

Campaign in which all men and women between the ages of sixteen and fifty (excepting those with bad class labels or physical handicaps) were expected to train with weapons as members of their local militias (see photo 4.1).¹³⁸ At a State Council meeting that same month, Mao enthused, “Everyone’s a soldier! We must issue guns. At first we’ll issue several million; later on, tens of millions. Every province should produce light weapons, rifles, automatics, hand grenades, small cannons. The people’s communes have military affairs departments which must all practice.”¹³⁹ One scholar of military affairs characterizes the movement as “perhaps the most ambitious military enterprise in the history of mankind.”¹⁴⁰ A Swedish anthropologist who lived in a Chinese village during the campaign observed that every “person with *civic rights*, only excepting invalids or the disabled, is a member of the people’s militia.”¹⁴¹

Timed to coincide with the launching of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the attendant establishment of people’s communes, the Everyone a Soldier Campaign was an integral part of these other bold initiatives (see photo 4.2). As Melvin Gurtov points out, “In all key respects—in its emphasis on mass participation, voluntarism, indigenous methods, decentralized authority, self-reliance and the Chinese revolutionary model—the militia movement was consistent with the spirit and essence of the GLF as a whole.”¹⁴²

Here then was a much expanded notion of citizenship in which virtually all the people would be organized and energized in concerted support of the new regime and its determined drive toward Communism. General Fu Qitao, the man in charge of militia work, explained that the Everyone a Soldier Campaign was intended to “strengthen the organization, discipline, and militancy of the people and transform the disunity and backwardness inherited from the old society.”¹⁴³ The national militia was being touted as a primary vehicle for promoting and protecting the postrevolutionary order.

The plan was for a people’s militia of 300 million (out of a total population then estimated at 700 million); among them, former soldiers would constitute the backbone (*guyan*) and hardy males the core (*jiguan*) of the militia. In the countryside, the newly formed communes would serve as the basis of militia organization; in the cities, urban work units as well as residential committees would perform



Photo 4.2. Peasants in a North China commune combine farm labor and militia training as part of the 1958 Everyone a Soldier Campaign. Taken from Zhongguo gongchandang 70nian tuji, Volume II, page 277.

that function. By late 1959, Shanghai’s militia had grown to more than 2.5 million people—a quarter of the city’s total population—of whom more than half a million were core members who received intensive military and political instruction.¹⁴⁴ At the Shanghai Metallurgy Bureau, for example, 85 percent of the workforce (773 of 911 employees) joined the militia; only those with clouded political histories or health problems were exempted. Nearly half of the militia cadres at the bureau had previously served in the army, while 22 percent of the grassroots cadres and nearly 20 percent of the rank and file were party members.¹⁴⁵ Nationally, the militia totaled approximately 220 million members—organized by workplace as well as by neighborhood.¹⁴⁶ Only in those parts of the country where potentially hostile ethnic minorities predominated, such as Xinjiang,¹⁴⁷ did

the regional military command refrain from promoting universal militia membership.

Military Control

As had long been true for the rural militias, now urban militias as well fell under direct supervision by the military. By this time, we have seen, unions had been effectively eliminated as a bureaucratic competitor. A Militia Department within the Central Military Commission, chaired by Fu Qitao, was responsible for overall command. Within each of the regional military districts, People's Armed Forces departments—staffed by active-duty PLA cadres—exercised control over local militia affairs.¹⁴⁸ At the ground level, militiamen were organized into companies, platoons, battalions, and regiments.¹⁴⁹ Weapons, in addition to those made available from army warehouses, were to be manufactured by all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.¹⁵⁰ Factories involved in the production of weapons would be managed by the regional military commands.¹⁵¹ The goal was one gun for every four people.¹⁵² In conjunction with the Everyone a Soldier Campaign, People's Armed Forces departments were expected to carry out political investigations of all old and new militia members. Those with impure politics or bad class backgrounds were to be expelled in this process. Only militiamen deemed politically reliable were granted access to guns.¹⁵³

Although a primary impetus for the Everyone a Soldier Campaign was to counter a possible military attack on China, the militias were promoted for other reasons as well. As A. Doak Barnett notes, the motives behind the Everyone a Soldier Campaign had economic and political, as well as military, objectives: "The militia forces were regarded as an important mechanism for improving the organization and discipline of the work force and strengthening political control at the local level. However, the regime also believed the militia would improve local defense capabilities."¹⁵⁴ The Central Military Commission, in justifying its 1959 plan for militia work, emphasized the multiple contributions of militias: "In the Civil War, War of Resistance, War of Liberation, and during the ten years since the founding of the country, militias have been extremely useful in protecting revolutionary political power, assisting the military, and advancing socialist con-

struction."¹⁵⁵ Greater reliance on militias, the commission suggested, would reduce the size of the standing army, thereby saving money that could go toward more pressing needs. Left unsaid was the obvious point that the militia served as a convenient means of increasing PLA involvement in a wide range of social and economic activities. Under the command of Lin Biao, who replaced Peng Dehuai as minister of defense in the summer of 1959, the PLA heightened its political profile by moving aggressively into extramilitary realms.¹⁵⁶

Discipline and Training

The enormous expansion of the militia that occurred during the Everyone a Soldier Campaign was accompanied by a predictable increase in disciplinary problems. These troubles were especially pronounced in the countryside, where the effects of the GLF were taking their deadly toll.¹⁵⁷ In the winter of 1960, the director of the Militia Department, Fu Qitao, undertook an inspection tour of Henan Province at the request of the Central Military Commission. Traveling through a countryside devastated by famine, General Fu found that many of the young people who had joined the militia in 1958 were no longer actively participating. Instead, he reported that "bad elements . . . descended from ruffians and bandits" had infiltrated the ranks of the militia, as had "members of the landlord class, counter-revolutionaries and other 'rightists.'" In one county, eleven of thirteen commune militia captains had used the cover of the militia to commit "seriously unlawful acts" that ranged from robbery to rape. Three out of four regimental and battalion commanders were said to be guilty of these and other criminal activities. As a result, the peasants referred to militiamen with epithets such as "mad dogs," "gangsters," "bandit kings," and "tiger bands." Weapons control was in disarray, with many rifles having fallen into the wrong hands. General Fu attributed these dangerous developments to the fact that grassroots officials "do not realize that the militia is the instrument of the proletarian dictatorship."¹⁵⁸ In coming to terms with this disturbing report, the Central Military Commission did not, however, recommend that the militia assume a greater internal policing role—as one might have expected of an "instrument of proletarian dictatorship" (and as would occur only a few years later, after Mao reminded his countrymen to

“Never forget class struggle”). Rather, at this time the PLA’s leaders specifically barred the militia from “repressing internal contradictions.”¹⁵⁹ The solution to the militia’s problems, cautioned the Military Commission, lay in upgrading the training of the militia to heighten its “revolutionary alertness.”¹⁶⁰

The PLA thereupon stepped up what was in fact already a considerable effort devoted to militia training.¹⁶¹ For core militia members, military instructors provided special courses in gunnery, anti-chemical warfare, medical aid, and communications. For the ordinary populace, summer camps were the main mode of training. In addition to participating in irregular spare-time training sessions, all militia members were expected to spend at least ten days each year undergoing full-time instruction.¹⁶²

Militia training sessions often stressed ideological commitment (or “redness”) as much—or more—than technical skills (or expertise).¹⁶³ When one young Shanghai militiaman complained that the gun he had been issued was old and heavy and not comparable to the automatic rifles carried by regular PLA soldiers, his instructor retorted, “We must not devalue these guns. These were taken from the hands of the KMT. In the hands of counterrevolutionaries, they were stained with the blood of the people. Now we control them and we can use them to redeem these blood debts.”¹⁶⁴ Movies such as the *Red Detachment of Women* (first released in 1961) were designed to popularize interest in military service among women as well as men.

Despite such encouragement, many ordinary militia members were reportedly quite fearful of encountering the enemy. A survey conducted at a Shanghai factory in 1962 found widespread trepidation among militia members that Chiang Kai-shek, with American assistance, was poised to drop an atomic bomb on the mainland. The remedy for these anxieties, according to militia instructors, was to further strengthen ideological training.¹⁶⁵ Apprehension among militiamen continued to present a problem, however. A summary report by the Shanghai Garrison Command in the spring of 1965 noted that even leading cadres in the local militia were popularizing slogans that undermined militia work: “Now that we have the atom bomb, the militia’s of no use,” and “Production is like cash but the militia is like a personal check. To slack at production brings serious repercus-

sions but to slack at militia work brings at most a reprimand.”¹⁶⁶ To overcome these reservations, the Garrison Command recommended “undertaking class education so as to strengthen ceaselessly the concept of class struggle.”¹⁶⁷

Extramilitary Assignments

Consistent with the growing emphasis on class struggle, militias began to perform an increasing array of tasks beyond the military arena. Crime control was an especially important concern for newly instituted urban militias. In 1962, a militia unit stationed at Shanghai’s Number One Department Store apprehended nearly five hundred pickpockets, as well as several arsonists and armed robbers.¹⁶⁸ From 1961 to 1963, Shanghai’s Caoxi Road Militia Company was credited with having cracked 189 criminal cases, four of which involved counterrevolutionaries. On Chongming Island, several prisoners were accused in 1962 of having plotted to seize guns, rob a bank, and escape to Taiwan with their booty. Militia forces on the island were acclaimed for forestalling this and eight other counterrevolutionary cliques that year.¹⁶⁹ Production drives and disaster relief were another focus of militia activity. In the countryside, militias organized production “shock troops” and “tackle-key-problems combat units” to deal with agricultural concerns such as insects, drought, water conservancy, and fertilizer application. In both urban and rural areas, militias assisted with emergency management during typhoons and other natural disasters.¹⁷⁰ Militiamen spearheaded the countless mobilization campaigns that were a hallmark of Mao’s rule. They enforced universal participation by all members of the factory or village, dragged out designated targets of struggle, and monitored mass meetings.¹⁷¹

The militias also served a kind of public relations function, performing military exercises to impress foreign dignitaries.¹⁷² A group of sixteen women militia members from Shanghai’s Xuhui Foodstuffs Company were a favorite choice to demonstrate competitive sharpshooting skills for visitors from abroad. Initially these women workers were no match for their rural counterparts, who after all had been handling rifles for a longer period of time. In March 1965, when Pakistan’s Ayub Khan toured Shanghai in the company of

Zhou Enlai, the Xuhui sharpshooters competed against a rural militia from nearby Baoshan County. After the performance, Zhou compared the city women unfavorably to their country cousins: "You are urban militia. They are rural militia. You are better dressed than they, but your marksmanship isn't as good as theirs. You should learn from your village sisters and practice hard." Ayub Khan was less reserved in his praise for the workers' performance, reportedly remarking to Zhou: "Other countries' regular armies can't shoot as well as your militia. If the U.S. attacks, you can defeat her." And a few months later, when Zhou Enlai—on another visit to Shanghai, this time to accompany Burma's Ne Win—again witnessed the Xuhui sharpshooters compete against their rural counterparts, he too had nothing but compliments for the urban workers: "This time you won! You shot very well."¹⁷³ With the extension of militia conscription from peasants to proletariat, the fulcrum of revolutionary authority was beginning to shift from the countryside back toward the cities.

CONCLUSION

The chameleonic character of militias in the opening years of the PRC was emblematic of the challenges involved in adapting complex revolutionary traditions to the service of a new political order. The course that this process of institutional inversion would take was not altogether obvious from the outset. Russian and KMT precedents, as well as the CCP's own urban and rural experiences, not to mention differences among the classical revolutionary theorists themselves, provided the raw material for competing conceptions of state-society relations. These alternative approaches translated into bureaucratic scuffles as various government agencies scrambled to gain control. Although Mao's initiation of the Everyone a Soldier Campaign in 1958 seemed to have decided the militia debate in favor of universal military mobilization for the purpose of national discipline, development, and defense, this turned out to be but a temporary resolution of a continuing controversy concerning the contours of revolutionary citizenship. Soon class would again overshadow community as the rationale for mass political engagement.

Along with this redefinition came more brutal expressions of both bureaucratic and popular conflict.

In the context of polemics with the Soviet Union over the correct course of Communism, the Chinese leadership returned to an interest in the Paris Commune model.¹⁷⁴ The influential essay entitled "Long Live Leninism," published by the CCP's theoretical journal *Red Flag* in 1960, echoed the words of Marx and Lenin on the key lesson of the Commune: "the proletariat should use revolutionary means to seize state power, smash the military and bureaucratic machine of the bourgeoisie, and establish the proletarian dictatorship to replace the bourgeois dictatorship." Mao and his colleagues now argued in effect that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the preferred type of institutional inversion for a postrevolutionary polity: "a continuation of the class struggle in another form under new conditions."¹⁷⁵

The appeal of proletarian patrols was thereby rekindled. Worker militias not only carried the official endorsement of Marx and Lenin, they also connected the Chinese Communists to their earliest social roots.¹⁷⁶ And when Mao advanced the slogan "Never forget class struggle," warning in the fall of 1962 that counterrevolutionaries were on the verge of reversing the country's revolutionary progress, the stage was set for a comeback of this paramount instrument of class warfare. The Shanghai Garrison Command dramatically summarized the stakes at a militia work conference in the spring of 1965:

Since launching the Socialist Education Movement, we have come keenly to realize that class enemies are plotting a restoration, hoping to seize leadership control, employing every possible means to try to seize the leadership of the militias. If we don't take the actual control of the militias into our own hands, we will be helping the enemies to carry out a class restoration, causing danger.¹⁷⁷

Militias were being spotlighted as a key site of class struggle (see photo 4.3).¹⁷⁸ The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (CR) would witness an extraordinary escalation of this dynamic.

On the eve of the CR, China was a nation in arms. While only core members of the militia may have been capable of performing combat duties, much of the rest of the population had received at




Photo 4.3. Peasant criticized as a class enemy bows in admission of guilt before his local militia in 1965. Taken from Li Zhensheng, *Red-Color News Soldier: A Chinese Photographer's Odyssey Through the Cultural Revolution* (London: Phaidon Press, 2003), page 32.

least a rudimentary military education, which included some experience in handling firearms, as a result of widespread participation in militia exercises. Doak Barnett summarizes the overall contribution of militia forces in this period:

They were prepared to enforce political control when necessary and at all times helped to mobilize and discipline the work force. They also provided a useful reservoir of potential army recruits, as well as an important outlet for soldiers returning from military service. In a sense, furthermore, they contributed to some extent to

the overall “militarization” of the population as a whole, by . . . sub-jecting almost the entire population to ideas of military discipline and control.¹⁷⁹

Although contemporary Chinese interpretations of the CR tend to treat the events of that decade—including the Gang of Four’s deployment of urban militias—as a sharp break with earlier experiences, previous efforts to militarize the populace through militia-building programs, such as the Everyone a Soldier Campaign, had in fact laid an organizational foundation for these subsequent experiments in revolutionary citizenship. Radicals in the CR drew not only on the distant model of the Paris Commune, inspirational as it was, but also on an institutional infrastructure that had been assembled right at home in the preceding decades.

Yet whereas the Everyone a Soldier Campaign had emphasized the mobilization of the entire populace, rural and urban alike, the CR would witness the return—with a vengeance—to the notion of a special revolutionary role for the working class. Now that domestic reactionaries, rather than foreign invaders, were identified as the chief threat to the body politic, strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat as a means of combating counterrevolutionaries was declared a pressing priority.

The composition of the proletariat had, however, been complicated and compromised by previous historical experience. In the mid-1960s, former leaders of the KMT’s Industry Defense Corps continued to occupy important factory positions.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, past practices of infiltrating enemy ranks in the course of revolutionary struggle, initiated by Zhou Enlai in the 1920s and revived by Zhang Qi in the 1940s, generated longstanding suspicions that would fuel subsequent witch hunts. As Zhang Qi later remarked, “For thirty years after Liberation, loyal CCP underground members bore the burden of this decision [to infiltrate the opposition]—suffering persecution during the Cultural Revolution.”¹⁸¹

Nearly a decade prior to the start of the CR, Zhang Qi—then serving as director of the SFTU—requested that his superiors in Beijing convene a meeting of cadres in the former Shanghai party underground in order to identify and exonerate those who had enlisted

in the KMT as part of the CCP's revolutionary strategy. His suggestion was never acted upon, but Zhang ruefully acknowledged that "even had such a report been written and approved by Party Central, it would have been of little use during the Cultural Revolution when historical facts were blatantly disregarded."¹⁸² China's Leninist party-state system, which had matured through a protracted process of institutional inversion under nearly forty years of combined KMT and CCP rule, was about to face its most severe challenge to date.

NOTES

1. For pathbreaking analyses of the early years of Communist rule in the cities, see Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-1952* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1980); and Ezra Vogel, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969). A. Doak Barnett, in his pioneering study of the period, *Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-1955* (New York: Praeger, 1964), concludes that "a small but vitally important minority of the Chinese population," including organized labor, had enthusiastically accepted Communist rule (11).
2. See, for example, Liu Binyan, *A Higher Kind of Loyalty* (New York: Pantheon, 1990), 61.
3. For these various conceptions, see Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (New York: Praeger, 1956); Alan P. Liu, *Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist China* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1976); Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); Frederick C. Teiwes, "The Chinese State during the Maoist Era," in *The Modern Chinese State*, ed. David Shambaugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 105-60.
4. For an elaboration of this point, see Elizabeth J. Perry, "Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State-Society Relations," *China Quarterly* (September 1994). Despite these important variations, the pre-CR system can be characterized as Leninist inasmuch as it operated by "principles of democratic centralism, ideology as guide to policy, and party supremacy over the government and military" and was "intent on transforming the status quo through economic policies, political mobilization and propaganda." These defining features of Leninist party-states are discussed in Bruce J. Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.

5. The formation of citizenship in general has been characterized as a violent process. Bryan S. Turner observes that "the critical factor in the emergence of citizenship is violence, that is, the overt and conscious struggle of social groups to achieve social participation." Bryan S. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 26. When citizenship develops as a product of revolution, the process is particularly violent.
6. V.I. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932), chap. 4.
7. Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1977), 261-92.
8. Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," (1939), and "On New Democracy" (1940), in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 2:305-34, 339-84.
9. Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: Free Press, 1986), 62.
10. Rex A. Wade, *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984), 312-15. A main activity of the Russian Red Guards after the revolution was to guard liquor stores and, when break-ins did occur, to put a stop to the resulting riots. Happily, this does not seem to have been a major concern for the PPPC!
11. For numerous examples of industrial sabotage, infiltration of Communist pickets, and other disruptive efforts by former KMT elements in Shanghai, see *Tenun puohuai gongchang de zuixing* [Crimes of secret agent industrial sabotage] (Shanghai: East China People's Press, 1951).
12. Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touru baowei dashanghai de zhandou" [A million workers join the battle to defend greater Shanghai], in *Jingbei dashanghai* [Guarding greater Shanghai] (Shanghai: Far Eastern Press, 1994), 178.
13. SMA, C1-1-32. Judging from an investigation of PPPC membership in the textile sector, it appears that the majority of People's Corps members were young males from Subei. However, a substantial number of older skilled workers, some of whom claimed picket experiences dating back to the mid-1920s, were also represented. Although most of Shanghai's textile workers were women, they accounted for only 13 percent of the PPPC membership in this sector. See SMA, C1-2-304.
14. Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touru baowei dashanghai de zhandou," 176-77.
15. SMA, C1-2-163; Li Jiaqi, ed., *Shanghai gongyunzhi* [Shanghai labor movement gazetteer] (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1997), 430.
16. Wade, *Red Guards and Workers' Militias*, 311, 318-19, 330. In the summer of 1918, as the Red Guards were being phased out, some remnant units were absorbed into the secret police, or Cheka; others were merged into the Red Army.
17. In a December 1947 talk about the Shijiazhuang debacle, Liu Shaoqi blamed its excesses on the mistaken assumption that rural methods of struggle were appropriate in urban areas as well. Liu Shaoqi, "Guanyu chengshi qunzhong gongzuo wenti" [

[On the question of mass work in the cities], *Liu Shaoqi lun gongren yundong* [Liu Shaoqi discusses the labor movement] (Beijing: Central Documents Press, 1988), 309–15.

18. For conflicts between military representatives and unionists at the Jiangnan Shipyard, see Shanghai Party Committee History Research Office, ed., *Jieguan Shanghai* [The takeover of Shanghai] (Beijing: China Broadcasting and Television Press, 1993), 1:258–59.

19. Li Lisan, “Zai quanguo gonghui gongzuo huiyishang de kaimuci” [Remarks at the opening of the work conference for the All-China Trade Union], *Li Lisan Lai Ruoyu lun gonghui* [Li Lisan, Lai Ruoyu discuss unions] (Beijing: Archives Press, 1989), 32.

20. Li Lisan, “Zai gongren yundong xunlianban kaixue dianlishang de jianghua” [Speech at the ceremony for the opening of the labor movement training session], *Li Lisan Lai Ruoyu lun gonghui*, 45.

21. Li Lisan, “Guanyu gonghui gongzuo wenti” [On union work], *Li Lisan Lai Ruoyu lun gonghui*, 87.

22. In a July 2, 1949, letter to Li Lisan, the head of the Shanghai Trade Union noted that comrades from the old liberated base areas in the north disagreed with the former underground leaders about how to organize in the factories. By this account, the northerners—lacking concrete knowledge of the local Shanghai scene—were easily prone to “subjectivist errors.” The southerners, although familiar with local conditions, were less knowledgeable about central policy and thus more susceptible to “economistic errors.” SMA, C1-2-12.

23. SMA, C1-1-16. One particularly pernicious rumor held that PLA soldiers had killed or injured more than eighty workers at the Shenxin Number Nine Cotton Mill (the site of a major strike under KMT rule only the year before). The Shenxin Factory was besieged with phone calls, inquiring about the alleged blood-bath, prompting its union to dispatch representatives to other factories around the city to dispel the misunderstanding. Zhang Jinping, “Baiwan zhigong touru baowei dashanghai de zhandou,” 181.

24. *Tewu puohuai gongchang de zuixing*. This collection provides information on ten major cases of secret-agent agitation in Shanghai factories in the early PRC period; in seven of the ten cases, former Industry Defense Corps members are depicted as having played key roles in instigating the conflicts.

25. Thanks to this initiative, more than 270 alleged enemy agents were rounded up in the wee hours of the morning on June 29, of whom more than 70 were factory workers. SMA, C1-1-16; Zhang Jinping, “Baiwan zhigong touru baowei dashanghai de zhandou,” 180.

26. SMA, C1-1-16.

27. Beijing Municipal Archives, 101-1-2, 101-1-230. The Beijing recruits included 178 railway workers, 541 factory workers, and 1,531 citizens drawn from residential districts of the city.

28. Zhang Qi, “Ji Shanghai renmin baoandui” [A record of the Shanghai People's Peace Preservation Corps], in *Shanghai zhamyi* [The battle of Shanghai] (Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 1989), 219.

29. SMA, C1-2-163. On metalworkers during the revolutionary years, see Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).

30. SMA, C1-2-163.

31. SMA, C1-1-16.

32. SMA, C1-2-165. The need for better control over the firearms issued to worker pickets was stressed repeatedly in union bulletins. See, for example, C1-2-494.

33. SMA, C1-2-182. The SFTU instituted a new photo ID system for armed pickets, identifying both the picket and the authorized weapon, which had to be available for inspection by any picket carrying a gun.

34. SMA, C1-2-163.

35. “Shanghai zonggonghui jiucha bu guanyu jiefang qianhou zhigong douzheng qingkuang de baogao” [Report of the Picket Department of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions concerning the struggle situation of workers before and after liberation], in SMA, ed., *Shanghai jiefang* [The liberation of Shanghai] (Beijing: Archive Press, 1989), 142.

36. SMA, C1-2-41.

37. *Jiefanghou Shanghai gongyun ziliao* [Materials on the post-liberation Shanghai labor movement] (Shanghai: May–December 1949), 149–56.

38. SMA, C1-2-41.

39. SMA, C1-2-240.

40. The attack elicited a stern rebuke to Taipei from U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who criticized the bombing as “purely provocative.” See David Michael Finklestein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949–1950* (Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University, 1993), 292–94; and Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: U.S. Policy toward Taiwan, 1950–1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 16, 272.

41. SMA, B120-1-69; Jiang Yi, *Chen Yi zai Shanghai* [Chen Yi in Shanghai] (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 1992), 92–95. According to one source, a KMT secret agent by the name of Luo Bingqian selected the targets and relayed them from a hidden transmitter on the ground in Zhabei. See *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing* [Milicias in Contemporary China] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1989), 343.

42. Zhang Jinping, “Baiwan zhigong touru baowei dashanghai de zhandou,” 182; *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 13:51.

43. *Shanghai gongyunshi ziliao* [Materials on the history of the Shanghai labor movement], no. 13 (February 28, 1951): 25–26.

44. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions, ed., *Shanghai gongren yundongshi: Kang-ri zhanzheng shiqi* [A history of the Shanghai labor movement: The War of Resistance period] (Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Press, 1992), 242. Sun Ming (aka Sun Hongxin) was a Shanghaiese of impoverished origins who had joined the CCP in 1938 and had served under Zhang Qi in the party underground during the War of Resistance. SMA, C1-1-72.

45. Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touren baowei dashanghai de zhandou," 183.
46. Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touren baowei dashanghai de zhandou," 183-84; SMA, C1-1-54.
47. C1-2-163. Of these, approximately 1,290 were students, 524 were party members, and 3,561 were league members. The rest were ordinary workers. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 431.
48. SMA, C1-2-167, C1-2-168, C1-2-490.
49. SMA, C1-2-167.
50. SMA, C1-2-177.
51. A report on picket training in the summer of 1950 estimated that politics comprised 60-70 percent of the curriculum. SMA, C1-1-163.
52. SMA, C1-2-170.
53. SMA, C1-2-170.
54. SMA, C1-2-174.
55. SMA, C1-1-28.
56. SMA, C1-2-167; Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touren baowei dashanghai de zhandou," 184.
57. SMA, C1-2-488.
58. SMA, C21-1-67. This confidential report from the Communist Youth League, which advocated placing picket operations under Public Security Bureau control, noted that "there is a very big difference between us and the Picket Department . . . Sun Ming's Picket Department insists that picket forces should be strengthened and expanded without first rethinking their mission."
59. SMA, C1-1-163. At this time, the trade union wing had 22,500 pickets with the following sectoral composition: textiles: 4,976; metallurgy: 2,800; city government: 2,163; military: 1,150; shop clerks: 4,252; railway: 650; postal: 700; rubber: 1,100; tobacco: 857; theaters: 247; foodstuffs: 300; handicrafts: 800; medicine: 306; printing: 500; flour: 280; transport: 1,500.
60. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 431.
61. SMA, C1-2-166. Other workers did participate in a gala national day parade, the route of which was virtually identical to that of the Guomindang's Double Ten Day parade of earlier years. SMA, C1-2-183, Q7-307.
62. Paul Harper, "The Party and the Unions in Communist China," *China Quarterly*, no. 37 (January-March 1969): 84-119.
63. *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], September 22, 1949.
64. Tang Chunliang, *Li Lisan zhuan* [Biography of Li Lisan] (Harbin: Heilongjiang People's Press, 1989), 144-54.
65. Gun registration records, compiled by the Shanghai textile unions in the period 1950-1951, indicate that although the rank and file picket members did not enjoy immediate access to guns, a substantial number of picket captains (pistols and rifles alike) were in the personal possession of picket captains. SMA, C-2-499.
66. Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touren baowei dashanghai de zhandou," 184.
67. On July 10, 1950, all party members were required to reveal their identities. SMA, C1-2-458.
68. Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touren baowei dashanghai de zhandou," 189.
69. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 432.
70. *Shanghai gongyunzhi ziliao* [Materials on the history of the Shanghai labor movement], no. 13 (February 28, 1951): 26.
71. Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touren baowei dashanghai de zhandou," 187-88; SMA, C1-1-60.
72. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 419. In other parts of China as well, the campaign reached its height at this time. On May 10, 1951, a close associate of warlord Wu Peifu who had carried out the massacre of worker pickets along the Jinghan Railway on February 7, 1923 (see chapter 1), was apprehended in Suzhou as part of the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign. On July 17, 1951, the defendant was sentenced to death by the Wuhan Municipal Court. He was thereupon taken to the Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery and executed by firing squad in front of the spirit tablets of victims of the 1923 massacre. Liu Bin, *Dangdai Zhongguo ming'an, 1949-1995* [Famous cases in contemporary China, 1949-1995] (Zhuhai: Zhuhai Press, 1996), 3.
73. Zhang Jinping, "Baiwan zhigong touren baowei dashanghai de zhandou," 189.
74. Tellingly, an investigation conducted by the CCP at the Shanghai Power Company on the eve of Shanghai's liberation had found Chen Jinfu to be "anti-Communist, but extremely capable, highly intelligent, and with ambitions of becoming a labor leader." SMA, Q0-4(5)-25.
75. SMA, C1-1-54, C1-2-397, C1-2-489.
76. SMA, C1-2-363.
77. SMA, C1-2-491.
78. SMA, C1-1-54.
79. SMA, C1-1-60.
80. SMA, C1-2-488.
81. At the Number Ten Cotton Mill, for example, twenty-five of the ninety-five pickets were women. SMA, C1-2-458.
82. SMA, C1-2-488.
83. SMA, C1-2-741.
84. SMA, C1-2-682.
85. SMA, C1-2-458.
86. Between January 11 and February 22, 1951, among the 3,341 counterrevolutionaries registered at Shanghai's privately owned factories were 1,643 former Industry Defense Corps members. C1-2-483, Q6-31-265.
87. SMA, C1-2-458.
88. SMA, Q6-31-265.
89. SMA, B127-1-1186.

90. Tang Chunliang, *Li Lisan zhuan*, 150.
91. Firms with fewer than one hundred employees, as well as private firms and cooperatives, were explicitly excluded from coverage. So too were contract and temporary laborers employed at large state firms. For a fuller discussion of divisions within the labor force created by the *laobao* system, see Elizabeth J. Perry, "Labor's Love Lost: Worker Militancy in Communist China," *International Labor and Working-Class History* (Fall 1996).
92. SMA, C1-2-397.
93. The suicides are discussed in several issues of the internal-circulation bulletin of the trade union, *Gongyun qingkuang* [Labor movement conditions] in May of 1951. See SMA, C1-2-397.
94. SMA, C1-2-397.
95. SMA, C1-2-490.
96. SMA, C1-2-487.
97. SMA, C1-2-491.
98. SMA, Q6-31-566.
99. SMA, C1-2-680.
100. SMA, C1-1-72.
101. Tang Chunliang, *Li Lisan zhuan*, 153.
102. Liu Shaoqi, "Guoying gongchang neibu de maodun he gonghui gongzuo de jiben renwu" [Internal contradictions in state factories and the basic responsibilities of union work], *Liu Shaoqi lun gongren yundong*, 407.
103. Harper, "The Party and the Unions in Communist China," 96. See also Jackie Sheehan, *Chinese Workers: A New History* (New York: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1.
104. Li Jiaqi, "Wushi niandaichu pipan gonghui de 'jingjizhuyi,' 'gong-tuanzhuyi,' jiqi zai Shanghai de yingxiang" [The early 1950s critique of "economism" and "syndicalism" and its influence on Shanghai], *Shanghai gongyunshi* [History of the Shanghai labor movement], no. 6 (1986): 1–7.
105. SMA, B168-1-240; Shanghai Communist Party Organization Department, ed., *Zhongguo gongchandang Shanghai zuzhishi ziliao* [Chinese Communist Party Shanghai city organizational history materials] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991), 419.
106. SMA, C1-2-646.
107. SMA, C1-2-680.
108. *Shanghai shi laodongji gongzuo baogao* [Work report of the Shanghai Labor Bureau], 1952 (courtesy of the SFTU).
109. Even so, the security situation at some factories remained tense. In the summer of 1952, the Xinxing Machine Tool Factory, located in the western suburbs of the city, was prompted by the sound of frequent gun shots to request more rifles for its beleaguered picket force. The thirty-odd pickets at the factory possessed only three outmoded rifles; the factory's request for six new rifles was met by authorization for four. SMA, C1-2-646.
110. SMA, Q6-31-187.
111. SMA, C1-2-680.
112. SMA, C1-2-646.
113. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 432. In the Soviet Union as well, members of disbanded workers' militias often entered the new state security organs. See Wade, *Red Guards and Workers' Militias*, 317.
114. John Gardner, "The *Wu-fan* Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control," in *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, ed. A. Doak Barnett (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 531–32.
115. In June of 1953, as Mao geared up for the socialist transformation of agriculture and industry, he declared that clinging to New Democracy was a "rightist deviation." Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics at Mao's Court: Gao Gang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 184–85.
116. SMA, B54–4.
117. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Shanghai's 1957 Strike Wave," *China Quarterly* (March 1994).
118. SMA, C1-1-189.
119. SMA, C1-2-2407.
120. Sheehan, *Chinese Workers: A New History*, 89.
121. *Shanghai minbing douzheng shiziliao* [Historical materials on the struggles of the Shanghai militia] (December 1980), bk. 2, 12:15–17. By 1958, Shanghai's rural counties had enrolled 740,000 militiamen. The militias were responsible for nightly patrols to keep watch over such sensitive locations as warehouses, railroads, and bridges. They served also as an important recruiting pipeline for the PLA. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 12:5–7.
122. Ding Li, *Zhonggong de minbing zhidu* [The Chinese Communists' militia system] (Hong Kong: Youlian Press, 1954), 29ff.
123. Quoted in John Gittings, "China's Militia," *China Quarterly*, no. 18 (April–June 1964): 102.
124. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 12:2.
125. G. William Skinner, "Aftermath of Communist Liberation in the Chengdu Plain," *Pacific Affairs* 24, no. 1 (March 1951): 62.
126. Yi Yuanqiu and Liu Guofu, *Minbing zongheng tan* [A comprehensive discussion of the militia] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1994), 195.
127. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing* [Militias in contemporary China] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1989), 347–48. According to public security statistics, 816 counterrevolutionary uprisings intending to overthrow the government occurred in the first ten months of 1950. See He Yumin, *Zhongguo renmin qongan shigao* [Draft history of Chinese public security] (Beijing: Police Officer Education Press, 1997), 256.
128. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, 274.
129. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, 247. Another (internal circulation) source credits the militias with having exterminated more than 2.4 million bandits, secret agents, and other enemies of the revolution during the first three years of the new

- regime. See Militia Editorial Department of *Contemporary China*, ed., *Jianguo yilai minbing jianshe dashiji* [Annals of militia construction since the founding of the country] (Beijing: 1985), 2. Hereafter cited as *Jianguo yilai*.
130. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 12:40–45.
 131. Samuel B. Griffith, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1967), 268.
 132. Rural militias did play a military role in the early years of the PRC; they fought alongside PLA units in the Korean War and constituted an important element of border defense. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:65; *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*: 290–341.
 133. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 12:15; *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, 21–23.
 134. *Changjiang ribao* [Yangzi Daily], December 26, 1951.
 135. Ding Li, *Zhonggong de minbing zhidu*, 70–71.
 136. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing* [Militias in contemporary China] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1989), 24.
 137. On the debate over military professionalism, see Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1989* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 169.
 138. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:7–8. The “bad” classes referred to landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists.
 139. *Jianguo yilai*, 36.
 140. Gittings, “China’s Militia,” 100.
 141. Jan Myrdal, *Report from a Chinese Village* (New York: Vintage, 1965), 243.
 142. Melvin Gurtov, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign Policy in Chinese Motives,” *Modern China* 2, no. 1 (January 1976): 57.
 143. Fu Qitao, “Renmin de minbing” [The people’s militia], *Zhexue yanjiu* [Philosophical studies], no. 1 (1959).
 144. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:1. Sichuan Province at this time boasted a force of 30 million militiamen; Shandong claimed 25 million; Henan, 20 million; Jiangsu, 14 million; and Liaoning, 8 million. Griffith, *The Chinese People’s Liberation Army*, 270.
 145. SMA, B112-4-324.
 146. John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 201–24.
 147. Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Policy and Power in Xinjiang, 1949–1977* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 106, and “The Urumqi Military Region: Defense and Security in China’s West,” *Asian Survey* 22, no. 8 (August 1982): 720.
 148. Thomas C. Roberts, *The Chinese People’s Militia and the Doctrine of People’s War* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 30–33.
 149. The 773 militiamen at Shanghai’s Metallurgy Bureau comprised a regiment, which was made up of two battalions and nine companies. SMA, B112-4-324.
 150. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:7–8. Some rural brigades fashioned “red tasseled spears”—a traditional weapon of village defense—to arm their militiamen. *Lintong xianzhi* [Lintong county gazetteer] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1991), 706.
 151. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:24.
 152. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:19.
 153. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 15:79.
 154. A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 245.
 155. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:16.
 156. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles*; Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).
 157. On the horror of the GLF famine, see Jasper Becker, *Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine* (New York: Henry Holt, 1998).
 158. J. Chester Cheng, ed., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People’s Liberation Army* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1966), 117–23.
 159. Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army*, 207.
 160. Cheng, *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army*, 123.
 161. Militia training was developed and supervised by the Mass Work and Mobilization subdepartments of the PLA’s General Political Department and General Staff. Roberts, *Chinese People’s Militia*, 32.
 162. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, 51–52; *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:8–9. The city of Beijing sent more than 120,000 militiamen to attend training camps in the countryside; Shanghai dispatched more than 300,000. Griffith, *The Chinese People’s Liberation Army*, 274.
 163. A nationwide conference on militia work, organized by the General Political Department of the PLA in 1964, called for greater emphasis on political education. Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army*, 201–24.
 164. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 15:67–68.
 165. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 15:75.
 166. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:110.
 167. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:112.
 168. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 15:15–18.
 169. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 15:81; 14:6.
 170. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:6.
 171. For numerous examples of this sort of militia deployment in one Chinese village, see Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
 172. In the spring of 1965, the Political Propaganda Department of the PLA criticized the reporting on these militia competitions, charging that the reports offered so much concrete information on military technology as to threaten national security, and that they provided too much coverage of militias composed of

women and of relatives (father-son, husband-wife, sibling, in-law, whole-family, and three-generation militias). *Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian, 1957-1992* [Selected documents on Chinese Communist Party propaganda work, 1957-1992] (Beijing: Study Press, 1996), 396-97.

173. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 15:39-41.

174. See John Bryan Starr, "Revolution in Retrospect: The Paris Commune Through Chinese Eyes," *China Quarterly*, no. 49 (January-March 1972): 110-12. Numerous books and articles on the Paris Commune were published in China in 1961 as part of the commemoration of the 90th anniversary of the Commune. In 1964, Mao accused the Soviets of having betrayed the international proletarian revolution dating "from 1871 when the proletariat of the Paris Commune made the first heroic attempt at the seizure of political power"; *On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World* (Beijing: Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1964), 90.

175. *Long Live Leninism* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), 1. On Mao's possible authorship, see Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1966), 302 (emphasis added).

176. In the years preceding the start of the CR, there was renewed interest in the militant history of the Chinese labor movement. In 1960, for example, the SFTU was instructed by party leaders to look into the possibility of restoring Huzhou Guild Hall, the headquarters of the Shanghai General Labor Union after the May Thirtieth Movement and the Three Workers' Armed Uprisings, to stand as a concrete reminder of the milestones of the Shanghai labor movement. But the original buildings having been completely destroyed by Japanese bombing in 1932, and a three-story workers' dormitory now sitting squarely on the site, the SFTU was unable to come up with a feasible plan for renovation. SMA, C1-1-257.

177. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:115.

178. In the months leading up to the CR, the Shanghai Party Committee initiated a political investigation of the local militia—focusing especially on cadres and core members—that exposed numerous alleged counterrevolutionaries. SMA, A52-2-562.

179. Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power*, 248.

180. SMA, C1-2-3900, C1-2-3898.

181. Zhang Qi, *Shanghai gongyun jishi* [Annals of the Shanghai labor movement] (Shanghai: Chinese Encyclopedia Press, 1991), 180.

182. Zhang Qi, *Shanghai gongyun jishi*.

5

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1966-1976

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (CR) presents a paradox in studies of the dynamics of state-society relations under Mao. On the one hand, proponents of totalitarian or totalitarian models of Chinese politics have pointed to this period as the apotheosis of the strong state.¹ On the other hand, those who highlight the role of social forces have seen the CR as an occasion when elements of society expressed their own interests and objectives with particular power and effect.² While such analytical differences can be attributed in part to contrasting tastes in scholarly approach and interpretation, they also reflect a defining feature of the event itself: as Chairman Mao's last hurrah, the CR exposed tensions between state-building and social mobilization that had been an integral feature of the Chinese Revolution for decades.

Among other things, the CR was a struggle over whether institutions that had developed during the long course of the Communist revolution and its aftermath still retained sufficient proletarian élan to prevent a revisionist retrogression akin to what Mao charged had befallen the Soviet Union. As the classic vehicle of proletarian revolution, urban militias figured prominently in this contest.³ Worker militias were touted as a means of upholding revolutionary orthodoxy in the face of revisionist challenges: "The Paris Commune made clear that we must arm the people, arm the working class, and thoroughly smash the bourgeois state machinery. This is the universal truth of Marxism . . . Whether or not to arm the people, arm the industrial workers, has historically been the major issue separating Marxists and revisionists."⁴