

CHAPTER 11

Border Crossings, 1946–1975

In 1959, an exhibition of U.S. machinery opened in Moscow to show Soviet citizens American science and technology. The exhibition hall featured a suburban-style ranch house, complete with built-in appliances and furniture from Macy's department store, not space satellites or airplanes. Visitors could watch dinner being produced from frozen foods and boxed mixes and admire the washing machine. When Vice President Richard Nixon toured the site with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the two men stopped in a model kitchen and debated the relative power of civilian and military production. Conceding that the USSR might be ahead in rocket science, Nixon claimed victory in color television and predicted that a consumer revolution would eventually transform the USSR. He added, "We won't force it [the American way of life] upon you," but "your grandchildren will see it." Khrushchev rejected Nixon's appeal to shift Cold War competition to consumer goods, but the Soviet government could not block knowledge of a rising standard of living outside the USSR or its attraction.

The three decades after World War II were a heady time of innovation and cross-cultural borrowing. On every continent, local communities adapted to outside influences. Globalization is far more than an economic process of integrating markets. It forces the interaction of cultural, social, political, and economic systems, and, most important, it raises individuals' consciousness of a wider world. The appeal of Hollywood movies, American jazz, rock and roll, and sports teams exploded when supported by the media and artful advertising. The launching of satellite broadcasting in 1974 by NASA (National Aeronautics and Space

Administration) ushered in the era of international television, permitting households around the globe to experience the same images and sounds.

But if crossing borders became normal, it could also be threatening. The products and ideas that swing around the globe are difficult to stop or to censor, though governments have often tried: Think of the unsuccessful international efforts to curb the trade in heroin. Neither acid rain nor an oil spill is stopped for lack of a passport. In the thirty years after World War II, governments had to come to terms with their inability to close national borders and the need to interact with international organizations.

A New Order of Things

Consumption

If you opened the pages of an American women's magazine—*Good Housekeeping*, for example—in the 1950s, you found a familiar world of goods: refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum cleaners. Well-dressed women and their electrical appliances kept homes and children sparkling clean. This mass-produced affluence, which had begun to transform daily life in the United States during the 1920s, accelerated in the postwar period as incomes rose rapidly. Each year thousands of families, blue- and white-collar alike, bought well-equipped houses complete with lawns and garages. The second car for the wife or teenager, chosen for its “sporty look,” began to appear in some suburban driveways.

These spending patterns spread from the United States to Western and Central Europe as employment and productivity rose. The baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s increased the demand for goods and services, and a revived manufacturing sector and international trade supplied a tempting array of products. Phonographs and records, colorful china, telephones, refrigerators, and washing machines were soon found in ordinary homes. Access to this bounty spread beyond the cities as rural areas were wired for electricity. The combination of a steady income and consumer credit bought a motorbike, a car, or a television. With wheels, people traveled more and traveled farther. Single-family homes with modern kitchens and bathrooms lured people from their older neighborhoods into a suburban-style existence, not only in the United States but throughout Western and Northern Europe. Home improvements and shopping trips became forms of entertainment.

This new consumption changed ways of life and undermined social distinctions. When industrial workers could buy cars and clothes similar to those used by professionals and managers, how could differences be recognized and maintained? In a world in which consumption signaled status, easier access to goods lessened social distances. Mass consumption was democratizing.

It also changed women's work. Although ads promised liberation from drudgery, the new appliances raised housekeeping standards and forced their owners to take the place of servants, who had vanished from European middle-class homes. Although working outside the home became a more attractive option, wives

found that the demands of home and family continued, and that they had less help. Nevertheless, employment rates among married women began to rise in the United States and Western Europe during the later 1960s and 1970s. The new consumption transformed the organization of households as well as material culture.

Europeans thought the growing taste for fast cars and clean bodies was an indication of “Americanization.” Indeed, the United States did launch much of the new because it could export freely while its major competitors were still recovering from World War II. U.S. factories churned out blue jeans and cars, while its media transmitted pictures of the good life in America. The seemingly effortless creation of excess both attracted and repelled Europeans, who saw it as threatening older standards of behavior and modes of living.

The export of U.S. culture was actively pushed after 1945 by the federal government as well as by U.S. corporations. Coca-Cola bottling plants came along with US troops after World War II. The arrival of the five-cent Coke triggered culture wars in France during the 1950s. While French students guzzled the new drink, farmers and winemakers attacked it as a menace to the nation’s health and its agriculture. For traditionalists, the red bottle cap symbolized a distinctly unwelcome economic and cultural imperialism, but for the young it offered cheap and tasty modernity. The fight against Coke, as against many of the new products, soon ended in defeat and was forgotten.

Films became tools of U.S. economic and foreign policy. After the war, the U.S. government demanded “freedom of information” in Europe, which in practice meant that American aid and credit were linked to open access to European markets for U.S. media. In the longer run, Hollywood studios evaded import quotas by investing in European companies and shifting production to overseas locations. The net effect was the triumph of Hollywood films over their European rivals and the broadcasting of particular values championed by those films: individualism, competition, free markets, and the melting pot.

For millions of people, Hollywood became a gigantic U.S. information agency, creating film worlds that eclipsed reality. As Eric Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association, explained to the U.S. Senate in 1953, “Pictures give an idea of America which is difficult to portray in any other way, and the reason, the main reason, we think, is because our pictures are not obvious propaganda.”¹ The United States Information Agency, which operated two hundred film libraries around the world, and the Motion Picture Export Association teamed up for their mutual benefit. During the 1950s, Hollywood produced over half (and in some cases well over half) of the films screened in the countries of Africa, the Middle East, Central and South America, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. Only the Communist states refused Hollywood products.

¹Reinhold Wagenleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, Diana M. Wolf, trans. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 229.

The idea of Americanization attracted the young, who were among the earliest to embrace postwar cultural changes, but over time the identification of the new consumption with the United States became less easy to sustain. In the longer run, the revival of the European and Japanese economies made these countries active producers and exporters of a similar basket of goods. The consumer revolution of the postwar period and the creation of an international mass culture were driven eventually by a number of industrial countries. Yet because of continuing differences between the rich and the poor, the end result was not homogeneity. Although international exchanges diminished the differences among cultures, they also intensified the gap between those who were part of a global economy and those who had few and weak links to it.

Exports from the cities to rural areas moved slowly and incompletely, but by the 1960s changes in consumption patterns were evident from the highlands of Chile to the rice-producing areas of Java. A stream of rubber boots, soft drinks, kerosene lamps, and cotton shirts flowed from cities to towns to local markets. A few such items reached the farming village of Karimpur in northern India (see Chapter 6). Some of the wealthier families bought bicycles and ready-made clothes. People could make trips to town to see films and buy newspapers. Regular bus service made urban visits easier. At the same time, imports of new technologies changed methods of production and daily labor. Hand pumps and electric motors made it possible to drill tube wells in the fields or inside house courtyards.



The darling new Corvette sports the Bel Air Sport Coupe.

*Chevy puts the purr
in performance!*

Gerry Images

This advertisement from *Life Magazine* was selling not only cars but the American Dream of the early 1950s. Well-dressed parents, child, and pets enjoy their modern, suburban house, complete with palm tree and garden. Her Bel Air Sports Coupe complements his Corvette, the first Chevrolet sports car.

Even if people still lived behind mud walls, the outside world was beginning to reach them directly. By the 1960s, television sets could be found throughout Latin America, the Middle East, northern Africa, and Southeast Asia. This revolution in consumption continued to deepen and widen during the 1970s and 1980s as incomes rose.

It has proved impossible for governments to stop the international flow of goods that they wish to ban or to regulate. Drug trafficking illustrates the problems involved in attempting to block trade when profits are high and markets vast. Democratic governments do not have the power to close their borders. Although the international drug trade, particularly in heroin, had virtually collapsed by the end of World War II, it quickly revived after the war. The drug story joins regions around the globe.

It begins with the cultivation of opium poppies by thousands of small farmers in the mountains of Asia, from Turkey east through Pakistan and down into the upland regions of Burma, Thailand, and Laos. The opium poppy is a major cash crop in these regions, and growing it is the most profitable occupation in places where the soil is poor and demand for other crops that can be grown is low. The flowers' seedpods produce a milky sap, which a few simple operations turn into bricks of morphine.

"Lucky" Luciano, an American Mafia boss deported to Italy in 1946 and one of the great criminal talents of his generation, organized the international narcotics syndicate that smuggled morphine into refineries in Marseilles and Sicily, converted it to heroin, and then moved it into the United States via Canada and Cuba. His Turkey-Italy-America heroin route operated successfully during the 1950s and early 1960s, until it was disrupted by the deaths and arrests of key Italian figures, the Cuban revolution, and, most important, the Turkish government's crackdown on poppy production. Soon the traffic reorganized around Saigon and Hong Kong, with shipment into Miami via Latin America. U.S. soldiers had easy access to cheap drugs in Vietnam, and their habits as well as their suppliers followed them home. As the number of addicts in the United States rose, so did the potential profits and the lure of the trade. International law enforcement has been unable to do more than disrupt this smuggling temporarily.

Production

The consumer revolution rests, of course, on mass production and on the output of thousands of firms and factories. Advances in transportation and communication in the postwar decades significantly lowered national barriers and encouraged more and more firms to turn international in the 1960s and 1970s. In a world in which many countries could produce at least simple industrial goods, relative costs influenced factory locations.

Along with international marketing strategies came international divisions of labor. Because wages in the industrialized countries rose sharply, so did the potential savings for employers from moving some types of production or distribution

into low-wage countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America. Even before World War II, U.S. employers produced goods in other countries in order to be close to foreign markets. But by the 1970s, the primary target was the U.S. market.

Companies built factories in Mexico, Haiti, and Colombia to assemble goods that were then re-exported to the United States. Employers sent textiles to Central America and the Caribbean to be cut and sewn into shirts, pants, and jackets, which then made their way back to America's suburban malls. Electronics firms, struggling to compete against Japanese rivals, decentralized the production of TV sets and other electronic goods. Plants in Mexico and Taiwan produced parts, which then went to Korea to be assembled before shipment to Los Angeles or New York. The Japanese shifted much of their electronics manufacturing to China and Southeast Asia. Mass production went international.

The restructuring of manufacturing overturned earlier gender divisions of labor. In the early examples of industrialization, men dug the coal, worked the furnaces, and ran most of the machines. Only in textiles did women hold a significant share of industrial jobs. But in the new, postwar international division of labor, women took on a major share of industrial work in developing countries. Their need to earn money for their families made them an easily exploitable group, unorganized and cheap to employ. Since such jobs were relatively scarce and wages and conditions in the export factories were better than their other options, many women had little incentive to strike or complain. They moved into these jobs while in their twenties and then turned away from factory labor as they married and had children. In the early 1960s, women held over 30 percent of all wage and salary jobs in a wide variety of economies—not only in the core states of the industrial world, such as the Soviet Union, the German Federal Republic, and the United States, but also in peripheral economies, such as those of Jamaica, Haiti, Nepal, and the Philippines. Throughout Central America, Eastern Europe, and parts of the Middle East and East Asia, women made up a significant share of the paid labor force in the 1960s, taking on not only factory work but jobs in the service sector, commerce, agriculture, and unskilled labor.

Along with increases in women's labor outside the home came smaller families. Birthrates declined sharply in many parts of the developing world during the 1970s as women became better educated and set higher goals for themselves and for their children. Particularly in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia, access to contraception and other forms of fertility control meant that couples on average had fewer children. Working parents turned to birth control to lessen the pressures of jobs, crowded housing, and rising aspirations. Nevertheless, patterns of authority within families and communities changed very slowly. Despite women's increased participation in the world economy, lack of access to education and laws limiting their rights restricted women's public activity in much of the world.

The second consequence of the changing international divisions of labor was a slow but significant deindustrialization of the United States and Europe. By the late 1960s, all the industrialized countries were producing similar sets of products,

which they traded among themselves. Soon several Asian countries joined this race, leading to excess capacity in one industry after another. Unfortunately for the United States and Europe, the rising industrial powers had newer machines and lower labor costs. Those who had industrialized first found themselves at a significant disadvantage.

Entrepreneurs moved toward two different strategies: They could either “go high-tech” or “zap labor.” The first solution required much investment and highly skilled workers. That combination permitted companies to produce high-quality products that were not duplicated elsewhere. Using this approach, the Japanese took over the markets for fuel-efficient cars and consumer electronics. Germans and Swedes dominated the machine tool industry, and Italian firms mass-marketed high-style clothing.

Many U.S. employers took the second approach in the 1970s and 1980s. They cut labor costs by moving production and investment abroad. All over Europe and the United States, coal mines and shipyards closed because their markets had shrunk or had been captured by cheaper competitors. Mills shut down in the textile regions of Britain, France, and the United States. Steel mills in West Germany, Belgium, and the United States laid off workers as their markets were captured by Asian rivals. When more Americans began to buy Japanese and European cars, the decline in Detroit’s fortunes accelerated. Older U.S. centers of production in the Midwest and East were supplanted first by plants in the South, where workers had not yet unionized and wages were lower, and then by factories abroad. Although 27 percent of employed Americans worked in manufacturing in 1970, only 19 percent did so by 1986, and this trend has continued.

The social cost for particular families, towns, and regions was enormous. Towns like Detroit, Glasgow, and Lille had to deal with mounting unemployment and a shrinking tax base. Areas that had been economic leaders in the late nineteenth century became poor relations, needing extra welfare funds and social services. Trade unions lost members as the middle-aged dropped out of the workforce and young people left for more progressive regions or countries. Boarded-up buildings lined city streets, and empty factories stood silent on the riverbanks. The slowdown in the international economy after the oil shock of 1973 pushed older areas of production in North America and Western Europe into recession and decline.

Agriculture and the Green Revolution

Production in factories required more production in the countryside to permit food and raw materials to flow from region to region. The challenges posed to agriculture by expanding populations and rising standards of living were enormous and worldwide. Not only did factory and plantation workers have to be fed but machines needed cotton, palm oil, and rubber to transform into cloth, soap, and tires. The combination of division of labor and large populations without land meant that even in mostly rural areas, workers needed to import their food.



GLOBAL Technologies

DDT

In his poem, *Choruses from the Rock*, T. S. Eliot suggested that post-war culture would be remembered for the asphalt road and a thousand lost golf balls. Equally long-lasting are many of the synthetic molecules of the era, including the polymer films that wrapped foods and the artificial fabrics that clothed bodies. These durable monuments of synthetic chemistry changed the tastes, textures, and colors of post-war societies and sometimes altered patterns of life. Some later became the target of jokes, as in the one word of career advice given to the young Dustin Hoffmann in the 1967 film *The Graduate*: “plastics”.

One of these many and mostly anonymous molecules stands out as a symbol of power and hubris: dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane or DDT for short. First synthesized in the

nineteenth century, the substance showed no signs of useful properties until 1939, when a Swiss chemist, Paul Herrmann Muller, discovered that it killed most insects quickly after contact. Subsequent testing suggested it might be the ideal insecticide. First, it was potent disrupter of nerve action in most insects, even in minute concentrations. Second, it was a very sturdy compound that did not decompose readily under exposure to sunlight and moisture; once applied to foliage or even marsh grasses it remained active for weeks or even months. And, most important, it had no discernable effects on human beings or farm animals, mainly because of differences between the chemistry of mammalian nerve cells and those of insects.

Put into production in the U.S. by 1942, DDT became famous as one of the miracle compounds of World War II. In Europe, medical officers herded troops and civilians through tents where fans maintained a blizzard of DDT powder. In the Pacific entire islands were bombed with DDT dust to make them safe for Allied troops. In both cases, the targets were insects that carried deadly diseases: typhus-carrying

For how long could the world continue to feed an expanding population? Arable land and water have been, and continue to be, scarce resources, distributed unequally. How could the interests of producers and potential consumers be reconciled? The issues of famine and food distribution posed not only technical problems to be solved but moral dilemmas to be debated. Countries that could not grow enough food to feed their citizens had to either export goods to pay for imports or beg for international charity. Moreover, people began to want to consume more. For individuals as well as for nations, having enough to eat requires both the production of food and the ability to buy that food. Revolutions in agriculture have technical, financial, and social consequences.

In the immediate postwar period, the revival of international markets and U.S. aid allowed enough food to be transferred to Europe from the Americas and

lice and mosquitoes that could transmit malaria, yellow fever, and dengue fever. After the war, public health officials at the World Health Organization hatched plans to eradicate malaria by destroying the mosquitoes that carried the parasite. Meanwhile, farmers began to apply the compound to their fields and homeowners to their lawns. Within a decade, aerial DDT sprays were being used in the United States to make parks more comfortable on summer evenings and to rid forests of invasive species like gypsy moths.

DDT had successes and failures. It was quite possibly critical in saving post-war Europe from the kind of typhus epidemic that had killed hundreds of thousands after World War I; it played a role in ridding warm-weather islands, such as Sardinia, of malaria; and it helped reduce the incidence of malaria in many parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America where it was sprayed on the walls of homes and public buildings. Used indiscriminately, however, it rarely suppressed unwanted insects for more than a few months, and it did so only by destroying populations of species beneficial to human beings, such as honey bees.

By the late 1950s, nature lovers and ornithologists were beginning to notice another effect: bird counts were shrinking in areas bombarded with DDT. By the early 1960s, the evidence was clear: birds were consuming DDT when they ate insects and seeds, and this DDT was then causing female birds to lay eggs with lethally fragile shells.

Most readers learned the bad news about DDT and related compounds from *Silent Spring*, a book by an American naturalist and science writer, Rachel Carson. Published in 1962, Carson's best-selling book provoked stringent controls on insecticides in the U.S. and Europe. It also helped stimulate a widening public concerns with other environmental issues—concerns that found expression in clean water and air legislation, tougher regulations on hundreds of industrial chemicals, and a growing public interest in ecology and the environment. By the end of the century, the movement had grown from a modest number of activists, almost all American and European, to millions who were enrolled in Green Parties and hundreds of environmental organizations around the globe.

Australia to fill the deficit left by the destruction of Europe's fields. Luckily, the mechanization of farming in the United States and Canada allowed those countries to produce large surpluses, which could be sent elsewhere. Moreover, the U.S. government committed itself to giving grain or selling it at reduced prices to countries that were threatened with famine. The combination of high productivity and international financing eased the transfer of U.S. grain and other food abroad.

In the longer run, European farmers mechanized too, replacing human and animal energy with tractors. During the 1950s and 1960s, methods of mass production in agriculture spread rapidly in Europe, increasing yields there and helping farmers to raise their incomes while decreasing the amount of labor needed to produce crops. First in the United States and then in Europe, farming became

more and more heavily capitalized and specialized as energy use in the form of electric-powered machines and fertilizers multiplied. With these changed methods, farmers could more than double their yields while the amount of human labor used shrank to insignificance.

In contrast, mechanization made little progress in Latin America, Asia, or Africa, where labor was abundant and capital for investment limited. Electricity, gasoline, fertilizer, insecticides, and machinery cost more than local farmers could afford. Moreover, in terms of energy expended per unit of food produced, their hand methods were actually more efficient than mechanized agriculture.

Genetic research led to more easily exportable changes in technology. Plant breeders and botanists in the United States developed hybrid varieties of wheat and corn that not only resisted plant diseases but also bore more seeds. In the longer run, scientists perfected new types of rice, dwarf plants that matured rapidly and raised yields. To adapt these plants to conditions in the tropics, geneticists worked with research institutes in other countries to find the best varieties for particular climates and soils.

Some of the first of this international cooperation took place in Mexico, where the Rockefeller Foundation financed a joint scientific mission to introduce and adapt disease-resistant wheat to local conditions. By the later 1960s, fields planted with the new seeds grew more than three times as much as had been produced there during the 1930s. The Ford Foundation started a program of rural development in India in 1951 that helped introduce the so-called Green Revolution there. The introduction of new types of rice and wheat in northern India and Pakistan was a spectacular success, raising output dramatically. In many parts of Asia, not only could farmers grow more rice with every crop, but under proper conditions they could double- or triple-crop their land without resorting to highly mechanized methods. The miracle seeds have made it possible for farmers in many areas to increase their incomes by growing a much larger amount and exporting it. Genetic engineering of plants has vastly increased the chances that the world can continue to feed itself despite heavy population growth.

The Green Revolution changed more than outputs; it had major social and ecological consequences. To produce new crops, traditional ways of farming had to be abandoned, and many small farmers did not survive the shift. They sold out to large owners who had enough money and other resources to risk changing their way of life. Because the new seeds need large amounts of water, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides, the Green Revolution required big capital investments, either by governments or through borrowing from moneylenders. Chemical fertilizers, derived from oil, had to be purchased abroad or produced locally from imported materials. Irrigation systems had to be devised and maintained. Relatively isolated villagers had to work with agronomists, engineers, and merchants.

Commercial agriculture is an international agriculture, dependent on long distance flows of knowledge, seeds, fertilizers, and marketed crops. Even as this high-energy farming shielded producers from the impact of drought and plant disease, they became vulnerable to wider market pressures. When oil and fertilizer prices

rose in 1973, farmers around the world saw their production costs rise sharply too, and many had to abandon the new crops. During the middle 1970s, the Green Revolution stalled because of its high price tag and its link to the availability of cheap oil. Ecological costs rose as well. Irrigation increased the salinity, or salt content, of fields and changed water table levels. Where dams and open irrigation systems were built, silt and herbicides washed off the land and clogged and polluted rivers. By increasing the demand for water, the Green Revolution intensified one more area of competition.

Despite the Green Revolution and the consequent increases in production, major famines that killed several hundred thousand people occurred between 1945 and 1975. In the 1970s, people starved in Ethiopia, in the Sahel of Africa, and in Bangladesh despite aid sent by the UN, the European Economic Community, and the United States. Economist Amartya Sen has shown that famine in the contemporary world is less a matter of scarcity than of entitlement: In many recent famines, enough food to feed the hungry has been available within the country, but those who died were too poor to buy it. Marginal groups, such as nomads, landless laborers, small holders, and transport workers, did not earn enough cash to purchase food in the market. Even if imported agricultural methods and crops have made it possible for the world to feed its growing population, the problem of uneven distribution results in mass starvation in certain regions. In the second half of the twentieth century, agricultural regimes around the globe became more tightly interconnected, both in feast and in famine.

People on the Move

At the end of World War II, as the victors rearranged political boundaries and the colonial powers retreated, millions of people found themselves in the wrong nation-state, vulnerable because of their ethnicity, their party affiliation, or their religion. For them, crossing borders seemed a necessity. Some moved voluntarily, and others fled invading armies or angry mobs. The category “displaced person” covered a wide variety of losses and humiliations. After the defeat of their country, Germans fled Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Poles, Yugoslavs, and Hungarians moved out of areas of Soviet influence. Jews who survived the concentration camps left Europe for Palestine or North America, if they could.

For a few years after the war’s end, Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States welcomed European refugees. Each of these former European colonies temporarily lowered barriers to international migration, allowing some people that it perceived as racially and culturally similar to its own citizens to enter the country and stay. Other war refugees found new homes in Western Europe or northern Africa. These migrations increased the cultural complexity of the neo-Europes around the globe, while diminishing the political and economic problems of those societies that had been torn apart by the world war.

Refugees and Migrants


These wartime rearrangements continued in the later 1940s as new countries formed. When the British left South Asia in 1947, millions of Muslims moved west into Pakistan, and millions of Hindus fled east into India. The lucky ones survived the trek and the accompanying massacres. The creation of Israel exiled several hundred thousand Palestinians into refugee camps in other areas of the Middle East. The Communist victory in China pushed Nationalist Chinese into Taiwan. The creation of Communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam triggered massive emigrations into neighboring states, as did uprisings against Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

The uprooting of people and their movement across international boundaries continued well beyond the end of World War II. The Vietnam War sent hundreds of thousands of individuals from several Southeast Asian countries into refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong for later resettlement in North America, Europe, and Australia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan pushed millions into Iran and Pakistan. To stay alive during civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, hundreds of thousands left their homes for more stable, prosperous societies. Ethnic conflict and political hostilities created more than seventy million refugees in Africa during the period from 1960 to the end of the century. Political turmoil in the modern age intensified migration and cultural mixing.

But for every person who was forced to emigrate by hostile armies or political parties, dozens more voluntarily walked or rode away in search of a different life. Few places are so isolated that rumors of jobs or tales of greener pastures do not penetrate. The uneven economic development of societies around the globe tempted the young and healthy to go where their labor was needed and better paid. Heavy movement out of the islands of the Caribbean into Britain and North America began in the 1950s when transportation costs declined and the economies of industrialized areas boomed. The long and relatively porous U.S. border permitted millions of Mexicans and other Latin Americans to move north across the Rio Grande. Workers from Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia trekked into Argentina.

Although migrants can be found virtually everywhere in the world, a few places stand out as major exporters of labor between 1945 and 1980: the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Mexico and Central America, the Caribbean, and northern Africa. For some small, overpopulated, poor countries, voluntary migration became a way of life, a necessity because farms were too small and families too large. The destinations of these migrants were generally North America and Europe, although Africa and urban areas of the Middle East have been secondary targets (see Map 11.1).

For the most part, it was adult males who made the trip, many on temporary job contracts. Wives and children initially stayed behind, deterred by the cost and by immigration regulations. But when fathers did not return, family members joined the exodus to the industrialized lands, producing large communities of immigrants in capitals and factory towns.



Although European governments restricted the granting of citizenship and tried to send immigrants home during economic downturns, their attempts to repatriate migrants failed. As long as there were jobs at wages far higher than could be earned at home, what reason was there for immigrants to leave, particularly after their families had joined them? Despite the impact of racial prejudice and social discrimination, immigrants had access to better housing, education, and medical care than in their home societies. Moreover, as the numbers of immigrants mounted, the newcomers built their own communities, complete with mosques, temples, and ethnic societies. They reconstructed simplified versions of their home culture around key institutions and kinship ties. For them, cultural imports brought protection and self-esteem.

Within the host society, opposition to the arrival of outsiders arose. The need for labor did not mean automatic tolerance of cultural differences. Mobs in Indonesia periodically attacked Chinese residents. The French and Belgian governments banned the wearing of Islamic headscarves by female students. In some U.S. states, voters lobbied to end bilingual education. The divisive issues posed by international migration have continued to simmer in the multicultural societies of the contemporary world. The balance between inclusion and exclusion has been the basis of many bitter fights, and the answers have been provisional. As second and even third generations of immigrants have grown in size, the problems of integration have changed. Many countries have conferred automatic citizenship on the children of newcomers, giving them voting rights and increased political power. Others have not done so, continuing to define membership in the nation-state by ethnicity or religion rather than by birthplace.

Moving to the City

Encouraged by cheaper transportation and communications, the international mixing of populations speeded up after 1945. As incomes rose, people spent more on travel. In 1947 Pan Am began the first round-the-world service, a trip that had shrunk to sixty-nine hours in 1969 when jet airplanes came into commercial use. Getting to Athens from London required three days by train in 1950, but only four hours by plane in 1960. Business travelers and tourists could hop a plane and find themselves in a different culture within a few hours.

It is easy to exaggerate the isolation of places distant from the cities of North America and Europe. Although in 1950 more than 80 percent of Asians and Africans lived in villages or rural areas, as did a majority of Latin Americans, most places were within reach of a market town, and rural bus services operated in India, the Middle East, and much of Latin America. Along with the spread of electricity came radios, which broadcast international news and sporting events. Later, television brought the outside world even closer. Boys in South American and Indian villages followed World Cup and cricket test matches, rooting for their favorite players and their national team. Wired into the outside world, ordinary folk intermittently joined much larger communities.

Such mental connections encouraged movement into the cities. Rates of urbanization in Africa, Asia, and Latin America rose sharply during the postwar era. Although in 1930 only about 12 percent of people in the Third World lived in towns of more than five thousand, that percentage had leaped to 20 percent by 1960 and to 27 percent by 1980. Urban populations exploded in Mexico, India, and Egypt. West Africans moved into the towns of Nigeria and Ghana looking for work. In China, government policy tried and failed to force city dwellers into the countryside and to slow the rush into the older cities.

With each passing decade, the number of cities with more than a million inhabitants climbed. No longer were most of the world's largest cities in industrialized countries. By 1980, about a third of the urban population in Third World nations lived in cities with more than one million inhabitants. When high population growth in the countryside forced people to move, the country's capital was a logical choice. The net result tended to be highly unbalanced urban networks—sleepy small towns and an exploding metropolis that was unable to provide work or decent shelter for its residents.

The big cities of new nations gained thousands of people each year, with disastrous results. Shantytowns built of recycled junk hugged the hillsides of São Paulo and the roadsides near Lagos. The price was right, even if the new address lacked running water, electricity, paved streets, and services. Called oil-drum cities (*bidonvilles*) in French, little villages (*kampongs*) in Indonesian, and canned food towns (*halabi abad*) in Farsi, their names mirrored their semi-urban, semi-accepted status. By the 1970s, the United Nations estimated that almost half the population in sixty-seven large Third World cities lived in such squatter settlements. Unplanned and unwanted by everyone except their inhabitants, shantytowns typify the new urbanism of the late twentieth century. These communities with few public services and less legal security have become the permanent homes of millions of new city dwellers.

The Pressure of Demography

The urban explosion was fueled by high levels of population growth in rural areas, distributed unequally around the globe. Birthrates in Europe and Russia declined to the point where fertility dropped below replacement levels, virtually ending population growth in those countries. In contrast, by the 1960s, annual rates of population increase in Latin America, South Asia, and Africa were approximately double those in North America and Europe.

At the same time, changes in sanitation, medicine, and nutrition led to declining death rates in most parts of the world. Since the difference in birthrates among regions was much greater than the difference in death rates, the net result was a large surplus of births and a much more rapid increase in population among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America than among those of North America and Europe. Moreover, high fertility produces young populations, whose death rates are relatively low and whose prospects for marriage and additional child-bearing are high. By 1980, virtually all of the world's population growth was taking place in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.



ROMEO GACAD/AP/Getty Images

Skyscrapers in the financial district of Manila loom over this Philippine shantytown, where houses lack electricity, sewage connections, and, probably, piped water. Similar social inequalities can be found in many of the world's largest cities.

Demographers argue that by the 1970s, two different demographic regimes were operating around the world, one produced by low fertility and the other by high fertility. In the industrialized countries, low birth and death rates led to an aging population, with few children and more and more elderly. The chance of dying young dropped sharply, and women spent fewer years in childbearing and child rearing. But as new opportunities opened for women and for the middle-aged, other risks increased. The death or serious illness of an adult could bring disaster to a household that had too few kin to help. Moreover, aging populations need extra social services and medical care. Such societies need more young workers to pay the bills for the elderly. In short, they need migrants, who have to come from outside. This demographic deficit has fueled much of the importation of foreign labor, which flowed from east to west and from south to north in the postwar period.

In contrast, the less-industrialized countries moved into an extraordinary phase of growth in the postwar period. High birthrates combined with declining death rates to produce a population explosion. Around 1950, in twenty-five of the poorest, most heavily populated countries around the world, women commonly gave birth to between 6 and 7.5 children during their reproductive years; in comparison, their European sisters gave birth to 2 children. Women in much of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia spent a large portion of their lives bearing and rearing children. Such a pattern of population growth, where land is scarce and industrial employment is unavailable, made migration necessary for survival. Demographic inequalities have pushed people across international boundaries into

the more heavily industrialized regions of the world. One hallmark of the modern world is mass migration into cities, where ethnic categories are blurred and cultural choices challenged.

International Styles

Mass media and mass migration eroded national borders. If Korean Americans in Los Angeles watched James Bond movies, sang Beatles songs, and ate Tex-Mex food, what kind of cultural world did they inhabit? Not only identities but also cultural constructs came into question. The uniqueness of place dissolved under the pressure of imports. International styles of architecture, consumption, dress, and leisure made it increasingly difficult for travelers to distant cities to identify differences. With rising incomes came more choices, but those choices were drawn from a standardized pool of goods and styles.

Whether a person lived in Buenos Aires, Singapore, Tel Aviv, or Copenhagen, elements of similarity, of familiarity began to multiply throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The same sorts of angular, air-conditioned glass towers loomed above city streets in central financial districts, whatever the country. The business suit served as a male uniform on several continents. The look of the “modern,” the growth of international businesses, youth culture, and international sports diminished cultural distances.

Modernism

New York City’s Museum of Modern Art, whose aim was to spread appreciation of contemporary styles of painting, sculpture, film, and architecture, became an international arbiter of taste. Its collection of works by Picasso, Mondrian, and Brancusi ratified the value of the stark, geometric forms that had been pioneered by European artists and architects and condemned by the Nazis. With the Fascist defeat came the triumph of a modernist aesthetic. After 1952, the museum’s international department regularly sent exhibitions around the world, spreading interest in modernism as it was defined in the United States and Europe. In 1958–1959, a traveling show of New York painters starring Jackson Pollock spread the gospel of abstract expressionism. Audiences in cities around the world flocked to see photographs, films, and objects that had been selected as representing the new taste.

Modernism meant different things in different fields, but in architecture and design in the first decades after the war, it translated into a triumph of the so-called international style—unadorned geometric shapes constructed from industrial materials. Le Corbusier’s sweeping structures of poured concrete and Philip Johnson’s one-story, rectangular glass house represent two influential varieties of modernism.

The most easily recognizable modernist structure in the postwar period was the skyscraper. Built of reinforced concrete with glass curtain walls, dependent on elevators and air conditioning, it testified to the mastery of and dependence

on advanced technologies. Such buildings multiplied in the 1950s and 1960s on the streets of Caracas, São Paulo, and Tokyo, as well as in North America and Western Europe. New York architectural firms translated their Manhattan successes into commissions in foreign capitals, and younger Dutch, Italian, and Latin American architects gave the internationalist geometry a local flavor.

Architectural superstars worked all over the world, worrying little about linkage to local traditions. City planners, whatever their nationality, hopped from project to project and from continent to continent. Le Corbusier designed Chandigarh, the new capital of the Punjab; Brasília was planned by Oscar Niemeyer and Luis Costa. Planners confidently proclaimed that there were universal principles of modernist design that would work in the tropics or the tundra. Rather than reflect cultural specificity, modernist architecture denied it (see pp. 213–214).

A reaction against modernism intensified during the 1970s, changing cityscapes. In 1976, the Aga Khan, head of the Ismaili Muslims, funded a prize to recognize architecture built to reflect the spirit of contemporary Islam. An international jury surveyed territory from Indonesia to Morocco, looking for architecture that successfully expressed Islamic culture and values. Inspired by the form of a Bedouin tent, one architect used stainless steel panels and poles to create a soaring hotel courtyard that was open to the sky. Most important, the process of selection publicized and validated the idea of an Islamic alternative to the international style. In the 1970s, there was increasing awareness that modernism came in several varieties.

Youth Culture

Long before their elders, young people in the 1950s and 1960s found it both appealing and possible to adopt U.S. cultural styles. Becoming “modern” required very little: Jeans and a T-shirt could do it. The media provided the models, and as soon as postwar scarcities eased, the market supplied the goods. The growing international communications industry found eager audiences everywhere. The sounds of *Blue Suede Shoes* brought teenagers onto dance floors in Berlin and Buenos Aires and New York, and the Elvis Presley film *Love Me Tender* became a hit worldwide. The Beatles and the Rolling Stones, based in Britain, quickly acquired a global following.

Access to images of these cultural styles was not difficult. By 1970, the USIA published one hundred forty magazines with a circulation of over thirty million copies. The International Communication Agency distributed U.S. materials in more than a hundred countries, and the U.S. government funded over a hundred radio stations, which then sent materials to several thousand others. The Voice of America and its equivalents were beamed south, east, and west. News, music, and entertainment crossed the Cold War divide as well as the world’s oceans. Rock groups, such as Bill Haley and the Comets, went on world tours, and their local imitators packed city clubs. Even if access to American casual clothes was initially limited to the wealthy and well-connected, others could see, admire, and eventually take their cast-offs. Films brought together the new music and clothes, setting them in motion with a dash of romance.



Photo provided by the Library of Congress, Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division/album cover used with permission of Universal Music Group, Copyright Universal Music Enterprises.

After the release of *Rock Around the Clock*, Bill Haley and the Comets acquired an international audience, which could hear their songs on long-playing records. Skirt decorations and song titles proclaim the group's global appeal.

Youth culture signaled limited rebellion, which was popular and possible in many places. The soft-edged defiance of respectability communicated through styles of dress and choice of music disturbed adults, who were eager to preserve a unified, hierarchical society, whether of a communist or a capitalist variety. In both East and West Germany, the consumption of rock 'n' roll led to public defiance of elders' cultural conservatism.

Occasionally, teen rebellion crossed the line from symbolic representation to riot. During the mid-1950s in West Germany, street fights begun by teenagers at movie theaters or by those at concerts of American music infuriated German adults. Jazz, which was seen as African American, symbolized the racial dangers of U.S. culture. When East German youths marched the streets demanding rock 'n' roll and denouncing their country's leaders by name, the Communist government saw these rowdy adolescents as a challenge to state authority. West German officials blamed Marlon Brando and his film *The Wild Ones* for dozens of riots that broke out in 1956 about the time the film opened. The cultural choices of young

people challenged gender, race, and class norms in ways that adults found politically threatening, whatever their politics.

In the longer run, however, economic development softened the impact of youth culture. When produced locally, jeans and T-shirts seemed less foreign, and they eventually became just ordinary dress. Ironically, the effect of greater consumer choice was a lessening of international differences and a homogenization of styles.

The Global World of Sports

Globalization can also be seen within the world of sports. By the 1950s, eighty countries, including several from Asia and Africa, belonged to the international federation of football associations, and this number had almost doubled by 1980. Teams from Japan, Europe, and the Americas battled one another annually in the world baseball championships. The numbers of fans and participants exploded as organized sports became the world's most popular form of entertainment.

Television created the modern sports industry. Network coverage of baseball in the United States boosted team revenues and players' salaries as it turned local stars into national heroes. Baseball's postwar popularity in Japan rose after the Tokyo-based Yomiuri Giant's games appeared on TV. Cable and satellite broadcasting of games in the late 1970s and 1980s turned national audiences international as media moguls, such as Ted Turner and Rupert Murdoch, bought sports teams and captured their coverage. The appeal of American professional basketball spread around the world after Michael Jordan joined the Chicago Bulls, and CNN showed fans his amazing jumps not only in games but in multiple Nike ads. Astute telemarketing sold shoes and sport at the same time. An estimated one billion people watched the 1976 Olympics, and more than two billion people, half of the world's total population, saw the 1978 World Cup matches on television.

Spectator sports fostered nationalism as well as international contacts. When athletes from the Soviet Union and the United States faced one another competitively, more was thought to be at stake than individual victory. Sportscasters translated gold medals into signs of national triumph. As a result, Olympic competitions became Cold War battlefields, with propaganda stakes far higher than the breaking of individual records. After 1947, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) spent years working out the rules under which Russians and East Europeans would join the games. Would a divided Germany have one or two teams? Whether the Communists or the Nationalists in Taiwan would have the right to represent China triggered disputes for twenty-five years.

Because of their large international audience, the Olympics became important symbolic territory for a range of political disputes. In 1956, the governments of Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq refused to send athletes to the games as a protest against the British and Israeli attempt to seize the Suez Canal. Newly independent countries in Africa pushed the IOC to restrict South African participation as long

as sports competitions in that country remained segregated. The IOC waffled repeatedly, but it suspended South Africa from participation in 1964, and finally expelled it from the games in 1970. The most dramatically politicized Olympics were the Munich games in 1972, when Palestinian terrorists raided the headquarters of the Israeli team and seized several hostages. After long negotiations, captors and captives left for the airport, where they intended to fly to an Arab country. But the German police opened fire on the tarmac; by the end of the shootout all the hostages and three of the terrorists had been killed.

Although the IOC insisted that the games were competitions between individuals, not nations, this argument had become culturally obsolete. No one believed it. When Sukarno of Indonesia barred Israeli and Nationalist Chinese teams from the 1963 Asian Games, he unleashed a furor of protests and name-calling by the IOC and by other governments. Sukarno's statement, "Let us declare frankly that sport has something to do with politics," recognized the obvious.² The Olympics permitted easy international exchanges, but they intensified the identification of athletes with their states, which in the case of Munich proved fatal.

International Organizations

Internationalism and nationalism coexisted in an uneasy balance in the postwar period. The need for global ties and commitments to counter the destructive energies of states was an article of faith after 1945. Yet even the United Nations operated through nation-states, which had strong ideas concerning their own self-interest. The five permanent members (United States, the USSR, China, France, and Britain) ran the Security Council, aided by an elected group of temporary representatives, and every state had a seat and one vote in the General Assembly. By the early 1970s, virtually every country in the world except Switzerland and a few microstates belonged, and the nations of the Third World had an easy majority. Either the USSR or the United States and its allies could veto action by the Security Council, yet each superpower could be outvoted and outmaneuvered in the General Assembly, where the smaller, poorer states clamored for better treatment. Although the UN acted to defend South Korea after its invasion by North Korea, either the USSR or the United States blocked most Cold War interventions. As a result, the UN acted most decisively in regional conflicts that were unrelated to the bipolar balance of power. UN peacekeepers went into Egypt in 1956 and into the Belgian Congo and Cyprus in the 1960s. In other conflicts, the UN found itself attempting to undo damage—for example, by dealing with refugees—rather than preventing it. Only where the United States and the USSR did not see their interests directly threatened was action possible. The United

²Allan Guttman, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), p. 110.

Nations was not designed to challenge the system of independent states that composed it.

In a strongly bipolar world, international cooperation happened much more readily in cultural and economic areas than on political terrain. The United Nations operates a series of special agencies designed to further a vague set of commitments to social progress. To that end, large international groups—for example, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—were formed. The UN sponsored conferences on women's rights and on the environment. WHO helped to organize a successful campaign to eradicate smallpox. UNESCO has worked to increase literacy and to improve libraries and universities around the world. Its World Wildlife Fund (WWF) helps to manage and protect dozens of spectacular, threatened sites, among them the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania, the Manas Tiger Reserve in India, and Australia's Great Barrier Reef.

The United Nations and its agencies need the cooperation of national states, which benefit from international resources and ties. Not only did most countries join the United Nations as soon as they could, but their leaders pursued the World Bank and other agencies for loans. Governments courted international foundations and research groups and worked with charities like the Red Cross and Oxfam in the wake of natural disasters. Countries competed for the right to host the Olympic games and world's fairs, which attracted hundreds of thousands of visitors. To broadcast international sports competitions, they improved and expanded TV transmission, which then brought in U.S. programs like *Dallas* and *Sesame Street*. Moreover, national school systems commonly taught their advanced students the few worldwide languages. The pursuit of national interest is compatible with internationalism, which helps to explain the continued support of the United Nations and its many specialized agencies by the major industrialized countries.

Language and Globalization

One of the most effective forces for globalization in the postwar period was increased knowledge of the English language. Spread first by migration and political control, English was then adopted as an official or almost official language in several of the successor states of the British Empire.

After 1945, the political, economic, and technological predominance of the United States, along with American linguistic ignorance, helped spread knowledge of English around the globe. Not only did English become the language of international aviation, but scholars in several scientific disciplines made it their language of choice. Many multinational corporations function primarily in English. The populations of Scandinavia and the Netherlands have adopted English as a second language, as have better educated Malaysians, Koreans, Mexicans, Israelis, and Indians.

Despite the efforts of purists to isolate and preserve linguistic independence, Franglish, Spanglish, Singlish, and other hybrid, slangy varieties of standard languages flourish internationally, spread by television and mass tourism. Since 1945, global linguistic diversity has been overlaid by the almost universal conversion to English as a second language. Although Russian filled that function within Communist societies during the Cold War period, the evaporation of the Soviet Union in 1991 led former satellite countries to cast their lot with the English-speakers.

English, through the accidents of history and international relations, provides a common ground for the exchange of ideas, but it does not and cannot produce common interpretations of those ideas. What produces laughter in one audience triggers disapproval in another. The conduct of international negotiations in English in no way guarantees agreement.

It is important to distinguish the forms and mechanisms of globalization from their content and impact. People act and react to global influences locally, in terms of their own perceptions and values. Language transmits and shapes, but it does not determine outcomes.

Earthly Concerns and Alternative Faiths

The benefits of modernism have become an article of faith in much of the contemporary world, where rising standards of living indicate progress. Yet criticism of secular modernism has also spread among many who reject at least part of that legacy. Since the 1960s, many churches have moved into an expansionist phase, working against what they see as the defects of modernism. This religious revival signals a conflict in value systems and dissatisfaction with some of the changes that have come along with rising incomes and greater freedom of choice. Fundamentalists, asserting the need for doctrinal purity or for rejecting social policies, such as abortion, have spread their messages widely.

During the nineteenth century, the idea of a secular state and secular societies grew in importance. The United States proclaimed the separation of church and state, and France ended Roman Catholic control of publicly funded education. In the early twentieth century, Communists replaced church with party membership and pushed Marxism in place of religious doctrine. By the mid-twentieth century, both liberal and Communist regimes had moved to delimit the status and influence of churches in order to create secular societies.

In the view of many, modern societies had no place for religion. In 1947, Nehru and the Congress Party established India as a secular state, both to assert its modernity and to de-emphasize internal religious divisions. Particularly where citizens came from different religious traditions, secularism seemed a safe sort of neutrality, the best design to avoid conflict. For example, Marxism usefully dampened, at least for a time, the murderous hatreds of Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox Christians in Yugoslavia.


Through the 1960s, churches seemed to be on the defensive. The Labor Party, representing a secular, socialist Judaism, governed in Israel, and socialist regimes pushing a civic religion of party and nation came to power in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Religion seemed to be fading as a force shaping twentieth-century society.

Then, during the later 1960s and 1970s, religious groups moved aggressively into politics. In Latin America, Catholic missionaries preached liberation theology and drew thousands into renewed fights for political and economic justice. In Israel, conservative religious parties representing Orthodox Jews gained influence and numbers. In the United States, Jerry Falwell formed the Moral Majority, increasing the voice of fundamentalist Christians in U.S. politics. The Iranian revolution of 1979 produced an Islamic republic run according to Islamic law. In India newly organized groups worked to unite Hindus and to demand pro-Hindu reforms. But by the 1970s, this activity had led to major social changes in only a few places—in Iran, as a result of revolution and in Burma, where a new constitution enshrined Buddhist rights.

The number of theocratic states in the world are few, but many countries have important religious lobbies. The impact of religion on politics continued to grow during the 1980s in countries around the world. Orthodox Jewish parties sometimes held the balance of power in the Israeli legislature. In India, Hindu parties gained votes by calling for curbs on Muslims' rights. The drive to institute religious controls over states grew in intensity. Since the 1970s, churches and independent religious groups have become active voices in national politics and have expanded their international presence, crossing borders in search of support.

Islam in Politics

The Muslim world is vast; it stretches from Indonesia and the southern Philippines westward through Pakistan, Turkey, the Middle East, and northern Africa (see Map 11.2). Moreover, significant Muslim populations live in China, the states of the former USSR, and North America. The fastest-growing religion in the world today, Islam has spread via conversion, migration, and reproduction. Islam has a sacred text, the Koran, and a long legal tradition, the Sharia, which gives believers a guide for proper conduct. Each year, millions of people flock to Mecca on pilgrimage, repeating actions and prayers that have unified Muslims for centuries. Nevertheless, even with these pressures for uniformity, Islam means vastly different things in different countries. Not only are Muslims divided into different sects and schools of thought, but their political orientations vary from ultra-conservative to revolutionary. Islam has its modernizers and its traditionalists, those who preach respect for Islamic authority and those who express more personal visions of their faith. What has been called “fundamentalist Islam” is only one strand in a complex tradition, and it too takes multiple forms. Both ethnic divisions and national loyalties hinder any sort of common action despite regular calls for Muslim unity.



MAP 11.2 Distribution of world religions in the late twentieth century.

The map identifies countries with the religion of the majority of their citizens, although religious minorities exist everywhere. Where one predominant religious minority exists, it is tabulated in a small circle, as can be seen on the continent of Africa and in India.

In countries around the Mediterranean, reinvigorated Islamic movements became more politically active during the 1970s, challenging the Marxist, Nationalist parties that had led these countries' struggles for independence. Islamic militants gained respect among university students by offering free lecture notes and tutoring classes. They organized social services for the hundreds of thousands of poor migrants flocking into the cities. When measured against government corruption and incompetence, they looked good. Muslim brotherhoods had been important political actors in Egypt and other North African countries for several centuries, and their successors could draw on much recognition and goodwill.

But the relative importance of Muslim groups has varied with shifts in the balance of power in the Middle East. After Israel's victory in the 1967 war, young Muslims transferred their allegiance from older Nationalist heroes to the Palestinian resistance movement, and the idea of a revolutionary answer to the Israeli challenge became more attractive. When oil prices rose sharply in the 1970s, petrodollars began to flow from Saudi Arabia throughout Asia to propagate a Wahhabist conservative version of Islam. A coalition of Palestinians and progressive Muslims helped push Lebanon into civil war in the mid 1970s, challenging automatic Christian control of that country. But only in Iran did a revolutionary alliance—in this case linking frustrated students, conservative clergy, and poor migrants—successfully defeat an autocratic government and institute a theocracy. The influence of militant Islam has continued to grow, particularly in Algeria and Egypt.

In many parts of North Africa, Muslims worked within an existing state without challenging elected authorities over policy differences. At its independence in 1960, Senegal proclaimed itself a democratic, socialist, and secular state, using French models. New codes of family law drew on French, rather than Islamic, traditions. Although more than 90 percent of the Senegalese are Muslims, few objected. The government traded tax money and legal protection for votes, keeping Muslim brotherhoods and a majority of citizens loyal. They accepted the rules of the existing political game within Senegal. Muslim politics has to a great extent been national politics, deeply influenced by local circumstance and organization.

Christianity in Politics

Christian churches also became more militant in the postwar years. After John Paul II became pope in 1978, the Roman Catholic Church attempted to “re-Christianize” a secular world. In practice, this meant encouraging demonstrations to protect Catholic schools, opposing abortion and divorce, and calling for religious freedom in Communist states and for social justice in Latin America. Catholics built new churches and youth organizations in Poland, voted for Christian Democratic parties in the German Federal Republic, and worked with Indian communities in Guatemala.

The organizational structure of the Catholic Church, as well as its theology, made the international transmission of ideas and stances easy. Around the world, Catholic bishops and priests worked to shape both public policy and private morality in accordance with church doctrine. These commitments had

strikingly different political implications, depending upon their setting. In Western Europe and North America, Catholic stances on marriage law, sexuality, and reproduction led to cooperation with social conservatives. These commitments led to similar social alliances in Latin America. At the same time, however, dislike of social and economic inequality pushed significant numbers of Latin American Catholic priests and lay members into partnerships with political radicals. Both in Guatemala and in El Salvador, priests influenced by liberation theology worked with groups that were attempting to oust military regimes and to empower the poor. Missionaries both from local churches and international denominations stoked the fires of religious radicalism.

Protestant Christianity also developed a large international presence. During the heyday of empire, European and American missionaries either preceded or followed national flags, building churches and using conversion to draw local people into new communities. Although the empires had vanished, the churches remained. No longer staffed by Europeans, they maintained links with similar denominations abroad.

Newer churches accelerated the pace of missionary activity in the postwar period. The Mormons, or Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, require missionary service from young members, who travel to other countries to convert local people. Several American fundamentalist denominations have poured resources and people into sub-Saharan African countries and have established fast-growing congregations.

Where born-again Christians gained political power, they encouraged and aided this expansion. In Liberia, Togo, and Kenya during the 1980s, fundamentalist churches allied themselves with existing regimes to protect their freedom to preach and to convert. Moreover, their conservative social message found an eager audience in African countries where governments oppose abortion and the extension of equal rights to women and to homosexuals. The social activism that has come to characterize many groups of Protestant missionaries in Latin America has been largely missing in Africa.

Environmentalism

Faith comes in many forms. For some, saving nature has taken on the importance of saving souls. The celebration of Earth Day in 1970 announced a powerful international movement dedicated to changing the relationship of humans to the natural world. In the decades after World War II, awareness of the many costs of industrialization grew along with pollution.

Whether angered by oil spills or choked by urban smog, more and more people began to question the automatic equation of economic growth with progress. Particularly where sufficient wealth had accumulated to lift the standard of living, citizens could afford to worry about issues other than survival. In the longer run, industrialization encouraged anti-industrialism and an intensified commitment to preserving the natural environment. Nature ought to be conserved, not merely used for humans' benefit, many argued.

The science of ecology, or the relationship of organisms to their environment, spread after 1950 from a fringe academic subject to a popular field in conservation science. In the 1950s, the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society blocked the building of a dam in Colorado parkland, successfully arguing that the goal of land protection outweighed development. Their lobbying encouraged Congress to pass the Wilderness Act in 1964, which prohibited commercial exploitation of national forests, wildlife refuges, and Indian reservations. In North America, the notion that nature had to be preserved became politically popular.

Similarly, the protection of other species became respectable. The International Whaling Commission, whose original purpose was to protect the price of whale oil, shifted somewhat ineffectively to preservation of whale stocks. But in the longer run, agitation by conservationists and growing scarcity drove most whaling fleets out of business. Groups like Greenpeace publicized violations of an international moratorium on whale hunting and worked to increase popular support for regulation.

During the 1960s, environmentalism spread from a hardy band of enthusiasts to a mass audience. The notion that concern for the environment must be weighed against efforts to industrialize has gained a large following. Many countries now have a Green Party that champions the cause of environmental protection. Although the successes of these parties have been mixed, their ability to elect representatives to legislatures testifies to the growing respectability of their message.

Conservationists have lost more battles than they have won, but they have changed the legal and political environment within which economic policies are made. Sweden's decision in 1967 to set up an environmental protection agency was only the first of many such actions that committed governments to conservation. During the 1970s, the U.S. Congress passed the Clean Air and Water Act, as well as legislation designed to protect endangered species. Even in poorer countries, grassroots groups of ordinary citizens and scientists have worked effectively. Women in Kenya organized tree planting for soil conservation, and Indian activists in Brazil worked to stop destruction of the Amazon rainforest. Support for conservation comes from more than an international elite.

Discussions of how to balance local, short-term needs for survival against the longer-term needs of the planet began. Rich countries lined up against poorer ones, and little was resolved. From the early 1970s, the United Nations worked to make international law and international policies that would recognize the need for environmental protection. Since the 1970s, a long series of issues, such as trade in elephant ivory, global warming, and acid rain, have been discussed internationally.

Conservation has received more support in theory than in practice. At an early meeting in Stockholm in 1972, developing countries insisted on their right to continue to pollute. Oil-producing nations resisted agreements restricting carbon emissions. In the early 1980s the U.S. government actively opposed existing levels of environmental regulation. Nevertheless, the limited successes of the environmental movement since the late 1960s have shown that citizens in many countries want ecological prudence. Environmentalism has crossed international borders and

transformed local politics. Its appeal, particularly to younger voters, has drawn people into parliamentary politics in Europe. The idea of “biosphere earth” has had an international appeal, giving globalism a new focus.

CONCLUSION

The first wave of international exchanges after 1945 looked like Americanization, but countries soon created their own versions of a modernist youth culture. Jazz, rock 'n' roll, blue jeans, and U.S. movies spawned local imitations, which then circulated internationally. Borders proved to be porous, particularly in an era of rising incomes and technological change. Along with millions of migrants to the big cities and international television coverage came new ideas, new products, and new languages, all of which were particularly appealing to young people who wanted more exciting lives.

This globalization of consumption did not happen automatically or without conflict. Governments and corporations worked actively to promote it, and the advertising industry and the independent media built their fortunes on it. One consequence was globalized production, which added new factory jobs in developing countries and subtracted them in the older manufacturing regions. Because different people paid the costs and reaped the benefits of such production, the implications of global economic change were, and continue to be, controversial. What labor standards and wage rates should apply?

Since the early 1950s, international economic and cultural exchanges have triggered multiple conflicts between conservatives and liberals, old and young, men and women, who saw the imports with different eyes. These cultural clashes were part of much larger political battles that raged internationally during the 1960s and 1970s, raising issues of values. Fundamentalist religious groups joined the fray, working to move their societies closer to their vision of an ideal world. International organizations added another level of consultation to complex political debates.

The 1960s and 1970s were decades of intense political conflict, both within states and between them. Issues of civil rights that pitted individuals against state governments or group against group convulsed societies in the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia. Both Communist and capitalist nations had to reexamine their fundamental principles. Angry students, who questioned the actions and values of their elders, protested against laws and habits they found unjust. In the early post-war decades, political dissatisfactions could cross borders just as easily as films and music.

For Further Reading

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<http://rockhall.com/story-of-rock/>
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