

19. GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP AND PEACE

Nigel Dower

INTRODUCTION

If in the 1960s someone asked what being a global citizen was all about the chances are that the answer would have been 'getting involved in the campaign to ban the bomb'; working to alleviate poverty in the third world might have been mentioned but protecting the environment – possibly the area most people would think of first nowadays – would not have been thought of. Since 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear annihilation has receded in popular consciousness (though it has certainly not gone away). Although there are a few still active in the 'peace movement', most people – even amongst those who think of themselves as world citizens – would not focus on peace issues. What I hope to show in this chapter is that campaigning to get rid of nuclear weapons (though in my opinion still an important goal) is only a small part of what *promoting* peace is all about and that working for the conditions of peace remains – and should be seen to remain – an important area of concern for anyone who takes the global point of view. There are many ways we either contribute or fail to contribute towards the promotion of peace – ways we may not always recognise as such or see as manifestations of global citizenship.

1. WHY PEACE IS IMPORTANT

There is something paradoxical about peace and global citizenship. If global citizenship involves the active exercise of responsibility by individual global citizens, it is not immediately obvious to most people what individuals ought to do (except in times of war when people are called up). War and peace are so much in the domain of international relations conducted by the representatives of states that the contribution of individuals seems marginal or intangible. By

contrast, with concerns like the environment, aid and human rights it is relatively easy to identify things that engaged world citizens might do – like recycling waste, sending money to charities or engaging in a letter campaign.

And yet there is a sense in which peace is fundamental compared with aid, human rights and the environment because peace is the precondition of other goods, and the duty to promote peace is correspondingly fundamental. This may not initially be obvious, since in another sense peace is not more fundamental. From the point of view of an individual, having enough food/shelter/clothing (subsistence), having a basically sound environment (resource-full and healthy), and having a basic liberty to give effect to one's choices may be equally important as personal security (freedom from attack on one's person and property), since all are preconditions of whatever kind of life one wants to lead – whatever 'conception of the good' one may pursue (to use the terminology in John Rawls' seminal work *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls 1972)). But in so far as humans can *cooperate* to create and maintain the conditions under which these goods are achieved for individuals, there has to be a set of relationships which constitute the conditions of peace between individuals. In conditions of war and conflict aid cannot be effectively delivered; the protection of human rights is undermined; efforts to protect the environment are largely thwarted (especially in war, where the environment is one of the first casualties). In other words, the capacity for human beings to support one another in the provision of these basic goods depends crucially on certain conditions of communication, cooperation and the absence of arbitrary thwarting of interests.

It is interesting to note that Hobbes insisted that the primary law of our nature (*lex naturalis*) was to seek peace as a condition in which there was not merely no 'battle' or period of active warfare but a period of time in which there was no disposition to go to battle (or war, as we would say (Hobbes 1991)). He believed that this could only be achieved within political communities under a strong rule of law from the sovereign but thought that international relations were inherently warlike. Although Hobbes was right to see peace as more than merely the absence of overt conflict and to recognise that it was important for us to achieve peace in this sense if we can, he was unduly pessimistic about the need for coercion to achieve domestic peace within nations and about his assessment of international relations. Indeed, even on his terms people cannot really live at peace in a state if there is always the possibility and sometimes the actuality of conflict between their state and other states. Kant recognised this and argued that if real, 'perpetual' peace is to be achieved it requires a transformation of international relations so that not only is there peace within states but permanent peace between them: for this, various 'articles of peace' would need to be agreed in a federation of states (Kant 1970). Both saw that peace, to the extent that it was achievable, was of the utmost importance as the social precondition for the achievement of the well-being of individuals.

Despite the fact, then, that working for peace does not seem to be the first thing that people think of when thinking of global citizenship (and it is striking that relatively little attention has been paid to this dimension in recent literature), there is a case for its centrality in discussions of global citizenship. We can first indicate this by looking at ordinary citizenship and membership of a political community, both because the parallel with ordinary citizenship is instructive and because a focus on this helps to dispel the idea that the issues of war and peace are simply remote from individuals. Since peace is a crucial feature of social life, the issues of war and conflict/violence (a second contrast to peace) are of immediate importance to us all.

2. PARALLEL WITH ORDINARY CITIZENSHIP

First of all, we in fact generally recognise a duty, both morally and legally, to uphold peace/order. This is done through a variety of activities. Unless our only motive for obeying the law is fear of punishment, we assert the value of peace by obeying the law and encouraging the same in others. This does not mean we have to be uncritical of laws, especially if some laws are in fact divisive and reinforcing of inequality and civil disobedience – breaking the law conscientiously for moral or religious reasons in order to change the law is perfectly consistent with the spirit of this position, if conducted under certain clearly defined conditions (Rawls 1972: ch. 55–9; Singer 1993: ch. 11). Second, and more generally, there are various ways of promoting the conditions of peace. If, as I remarked above, some laws are themselves socially divisive or violate the rights of social groups (where violation is itself a form of violence) then working to change them through political processes is in a sense working for peace (though it may not be described in those terms). Third, an important aspect of promoting peace is respecting cultural diversity and upholding the values underpinning a multicultural society in modern pluralistic societies; this shows itself particularly in attitudes of mutual acceptance between different religious groups. Fourth, working in private capacities or through bodies such as citizens' advice bureaux or racial equality councils to uphold people's legal rights is an important aspect of upholding the framework of rights. This, whatever other values it protects, helps to maintain the conditions of peace. Finally, and most generally, the use by oneself and the encouragement in others of dialogue/negotiation/consensus-building as a way of reaching agreements or resolving conflicts is a basic manifestation of a commitment to peace and to creating the 'culture of peace'. (This perception was, for instance, reflected in the fact that the year 2000 was declared the UN International Year for the Culture of Peace.)

The attitudes and practice indicated here are not merely important for the maintenance of the conditions of peace within societies. They are linked to similar attitudes and practices in relation to the rest of the world. They are linked both in the sense that they already indicate a range of attitudes and

practices to be replicated at a global level and in the sense that if they are well-established within a society they already form the basis for the extension to the global level. How, then, does all this translate into the global level?

3. PEACE AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL

Global citizenship expresses itself through a wide variety of activities: (i) the private activities of individuals (who do what they do because they consider themselves members of a world community or as promoting global causes): for instance, developing and maintaining personal links (like penfriends in other countries, keeping in contact with people one meets from abroad) or encouraging the development of appropriate global citizenship values and attitudes in other people *in one's own society* through cosmopolitan education (Nussbaum 1996); (ii) involvement in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (which themselves engage in many kinds of activities like political lobbying, education, fostering cultural exchanges, civil disobedience): working for interfaith dialogue and the development of a global ethic of mutual tolerance such as the *Declaration Toward a Global Ethic* of the Parliament of the World's Religions (Küng and Kuschel 1993), working within peace organisations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation or within organisations devoted to promoting conceptions of development and environmental responsibility which are seen as conducive to peace; (iii) political lobbying, joining political parties with a view to advancing international peace agendas.

This is a brief indication of the *forms* which the expression global citizenship can take, which are discussed more fully in other parts of this reader. The examples given, however, illustrate a number of general points about the ways global citizenship can be expressed. Activities like keeping up with a penfriend from abroad illustrate a feature of many appropriate actions and while the development of such links throughout the world is generally conducive to peace it is hardly the *reason* why people do what they do: contributing to peace may be a by-product of other activities. Working towards an agreed global ethic or for adequate conceptions of development and environmental responsibility are not as such focused on peace but on other global goals which constitute the conditions of peace: peace is the goal but under various guises. Working for interfaith dialogue in one's own community also illustrates another important feature of a goal like peace: global peace is in large measure (though not entirely) constituted by local peace or rather many local peaces. Finally, it is worth remarking that only one of the above activities actually works through the *concept* of global citizenship – namely the promotion of cosmopolitan education in schools. All the activities may be done by people who think of themselves as world citizens but most do not make it their explicit goal.

In the remainder of this chapter I will examine one key area to do with peace, namely foreign policy, and indicate some background conditions which are relevant to the pursuit of peace.

4. FOREIGN POLICY

There are at least three dimensions to foreign policy relevant to peace and the possible involvement of citizens in promoting it: first, the country's armaments policy; second, its particular responses to particular conflicts; and third, the general tenor of its foreign policy in terms of promoting or undermining the conditions of peace.

Thus (i) a global citizen might work for nuclear disarmament by political campaigning, going on demonstrations and vigils, or engaging in civil disobedience as with the current Trident Ploughshares initiative. The latter involves peace activists who seek to draw attention to the wrongness of a defence policy based on Trident nuclear submarines by illegally entering submarine bases. (ii) A person might be opposed to a particular military conflict as many were in the UK over the war in the Gulf in 1991 or Kosovo in 1999 and take various forms of action in response. (iii) Again, someone might work against the prevailing tendency to 'demonise' the enemy, in time of war (or during the Cold War) or the tendency to polarise the world into friends and enemies, for instance seeing Islam as the enemy, as the notorious Huntington thesis had it (Huntington 1996), rather than recognising that Islamic countries and cultures should not be tarred with the brush of our perception of militant Islam. Another example of a general approach would be if someone who thought that North-South inequalities or the dynamics of greed underlying modern materialist development were among the background causes of conflict were to campaign for changes of attitude in foreign policy (and in public attitudes more generally) *partly* for the sake of peace – though, of course, for many other reasons as well.

I do not expect all others to accept that these forms of action are necessarily right or appropriate. The examples are chosen deliberately to make the point: what someone does as a global citizen may not be regarded as right by others. (i) Others may not approve of using the *means* of civil disobedience in stopping the Trident submarine programme or may disagree with the *end/goal* of nuclear disarmament on the grounds that such peace as can be achieved in the world requires some (responsible) nuclear states. (ii) Others may think that the Gulf War and its mode of operation was justified as contributing to the containment of dictatorships and the development of peace conditions in the long run. (iii) A different reading of the geopolitical facts of the Middle East might see the Islamic threat as inevitable and therefore needing to be confronted and not avoided in a soft liberal pluralist compromise. North-South inequalities may not as such be seen as a cause for conflict (though extreme poverty might need to be tackled) and economic growth may be seen as the engine of prosperity which is in turn the condition of peace.

The point is that if a person acts with a concern for peace in the world as a whole, and operates through a variety of institutions with a view to influencing things, then she acts as a global citizen with a commitment to peace.

Whilst obviously, from any particular point of view, certain forms of action will be better than others – both in terms of appropriate means and in terms of the kinds of goals pursued (linked to different conceptions of peace) – the general claim can I think be made that it is better overall if more people are actively concerned about peace at a global level (whatever their views) than if fewer people are.

In this context global citizenship is doubly normative. First, it is normative in that what people advocate in the name of global citizenship will be a particular set of prescriptions based on their values and their reading of the world and what will be effective in it. Second, it is normative in that there are arguments for saying that it is a good thing that people think that they are global citizens and for encouraging others to think so as well, whatever their views. 'Whatever their views' needs qualification, since there will be limits on what global citizens would regard as reasonable views to be encouraged in other global citizens if we regard the spread of global citizenship thinking to be important. The limits will vary from person to person, depending on one's own global values. Thus most global citizens would not welcome someone who advocated neo-Nazi views or a disregard for human poverty in the name of some extreme ecological worldview (such as 'ecofascism'), even if they did advocate them as global values; though even here a culture which *allows* the expression of such views is more likely to encourage the critical development of global perspectives which are progressive than one in which they are suppressed. Again, a member of a 'pro-life' organisation is unlikely to welcome what a member of the International Planned Parenthood Federation does and vice versa, even if members of each think of themselves as global citizens.

We can, however, despite this fluidity of what is or is not endorsed by global citizens, indicate broadly what approaches to war and peace are *inconsistent* with *any* global citizenship approach. First, someone who advocated a 'realist' view of international relations or foreign policy would regard 'ethics' as irrelevant to such considerations: foreign policy is shaped by strategic interests and although peace as the absence of war may often be preferable from the point of view of national interests, war may sometimes be seen as expedient and 'the continuation of politics by other means' (Clausewitz). Since global ethics are irrelevant, global citizenship is too. Second, on the 'internationalist' view, even if one thinks that moral norms do (and should) determine the behaviour of states, the role of individuals is largely irrelevant to such matters, since the 'morality of states' operates at the level of agreements amongst states. The pursuit of peace is a matter for state-level negotiation and diplomacy, not something for citizens to get involved in. Third, whatever theories one might have about international relations, one might have a general pessimism about human nature as selfish and about the fragility of the human condition which renders working for peace as a 'global goal' a futile exercise. Global citizenship requires a degree of optimism about the possibility of progress which may simply be denied.

5. BACKGROUND CONDITIONS FOR THE MORE EFFECTIVE REALISATION OF PRIMARY ACTIVITIES

Here I am thinking of a range of activities which, if engaged in, will make one a more effective global citizen because one will be informed by adequate information about the world, will have properly worked-out values, an adequate conception of peace and appropriate attitudes. Amongst these, I should mention briefly the following:

5(i) Interest in the rest of the world

This is the recognition of the importance of being globally educated (including proper knowledge of the United Nations). Whatever else is necessary, like appropriate attitudes and moral commitments, one needs to know the *facts* about the world – knowledge of other cultures, the realities of aid, the role of transnational companies, the causes of conflict and so on. As Nussbaum remarks, it is not enough to know about the world in an abstract way: detailed knowledge of other cultures is important, both because the knowledge is practically important and because in knowing how other people live one can understand oneself better – what is essential to being human and what is accidental or contingently true of one's being American, British or Indian (Nussbaum 1996).

5(ii) Thinking about the nature of ethics at a global level

Although, of course, some would dispute this way of thinking about ethics, it seems to be important that one explicitly acknowledges the *global* dimension to ethics. In this way it becomes clear that one's interest in peace is properly ethical, that it is based on a concern for the value of peace for anyone in the world, not just for oneself or one's own country. If one took the latter view, one's interest in the conditions of peace would turn out to be largely, if not wholly, prudential or self-interested. One idea I find attractive is that of R. M. Hare who once argued that an ethical theory based on the primacy of individual human interests could avoid the dangers of nationalism (putting the interests of people in one's own nation first) and fanaticism (setting up abstract ideals as more important than the interests of people) (Hare 1972). If, as I have argued in Chapter 11 of this reader, a global ethic stresses the importance of a common core of values, the equal status of all human beings and the idea of global responsibility, then it underscores the point that if local peace is valuable to people in particular places, local peace anywhere is equally important to others and therefore global peace is an object of endeavour. Not all global ethics, however, will have the same emphases; as I note elsewhere, a global ethic with a dogmatic proselytising agenda might well not be a good basis for the promotion of peace.

5(iii) Interest in the conditions of peace and conceptions of peace

Peace is not a simple concept (Curle 1981; MacQuarrie 1973). Unless we settle for a very superficial idea of peace as the 'absence of war', we need to understand the inner dynamics of peace and war/violence. One suggestion I have found useful is that of Iredell Jenkins who argued that amongst the conditions of peace is the development of divided loyalties (Jenkins 1973). Suppose people have different loyalties, for example to their country but also to other groups such as their church, their professional community, sporting fraternity, members of international NGOs (or even, I would add, loyalty as global citizens to the global community itself). Suppose also that the membership of these groups which these loyalties involve do not coincide. One is less likely to go to war in response to one of one's loyalties if this means fighting members of other groups one has loyalty to.

Those like MacQuarrie and Curle who advocate a more positive conception of peace (as opposed to a 'negative' conception as the absence of war or violence) wish to stress the links with the idea of wholeness and harmony (suggested, for instance, by the word 'shalom') (MacQuarrie 1973) and with moral values which are integral to peace in a richer sense. Peace is not something which just happens; it is sustained by positive actions themselves informed by moral values. In particular the idea of justice is stressed, since a peace which is maintained in the face of continuing injustice is not a real peace and is not in the long run sustainable (Curle 1981).

Whilst, of course, very different views can be held about what peace means and what the conditions are for peace, it is reasonable to suppose that peace is more likely to be achieved the more people are willing to give thought to its nature and causes.

5(iv) Understanding the bases of multiculturalism

This is linked to all three dimensions above – knowledge of the world, global values and an understanding of peace itself – but is worth singling out because of its importance and controversial character. Hans Küng once argued: 'there will be no peace in the world without peace among the religions; there will be no peace among the religions without dialogue between them' (Küng 1991; Chapter 10 in this reader). Differences in religious faith are not, of course, the only source of conflict between different cultural groups but they are a powerful potential source of conflict and illustrate the challenge raised. The challenge is to see how to get those within different cultural groups to engage in dialogue rather than confrontation and to recognise that common values such as peace are better served this way than otherwise.

One aspect of this is the recognition that whilst it is reasonable to seek a common core of mutually acceptable values, it is not reasonable to expect those with different worldviews – religious or philosophical – to accept one's

own worldview. Thus we may seek a common global ethic as a set of shared values whilst accepting a diversity of global ethics as theories or 'source stories' (Dower 1998).

However, matters are complicated by the fact that this way of putting the challenge may itself be challenged. Why should the presumption be that peace is more important than the promotion of one's values or beliefs or, more to the point, more important than opposing the values and beliefs of other groups that one believes to be seriously in error? An important issue is raised here, both of general significance and of relevance to our understanding of global citizenship and peace. Clearly a middle way needs to be found between confronting all beliefs and practices which are at all different from our own and tolerating everything. Few people will try and accommodate those who preach racism, strident nationalism or fanaticism. It is a matter – a difficult matter – of determining where to draw the line between mutual acceptance of diversity and the need, in terms of one's moral values and religious beliefs, to confront what lies beyond the pale of the reasonable. On the other hand, it seems clear that most of what counts as cultural differences should fall within the realm of accommodation and mutual acceptance. The need for this is important at the global level, both for its own sake and also, as Nussbaum has argued, because it provides the proper universal basis for grounding multiculturalism within a pluralist society as well (Nussbaum 1996).

CONCLUSION

Global citizenship cannot involve an unqualified commitment to peace. Peace may always be a long-term goal, even if war and conflict occur in the short term. As Augustine said, we wage war for the sake of peace, we do not have peace in order to go to war (Augustine 1947: bk xix ch. xii). But peace may not always be the right means in all circumstances. Though Sidney Bailey once said 'peace is process not (merely) an end' (Bailey 1996), there may be circumstances in which the right processes in interacting with others are not fully peaceful but confrontational. (Whether armed confrontation is ever justified is a matter of dispute.) Nevertheless the presumption is, if my analysis is right, that the way of peace is to be preferred in most circumstances and that being a global citizen involves accepting that presumption and acting on it in the various ways which I have outlined above.

QUESTIONS

1. How would you define peace? Why is peace important?
2. Is concern for peace a significant part of being a global citizen?
3. If one is committed to peace, what are the most important things to do?
4. Why are some global ethics conducive to peace and others not conducive to peace?