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Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870–1956: A Research Assignment*

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When studying the motives and causes for war it is fashionable to focus on the aggressive drives of modern man, those same drives which are said to feed nonviolent forms of conflict, such as competition, opposition, and rivalry. One of the attractions of this approach is the implied prospect of banishing war in one of two ways: by restructuring society so as to reduce, if not eliminate, individual aggression, or by rechanneling man's bedrock of aggressiveness into socially sanctioned but harmless "aggression-absorbing" activities.¹ Incidentally, to date no one seems to have established any solid correlations—positive or negative—between the degree of aggressiveness of specific political actors, classes, or peoples and their disposition first to advocate war and then to shoulder its burdens.

In another analytic scheme, which is almost equally fashionable, the focus is on the harsh realities of international life in a world of multiple sovereign states, each state being bent on jealously guarding and enhancing its own independence and welfare under conditions of international anarchy. By implication this second focus makes the achievement of perpetual peace contingent on the contraction or disappearance of sovereignty as such.²

Admittedly both of these approaches have their merits. But they also have one flaw in common: both neglect or misjudge the vital political core of the decision to go to war. That decision is made by political actors and classes who in critical moments look at the dual field of domestic and international politics. When having recourse to war, these actors and classes conceive of it as an instrument of policy which, whether used successfully or unsuccessfully, produces important inter-

* This paper is one part of the conceptual framework that I am using to organize my projected *Europe Between Revolution and Counterrevolution, 1870–1956*. This volume will not be a survey but a topically and analytically structured interpretation. I invite criticism of this conceptual framework, also from students of the causes of wars in other historical periods and areas.

¹ See Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York, 1967); and Jerome D. Frank, *Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace* (New York, 1968).

² See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4th ed. (New York, 1967). For an anthropo-psychological interpretation of the mainsprings of this international conflict see Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative* (Boulder, Colo., 1966).

nal as well as external results. They anticipate that these domestic and foreign policy results will be of varying mixes, in terms both of their relations to each other and of their degrees of intentionality.

Another reason why, in critical moments, political actors carefully scrutinize the domestic side of war is that, compared to other forms of conflict, war is a distinctly collective phenomenon.³ It is distinguished by conscious cooperation among and within all major segments of society. This being so, those facing the decision and responsibility for war are bound to weigh the degree of actual and potential loyalty and support among classes and masses alike. They make this evaluation not only for their own country and its allies but also for potential enemy nations, particularly under conditions of mass politics and in revolutionary eras.

At first glance Carl von Clausewitz seems altogether oblivious to the domestic causes, uses, and consequences of war. But a closer look at his work—which focuses so heavily on the impact of the new politics of the French Revolution on warfare—shows that his conception of war as a political act and instrument points squarely in this direction. For Clausewitz war “has its roots in a set of political circumstances” and is brought about “only by a political *Motiv*.”⁴ Given these very real political roots and impulses, war cannot be “an isolated act, that explodes suddenly and with complete surprise.” The internal as well as the diplomatic preparations for war are part of its originating matrix, while its political purpose and intent fix the parameters of the aims to be achieved and the efforts to be expended. According to Clausewitz, this preparation, purpose, and design are decided and implemented not by abstract states but by governments composed of specific persons and acting under concrete historical conditions. Moreover, since the political purpose of war has to stimulate the masses to effort and sacrifice, this purpose must be so defined as to inspire a positive popular response.

In other words, the decision for and the direction of war are set within a fluid political context by chief executives in consultation with their principal civil and military advisers. To make sense, Clausewitz's conception of war must be anchored in this concrete political reality. For otherwise, precisely what is the meaning of his celebrated dictum that “war is not only a political act, but a truly political instrument, a continuation of political relations, an implementation of these [relations] by other means, . . . [or rather] by the admixture of other means?” Clausewitz does not see war as a continuation of *diplomacy*—

³ Gaston Bouthoul, *Les Guerres* (Paris, 1951), pp. 26–31.

⁴ This and all subsequent quotations from Clausewitz are cited from his classic *Vom Kriege* (Berlin, 1957), pp. 22–25, 30–35, 726–35.

that is, of interstate relations—by other—that is, violent—means. Significantly, he invariably opts for the comprehensive concept of politics, which subsumes diplomacy, thus leaving open the possibility that recourse to war can be not only influenced but, in some instances, even determined by internal political considerations.

Clausewitz himself insists that while “the political *Absicht* is the purpose, war is the means,” and that these means cannot be conceived of separately from the ends they are to serve. Granted, he chooses to consider a government’s policy as the reflection of an objective national interest to be protected against the equally objective national interests of other states. But Clausewitz posits this national interest as an ideal-typical construct, since he readily concedes that governmental policy “can take a wrong direction as a result of the ambitions, private interests, and pride of the rulers.” Once such motives and interests are taken to be normal and standard, rather than “wrong,” the political motives and purposes for going to war emerge as being forged in the fire of the political process. Specifically, in the crunch of the decision the principal actors and classes can be expected to calculate whether and how war can serve to establish, maintain, advance, or undermine the political fortunes of influential segmental elites within and outside the government of their own country as well as of target countries.

In an era of mass and revolutionary politics the decision to go to war is very much a political decision. To be sure, even or particularly under tumultuous political conditions decision makers and their advisers—including civil and military experts—feign to stand above or beyond partisanship. They mean to sanctify this nonpartisan posture with spurious incantations about their selfless devotion to an objective national interest which instantly demands the subordination of domestic politics to foreign policy. In reality, however, these decision makers and their advisers continue to be political actors with very tangible social, economic, political, and ideological attachments, if not interests. With rare exceptions these attachments are not dissolved or deactivated by the alleged requirements of the primacy of foreign policy.

It is not without significance that in those situations in which foreign-policy actors abide first and foremost by the primacy of domestic politics, they do so furtively rather than openly. Ordinarily, however, these actors, when making foreign policy decisions, including decisions for or against war, are moved—if not consciously, certainly unconsciously—by a mixture of external and internal considerations. With each actor the blend of these two components depends not only on the overall context of power and politics in which he operates but also

on his functional position, his habitual political preferences, and his formal political associations. Even with otherwise relatively apolitical actors, notably permanent officials and experts, the degree of internal political calculation rises under conditions of intense partisan conflict at home and in third countries.

Again it was Clausewitz who noted, quite rightly, that war is more likely to approach its abstract nature of unchained violence when the originating motives are exceptionally ambitious and strong and the prewar tensions singularly acute. Under such taut conditions, once war has started, political purposes recede into the background, and the enemy's unconditional surrender becomes the sole objective. Conversely, the weaker the motives and tensions, the more likely that war will retain its political purposes, to be achieved by timely negotiation.

Here, then, is the paradox. Whereas wars whose motivation and intent are primarily diplomatic and external retain their political purposes, as conceived by Clausewitz, those whose mainsprings are essentially political and internal fail to acquire a well-defined project.

By Clausewitz's criteria wars whose motives and causes are fundamentally—not exclusively—diplomatic and external are and remain essentially political—that is, limited and controlled—in purpose. These are wars that are decided by political actors and classes whose political tenure and social position tend to be secure and who tend to have great latitude for foreign policy decisions. Moreover, though these objectives are likely to precipitate changes in the government and administration of the vanquished power, they neither involve nor require the overthrow of the enemy's regime. In sum, the fabric of legitimacy, both international and national, tends to weather hostilities intact.

As for wars of primarily partisan and internal dynamic, they are decided by political actors and classes whose political tenure and social position tend to be insecure and whose latitude for foreign policy decisions tends to be circumscribed. Precisely because their internal influence and control are tenuous, these actors and classes are inclined to have recourse to external war which, if successful, promises to shore up their faltering position. At the same time rival governments, which probably have internal problems of their own, may consider it opportune to take advantage of this instability. In any case, at the outset even the minimal external objectives of wars that are sparked internally have a tendency to be singularly ill defined. As hostilities unfold these objectives become increasingly indeterminate and ideological and therefore incompatible with the survival of the existing international system. In addition, they are prone to require the overthrow of the regime, rather than of just the government of the defeated power. In sum, the fabric of legiti-

macy, both international and national, is seriously strained, if not actually torn.⁵

Depending on the intensity and nature of internal instability and conflict, incumbent governments are disposed either against or for foreign-policy pugnacity, including war. Governments tend to refrain from external complications and war if internal disturbances and tensions are so acute that they cannot rely on the loyalty of critical segments not only of the working and peasant population but also of the armed forces. In general terms, "the relation between outer conflict and inner cohesion does not hold true where internal cohesion before the outbreak of the conflict is so low that the group members have ceased to regard preservation of the group as worthwhile, or actually see the outside threat to concern 'them' rather than 'us.'" Under such circumstances "disintegration of the group, rather than increase in cohesion will be the result of outside conflict."⁶ This being the case, unless other powers, vital allies, or reckless internal factions force their hands, governments that face acute internal turmoil or conflict (e.g., strikes, demonstrations, riots) are inclined to avoid a test of arms in which the risks of defeat, and hence of fatal inner convulsions, seem prohibitively high. They may seek to postpone war until shortly after the internal situation has been brought under better control, when mounting external conflict can become part of a political strategy designed to erode the sources for renewed internal unrest. In the meantime, in their bid to recover greater internal control, embattled governments tend to flaunt the specter of external dangers with the calculation that international tensions short of war can help to foster domestic cohesion.⁷

But strained and unstable internal conditions tend to make elites markedly intransigent and disposed to exceptionally drastic, not to say extravagantly hazardous, preemptive solutions. Beleaguered and vulnerable governments and political classes are more likely to be disposed for than against recourse to mounting external conflict or war. By both reflex and calculation they assume that the members of a seriously torn polity and society will pull together once they are confronted with a common and imminent external threat and foe. Such governments incline to use heightened external conflict or war as an instrument of internal cohesion, as an antidote to insurrection, revolution, civil war, or secession that they claim to be imminent. The ultimate objective is to

⁵ Cf. Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston, 1963), *passim*.

⁶ Lewis Coser, *The Social Functions of Conflict* (New York, 1964), p. 93.

⁷ Cf. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," *Journal of Peace Research* 5, no. 1 (1968): 64-65.

monetize a striking diplomatic or military victory to restore, preferably to enhance, the waning power and prestige of internally enfeebled regimes, governments, and elites.

It appears, then, that the calculus of the internal political effects of intensified external conflict or war is more likely either to deter or to encourage recourse to war in a revolutionary era and under conditions of internal instability than in times of domestic and international equipoise.⁸ In troubled times all major leaders, factions, and parties are intensely alive to the internal political uses and abuses of war. They know that the course and outcome of war are bound to have profound political consequences. Whereas victory promises to strengthen those who advocate, direct, and support war, defeat holds in store the opposite fate. At least in the short run, defeat portends a decline in the power and influence of the war party and its institutions, to the advantage of opposition elements. Furthermore, in revolutionary eras political leaders of all persuasions are anxious about the impact of war on the power and prestige of the pacesetter but embattled revolutionary regime, as well as on critical political struggles in third countries.

The view that war has important internal functions has a long lineage. Through the ages writers have glorified the advantages and virtues of war for individual man. In spite of or because of all its brutalities, until very recently war was said to promote man's virility, biological selection, selflessness, and nobility. The benefits to woman usually were passed over in silence, except that the female was said to bask in the male's heroic comportment, even or especially when it resulted in his death, disability, or disfiguration. Needless to say, these "individual" wages of war are as difficult to measure and verify as such individual motives for war as personal aggressiveness.

In addition to celebrating these reputed gains for the individual, writers sought to demonstrate the benefits for community, society, government, and nation. At these various levels of social existence the payoff was said to be in the form of improved solidarity, cohesion, stability, and prestige. Walter Bagehot and Ludwig Gumplowicz focused on the functions of war in the formation of communities, states, and nations. Other social theorists—notably Aristotle, Machiavelli, Bodin, Montaigne, Treitschke, and Simmel—were concerned with the uses of war in the preservation and consolidation of existing but internally divided or disintegrating societies and polities. They conceived of war as a

⁸ See my schematic case study "Domestic Causes of the First World War," in *The Responsibility of Power*, ed. Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern (New York, 1967), chap. 15.

safety valve for pent-up internal conflicts and tensions, as a deflection of domestic antagonisms into foreign hostilities.

Bodin's reference to the expediency of using war for internal purposes is a telling illustration of this position:

. . . the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause. Examples of this can be found in all commonwealths. The Romans are a specially good illustration. They could find no better antidote to civil war, nor one more certain in its effects, than to oppose an enemy to its citizens. On one occasion, when they were engaged in bitter mutual strife, the enemy found his way into the city and seized the Capitol. The citizens instantly composed their differences, and united to expel the enemy . . . Without looking further afield, we have an example in this kingdom [i.e., France] when it was in grave peril in 1562. The English set foot in France and seized Havre de Grace, whereupon the civil war was abandoned, and the subjects united to make common cause against the enemy. Perceiving which, the English resolved to leave the French to fight one another, and wait till they were thereby altogether ruined, when they might invade the kingdom without difficulty, or the danger of encountering resistance. . . .

Unrestrained freedom inflates men and encourages them to abandon themselves to every sort of vice. Fear however keeps them mindful of their duty. One can have no doubt that the great Ruler and Governor of the whole world, in creating things so that each balanced by its contrary, permits wars and enmities between men to punish them the one by the other, and keep all in fear, for fear is the sole inducement to virtue. When Samuel addressed the people, he told them plainly, that God had raised up enemies against them to keep them humble, and to try, prove, and punish them. *These considerations serve to show how wrong are those who say that the sole end of war is peace* [italics mine]. . . .⁹

Writing in the sixteenth century, Bodin fused the individual and the collective aspects of the internal benefits of war; and he spoke in terms of the state, the citizen, and his civic duty. By the late nineteenth century Treitschke, aware of both dimensions, related them to class divisions. According to this champion of power in politics, "war, with all its brutality, and sternness, weaves a bond of love between man and man, linking them together to face death, and causing all class distinctions to disappear."¹⁰ More recently American theorists of international politics have postulated that acutely beleaguered power and governing elites tend to resort to heightened external tensions or even to war in order to preserve or buttress their precarious internal position.¹¹

⁹ Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, abr. and trans. M. J. Tooley (Oxford, 1955), pp. 168–69.

¹⁰ Heinrich von Treitschke, *Power Politics*, abr. and ed. Hans Kohn (New York, 1963), p. 245.

¹¹ Ernest B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York, 1956), pp. 62–64; and Rosecrance, pp. 304–5.

Montaigne was one of the first to question the rightness of channeling domestic tensions into foreign wars, even if internal chaos should be the price of continued peace. Though he conceded that a "foreign war is a much milder evil than a civil war," he assumed that "God would not favor so unjust an enterprise as to injure and pick a quarrel with others for our own convenience." Even so, Montaigne grudgingly accepted that societies which face fatal internal schisms expediently have recourse to "bad means for a good purpose."¹²

Centuries later the Marxists, rather than question the reality or legitimacy of diversionary wars, probed into their class determinants. In the Marxist scheme capitalist classes deliberately and cunningly whip up nationalist passions and unchain such wars as part of a rearguard action designed to postpone the inevitable proletarian revolution. In sum, Marxists sought to identify the class ties of the political actors who manipulate the safety valve and to uncover the social, economic, and political mainsprings and purposes of this calculated recourse to war.

There are grave objections to the Marxist thesis that shrewd capitalists or their hired hands bring on wars for selfish class objectives. But notwithstanding these objections, the overall direction of the Marxist inquiry into the causes and objectives of war is altogether sound. In particular, during Europe's most recent era of revolution and counterrevolution (1870–1956), the internal and external mainsprings of war have been thoroughly intertwined. Whereas the diplomatic side of the causes of this era's wars has been thoroughly explored, the domestic side of these wars continues to be neglected. In seeking to correct this imbalance researchers could usefully hypothesize the primacy of domestic politics in international relations. But in this examination of the internal side of the causes of war they will have to enlarge the focus of sclerotic Marxists who confine themselves to examining the class determinants of foreign policy, including the decision to go to war. Researchers will have to take account of the full range of interrelated political, social, economic, and ideological factors and conflicts that condition the making, conduct, and implementation of foreign policy.

In this most recent era of European turmoil the decision for or against war, whenever it presented itself, necessarily became caught up in the struggle between the forces of order and the forces of change. The more intense a given internal crisis, the greater the erosion of the compromise-seeking center, to the advantage of the collision-bound

¹² Michel de Montaigne, *Essays*, bk. 2, chap. 23 ("Des mauvais moyens employez à bonne fin").

forces of revolution and counterrevolution. This erosion was as fatal to internal cohesion as it was to external quietude.

As noted above, internal tensions can become so acute that key political actors within or close to the government will counsel extreme caution, if not perilous appeasement, for fear that the exertions of war will fatally strain or transform government and society. More commonly, however, such internal tensions incline political actors and forces to resort to external tensions and war in efforts to salvage or bolster their domestic position.

Since 1870 political actors who tended to favor resort to war for internal purposes looked for support to social and occupational strata, interest groups, and political formations that were anxious, if not panicky, about their life chances in the crisis-torn, modernizing world about them. The appeals of inflamed jingoism and war found particularly strong resonance among nobles, gentry, artisans, small shopkeepers, low-level civil servants, status-seeking degree holders, bypassed entrepreneurs, ex-officers, small peasant proprietors, and the new middle classes. These were the same crisis strata that provided the social bases for counterrevolutionary movements and politics.

In fact, starting with the Franco-Prussian War the politics of counterrevolution¹³ and of diversionary war have repeatedly been closely tied, if not completely interlocked. They were activated by the same conservative political leaders, who, doubtful of their ability to master mounting internal dysfunctions, inclined toward the preemptive use of force, either at home or abroad. Significantly, the cadres of the bureaucracy, foreign office, army, police, and church either were drawn from or had strong attachments to one or more segments of the crisis strata. For fear of losing the loyalty of these cadres and institutions that are so vital for the maintenance of law and order—let alone for preventive confrontations—otherwise self-confident and compromise-seeking conservatives became responsive to the pressures of counterrevolutionary leaders who counseled recourse to force and violence.

In addition to disposing of a Trojan horse within the government in the form of strategically placed cadres, these counterrevolutionary leaders had another valuable asset. Unlike traditionalists and conservatives, who were reticent and awkward about the populist politics of this age of mass mobilization and manipulation, counterrevolutionaries thrived and excelled in it. Specifically, they propagated mass appeals attributing society's ills to internal, external, or mixed conspiracies. Such formulas were designed to serve a double purpose: they provided a political ori-

¹³ See my unpublished and privately circulated essay "Mainsprings of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870–1956: A Research Assignment."

entation for social elements that were in danger of succumbing to the rival revolutionary rhetoric, while at the same time they depicted the root evil as one that could and should be destroyed by instant and drastic recourse to force. In any case, the conspiratorial view of politics was peculiarly attractive to anxiety-ridden crisis strata which, instead of trusting the course of history, were impatient to arrest or reverse it. And it was among these strata that counterrevolutionary leaders sought and organized the mass support which, for a price, they put at the service of conservatives. Whether or not conservatives were prepared to pay the price, which could include either a preemptive coup at home or preventive diversionary war abroad, depended on the prospects for internal stability that the counterrevolutionaries themselves did their best to undermine.

In other words, diversionary war tended to be related to the polarization of politics, which, in turn, was a function of the reality or fear of approaching internal chaos. This being so, it is important to study the nature of this polarization between the forces of order and the forces of change; to examine its impact on the making of foreign policy; to identify the social roots and attachments of political actors who, in this situation, advocated external war for internal purposes; and to probe the social bases and the political tactics of those political factions and interest groups which either supported or pressured these actors.

Conservatives and counterrevolutionaries have two ways of launching an acute crisis situation. One consists of precipitating diversionary war in the expectation that first the war effort and then victory will solidify the political situation to their advantage. The other takes the form of a coup d'état. Depending on the constellation of power and politics, both national and international, this coup d'état may, at a subsequent stage, require external war for survival.

Since not only war but also a coup are solutions of force, the reliability of the army and police is decisive in both. The counterrevolutionary coup is executed if not with the cooperation at least with the connivance of the forces of law and order, including the military and police forces. This option of a coup from above is not open to revolutionaries, who are forced to stage their assault from below.

The year 1848 taught revolutionaries the extreme difficulty and high cost, not to say the impossibility, of a frontal assault on the state. The Paris Commune of 1871 confirmed the lesson that in the face of modernized military and police forces barricades and street fighting become obsolete. The military advantages are increasingly on the side of governments which can call on skilled officers and men to use the latest

artillery, matériel, transport, and communications to suppress insurrections. Furthermore, because of the state's heightened capability and readiness for counterinsurgency, well-disciplined and equipped revolutionary bands or shock troops lose the hitherto significant advantages of surprise attack. As for primitive rebels, though they retain their nuisance value, they cease to be any kind of a serious threat to law and order.

No wonder, therefore, that Engels repeatedly cautioned revolutionaries against playing with insurrection and against letting themselves be provoked into premature street fighting.¹⁴ He realized—and so did many others who lacked his military sophistication—that more than ever all the advantages, both offensive and defensive, were with the anti-revolutionary side. Of course, especially once a revolutionary movement has a disciplined vanguard and mass membership, a government afraid of being engulfed and pressed by counterrevolutionary elements may throw out the kind of preemptive challenge that is impossible to refuse, even if the prospects for success are poor.

Under one set of conditions, however, the revolutionary prospects improve drastically. In the event of a world crisis involving the major European powers in war, certain governments might lose their otherwise impregnable position. In particular war saps the capability for internal repression by regimes and governments that are outclassed, ill-prepared, overextended, or defeated on the battlefields.

Here, then, is another paradox. After 1871, certainly in theory though also in practice, socialists either resolutely opposed war or yielded to it reluctantly and under protest. And yet, given the unparalleled order-enforcing capabilities of states and governments that were spared the exertions of taxing external hostilities, it looked increasingly as if only the strains of war could burst the antirevolutionary dam in one country or another.

At the same time, while the radical Left found itself steadily more dependent, in spite of itself, on defeat in war to blaze a revolutionary trail, the Right renewed its trust in military victory to buttress its failing political fortunes. But, unlike the Left, the Right kept the option of using the military and police cudgels to break its enemies at home before seeking the destruction of enemies abroad.

When the examination of the causes and objectives of war centers on decision making in one of the belligerent countries, the analytic and explicative weight falls on its domestic and political rather than on its

¹⁴ See Friedrich Engels's introduction of March 6, 1895 to Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848–50* (New York, 1935), pp. 13–14, 17, 21–24, 27–29; and Engels, *The German Revolutions* (Chicago, 1967), pp. 227–28.

external and diplomatic life. But since it takes at least two sovereign states to make war, and since the decisions of as yet uncommitted governments can decisively influence the course of events, this focus needs to be enlarged. It must be expanded to encompass decision making not only in nations set on a collision course but also in third nations whose stand is likely to affect the balance of international power. Needless to say, it is important to take account of the nature of the regimes and the political systems within which political actors face and manipulate this interplay of internal and external conflict. The necessity, possibility, and scope for manipulation may differ according to whether authority systems are autocratic or democratic.¹⁵

In other words, even though the diplomatic and military points at which two or more nations touch constitute the critical nexus, the causes and objectives of war cannot be deduced from the minutes of bilateral or multilateral negotiations or the texts of foreign office dispatches. These reflect immediate bargaining considerations and only rarely, if ever, political concerns which guide, possibly determine, diplomatic negotiations. Granted, the choice of specific diplomatic issues or objectives is not necessarily influenced to any significant degree by political or partisan calculations. However, the flexibility with which negotiators or envoys approach diplomatic issues cannot be divorced from their own and their opposites' internal political coordinates.

In the perspective of pure diplomacy—cabinet diplomacy in an era that is essentially stable, both internationally and domestically—it may well be possible to prescribe a correct policy for the statesmen of nations that have been singled out as targets for diversionary war. But if the governments of the target nations are under acute internal pressures themselves, this "correct" policy may be difficult if not impossible to follow. The governments of all the participating and affected nations find themselves guided by considerations of domestic politics rather than by calculations of *raison d'état*.

But in addition to taking account of the political needs of their own governments, diplomatic actors seek to influence the internal situation in other nations to their own advantage. This requires not only that they be accurately informed about internal developments there but also that they have the political astuteness to use that intelligence wisely and effectively. Depending on the circumstances, the indicated diplomatic course may be one of provocation, obduracy, appeasement, or temporization.

Under conditions of mass politics this double-edged politicization of

¹⁵ Wilkenfeld, esp. pp. 57, 60, 63–67.

diplomacy is intimately related to or grafted upon the equally politicized making of foreign policy. In times of instability, both internal and external, this all pervasive politicization is proof that international relations, including war, have become an extension and tool of domestic politics.