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6. Education, Movement and the Curriculum

The Place of Movement in a Curriculum of General Education

The major concern in writing this book has been with an exploration of the concept of movement, especially that dimension of it which is to do with the person as agent engaged *in* movement. It is the task now to say something about movement in relation to education and in particular say something about its place in the curriculum. Before doing this, however, a preliminary comment needs to be made in order to understand in general terms what follows.

Underlying any serious attempt to characterize what education is or what should go into the curriculum are two fundamental questions: 'What is it to be a person?' and, 'How can what is being suggested help the person to actualize himself along lines that are in keeping with the good life?' Any programme of curricula activities is likely to founder, no matter how impressive its superstructure, unless it can provide satisfactory answers to these questions. It will be appreciated, for example, that the person who is conceived 'dualistically' as opposed to 'holistically' is likely to affect the very aims and content of the educational enterprise—separating, distorting, emphasizing, ignoring as the case may be. Many intellectually biased forms of education are not only based upon dualistic assumptions, even if they are not always acknowledged, but have difficulty in seeing that the good life is made up of more than the pursuit of truth. What then is needed in education and curriculum planning if persons are to fulfil themselves and change in some way for the better is a rounded and balanced programme of activities that call upon all those forms of life that have significance in human affairs.

At the present time there are two influential formulations of what

the curricula should contain. The first is the one constructed by Phenix;¹ the second is the one largely based upon the work of Hirst.² It is the former that I propose to look at further whilst at the same time making some comments about the latter.

In his *Realms of Meaning*, Phenix recognizes that a curriculum for general education must take account of the idea of logical patterns of disciplined understanding but at the same time not be exclusively bound by them. He sets out by stating that he wishes to avoid two temptations.

- (i) To return to a traditional subject-matter curriculum related neither to the needs or ability of the individual learner nor to the social and psychological factors affecting education;
- (ii) To construe knowledge too narrowly in purely intellectualistic terms.³

The full development of human beings, he maintains, 'requires education in a variety of realms of meaning rather than in a single type of rationality'.⁴ Certainly on this point he has the support of Reid⁵ who has argued that man comes to know and experience in a variety of ways and that not all of them are reducible to a propositional formulation of them.

What makes Phenix's approach to the curriculum particularly commendable is that he recognizes that it should be based upon a conception of the person that is holistic and not 'just a collection of parts'.⁶ Also, instead of placing rational autonomy at the centre of the educational enterprise he emphasizes more the notion of *meaning*. If such ideas as 'reason' and 'mind' are too narrowly construed as referring to the processes of logical thinking, he contends, the life of feeling, conscience and imagination suffer, the outcome of which is a one-sided and emasculated form of development. By adopting the word meaning he hopes to overcome some of the criticisms that I have laid against some of the more traditional approaches to education.

Meaning, Phenix suggests, has four dimensions.⁷ The first is that of *experience* which pertains to human consciousness and its peculiar quality of reflectiveness, or self-awareness. It recognizes that the inner life of testimony and direct objectification are no less valuable in our knowledge of what it is to be human than the knowledge about man which arises from scientific interpretations based upon inference. The second is that of *rule, logic or principle* which helps characterize and differentiate between the various

kinds of meaning.* The third is *selective elaboration*. Here reference is made to those areas of meaning which in the long history of mankind have demonstrated their actual fecundity and have not arisen from an *a priori* analysis of possible classes of meaning. Meanings in this third dimension have arisen from and have been elaborated by particular groups of scholars. They incorporate those meanings which have been explicated by the traditional disciplines but are by no means confined to them. The fourth dimension of meaning is *expression*. Here the concern is the effective communication of meanings through the use of appropriate symbolic forms. Symbolization presupposes self-transcendence in the awareness of a common world, for the symbols are taken as having the same or similar connotation to oneself as to others into whose being one imaginatively projects oneself. All in all it will be seen that meaning for Phenix is a more embracing notion than Hirst's characterization of 'knowledge'. Clearly these are not identical or interchangeable. What is found meaningful in human affairs ranges considerably beyond those areas for which there are agreed procedures for the establishment of truths. Existentially meaningful experiences, for example, are not rendered less poignant or significant because they cannot be validated or because they cannot be readily articulated and shared within an already formulated and commonly shared symbolic system.

Phenix's underlying thesis is that people have the power to experience meanings. What characterizes human existence, he maintains, is its distinctively different patterns of meaning. A curriculum of general education is therefore concerned with 'the process of engendering essential meanings'.⁸ What then are these realms of meaning that will help the person to live his life in a unified, comprehensive and personally significant fashion?

To list them they are:⁹

- 1 SYMBOLICS, under which realm he places (i) Ordinary language; (ii) Mathematics.
- 2 EMPIRICS, includes (i) Physical Science; (ii) Biology; (iii) Psychology; (iv) Social Science.
- 3 AESTHETICS, covers (i) Music; (ii) The Visual Arts; (iii) The Arts of Movement; (iv) Literature.

* It is this dimension of meaning with which Hirst is primarily concerned when he speaks of the categorization of the different 'forms of knowledge'. Hirst sees knowledge as 'the domain of true propositions or statements'. See his *Knowledge and the Curriculum* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 84-7.

- 4 SYMNOETICS invokes the significance of (i) Personal Knowledge.
- 5 ETHICS, which is really to do with (i) Moral Knowledge.
- 6 SYNOPTICS, which are integrative and interpretative realms. They serve to give a unified perspective about life. The disciplines here are (i) History; (ii) Religion; (iii) Philosophy.

It will be noticed that when Phenix's 'realms' are compared with Hirst's 'forms'¹⁰ (Mathematics, Science—physical and social, Ethics, History, Religion, Aesthetics and Philosophy) that, despite the considerable agreement that exists between them, there remain two noticeable differences, which from the point of view of movement, are important. These are:

- (i) That 'the arts of movement' are given explicit recognition as coming under the general heading of aesthetics;
- (ii) That the whole area of 'personal knowledge' is given a place of its own in what is called the symnoetic realm.*

In connection with the first of these two points Phenix makes specific reference to dance and underlines what I have previously said about it—namely that dance is the primordial art in that the human body itself is the source, instrument and object of aesthetic experience. Furthermore, Phenix acknowledges, again in common with what has been maintained earlier, that the arts of movement, because they involve the person as a unitary totality, help bring together in a distinctive way his thoughts, feelings and actions. The arts of movement then may be regarded as an important area of holistic education.

The symnoetic realm also represents an attempt to bring attention to and highlight precisely those dimensions of living which are to do with the articulation, significance and interpretation of personal meanings. It recognizes that a person lives in a private and existential world as well as a public and objectively shared one. Symnoetics is perhaps best described as a realm of meaning which is personal, direct and relational and which arises out of the concrete existence of individuals in the experience of a personal encounter with one's self, with others or with things. Put another way symnoesis or personal knowledge is concerned with those somewhat abstruse but nonetheless crucial aspects of what it is to be a person. It emphasizes

* Hirst in the modified version of his original thesis now recognizes that a mode of awareness 'of our own and other people's minds' exists, but despite talking about such concepts as 'wanting', 'intending' and 'believing' etc. fails to get to grips with what Phenix is essentially referring to in his symnoetic realm. See P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters, *The Logic of Education* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 63.

subjectivity not *objectivity*; the *concrete* and not the *abstract*; *engagement* and not *detachment*. It is not concerned with *essences* as in language and science, for instance, but with the *existential* in which *being* and the *freedom to become* are held as important. In broad terms it will be seen to incorporate much of what has been discussed in relation to movement when dealing with such themes as the phenomenology of action and meaning, perceiving and knowing in movement, aesthetic experience, inter-personal perception as well as such notions as the lived-body, and self-actualization. In other words a good deal of what has been discussed under the general heading of movement as a source of meaning and significance could be suitably accommodated under what Phenix has designated as the synnoetic realm of meaning.

All in all, although it can perhaps be said that Phenix's 'realms' are less rigorously formulated than Hirst's 'forms', they do have the merit of attempting to produce a curriculum structure that has as its fundamental concern the unitary person rather than that aspect of him which is predominantly to do with the intellectual aspects of 'mind'. It is worth pointing out that despite the difference in what they take to be the central purpose of education both Hirst and Phenix each take as their baseline the common rooting of experience in the different forms of life or systems of meaning that make up what is most characteristic of human culture. Whereas, however, Hirst sees education as principally to do with the acquisition of knowledge, Phenix sees education as something more than just this. It is perhaps because Phenix is conscious that education as rational autonomy* is important but somewhat limiting and distorting in relation to what it is to be a person, that he calls his scheme a curriculum for general education. Be that as it may the fact is that Phenix's realms, especially the two called 'aesthetics' and 'synnoetics', are very much more sympathetic to and in accord with what has been said previously about the person as an embodied consciousness. Nonetheless the question remains 'Should movement be left assimilated under the two realms that are able to accommodate much of what the concept involves, or is movement best considered as an independent element in curriculum design?' The straightforward answer to this question is that movement should be regarded as an independently viable yet necessary element in any curriculum of general education. To omit it altogether from the

* Being 'rational' Hirst sees 'as a matter of developing conceptual schemes by means of public language in which words are related to our form of life, so that we make objective judgements in relation to that form of life'. See *Knowledge and the Curriculum* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, p. 93).

'serious curriculum as the Initiation Model does', or to detract from its coherent and distinctive character by seeing it in a limited way by subsuming it under the aesthetic realm, as Phenix does, is to leave unrecognized the full import of its conceptual implications. With regard to the synnoetic realm of meaning, although as has been pointed out it has a number of the major themes in common with the concept of movement, it is by no means commensurate with it. Synnoetics in the writings of Phenix is more associated with certain aspects of philosophy, psychology, literature and religion than with movement, to which he makes no explicit reference. There is no reason, however, why movement should not remain partially associated with the synnoetic realm in the same way that the other disciplines mentioned are, yet at the same time have recognition of its own.

Among the arguments that can be made for movement as 'subject', apart from practical and administrative ones, are the following. First, recent advances in the articulation of movement as a 'field of study' are now sufficiently well established for it to be regarded as an area of scholarly interest and worthy of study in its own right. Second, it should be acknowledged more readily that sometimes it is possible to justify movement on instrumental grounds if it can be shown in so doing that educative ends are being served. Third, there are good grounds for claiming that certain physical activities (e.g. sport and dance), called here for convenience, movement, together constitute a traditionally related system of culturally shared meanings which should be transmitted from one generation to the next. These, it is contended, are no less worthwhile than the different 'forms of knowledge'. Fourth, movement, apart from the provision of distinct types of whole-bodied, action-based contextual meanings, is the only area of the curriculum which is directly concerned with those experiences of moving that can be entered into and enjoyed for their own sake. It should not be forgotten either that kinesthetic perception is a unique form of awareness and that to deny movement is to deny one aspect of the growth of consciousness.

It is the task now to take up these themes and look at movement as an element in curriculum design which is as much to do with the all-round and balanced education of the person as such other elements as mathematics, science, languages, religion, art and history. Because movement is the only subject that takes as its central focus those aspects of the culture that are to do with meaningful whole-bodied action it has a strong claim for inclusion in any core curriculum of general education.

* See Peters, R. S., *Ethics and Education* (Allen and Unwin, 1966) pp. 145-66.

Education and the Three Dimensions of the Concept of Movement

During the past hundred years or so the place of physical activity in the curriculum, when it has found a place at all, has undergone many vicissitudes and several changes of direction. What has gone on has been called successively 'drill', 'training', 'physical education' and more recently by some people, 'movement'. Each label connotes in turn a different emphasis, a new stage of enlightenment. Whilst to the lay person and perhaps even to some teachers, all may seem calm and orderly, there has been in fact, within what has been called 'the movement movement',¹¹ considerable confusion and bewilderment.

The literature in this area, it seems to me, has been troubled by two main problems: one, conceptual; the other, professional. The major part of this book has been concerned with attempting to help unravel the first of these. It remains now to say something about the second.

The purpose of this final section then is to look at what has been said about movement as a concept and see how and to what extent it can be constituted as a 'subject' in a curriculum of general education. This task will be undertaken by looking at the three 'dimensions' of movement as I shall call them, and see how they relate to what has been said about education and curriculum design. The three dimensions I propose to discuss in turn are

- Dimension I. Education *about* movement;
- Dimension II. Education *through* movement;
- Dimension III. Education *in* movement.

It should be stressed that these three dimensions of movement are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are overlapping and interdependent. In the context of education this should not only be recognized but whenever possible brought about by a structured programme of work.

Dimension I. Education 'about' Movement

Education *about* movement can be looked upon as a rational form of enquiry, concerned with the answering of such questions as: What effect does movement have on the living organism? How is growth related to motor control? How does man best learn to move in different ways? What factors determine man's potential for achievement in movement? In what ways does movement, or lack of

it, influence the development of the personality? What part does movement play, if at all, in facilitating interaction and communication? What place does movement have in the cultural study of man? What are the best ways of classifying, analysing, and notating movement? What are the questions that should be raised and what are the methods that should be adopted in attempting to evaluate movement?

As a *subject to be studied* movement takes an interest in human motion in all its richness and diversity. By calling upon such areas as anatomy, physiology, physics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, aesthetics and philosophy it can be regarded as comprising a composite area of study and research. In principle, the study of human movement is as much to do with work and industry, the theatre and arts, medical services and the armed forces, as with education, sport and recreation. It therefore spills over into areas of life the school as an institution cannot ignore.

Apart from studying movement as a theoretical body of knowledge that is of interest in its own right, it can be studied in order to apply it to practical situations. How best to lift and carry? How best to train in order to delay the onset of fatigue? These are questions to which one can find answers in the disciplines of bio-mechanics and physiology. 'Moment of inertia' and 'oxygen debt' are terms or concepts associated with the provision of intelligible and rational answers to matters of practical concern. Movement study and research then can (a) be entered into for its own sake or intrinsic value; or (b) taken up for its usefulness or instrumental value. It should be pointed out, of course, that the one need not preclude the other. Both as a 'field of study' and a 'practical theory' movement can be found to be intrinsically worthwhile as well as useful.

Although movement as a body of knowledge draws upon such concepts, processes and procedures as embodiment, kinaesthetic perception, knowing-how, interaction, communication, aesthetic experience, intention and action that are not exclusively its own, together with some it has been suggested that are its own, such as movistructure, moviecept and movisymbol, it uses them in such a collective and family-like way that when taken together they constitute a network of meanings that help characterize movement as an important psycho-social and cultural aspect of life. Movement forms like games, play, sport and dance, incorporate and provide instances of some of those facets of life without which the nature of what it is to be a person could not be fully grasped. Sport and dance, particularly perhaps, incorporate within their differing instances, beliefs, values, norms, signs and symbols which make them peculiarly what they are

as sources of meaning and expression. In this respect they are no different from such other cultural forms of music, poetry or painting. As 'objects' of study they are no less rewarding.

Movement as a 'field of study', it is being claimed, is a composite 'discipline' and as such is concerned with the understanding of a 'portion of reality—that is its description, its explanation and sometimes its prediction'.¹² Since movement in this academic or theoretical sense is 'professionally' orientated towards education, it must necessarily be selective in its content and attentive to changing people in some way for the better in a coherent course of study. This highlights what can be said about movement in a rational way and be capable of providing satisfactory answers to such questions as: What is its purpose? What subject matter is to be used? What learning experiences is it hoped to bring about? How is the planned for knowledge and understanding to be assessed?

The rational study of movement as one dimension of the subject in the curriculum can take many forms. Although it can and does relate to the other dimensions of movement, as will be made clear, it can be studied as a theme or project on its own, rather as 'roads' or 'ships' might be. In Primary Education this type of approach has much to commend it. In the later stages of Secondary Education, however, by which time a good deal of general background knowledge will have been assimilated, there is no reason why education 'about' movement should not become more differentiated and broken down into such sub-components as human developmental patterns; motor learning and skill development; social-cultural aspects of human development; history and development of sport and dance. The content of such sub-components readily lend themselves to some sort of examination structure if this is desired.

It will be appreciated then that education 'about' movement is predominantly concerned with the transmission of what might be called rational movement knowledge. It is largely of a propositional kind and is capable of being presented in a discursive way. It is public and objective, in principle shareable, and therefore communicable. It has the merit of providing a theoretical background of understanding which helps make coherent and meaningful that which is performed. In this respect knowing 'about' movement can act as an analytical as well as a critical and evaluative aspect of movement education.

Dimension II. Education 'through' Movement

The idea of education *through* movement is perhaps most easily associated with the term physical education. To say, however, that

physical education is to learn by means of the 'physical' is to say little for as has been argued the learning of a person as an embodied consciousness is largely if not exclusively bound up with and dependent upon the use of his sensory organs. Nonetheless as Wunderlich¹³ says of movement: 'It provides sensory data. It broadens the perceptive horizon. It stimulates function and structure of all bodily organs. It is the means by which an individual learns about himself in relation to his ambient environment.' What in addition, however, education 'through' movement more particularly entails is the taking of that culture-based family of activities and processes—games, dance, gymnastics, athletics, swimming, outdoor pursuits, etc.—as a means 'through' which the teacher can help effect desirable outcomes, regardless of whether or not those activities have intrinsic worth of their own.

When 'physical education' or education 'through' movement is conceived of in instrumental terms it is looked upon as being able to assist in the fulfilment of certain useful purposes. It is concerned not so much with any intrinsic values the activities might have but with the extrinsic or functional values with which they are associated. Such values are sometimes spoken of in terms of 'spin offs', 'by-products' or 'outcomes'. When activities are expressly taught with a view to promoting their extrinsic, rather than their intrinsic, values, they can be justified as being worthy of inclusion in the curriculum if it can be shown that they are a good means in the promotion of other ends that are considered worthwhile.

A brief acquaintance with the history of physical education will show that what was done was invariably done for what were regarded as good extrinsic reasons. Thus in classical Greece physical education was concerned not only with hygiene, medicine, aesthetics, and ethics but was seen in addition as a means of recreation. In ultimate terms, however, it was regarded as a necessary element in the balance and harmony of the soul.^{14*} In Roman times physical education was tied more to notions of health and military training, but by the Middle Ages with the establishment of Christianity it had become a part of the chivalric order of which both dancing and the martial arts formed a part. In the 19th century under the influence of such patriots as P. H. Ling in Sweden and F. Jahn in Germany it became an effective force in the forging of a national identity.¹⁵ In the public schools of Victorian England it became a strong influence in the movement which led to the theory and practice of 'muscular Christianity'¹⁶ in which the notion of character featured strongly. It was not until the present century that physical education once more began to be seen as a means of bringing about the 'goals' of general

education as they related to the developing 'total person'. It was left to Williams¹⁷ who had been influenced considerably by Dewey, to sound a more contemporary note and state unequivocally that:

Education through the physical will be judged, therefore, even as education of life will be judged—by the contribution it makes to fine living.

Since 1930, when these words were written, the idea of education 'through' movement has continued to gather ground. Kane,¹⁸ in an examination of the literature to do with physical education found that among the 'purposes' most frequently mentioned in connection with it were emotional stability, self-realization, leisure-time pursuits, social competence, moral development, organic development, motor skills, aesthetic appreciation and cognitive development. It will be seen that these findings are somewhat diverse and range from the broadest of 'aims' to the narrowest of 'objectives'. The important question for the instrumentalist, however, is not to ask whether activities are done for their own intrinsic values, but whether as a result of them being done in a certain way and with appropriate guidance, they do or can be made to assist in the bringing about of ends which are considered desirable. If in other words movement activities in the form of extrinsic values can be shown to be a good means of helping to further educational endeavours then there is good reason for including them in the curriculum apart from whatever intrinsic values they may have of their own.

Andrews in arguing along these lines through what he called the 'supportable' evidence, concluded that the following areas were tenable as curricula 'aims':¹⁹

- 1 The promotion of cognitive development;
- 2 The promotion of aesthetic education;
- 3 The promotion of moral education;
- 4 The promotion of social relationships;
- 5 The promotion of education for leisure;
- 6 The promotion of fitness for 'positive living'.

Although one may have some qualms in many instances about what can be claimed on behalf of physical education as an instrument of general education in view of the inconclusiveness of the relevant evidence available there is little doubt that in some of the more finite areas it is a good if not the best way of realizing them. In that health, for example, is a precondition of education and organic

fitness contributes to its achievement, it is clear that there is no substitute for the taking of exercise²⁰ and that in the school situation physical education has responsibility for seeing that it is taken in a responsible and profitable way.

According to Jahoda,²¹ 'positive' health too, not just the absence of disease, is bound up with the ability to play and to physically cope with the environment. This, as Jahoda recognizes, is associated not only with the acquisition of skills in order to do what has to be done but with the confidence that comes from their mastery. To the extent indeed that organic fitness and the development of motor skills are the *sine qua non* of most people's health and pleasure and that physical education activities can bring them about they should be pursued as instrumental values. As Barrow observes: 'It matters little whether we call such activity educational or not. What is of importance is the claim that this is something that we ought to be concerned with in relation to children.'²²

It would be possible to expand upon the considerable empirical evidence assembled by writers like Arnold,²³ Rarick²⁴ and Cratty²⁵ that indicates how effective a means physical education *can* be in promoting desirable general outcomes to do with health, growth and development, but rather than do this—since as Taylor²⁶ points out what is actually accomplished is always dependent upon 'a set of transactions' between the teacher and learner—I propose instead to outline in principle how, even in those intellectual areas to do with knowledge and understanding, the dimension of education 'through' movement can be of value.

It has been suggested that the notion of education 'through' movement is an adaptable and flexible one. The purpose now is to indicate that even within academically orientated areas of the curriculum it can still be profitably employed. Here it will entail the intelligent utilization of those situations that arise, or can intentionally be made to arise, in the teaching of physical activities that can assist in being initiated into what are sometimes spoken of as the basic forms of awareness. Thus education 'through' movement can be made to relate to education in at least two main ways:

- (i) It can be 'illustrative' of something that has arisen in another context;
- (ii) It can throw up problems and issues of its own which are unlikely to be resolved unless they are 'referred back' to one or more of the basic forms of knowledge.

For the sake of convenience I will call respectively these two main ways of relating education 'through' movement to an academic type

* For a detailed account of physical education in the Hellenistic Age see Marrou, H. I. *A History of Education in Antiquity* (Mentor, 1956), pp. 165–86.

of curriculum based upon the forms of knowledge as the 'illustrative function' and the 'referrent function'.

1 *The Illustrative Function.* The illustrative function is perhaps best understood in terms of the question 'How can I, the teacher, get children to better understand what they have learnt in the classroom through the active use of their bodies or through the concomitant activities that form a part of physical education?'

It may be, for example, that mechanical principles arising in science can be put to the test and made more meaningful by the pupils using themselves or their fellows as subjects. In such activities as athletics, diving, trampolining and gymnastics, theory can be transformed into practice. The track, pool and gymnasium can become an extension of the laboratory. Apart from the possibility of transforming something inert and abstract into something fresh and meaningful, the utilization of one's self in learning in the form of the body can have several other effects which can assist the growth of knowledge and understanding. It can help 'personalize' knowledge;²⁷ it can give a new perspective on the same material; it can help illuminate and give a greater insight into what in a sense is already 'known'; and it can act as a secondary reinforcing process.

2 *The Referrent Function.* The referrent function, like the illustrative function, is best understood in terms of a question. Let us take the activity of dance. It may be that at some stage in a lesson the question will arise 'What is it that makes dance dance?' It is not long before a host of other questions are raised to do with such notions as expression, rhythm, line, form, illusion, and so on. It is inevitable if such questions persist that one is led back into that branch of knowledge called aesthetics.

A second example of the referrent function can arise in the case of games. In this situation it may happen that a question like 'Why is it necessary to have rules?' will be asked. If the educationist is to take the query seriously it may lead on to a consideration of the purpose of rules, their function and their justification or otherwise. Such concepts as freedom, equality and justice, it will be seen, are related to such notions as 'sportsmanship' and 'fairplay' and are as applicable on the field of play no less than off it. The point here is that when regarded instrumentally games and what goes on in them need not remain morally neutral, or as 'self-contained' activities which they are sometimes made out to be, and which have no bearing on the world outside them. Certainly it is unlikely that educators like Arnold of Rugby and Kurt Hahn would have viewed games and

sports with such favour unless they were able to see in them an efficacious means whereby such character-building qualities as determination, self-reliance and courage could be brought about. It is possible that there is more in the claim than is generally acknowledged that the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. Games then, it is being maintained, can be (but of course need not be) looked upon as a useful medium through which pupils can be encouraged to consider and act upon, ethical values. From the midst of sporting engagement can come the moral injunction 'What ought I to do?' The question calls for executive decision-making not armchair deliberation. The question is real, not hypothetical and has to be dealt with in concrete terms. The schoolboy touch-judge, desperate for his team to win, sees his wing three-quarter about to score after putting his foot out of play. To raise the flag or not to raise the flag? The choice is his. Action is required. Opportunities like this are many in physical education. They are important for moral development because they provide situations for thought and will to be combined with responsible action. Such factors, together with those of empathy and a consideration for others are, according to Wilson,²⁸ the necessary components without which a person cannot be said to be fully morally educated. Far then from being removed from reality, games, if intelligently handled, although physically 'bound' by time and space, need not be cognitively bound by the same factors. The lessons that can be learnt from them can be made to relate in an open ended way to the issues and problems that lie outside them. In the hands of a gifted teacher the activities of games need not be more self-contained *per se* than any other family or class of activities. This, it seems to me, can be upheld regardless of whether or not one accepts the arguments that have been put forward most recently by Keating²⁹ and Aspin³⁰ that sport and games are in and of themselves partially concerned with moral considerations.

It has been maintained that the instrumental use of physical activities in the curriculum can be justified if they can be shown to serve the interests and purposes of education. By capitalizing upon their 'illustrative' and 'referential' possibilities the teacher can contribute in new and exciting ways to the quality and coherence of what is learnt. Thus just as Caldwell Cook³¹ transformed the teaching of English through play activities so other educationists such as Dienes³² have found that a subject like mathematics can be better grasped by many pupils through the use of such activities as games and dance. Perhaps enough has been said to suggest that physical education or education 'through' movement in principle and in

practice, can and frequently does serve, directly and indirectly, the purposes of education. The degree to which physical activities can be instrumentally used to effect desirable outcomes will always to one extent or another be dependent upon the intention, knowledge, imagination and skill of the teacher. All in all the dimension of education 'through' movement is best conceived of as being that part of the educational process which aims to enhance and harmonize the physical, intellectual, social and emotional aspects of a growing individual chiefly through professionally selected and directed physical activities.

Dimension III. Education 'in' Movement

Education 'about' movement has been characterized as being to do with movement as a field or theoretical body of knowledge that can be academically studied in a disinterested way, whereas education 'through' movement, it has been suggested, is to do with the justifiable utilization of that family of physical activities, known normally as physical education, which with intelligent teaching can be made to serve values which are not necessarily intrinsic to them. In this third dimension of education, *in* movement, the concern is with the values that are an inherent part of the activities themselves. To put the matter another way: education 'in' movement upholds the view that movement activities, especially when looked at from the 'inside' or participatory perspective of the moving agent, are in and of themselves worthwhile. What makes them educationally desirable is that they permit the person to actualize his self in a set of distinctive and bodily orientated contexts and thereby allow him to learn a great deal about himself and the world in which he lives.

Before going on to say something further in relation to the educative dimension of 'in' movement it will be appreciated that education, when employed in its evaluative sense, implies:

- (i) That it concerns having respect for the person as an embodied consciousness;
- (ii) That it involves becoming acquainted with a number of activities ('physical' as well as 'intellectual') that are in themselves worthwhile;
- (iii) That the processes (or means) employed to bring about achievements (or capacities) are morally defensible.

It will be seen then that education like 'the good life' will be a 'mixed' life. It will comprise a plurality of inherently worthwhile activities which are not only recognized to be of value in an 'objective' sense but found to be so in a 'subjective' sense. They are both

'good-in-themselves' and 'good-for-me'. To be in an educative situation is to be caught up in a qualitative process of becoming. It is not just a question of pursuing activities considered valuable in a perfunctory or prudential way, but of entering into them for their own sakes as meaningful and satisfying enterprises. Although as Wilson³³ points out the process of education (in contrast to just learning or schooling) can only proceed through someone having interest, it should not be thought that interest exists as a sort of independent and free-ranging commodity. Always interest suggests an interest *in* something, and in terms of education it means having an interest in something that is worthwhile. Dewey helped clarify the nature of interest and the fact that, like consciousness, it is always 'intentional' towards something when he wrote:

Interest is not some one thing; it is a name for the fact that a course of action, an occupation, or pursuit absorbs the powers of an individual in a thorough-going way. But an activity cannot go on in a void. It requires material, subject-matter, conditions upon which to operate. On the other hand, it requires certain tendencies, habits, powers on the part of the self. Wherever there is genuine interest, there is an identification of these two things. The person acting finds his own well-being bound up with the development of an object to its own issue. If the activity goes a certain way, then a subject-matter is carried to a certain result, and a person achieves a certain satisfaction.³⁴

What should be made clear is that although education in relation to the concept of movement is partially explicated by reference to the dimensions of 'about' and 'through' movement, neither is centrally concerned with movement as a family of meaning laden activities and processes which are of interest in themselves and worth engaging in for the intrinsic values they contain and sources of satisfaction they offer. It is not that either of the dimensions of 'about' or 'through' are irrelevant to or out of keeping with the notion of 'in' movement. On the contrary both inevitably feed into it and in their different ways help illuminate it. The dimensions of the concept of movement then are conceptually discrete but functionally related. Each dimension is not exclusive of the others, but overlaps and merges into them. The concept of movement is a mutually reinforcing and inter-dependent one. Like a triangle, it has different points of emphasis which come into prominence at different times. If movement were conceived of only in intellectualistic terms or what can be propositionally stated about it, it would be but a hived-off and disembodied academic pursuit. Similarly, if movement was seen only as a means of serving ends other

than its own it would remain purely instrumental in character and not worthy of being educative in its own right. For the curriculum implications of the concept of movement to be grasped in an adequate way it must be seen not only as a field of study, and as an instrumental value, but as a worthwhile group of physical activities to be engaged in for their own sake.

It will be seen that although 'in' movement is largely to do with 'knowing how' to engage in physical activities and in having a direct and lived-body 'acquaintance' of them, the mover who is the author of his movement actions can enrich and bring greater understanding to what he does by a knowledge of 'what is the case', just as he can help realize them by an informed appreciation of appropriate means. There is thus no artificial divide between the dimensions. The notion of 'in' movement without the employment of some rational knowledge would be intellectually vacuous just as without some utilization of movement as means it would fail to reach certain of its objectives.

The notion of education 'in' movement then is not a self-contained or distinct entity. Although it emphasizes the process of moving it relates to and draws upon the other dimensions at different times and in varying degrees according to the situation in hand. To acknowledge this, however, is in no way to detract from movement as a family of whole-bodied activities in which the person can meaningfully engage for no other reason than that he finds them intrinsically rewarding. They are, for everyone, potentially in and of themselves interesting and satisfying. They permit the person to actualize the physical dimensions of his being in the form of developed capacities, skilled accomplishments and objective achievements that are in themselves worthwhile. They provide consciously embodied exemplifications of a culture's sporting and dancing heritage that no other subject in the curriculum attempts. Movement in the meeting of its own internal rules, standards and traditions is in and of itself educative. It is in no need of a qualifying suffix as in the term 'physical education'. Just as it is redundant to speak of English education or mathematics education so it is equally redundant to speak of movement education. An initiation into the paradigm instances of movement whether sport, dance or outdoor activities, is inherently valuable and therefore should form a part of any humanistically based programme of education. What gives them their importance and distinctiveness is that they are 'body-orientated', culturally significant and synoetically meaningful activities.

The dimension of education 'in' movement upholds the view that

movement activities should be done for what they are. If they are only looked upon as 'objects' of study no matter how valuable this may prove to be, one is not entering into the nature of the activities themselves. If one studies muscle fatigue, one is doing physiology. If one studies body-mechanics, one is doing physics. If one studies games as an aspect of society, one is doing sociology. Somehow movement as an activity and as a process entered into for its own sake gets neglected. Locke, concerned by the growing tendency in America to study sport and use it as a means to other ends rather than participate in it for what it is, laments:

To love and teach sport because it is human and beautiful, full of its own meanings and its own absurdity, has been denied us. We have had to struggle up-hill, like Sisyphus, to make sport something that it cannot be. Thus, sport seems sometimes to fail us, not because of what it is, but because of what we have asked it to become.³⁵

Peters understands better than most the question of getting on the 'inside' of activities and the difficulties of the educator in getting children to take up activities for what they are. He writes:

Now anyone who has managed to get on the inside of what is passed on in schools and universities, such as science, music, art, carpentry, literature, history, and athletics, will regard it as somehow ridiculous to be asked what the point of his activity is. 'The mastery of the "language" carries with it its own delights, or 'intrinsic motivation,' to use the jargon. But for a person on the outside it may be difficult to see what point there is in the activity in question. Hence the incredulity of the uninitiated when confronted with the rhapsodies of the mountain-climber, musician, or golfer. Children are to a large extent in the position of such outsiders. The problem is to introduce them to a civilized outlook and activities for which they have aptitude.³⁶

In conclusion it should be clear from what has been said that if movement is to be conceived of as being more than just a portion of reality to be studied or as a means to serve purposes extrinsic to itself, it must be entered into for its own sake. Only then can its intrinsic worth be experienced; its inherent values made manifest. The world of movement for the agent or the moving being, is a world of promise towards self-actualization. It can expand his conscious horizons. It is a world in which the mover can come to understand an aspect of his socio-cultural world and in doing so discover more perfectly his self and his existential circumstances. To deny this world of bodily action and meaning because of prejudice or neglect is to deny the possibility of becoming more fully human.

If, finally, there is need to state what unsought after advantages are possible or likely to accompany an education 'in' movement, I would, in the light of what has been discussed in this book suggest the following:

- 1 That the person's organic fitness and overall health will be improved;
- 2 That the person's range of physical skills and accomplishments will be increased as will his knowledge and understanding of them;
- 3 That the person's kinaesthetic perception will be extended and refined in such a way that this aspect of his consciousness will be considerably enriched;
- 4 That the person will be more aesthetically aware and more sensitized towards his own movements as distinctive sources of aesthetic experience;
- 5 That the person will be able to appreciate more fully the range, intricacy and subtlety of non-verbal interpersonal perception and communication;
- 6 That the person will because of the need for choice, involvement and commitment in movement situations become more firmly established in his identity;
- 7 That the person when engaged in authentic actional projects will be able to experience himself as a total, holistic and synthesized acting-thinking-feeling-willing-being: in short as a unitary embodied consciousness;
- 8 That the person because he has been touched by the spirit of 'sportsmanship' and all that this implies about fellowship and the quality of relations with others, will become more morally conscious and socially responsible;
- 9 That the person when caught up in and absorbed by what he is doing will be more open to the possibility of 'peak' moments, whereby he will be able to discover what it is to be self-actualized and thereby experience new and value-laden forms of existential meaning.

It will be seen then, somewhat paradoxically, that many of the benefits of an education 'in' movement can come about not because they are consciously formulated objectives but because they are fortuitous and invaluable by-products that arise as a natural consequence of what is done.

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Glossary of Phenomenological Terms

APPERCEPTION. The spontaneous interpretation of sensory perception in terms of past experiences and previously acquired knowledge of the perceived object.

ATTENTION.* Active attention rests in the full alertness and the sharpness of apperception connected with consciously turning toward an object, etc., combined with further considerations and anticipations, etc., of its characteristics and uses. An act of attention is a 'free act' of willfully and selectively turning toward, or alertly paying attention to, certain features, objects, etc., in the actual given environment at a specific moment.

ATTITUDE. A general posture or stance taken toward larger spheres of life and interest, including a particular 'style' of thinking, for example: the common-sense attitude; the scientific attitude.

BRACKETING.* A methodological device of phenomenological inquiry consisting in a deliberate effort to set all ontological judgements about the 'nature' and 'essence' of things, events, etc., aside. Thereby, the 'reality' of things and events is not denied but 'put into brackets'. This procedure makes the mental processes of experiencing into the central subject matter of phenomenology.

CONSTITUTION.* The term refers to the constitution of thought objects (cogitata) and indicates the processes of clarification of meaning, establishment of meaning context, and mobilization of prior knowledge concerning specific objects of the ongoing conscious life. It is a cumulative process in which the cognitive results of repeated experiences of the 'same object' are deposited ('sedimented') in the mind.

EIDETIC APPROACH. The main level of phenomenological inquiry. It serves the establishment of the 'essential' features and characteristics of concrete objects of apperception. Eidetic features of thought objects consist of general meanings as constituted by cognitive processes.

EPOCHÉ. The suspension of belief in the ontological characteristics of

* The thirteen definitions marked with an asterisk are the work of Helmut R. Wagner and are reproduced from *On Phenomenology and Social Relations* with his permission and that of the publishers, the University of Chicago Press.

6. Education, Movement and the Curriculum

The Place of Movement in a Curriculum of General Education

The major concern in writing this book has been with an exploration of the concept of movement, especially that dimension of it which is to do with the person as agent engaged *in* movement. It is the task now to say something about movement in relation to education and in particular say something about its place in the curriculum. Before doing this, however, a preliminary comment needs to be made in order to understand in general terms what follows.

Underlying any serious attempt to characterize what education is or what should go into the curriculum are two fundamental questions: 'What is it to be a person?' and, 'How can what is being suggested help the person to actualize himself along lines that are in keeping with the good life?' Any programme of curricula activities is likely to founder, no matter how impressive its superstructure, unless it can provide satisfactory answers to these questions. It will be appreciated, for example, that the person who is conceived 'dualistically' as opposed to 'holistically' is likely to affect the very aims and content of the educational enterprise—separating, distorting, emphasizing, ignoring as the case may be. Many intellectually biased forms of education are not only based upon dualistic assumptions, even if they are not always acknowledged, but have difficulty in seeing that the good life is made up of more than the pursuit of truth. What then is needed in education and curriculum planning if persons are to fulfil themselves and change in some way for the better is a rounded and balanced programme of activities that call upon all those forms of life that have significance in human affairs.

At the present time there are two influential formulations of what

the curricula should contain. The first is the one constructed by Phenix;¹ the second is the one largely based upon the work of Hirst.² It is the former that I propose to look at further whilst at the same time making some comments about the latter.

In his *Realms of Meaning*, Phenix recognizes that a curriculum for general education must take account of the idea of logical patterns of disciplined understanding but at the same time not be exclusively bound by them. He sets out by stating that he wishes to avoid two temptations.

- (i) To return to a traditional subject-matter curriculum related neither to the needs or ability of the individual learner nor to the social and psychological factors affecting education;
- (ii) To construe knowledge too narrowly in purely intellectualistic terms.³

The full development of human beings, he maintains, 'requires education in a variety of realms of meaning rather than in a single type of rationality'.⁴ Certainly on this point he has the support of Reid⁵ who has argued that man comes to know and experience in a variety of ways and that not all of them are reducible to a positional formulation of them.

What makes Phenix's approach to the curriculum particularly commendable is that he recognizes that it should be based upon a conception of the person that is holistic and not 'just a collection of parts'.⁶ Also, instead of placing rational autonomy at the centre of the educational enterprise he emphasizes more the notion of *meaning*. If such ideas as 'reason' and 'mind' are too narrowly construed as referring to the processes of logical thinking, he contends, the life of feeling, conscience and imagination suffer, the outcome of which is a one-sided and emasculated form of development. By adopting the word meaning he hopes to overcome some of the criticisms that I have laid against some of the more traditional approaches to education.

Meaning, Phenix suggests, has four dimensions.⁷ The first is that of *experience* which pertains to human consciousness and its peculiar quality of reflectiveness, or self-awareness. It recognizes that the inner life of testimony and direct objectification are no less valuable in our knowledge of what it is to be human than the knowledge about man which arises from scientific interpretations based upon inference. The second is that of *rule, logic or principle* which helps characterize and differentiate between the various