

CHAPTER 5

RELATIONSHIPS

Our aim is to provide a conceptual framework for human well-being, a framework that requires empirical filling. Being well is constituted by non-instrumental goodness along the inescapable dimensions of our (human) way of being. In Chapter 1, we identified four such dimensions. These are structural features of any human life, akin to the *a priori* forms of well-being. As such, they constitute different ways of good-making relevant to well-being, and thus different kinds of intrinsic values directly pertinent to being well. For this reason, any account of well-being must include at least these four aspects. The first is the level of activities, which we examined in Chapter 3; the second is the level of awareness as discussed in Chapter 4; the third is that of self-consciousness, which is the topic of Chapter 6. In this chapter, we examine the relational dimension of our way of being.

The experiences, activities and processes that comprise our lives are all relational. We are constantly in interaction with objects, one's body, nature, buildings, other people, social groups, society and the world at large. Some of these relations constitute aspects of well-being. The aim of this chapter is to clarify these uses of 'some'. In what ways do these relations partly constitute well-being?

Specifically, we shall concentrate in this chapter only on our relationships with other people and how they pertain to well-being. This doesn't mean that other relations, such as one's relationship with the natural world and with everyday objects, aren't also constitutive. Human relations are especially important and difficult. Let us take the example of digging a ditch, as a typical social activity. To advance, we need to distinguish three ways this activity is relational or social. First, the end is social: the finished ditch has instrumental value in relation to how it improves people's lives (doing-for). Second, we are digging the ditch with one another, as a part of a group (being-with). Third, the activity is embedded in a complex set of social relations, which form part of a society (being-in). To explore more deeply these complex relationships, this chapter will be organized around this three-way distinction.

We assume that a person is always already a social being: we humans are part of communities and societies, and our lives are ineluctably lived in relation to other people. The content of our consciousness is formed by social meanings (Wittgenstein 2009). Thus, well-being is constituted in part by relations (Aristotle 2011: 1245b18). Consequently, when we mention later how relationships contribute to well-being, this does not imply that a person is an autonomous individual who becomes more than that through her relationships to others (Thomson 2017). We shall investigate how other persons are integral to one's well-being without such an individualistic assumption.

DOING-FOR

To examine the first of the three ways activities are relational, we will resolve a curious paradox. Because the paradox is abstract, its immense importance is perhaps initially difficult to discern. David Wiggins discusses the puzzle in relation to the action of helping a community by digging a drainage ditch. Insofar as such activities constitute part of one's well-being, they

are non-instrumentally valuable, but at the same time, the action of helping is clearly instrumental (Wiggins, 1987: 162).¹ How can it be both at the same time? The puzzle consists in three seemingly inconsistent propositions:

- a) The meaning of a goal-directed activity is the achieving of the relevant goals
- b) Such activities contribute to well-being because of their meaningfulness
- c) Such activities are relevant to well-being directly only insofar as they have non-instrumental value.

In short, the dilemma is how could the meaning of an activity be its point or purpose if it is also the non-instrumental value of the activity? As Thaddeus Metz wisely points out, it is important to see that the puzzle is not solved simply by noting that some activities, such as eating, are good both for their own sake and for the good for what they bring about (Metz 2013). You can't just say: "both". This is not sufficient to defuse the puzzle because the problem is that helping seems to be an action that is intrinsically or non-instrumentally valuable *insofar* as it is instrumentally good.²

This paradox requires us to rethink the relationship between goals and activities, echoing Chapter 2. There we saw if we confuse goals or ends with non-instrumental value then this implies that all activities are merely instrumentally valuable. To avoid this disastrous result, one needs to separate two distinctions: instrumental versus non-instrumental value and means versus ends. This separation permits the important idea that actions can have non-instrumental value *as means*.

This idea resolves the paradox. Helping is an activity that has non-instrumental value, but, at the same time, it is also a means to the end of helping another person or helping a worthy cause. Separating the two distinctions allows that an activity has non-instrumental value *as a means*. Thus, well-being can be constituted (in part) by the purposes of our actions without this endangering the idea that this value is non-instrumental.³ The activity of cooking is a means to feeding the family, but the activity as a means has non-instrumental value.

Metz puts the point like this: the intrinsic value of help is constituted by its extrinsic value (Metz 2001). About the same point Shelly Kagan says:

“Helping is not a case of ‘mere’ instrumental value, but rather a case of intrinsically valuable instrumental value . . . In helping someone else, my own life has intrinsic value—by virtue of this instrumental fact about me”, (Kagan 1998: 288).

With the phrase ‘intrinsically valuable instrumental value’, Kagan is referring to means that *as such* have non-instrumental value. The same point applies to Metz when he talks about intrinsic value being constituted by extrinsic value. In other words, to make their point, one needs the distinction between means/ends versus instrumental/intrinsic value, which we drew in Chapter 2.⁴

This solution requires a condition that is pregnant with implications: the intrinsic value of activities *as means* can consist in activity for a purpose but only when the person is appropriately connected to the purpose as something of value beyond herself. For instance, the non-instrumental value of digging the ditch can consist in the activity of trying to attain the goal. But, for it to do so, the person must be appropriately connected to the value beyond

herself, which might consist in understanding the need for the ditch, and performing the action from this understanding.

How does this abstract solution help us understand well-being? Doing things for other people is an important part of our lives, and is a dimension of well-being. Understanding it properly requires the ideas that solve the paradox, namely the idea that the activity of helping is intrinsically valuable albeit *as* a means. Of course, in everyday life, people won't separate the means/ends distinction from the instrumental/intrinsic distinction. As we saw in Chapter 2, this implies that they will tend to be wedded to an instrumental conception of rationality, which automatically identifies means with instrumentally valuable and intrinsically valuable with ends. It also implies that they won't articulate the idea of an activity being intrinsically valuable *as* a means and won't employ such an idea to characterise the well-being-relevant value of helping, caring and contributing. Nevertheless, in our research conversations, most people report that "helping others is an important part of my life". Here is an example.

James was in his mid-30s at the time of our research and was working as an expert consultant in social work. An eloquent and articulate interlocutor and an animated storyteller, James speaks with a Northern accent, proudly pronouncing his working-class background. Born in a large city in Northern England (but lived "a small life" in his own words), he grew up in an "austere" environment. As a child and a young person, James was a victim of violent abuse from his father and he learned to defend and look after himself from an early age. This was also because there was little help from agencies outside of his home. For instance, although, at the age of 10-11, there was a period when his father's punches became a daily feast and James often carried black eyes and other wounds from the beating to school, few teachers or social workers enquired about them. This continued until he was 16 when he was able to leave home thanks to the kindness of strangers. These early experiences prepared James to be empathetic to the vulnerable, and willing to help and care for the poor and the powerless.

James spent half a day each week helping (on a volunteer basis) a charity that supports people who are struggling with mental health issues and cognitive disabilities. He spent another half day studying for a part-time doctorate in social work. The help James provided for the charity enabled social workers to develop better rapport with 'clients' and their families, and to see how relational approaches can better support the clients in a holistic way. This was also the focus of his doctoral research. Volunteer work has always been part of James' life ever since he got his first job in social work, and he set himself the challenge to study for the PhD, not to progress to a more senior position in his workplace, but to understand better social work. The combination of the two objectives, helping others and studying, brought James immense joy and happiness. "I feel benefit if I help people; and I study to be able to better help those who are in need." said James.

Expanding on the above solution to the paradox, we shall argue that a person's living can be more valuable through her connection to things of value beyond itself, such as the needs of others. Appropriate connection to value beyond oneself can partly constitute and augment the intrinsic value of one's own activity. One way this can occur is through our actions being means to valuable goals (Haidt 2007: 222).

What are things of value beyond oneself? What does it mean to be appropriately connected to them? Regarding the first question, in Chapter 2, we argued that the primary bearers of non-instrumental value are persons and other conscious beings. From this, we may conclude that

‘things of value beyond oneself’ will include other people and their interests, as we have just illustrated with James’ story.

The second question. The immediate goal of one’s activities is often to acquire something that has only instrumental value. For example, we gather firewood or collect water; we make chairs and we earn money. Under these descriptions of the goal, one has *not* connected directly to something of primary value beyond oneself. As we saw in Chapter 2, in a sense, it is misleading to describe something of purely instrumental value as valuable because their use is a cost that we should rationally diminish. For instance, in Chapter 2, we discussed Stanley’s ambition to make money. However, *as such*, making money doesn’t count as connecting directly to something of value beyond oneself. The goal is under-described. The meaning of money is how one uses it, how it enables one to do things, how it lubricates one’s life. This applies to Stanley’s ambition. Equally, the firewood we gather enables someone to cook and to keep warm, and the chair enables people to sit in comfort and it furnishes a home that we inhabit.

These ruminations establish an illuminating contrast. On the one hand, if we are aware of our goal *simply* as to make a chair, this will *not* count as connecting directly to something of value beyond oneself. On the other hand, insofar as we are aware of our goal as enabling people to sit or as improving people’s lives by visually decorating their homes, then we have connected to something of value beyond oneself, namely to the lives of other people. In the former case, the activity will not *ipso facto* be a partial constituent of well-being. In the latter, it will. We can portray the point as an argument:

1. Well-being consists in part in doing activities that connect directly to things of value beyond oneself
2. Such connection requires appreciating the things in question as valuable
3. Such appreciation is impossible insofar as one conceives as one’s goals as purely instrumentally valuable.
4. Thus, insofar as one conceives as one’s goals in purely instrumental terms, they will be not a constituent of one’s well-being.

This conclusion has startling implications for traditional conceptions of work, business and economics (Thomson 2015). ‘Connecting directly to things of value beyond oneself’ must include more than the purely instrumental; it must be to things of intrinsic value such as persons and their interests. Thus, insofar as work has intrinsic value *as a means*, this consists in its relation to other people.⁵

This is an important insight. In support of it consider the following two steps. First, the *instrumental* value of work is always in relation to people or other conscious beings, though this is often hidden and indirect, as we have seen in James’s story. Let’s now examine another research participant, Malik, and how he connects with his work in a company that produces stationery. As in many companies, there is a tendency to regard the instrumental value of the work solely in terms of the volume of production, the sales of the commodity and the net revenue. However, this misses the point that articles of stationery only have value in relation to the people who might use them. Any article is the permanent possibility of service. Thus, the instrumental value of one’s work is entirely derivative on the value of people, their lives and well-being. This is often disguised because we tend to think of the point of the work in purely financial or material terms.

Malik just turned 50 when he took part in our research. He was very enthusiastic about sharing his life. His family immigrated to the UK from the Horn of Africa, and he is a father of three daughters, two of whom already graduated from universities and the youngest was in her second year. Malik had worked for a large office stationery company for his entire adult life. Initially, he was a labourer in the factory, then in charge of quality control, and after completing a business management diploma, he was promoted to work in marketing, and he became 'really successful'. Most recently, he became the Regional Marketing Director for the Southeast of England. For Malik, his life was a triumphant story of upward social progression, and he was eager to narrate it in that way. He recounted his smart approaches to marketing and his achievements, marked by the sales records that his office continued to break. At a time when there are so many competitions in the sector, Malik was proud to be able to create so much wealth for the company, which in turn meant benefits for himself and other employees.

This point is not altered if the dependency of the instrumental is indirect. For instance, consider the case of working in an industry that produces part of a product, such as a valve needed in an airplane engine, or the construction of the machine that makes the regulator. The instrumental value of the work depends on a resulting service in a very indirect manner.

Second step: insofar as one understands the value of one's work in purely instrumental terms, one does not connect properly to the relevant intrinsic value (namely other people). It is the intrinsic value that makes the relevant instrumental value valuable at all. In Malik's case, there is a tendency to regard the value of the company in purely instrumental terms. Because of this, the failure to connect constitutes a diminishing of well-being. To connect only at the instrumental level is one way of missing out on how other people can enter one's life. It represents work as solely material as opposed to social or human in its aims. It disguises the nature of work and in the process, diminishes our well-being.

This is a form of instrumentalisation whereby we take as primary our relation to objects instead of our relationship to other people. For instance, we often assume that our work-relationship is with a material product because we view work as instrumentally valuable in producing commodities.⁶ After all, so the reasoning goes, work is a means to an end (the production of a product), and *thus* work is primarily of instrumental value. This reasoning contains two huge but subtle errors. First, it forgets that mere instrumental value is only a shadow of intrinsic value; it is entirely derivative. Second, the term *thus* neglects that 'work is a means' does *not* imply 'as such it is instrumental valuable'. It commits the error of the instrumental conception of rationality characterized in Chapter 2, which is bound to ignore the intrinsic values of work activities. This point is important for how one appreciates the value of one's work, and for how shared purposes are understood by a group of people who are working together.

BEING-WITH IN GENERAL

We turn now to the second way in which activities can be social: we dig a ditch *with* others (rather than *for* others). In a similar manner, we work, play and hang-out with others. Indeed, few of life's experiences, activities and processes are solitary; most are social in this second sense (being-with). To investigate this dimension of human life, we will outline a second paradox. As with the first, resolving this new antinomy will enable us to understand better an aspect of well-being: in this case, how other people enter one's life.

Typically, the most important aspect of a person's life is her relationships with other people. This generates a paradoxical tension. On the one hand, the value *for me* of the activities I

engage in with others is self-regarding. This *suggests* that other people, including even friends, are valuable only instrumentally insofar as my well-being is concerned. On the other hand, in one's relationships, it is the other person that matters, and a relationship requires connecting to that person as such. Insofar as one doesn't, one wouldn't have a relationship with another person *as such* at all. This *suggests* that the value of relationships is other-regarding, and that acts of friendship are altruistic.

Is the well-being-relevant intrinsic value of relationships self-regarding or other-regarding? The paradox consists in the fact that it apparently must be one or the other, but in neither case would relationships be constitutive of well-being. If friendship is self-regarding then friends are merely instrumentally valuable to one's well-being. In contrast, if friends are valuable in themselves then friendship is other-regarding and altruistic, and thus not *constitutive* of our well-being.⁷

We cannot resolve this apparent paradox by trying to combine both ideas (i.e. self-interest and altruism). This is because neither view is adequate to understand our relationship with other people. To resolve it, we need to carve out a space that is neither self nor other-regarding. Or put another way, we must define when other-regarding becomes self-regarding and *vice versa*. We need to transcend those categories. We shall argue that this occurs when other people become part of our lives.

The solution to the paradox combines two ideas. The first is that of connecting to something of value beyond oneself. We employed this idea earlier to goals to resolve the first paradox. In the case of being-with, the appropriate connection isn't through attaining a goal, but rather through being *with* other persons. For example, I take a stroll with a friend: this friendship-activity connects me to a person who is something valuable beyond me. To claim that the other person is something of value that one can connect to might sound a little strange, but the idea isn't weird. Persons and other conscious beings are the primary bearers of non-instrumental value; their activities and life experiences matter because they matter. Because of this, all the instrumental goods that enhance those activities of persons, such as shoes, stationery and automobiles are important. The idea that other people have value that one can connect to signifies that one has good reason to care for them.

The second idea is that, insofar as a person is connected appropriately to the value of other people, that value can become part of her life. Appropriate connection to primary value constitutes an enhancement of one's life: one's life is better in ways that are constitutive of well-being. It is as if such connection enlarges one's life because other people become a part of it. Family and friends are not just external causes of our well-being; they are part of one's life.

The combination of these two ideas resolves the paradox regarding self and other-regarding values. When someone is a part of one's life, the two meld: the self-regarding intrinsic value of the activity consists in connecting appropriately to something of value, which is other-regarding.⁸ When one engage in activities and connect with others, our activities contribute to one's own well-being-value in virtue of this connection. The connection transcends the categories self and other-regarding values by making others part of our lives.

This is a major conclusion of this chapter: the claim that by becoming part of one's life, other people can augment one's being well. The argument is as follows.

Premise 1: Insofar as one connects appropriately to a person in performing an activity then that person may be part of one's life.

Premise 2: Insofar as a person is a part of one's life then her value as a person is part of the value of one's life.

Conclusion: The value of one's activities is partly constituted by their being performed with other people.⁹

When other people are part of one's life, it is as if one imports their intrinsic value into one's life through the appropriate connections. One's life is enlarged. This constitutes a dimension of well-being distinct and not reducible to the other dimensions discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.¹⁰ One's well-being enhanced by when other people are a part of it.¹¹ This conclusion signifies that, to have well-being along this dimension, one must be capable and willing that others become part of one's life. This means that one must be open and accepting of them as persons. Attaining this can be a life-long struggle. This isn't merely a question of transcending personal self-centredness *inter alia*. It is also a question of to what extent the society one lives in permits others to be part of one's life. It is both a personal and a social issue.

The unusual story of Eleanora illustrates the possibility of such an 'enlarged' life.

Let us rehearse the steps of the argument. Premise 1: through appropriate connections, a person may become a part of one's life. The claim seems intuitively plausible, as illustrated by Eleanora's connection with people in the Buddhist community. Her decision to join the community suggests that she considered the other people, both the members of the community and people it serves, as a part of her life. However, the two central concepts (appropriate connection to others and part of one's life) have not been clarified sufficiently. We need independent criteria for 'appropriate connection' to avoid that the premise is true trivially.

Premise 2: Insofar as a person is a part of one's life, her value as a person becomes a part of one's life. The bearers of primary value are persons and, because of this, our lives have value, and so do the activities that make up our lives. When someone becomes part of one's life, the value of her life becomes an ingredient of the value of one's own. As Eleanora showed us, this implies that one has reason to care for the other person, just as one has reason to care for oneself. The fact that she has a subjectivity, a point of view on the world, and a history and future becomes relevant to one's own life. In a sense, one no longer lives through oneself only, but also through the other.

Born and bred in the West country of England to a farmer's family, Eleanora loved nature, but hated the hard work of the farm. At 19, she was married Max, a builder 10 years her senior, as a way to leave home and to escape the heavy duties on the farm.

At 21, Eleanora moved to Essex with Max, who started a construction company. Within a few years, they had two children. They lived in constant pressure from Max's business. Far from families and friends, and with little time to socialise, Eleanora lived an isolated life. By fully occupying herself with childcare and housework, she got accustomed to the isolation. Her only sanctuary was the garden behind her house, where she created beauty and wonder with the help of nature. Life went by quietly, until when she reached her mid-40s and after both her sons left home, Max suddenly became disabled in an accident. Losing mobility had turned Max into an angry and self-pitying person, and he found other people a pure annoyance. Eleanora saw it her duty to care for him, and remained Max's carer for 14 years until he passed away.

At 60, widowed, living in large house all by herself, with her sons working in the Middle East, Eleanora soon found life alone unbearable. She was desperately in need of company and connections with other people, but too shy and too out of practice to know where to start. Eventually, she chose to take a week-long health retreat in the Midlands, which was previously recommended for Max when he was suicidal. The Retreat was in an idyllic setting, which appealed to Eleanora's nature-loving yearning. Additionally, most of its daily activities were organised for groups, so she wouldn't be alone. In fact, Eleanora was elated by how welcoming and accepting the Centre was. It was also home to a Buddhist community with members from all walks of life and backgrounds. During the retreat, Eleanora felt alive and happy, and the meditation and the conviviality touched her. She wanted to stay a little longer, and ended up staying for another three months.

By then, Eleanora also learned more about the community – meditation, self-development, serving others, taking care of nature, and contributing to the greater good. Not having had a job of any sort in her entire life, Eleanora was initially embarrassed and uncertain about what she might offer, but was soon able to recognise the qualities she could bring to other people. At the end of the three months, Eleanora left for a professional training course in holistic healing, and within a year, she had sorted out all her affairs at home, in order to return and become a permanent resident in the community.

At the time of our interview with Eleanora, then aged 73, it was her twelfth year there. She told us that she adores everyone in the community who are now her closest friends, and she enjoys life more than ever because she feels a part of larger family. She concluded: "More importantly, by taking care of the community and running the Retreat Centre together, we also contribute to other people's health and wellness."

To make these points vivid, consider a newly born baby. Quite suddenly this new person becomes an immensely important part of the parents' lives. The best explanation of why this is such an important transformation is that the value of the baby's life has been imported into the parents' own lives.¹² The baby is a bearer of primary value: this means that the baby is worth loving, and that a host of other things matter only because the baby matters, such as: Do the nappies work? Is the food too hot? The baby has become part of the parents' lives: they are not living as one person anymore. Sadly, in a similar fashion, when a person one loves dearly dies, their life is abruptly removed from one's life.¹³

We have given a rudimentary defence of premise 2. Nevertheless, the main ideas are still not clear in part because we must distinguish two ways people can be part of one's life. First, in the minimal sense: people are part of my life insofar as I relate to them as people. This depends

on my willingness and capacity. In the second sense, people are part of my life insofar as I have good quality relationships with them, and this quality depends not only on what I do, but also on what they do. These ways two are unified because one's life is better insofar as other people are a valuable part of it.

BEING-WITH 1: OTHERS AS PERSONS

We claimed that there are two ways in which a person can be part of one's life: the minimal way, and the way in which depends on the qualities of one's relationship. In this sub-section, we will briefly examine the first of these. Part of one's well-being is to recognise others as persons as one undertakes activities with them. This recognition is part of well-being because one's being with others has intrinsic value but only insofar as one is connected to them as bearers of value or *as* persons.

One way to fail to be so connected is to instrumentalise other people. Insofar as one does that, one inhabits a phenomenological world that does not contain other people *as such*. For example, when I regard someone primarily as a nuisance or as an obstacle then I am treating that person in this respect merely as an object. Likewise, if I regard someone merely as useful or as an affordance, to that extent I do not regard her as a person. In a similar fashion, many interactions and social relations with others are governed by functional roles defined by purposes. Insofar as one's interactions with others accord with such roles, one does not regard the person as a person, but rather in terms of use-value. For example, consider the person at the supermarket cash register. In societies that are largely structured around production and consumption, these functional relations can dominate the way that we are with others. Insofar as they do, we are not connected to others as people.

As we saw in Chapter 2, this is not an all-or-nothing affair. Terms such as 'regard' and 'treat' are intensional verbs; this means that their individuation is relative to a set of descriptions, and they are aspectual.¹⁴ In some respects, we regard the cashier as a person, for instance, even when we ask him whether we can pay with a credit card. In others, we don't. Nevertheless, insofar as one regards a person merely instrumentally, one cannot connect appreciatively to her intrinsic value. And insofar as this is true, then being with other people will not count towards one's well-being.

The point isn't the familiar Kantian one that treating others as mere objects is immoral. Rather it is that the tendency to treat other people in this way constitutes a form of ill-being. It is a pattern that precludes one from appreciating and being with others *as persons*. Insofar as we live in a phenomenological world that is devoid of other people, we live an impoverished life.

Eleanora's story demonstrates vividly the following: the fact that other people have entered one's life brings value to the living of one's life. It satisfies a necessary condition for the relational aspect of her well-being. Insofar as one lives more as one among others, the more this relational dimension of well-being will be satisfied and one's experiential or phenomenological 'world' will be richer, in that it contains persons with their own experiential 'universes'. Consider how great novelists bring characters to life and illuminate the complexities and depth of the other person. In contrast, insofar as one lives as a single isolated person and views other people merely as a nuisance or as useful affordance, one will inhabit a phenomenological 'world' empty of people.

The famous quote “A person first starts to live when he can live outside of himself.” misses the point that, in a sense, there never was a time that a person didn’t live outside of herself.¹⁵ We always have been in myriad relationships with others in a society at large. The point is that we don’t always live with emotional recognition or appreciation of those relations. To live in a self-centred way is *not* to live as an autonomous individual, but rather, it is to live in a way that fails to recognise emotionally that one is not an autonomous individual. The conclusion isn’t that we add value to our lives by becoming more than self-contained autonomous individuals. It is rather that we add value by recognising more deeply and thoroughly that we are not such individuals.

This suggests the principle that all people are equally real. Hopefully, this sounds like a tautology. Nevertheless, self-centredness is a failure to recognise or appreciate emotionally the reality of other persons. For example, consider Max’s self-absorption: when he was preoccupied with his own disability, he was less sensitive to the emotional state of other people around him, even Eleanora’s. Being withdrawn is a way of being less connected to the reality of others. Another person is a living being whose existence constitutes a subjective point of view on the world, as equally real as one’s own. When Max was withdrawn, he could not make contact with that reality. In sharp contrast, the capacity to see things from another’s point of view constitutes evidence that one recognises more fully the reality of others. This would apply to James. Likewise, the capacity to recognise that I am part of other people’s lives will count as evidence that I recognise the reality of others. It indicates that I can view our relationship from their point of view.

These points need to be set in the context of the previous chapter: the intrinsic value of an activity can become a part of a person’s well-being only through her awareness. This applies to the relational, our connections with others.

APPROPRIATE CONNECTIONS

Being appropriately connected to other people means that they become more part of one’s own life *as persons*. This important idea needs amplifying. We connect to other people in three fundamental ways: first, by appreciating them, that is, through our own perception, feelings and emotions; second, through our goals and desires, by making their interests or concerns our own. The third involves a ‘we’-consciousness (Solomon 1988; Nozick 1989; Martin 2012). As we shall see, the third element is crucial because it marks the transformation from the minimal sense in which others can be part of one’s life (by being recognised as persons) to the richer sense in which a person is a part of one’s life because one has a meaningful mutual relationship.

1) Appreciation and Feeling

Appreciation is a form of experiential perception of valuable characteristics, which may involve having appropriate feelings and emotions. Part of appreciating the value of the activities that constitute our lives consists in appreciating the valuable nature of other people. Both James and Eleanora’s stories illustrate this appreciation. Such emotive perception is part and parcel of what it means to admire, respect, like, adore, love and care for others. These are ways of connecting to something of value beyond oneself.

2) Caring and Common Purpose

An important way of connecting to other persons is through goals and desires. For example, when we love another person, we make her concerns our own. We can care for strangers in this way too, as James’ does in his studying for a PhD and in his volunteer work and as Eleanora

does in her work for people who attend the retreat. Furthermore, most people feel a need to be connected to things of value beyond themselves, and we forge such connections by adopting new ends, such as social causes, the furtherance of knowledge and the creation of art. There are jobs to be done, people in need and our friends require help. In these ways, we care. In Chapter 2, we saw that purposes are a way of improving the lived-through processes of life. By caring, we extend the limits of our lives. In both James and Eleanora's stories, we see how we expand our lives, and we improve the quality of life's processes.

This does not imply that the things of value that we connect to are merely instrumentally valuable as a way to improve the processes of living. There is a world of difference between, on the one hand:

a) "I care for him because I want my life to be meaningful, and caring for him is a way to make it more meaningful."

and, on the other,

b) "I care for him because he has the following qualities...and he is part of my life and its meaning."

The key differences between the two are that the first example is driven by an I-desire, whereas the second is motivated by a perception of the other person's qualities. Additionally, the first example involves an instrumental relation, and the second a part/whole relation. Let us review these two points. First, an I-desire is directed to oneself; it has oneself as part of its content. For instance, the desire to drink coffee has the form "I want that *I* drink coffee soon." It is an I-desire because the content of the desire requires mention of me. In contrast, wanting the world to be a healthy place for future generations is not an I-desire, because its content does not mention me. Psychological egoism is the view that all one's basic desires are I-desires (Williams, 1973). Second, the caring mentioned in b) constitutes a connection to value; claim a) does not because it instrumentalises the other person. It is not an instance of connecting to the intrinsically valuable aspects of another person. In contrast, b) is such an instance, because she is part of one's life.

3) Awareness of Us

The third way in which one connects to other people is by thinking, feeling and perceiving them and oneself not as 'me and you,' but as 'us.' What are the differences between these two? The first difference is that the idea of two individual persons with separate, but perhaps overlapping, interests and concerns is distinct from the idea of a couple or group, for each one of whom the other is part of her life. Additionally, 'we'-consciousness is self-reflective. In other words, I am aware of us as a couple, and so are you. Furthermore, you are conscious that I am so aware and so am I. We recognise of each other that we regard ourselves as 'we' or 'us.'

BEING-WITH 2: RELATIONSHIPS

Earlier we claimed that other people can be part of one's life in two ways. In the minimal way, insofar as one treats others as persons, they form a valuable part of one's life and one inhabits a phenomenological world that includes other people as such. Since conscious beings are the primary bearers of value, this implies that one's life will be more valuable. It is better to live in a human world.

The second way ascends to the level of relationships. This constitutes a new dimension to the idea of other people being part of one's life. In this new dimension, as the quality of one's relationship improves, the more the other person becomes part of one's life and one's life improves. Because relationships are two-way, the quality of the relationship will depend on the other person, as well as oneself.

We have provided two distinct accounts of being-with; isn't this an unnecessary complication? To answer this, consider the following juxtaposition. On the one hand, one's capacity to regard other people in general as real beings doesn't depend *directly* on how others behave. It is rather a question of one's growing beyond one's self-centredness (Russell 2012: 216-219). In this regard, what matters for one's well-being is that other people in general are part of one's life *as persons*, that one lives in a human world. On the other hand, however, this doesn't guarantee good relationships. For instance, throughout her period of caring for Max, although Eleanora was in a deep relationship with him, nevertheless, it was close to being abusive. Being in an abusive relationship would constitute a form ill-being, even when one regards the other fully as a person. In this regard, what matters for one's well-being is the quality of one's relationship with the other person.¹⁶

As so far defined, appropriate connection enables others to be part of one's life in a minimal sense. How do we make the jump to the richer second sense of being part of one's life, when people have reciprocal relationships with each other? The answer is that self-reflective 'we'-awareness dramatically alters the nature of relations. It transforms the bonds between people from the interpersonal to the collective intrapersonal in three ways. First, it permits the ideas of doing things together as a unit and as communal activity, in contrast to the concept of co-operation between separate individuals. This locates a very important difference, say, between playing tennis with a close friend and playing with a stranger: the first is something *we* did; the second is something I did with someone else. Second, it transforms the way other peoples' concerns enter our lives. It is one thing for a person's goals to become mine, quite another for us to have purposes that are essentially conceived of by both of us as *ours*. This allows for a new possibility: this goal is mine only insofar as it is ours. Thirdly, 'we' awareness permits the introduction of a new historical consciousness into the appreciation of a relationship. For example, couples often say: "We have been through many things together." Blood and family ties involve this historical 'we'-awareness. In summary, 'we'-awareness transforms the earlier points about appreciation and shared goals. There is now another way to appreciate other people: as part of one's life. In this regard, they are no longer *other*. And there is now another way to share goals: not merely by having purposes in common but by having common purposes. We acquire ends that are 'we' goals. As we become 'we'-centred in these reflective ways, we move into the sphere of personal relationships. For example, one's children are part of oneself, integral to one's everyday living, and one is a member of a family group. One is a 'we'.

For the limited purposes of this chapter, we will not define what 'a good quality relationship' means.¹⁷ Nevertheless, one of the minimal dimensions that defines a good quality relationship is the extent to which one feels recognised as a person by the other. A major complaint in relationships is that the other person doesn't pay one enough attention, or doesn't listen to one, or that the other person is cruel or treats one as stupid or disrespectfully. For example, James's abusive parent and Eleanora's angry husband suggests that these weren't good quality relationships. In each case, the person who feels unloved or disrespected feels treated as less than a full person. In a similar vein, it is hard to have a good quality relationship with a person who is consistently selfish and bullying, and a person who is short tempered or irascible will

tend to treat one as less than a person during her bad moods and storms. In each of these relationships, one will tend to feel treated as less than a full person.

Let us return to the broad context. Human experiences, activities and processes essentially involve interactions. Whenever we act, our activity has a content that is necessarily defined in relation to others, that is, to things, organisms, persons, social groups, and assemblages of these. For reasons already discussed, relations with other persons are especially important for our well-being. One's way of being is better insofar as one has good quality relationships with others and, consequently, such relationships constitute an important aspect of well-being.

The two ways in which other persons are part of one's well-being stand in tension. First, *all other things being equal*, it is better to have a wider life that has more persons as part of it. This means that it is better to connect to the reality of more persons as opposed to fewer. Being connected to the reality of other persons means feeling that the other is a living bearer of intrinsic value. This means feeling that she is worthy of care. This means that other things matter because she does. This connection can be a strong emotional experience. As such, this requirement of the first kind may conflict with the second regarding quality relationships. In short, all other things aren't always equal. One cannot be close-friends with everyone. One cannot let everyone enter equally into one's life. People have different capacities to bring others into their life, and people matter to us in diverse ways. Given my capacities, if I have too many friends then the quality of each of those relationships may decrease. A person can overstretch herself, and thereby end up having fewer meaningful good quality relationships. Quality relationships require commitment and loyalties. This means that one must spend time on and pay attention to those persons with whom one has a special relationship, and this may compromise or diminish one's capacity to connect well to the reality of others beyond one's immediate circle.

There is a second tension. Insofar as I perceive others as real and as persons, to this extent I am more vulnerable to being mistreated by them. To let another person into one's life is to be closer to her subjectivity, which means being more willing to see and feel things from her point of view. This means that one is more willing to consider the other person's perception of oneself. In short, it is much harder to be rejected or abused or humiliated by someone whom one perceives as real than by someone whom one discounts or hardly sees as real. The same point: one way to become less vulnerable to the mistreatment by others is to cut oneself off from them by regarding them as less than human. One gains greater immunity from mistreatment by others by distancing oneself from them and thereby living in a less human 'world'. In affirming this, we are not denying that there might be a better third alternative: a way of being more immune from hurt without depersonalising others. This third alternative has important ramifications. It means that well-being requires that we need to be more resilient in our relationships with others without sacrificing our capacity to appreciate the reality of others as persons. We don't need to cut off others who hurt or humiliate us. However, in suggesting resilience, we do not mean that people should put up with abuse and relational exploitation, or must one endure the ill-treatment. How is this possible? We shall see.

PITFALLS AND OBJECTIONS

Let us deal with some misunderstandings of the points argued for here and avoid some pitfalls. First, especially considering Eleanora's story, one might be tempted to affirm: "Life is dreary without friends, and empty without people to share with. We need friends, companions and acquaintances." This kind of assertion carries a misleading emphasis. It suggests that friends are external to us, and that we need them to avoid feeling empty and dreary. It misses the whole

idea that others can be part of one's life and that this matters because the other person matters. To remedy this misleading approach: the issue isn't what causes a feeling or sense of well-being but rather what constitutes being and living well. Relationships with others might *cause* well-being, but the more fundamental point is that they *constitute* an inescapable aspect of well-being. Consequently, relationships with others might constitute well-being, even when they cause feelings of ill-being. In more common parlance, another person can be a meaningful part of one's life even when she causes one to feel bad.

There is a deeper remedy for the misleading approach. Insofar as one enters a non-instrumental relationship with another person, it is the other person that matters. In such a relationship, one cares about the other because she has value. My care shows that I am connected to this value in virtue of which she matters and my relationship with her consists *inter alia* in this value becoming part of my life. Likewise, the relationship consists in my value as a person becoming part of her life. Recognition of this adds to my being well. My well-being consists in a mutual recognition that this happening to both of us. Just as she is part of my life and just as I am part of her life and just as we both recognise these truths, these mutual recognitions make our relationship deeper and hence more constitutive of our being well together.

This general point is important for happiness studies about having children: many parents report a reduced feeling of happiness when they have children. At the same time, parents report that their lives are more meaningful for having children. These reports might look contradictory if we conflated the causes of and the constituents of well-being, and if we fell into the allied mistake of identifying well-being with feelings of happiness (Layard 2006). These reports seem contradictory insofar as we forget that children become part of one's life and insofar as they do, they transform what counts as one's being well in a way that is an improvement.¹⁸ Once these points are clear, we can understand that aspects of our lives are constitutively part of well-being even when they cause us hardship. In this sense, they need to be accounted for differently: as constituent and as cause. While people who don't have children may have lives that are more self-directed and even carefree, it is fair to say that they lack a dimension of human existence.

It might be objected that this last claim is too romantic and not realistic enough. Indeed, there are people who wish that their children had never been born. Presumably, this is usually because of the hardship and the emotional strain of having children in conditions of deprivation. Having children demands sacrifices, which under conditions of destitution and struggle may be near impossible. On the other side, we perceive the normal human condition as one in which any person has others as part of her life, and children would be one paradigm of such a relation. Where does our analysis fall concerning this conflict? The answer is that the current analysis insists on distinguishing constituent and cause: having children is part of well-being, but it can cause parents hardship. How do these two factors play out? It depends on the circumstances of the lives of the parents. There isn't an answer that it is context-free, except for *inter alia* the general insistence that we shouldn't confuse the constituents of well-being with the causes.

A second pitfall: there is the tendency to think that other people enter one's well-being through their well-being. The idea is that if the people I love are ailing then I cannot flourish. Likewise, if my loved ones are flourishing then this will contribute to my well-being. We claim that this way of conceiving the connection between people is a pitfall: it is too individualistic to serve as a constituent of the relational aspect of well-being because it lacks the underlying idea that other people can become part of one's life. The point *shouldn't be* that I can't feel good unless my children are flourishing or happy because this would make them external causes or

conditions of my well-being. Rather the point should be that my children are a part of my life. My sense of me includes my children; in some regards they are not other at all. Claiming that our well-being is interlinked under-describes this point.

Third, someone might object that when other people increasingly become part of one's life, this doesn't necessarily constitute a furtherance of one's well-being. Other people can destroy one's life. Sometimes one is better off alone. Sometimes, it is better that others are not part of one's life. To answer this objection, we need to make a fundamental point. This is the now tedious idea that we aren't discussing what causes well-being but rather what constitutes it. It may *cause* one terrible suffering and ill-being to allow a malicious person to become part of one's life. This isn't the issue at hand, however. The issue is whether other people's becoming part of one's life constitutes *ipso facto* an increase in well-being. If it does, then this doesn't preclude the idea that such intrinsic value might be overridden by the harm another person can cause one. In short, intrinsically, it is better to be open; instrumentally, sometimes, in special circumstances, we need to be closed.

One might want to press the objection. Clearly, our relations with others can constitute ill-being. Indeed, damning relations with other people constitutes the worst hell, as Sartre reminds us. This suggests the objection that it is not part of our well-being to be open to others as persons; sometimes we need to be closed. This objection isn't about social moral norms; rather it is that well-being dictates that, in harmful relationships, we may need to close-down to the reality of others.

The aim of this section is to reply to this objection in a deeper way. We begin with two observations. First, whenever someone wants something, she necessarily wants it primarily under some description that describes it as desirable. This doesn't mean that the thing wanted *is* desirable, but it does mean that the thing wanted is perceived as desirable under some description by the person who wants it.¹⁹ It implies, what is perhaps obvious, that a person's intentions always make sense to the person herself. However, this first-person point translates into the possibility of a third-person understanding. It implies that there is some description of the person's desires or intentions that make sense to others who can see it from the person's point of view. There is a way of making sense of others' wants, of seeing what they want as a good in some fashion. This applies to one's worst enemy: there is some description of the situation such that he thinks it of as good, which one could oneself recognise as such. (This doesn't mean that we must agree with the person's judgments concerning the overall goodness of the intended action) (Thomson, 2020)

To this, one might add a second point. We are subject to an epistemological asymmetry, which follows from the very nature of consciousness. This is the tendency, in our own case, to apparently understand directly our own intentions, but in the case of others, to perceive their actions as defined by their results.²⁰ In the first-person case, we perceive directly our own intentions, which are necessarily directed to some good. In contrast, in the case of others, we directly perceive their actions, usually as defined by their results, which are typically at best a mixed bag. In conjunction with the first point, this epistemological asymmetry constitutes a double standard: it means that I am prone to see my own actions as always intended at good, and those of others as wrong or, at best, as less than good. There is a built-in bias.²¹

Here we are concerned with the consequences of this asymmetry for well-being rather than morality. The quality of a relationship depends on the other person, as well as oneself. The two points that we just made modulate this dependence on the other: one cannot simply place blame

on the other person for the poor quality of the relationship. Let us examine an example. I am fed up with a close friend of many years. Recent events have led me to feel that he is too self-absorbed, and that our interactions are less than satisfactory from my point of view: he doesn't listen well and he is always putting his own interests first in any conversation or situation. I feel used or taken advantage of. This situation causes me pain, sadness, self-doubt, and some anger and anxiety. I take this example to be a mild but typical case of the kind of sufferings one might endure in a relationship.

How do the two points temper this description? My description of the relationship doesn't respect the two hermeneutical ideas. First, I have ignored the idea that the other person is aiming at something good in his desires, and I haven't tried to make my description and feelings consistent with this. Of course, I don't see what he wants as directed to the *overall* good, but that's not the issue at hand. Even given this, this shouldn't lead me to deny that his wants are directed towards something good. In other words, I have dismissed his wants as being directed towards the bad *per se*. Second, I have fallen blindly into the trap of the epistemological asymmetry. I have put my grievances about his actions solely in terms of their effects on me, which signifies that I haven't tried to enter his point of view. While, I think of my intentions as necessarily directed towards some good, I judge his actions in terms of their results on me. Thus, I haven't tried to overcome this epistemological asymmetry. In conclusion, this means that I have adopted a hermeneutic that favours blame.

Let us relate this to well-being. We argued that well-being requires having good relations with other people, which requires being connected and open to the value of others. Against this proposal, we articulated an objection, namely, that when one has seriously bad relationships with other people then well-being cannot require that we be open to the other as a person. In other words, horrible relationships that partly constitute ill-being don't require this condition of openness. In reply to this objection, we have presented two ingredients: the idea that others' intentions are directed to some good, and the concept of the epistemological asymmetry. How do these two ingredients relate to the point at hand (replying to the objection)? They show how acknowledging that a relationship is constitutive of ill-being doesn't require jettisoning the idea that well-being requires that we relate to others as persons. What the two ingredients show is that one doesn't need to demonise or dehumanise the other, even in the context of a harmful and abusive relationship. One can still maintain that well-being requires that one regard the people around one as persons, including the person who has hurt one. The fact that others might treat one as less than a person doesn't require abandoning the idea that our well-being requires that we don't do the same. Even when a relationship is bad (intrinsically), we can still acknowledge that the other is a person who intended something good, even if he is egoistic, insensitive and misguided. Furthermore, once we acknowledge the inherent epistemological bias, *ipso facto*, we will be less willing to judge the situation in terms such as "I was right and you were wrong." Recognising the inherent partiality means that one's judgments will be spontaneously predisposed to be more nuanced and open-ended: "As far as I can see, I was more right in this way than in that way..." Thus, given what the epistemological bias means, and given that others' intentions are directed to some perceived good, the objection fails. Being open doesn't mean that we should inhabit Sartre's *No Exit*.

Why is the failure of this objection important for well-being? First, it relates to well-being instrumentally. Clearly, a person who embodies the two hermeneutic principles will tend to have better relationships. Second, it pertains to the constitutive aspect of well-being concerning self-consciousness. As we shall see in Chapter 6, part of what constitutes one's self-consciousness of being healthy is one's ability and willingness to see oneself as a person who

is equally real as other people. Third, it allows us to retain the important insight that we developed at the beginning of this chapter, namely, that part of the relational nature of well-being is to be with others *as persons*. We don't need to abandon that idea even in the tempest or torture of a bad relationship.

BEING-IN

One's activities and experiences have value in relation to other people: one can do things for others (doing-for) and one can do things with others (being-with). In addition, activities are embedded in a complex set of social relations, which form part of a community or society. Since this is an inescapable and value-relevant aspect of our way of being, it will also be a dimension of our well-being. We are social creatures; there are forms of goodness along this dimension that constitute our being well, and conversely forms of badness that comprise ill-being. One might call this aspect of well-being 'being-in.' An aspect of a person's well-being is her *being in* a community or society in ways that count as doing so well. This is a third factor of the relational nature of well-being pertaining to persons. As Eleanora's experiences illustrate, part of living well includes how one lives within a society and community such that it dovetails with one's well-being. To repeat, we are concerned with how this dimension of our lives *constitutes* well-being rather than with how it causes it.

We will describe two facets of this specific dimension of well-being. For the first it is important to remember in everyday life that our activities, awareness and self-consciousness are all relational.²² This is so in part because activities are always in relations to some things: we eat the apple, watch the sunset, evaluate the plan, converse with a friend and so on. More deeply, it is also because the activities, experiences and processes can be meaningful because of what it is to be an agent. An action is defined by its content and this is a form of meaningfulness.²³ At least in the case of linguistic beings, this meaningfulness is ineluctably social. In short, this implies that the meaningfulness of our lives and the living of a life is social. The very substance of our being is social: look into a human heart and mind and you will find a social history.²⁴ This doesn't mean that we aren't individuals; it means that our individuality must be conceived socially, in terms of the social conditions that permit it. These points are important for well-being because it is possible to live in ways that are more or less consonant with the social fabric of our being. It is something that we can ignore, violate or appreciatively integrate both in our social arrangements or institutions and in the way we conduct our daily lives.

The second facet of being-in is a localised or specific expression of the first. The social nature of one's being is general, but the communities one lives in are specific. This second facet is that one can live in a community in ways that are more or less well and which are constitutively relevant for well-being. We can define this in three steps. The terms 'community' and 'to commune' have connotations of shared open intimacy, to which we should add the idea of solidarity or solid mutual care. This means that well-being requires that we are in a community in which open sharing and intimate relationships of mutual care are the norm.

Second, being-in means more than just being a member of a community. It requires that one feels part of and that one belongs to a community. In this sense, it is the opposite of intimate being-with in which another person becomes part of one's life (and *vice versa*). For being-in, one becomes part of the life of a larger whole: one actively participates in that life. This means that the members of the community share a 'we' consciousness that consists in one's being part of the life of the larger whole of a community and recognizing that others are too. This recognition will be mutual.

Third, being-in modulates both doing-for and being-with. Part of being in a community is that one does things for others and with others who are also part of the community. Likewise, self-reflective 'we'-consciousness is modulated by being in a community. For being-in, these elements are fused: the doing-for and being-with are an expression of a special shared 'we'-awareness: we are in a community insofar as we do things for others and we are in relationship with others because of a shared 'we' consciousness that consists in ones being part of the life of the larger whole of a community, which has a history.

It is important not to confuse this belonging with one's identity, which will be the subject of the next chapter. To claim that a person belongs to a community in a way that is partly constitutive of her well-being isn't necessarily the same as asserting that this is her identity. To belong to a community doesn't require that one self-identifies non-derivatively as a member of it. To see this, suppose that a good community would be small. The fact that one has a sense of belonging to a village doesn't imply that one's self-identifications should be parochial.

Notice that we haven't described this aspect of well-being in instrumental terms. Typically good communities are characterised as such also in instrumental terms: for example, in terms of safety and the means for achieving of common goals. Such instrumental characterisations are not mistaken, but they are out of place when one is trying to define what constitutes well-being.

¹ This puzzle has been noted by other writers such as Shelly Kagan 1998 and Thaddeus Metz 2001

² This problem is discussed in Martin 2012: 114 who notes: “the mere appeal to the happiness of givers is unsatisfying, or at least incomplete, as moral justification. It misses the primary moral point of helping others.”

³ We assume that meaning is a kind of non-instrumental value.

⁴ Intrinsic here means non-instrumental and not non-relational

⁵ We say ‘usually’ because there are activities that are valuable as means for which the relevant end is entirely self-regarding. I might enjoy cooking for myself or having a bath. (Note: some self-regarding goal-defined actions might be activities that are also instrumentally valuable as means and others, such as playing, might be intrinsically valuable but without being intrinsically valuable *as* means.

⁶ As well as our own income. But the same point applies.

⁷ Notice that the problem and its solution arise at the level of the constituents of well-being, and not at the level of its causes. As we explained from the outset, the questions, ‘What constitutes well-being?’ and ‘What causes well-being?’ are fundamentally different. In this work, we concentrate on the first to avoid an impoverished conception of well-being.

⁸ Or more clearly, part of the self-regarding non-instrumental valuable nature of the activity, experience or process in part consists in connecting appropriately to something of non-instrumental value that is other-regarding.

⁹ The intrinsic valuable nature (pertinent to well-being) of one’s experiences, activities and life’s processes is partly constituted by their being performed or undergone with other people.

¹⁰ Not reducible but dependent. Typically, human motivation is such that we have deslogo interests pertaining to the ‘need’ for certain relationships. Also, appreciation or awareness is an important aspect of one’s relationships. The value of relationships isn’t reducible to these two factors but it is dependent on them.

¹¹ Some philosophers argue that well-being and meaningfulness are mutually exclusive. In other words, they would deny the claim that one’s well-being is greater if one engages in activities that are more meaningful. See Metz 2002 and 2013.

¹² The best explanation of a certain kind.

¹³ Philosophical aside: To claim that typically one feels very happy or even elated on becoming a mother or father misidentifies the point. One can see this by considering the point that the parents feel elated *because* a new person has become part of their lives. Therefore, one could recognize the baby as a primary bearer of value and recognize that this value has become part of one’s own life and not feel elated (because for instance one is too tired or too anxious). The feeling of happiness isn’t the main point. The cause of it is. The cause is that this person or valuable being has become part of one’s life.

Perhaps a better alternative explanation is that when parents see their newly born baby, they are genetically programmed to have a tendency to feel immediate love of the new born. This wouldn’t count as an *alternative* explanation if the concept of loving includes the idea of making someone part of one’s life in a way that imports the value of the other into one’s own life. This is indeed what we shall argue below. However, we can already see the insufficiency of the genetic psychological explanation. It explains why we care for the baby. It doesn’t explain why it is important to care.

¹⁴ They are intensional verbs means that they are referentially opaque.

¹⁵ ‘The Big Picture: The Meaning of Life: Philosophers, pundits and plain folk ponder what it’s all about’, (Answer by Armand Hammer), *Life*, 1988, December, Page 89, Column 2, Published by Time, Inc, Chicago, Illinois and New York

¹⁶ In this discussion, we are not referring to the causal impact of relationships on one's well-being. Relationships with persons can have a positive or negative instrumental impact on one's well-being.

¹⁷ This would require some classification of relationships as well as a definition of what counts as non-instrumentally good in well-being-relevant ways for each type.

¹⁸ Given a good quality relationship

¹⁹ This point has its origin in the thought of Socrates and Plato (Thomson 2016).

²⁰ This doesn't mean that such self-perceptions are immediate and infallible. For more detailed argument see: Thomson 2002b, and Gill & Thomson 2019: Chapter 3

²¹ This bias has deep implications for morality. It means that we are morally obliged to be careful and generous in the way that we construe others.

²² This is because the four aspects of well-being are melded. This implies also that our activities, awareness and relations are suffused and structured by self-consciousness, and so on.

²³ Charles Taylor,

²⁴ or perhaps more accurately, what you will find is constructed through a social history