and forms (particular existences). *Sarayān al-wujūd* ('flow of existence') is an intuition produced by the 'risen' consciousness that has been 'awakened' from the illusion of stability of the (sensible and psychic) world, as Ṣadrā seems to testify in the following passage on the Rising, found in the '*Arshiyya*:

Know that the Rising . . . is inside the veils of the heavens and the earth and that it relates to this world as human being relates to womb and bird to egg; and whoso has not destroyed the building of the outer, the inner states are not revealed to him, because the Unseen and the Witnessed cannot be brought together in one locus (*mawḍi'*) . . .

And the gnostic witnesses these states and awe-inspiring affairs [of the Rising] upon the manifestation of the authority (*sulṭān*) of the other world to his essence, and hears the call: "Whose is the kingdom today?" "God's, the One, the Overwhelming" (Q.

²⁷⁴ Ṣadrā, *Mafātīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 723.

²⁷⁵ Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi ash'ār*, ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi, p. 62.

40:16)²⁷⁶ and sees ‘the heavens [being] rolled up in His right hand’ (Q. 39:67)²⁷⁷ and, upon [the occurrence of] the Rising, sees this earth quaking and the mountains [being] broken into pieces, so that there is no stability and no solidity in them, and, when the veil is removed through the Greater and Lesser Risings, he sees every thing in its root, without the error of the sense and the doubt of the estimative faculty, and he [also] sees the compound individual possessors of positions [i.e. the natural bodies] as [constantly] self-renewing and transforming matters and forms, together with their different accidents – those through which their existence as sensible individuals, whose loci of manifestation are the tools (i.e. the organs) of senses and their receptacles, is completed. Upon the Rising they [the ‘possessors of positions’, i.e. natural bodies] are seen by another kind of seeing and at the other-worldly locus of witnessing they do not possess this [sensible] existence: at the Plain of the Rising, the gnostic witnesses the things in their principal realities by his other-worldly sense, illuminated by the light of Sovereignty, and he witnesses the mountains as ‘plucked wool-tufts’ (Q. 101:5),²⁷⁸ and [then] understands the meaning of His word: “They ask you concerning the mountains. Say: “My Lord will uproot them and scatter them as dust. He will leave them as plains smooth and level. Nothing crooked or curved wilt thou see in their place” (Q. 20:105–107).²⁷⁹ And on that day he sees the fire of Gehenna ‘encompassing the unbelievers [i.e. the natural existents]’ (Q. 9:49)²⁸⁰ and sees how the bodies are being burnt and ‘their skins are roasted through’ (Q. 4:56),²⁸¹ and the flesh is being melted [in the Fire] ‘whose fuel is men and stones’ (Q. 2:24),²⁸² and [how] the seas are boiling over with a swell.²⁸³

The vision of the Rising, thus, is the vision of the unity of the true existence (‘the Real’) and illusoriness of its limitations. Upon a closer

²⁷⁶ Translation of the verse taken from Chittick, *Knowledge*, p. 433.

²⁷⁷ Translation by Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur’ān*, modified by the present author.

²⁷⁸ Translation by Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted*.

²⁷⁹ Translation by Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur’ān*.

²⁸⁰ Translation by Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted*, modified by the present author.

²⁸¹ Translation by Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur’ān*.

²⁸² Translation by Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted*.

²⁸³ Ṣadrā, *‘Arshiyya*, pp. 267–268.

examination, however, one finds that what is at issue is not an unqualified individual unity (according to which, ‘all is He’²⁸⁴), but a sort of unity-in-multiplicity and multiplicity-in-unity (*al-waḥda fī’l-kathra wa’l-kathra fī’l-waḥda*): although the gnostic perceives the constant change and ‘flow’ of the natural bodies, he simultaneously witnesses the stability of their principal realities (*al-ḥaqā’iq al-aṣliyya*), which, as it was indicated earlier, should be understood as directions (*jihāt*) and aspects of the reality of existence (or, speaking in *ishrāqī* terms, as the ‘rays’ of the Light of Lights, which appear, i.e. can be discerned, at a certain level of its decrease and ‘descent’). In the above quoted description of the experience of the Rising, Ṣadrā combines the approaches of Islamic gnosis (*irfān*) and Neoplatonism. The prevailing intuition, apparently, is that of the natural world as Fire (Hell), whence he considers all its inhabitants – in particular those who develop a liking for and affection to it – to be ‘unbelievers’ (*kāfirūn*), while those who have cut their spiritual connections with the natural world, turning their aspirations towards and putting their trust into the truly real intellectual existence, but still remain in this world in the aspect of their bodily frames (or the animal soul), can be treated as ‘Abrahams’, being placed amidst fire, but not burning in it.²⁸⁵

In the *Asfār*, Ṣadrā identifies the experience of the Rising as the transformation of the this-worldly configuration into the other-worldly one, or as the ‘change/replacement of existence’ (*tabdīl al-wujūd*), which can occur both before and after the natural death – in the former case, it is called ‘voluntary death’ (*al-mawt al-irādī*).²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ According to some testimonies, the expression was first employed by ‘Abd Allāh Anṣārī (396–481/1005–1089).

²⁸⁵ According to the Qur’an, when Abraham, who had come to believe in the True-and-One God, destroyed the images of his tribal gods, his tribesmen sentenced him to death in fire, but the fire, obeying God’s command, did not burn him: ‘We said: “O Fire! Be thou cool and (a means of) safety for Abraham!”’ (Q. 21:69); translation by Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur’ān*. The symbol of Abraham, to my knowledge, is never employed by Ṣadrā, but it would be a very appropriate one to indicate the state of the separated souls (of the sages and gnostics) in the kingdom of Nature.

²⁸⁶ See Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 238.

“We have lifted the veil, and today thy sight is piercing” (Q. 50:22)²⁸⁷ – because of the change of their [the gnostics’] this-worldly configuration into an other-worldly one. And when their configuration, and their hearing, sight, and [other] senses are changed into/replaced with [the other-worldly] hearing, sight, and senses [simultaneously,] in respect to them, all existents [present] in the heavens and on the earth are changed, because they also have a this-worldly configuration and an other-worldly one.²⁸⁸

And through this change/replacement in existence, regardless of whether it occurs before the [natural] death, [simultaneously] with it, or after it, the human being becomes worthy of entering the Garden and the Dwelling of Peace, and through it is established the difference between the inhabitants of the Garden and the inhabitants of the Fire. As for the inhabitants of the Garden, they have illuminated hearts and opened breasts, and purified bodies, and forms separated from the dirt of natural matter, which is not the case with the inhabitants of the Fire, because in the essences of the latter, the change/replacement of the natural existence has not taken place.²⁸⁹

The term *tabdīl al-wujūd* (‘change/replacement of existence’) has strong Sufi connotations: the Sufis believe there is a class of God’s clients/friends, called *abdāl* (‘the changed/replaced ones’), whose bad character traits He replaces with (or makes look like) good ones. Since the *abdāl* enjoy God’s special favour, they should not be judged by common standards.²⁹⁰ In Ṣadrā’s interpretation, however, *tabdīl al-wujūd* is, first and foremost, *tabdīl al-nash’a* (‘change of the configuration’): upon the increase of the intensity of the soul’s this-worldly (i.e. sensible) existence, it gradually changes itself into the

²⁸⁷ Translation by Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur’ān*, modified by the present author.

²⁸⁸ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 282.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., vol. 9, p. 283.

²⁹⁰ Rūmī, however, interprets *tabdīl* as the ripening (or strengthening) of one’s individual existence.

Who are the *abdāl*? Those who become ‘replaced’ (or ‘substituted’).

Through replacement (or substitution) their wine becomes vinegar.

See Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī [Jalaluddin Rumi], *The Mathnawi*, 6 vols., ed. and tr. Reynold Alleyne Nicholson (London, 1925–1940), 3:4000.

other-worldly one. 'Rising', apparently, then refers to the moment when the soul becomes fully aware of the occurrence of the change, while the change itself is a gradual affair that usually takes one's lifetime – spent in the natural body – to be completed.

Furthermore, to Ṣadrā, *tabdīl al-wujūd* means simultaneously rising, the transformation of the sensible existence into the imaginal one, and entering the (imaginal) Garden. Remaining on the sensible level of existence means, properly speaking, remaining in the Fire of Nature without the Rising. Is, then, the Garden of the prophets and God's friends, to which the former invite us, the imaginal (psychic) Garden, while that of the philosophers, the intellectual one?

3.5.5 The Garden and the Fire

Depending on the degree to which the soul is able to identify itself as the unqualified existence, its post-Rising (*ba'd al-qiyāma*) existence pertains either to the Garden (Paradise) or the Fire (Hell). Furthermore, Ṣadrā distinguishes two Gardens – 'the Garden of those drawn near to God' (*jannat al-muqarrabīn*), i.e. the intellectual or noetic Paradise, and 'the Garden of the people of the right side' (*jannat ahl al-yamīn*), the imaginal or psychic Paradise – and two Fires, 'the Fire of the people of the left side' (*nār ahl al-yasīr*), the imaginal, or psychic, Hell, and 'the Fire of nature' (*nār al-ṭabī'a*), the natural world proper. Undoubtedly, two Gardens and two Fires represent nothing but certain ranges of perceptual existence. Each particular range of the scale of perceptual existence corresponds to a certain cosmological level: the Garden of those drawn near to God corresponds to the world of Creation from nothing (*ibdā'*)/Intellect; the Fire of nature to the world of nature; the imaginal Garden and the imaginal Fire to the intermediate world of the Soul (the former, in the aspect of the soul's independence from the natural body, while the latter, in the aspect of its dependence on/connection with the natural body). According to the principle of *tashkīk al-wujūd*, the soul's post-Rising existence is a systematically ambiguous affair which allows the possibility of the existence of an infinite number of degrees of intensity, the higher of which are referred to as the 'Garden' and the lower, as the 'Fire'.

The sensible Garden [belongs] to the people of the right side and the intelligible one to those drawn near to God (and they are 'the highest'). And, likewise, the Fire is two Fires: the sensible Fire and

the Fire of meaning. The sensible one is [created] for the unbelievers, and the Fire of meaning, for the arrogant hypocrites – [that is,] the sensible [Fire] is for the bodies, and that of meaning, for the hearts. Both the sensible Garden and the sensible Fire are worlds of measurable magnitude, [but] one of them is the form of God's mercy, and the other, the form of His wrath; and the Garden is created by essence, but the Fire, by accident, and there is a secret in it'.²⁹¹

The secret to which Şadrā refers, apparently, consists in the Fire's being a concomitant of the Garden and in wrath's accompanying mercy – in other words, the Garden could not be created otherwise than together with Fire. However, the human soul which begins its existence as part of Fire (i.e. the world of Nature) is not meant to remain in it forever. On the contrary, through a gradual increase of the intensity of its existence, it is supposed to ascend from the Fire to the Garden, but it cannot begin its existence as the soul elsewhere except in the Fire (the natural world). The Fire is not an evil, but rather an evil is a belief that there is nothing in existence except the Fire and the refusal to come out of it.

What pertains to the other world (*al-ākhirā*) proper is the Garden of the people of the right side and the Fire of the people of the left side, i.e. the Garden and the Fire as psychic realities. Both of them are imaginational affairs, but the imaginational Garden is created by the non-delimited imagination of the soul, which is convinced of the rightfulness of its actions and its worthiness of entering the Garden, while the imaginational Fire is a product of the bound and delimited imagination of the soul, which perceives itself as transgressor and, therefore, is tormented by its conscience.

From another aspect, the entire psychic world (i.e. the domain of imagination) can be considered as the Garden, while the natural world in its totality may be treated as the Fire, because, as long as the soul is connected with and depends on prime matter, it is tormented by the constant change and instability inherent in the world of nature, which does not permit it to contemplate itself and its principle (whereas the

²⁹¹ Şadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 322. Cf. Şadrā, *ʿArshiyya*, p. 273.

experiences of the Imaginational Garden should be understood as images in which the soul contemplates itself and its lord).²⁹²

If we endorse this stance and interpret the Garden as the world of the Soul and the Imagination, and the Fire as the world of Nature, the experience of the Rising, apparently, must be understood as 'the moment of truth', at which the inhabitant of the natural world realises

²⁹² The following passage in the *Asfār* (repeated almost verbatim in the *Asrār*) is particularly suggestive of such interpretation:

As for the inhabitants of the Fire, there is no doubt concerning the self-renewal of their skins and transformation of their bodies, and their turning from one form into another . . . because their natures are nothing but material bodily faculties . . . and it was previously established that the actions and affections of material faculties are finite, therefore ceasing and change are inevitable in them. Then, change of bodies and transformation of matters must inevitably have its cause in a circular movement produced by celestial bodies, which encompass the generated and corrupting bodies, possessors of directions. The judgement concerning the inhabitants of the Fire is [made] in accordance with what God's command gives them through the locomotive faculty, put in the Remotest Body, which compels it to move and [through] the luminaries [i.e. the fixed stars] [that remain] fixed in respect to the travelling of the seven bright ones [the planets] . . . and they have influence upon the creation of the inhabitants of the Fire through inflicting upon them different kinds of suffering and sorts of punishments in accordance with what is required by their previous practices, principles of their actions, their beliefs and intentions . . .

As for the inhabitants of the Garden, they do not experience this kind of change, transformation, generation, and corruption, because their configuration transcends the natural configuration and its properties, and their movements and actions are of a different kind, wherefore they do not experience tiredness and exhaustion, nor are their deeds afflicted by weariness, because their movements and actions are not corporeal, but are like the operations of the estimative faculty (*wahm*) and the movements of the inner consciousness (*ḍamīr*) that occur without [entailing] tiredness, weariness, exhaustion, and fatigue, since, in respect to them [the inhabitants of Garden], the heavens and their movements are 'rolled up', due to their standing on the right side and possessing a station at which time and place are 'rolled up'. In their time, the past and the future of this [our] time are brought together, and their place contains everything that the heavens and the earth contain in themselves. Nevertheless, the Garden of the Deeds and its pleasures undoubtedly must be counted among sensible affairs, except that, although they are sensible affairs, they are not material and natural ones, but their forms are perceptual ones, whose entified existence is their

its true character, i.e. witnesses the natural world as the Fire and, therefore, makes a decision to exit it – which, however, does not necessarily mean physical death. Rather, it means a change in the state of one's consciousness, in particular, abandoning the habit of identifying with the bodily shape and its pleasures and pains. To attain psychic or imaginational bliss, it is sufficient to stop identifying one's self with the natural body. Whoso is able to conceive of themselves as of pure soul and imagination, having nothing to do with the physical body, comes out of the Fire and enters the Garden. In this sense, entering the Garden is a common experience of all human beings that occurs during sleep – and sometimes while awake – when we see dreams or have dream-like visions. The visions of prophets and God's clients, according to Ṣadrā (though the original idea apparently belongs to Suhrawardī), also pertain to the world of Imagination, but differ from those of ordinary people by their greater intensity, due to which they can externalise these visions and make other people witness them.²⁹³

very sensibility (*maḥsūsiyya*), and everything that is in this Garden has a psychic existence . . . Despite this, in the world of Gardens occur self-renewals in terms of the generation of the forms of the Garden [that emerge] not from material occasions, but from the active directions of the soul and God's facets (*shu'ūn*) . . . Thus, it has been established that the principle of changes in the horizons [i.e. in the natural world] has its beginning in the world of souls, and the configuration of Gardens is the configuration of souls, and inside them are found psychic engendered affairs.

Ṣadrā, *Aṣfār*, vol. 9, pp. 380–382.

²⁹³ See the following passage in the *Asrār*:

Whoever has understood how God exercises His power in respect to the existence of imagination, and [in respect to] what is found by the soul in a single instant, such as huge bodily forms and [gigantic] dimensions, and their attributes and states, will easily affirm the corporealisation of spirits (*tajassud al-arwāḥ*) and the assumption of bodily forms by the intentions, and the immediate bringing to [one's] presence the objects of appetites [that occur] through sheer aspiration and intention . . . without the participation of bodily matter. To this kind [of imaginal affairs] pertain the appearance of angelic individuals to prophets and God's clients, and their [the angels'] descending with the prophetic revelation (*wahy*) and charismata, in forms of sensible bodies, [which happen] owing to the manifestation of the authority (*sulṭān*) of the other world to their [the prophets and God's clients'] hearts and to their inner faculty. Some of the People of Revealing have been left in doubt whether they

Interpreting the gift of sainthood (*walāya*) in terms of the extreme intensity of the imaginative faculty and treating *himma* ('aspiration') as the ability to externalise imagined forms and to make them subsist in the outside is typical of Ibn 'Arabī and Qūnawī's understanding of the nature and properties of sainthood – to the extent that it is probably not utterly wrong to describe them as *ahl al-khayāl* ('people of imagination') par excellence. Ṣadrā seems to endorse their stance in his treatment of the high intensity of imagination as the key property of sainthood.

Now, if the Garden in which the experiences of prophets and God's clients take place – and to which they invite the common folk – is the Garden of Imagination or the Garden of Soul, who, then, inhabits the Garden of Intellect? Ṣadrā's answer, apparently, is that the difference between intelligible and imaginal realms is a relative (*nisbī*) affair: imagination can and must be treated as a weak intellection. Hence, the prophets, God's clients, and true knowers, whose perceptual faculty has been developed to its perfection, reside simultaneously in both Gardens – essentially in the Intelligible/Noetic Garden and concomitantly in the Imaginational one, because their essences, due to their simplicity, have become all things.

3.5.6 The Ramparts

The *a'rāf* ('Ramparts' or 'Heights') are discussed in Q. 7:46–53. Ṣadrā seems to have drawn his inspiration particularly from verse 7:46: 'Upon the Ramparts, there are people who know everyone by his marks'.²⁹⁴ Traditionally, the commentators of the Qur'an and the

have seen what they have seen – namely, the forms which appeared and made themselves present to them – with the eye of sense or with the eye of imagination. The truth [about these forms] is that they are forms [which are] [firmly] established in existence and that they are stronger in obtaining [are perceived more intensively] than natural forms, except that a precondition for obtaining them in the most complete manner is the predomination (*ghalaba*) of the active faculty of the soul, i.e. the form-making (*muṣawwara*) [faculty], and preserving them through intense aspiration.

Ṣadrā, *Asrār*, pp. 231–232.

²⁹⁴ Translation by Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur'ān*, modified by the present author.

mutakallimūn had identified the *aʿrāf* with a wall erected between the Garden and the Fire, mentioned in verse 57:13 ('A wall with a door [in it] is put up between them. In its inner side is mercy, in the outer side – wrath'²⁹⁵). Those on the Ramparts were, in turn, identified as the people whose good and bad deeds are in perfect balance, wherefore, it was said, they could not enter either the Garden or the Fire, but remained in the isthmus between them, partially experiencing both states.

Ṣadrā dismisses the interpretation of the *mutakallimūn* as lacking due insight and, instead, proposes his own:

. . . the inhabitants of the Ramparts are those perfect in knowledge and gnosis, those who recognise each group of people by their [specific] marks and, by the light of their insight, see the inhabitants of the Garden and the inhabitants of the Fire, and their states in the other world . . . However, they [the inhabitants of the Ramparts] are counted as belonging to this [natural] world in respect to their bodies . . . and, thus, through their bodies they are earthly beings, but through their hearts, heavenly ones. Their apparitions (*ashbāh*) belong to the carpet (*farsh*) [of Nature]; their spirits pertain to the Throne ('*arsh*). They have not yet died by natural death so that they might enter the Garden in body, as they have entered it in spirit . . . When they come out of the [natural] world, their hope becomes its very fulfilment and their potentiality, the very actuality and obtaining; but, before this, their state is an intermediate perfection (*kamāl barzakhī*) between the states of the inhabitants of the Garden and the inhabitants of the Fire, because their hearts partake in the pleasures of the Garden, such as faith and knowledge (*maʿrifa*), but their bodies are tormented by the torments and pains of this [bodily] world.²⁹⁶

The symbolism of the passage from the '*Arshiyya* is transparent: Ṣadrā interprets the Ramparts (*aʿrāf*) as the situation of the people (sages and gnostics) whose souls have experienced the Greater Rising before

²⁹⁵ Translation by Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur'ān*, modified by the present author.

²⁹⁶ Ṣadrā, '*Arshiyya*, p. 278.

their natural death and (final) separation from the material body. While their souls belong to the other (imaginational or psychic) world, their (physical) bodies still reside in this (physical and sensible) one.²⁹⁷ (It is quite likely that Ṣadrā counts himself as one of this group.) Such interpretation of the Ramparts makes one even more confident that, in its esoteric sense, Ṣadrā regards the natural world as the true Fire, while he sees the other world – the world of Imagination – in its entirety as the Garden. ‘Knowing everyone by his mark’, in all likelihood, must be understood as the ability to recognise those who, like themselves, after dying by voluntary death before dying by a natural one, have ‘risen’ from the ‘graves’ of matter by transforming their explicit and implicit attitudes towards this-worldly and other-worldly affairs.

* * *

As we have seen, Islamic eschatological concepts are interpreted by Ṣadrā as states and phenomena of perceptual existence (*wujūd idrākī*). The central concept of rising (*qiyāma*), according to Ṣadrā, refers to the moment of truth, which brings intense awareness of the constant change and instability of the world of Nature and erases the borderline between (external) senses and imagination, replacing the illusion of stability and permanence of the surrounding world with the intuition of the flow of existence (*sarayān al-wujūd*). Furthermore, Ṣadrā believes

²⁹⁷ The twenty-second chapter (‘The Bezel of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Word of Elias’) of Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Fuṣūṣ* is likely to have been Ṣadrā’s direct source of inspiration. Ibn ‘Arabī writes:

The gnostics here appear as if they [still] were in the form of this world, due to what pertains to them of its properties. But [in actual fact] God, the Most High, has [already] changed them, in their insides, into the other-worldly configuration (*al-nash’a al-ukhrawiyya*) . . . and, by their [true inner] form, they are not known to anyone except the one to whom God reveals them through his insight and he understands. And there is no knower of God, [knowing Him] through His self-disclosure, who has not been changed into the other-worldly configuration and has not been ‘gathered’ in the world and ‘risen’ in his grave, and he sees what you do not see and witnesses what you do not witness.

See Ibn ‘Arabī, *Fuṣūṣ*, vol. 1, p. 186. Cf. Caner Dagli’s translation in Muhyi al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī, *The Ringstones of Wisdom*, tr. Caner K. Dagli (Chicago, 2004), p. 213.

this flow to be a unidirectional motion of the substance towards ever higher degrees of intensity, wherefore there is no return possible from a higher level of substantial evolution to a lower one. The inhabitants of the Garden of Imagination never come back to the earth of natural existence. Therefore, metempsychosis (unless we interpret it as the change of the imaginal body of the soul in keeping with the change of the soul's dominant virtue or vice) is impossible and absurd.

Şadrā interprets the spiritual and corporeal returns as the intellectual/noetic (*'aqlī*) and imaginal resurrections. Unlike Ibn Sīnā, who apparently believed imagination to be a hindrance to the intellectual return (the soul's coming in touch or unification with the Agent Intellect), Şadrā holds that spiritual (i.e. intellectual/noetic) resurrection cannot occur otherwise than through corporeal (i.e. psychic/imaginal) one, because external senses, imagination, and intellection, to him, represent three degrees of the ever-increasing intensity of perception. According with the principle of the lower possibility (*al-imkān al-akhaṣṣ*), in the ascending movement, the lower possibility must be actualised prior to the actualisation of a higher one.

Depending on the standpoint taken, different affairs can be considered as the Garden (*al-janna*) and the Fire (*al-nār*) – that is, Paradise and Hell. The natural existence, due to its permanently experienced generation and corruption, can be regarded as the Fire, though there can be manifestations of the Garden in it (i.e. at times particular loci of the natural world can be perceived as belonging to the Garden if seen with the eye of imagination). Intellectual existence, in turn, must be considered as the Garden in the true sense of the word (because, to Şadrā, the real bliss consists in witnessing the intelligible – not the psychic/imaginal affairs). As for the world of the Soul, it contains in itself both the Imaginal Garden and the Imaginal Fire. However, Şadrā apparently believes that in its essence it is Garden, which is sometimes mistakenly perceived as Fire due to the painful psychic experiences (which last only as long as the soul remains attached to its natural body by preserving in itself bodily desires which cannot be satisfied after its separation from the natural body).

To Şadrā, the souls that experience at least partial spiritual Rising during their natural lifetime and realise the true character of this and other worlds, but, for the time being, remain connected with their natural bodies, can be best described as 'the men of the Ramparts'

(*rijāl al-a'rāf*) – those who know the inhabitants of both worlds by their marks.

In view of the aforementioned peculiarities, Ṣadrā's eschatological doctrine can be defined as a teaching on the transformations of perceptual existence, in which particular attention is paid to the analysis of the states and properties of imagination.

4. Summary of Ṣadrā's Doctrine: Eleven Premises

In the ninth and final volume of his *Asfār*, Ṣadrā summarises the key principles of his philosophy as the eleven premises of the proof of the necessity of corporeal resurrection, as follows.²⁹⁸

First. In every existent thing, the principle of its being existent (*mawjūdiyya*) is its existence, while quiddity only follows existence as a shadow follows its possessor. Hence, the reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of every thing is its specific kind of existence (*naḥw wujūdihi al-khāṣṣ bihi*), not its quiddity. Existence, therefore, is a concrete ipseity (*al-huwiyya al-ʿayniyya*), which cannot be imitated by any mental affair. It is not possible to refer to it otherwise than through knowledge of witnessing (*ʿirfān shuhūdī*).²⁹⁹

Second. The individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) of every thing is nothing else than its specific kind of existence. Existence and individuation are one in their essence and differ only as concepts. The so-called individuating accidents (*al-ʿawāriḍ al-mushakhaṣṣa*) are, in fact, only signs and concomitants of an individual existential ipseity, and even in this capacity they can be accepted only if taken, not in their entities and individuals, but as the constant changeability of limitation (*ḥadd*) – and hence, quiddity – in the accident.³⁰⁰ (In other words, what subsists is accident-in-general, while its intensity is in constant change. This change of the intensity of accident, naturally, is caused by and must be viewed as the concomitant of the change of the intensity of substance.)

²⁹⁸ Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, pp. 185–197.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 185. Cf. Ibn Sīnā's statement in the *Ishārāt*: 'It is not possible to refer to the First One except by pure intellectual knowledge (*ʿirfān ʿaqlī*)'; see Ibn Sīnā, *Ishārāt*, p. 275.

³⁰⁰ See Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, p. 185.

Third. Existence by its very essence (which is simple and non-compound, both externally and mentally) is susceptible to intensification and attenuation. Hence, the difference between its instances occurs, not owing to the essential differentia, accident, or any other individuator that is added to the principle of this nature (as the Peripatetics hold), but owing to their essential intensity and weakness and (essential) priority and posteriority. However, the universal concepts that are essentially attributed to the instances of existence and are extracted from them (i.e. the quiddities) differ from each other by genus, differentia, and accident. Therefore, because the essentialists treat different levels of intensity of existence as different species, it is said that existence differs in species.

Fourth. Existence accepts an intensifying motion (*al-ḥaraka al-ishtidādiyya*) and substance is capable of an essential transformation (*istihāla*) of its substantiality. Parts and limitations of a single continuous motion do not exist *in actu*, but only *in potentia* and as abstractions in the mind. Hence, all parts of such motion exist by the same existence.³⁰¹

Fifth. Every compound thing is what it is through its form, not through its matter. Matter is nothing else than the subject of the potentiality and possibility of the thing and the substrate of affection (*infi'āl*) and motion. Therefore, if one supposed the subsistence of the form of a compound thing without matter, he would find the thing existing in the totality of its reality.

Sixth. The individual unity of every thing – which is the same as its existence – is not univocal in fashion and does not pertain to all existents in the same degree. On the contrary, like existence itself, it is systematically ambiguous: in continuous quantities (magnitudes) it manifests itself as continuity and uninterruptedness; in time and gradual affairs, as ceasing and self-renewal; in numbers, as actual multiplicity; and in natural bodies, as potential multiplicity. Furthermore, in separated substances it manifests itself differently than in material ones, because their capacity as receptacles of existence is different. As one's separation from matter and substantiation increases and he grows more powerful and more perfect, he becomes able to encompass more and more things and bring together more and

³⁰¹ Ibid., vol. 9, p. 186.

more different affairs, until eventually he actualises in himself the form of existence in its entirety. Due to its ability to encompass everything, the human soul moves freely up and down the scale of existence, decreasing and increasing its intensity at will. Owing to its phasing itself in different phases, one and the same thing can be at times connected with matter and at other times separated from it (while this separation also has different degrees).

Seventh. The identity and individuation of the body rest on the soul, not on the matter. Even if a physical form is changed into an imaginational one, the ipseity of human being, regardless of all transformations, remains the same because it exists as a gradually actualised continuity. The soul, as the form of perfection and completeness of human being, is the principle of its essence and the place of the origin of its faculties and tools (such as eyes, ears, nose, etc.), and the source of its dimensions and parts, which preserves all of them in this natural configuration and simultaneously gradually changes them into parts of the psychic body, and then into a simple intellectual substance. The change of matter is not an obstacle for the subsistence of a compound thing, because matter constitutes it not in the aspect of its specification and entification, but as a genus and something indefinite and non-specified (*amr mubham*).³⁰² (The latter postulate, as mentioned above, plays a crucial role in Ṣadrā's teaching on substantial motion.)

Eighth. The imaginative faculty does not reside in any part of the material human body or in any direction (aspect) of the natural world. Rather, it exists in an intermediate substantial world, which is situated between the world of the intellectual substances and the world of the material natural existents – i.e. in the world of Imagination (*‘ālam al-khayāl*) or that of the Image (*‘ālam al-mithāl*).³⁰³

³⁰² Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 190–191.

³⁰³ According to Plato and the ancient Platonists, it is the world of the sensible things which is the image of the intelligible paradigm(s). This is not the case with Muslim (Neo)platonists who, since the time of Suhrawardī, and with a few exceptions (notably, that of Mīr Dāmād – see the discussion in Chapter 1 above), distinguish the world of the Image as a separate level of reality, situated between the intelligible and the sensible realms (following the Master of Illumination who proposed the existence of an intermediate world of the Image, *‘ālam al-mithāl*, or the world of suspended

Ninth. Perceptual forms do not inhere in the soul, or in any other locus, as their substrate. Instead, they subsist through the soul as the act subsists through its agent, and not as a received affair subsists through its recipient. As long as the soul is connected with the (natural) body, its sense perception is different from imagination: the former requires external matter and specific preconditions, whereas the latter does not. But after the soul's exit from the natural world, the difference between sense and imagination disappears, because when the imaginative faculty grows strong and comes out of the 'dust' (*ghubār*) of the natural body, all faculties unify and return to the common sense (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak*), and imagination replaces all other faculties.³⁰⁴ In another aspect, the soul's power, knowledge, and appetite becomes one thing, therefore, by imagining the objects of appetite, the soul simultaneously makes them present.

Tenth. In the same way quantitative forms and bodily shapes and figures are produced by the agent with the participation of matter which receives them in accordance with its preparedness, they can also be produced by the active directions and their perceptual aspects

images, *ʿālam al-muthul al-muʿallaqa*, situated between the intelligible and the sensible worlds). Under the influence of Ibn ʿArabī, who believed that the Real (i.e. God) discloses Himself to the human being not otherwise than through imagination (*khayāl*), many later Muslim philosophers, following Ṣadrā, tend to identify the world of the Image as/with the world of Imagination.

³⁰⁴ The late-antique Neoplatonists often identified the imaginative faculty (*banṭāsiyā*) with the common faculty (*koinē aisthēsis*). Some of them (notably Porphyry and Hierocles) associated this faculty with *pneuma* or the irrational soul (*anima spiritualis*) and with the astral/ethereal body or vehicle (*ochēma*) of the rational soul (*anima intellectualis*); cf. note 182 of Chapter 1. According to them, this ethereal body remains with the rational soul when it leaves the physical body but eventually is dissolved into aether if/when that soul leaves the perceptible cosmos; see Andrew Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism* (The Hague, 1974), pp. 155–156, where Smith describes this theory as 'confusing'; Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler, 'Synesius and the Pneumatic Vehicle of the Soul in Early Neoplatonism', in Donald A. Russell et al., eds., *On Prophecy, Dreams and Human Imagination: Synesius, De insomniis* (Tübingen, 2014), p. 129. Synesius of Cyrene (ca. 373–414), a Christian bishop and lay philosopher, explicitly describes the imaginative faculty as 'the first body of the soul' (*soma proton psihēs*); see Russell, *On Prophecy*, p. 21 (135 D). Ṣadrā's theory of the survival of the imaginative faculty after the physical death is likely to ultimately go back to this Neoplatonist teaching.

without its participation. (Similarly to the Greek Neoplatonists, Ṣadrā believes that celestial spheres and planets are produced by the intellects exactly in this way – as pure acts of thought.³⁰⁵) Basing his reasoning on Ibn ‘Arabī’s discourse on *himma* (‘aspiration’) in the *Fuṣūṣ*,³⁰⁶ Ṣadrā asserts that intensity and weakness of the imaginal forms one perceives depends on his ability or inability to bring together his aspiration.

Eleventh. There is an infinite number of worlds and configurations existent, but they all fall into three genera: 1) the world of constantly generated and corrupted natural forms; 2) the world of sensible perceptual forms; 3) the world of intellectual forms and paradigms. The peculiarity of the human soul consists in its being gradually generated in each of these three worlds while retaining its individuality. At its birth, the human being experiences natural/physical generation (*al-kawn al-ṭabī‘ī*), which makes him a ‘smooth-skinned’ mortal human being (*insān basharī*). In the process of substantial motion, his existence gradually becomes purer and subtler and because of such purification, he experiences psychic generation (*al-kawn al-naḥsānī*), in conformity with which he becomes an other-worldly psychic human being (*insān naḥsānī ukhrawī*), the object of Awakening (*ba‘th*) and Rising (*qiyām*). Then, he is gradually transferred from the psychic generation/existence to the intellectual one (*al-kawn al-‘aqlī*) and becomes an intellectual human being.³⁰⁷

To sum up, Ṣadrā’s doctrine on substantial motion rests on the assumption that nature can become soul, and soul can become intellect, since, ultimately, they differ from each other only in terms of the intensity of their existence – or rather, that the terms ‘nature’, ‘soul’, and ‘intellect’ denote three different levels of existence which vary only in terms of intensity, wherefore there are no strict limits between them (following Plotinus Arabus, Ṣadrā repeatedly describes senses as weak intellects, and intellects as strong senses). Like the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, Ṣadrā apparently believes that the souls of the celestial spheres achieve their ultimate perfection, i.e. unification with the

³⁰⁵ See Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, vol. 9, pp. 192–193.

³⁰⁶ See Ibn ‘Arabī, *Fuṣūṣ*, vol. 1, pp. 88–89.

³⁰⁷ Cf. a similar passage (which probably became the source of inspiration for Ṣadrā) in the *Uthūlūjīyā*; see Badawī, *Uthūlūjīyā*, p. 146, lines 1–9 (Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.7.6.8–16).

intellect, and become angels³⁰⁸ at the end of every great cycle ('the day of God', which, to Ṣadrā, equals fifty thousand human years).³⁰⁹

Let us now return from Shiraz to Isfahan and investigate how the teachings of Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā were received by the scholars of the next generation, among whom the principal figure was Rajab 'Alī Tabrizī.

5. Addendum: Ṣadrā and the Stoics

Ṣadrā's theory of substantial motion, along with the principle of the intensification of existence (*ishtidād al-wujūd*) which it presupposes, strictly speaking, is incompatible with both Platonism and Aristotelianism (and, hence, also with the Neoplatonizing Aristotelianism represented by Ibn Sīnā). As said above, Aristotle (and, following him, Ibn Sīnā), explicitly dismissed the possibility of motion in substance (because, for them, motion required a stable and unchanging substrate, which requirement could not be met in the case of substance), whereas the Platonists would view as absurd the alleged 'return' of the instance to its paradigm or archetype:³¹⁰ what the instance was capable of, was to imitate the paradigm and/or to participate in it; never could it become the paradigm and unite with it by intensifying its (shadowy) existence. The incompatibility of the doctrine of substantial motion with both Platonism and Aristotelianism (and, ultimately, Avicennism) apparently also explains why it was, tacitly or explicitly, dismissed by Ṣadrā's students, with the exception of Fayḍ Kāshānī.

However, Ṣadrā's theory agrees much better with the tenets of the third major ancient philosophical school, Stoicism, according to which, the world is periodically destroyed by conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις)

³⁰⁸ Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, vol. 4, p. 242.

³⁰⁹ Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, 'Risāla fi'l-ḥashr', ed. Sayyid Naẓarī Tawakkulī, in al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, 4 vols. (Tehran, 1389 Sh./2010), vol. 2, pp. 182–183. Cf. Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Taḥfīr al-kabīr*, 7 vols., ed. Muḥammad Kh^wājavi (Qum, 1366 Sh./1987), vol. 6, pp. 160–161.

³¹⁰ Though it ceases to sound absurd if we treat the instances as 'branches' (*furū'*) and the paradigm/model as 'root' (*aṣl*), as Ṣadrā does (Ṣadrā, *Ta'liqāt 'alā ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, vol. 2, p. 177), but this (re)interpretation can hardly be described as genuinely Platonic.

and then originated anew (the process which is sometimes described as the ‘eternal return’,³¹¹ though ‘periodical return’ would be a more precise term). The Stoics believed that during the conflagration the cosmos does not die but, instead, is completely absorbed into the World-Soul (i.e. reduced to its ruling faculty, or providence, or Zeus).³¹² This state of absorption (of the body of the cosmos into the World-Soul), in which ‘all things splendidly become God’,³¹³ to the effect that providence no longer cares for the phenomena but only for itself, according to Chrysippus, is superior to the familiar ordered state, since it is the victory of Zeus and his domination over every thing.³¹⁴ In addition, the Stoics viewed the elements as entities that were not qualitatively fixed but which transformed themselves one into another, or as limits between which change occurs.³¹⁵ In other words, they treated the elements as tensional modifications of the primordial creative principle, or primordial fire,³¹⁶ – which means that they endorsed the change of the intensity of this creative principle.

Furthermore, to prove his theory of substantial motion, Ṣadrā uses (e.g. in *al-Hikma al-‘arshiyya*)³¹⁷ the argument which is

³¹¹ See, for example, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, ‘Éternel retour et temps périodique dans la philosophie stoïcienne’, *Revue philosophique* 2 (2002), pp. 213–227, esp. pp. 221–227.

³¹² Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. 2, pp. 185–186, fragments 604 and 605. For the discussion, see Jaap Mansfeld, ‘Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, with Some Remarks on the “Mysteries of Philosophy”’, in M. J. Vermaseren, ed., *Studies in Hellenistic Religions* (Leiden, 1979), pp. 176–177.

³¹³ Jaap Mansfeld, ‘Bad World and Demiurge: A “Gnostic” Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo’, in R. van den Broek and M. J. Vermaseren, eds., *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions, Festschrift G. Quispel* (Leiden, 1981), p. 307.

³¹⁴ Mansfeld, ‘Providence and the Destruction of the Universe’, pp. 180–181; cf. Émile Bréhier, *Chrysippe* (Paris, 1910), p. 157.

³¹⁵ Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, p. 136.

³¹⁶ Edward P. Butler, ‘A Metaphysical Reading of Stoic *Ekpyrôsis*’, *Walking the Worlds* 5/1 (Winter 2018), pp. 43–44.

³¹⁷ Shirāzī, *‘Arshiyya*, pp. 249–250. Cf. David Sedley, ‘The Stoic Criterion of Identity’, *Phronesis* 27 (1982), pp. 260–261.

virtually identical with the Stoic refutation of the so-called Growing Argument (αὐξανόμενος λόγος), elaborated by the skeptics of the Academy.³¹⁸ This refutation rests on making a distinction between commonly qualified (κοινως ποιοί) and peculiarly qualified (ιδίως ποιοί) individuals, and consists in demonstrating that the individual remains the same and preserves its identity in spite of the changes that affect it during its growth and diminution, as long as its peculiar qualification (ιδίως ποιόν) persists.

Şadrā's system also contains a version of the Pythagorean and Stoic teaching of the Great Year (in other words, the great cycle). According to him, the completion of the latter – which he identifies with the Greatest Rising (*al-qiyāma al-‘uẓma*), and which, in turn, includes seven intermediate risings (*qiyāmāt wusaṭawiyya*) – consists in the realisation of the entirety of the intelligible relations and occurs every fifty thousand years.³¹⁹

In sum, Şadrā's theory of substantial motion appears to represent an adequate description of the process of the return of the world to its origin, the primordial creative fire, identical with the intellect or, as it was envisaged by the Stoics, with God himself. Considering the theory in a broader context, with its physical, psychological and noetic implications, one might argue that, in Şadrā's philosophical system, we encounter a kind of Stoicizing teaching on providence which on different levels manifests itself as intellect, soul, and nature.³²⁰ One wonders whether Şadrā is knowingly reproducing elements of Stoic thought or if we are dealing with a mere coincidence when two historically distant thinkers, or groups of thinkers, reflecting on a subject, follow a similar pattern. At present, I have no clear answer. Of course, Şadrā's

³¹⁸ Presented in Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions* 1083A—1084A in Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987), vol. 1, pp. 166–167 (English translation), vol. 2, pp. 169–170 (Greek text); discussed in Gourinat, 'Éternel retour', p. 226; the Stoic refutation of it is examined in Sedley, 'The Stoic Criterion of Identity', pp. 259–263.

³¹⁹ Şadrā, *Ta'liqāt 'alā ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, vol. 2, pp. 225–226.

³²⁰ Remarkably, Şadrā accuses Suhrawardī of invalidating divine providence by creating the hierarchies of lights; see Şadrā, *Ta'liqāt 'alā ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, vol. 2, p. 162.

acquaintance with Stoic thought could only have been limited and indirect: he may have read short (and often biased) accounts of it given by the doxographers (such as Shahrastānī) or else encountered certain Stoic teachings, adapted in Neoplatonic manner, incorporated in the corpus of works attributed to Jābir b. Ḥayyān.³²¹

³²¹ Now and then, in Ṣadrā's works, one comes across remarks, expressions, and images that betray Stoic influence, without mentioning the Stoics by name – for example, in *al-Wāridāt al-qalbiyya* he speaks about 'the great fire situated in the concave of the celestial sphere'; see al-Shīrāzī, *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il-i falsafī*, vol. 3, p. 359, section 19. One may argue that perhaps he means the sun; I am inclined to think, however, that it is the Stoic primordial fire he has in mind (cf., for example, Plutarch's testimony that the Stoics' Zeus was 'one mighty and continuous fire'; see Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. 2, p. 308, fragment 1045). Kraus describes the influence of Stoicism on Islamic thought as follows: 'La tradition arabe n'a pas gardé un souvenir trop précis du stoïcisme et de sa place dans l'histoire de la pensée grecque. Par l'intermédiaire des manuels doxographiques, des commentaires d'Aristote, des ouvrages néoplatoniciens et néopythagoriciens, des médecins, des astrologues et des alchimistes, un certain nombre d'idées de provenance stoïcienne se sont introduites de bonne heure dans l'Islam et ont joué un rôle considérable dans les courants antipéripatéliens de la philosophie et de la théologie arabes'. (The Arab tradition has not preserved a clear and distinct memory of Stoicism and its place in the history of Greek thought. However, through the medium of doxographic manuals, commentaries on Aristotle, the works of Neoplatonists and Neopythagoreans, as well as the writings of physicians, astrologers, and alchemists, a number of ideas of Stoic origin were introduced to Islam at its early stages and played a considerable role in the development of anti-Peripatetic trends of Arabic philosophy and theology); see Paul Kraus, *Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān. Contribution à l'histoire des idées scientifiques dans l'Islam*, vol. 2. *Jābir et la science grecque* (Cairo, 1942), pp. 171–172, footnote 2.

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