



A Justification for Moral Objectivism as both Truth- analogous and Truth-apt using Parfitian Moral Cognitivism and Habermasian Moral Constructivism

Becky Phillips (2319311)

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Abstract

This dissertation creates and develops an argument for moral objectivity named *Critical Cross-System Objectivism*. This metaethical framework defends moral objectivity both epistemologically and metaphysically. Moral validity requires a dialectical account that considers both moral substantive and procedural moral theories while accommodating for both moral truth-analogousness and moral truth-aptness. Moral validity is comprehensive, plural, and objective without being reduced to a dogmatic ontology.

The argument develops from a critical examination of Derek Parfit and Jürgen Habermas' work. Important theories from both thinkers are examined. On the first side of the coin is a post-metaphysical, pragmatic account of reason that de-transcendentalizes Kantian rationality within communicative rationality and reflects it with considerations from the linguistic turn. It is more dialectical and tied to process and fluid evolution that considers communication, history and agents. So, by grounding reason within the intersubjective communicative ontology of the lifeworld Habermas is using situated reason. This ought to use my theory *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity*, which allows access to truth-apt moral validity by adopting a theory that allows both social mediation and truth-apt standing. With this there needs to be an anti-regress commitment. When grounded and given access, the other side of the coin ought to be entertained which allows theoretical moral reasoning committed to truth-ratio and practical reason as fact. Together, these approaches support a moral framework that recognises both the reality of reason and the reality of moral agents who exercise reason in practice.

By synthesizing Derek Parfit's non-realist cognitivism with Jürgen Habermas' formal pragmatics, this dissertation establishes that substantive normative constraints and procedural discourse are both needed for moral objectivity and that moral validity can involve both truth-ratio tested morality and discussion and lifeworld ordained application models to intersect within an overall objective system.

Finally, the *Agentifying Process* is a matter of how moral agents generate morality as both truth-analogous and truth-apt with an access point. This utilises the work of philosopher Neil Sinhababu in his paper *The Reliable Route from Nonmoral Evidence to Moral Conclusions*. This provides the final brick in the wall for epistemological connection between these forms of validity. The result is a framework that still rejects

moral naturalism while accepting naturalist comparisons regarding moral truth-ratios and other forms of logical and empirical investigation that matter to moral validity and the moral problem solving behind it.

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Introduction:

A considerable amount of philosophical literature has been published on the topic of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is vital for navigating a morally confusing world. Without reflection, argumentation and research we waste the gift of moral agency that humans possess but must refine. Moral philosophy has been studied for thousands of years; the puzzles are ongoing and important.

What this Essay Brings to Metaethics

In relation to this dissertation, I am looking into the heart of this debate in the context of dealing with and justifying moral facts while at the same time justifying moral truth-analogue-ness. A truth-analogue proposition operates as true or false without subscribing to epistemic facts that are mind-independent; they are more operative and discursive but still subscribe to a form of analytical validity. I do this with a metaethical synthesis that works off the problem solving of two philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Derek Parfit. The work argues that these philosophers offer a methodology that gives critical understanding to morality's epistemology and ontology by creating a system that explains and justifies moral objectivism. While other philosophical approaches exist, this methodology offers a robust framework for justifying moral objectivity defended as useful to metaethics research.

This work does not claim to be absolute truth; it welcomes refinement and/or complete abandonment if other research and arguments surpass it. It does however hold confidence in being a useful research methodology for understanding the nature of moral truth. I stand by that usefulness for the field of metaethics being novel, inventive and veering the limelight onto the transformative struggle that comes from studying philosophy at almost any stage of expertise.

I defend my theory which I call *Critical Cross-System Objectivism*. This theory argues moral validity operates with two different systems one as truth-apt and one as truth-analogue for moral objectivism. Its purpose is to demonstrate an argument with my own ideas and problem solving that is built on the study of other methods too. Methods used are mostly connected to Parfit and Habermas, however several other philosophers play important roles in this work's problem solving, argumentation and conclusions. These include Terence Cuneo, Neil Sinhababu, Nadeem J. Z. Hussain and Nishi Shah (Cuneo, 2007; Hussain and Shah, 2006; Sinhababu, 2022).

How Habermas, Parfit and Sinhababu Fit in

Parfit establishes truth-evaluable normative claims. He gives this project its main foundation for moral truth. This is how morality can be deemed a yes or no fact, hence the essay deems them truth-apt validity (Parfit, 2017, pp. 2–5, 2011a, pp. 213–226). His reasoning is labelled by me as *sufficiency-based-reason* based on his moral rationalism which leads him to write “rationally if we act in some way because we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us sufficient reasons to act in this way”. This leads to his Wide-Value-Based claim on validity (Parfit, 2011b, p. 35).

While Parfit’s metaethics is greatly useful, this paper considers there to be a gap for Parfit in his non-ontology relation to epistemology, which is why this paper offers a theory *Agnostic-Pragmatic Reductionism*. See Section [1.5](#) to learn more.

In his three volumes *On What Matters* series, he comes to the conclusion that moral facts are based on moral rationalism (Parfit, 2017, 2011b, 2011a). If we are to be moral then we have sufficient reason to treat morality as facts based on those reasons (Parfit, 2017, 2011b, 2011a). This demand for non-arbitrary constraints is demonstrated by Parfit in his thought experiments like *Future Tuesday Indifference* (Parfit, 2011b, pp. 56–57, 2011a, pp. 244–263). This is a thought experiment about a man who cares about his own suffering but not on a Tuesday.

Parfit’s rationalism works as a scaffolding and anti-regress device for the moral objectivism justified in this paper, but it still shows blind spots that could risk colonisation of the lifeworld which must be supplemented. Colonisation of the lifeworld is when public discourse and morality is disturbed by more strategic reason. See Section [2.4](#) for more details on this. This is where Habermas’ project of metaethics and lifeworld ontology analysis becomes necessary for dealing with this problem.

Habermas’s formal pragmatics de-transcendentalise Kantian pure reason into a historically situated and intersubjective model that can be treated as sensitive to the linguistic turn (Habermas, 2003, pp. 1–237; Yates, 2011). This means rather than an internal, pure and idealistic form of reason it is more situated. It is more dialectical and tied to processes with fluid evolution that considers communication, history and agents. So, by grounding reason within the intersubjective communicative ontology of the lifeworld Habermas is using situated reason (Fultner, 2011a, pp. 7–12; Habermas, 2003, pp. 83–131). Habermas’ use of formal pragmatics avoids colonising the lifeworld while providing a robust cognitivist

metaethics of moral validity. (Allen and Mendieta, 2019; Fultner, 2019a, 2011a, p. 10; Habermas, 1987; Silva, 2019). This is one that defends moral validity as truth-analogous without resorting to non-cognitivism or metaphysical realism (Habermas, 2003, pp. 42–43). Formal pragmatics allow presuppositions of language and argumentation. Truth-analogousness bypasses mind-independent commitment to strict facts without destroying their validity power and yes or no operation.

The essay discusses Habermas' Discourse and Universalisation Principles and makes use of his situated reason for moral validity for better methodology and understanding. The first is the rule of mediated discourse and the second is the rule of considering how it rationally fits in to how it affects everyone involved.

The project further expands on Habermas lessons in justification, validity and truth to add to Parfit's project with dialectical revision and guidance. This is supplemented with my own problem solving and ideas to justify a methodology that explains and argues for moral objectivity.

In the last chapter of this dissertation, I make use of a paper by the philosopher Neil Sinhababu in section [4.3](#) to justify the argument that aims to bridge moral truth-aptness with moral truth-analogousness. This gives details for understanding the bridge involved in what I call the *Agentifying Process*, where agents are directly involved in dealing with moral validity and the dialectical sorting of moral facts and moral truth-analogousness.

Essay Road Map

The main arguments proceed with [Chapter 1](#) which examines Parfit's non-realist cognitivism that highlight moral facts as true or false and it identifies an epistemic-ontological gap in his work. [Chapter 2](#) explores Habermas' post-metaphysical constructivism and the role of situated reason and discourse in preventing lifeworld colonisation. [Chapter 3](#) evaluates the contributions of Parfitian realism and Habermasian constructivism and finally [Chapter 4](#) introduces *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity*, the *Agentifying Process* and demonstrates how reliabilism can be used to bridge Habermasian and Parfitian Reason to connect to an added *Sorting Principle (S)* in Habermasian Discourse Ethics to complement the *Agentifying Process and Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity*. Finally, the [Conclusion](#) recaps the final unified moral theory and its main claims with acknowledgment of areas needing further study.

Chapter 1: Non-Realist Cognitivism and Truth-Aptness

Derek Parfit's work scales many areas of metaethics, normative ethics as well as debates on personal identity and practical reason. Parfit is highly renowned and regarded by many scholars to be one of the most important moral philosophers of the late 20th century and early 21st century (Duignan, 2011).

Near the end of his life, Parfit wrote a three-volume series *On What Matters* (Parfit, 2017, 2011b, 2011a). His work demonstrates precise and clear writing, deduction and creative problem solving relating to moral matters. The work blends comprehensive explanation and analysis of metaethics with a profound sense of humanity and conscience.

Parfit's project is one that concludes moral facts exist regardless of human opinion; they are objective knowledge (Parfit, 2017, pp. 55–65). In Parfit's moral realism there are three important considerations. One is Parfit's rejection of moral naturalism, another is his rejection of ontological implications for objective moral values and finally, Parfit's cognitivist overview of moral values where they are truth-apt, therefore they are true or false (Parfit, 2017). The rejection of ontological implications for Parfit are ones that are Platonic, naturalist or reductive in any format relating to something as existing relating to ontology (Parfit, 2011a, pp. 464–488).

1.1 Parfit Responding to Reasons

Parfit's moral philosophy as moral cognitivism is broken down as non-naturalist, non-metaphysical and non-reductive. The structure of his moral system within epistemology is one grounded in rationalism. For Parfit moral truth mirrors mathematical abstracts, they are truth-apt and epistemic notions of truth (Parfit, 2017, pp. 3–4). His metaphysics or non-metaphysics as he might prefer rests on the idea moral truth is objective and true as knowledge (Parfit, 2017, pp. 2–8). The manner in which Parfit's epistemology is structured is an important aspect to understand how his philosophy works. The epistemology of reasonableness and non-reductive moral validity must be grounded and demonstrated as knowledge through our use of coherent reason. He demonstrates this by comparing only caring about a stamp collection to caring about humanity because it shows internal non-contradiction but also a detachment for the holistic picture which he finalizes as an "appeal to coherence would again assume that we have object-given reasons to have our desires. Subjectivists deny that we have such reasons." (Parfit, 2011b, p. 80). This makes sense because human beings have the ability

to recognise and act on moral truths, he summarises this further in *Vol 1 of On What Matters* “we are the animals that can both understand and respond to reasons” (Parfit, 2011b, p. 1). This ability, Parfit writes, could be explained by natural selection (Parfit, 2011a, p. 21). Of course, Parfit, as explained in section 1.4, is not a naturalist about moral validity nor is he making a naturalist defence of mathematics. He is just making a reasonable explanation of our ability to achieve cognitive success through reason as a product of evolution that can be used for knowledge of normative facts. This is important, we are responding to validity, reasons and making sense of truth and facts. It does not make the facts themselves a physical property, it just explains how we might have come to be beings capable of reason. This ability is important for the structure of Parfit’s epistemology. It grounds the idea we can reason and respond to reason, but we do not construct truths just handle and discover them. It is fair to add one can be bad at reasoning and fail to find a fact, or one can make an irrational choice and know it is irrational but commit to that choice anyway. In other words, it is fair and important to add that Parfit’s theory does not rest on humans themselves, it is just that the epistemology, to be understood and documented depends on rationality as a discovery methodology. In the appendix of *On What Matters vol 2* Parfit explains this reasoning in response to an example of truth with prime numbers. “We did not create these truths, nor does their truth in any way depend on us.” (Parfit, 2011a, p. 747).

Parfit’s response to reasons leads him to develop a view of moral plurality which acknowledges conflicts that can be acceptable and ones that cannot.

When one of our two possible acts would make things go in some way that would be impartially better, but the other act would make things go better either for ourselves or for those to whom we have close ties, we often have sufficient reasons to act in either of these ways (Parfit, 2011b, p. 137)

Parfit offers us a “Wide-Value Based” plurality to moral reason while grappling with the philosopher Henry Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason (Parfit, 2011b, pp. 130–141). Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason is the argument rational egoism and rational benevolence both have sufficient rational merit. In Parfit’s *On What Matters vol 2*, there is an essay by philosopher T Scanlon *How I am not a Kantian* (Scanlon, 2011). This highlights boundary conditions at both ends of the spectrum between partial and impartial reasons. He gives the example where “one would not have sufficient reason to do something that would

lead to the death of many people just to avoid scratching one's finger". Of course, Parfit agrees and makes a similar argument when asking the question if it would be ok "to save ourselves from mild discomfort, rather than saving a million people from death or agony?", to which he replies, "No. This horrendous act would not be rational". There are clearly plural values but some values still out rank others with measurable differences (Parfit, 2011b, p. 135).

1.2 Triple Theory

To explain both how Parfit mounts moral truth and the universalizability of moral validity, Parfit uses his Triple Theory. Parfit's Triple Theory could be described as a unification of rival moral theories. Rule and motive consequentialism, Kantian contractualism and Scanlonian contractualism. Parfit uses the analogy "climbing the same mountain on different sides" (Parfit, 2011a, p. 26). Parfit is using a creative and systematic pull of philosophical strings to propose a theory that can unite and calcify conditions for moral truths. This is not a blueprinted procedure for constructing moral norms but a map for discovering them.

In *On What Matters Vol 3* Parfit puts in the summary a nice encapsulation of the principles that make up Triple Theory (Parfit, 2017).

Triple Theory: An act is wrong just when such acts are disallowed by some principle that is

- (1) one of the principles whose being universal laws would make things go best,
- (2) one of the only principles whose being universal laws everyone could rationally will, and
- (3) a principle that no one could reasonably reject. (Parfit, 2017, p. 434)

The first of the three principles is the optimific principle. This would be outcome based. This is not a form of simplistic utilitarianism. In *Vol 3* of *On What Matters* Parfit describes this as the outcome of arguments for *rule and motive Consequentialism* (Parfit, 2017, pp. 413–422).

- (1) What matters most is how well things go.
- (2) Things would on the whole go best if we have optimific motives and we accept and try to follow optimific rules.

Therefore We ought to have such motives and we ought to try to follow such rules.
(Parfit, 2017, p. 35)

Parfit believes that from an impartial point of view you need to consider outcomes and motives as rules. This would make morality like a blend of a calculator for results but with more room for reasonableness in predictability and context. Motive is considered important because “optimific rules would often require us or permit us to act on such optimific motives even when such acts would not make things go best.” (Parfit, 2017, p. 33). In other words, general rules like loving our family, which would be partial, would as a probability therefore make life better in an impartial sense. His example to demonstrate this is that if “we cared equally about everyone’s wellbeing, we would have no strong love for anyone” (Parfit, 2017, p. 414). Deeper explanation requires deeper diving into more nuance into what Parfit means, but the simple track to follow based on my own interpretation of his work and the quotes discussed, would be that Parfit considers outcome and probability, therefore he considers well-being of all affected and general rules including motives for producing such. It is more of a general formula based on commonsense rationality rather than absolute calculation.

This carries over from his conclusion on Kantian Rule Consequentialism.

Kantian Rule Consequentialism: Everyone ought to follow the principles whose being universal laws would make things go best, because these are the only principles whose being universal laws everyone could rationally will. (Parfit, 2011b, p. 25)

Parfit is taking the idea of the categorical imperative from Kant. The idea of the categorical imperative is one of rational merit; it is objective and demands consistency (Johnson and Cureton, 2025). For Kant though rationality is in the internal subject, it is connected to the rational will. In an added *Introduction* of Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, philosopher Stephen Engstrom explains that objective principles that are practical laws “are precisely those in which the determination of the will is subject to this universally valid condition.”, in other words a truly rational maxim reflects universal and valid conditions (Engstrom, 2002, p. XXXV). Subjective maxims fixated on sensory desires would fail this test of rational excellence and universality (Engstrom, 2002).

Parfit is seeking to make a version of the categorical imperative that is less internal, which is also what Habermas is doing. Rather than doing so intersubjectively like Habermas, or from an omnipotent internal moral compass like Kant, Parfit is putting

more emphasis on rationality that represents agents as it refers to them as subjects. This makes it less immune to being a mere rationally tested internal rulebook only if the subject referring form of rationality is objective not just an internal consistency test. Scanlon considers issue with Kant's theory because Kant's test "bypasses the question of whether the constraints in question are indeed justified", as it is from the perspective of the agent's will not the quality of objective reason (Scanlon, 2011, p. 122). Despite their disagreements on reasonableness, it is clear Parfit shares this concern with Scanlon which is very likely why he has his Triple Theory the way it is. This can also further link to why Parfit is not a constructivist. Parfit reflects the Kantian spirit as a rationalist about practical reason but grounds the normative principles not in what we would do as rational agents, but what we have sufficient reason to do. To prove this point, we can reflect on Parfit's thought experiment *Future Tuesday Indifference* which Parfit brings up in *Volume 1 of What Matters* (Parfit, 2011b, pp. 56–57). Parfit presents a man who cares about his future pleasures and his avoidance of pain but not on a Tuesday. It shows that the rationality itself is about the agent not just from the agent. I will be calling his contribution *sufficiency-based reason* in the conclusion of this essay to give clarity on Parfit's rationality as compared to Habermas'. Parfit himself says in his chapter on *Normative Reason* "Our reasons to do something are sufficient when these reasons are not weaker than, or outweighed by, our reasons to act in any of the other possible ways.", which he continues with "When neither of two conflicting reasons is stronger, that is seldom because these reasons are precisely equally strong. Though there are truths about the relative strength of different reasons, these truths are often very imprecise" (Parfit, 2011b, p. 33). He is explaining how reason is guided by sufficiency and context which is appropriate to his whole moral project where moral facts are based on reasons not expressions or natural facts. He uses this in his explanation to justify the implications of this explanation of reason for his optimific principles (Parfit, 2011b, p. 399).

Finally, the third principle of Triple Theory which Parfit uses during his critique on Scanlonian contractualism proposes that a moral maxim should be one we cannot reasonably reject. Principles that no one could reasonably reject are the same principles that everyone could rationally will as universal laws, hence it is familiar to the Kantian model but with more intersubjective relational insight considering what is reasonable not just rational has a slightly different meaning. He elaborates this as "Scanlon's Formula uses

this word in a different, partly moral sense” and encapsulates it as “We are unreasonable in this sense if we give too little weight to other people’s well-being or moral claims” (Parfit, 2011b, p. 360). What it means is it is not just a consistency test for the group; there are real subject-referring conditions and justifications that must be considered. So to interrupt, it is fair to say reasonableness is connected to how we reason regarding both partial and impartial values. While I refer to this as subject-referring, Parfit himself makes the distinction of reasons that are “subject-given” and “object-given” (Parfit, 2011b, p. 2). I am using *subject-referring* because it better captures object-given reasons about subjects themselves, rather than *subject-given reasons*; it simply makes things clearer when addressing object-given reasons concerning subjects. So rather than just implying “everyone should be given equal shares” the extension is that one person could have higher reason to reject something due to a claim of a greater burden (Parfit, 2011b, p. 360). Parfit explains with an example of how “Losing a leg is a much smaller burden than failing to have our life saved.” (Parfit, 2011b, p. 361). So, in simple terms we must consider individual burdens rather than just universal consistency while embodying care towards subject-referring constraints and conditions.

Something stands out about Parfit’s work in a way that invites a core reflection on the limits of metaethics when it does not address meaning and practical application. As well as matters of moral objectivity we need to consider the holistic approach of how moral objectivity interacts with moral meaning, moral agents and moral motivations.

In his final volume, *Volume 3* Parfit says:

I regret that, in a book called *On What Matters*, I have said little about what matters.

I hope to say more in what would be my Volume Four (Parfit, 2017, p. 436).

Parfit expresses regrets that during his research and writing he did not invest enough attention to explain why things matter. While he considers not enough space devoted to discussing what does in fact matter in a direct normative and applied sense, I would defend his work for dealing with the challenging nature of an entrenched pocket of philosophy such as metaethics. Parfit himself intended to explore this more in his fourth volume but the third volume was published after his death. This sombre and heartbreaking reality resonates with my own experience writing this essay, where I wrestle with both the “why” and the “how”. We need to be able to deal with the nature of how these things exist and how they matter and in Parfit’s own words “By standing

on the shoulders of giants, we may be able to see further than they could” (Parfit, 2011b, p. 300).

1.3 Parfit’s Cognitivism

Moral cognitivism greatly differs from moral non-cognitivism, where moral propositions are not argued to be true or false but instead to be expressions that are neither true nor false (Van Roojen, 2024). This however often leads to a more nuanced debate, for example when metaethical groundings of non-cognitivism have more cognitivist implications in normative ethics, such as Simon’s Blackburn’s Quasi-realism (Blackburn, 1993, pp. 5–6). This means they can operate as valid but are still tied to a kind of human expression rather than a realism for knowledge itself. A good example would be talking about how a video game is “good” in some functional sense where it is treated with value in a yes or no sense but still admitting it is an expression of something neither good nor bad as a fact. It might function normatively but the metaethics do not demand validity unlike the normative ethics. Parfit explains that Quasi-realism is aiming to justify our right to talk about moral truth but while recognising the subjectivity that links to nature, desires, attitudes etc ,which would be their source (Parfit, 2011a, p. 390).

Parfit however is not satisfied with Blackburn’s Quasi-realism. For the leap of morality being a matter of expression to something that functions as truth, it cannot resolve conflicts by claiming they are able to be false or mistaken in a normative sense.

Parfit points out “On Blackburn’s view, however, value judgments fundamentally express desires.”, and that if this is the case, when something ontologically is a desire, that cannot be fulfilled or that leads to conflict, arguing that this makes it normatively true or false is a categorical mistake (Parfit, 2011a, p. 391). Something cannot exist as neither truth nor false as an expression and be argued as if functions normatively as true or false.

Here Parfit has identified a very important contention in Blackburn’s work. Truth-aptness, the state of being either right or wrong, must have a foundation for its abstraction that is coherent; something that bridges the gap of how something is with how it functions and how it is true. As an illustration, for example if Person X says to Person Y, “it is wrong to steal” and this conflict is pragmatically resolved on the grounds that the proposition is “I do not like stealing” rather than “it is wrong to steal”, it is not enough to claim that this can be normatively classed as true or false. There is a gap from how something existed to how it is mediated as normative knowledge.

The realism for mathematics is only real as far as it is truth for knowledge. Parfit himself ends up with a non-realist definition as a compromise between mathematical Platonism and mathematical Nominalism because he considers cognitivism to be about something true or false but in the case of mathematics and morality to be something not existing in a Platonic realm or anti-realist (Parfit, 2011a, pp. 475–488). In volume three of *On What Matters* he refers to this as “non-realist cognitivism” (Parfit, 2017, p. 55).

1.4 Moral Realism without Moral Objects

Parfit’s avoids the naturalist position of subscribing moral facts to moral objects as he distances himself from reductive theories of truth values that relate to things that correspond or refer to objects and descriptions within reality. He avoids reductionism for truth claims about abstracts such as laws and rules. These are facts but not something we can refer to the same way we refer to the fact a chair exists in space and time as something reduced to material.

Nagel, Scanlon, I, and others accept one such view, which I now call Non-Realist Cognitivism. On this view, there are some true claims which are not made to be true by the way in which they correctly describe, or correspond to, how things are in some part of reality. Some examples are the claims that state logical, mathematical, and modal truths, and some fundamental normative truths. (Parfit, 2017, pp. 3–4)

This simply is saying something factually true that does not refer to descriptions or locations within the universe as it can still describe laws and conditions that correspond to knowledge as truth.

It is important to note that Parfit himself avoids the realism label in *On What Matters* especially by the third volume, but because he subscribes to the truth-aptness of moral facts or truths, I am choosing to peg him as an epistemological moral realist to clarify any semantic confusion and make the comparison of Parfit and Habermas clearer (Parfit, 2017, pp. 55–58).

In the *Normative Web* by the philosopher Terence Cuneo this position is established as a form of “epistemic realism” (Cuneo, 2007, p. 6).

Fundamental to what I call ‘paradigmatic’ moral and epistemic realism is the claim that moral and epistemic facts thus understood exist. Definitive of paradigmatic forms of moral and epistemic antirealism, as I understand these views, is the denial that moral and epistemic facts thus understood exist. (Cuneo, 2007, p. 6)

Cuneo explains the type of realism he is defending is one regarding facts existing as true and therefore real as knowledge.

We must also nod to the philosophy of mathematics where mathematical realism is often associated with Platonism which Parfit rejects (Parfit, 2017, p. 56, 2011a, p. 475). Epistemic realism as clarified by Cuneo could be applied to Parfit's theory on the grounds that he accepts moral facts are a type of truth. It is vital that we make sure to note that this is not a claim about the overlap of ontological realism with epistemology. The distinction is that something real as knowledge, it is less about what it is made of rather than how it is true and *existing as knowledge*. Cuneo actually says that even though they have drastically different natures, moral facts exist "in the same sense of 'exist' as do mountains or persons", that because they converge entirely on the epistemology that both are truth-apt facts, we can consider this still a form of moral realism (Cuneo, 2007, p. 14). So how are they as real as mountains? Well Cuneo explains with a neat argument that they simply exist as facts.

(1) If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. (2) Epistemic facts exist. (3) So, moral facts exist. (4) If moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. (5) So, moral realism is true.

As far as $1+1=2$ or a mountain really exists they exist as knowledge. (Cuneo, 2007, p. 6) This is exactly why I will be referring to Parfit as an epistemic realist. His own non-realist cognitivism fits here.

The moral realism of Parfit is not naturalistic or reductive. Natural facts might explain for Parfit how we come to understand them without themselves being moral facts.

Such normative truths, I have claimed, are not about entities or properties that exist in some ontological sense. Natural selection could explain how, without being causally affected by any such normative properties, we are able to understand and recognize such truths. And we can reasonably believe that, in ideal conditions, we would nearly all have sufficiently similar normative beliefs (Parfit, 2011a, pp. 618–619).

This is a good start for learning about Parfit's ontology or more so his Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit's metaethics in relation to normativity, is non-reductive and has no ontological implications. These properties are not things that exist within reality as objects. They are defined by their own existence and reduced to their own existence.

These are true not just within an anthropomorphic framework but as a non-platonic, non-naturalistic and purely epistemological notions of truth. Parfit himself in this quote appears to nod to “ideal conditions”, of which would condition a moral agent to respond to moral reasons with clarity and objectivity.

1.5 Parfit's Gap

Parfit has given a good groundwork for his moral objectivity, he bases his theory in *Rationalism* over naturalist alternatives. Normativity reduces only to itself and refers to reasons to explain its nature but without ontological implications for the abstract truth of morality. This means abstracts exist as realist, but in an epistemic sense only; they exist as knowledge not things we refer to within reality. However, Parfit makes a leap to moral epistemology by avoiding moral ontology. When Parfit argues that normative truths exist in a non-ontological sense, he creates a new gap. While it is different from the gap of Blackburn's expressions to facts, it still is one worth digging into. This is a matter of debate of abstract ontology and questions regarding universals and particulars. Particulars are individual concrete entities like sense data, and universals are shared properties or qualities in many things like the quality of whiteness (Russell, 2007, pp. 65–80). To extract this into a simple and clear explanation while Blackburn's gap is to do with expression to fact, Parfit's is ontology to epistemology. We need a bridge to explain how something can go from being true as knowledge from nothing.

If Parfit's universals do not exist does this not strip them of any bargaining power? This would make them just linguistic tools and frameworks. If they do not exist, does this not disempower them?

This is where I propose an alternate theory which I call *Agnostic-Pragmatic-Reductionism*. It is important to note this theory is not endorsing an argument for moral realism but offering a potential gap closer as a response to my contention with Parfit. The argument is based under the conditions of the validity but not the soundness that:

If moral propositions that can be justified a true are analogous to methods used in mathematics, then moral validity is justified while rationalised and argued, which is best explained using abstract mind independent description in ontology.

We do not have the capacity to locate descriptions of truths as reductive even if we can locate them in knowledge as truth-apt. Non-empirical methodology that is truth-apt cannot be

reduced to an aspect of reality based on our capacity to locate it. Therefore, reduction could be a possibility if our capacity could improve. In conclusion moral propositions that are truth-apt are best considered as agnostically reducible. Credence can be adjusted but the reduction could be relational in ways current knowledge cannot do justice to at this time.

If this is granted as Parfit's philosophy aims to prove, then fixing any objection of non-ontology created gaps should be more straightforward and not demanding or dogmatic.

Pragmatic philosophy is utilised because while it denies knowing how moral facts matter could exist in the concrete sense it still treats them as part of reality to empower their normative strength. We might view these as platformed ontologically by our cognitive frameworks, or relational qualities or rules of the universe. It still is anchored in non-reductive ontology as far as we are concerned to comprehend it but only because it transcends our ability to describe or reduce these facts to concrete objects like chairs or oxygen.

This means it is still a fact; it just does not claim to exist as a traditionally naturalist format of understanding and knowledge. It is important to note that comparing empirical methodology in order to refine its truth-ratio is something I argue for in this section [4.3](#). This is where we can compare both mathematical and empirical problem solving to refine and discover their truth-ratios. In the context of morality this would be a matter of breaking down the patterns, reasons, subjects and objects to isolate properties, metrics and coherence relating to that break down. The nature of truth-aptness for morality even when tested for truth-ratios cannot ignore human fallibility, its relationship with moral agents and its socially mediated structure, relations and application contexts. This is why we need to move on next to Habermas as he offers a more accommodating procedure grounded in critical theory and social philosophy.

Chapter 2: Jürgen Habermas' Post-Metaphysical Moral Constructivism and Discourse Ethics

Jürgen Habermas bridges the gap of continental and analytical philosophy with pragmatism. He considers more intersubjective factors in relation to language, knowledge and validity, which are very much core things in his work on post-metaphysics, discourse ethics and his work on validity, justification and truth (Fultner, 2011b; Habermas, 2003, 1993, 1992).

Academically, Habermas is highly renowned being regarded by many as one of the most groundbreaking and important philosophers of the second half of the 20th century (Matustik,

2025). Habermas's contribution to post metaphysical ethics ranks alongside the major traditions of German Idealism from Immanuel Kant, Hegel and beyond. Habermas, as well as being a key thinker in critical theory, utilises American pragmatism, studies in democracy and the philosophy of language to develop deeply comprehensive theories in morality, politics and metaphysics (Matustik, 2025). His research has influenced and shaped a wide range of academic disciplines giving resources such as his theory of *Formal Pragmatics*, *Post-Metaphysics*, and *Communicative Rationality*. This overall gives a more procedural and dialectical lens to philosophical problems that all unite as a useful toolkit for challenging the moral sceptic without over abstracting moral knowledge or over playing unreasonable demands from ontology and validity (Fultner, 2011b, pp. 1-13 54-74; Habermas, 2015, 2003; Matustik, 2025).

2.1 Habermas' Groundwork of Meta-epistemology

In Habermas' *Truth and Justification*, Habermas' justification uses his post-metaphysical and formal pragmatics as methodology to bring a new spotlight on the shades of grey of how we respond to righteousness and norms (Habermas, 2003, pp. 237–277)). Before we get to normative righteousness however, I will explain here some of the groundwork of his thinking within this text.

Habermas' *formal pragmatics* is his method of explaining the universal conditions for language to mediate his philosophy. This is important for understanding his communicative rationality theory for rational discourse and consensus which is used for constructing and platforming epistemology. This interacts with more ontologically grounded but less accessible realities like truth that refers to an objective, external reality. (Communicative action and formal pragmatics Fultner, 2011b, pp. 54–74; Zhang and Wu, 2024).

Habermas refers to what he calls, “idealizing suppositions” which are something to be considered in a “Wittgensteinian rather than a Kantian sense” (Habermas, 2003, pp. 85–86). This is because they are idealized for the sake of theorizing or explanation rather than more dogmatic static universals, abstracts and rules. They are the preconditions for social and linguistic practise to exist. Furthermore, he refers to this as a “transformation of ‘pure’ into “situated” reason” (Habermas, 2003a, p. 84). It is the de-transcendentalising of Immanuel Kant where “The distinction between the realm of reason and the realm of appearances returns in detranscendentalized form” (Habermas, 2003, p. 218). Kant's philosophy explains how knowledge and reasons can exist as universal, but Habermas is making this more

socially mediated. The philosopher Barbara Fultner explains his situated reason in *Habermas Key Concepts*.

In the wake of Darwin, Marx and Peirce, Habermas takes seriously the idea that our practices evolve and are historically situated and that there are facts of the matter about our evolutionary history, both in terms of biological and cultural evolution, that make us who we are (Fultner, 2011b, p. 8).

Fultner summarises Habermas' comprehensive dialectics which draw on our evolutionary history and our emerging cultural realities. This explains why he wants to shift the debate of pure reason to something more socially mediated and humanised. In *Post Metaphysical Thinking Philosophical Essays*, Habermas explains why we need to have a middle ground (Habermas, 1992). He critiques the way systems theory uses an overly "metabiological perspective" to make the lifeworld "into something unfamiliar," even though such a theory might appear "both more sensitive and more comprehensive" than traditional models (Habermas, 1992, p. 22). In other words, meta-biology is important but not the whole story. It is a compromise of "weak transcendence" from within the lifeworld with objective and natural conditions of weak naturalism that create it, there is a continuity between the two of them even if their operations are separate or evolving with independence (Habermas, 2003, p. 28). This is an important aspect of Habermas' work that is vital for the argument in this essay. If we are to understand Habermas' theory of truth and meta-ethics we need to understand his meta-epistemology, otherwise when the topic of truth-aptness in relation to normative values comes up, it could lead to oversimplification. Without the history and content of language and thought processes we could fail the understanding of moral objectivity. To accuse him of needless obscurity rather than methodical dissection, would be a grave error. It can still be simplified and learned from with dialectical execution.

Weak transcendence and weak naturalism when synthesised and used to replace more dogmatic metaphysics helps overcome two fallacies identified by Habermas. The first is the naturalistic fallacy. It is the idea we have to appeal and reduce the study of morality and human society to nature to understand it. The second is the idealistic fallacy it is the idea we must have an idealistic realm instead of one that accepts more neutral ontology, in which the methodology of understanding the mind, morality and society can be distinguished from understanding the empirical reality without either of them requiring separate realities. These insights are part of how Habermas synthesises his weak naturalism with his weak

transcendence his post-metaphysical philosophy does not reject ontology of the lifeworld due to the requirement of complexity relating to the methodology needed to understand it.

Habermas is not saying weak naturalism is a scientism of the lifeworld but is linked to its naturalist continuity in weak format hence his weak-transcendence. Whereas Parfit is only saying we evolve reason therefore we access morality. Habermas is saying moral agents evolve into the lifeworld therefore the lifeworld creates and mediates moral validity.

Weak naturalism neither incorporates nor subordinates the “internal perspective” of the lifeworld to the “external perspective” of the objective world. Rather, it keeps these theoretical perspectives separate, connecting them at the metatheoretical level by assuming a continuity between nature and culture (Habermas, 2003, p. 28).

Habermas keeps more separation of the lifeworld and the natural world, but their connection is clearly more mediated as the internal perspective is separated from the external perspective with more of an intimate relationship than just evolved capacity but an evolved reality. This just means the lifeworld is not just an access point it is a methodology and birthplace for moral validity itself.

The link between weak naturalism and weak transcendence can be further summarised as the idea that validity has ties to what Kant would refer to as things in themselves which differ from appearances (Stang, 2024). Habermas upgrades this into the more situated concept of pragmatic epistemological realism through his formal pragmatics with inspiration from the work of Hilary Putnam. He himself writes “In a certain way, the distinction between truth and rational acceptability replaces the difference between “things-in-themselves” and appearances. (Habermas, 2003, p. 92,8). This means in regard to the concept of reality, what we can know as truth and including what we understand as reality must be “justification-transcendent” (it transcends justification), it means that the truth exceeds rational access even under ideal conditions (Fultner, 2011b, p. 70; Habermas, 2003, pp. 247–248) . However, within our experience and defined within a linguistic-pragmatic framework, we can still make sense of what is truth as open ended and truth-apt.

There is no unmediated, discursively unfiltered access to the truth conditions of empirical beliefs. After all, only the truth of unsettled beliefs is subject to question—beliefs that have been roused from the unquestioned mode of functioning practical certainties. Although we cannot sever the connection of truth and justification, this epistemically unavoidable connection must not be turned into a conceptually

inseparable connection in the form of an epistemic concept of truth (Habermas, 2003, p. 8).

Habermas considers the relationship of absolute truth to justification as necessary and pragmatic. He avoids dogmatic scepticism and dogmatic metaphysics, making the gap of ontology and epistemology a bridge that is a matter of pragmatism.

In the paper '*Consensus theory of truth*' to '*Janus-Faced Truth*' — *A Research on Jurgen Habermas's Theory of Truth* by Zunpan Zhang & Xiaoling Wu they explain what Janus-faced truth means.

Habermas used to propose 3 kinds of validity claim in *Wahrheitstheorien*: true (validity about outside reality), right (validity about social norms), truthfulness (validity about our inner world). Now he realizes the particularity of the concept of 'true' and 'truth'. He points out the truth cannot be reached by purely discourse like social norms. Truth cannot be defined as 'believe to be true' either, because our belief will change by science discovery, but the concept of truth requires an unconditional validity.

This means Janus-Faced Truth can be still justification-transcendent because it is not tied to belief but still truth-apt as far as pragmatically linked to justification as it used and made sense of it the lifeworld with the adjusting of credence for things like new discoveries in science. He identifies three mutually irreducible validity claims which would be, truth, rightness, and sincerity (Fultner, 2011b, pp. 60–63) Janus-Faced truth can therefore isolated from Janus-Faced moral validity which would be what is morally right or righteous.

What does this mean for the debate of moral realism and constructivism based on Habermas and Parfit? It means we must determine if a realist epistemology of morality is feasible and how it dialectically relates or else transitions from one theory to another. I would argue because Habermas makes a good case for truth-aptness as pragmatism through springboarding off his idea of situated reason, we must accept the pragmatic implication that human beings as fallible but layered beings. We cannot neglect the critical social elements and the relation of meaning and minds in making sense of the objective world. This means we need post-positivism, where analytical observation and structure must acknowledge its messy and protean origins of humanity.

I am not convinced that any form of moral realism, where there are moral facts or partial moral facts, will be immune to the messy linguistic and conceptual communication factors that we must consider with its application and practise in the lifeworld. In other words, moral realism becomes constructivist and constructivism becomes moral realism but without losing their own identity. They will have truth-apt conditions to function as a procedure and to reflect rationality, but they are reproduced and filtered by moral agents themselves. Habermas rejects the realist epistemology for moral values despite it retaining objectivity but, if we are to take seriously the cognitive content of morality, we must take seriously the philosophical pavement that leads to moral rightness.

2.2 Habermas' Discourse Ethics

In *Habermas Key Concepts* in the essay *Discourse Ethics* by William Rehg, Rehg writes “We can read Habermas’s discourse ethics as a metaethical attempt to save objective morality from scepticism” (Rehg, 2011, p. 119). Habermas’ position involves an important principle to do this, the *Universalization Principle* and the *Discourse Principle* (Rehg, 2011, pp. 15–16).

Only a maxim that can be generalized from the perspective of all affected counts as a norm that can command general assent and to that extent is worthy of recognition or, in other words, is morally binding. (Habermas, 1993, p. 8)

This is the *Universalization Principle*. Habermas introduces it while discussing practical reason. While this may sound like a copy and paste, of Kant this is how the *Discourse Principle* sets it apart. On top of his discursive pragmatism of situated reason, he also makes a key distinction in relation to Kant’s philosophy of will. In the case of Kant Habermas notes that Kant “confused the autonomous will with an omnipotent will” (Habermas, 1993, p. 10). This is not isolated in Habermas’ thought of the idea of the *Discourse Principle*, Habermas also considers the will, identity and even independence to be mediated by the intersubjective.

Individuation is merely the reverse side of socialization. Only in relations of reciprocal recognition can a person constitute and reproduce his identity. (Habermas, 1993, pp. 130–131).

In simple terms identity and individuation is not a private matter and if an ‘ought’ is a matter of “striving for self-realization” this overlaps with a more reflective will grounded in situated reason (Habermas, 1993, p. 9).

It is through producing conditions ideal for rational discussion that we can therefore reflect on our moral relations about the interests of others and ourselves. This embodies our social nature and the nature of how we become individual through non-individual means. We must discuss and problem solve with respect to the continuity meta-biology and our transformative presence of agenthood which evolves from it.

2.3 Why not Moral Realism for Habermas?

In the *Normative Web*, Cuneo writes that regarding moral constructivism, “these views needn’t be viewed as non-realist... If such a position were to preserve the central platitudes concerning moral facts”, Cuneo insists on defending “moral facts” (Cuneo, 2007, p. 48). There are indeed some philosophers who, rather than rejecting realism, reject substantive realism. Christine Korsgaard’s procedural realism is a form of constructivism that focuses on procedure not substantivity (Hussain and Shah, 2006). The authors Nadeem J. Z. Hussain and Nishi Shah, in the essay *Misunderstanding Metaethics*, argue that the distinction of substantive realism with procedural moral realism has a regress issue (Hussain and Shah, 2006).

And if we try to give a constructivist account of the concept of the reasonable, we face a regress so long as the procedures used to construct the normative facts expressed using this concept are themselves couched in normative terms (Hussain and Shah, 2006, p. 291)

In simple language the concept of what is “reasonable” must use a formula for normativity and explanation that needs to address procedure itself. This would imply an issue of regress where we do not know where the starting point of “reasonable” begins. Furthermore, the authors suggest this may be avoided when “specifying the correct procedures in non-normative terms”. However this can be challenged once again as relevant procedures being determined would need to be normatively classed and “we still need to be told what it is to judge that procedure x is correct” (Hussain and Shah, 2006, p. 291).

How might Habermas respond? Habermas rejects the idea there are moral facts tied to more traditional ideas of truth-aptness, but he still protects the moral objectivity of moral procedure. His meta-ethics is complicated. Unlike Blackburn he is not a Quasi-realist, he sticks to a form of cognitivism in his metaethics. I would call this a matter of either post-cognitivism or neo-cognitivism as rather than “truth-apt” he describes it as “truth-analogous”. This is vital for this essay. Something analogous to truth for moral validity is something that

is objective but is tested by intersubjective rational acceptability that is still within the architecture of the lifeworld. As it uses the *Universalization Principle (U)* and the *Discourse Principle (D)* it operates as something that must operate as universal and validity based so it is not merely an intersubjective bargaining tool. See Section [2.2](#) for more details on these principles. There are no gaps in his metaethics because his more post-metaphysical lens can recognise neutral ontology without scientific reduction because he is able to maintain metaethical methodology that is neutral in terms of the ontological stance that protects the participant's perspective from being reduced to neurobiology (Habermas, 2003, p. 28). It must be noted that later on in this essay for bridging Habermas to Parfit, I use methods that could be deemed more neurobiological however I stand by these as developing truth-ratios that also consider empirical comparisons to help refine access to higher truth-ratios not as reductions themselves. See Section [4.3](#) for more details.

Habermas might then respond by arguing the regress issue is not an issue considering the substantive qualities that protect the procedure are a matter of pragmatic presupposition. We have to presuppose universals within the lifeworld to make sense of how we justify values and facts. We accept them for their success of allowing discursive moral procedure, we do not have to justify their normativity outside of their success. We can also consider them normative without realist implications for normativity. They allow moral agents to mediate moral discourse and communicative rationality within the lifeworld.

Moral insight is already a sufficient motive for moral action... direct action regulating force outside the context of argumentation may (or need) be ascribed to the "normative" content of presuppositions of argumentation that cannot be denied without falling into a performative contradiction or to the moral principle based upon them. The moral principle performs the role of a rule of argumentation only for justifying moral judgments and as such can neither obligate one to engage in moral argumentation nor motivate one to act on moral insights. (Habermas, 1993, p. 33).

Habermas insists the procedure and substantivity, that are themselves moral insight related, must both be normative. Even if Habermas' constructivism is procedural in practise he does not divorce from the normative conditions that allow it to be platformed. This is to avoid the performative contradiction explored earlier. This normativity does not make Habermas' theory realist but as his metaethics is bound to conditions of validity which include Universalisation and Discourse Principles, these become normative imperatives that allow morality to develop

and actualise within the lifeworld. This simply means that for Habermas moral objectivity is objective like a game of chess rather than a mathematical equation. This reflects again, the transcendence within, but Habermas also makes a distinction between epistemic facts about truth in comparison to epistemic justification about righteousness (Cronin, 1993a, p. xiv; Habermas, 1993, p. 146). Habermas does accept the pragmatic implication that there are more substantive conditions. They must “have "normative" content in a broad sense” (Habermas, 1993, p. 31) These ought to cover those addressed by Hussain and Shah such as normative conditions that objectively allow moral procedure to exist without regress or non-normative categorization (Hussain and Shah, 2006). However, Hussain and Shah might argue Habermas is still making a category error. If the lifeworld has normative procedure and substantive conditions could this not be explained through moral realism?

Instead of the resistance of objects, which we run up against in the lifeworld, here we have the opposition of other social actors whose value orientations conflict with ours. This objectivity of other minds is in a sense made of softer stuff than the objectivity of a world that can sometimes take us by surprise. If moral claims to validity nonetheless owe their binding force to something unconditional and analogous to truth, then the orientation toward ever increasing inclusiveness of other claims and persons must somehow compensate for the missing reference to the objective world. We project this ideal, expanded social world of legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships from a moral point of view. (Habermas, 2003, pp. 42–43)

Habermas has moral objectivity that is not committed to moral values being facts but being truth-analogous. This means Habermas is making a metaethical claim *not* just a normative one. He is making a metaethical categorisation of truth-analogous objectivity to explain how these validity conditions exist as different to truth-apt statements about descriptions that refer to an objective world. While many could argue for semantic rescue of moral realism, at most to consider Habermas as a post-moral realist over an anti-realist or moral realist would be more appropriate as Habermas is not defending moral values as facts. As for non-reductive normativity that refers to the social world in any way, Habermas demonstrates it is different to truth-apt conditions that do more than transcend context but also transcend construct. Habermas is not a moral relativist or a moral sceptic however it is appropriate for the objectivity of the normativity of the lifeworld to be made distinct from the normativity of non-communicative reason. The moral realist is better filtering instrumental reason through communicative reason here, rather than diluting the meaning of moral realism to the

barebones substantive normativity that Habermas bites on or the very generous moral constructivism pass that Cuneo argues for. This is why I think the semantic class of post-moral realism is more appropriate for Habermas on this issue, even if his post-metaethics is further from epistemic realism than his post- metaethics, the semantic requirement is one that demands a distinction especially when we are comparing Habermas to the moral realism of the very analytical brand of Parfitian philosophy. The moral realism of Parfit, defends moral goodness and truth as truth-apt, therefore as moral facts. This is beyond a category dispute.

2.4 Colonization of the Lifeworld

In the book *Cambridge Habermas Lexicon*, the chapter written by Felipe Gonçalves Silva, *Colonization of The Lifeworld* explains that “the colonization thesis presupposes the comprehension of a society split between the levels of lifeworld and system and specifies different rationalization processes inherent to each. (Silva, 2019, p. 36) “He introduces it, “it is considered the core social criticism of Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action” (Silva, 2019, p. 36). What this means is simply that the lifeworld and the systematic structures both have rational processes relevant to each. The introductory quote simply is stating that Habermas’ thesis on these two divisions becomes relative to this divide in reason. Silva further explains that “Colonization is properly identified when the “hypertrophied growth” of both subsystems encroaches upon the spheres of symbolic reproduction and suppresses the irreplaceable integrative force of communicative understanding through the delinguistified media of money and power.” (Silva, 2019, p. 36). What this means is that when the economy and bureaucracy have grown so large and dominant that they start to overwhelm other parts of the lifeworld; it is a form of colonization where social reason is overwhelmed by power and systematic structures crossing over necessary boundaries. This is important to explain because it is relevant to how we incorporate Parfit’s more sufficiency-based-reason with Habermas’ warning’s about invading the lifeworld’s boundaries.

Chapter 3: Parfit and Habermas and the Combination of Moral Realism and Moral Constructivism

Parfit’s moral realism and Habermas’ moral constructivism are important for my theory *Critical Cross-System Objectivism*. This is where I compromise and unify the theories as co-explanative and compatibilized which will give me a chance to add my own arguments.

3.1 How Parfit's Contribution Matters

Parfit has given us an important contribution and contention. If morality is objective in a way that can be seen as *true* or *false* in the same sense that mathematics can, then moral realism is true, unless we make some kind of subjectivist argument for truth-aptness, which would demean its translation and purpose, considering it would mean truth-aptness is relative. It could demand its own type of truth-aptness, but at least if we are to grant, as Parfit does, its validity is on par with mathematics, we have an epistemic realist position.

This highlight for truth-aptness can be further backed up by the philosopher Terence Cuneo in his work *The Normative Web*. Cuneo goes as far as to say "If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist" (Cuneo, 2007, p. 6). This is something that he regards as resolving any form of epistemic expressionism where there is a "a radical form of epistemological scepticism according to which there isn't epistemic reason to believe anything" (Cuneo, 2007, p. 225).

This parallels Habermas who also considers epistemic realism to be a necessary form of pragmatism to navigate our world and interaction with truth. Habermas explains this in his essay *Realism after the Linguistic Turn* (Habermas, 2003, pp. 1–51). However, while this does not make him a realist about moral validity like Parfit and Cuneo, it at least shows he understands the threat of epistemological scepticism in debates of inaccessible or only partially accessible ontology. This means while he rejects epistemic realism for morality, he does not reject it for general facts.

Actors rely on certainties of action in their practical dealings with an objective world, which they presuppose to be independent and the same for everyone. And these certainties in turn imply that beliefs that guide actions are taken to be true absolutely. We don't walk onto any bridge whose stability we doubt. (Habermas, 2003, p. 39).

Knowledge that is epistemic and truth-apt can be granted the status of fact, regardless of whether it evolves with paradigm shifts. This is a pragmatic matter. We need to be able to navigate with a form of pragmatic realism even if that realism is filtered through a this more pragmatic and probability centred approach to facts, based on available information. This should be compatible with Parfit's moral realism in structure but regardless, the important point is clear. If, however, we cannot prove morality to be objective in the same truth-apt sense that Parfit and Cuneo argue for, its validity will

need to be both redefined and explained. I believe regardless of whether there are moral facts, only partial moral facts or no moral facts, it can still be ontologically explained without dogmatic ontological implications. It just demands we consider what we can and cannot access.

3.2 How Habermas' Contribution Matters

Habermas' contribution matters because he allows us to mend Parfit's Gap using post-metaphysics. Rather than the gap of knowledge and ontology being completely dismissed Habermas lets us contain it as socially mediated or non-reductive with ontological neutrality. See Section [2.3](#). He rejects both the naturalistic and idealistic fallacy (Habermas, 2003, p. 28). This allows for us to consider how objectivity can operate with nuance and complexity See Section [2.1](#). Habermas is also able to offer a form of moral objectivity and validity that uses reason situated in the lifeworld. This means that moral debate and validity avoids being just an expression or a cold mathematical fact.

Habermas' work on truth-analogues belief can operate as true or false both operatively and with demands for rationality and validity but it works as "the unforced force of the better argument." (Habermas, 1993, pp. 23, 31) Habermas' Janus-faced validity for normative contexts allows for moral validity responds to epistemic conditions without just being mere intersubjective concerns of public opinion (Habermas, 2003, p. 130, 1992, pp. 138–139).

His Janus-faced truth allows for a pragmatic realism option where something can be realised through justification and credence while not claiming absolute truth. Degree of truthfulness can be justified as truth-apt in the lifeworld with enough confidence (Fultner, 2019b, p. 448). It's where truth and fallibility meet. This is more post-positivist because it considers fallibility and lifeworld conditions for knowledge to make sense of truth with justification without denying the justification-transcendence. We can bridge the gap of the lifeworld of moral validity to Parfitian reason. *Critical Cross-system Objectivism* is what we have already defined as the link epistemically, but the actual metaethical grounding will need to establish what this platform is metaethically with more details or a demonstration.

Habermas also brings in the importance of avoiding colonisation of the lifeworld. See Section [2.4](#). This means that moral objectivism ought to not only consider coherence and consistency but still respect moral agents themselves and their lifeworld. This is vital if morality is to not only function in practice but represent the moral agency of the agents.

Chapter 4: Bridging Moral Truth and Moral Truth-Analogousness

4.1 Truth-apt Scaffolding and Truth-apt Constraints for Normative Reasoning

Showing his post-realist colours in *Truth and Justification*, Habermas explains how moral validity is truth-analogous rather than truth-apt.

If moral claims to validity nonetheless owe their binding force to something unconditional and analogous to truth, then the orientation toward ever increasing inclusiveness of other claims and persons must somehow compensate for the missing reference to the objective world. We project this ideal, expanded social world of legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships from a moral point of view. In fact, this point of view can function as the equivalent of the assumption of an objective world because it is rooted in pragmatic presuppositions of argumentative practice that are equally not up to us. (Habermas, 2003, p. 43)

This means that validity is still maintained within the lifeworld, it is not truth-apt in a sense that is falsifiable outside the lifeworld. It is more socially mediated. It would be fair to say this is Habermas demonstrating his thinking on both the *Universalization Principle (U)* and the *Discourse Principle (D)*. We can back this up further on two more quotes from his work. “Whoever employs a language with a view to reaching understanding lays himself open to a transcendence from within” (Habermas, 1993, p. 146). Habermas is giving us something to hold onto that is universal, robust and objective. The pragmatic nature of language such as in his *Formal Pragmatics* allows us preconditions for social and linguistic practise to exist without any dogmatic commitment to abstracts. See Section [2.1](#). Whereas, for Parfit instead of social mediation moral contractualist theories are used instead. See Section [1.2](#). By focusing on object-given facts it leads to his arguments being used for debunking subjectivist theories of morality. The key example being *Future Tuesday Indifference*, this further demonstrates this type of reason for normative justifications (Parfit, 2011b, pp. 56–57). This is person who only cares about the suffering when it is not a Tuesday which is incoherent as a Tuesday means nothing to suffering.

The tension of Parfit’s realism and Habermas’ post-realism is what we need to grapple with to make sense of moral objectivity as both truth-apt and truth-analogous. This is

where I will introduce what I will refer to as *Critical Cross-System Objectivity* and therefore *Critical Cross-System Rationality*. It is a theory that uses both truth-apt and truth-analogous validity.

The critical analysis of Parfit leads to the argument that we have sufficient reasons in moral context that refer to subjects themselves not just consensus or opinion. Parfit objects to intersubjectivity as a “Rational Agreement Formula” with concerns of unfair gaps in bargaining power (Parfit, 2011b, pp. 32–38, 20–21). Parfit is our map for discovery and is our grounding and theoretical philosophy device. This is extended from and interacts with Habermas’ Janus-faced moral validity theory, with Habermas’ communicative rationality or situated reason as the application device. (Habermas, 2003, p. 130, 1992, pp. 138–139).

Habermas’ Janus-faced validity for normative contexts demonstrates how moral validity responds to epistemic conditions beyond just mere concerns of public opinion (Habermas, 2003, p. 130, 1992, pp. 138–139). I am making the claim that Parfit’s analytical and rationalist methodology could be part of these epistemic conditions. By committing to a moral activity, we are exercising our moral reason. We must interact with the reality of subjects themselves both moral agents and patients. This means we are referring to real conditions and opening the path to constraints that rationally cage morality. Somebody has sufficient reason to consider moral conditions imposed by oughts so they can function. If I am asking, “what is morality?”, and suppose it must be relativist I am sub-creating a new direction to a non-functional moral system. Even if this leads to multiple descriptions and categories, something that is worked through with problem solving and application within the lifeworld, is also referring to real categories of normative conditions outside it. An objection to this might be “Why is this now truth-apt?”. To that the response ought to refer to a chain of rational implications from the act of moral questioning, action and discussion in the lifeworld; the act of moral questioning demands moral scaffolding.

We do not have to colonise the lifeworld to respond to epistemic conditions imposed on us because of the reference points being discovered during action and the revisionary nature of moral paradigm shifts. See Section [2.4](#) about colonisation of the lifeworld. This is why my overall theory is also called critical; it must consider critical studies and the dynamics of preventing any kind of moral imperialism on the lifeworld. It must also consider agents themselves and their social world. The actual process of applying the more Habermasian reason while grappling with Parfitian reason will be deemed the *Agentifying Process*. This is

where moral agents can deal with theoretical moral reason testing with truth-ratios. It does not just reflect on the fallibility and paradigm shifts needed for moral agents to morally reason and establish or realise moral validity, it also puts pressure on moral agents to realise their own limits without giving up commitment to moral objectivity both inside and outside the lifeworld.

The truth-analogousness springboard that is mind-dependent, discourse orientated validity can be tested for and test moral reason in far more theoretical settings that operate like “armchair” or theoretical based epistemic reduction. This process is also where *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity* takes place. For more on this see Section [4.2](#). With the *Agentifying Process* consider less mind-dependent methodology but because of *Agentifying Process* moral agents and their rights are considered more in truth-analogous and anthropological context. Theories discussed in this essay such as Parfit’s Triple Theory and Habermas’ discourse ethics can be merged. I am focusing on important details and the structure of Habermasian situated reason and *sufficiency-based reason*. It follows, however that Parfit’s Triple Theory and Habermas discourse ethics demonstrate these philosophers’ own use of reason. The application of Parfit’s Triple Theory would end up mediated in the lifeworld through Habermas’ Discourse ethics while Triple Theory depends on *sufficiency-based reason* which is justified and explained by implication in the Parfit chapter.

4.2 Dealing with the Problem of Regress and Introducing Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity

The problem of regress makes itself known when we address the differences of procedural and substantive reason in this theory. The reason we can say moral validity is truth-apt not just truth-analogous is because the justification-transcendent epistemic conditions of validity are making normative claims and using normative reasons that can be deemed true about the world itself to avoid regress. I note that Habermas’ pragmatic presupposition could be applied to the regress issue without resorting to moral realism in section [2.3](#). However, it means we have a better grip on pragmatic presuppositions if we use moral truth-aptness. A lack of clarity could risk pragmatism falling into its own relativist regress loop. These are necessary truths not just anti-realist pragmatic foundations. This is why my theory *Critical Cross-System Objectivism* is letting us not only prevent regress but is allowing for more theory-based discussions of morality that are truth-apt. To explain this further consider the difference of setting up the rules of a courtroom and articulating the normative reasons themselves to access the implications of facts about subjects and objects themselves in relation to suffering, protections and interests. I am arguing these are normative as facts not merely pragmatic

descriptions or even truth-analogous presuppositions. We need both the abstract and the situated form of reason, even if it is imperative we avoid colonising the lifeworld with discussion and acknowledgement of limits of moral patients, agents and subjects. This means that the normativity of substantive validity offered by Parfitian sufficiency-based reason can be considered a necessary moral fact. This not only prevents regress but enables a foundation for a procedure for more armchair or theoretical debate on both the applied moral systems within the lifeworld and their more independent normative moral reasons before that application takes place. This helps fully resolve the regress challenge of Hussain and Shah, where procedural constructivism struggles to define reasonableness (Hussain and Shah, 2006).

Parfit establishes an unyielding starting point against arbitrary or purely lifeworld operative constraints. In other words, normative constraints like object-given reasons and subject-referring conditions such as suffering and interests give normative truth-apt drawn conclusions. These could be “unnecessary suffering is wrong” which would then be applied and unpacked in more socially mediated and complex context, such as “What sacrifices or steps are involved with how these are managed or responded to by the broader community”. In other words, Parfitian objective reasons prevent the procedural regress, and Habermasian discourse operationalizes these truth-apt constraints in application.

What I am calling *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity* is the exact access point needed to connect Parfit and Habermas. This theory does not deny the mutually exclusive validity claims that Habermas makes but instead allows for a dual system for his moral validity claims where moral validity of righteousness is split. One is still truth-analogous and the other is truth-apt. For more on Habermas’ Janus-faced theories see Section [2.1](#)

Parfit’s *sufficiency-based reason* has an access through a *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity*. To prevent regress and to make sure the system is coherent and consistent it uses Parfit’s *sufficiency-based reason* such as arguing that irrational arguments are something we can prove and reason as truth-apt. It is objective in the lifeworld for that discourse to function and to do justice to moral subjects, agents and patients can connect to more armchair moral debates and scaffold itself with anti-regress normative conditions. This considers fallibility and anti-colonisation because discourse ethics where discussion happens allows moral agents to filter it on a continued loop. The

Agentifying Process fits into Habermas' Discourse fits with how it affects everyone involved. We ought to add a third principle to his Discourse ethics. The *Sorting Principle* (S) it is the principle that makes sure validity that split when it is tested for truth-ratios that are refined and classed as truth-apt, ought to go through the *Agentifying Process* where more theoretical philosophy takes the throne even if still adjusted for application and discussion. It must consider both lifeworld orientated and theoretical orientated validity as different. There could be overlaps and it is important to note that a debate of credence, clarity and plurality in both subsets including overlaps is worth discussing but it is not required to cover in this essay. What this means is that moral agents ought to reflect on the nature of moral validity for what it is. They must consider truth-ratios and social mediation in detail.

A good example of the *Sorting Principle* (S) might be rules like democracy being incorporated into normative theories affecting political life compared to more clear calculative based procedures for moral outputs such as suffering. These should interact and refine each other, so real interests are considered properly. Another example could be socially mediated identity. A socially mediated identity must value experiences and the social lifeworld in ways perhaps truth-aptness could not capture with reductions. This might be where somebody is seen as a continuation of their thoughts, memories and actions in society in a way that may not have the same meaning compared to more abstract non-social understanding. This does not mean we should abandon truth-ratios; it is just a demonstration of why some aspects of moral validity are therefore truth-analogous. They still test validity, reason and coherence but they ought to keep a link to moral validity tested with more rigorous non-social high truth-ratios.

This is an argument for why *Critical Cross-System Objectivism* leads to a coherent moral system. It justifies why moral validity ought to be both truth-analogous and truth-apt. However, before the conclusion it is important to make sense of the metaethics of how *Critical Cross-System Objectivism* is grounded. It is important briefly to touch on the debate of naturalism vs non-naturalism.

To defend a holistic and systematic structure for Habermas' weak naturalism, it can be defended as a necessary ontology for explaining how moral agents adapt and deal with moral discoveries in the lifeworld.

Parfit himself considers natural selection as merely a causal explanation for how human organisms evolved the cognitive capacity to understand moral reasons (Parfit, 2011a, pp. 618–619). Habermas, on the other hand, sees a stronger link due to the process of philosophy of culture, social life and moral discussion which have stronger ties to its weak natural elements. This is more continuous and embedded where social, cultural and evolutionary bridges cross as an ontology rather than just a moral capacity of access from evolution (Habermas, 2003, p. 28). See Section [2.1](#) for more details.

How can we bridge the lifeworld to the world of Parfit's reason in terms of metaethics? Habermas already synthesises his weak naturalism with weak transcendentalism himself so all we must do is use the *Neo-Janus-faced Moral Validity* where we show there is some kind of epistemic link where the nature and form of metaethics can give access to Parfitian reason using the post-metaphysics of Habermas. We already have a denial of the idealistic and naturalistic fallacy from Habermas where he concludes that methodology can be ontologically neutral rather than ontologically absolute or absent. The case for ontological neutrality and what that means for rejecting both naturalistic and idealistic fallacies is also covered by Habermas in *Truth and Justification* (Habermas, 2003, p. 28).

We have to distinguish sharply between the hermeneutic approach of a rational reconstruction of the structures of the lifeworld, which we undertake from the perspective of participants, and the observation-based causal analysis of how these structures naturally evolve (Habermas, 2003, p. 28)

Habermas mentions the hermeneutic approach. It is no mystery that Habermas is trying to bridge earlier theories of philosophy of consciousness with newer ones in the social sciences and analytical philosophy while responding to the linguistic-turn. (Cronin, 1993b, p. xxviii; Fultner, 2011a, pp. 8–10, 2011b; Habermas, 2003, pp. 1–51) In this essay we use *Neo-Janus-faced Moral Validity* which, like Habermas' Janus-faced truth, is able to navigate both the social and objective world with the key tweak being the moral validity is now closer to truth through justification. In simple terms this just means we are using a blend of Habermas' argument for realism where truth links with justification, instead of his use for moral validity where moral justification is justification only. Now it gives access to truth through truth-aptness. This does not claim to get to a Hegelian absolute or to reach what is justification-transcendent, but it maintains a quality for realism where facts are facts not just lifeworld objectivism. So, it is an unavoidable point to take in when it comes to this essay that we are

adding to Habermas so we can argue for truth-aptness in morality. Habermas, when using Janus-faced truth rather than Janus-faced moral validity, gives more realist objectivity hence the tweak.

Habermas is more lifeworld centric than Parfit, my *Critical Cross-System Objectivism Rationality* utilises both the lifeworld and the abstract. This also must leave room for agnostic space for non-reductionism and use a more Habermasian post-metaphysical claim for being able to talk about something existing without outdated metaphysics or denial of metaphysics. (Cronin, 1993a, p. xxv; Fultner, 2011a, p. 8; Habermas, 1993, 1992; Parfit, 2011a, p. 21) So the final step for this essay will be bridging an important epistemic detail which will be the next chapter.

4.3 The Reliable Route Method

The philosopher Neil Sinhababu's method uses a reliable route methodology. Sinhababu demonstrates to us that moral agents can argue for substantive moral conclusions from non-moral empirical evidence that crosses David Hume's infamous *is* and *ought* gap. This is with the methodological and grounding power of inductive inference. It draws upon a probable conclusion from specific evidence, observations or reason to avoid circular reasoning. He explains a summary for this neatly in his abstract.

We can infer moral conclusions from nonmoral evidence using a three-step procedure. First, we distinguish the processes generating belief so that their reliability in generating true belief is statistically predictable. Second, we assess the processes' reliability, perhaps by observing how frequently they generate true nonmoral belief or logically inconsistent beliefs. Third, we adjust our credence in moral propositions in light of the truth ratios of the processes generating beliefs in them. This inferential route is noncircular, and progress along it is driven fundamentally by induction. (Sinhababu, 2022)

Sinhababu introduces truth-ratio induction, "in which the truth ratios of some beliefs inductively suggest truth ratios for other beliefs generated by the same process." (Sinhababu, 2022, sec. 1 para. 3). Truth-ratio induction uses non-moral beliefs to evaluate moral reliability non-circularly (Sinhababu, 2022). I am auguring his method can be used to bridge lifeworld reasoning with theoretical reflection without colonising the lifeworld. This should not only defend the *Agentifying Process* but address not only constraints to prevent regress but the coherence of philosophical strategies with key examples. These examples will be the *Future*

Tuesday Indifference and Habermas' Discourse Ethics. For more on these theories see Sections [1.2](#) and [2.2](#).

“The attitude of positivism and its successors was for a long time unambiguous; it had unmasked the questions formulated by metaphysics as meaningless they could be pushed aside as being without any objective basis ” (Habermas, 1992, p. 28) Habermas established scepticism towards more positivist methods as they strip philosophy of any speculation that cannot be measured or put to test scientifically or logically. However, I consider Sinhababu's ideas to be applicable to truth-analogous beliefs when they springboard themselves to more truth-ratio tested normative constraints. That is why we just need to study the reliable route method in the lifeworld which still operates with demands for validity and rationality. We connect to Parfit in a more operative sense after which the metaethical and epistemic links are revealed. Sinhababu himself puts it “cognitivist metaethical theories are typically built to support these assumptions. Non-naturalists, constructivists, error theorists, and naturalistic realists all accept that the same processes generate beliefs with both moral and nonmoral content, with nonmoral reliability predicting moral reliability.”(Sinhababu, 2022, sec. 2.2 para. 1).

The fallibility and intersubjective application and starting point connects to inductive truth ratio induction. To demonstrate this, we can use an example where “processes generating moral belief can be assessed” which Sinhababu gives in his paper. His example shows how reliability of how humans look at numbers show a genuine struggle to deal with magnitudes of harm and numbers.

Those asked about saving 2000 seabirds offered a median sum of \$80. Those asked about saving 20,000 seabirds offered \$78. Those asked about saving 200,000 seabirds offered \$88. Just as people often don't distinguish large magnitudes in nonmoral cases, they often don't distinguish the moral weights of large magnitudes of bad events. Cognitive scientists call this phenomenon “scope insensitivity” (Sinhababu, 2022, sec. 2.1 para. 6).

This means that there are reliable routes for not just understanding consistency but coherence. The challenge of addressing scope sensitivity needs to be balanced with something more calculative than just intuition. If we can argue that morality needs to function, it must respond to rational constraints and anti-regress considerations which are truth-apt. Then *Critical Cross-System Objectivity* can link to the lifeworld's discourse ethics. Coherence as far as a

good moral epistemology goes can still prevent colonisation of the lifeworld and can still recognise human fallibility. However, we need to keep in check the dialectical relationship between truth-analogous validity and situated reason with truth-aptness and reliable *sufficiency-based-reason* to do this.

Neo-Janus-faced Moral Validity can open a metaethical lens for a reliable route. So, the metaethical gap is easier to fill by linking the pragmatic and anthropological philosophy of the lifeworld, that is justified as necessary for an operative and functional theory of objective moral validity. The only thing left to do is to show how to demonstrate this with an example justifying not just consistency but coherence.

When Sinhababu discusses the work of James Beebe and Samuel Kampa, he explains that their methods are a response to dealing with the psychological processes as “unified causal structures with statistically predictable truth ratios” (Sinhababu, 2022, sec. 1.1 para. 4). This supports “truth-ratio induction as natural kinds do” (Sinhababu, 2022, sec. 1.1 para. 3). This means that empirical natural objects can be examined on their structures and on their categories that shape their differences and similarities regarding their natural makeup. So, we can identify the cognitive processes involved to make moral validity claims and compare them to cognitive processes used to predict truth-ratios.

Because instances of a natural kind share causal structure, observing some instances inductively supports predictions about other instances. Samples of gold share causal structure at the atomic level, explaining their melting points. So seeing some samples melt at 1064 °C inductively suggests that other samples melt at 1064 °C. (Sinhababu, 2022, sec. 1.1 para. 4)

Sinhababu explains an example of comparing natural kinds like samples of gold, because these samples share atomic structures their predictability for new boiling points becomes a good indicator of the truth ratio.

It is important to note that I am not claiming *Critical Cross-System Objectivism* needs empirical verification as a naturalistic system for validity. Sinhababu’s work matters here to show how comparing non-moral truth solving processes can help us solve or at least refine moral ones. This simply shows us how evaluating the structural reliabilism of non-moral problem-solving processes equips us to test and refine moral ones. In the context of Habermas, what we are doing is isolating the problem-solving mechanics. He anchors substantive validity in functionality, but I am arguing that from this step alone we can push it

further. If we can commit to moral problem solving in the lifeworld, we can isolate the actual probability for truth-ratios of moral problem solving. Before we can do that though we must further break down parameters and algorithms.

Causal structures are what caused the problem solving, such as the relevant atomic structures involved. This does not have to be an empirical matter as far as my essay that is why we also need algorithms. Algorithms “describe how the parameters generate the belief, and can be realized by the causal structures invoked by the statistical solution.” (Sinhbabu, 2022, sec. 1.1 para. 3). I am arguing if we identify problem solving patterns and processes without reducing them to their natural origin that is completely fine. We simply must isolate and break down what reasoning is being used and how comparing it to the reasoning of non-moral matters to improve that moral reasoning. In simple terms, this means there are cognitive processes to make sense of object-given facts. We can identify them in the lifeworld where all those affected by a moral matter appeal to interests. So, we can look at these cognitive processes. Sinhababu gives a very easy to understand example that proves this point.

Suppose Rene sees that Elisabeth sent him a letter. Is his belief that he has a letter generated by visual perception, a reliable process with a high truth ratio? Or is it generated by visual-perception-of-letters-or-wishful-thinking, an unreliable process with a low truth ratio? (Sinhbabu, 2022, sec. 1.1 para. 1)

If somebody uses wishful thinking over visual perception for a task like checking if one got a letter, the likelihood of truth ratio changes depending on which algorithm we use. So how does this relate to moral examples? If moral reasoning and moral validity claims are broken down, we can spot more than just a consistency test going on. If wishful thinking or tribalism is being used to argue for a moral claim, we can isolate its algorithm and its parameters and compare it to non-moral examples to refine it. For example, wishful thinking being used to evaluate non-moral perceptions being compared to wishful thinking used to generate moral perceptions, such as perceptions of brightness compared to perceptions of brightness that causes discomfort. Wishful thinking has a low truth-ratio process for both.

However, there is an issue here. How do we know when a non-moral example is even relevant? What if it is too general, too narrow or just completely irrelevant? Parameters are the factors or criteria that operate. They are important to how a moral system works. These could be principles such as structures that affect desired outcomes or conditions such as “the

best outcome is the one with the least amount of suffering”. Metrics might be useful in the conversation too, such as when comparing the severity of suffering. This helps us connect to subject-referring given reasons, object-given reasons, subject-referring facts and object-given facts. It is different from subject-given facts or reasons that are only based on pure subjective preference. Although one could argue these could be developed into consistency tests and/or rhetorical persuasion. However, I am interested in proving coherence. Object-given facts such as conscious suffering, agent interests or severe physical burdens etc ought to be identified instead. These matter because inductive inference problem solving reveals truth-ratios in problem solving and if morality ought to be functional and given truth-aptness footing these are required. However, they are not just a mere choice they are a consequence of taking morality seriously including how it maps to making sense.

Sinhababu gives examples of input variables as parameters “such as brightness, object size, and distance” which “are inputs to visual perception, which has a belief as its output.” (Sinhababu, 2022, sec. 1.1 para. 6). We could recognize rights, interests, subjects, duties etc. The output is the belief. No coherent moral system can exist without a moral subject at its centre; without the subject and their interests, the normative parameters simply fail to add up properly. When we apply a parameter-deconstruction test and then make a normative claim, we are now able to isolate its cognitive algorithm and inspect its parameters. Through both Habermasian discourse ethics and Parfitian Triple Theory it is completely inevitable that we recognise moral conditions.

Let us use this now on Derek Parfit’s *Future Tuesday Indifference*. An agent has a case of Tuesday Indifference, they do not care about their own suffering on a Tuesday (Parfit, 2011b, pp. 56–57). A consistency test is not enough. We need to go a step further beyond just general moral intuition. By deconstructing “Tuesday” it reveals no relevant difference in suffering, agency, or subject-referring interests compared to Monday. We can look at the problem-solving algorithms relevant to their parameters. The parameters are the variable inputs or conditioning factors. In the case for Future Tuesday Indifference, these would relate to suffering. When deconstructed, “Tuesday” shows no relevant property for causing harms or benefits. Non-moral examples help us refine our moral ones. For example, when testing the probability of winning the lottery, there is no relevance to Tuesday or Monday either. If there were, there would need to be a coherent explanation revealing something new about Tuesday that affects the probability of winning

In *Justification and Application* Habermas comments on the philosopher Albrecht Wellmer where he agrees as far as “argumentation leaves participants without a choice; just in virtue of undertaking to engage in such a practice as such, they must accept certain idealizations in the form of presuppositions of communication” (Habermas, 1993, p. 31) . Habermas agrees that reason here must “have "normative" content in a broad sense” but he insists that these normative rational constraints should “not impose obligations to act rationally; they make possible the practice that participants understand as argumentation.” (Habermas, 1993, p. 31). Habermas considers these conditions to be rationally and normatively functional even if he rejects them as necessarily being forced as duties, rights etc. They are not actual duties themselves they are unavoidable constraints that are normative for the sake of substantive functionality. However, this can still work as a starting point, considering for *Critical Cross-System Objectivism* I use a *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity*. See Section [4.2.](#) for more details. I am not claiming there is only room for *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity* and not Habermas’s original Janus-faced moral validity. By pushing moral validity to Janus-faced truth, I am merely giving an access point to moral truth. Truth-analogousness, as far as objectivity, is more grounded in moral discussion and the interests of those involved as a process philosophy. It is still necessary to avoid a complete force of pure moral reason on the lifeworld. It can also deal with plural moral conflicts, agnostic or uncertain algorithms, parameters and so forth. I am not making the claim for a robust moral realism theory, but instead a justification for varied moral methodologies and validity claims that refine each other. This is not a compromise for the moral sceptic but instead a compromise for application, fallibility and the engagement with the reality concerning moral agents themselves.

When moral agents engage in rational discussion, debate and problem solving which is governed by the Habermasian *Discourse Principle (D)* and *Universalisation Principle (U)*, intersubjective exposure can do the same thing with reliabilism that it does with Parfit. We identify the parameters and the algorithms. The Habermasian *Discourse Principle (D)* and *Universalisation Principle* are the parameters, and the algorithms are the actual discourse processes. We are testing morality for all involved and using argumentation structures that promote rationality, clarity and sincerity. Then we compare these parameters to mathematical and empirical non-moral contexts to test truth-ratios. We then use my *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity* and the *Agentifying Process* where moral validity is broken down further into interests, subjects and object-given facts such as suffering, moral patients and agents, self-

preservation, autonomy etc. We can see the dualism of practical reason where agents and moral patients have both their own interests reasonable and important to them and interests for the broader community and all involved. This way we will see conflicts but be able to better respond to thresholds and degrees of conflict between them. Such as if one person's life is taken to save another, compared to if one person is asked to give up some their owned wealth through progressive taxation to benefit others and prevent resource monopoly and bad power dynamics. This means it is not just about comfort markers but real comparisons and intensity debates for ranking harms and benefits. We might compare empirical examples of suffering and psychological distress and get a better grip on degrees of harm. The *Sorting Principle (S)* introduced in Section [4.2](#) could be explored and developed to sort out moral validity with lower credence, conflicts or socially committed compromises. It is important to note that Parfit might argue his Wide-Based-Value theory and his Triple Theory accommodate for dealing with conflicts and questions of the reasonableness thresholds involved in the dualism of practical reason considering they are plural and convergence based. For the introduction to these theories see Sections [1.1](#) and [1.2](#). Values in the lifeworld regarding concepts like consent might be hard to reduce to normal empirical or neurological science but social science and social philosophy do not have to abandon truth-ratios just adjust methodology for parameters, credence and algorithms to compare it. This is exactly why I am arguing to make room for both truth-analogueousness and truth-aptness.

These causal structures involved in discourse ethics do not have to isolate every brain state, and we cannot reduce the mind to just the epistemology and psychology of brains and nerves. However, we reject both the naturalistic and idealistic fallacy, we see the link of brains and minds without complete reduction of them. Even if in theory it could be attempted into a relational reduction, that reduction is likely agnostic due to the lack of methodology and high credence for grasping it. See Section [1.5](#) for more on agnostic-based reasoning for this topic. We know minds relate to brains and nerves regardless of reduction. This might lead us to more social science break downs of parameters and algorithms with intersubjective and relational values like moral hygiene and more socially mediated concepts of moral agenthood and patienthood, but it still lets us compare and test truth-ratios. It must be noted here that we are still avoiding colonisation of morality into a pure theoretical and calculative matter. The degrees of conflict, the messiness of application and the respect for moral agents and their lifeworld still require truth-analogueousness. Therefore, we must allow a process philosophy, discussion and unforceful process for further development of moral validity.

Explanations of algorithms and parameters have given an advantage for bridging Habermas and Parfit. Even if we are not claiming to deny truth-analogueousness altogether, in the sense we allow a process philosophy and discussion, we are still able to do real theoretical moral philosophy that can treat moral validity in this context rightly as being tested for truth-ratios and truth-aptness.

We must also consider credence. This means the degree of truth-aptness must be adjusted based on our confidence in the truth.

Moral beliefs should be revised in light of evidence of their truth, just like any other beliefs. Changing credence in moral propositions on the basis of evidence concerning the reliability of the processes generating them is reasoning from nonmoral evidence to moral conclusions. (Sinhababu, 2022, sec. 3 paras 5-6).

We might find some moral problem-solving algorithms are more reliable to different parameters than others and to different degrees so that can also be considered as important.

In the context of *Future Tuesday Indifference* if we found suffering on a Tuesday was experienced as pleasure, which even if unlikely, for the sake of argument we might also update our findings and how they affect truth-aptness as well. New adjustments can affect credence and credibility of statements. What is thought to be truth-apt in the past may be debunked or adjusted with new information. This is also why realist theories cannot claim absolute access to truth. See Section [2.1](#) for more details why this is.

Conclusion

This dissertation has aimed to achieve a novel yet robust model to justify moral objectivity as both objective in the lifeworld as truth-analogueous and objective as fact in a purely rational prescription for truth as truth-apt. The reconciliation through critical explanation of two different philosophers with different strengths achieves clarity, objective scaffolding and anti-regress demands for objectivity. This is achieved with Parfit's moral realism and with Habermas's discourse ethics avoiding abstract colonisation of the lifeworld, acknowledging respect for moral agents for what they are, and using more post-positivist and dialectical analysis to keep the epistemology and methodology applicable, functional and reflective of necessary process philosophy and compromise.

The realism of Parfit is defined with the help of Cuneo, and Parfit's "non-ontology" is adjusted by me for flexibility through the introduction of *Agnostic-Pragmatic-Reductionism*. Reduction could be entertained not as absolute but entertainable with understanding to epistemic limits.

In regard to truth-analogous moral validity it is able to deal with the social lifeworld of moral agents in order to not only account for its complexity but to avoid colonising the lifeworld with claims of moral theoretical philosophy. This must entertain post-metaphysical accounts for ontological neutrality to ground it in a more socially mediated but still receptive access point for theoretical philosophy. This is where the moral objectivity is more open-minded and involves an intersubjective process philosophy. This is not one that is relativistic or even merely intersubjective, it still is one that responds to validity with reason which works more as a methodological filter and process philosophy. Habermas allows for exploration of Janus-faced righteousness which this essay tweaks to *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity* to argue for objective constraints for object-given-facts and subject referring conditions imperative for Parfit's moral project with anti-regress of moral foundations. This makes the theory a hybrid of coherentism and foundationalism where foundations are cemented in necessary moral truths that dialectically continue within the lifeworld.

Important challenges from philosophers Hussain and Shah have highlighted purely procedural accounts because they struggle to ground the "reasonableness" of their own constraints. They warn of falling into an infinite regress with arbitrary and local consensus. Habermas' potential solution is proposed but the project stands with Parfitian *sufficiency-based-reason* that can better address concerns with an unyielding starting point as both operative and objective.

This essay had to deal with the risks of unmediated abstract rationalism of the colonisation of the lifeworld. This more Habermasian warning makes the project much more open-ended and concerned with limits of the fallibility and rights of moral agents. This must also be re-enforced with critical theory for understanding structures of authority and power. This also initiates the *Agentifying Process*. This process is where both Habermasian situated reason and Parfitian sufficiency-based-reason are realised and dealt with in synthesis with moral agents. This process allows more discourse ethics style process philosophy to interact as an access point and safeguard for abstract normative principles to be tested, applied and developed while still allowing for more theoretical and abstract moral debate. At the end of the essay a

demonstration of the *Agentifying process* narrows into an epistemological tool to show how truth-analogousness can lead to truth-aptness. This uses a reliabilism philosophy plan from Sinhababu for a better epistemic link to *Neo-Janus-Faced Moral Validity*. This allows us to isolate problem solving and test inductive inference where moral reasoning leads to moral facts.

This is not claiming to be a finished project but one supplementary and still necessary for anchoring moral justification and moral truth. Even if absolute truth will always transcend justification as learned from Habermas, the link for truth-aptness makes it something that as a degree and as pragmatic epistemology is itself a realist project in terms of knowledge.

This project only scratches the surface for understanding moral objectivity. Future work needs to be done, such as defending vulnerable moral patients in relation to critical theory and discourse, exploring credence for agnostic reductionism and exploring overlapping validity claims with more detail and research. Future theories are highly welcome that could develop or even revise and debunk its earlier conclusion with exciting new arguments for understanding moral objectivity.

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