

Does what God wills become good, or does God only will good things?

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Certain questions are uttered once and act as an opening: they become an echo, and reverberate through history. Each generation lives and dies in a manner that equates to their ability of understanding these questions, and to the degree in which they can live, whether at peace or war, content or discontent, with their own answers. These answers transfigure and take the form of the kind of life they give their children, and that, in turn, is how a new generation comes into contact with the questions that conceived it. Understanding this isn't the task of a lifetime, but the task of all lifetimes.

We must turn back many a lifetime to situate ourselves in the portico of King Archeon, over two millennia ago, when Socrates asked Euthyphro: 'tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do you say?'¹ It is worth noting that Socrates himself was a dialogue away from going into the Stoa Basileios to formally answer to the charges of impiety² that would lead to the subsequent trial which would sentence him to death. And yet, it is Socrates the one that asks, not because he didn't know the answer, but precisely because he knew. The inquiry on piety and impiety comes down to us barely alive: piety is that which is dear to the gods, impiety is that which isn't. It is time that proves Euthyphro to be right. Socrates' mayeutic was impious to the gods that ruled Athenian society, which is to say that it was pious to some other gods. It is the question on the nature of Socrates' life and death that echoes towards us very much alive. All is left to ask is what answers are shaping us?

¹ Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for murder. The context of the prosecution is given, but still, a son prosecuting his own father is mostly unheard of, and the enterprise itself, if anything, comes to show Euthyphro's discernment and knowledge of the pious and impious, and morality itself. A stone that Socrates wouldn't leave unturned.

For Euthyphro, it's easy: 'what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious,' (7a) he presents as his guiding principle. Socrates takes issue with it: 'is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?' (10a) He further lays down the problem: 'we speak of something carried and something carrying, of something led and something leading, of something seen and something seeing... So there is also something loved and –a different thing– something loving...' (10b)

Socrates, in his differentiation, establishes a bigger problem than that of explanatory priority. The same thing can be observed when discussing the chicken and the egg paradox: what came first? If we differentiate between an egg and a chicken egg, if we see them as distinct, even if it is for the argument's sake, explanatory priority comes in, and there is a bigger problem to reckon with. To take one to be prior than the other, i.e.: the egg coming before the chicken, but the chicken egg only coming after the chicken, is to deny the process in motion that allows dialectical thinking to take place, and we are, in that, impoverishing our capacity for understanding the reality we inhabit, and reality itself.

Hence, by denying the process in motion we are led to a place of compromise in regards to the divine. We are to assume that certain moral truths are prior to the divine, though it is the divine itself that explains them in the first place. We are to buy this paradox religious scholarship has always had on sale. To deny one process and accept another in its place. And in that, both answer and question lose relevance.

With that established, the way it translates to morality and the divine could be put in this way: does the goodness explain the will of God, or does the will of God explain the goodness? If we take part in the kind of differentiation done before, we'd have two answers:

- a. If goodness exists outside God's will, if it exists independently of whether God wills it or not, then we still remain uncertain as to the nature of goodness. God's will does not explain it. We might even go further and assert that God is subject to an objective moral truth that leads us to a third thing, and we are left with what is usually known as a third-man problem.
- b. Morality is arbitrary, which is a statement that rationally betrays us.

See Plato, *The Trial and Death of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Death Scene from Phaedo*, trans. by G. M. A. Grube, rev. edn by John M. Cooper, Hackett Classics, 3rd ed (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2010), *Euthyphro*.

² *Ibid.*, *Apology*, 18a-c, 30d-31c.

If I am to conceive figures like Socrates as the father of Philosophy, Heraclitus as the father of Dialectics, Descartes as the father of Rationality, or Kierkegaard as the father of Existentialism, I must concede to two things: (1) that these figures hold a prophetic nature of some kind.

I must concede to this if I am to understand God in two ways, first as

the name by which I designate all things which cross my willful path violently and recklessly, all things which upset my subjective views, plans, and intentions and change the course of my life for better or worse.³

And second, as love.

Love takes off the masks that we fear we cannot live without and know we cannot live within. I use the word “love” here not merely in the personal sense but as a state of being, or a state of grace—not in the infantile American sense of being made happy but in the tough and universal sense of quest and daring and growth.⁴

And (2) reason creates monsters. Picture three figures as one and the same: the mythological Narcissus, Socrates, and Christ. Now to the question: did they ever come to know themselves, even in death, what would the answer be? Did Narcissus ever come to know himself?⁵ In the way the Oracle of Delphi intended by its maxim?⁶ In the way, and with the criteria, it deemed Socrates the wisest man?⁷ He must have, Narcissus that is, that’s the reason he died, according to Tiresias’ prophecy. Equally, when Socrates chose to stay in Athens rather than flee, it’s almost as if he understood that in order for his impiety to be pious to some other god, it demanded a sacrifice. In the same manner, when Christ pleaded at the cross: ‘Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing,’⁸ did he know what he was doing? Perhaps that’s why ‘what Tarquin the Proud communicated in his garden with the beheaded poppies was understood by the son but not by the messenger.’⁹

A problem is usually the seed of what will become a monster one day, and the problem with the Euthyphro dilemma is ontological: that it itself is a dilemma. The same kind of problematic

³ Carl Jung, letter to The Listener, 21 January, 1960.

⁴ James Baldwin, *The Fire Next Time* (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2013), p. 57.

⁵ When Liriope, mother of Narcissus, asked Tiresias, a man famous in Boeotia for his prophecies, how long her child would live: ‘To great old age?’ the prophet answered, “Only If never he comes to know himself.” See Ovid, *The Metamorphoses*, trans. and ed. by Horace Gregory (The Viking Press, 1958), p. 75.

⁶ ‘Know thyself’ (gnothi seauton) is an ancient Greek aphorism carved into the anticum of the portico at the Temple of Apollo.’ See Michael A. Peters, ‘Truth and Self-Knowledge’, *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 53.2 (2021), pp. 105–11, doi:[10.1080/00131857.2019.1682489](https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2019.1682489).

⁷ Plato, *The Trial and Death of Socrates; Apology*, 21a.

⁸ Michael D. Coogan et al., *The New Oxford Annotated Bible - New Revised Standard Version: An Ecumenical Study Bible*, (Oxford University Press, 2018), Luke, 23. 34.

⁹ Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, ed. by Sylvia Walsh and C. Stephen Evans, trans. by Sylvia Walsh, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. x.

can be found in the *Parmenides*¹⁰ as well as in the Western¹¹ scholarship that teaches dialectics as the triunvirate of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,¹² obviating the process in motion that dialectics is itself. For this, the hellenic denial of motion¹³ could be used in caricaturised contrast to better explain what will, with time, become more nuanced, but static nonetheless, conceptualisations, such as: Descartes' view on free will,¹⁴ Kierkegaard's dialectical lyric,¹⁵ Sartre's condemnation to freedom,¹⁶ scenes in the Christian imagery (Nativity, Crucifixion, Resurrection...)... It is all 'isolated, static and one-sided.' The result of an outlook that regards 'all things in the universe, their forms and their species, as eternally isolated from one another and immutable.' Their motive of force? External, reactionary. Such is the case with the bourgeois

¹⁰ Socrates' reluctance for the conception of undignified forms, such as dirt, does open our eyes to the subjectivity at play in the dialectical process. We must not mistake the former to shape the latter. It is the dialectical process that creates subjectivity in the first place, and it is subjectivity itself that creates the differentiation and discrimination that hinders dialectical thinking itself.

'Does a Platonist need a form of mud, for instance, if there are forms of earth and water?' Awareness of the problem doesn't solve the problem, but it's a start. If awareness doesn't occur, we mistake the matter of explanatory priority to actually be of an explanatory nature, and hence, hold a meaning of some kind.

The same problem as in the Euthypro is observed: we are to derive meaning from this. We are to believe that explanatory priority actually explains something. That there is meaning in differentiation, in seeing things as separate, in questioning the relevance the parts have to account for the whole... If we take forms to perform an explanatory role, we have to grant a process in motion to forms: they cannot be static. The same process in motion we see in the world around us ought to be reflected in how we make sense of it, forms cannot be fixed in their relations.

See Plato, *Parmenides*, trans. by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, (Hackett, 1996), p. 23-24.

¹¹ It is important to note that these denominations, i.e.: East, Middle East, West, etc., are colonial in nature. In this instance, 'Western' is used to refer to the scholarship in the countries that inherited that colonial and imperial tradition. The intention is to clarify the nature of certain thought and scholastic attitude, never to centre it as the only one to hold relevance.

¹² Hegel never makes use of those terms, neither conceptually nor formally. To observe dialectics as such will impede, in the long run, any real dialectical conception. See Terry P. Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, First paperback edition (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 17.

¹³ The hellenic denial of motion considers the concept of infinity as inherently problematic: space and time are divisible ad infinitum. That is a problem in itself, and whether Zeno or Parmenides denied motion or not is not our concern for debate here. In the process of differentiation, division is needed, but it isn't all there is. If I cannot prove or disprove Achilles' paradox by chasing down a tortoise, then what remains? Is that what philosophy or rationality is? If we have to deny practical reason to prove rationality, we've found ourselves a monster of our own making. See *Zeno's Paradoxes* | *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, n.d. <[link](#)> [accessed 26 March 2026].

¹⁴ Descartes concept of free will can be understood perfectly by Spinoza's critique of it. To Descartes saying 'it is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within me to be so great that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and likeness of God,' Spinoza cannot grasp the conception of believing oneself to be uncaused. You are equating yourself to God. 'The mind is determined to this or that volition by a cause which is also determined by another cause, and this again by another, and so on ad infinitum.' This critique demonstrates perfectly how a static conception of a thing, whatever it be, when taken it to be fixed in its relations, will see its context as redundant, and its conceptualisation will be flawed, due to it not being reflective of reality. See René Descartes et al., IV Meditation of 'Meditations on First Philosophy' in *Selected Philosophical Writings* (Cambridge university press, 1988), p. 98-102 (p. 53-58 in text), and Benedictus de Spinoza, *Ethics*, ed. by James Gutmann, The Hafner Library of Classics, number 11 (Hafner Publishing Company, 1949), Part II: Propositions XLVIII-XLIX, p. 119-126.

¹⁵ 'Fear and Trembling is described on the title page as a "dialectical lyric," and this description accurately captures its paradoxical character. On the one hand the book is indeed lyrical, with intensely poetical and moving passages that engage the imagination as well as the emotions of the reader... However, the book is also "dialectical" in the sense that it poses sharply defined philosophical and theological questions about such issues as the relation between a life of religious faith and the ethical life, and the relation between personal virtue and integrity and social and political duties.' See Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, p. vii.

¹⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Existentialism is a Humanism' in *Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre*, trans. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New American Library, 1980), p. 287-311.

metaphysics, as described by Mao Zedong,¹⁷ and such is the case with the metaphysical dimension of rationality that equates God's will to the ethical, and considers freedom a choice: is God good?

With this I am not criticising rationality, but its monstrous side, which is control. For it, we will come to unreasonable conclusions if it means we get to keep it. We will create symbolic limits and see things as ontologically separate and immutable: those are the answers empire has raised us with, to come to the questions of being, teleology, religion... It's no coincidence that it is in our conceptualisations of faith and freedom where we get to see this flaw, for it is precisely where the medium stops being the message.¹⁸ If I cannot see myself in the conception of freedom that I have, or if I cannot see God or myself in the conception of faith that I have, I'm empty and blind. There is definitely this void covered in darkness that is staring right into me trying to recognise itself. It's monstrous. It's alien. It's definitely alienation, that's how the abyss comes to be.¹⁹

The medium, much like the abyss, is any extension of ourselves. This extension in turn, determines the scale and form of human relations and action. However, the content of the medium is not the message, and we must not let said content blind us to the character of the medium.²⁰ Having said this, the content is information per se. The message would then be the meaning and understanding we derive from it.

Now, although I find McLuhan's 'the medium is the message' to be deeply insightful, I must recognise that his critiques of various thinkers, and I am specifically referring to his critiques on Engels, Marx, Spinoza, and Hegel, lack the grace he gave himself.²¹ Perhaps McLuhan fell into his own trap, and failed to recognise that he was the message to some other medium. In that regard, the four aforementioned figures surpass him.

¹⁷ Mao Zedong, 'On Contradiction' in *Five Essays on Philosophy*, dir. by Christophe Kistler (Foreign Languages Press, 2018), p. 33.

¹⁸ 'In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the medium is the message.' See Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (Routledge, 2010), p. 9.

¹⁹ 'Anyone who fights with monsters should take care that he does not in the process become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes back into you.' See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. and ed. by Marion Faber, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 68.

²⁰ McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, p. 9.

²¹ The medium as the message is an easy principle from which to start, but then, under inspection, the analytical implications become very difficult. They are fractal in nature: the medium becomes another medium, so the message of one medium is that of the other, but not quite the same, and so on... It's interesting then, that he would criticise Hegel's work as plain and rational, and take issue with what he considered was linear teleology, although he conceived his theory the same way Hegel conceived his: not linearly, but fractally.

He continues with both Engels and Marx, he criticises them for having such narrow outlooks, which led them to not pay enough attention to certain aspects, such as media and technology, which truly are the motors of history. This narrowness is in turn reflected in their theories. McLuhan considers this a foundational flaw, despite defending Hume's critique of causality and stressing the impact technology can have in social relations. Finally, he deems Spinoza to be too rational, and not relational enough, which is a complete misread of Spinoza. These figures were not limited by the vocabulary of their time, their conceptions are not lacking. They are what they are for the time and place they inhabited. If they lived today their answers would be different, but they don't. Their answers remain what they are, for the medium that conceived them.

See McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* and Paul Grosswiler, 'The Dialectical Methods of Marshall McLuhan, Marxism, and Critical Theory', *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 21.1 (1996), doi:[10.22230/cjc.1996v21n1a925](https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.1996v21n1a925).

Engels sees science as the vehicle that drives God out of this world:

One division of the army after another lays down its arms, one fortress after another capitulates before the march of science, until at last the whole infinite realm of nature is conquered by science, and there is no place left in it for the Creator.²²

It is in that industrial and scientific revolutionary environment that Marx conceives dialectical materialism. He writes in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*:

The universality of man is in practice manifested precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life-activity. Nature is man's inorganic body—nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself the human body. Man *lives* on nature—means that nature is his *body*, with which he must remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.²³

What is the difference between Marx's conceptualisation of nature as humanity's inorganic body and Spinoza's 'God as Nature' (*Deus sive Natura*)? The medium: there is Marx's dialectical materialism on the one hand, which views humanity's class struggle as the driving force of history,²⁴ and Spinoza's rationality on the other, which is inherently tied to necessity. God is a necessary principle to explain anything.²⁵ As such, nature and anything existing in nature also follow necessity.²⁶

How could very different environments: one industrialist, one mechanistic, give rise to very similar conceptualisations? There is a certain inflexibility, or rigidity, that would deem both as inherently different, and that is a problem in itself, which Kant did seem to grasp. He ultimately came to grips with his own limits when he confessed: 'I therefore had to annul knowledge in order to make room for faith.'²⁷ He couldn't reckon with the corollary of consequences and implications that arise when we take matter to be a metaphysical conception, as Engels explains in the *Dialectics of Nature*:

Matter as such is a pure creation of thought and an abstraction. We leave out of account the qualitative differences of things in lumping them together as corporeally existing things under the concept matter. Hence matter as such, as distinct from definite existing pieces of matter, is not anything sensuously existing. When natural science directs its efforts to seeking out uniform matter as such, to reducing qualitative differences to

²² Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, trans. by Clemens Dutt (Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 200.

²³ Karl Marx, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844', in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto*, trans. by Martin Milligan (Prometheus, 1988), p. 76.

²⁴ Marx and Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party', in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto*, p. 206.

²⁵ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I: Propositions XXIX and XXXIII, Part II: Proposition XLIV, p. 65-66, 68-71, 115-116.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Part I: Propositions XIV and XV, p. 51-55.

²⁷ Kant takes Fichte's conception of practicality tending to the idea of infinity: 'not merely a sensitive, but also an intuitive; not merely a practical being, but also an intelligence.' Fichte focuses specifically in vocation: 'not merely to know, but according to thy knowledge to do, is thy vocation.' But both us and our vocation are finite in their existence, and the transcendental questions, though unavoidable, will forever remain unanswered. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *The Vocation of Man*, trans. by William Smith, L.L.D. (Open Court, 1965), p. 71, 94 and *Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Werner S. Pluhar (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1996), p. 31, 32, 650, 658.

merely quantitative differences in combining identical smallest particles, it is doing the same thing as demanding to see fruit as such instead of cherries, pears, apples, or the mammal as such instead of cats, dogs, sheep, etc., gas as such, metal, stone, chemical compound as such, motion as such.²⁸

There is a movement between the material and the metaphysical, a motion in the eternal continuum of physicality. Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas understood it by the moving principle, or the moving cause,²⁹ and Spinoza saw it as the capacity for movement.³⁰

It is true that you cannot bathe in the same river twice, as Heraclitus said,³¹ but it's even truer that you cannot even do it once.³² That's not Heraclitus anymore, it is one of his disciples, which Kierkegaard views as audacious:³³ the disciple's wish to go further. What is a disciple, after all, if not the one that goes further? What is a disciple, an apprentice, a slave if not the one, in principle, bound by the limits of their master?³⁴

The question of this essay equates the ethical, as Kierkegaard conceived it,³⁵ with God itself. It thinks A equals B, but A has no choice but to be A, that's the reason we keep finding the same teachings in different environments: the same could be said about the Buddha, the Stoics...³⁶ It's not that we come into this world. We come out of it, yet remain within it.³⁷ Deleuze puts it best, when discussing Spinoza:

Generally one begins with the first principle of a philosopher. But what counts is also the third, the fourth, or the fifth principle. Everyone knows the first principle of Spinoza: one substance for all the attributes. But we also know the third, fourth, or fifth principle: one Nature for all bodies, one Nature for all individuals, a Nature that is itself an individual varying in an infinite number of ways.³⁸

But what is the denial of motion, really? If 'all reality is interconnected, defined and understood through its relationship to other, often opposing, things in an unfolding process'³⁹ then the denial of motion takes place exactly when negation becomes alienation, when mediation doesn't mediate. Mediation is not inherently wrong or flawed, it is everywhere, and can give rise to both motion and the denial of it. Nothing exists in isolation. Unless we take bourgeois

²⁸ Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 255.

²⁹ See Aristotle, 'Metaphysics: Book VIII (H)' in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. by Jonathan Barnes (Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 119 and Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God*, trans. by Anton C. Pegis (University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), p. 81.

³⁰ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II: Proposition XIII, p. 89-95.

³¹ Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, p. 109.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ 'The relation to the other is thus double-edged in that the other both affirms and undermines the subject's sense of himself, and it is this doubleedged quality that leads to the dialectic of dependence and independence that structures the discussion of mastery and servitude.' See Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, p. 54.

³⁵ 'The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, which may be expressed from another angle by saying that it is in force at every moment.' See Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, p. 46.

³⁶ 'It is the discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other perceptions and by investigating its nature in order that we may thus know our power of understanding.' See Spinoza, 'On the Improvement of Understanding' in *Ethics*, p. 13.

³⁷ Alan Watts, *The Book on The Taboo against Knowing Who You Are*, (Sphere Books Ltd, 1973), p. 13.

³⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. by Robert Hurley (City Light Books, 1988), p. 122.

³⁹ Hubert Dreyfus, 'Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling,' online video recording, Youtube, <[link](#)>, 22 August 2018, [accessed 10 April 2026]

metaphysics to be the only possible outlook in this world, then everything exists in isolation, in a continuous process of alienation. This would lead to think ontology separate from teleology, which in turn, would give rise to a continuous teleological suspension of the ethical.⁴⁰ Then it won't be the eyes that are blind, but the heart,⁴¹ and nothing could be mediated after that:

This frugal, propertiless life, undermined by illness. This thin, frail body. This brown, oval face, with its sparkling eyes. How does one explain the impression they give of being suffused with life itself? Of having a power identical to life?⁴²

Religion has never stood on its own, it's always had social and political implications. We can't talk about God without mentioning the ethical, social, economic, and political frameworks of this world. If we did, we'd have to make a third concession on this essay: God is far removed from this world. Such concession would not only be impossible, it would be a limit imposed on God, by men, for men. After that, the only question worth asking is, which men? The answer is obvious: the ones contempt with the semblances of life, the ones that never leave the cave, the ones that, in their contempt,

feel a hatred of life, they are ashamed of it. A humanity bent on self-destruction, multiplying the cults of death, bringin about the union of the tyrant and the slave, the priest, the judge, and the soldier. Always busy running life into the ground: mutilating it, killing it outright or by degrees, overlaying it or suffocating it with laws, properties, duties, empires. This is what Spinoza diagnoses in the world, this betrayal of the universe, and of mankind.⁴³

'I am who I am,'⁴⁴ is the perfect dialectical synthesis. It coarises, all of it. Form is empty, emptiness form.⁴⁵ We think the pain a pathology, and we pray to be freed from it. But the will of God is both pain and suffering, goodness and bliss, it is and becomes at the same time.

⁴⁰ 'Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?' is the first problem Kierkegaard poses in *Fear and Trembling*. See Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, p. 46.

⁴¹ *The Sublime Quran*, trans. by Laleh Bakhtiar (Library of Islam, 2009), Surah Al-Hajj, 22:46.

⁴² Breht O'Shea, 'Dialectics Deep Dive II: The Philosophy of Spinoza & God as Nature' with Matthew Furlong, online video recording, Youtube, <[link](#)>, 19 June 2021, [accessed 10 April 2026], 0:00-1:08.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Coogan et al., *The New Oxford Annotated Bible - New Revised Standard Version: An Ecumenical Study Bible*, Exodus 3.14-15.

⁴⁵ Red Pine, *The Heart Sutra: The Womb of the Buddhas* (Counterpoint, 2005), p. 47-49.

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