

Name: Owen Sellars

Student Number: 2031209

Academic Assignment 2

Question Two

Terrorism is defined as the use or threat of action which is “designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public” and the “use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious (racial) or ideological cause” (Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000). With the evolving threat of terrorism, it is important evaluate the role of police in counter-terrorism policing and to examine how intelligence gained in the investigation of other types of criminality might inform counter-terrorism policing.

The sharing of intelligence and collaboration between counter-terrorism police and other agencies in the UK is key to improving the success of the police in disrupting and responding to terrorist activity. The importance of intelligence in counter-terrorism policing is highlighted by McGarrell, Freilich and Chermak (2007) who argue that intelligence can “identify terrorist groups and allow for intervention prior to an attack”. Wong (2021) highlights the difficulties which may arise when sharing counter-terrorism intelligence. She states that a “collaborative approach, a high degree of trust and a shared understanding about dissemination and storage of confidential information” is required, however this “can be difficult to achieve because law enforcement agencies have traditionally worked in silos”. Although these challenges have been noted, the police in the UK appear to have overcome these by sharing of information through joint collaborations. For instance, counter-terrorism experts from the police form part of the Joint Extremism Unit and share information with probation and prison services to monitor and evaluate extremist offenders. The police also attend monthly ‘pathfinder’ meetings in prisons and Young Offenders Institutes with partner services in which information about terrorism offenders is shared and strategies are developed to mitigate risks.

Additionally, the police share information about terrorism-related offenders with probation, prison and other services through Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) and the Violent and Sex Offender Register (ViSOR)

database. Wong's (2021) research highlights the difference between counter-terrorism police in the UK and that of Australia as she describes the UK's approach as "distinctly collaborative", "a good demonstration of social exchange theory" and argues that the use of MAPPA and the ViSOR database "facilitates the early implementation of risk intervention strategies to reintegrate offenders and disengage them from future terrorist activity". In contrast, Wong argues that Australia's "traditional hierarchical model" may lead to vital pieces of information being overlooked and that therefore the full extent of risk may be hidden. From Wong's research, it can be argued that the police within the UK play an effective role in counter-terrorism policing and that other countries can learn from this approach.

The UK police role in counter-terrorism policing however goes further than the sharing of intelligence between partner agencies. Spalek (2013, p. 65) argues "the critical importance of relationship building for community policing in relation to counter-terrorism cannot be stressed enough". Therefore, the police must also form positive relationships with communities to gain their trust and co-operation. Lambert and Parsons (2017) state that "individuals in communities and neighbourhoods where terrorist movements seek recruits and supporters are often more likely to help police identify and disrupt terrorist conspiracies if they are treated fairly." UK police follow the CONTEST strategy (HM Government, 2018), which consists of a 'prevent', 'pursue', 'protect' and 'prepare' risk reduction model to combat terrorism. Lambert and Parsons discuss the potential negative effects which the 'prevent' element of this approach can have on the relationship between the police and members of certain communities, and the wider effect that this can have on the success of counter-terrorism policing. They argue that the 'prevent' aspect of the approach has "shifted from such a tight focus on terrorism and violent extremism to a wider target of 'extremism'". They argue further that this shift risks "alienating potential allies in Muslim communities and affords opportunities to terrorist recruiters and radicalizers". The implications are that this aspect of the UK's police role in counter-terrorism policing can not only halt its own success, as members of Muslim communities may refuse to co-operate, but can also create further support for terrorist organisations as the unfair treatment may push people closer to terrorist organisations. The research highlights the consequences which failing to recognise the limitations of policing by consent and respecting the religious beliefs of communities can have on the police's relationships with

communities and consequently the success of counter-terrorism policing. Therefore, considering this research, it can be argued that the UK police efforts may have a negative impact on counter-terrorism policing if the police fail to foster positive relationships with communities.

Perhaps the most useful way of evaluating the role of the police in counter terrorism policing within the UK, is to consider its effectiveness in preventing terrorist incidents. When discussing project SERVATOR (Counter Terrorism Policing, 2023), a police counter-terrorism tactic launched in 2014, Aplin and Rogers (2019) reported it provides reassurance and increases resilience as well as the reporting of suspicious activity. Additionally, the Home Office (2023) reported that in the year ending 31 March 2022 the police made 1,808 referrals to the Prevent counter-terrorism programme (Counter Terrorism Policing, 2023) and made 203 arrests for terror-related activity in the year ending 30 June 2022 (2022). However, Innes and Thiel (2012, p. 564) highlight negative aspects of the police in counter-terrorism policing. They contend that a number of “suspects have at one time or another been ‘on the radar’ of the police” however due to more viable threats being present, “expensive intensive surveillance assets” are directed elsewhere. They go on to argue that the police base their risk assessments and decisions on “imperfect and oftentimes uncertain intelligence” and that the police are hindered in preventing individuals from becoming “violent radicals” due to information and theory on the causes of this being in its infancy.

Conversely, counter Terrorism Policing (2021) stated that since March 2017, counter-terrorism police within the UK foiled thirty-two terrorism plots, including seven late-stage terror attacks since March 2020. Whilst these figures highlight the success of UK’s counter-terrorism police, these figures should be compared with the successful attacks during that time which were not prevented. Between 2017 and 2020 the UK saw twelve unprevented terrorist attacks, resulting in the combined deaths of forty-one people (Basu, 2021). Basu reflects on these terrorist attacks and argues that to prevent further attacks, the police need partnerships with other local authorities to better protect crowded public places, early intervention among suspects of terrorism, and collaboration with social media platforms to reduce hateful radicalisation. With all above points taken into consideration, it can be argued that counter-terrorism police within the UK play an important and effective role in counter-terrorism policing. However, there are areas in which it could be improved to become more effective,

whilst implemented approaches must be carefully considered to avoid alienation of communities.

There are multiple forms of criminality which, when investigated, may provide intelligence which can inform counter terrorism policing. One example of this is domestic abuse. Smith (2019) argues that terrorists often have a “long history of abuse and assaults on women”. Smith specifically highlights that the perpetrator of the 2017 Westminster Bridge attack had a history of violence and coercive and controlling behaviour relating to extreme religious ideologies against his wives and abducted his daughter to force her to convert to Islam. Smith further argues that if the security service were aware of the perpetrator’s history of domestic abuse, this might have helped them “to come to a different assessment of how dangerous he was”. Furthermore, research conducted by Zimmerman (2018) also found that high proportions of perpetrators of terrorism have histories as perpetrators of domestic violence. Zimmerman concluded that “addressing violence against women is a valid counterterrorism tool” and that it is important for “law enforcement to look at a violent criminal history, specifically of domestic violence, as a potential factor for radicalization.” This illustrates that intelligence gained in the investigation of domestic abuse may be useful in informing the policing of terrorism as it may provide insights into extreme religious ideologies and violent tendencies of perpetrators.

Furthermore, there are growing links between Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) and terrorist activity, as highlighted by Viano (2020) who states “it is clear that the merging of international organized crime and terrorist groups is growing”. This suggests that intelligence gained in the investigation of this type of criminality may inform counter-terrorism policing. An OCG is defined under section 45(6) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 as a group whose purpose is “the carrying on of criminal activities” and one which “consists of three or more persons who act, or agree to act, together to further that purpose.” This joint planning by multiple people was seen in the 7/7 London Bombings attack in 2005 and the London Bridge attack in 2017. Viano highlights the links between OCGs and terrorist activity by arguing “there are strong operational needs and requirements that bring organized crime and terrorists together for collaboration and even seamless transitions within the same general operation”. Clarke and Lee (2008) support this and argue terrorists “often still have to resort to criminal activity to continue to run their organisations.” Terrorists use multiple OCG style techniques to

fund terrorism. Examples of this are financial crime such as fraud, taxing the drug trade (Makarenko, 2004) and money laundering. Terrorists may also be involved in other types of crime, such as the trafficking and supply of drugs (Evans, 2017). When discussing alliances between terrorists and OCGs, Makarenko states, "the most commonly cited alliances exist in the realm of the international drug trade" and discusses how this can lead to terrorists gaining weapons through 'drugs-for-arms' arrangements with OCGs. Considering the above points, by investigating OCG related activity such as financial crime and drug supply, officers may discover evidence of preparation and fund raising for terrorist acts and gain intelligence about the activity of terrorist groups.

Policing the roads may also provide officers with intelligence about terrorist activity. Intelligence gained using Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) allows officers to disrupt suspected terrorists and gain an understanding of their travel routes. This is highlighted by the College of Policing (2019) and Etomi and Onyishi (2021) who have argued that ANPR has been proven to be important in "solving cases of terrorism". ANPR cameras can assist in providing both proactive intelligence about terrorism-related activity and retrospective investigations following terrorist incidents, whether through aiding in identifying suspects and their vehicles or intercepting suspects following an incident.

Additionally, intelligence which is gained through carrying out traffic stops under section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 can also inform counter-terrorism policing. Research conducted by Dahl (2011) found that proactive traffic stops by police play an important role in preventing terrorist attacks. In performing traffic stops, officers may come across terrorists who are attempting to use the road networks to travel undetected and can ascertain their details through using powers under sections 164 and 165 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Once these details have been ascertained, officers can run checks via local databases and the Police National Database to obtain intelligence on vehicles and suspects. Officers can also submit new intelligence on the locations of suspects, who they may be associating with and the vehicles they are using which further informs counter-terrorism policing.

Furthermore, intelligence gained from stop and searches of individuals and vehicles which have been prompted through policing the roads may also inform counter-

terrorism policing. By using powers under section 47A of the Terrorism Act 2000 (previously section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000), the police may search vehicles and drivers if terrorist activity is suspected. Research conducted by Parmar (2011) found that whilst discussing this legislation, officers described it as 'really useful' and argued that "it may have a 'deterrent effect' (by making potential terrorists less likely to plan or engage in an attack for fear of being caught)". Intelligence gained through the use of stop and search can not only inform counter terrorism policing (Quinlan and Derfoufi, 2015) by gathering information on suspects who are in possession of terrorism-related items, but as highlighted by Parmar (2011), may also deter suspects from engaging in terrorist activity. Considering all points, intelligence gained through policing of the roads can inform counter terrorism policing by enabling counter-terrorism police to locate and identify terrorist suspects as well as gaining information about their vehicles, associates and registered addresses.

In conclusion, the police play an important role in counter terrorism policing. The police's collaborative approach to information sharing increases their ability to mitigate risks. As a result, numerous terrorist plots have been foiled by police in recent years. The police have an opportunity to combat terrorism through community policing, but this approach must be carefully considered to prevent it having counterproductive effects. As discussed however, despite the positive aspects of the police's role in counter terrorism policing, there have been unprevented terrorist attacks in recent years which highlight a degree of ineffectiveness and room for improvement in the role of the police. By gaining intelligence through the investigation of other forms of criminality such as domestic abuse, OCG related crime and through effective enforcement of roads policing, counter terrorism policing can be better informed and more effective in disrupting terrorism.

Word count: 2,188

Question Three

There are many key issues and challenges which operational policing within the United Kingdom faces. Challenges such as budget cuts which have led to high workloads and mental health problems among officers, new types of crime and officers dealing with non-crime related incidents, issues with body worn cameras and integrity issues, corruption among officers, and misunderstanding of cross-cultural differences can all affect the ability of police forces to function effectively. Here, these issues will be explored and consideration will be given as to how they can affect the investigation of volume and priority crime.

The budget cuts which police forces in the United Kingdom have faced since 2011 have led to increased demand on forces and the individuals within them, which has negatively impacted the investigation of volume and priority crime. Duran, Woodhams and Bishopp (2019, pp 184-198) argue “policing in the UK is facing even greater challenges at present with the current organisational climate of budget cuts due to austerity measures”. This austerity amongst the police has given rise to two main challenges: namely the poor mental health of officers and high individual workloads (Jackman et al., 2020, pp. 370-388), following a reduction of 14% in the number of police officers between 2009 and 2019 (Home Office, 2019). This issue is highlighted by research conducted by Elliot-Davies (2018). The research found an increase from 29.1% in 2016 to 31.9% in the number respondents who stated that at “least one day of their sickness absence was attributable to stress, depression or anxiety”. The research also found that the key factor in the psychological issues of police officers was workloads being too high. This rise in statistics suggests that nearly a third of the workforce which was surveyed took time off work due to mental health related issues. This data, combined with the reason for the stress being high workloads, highlights the risk of the creation of a downward spiral for officers as workloads continue to rise due to more officers taking time off work due to mental health issues. Additionally, “mental health”, “stresses” and “hazards” have been associated with an average dropout rate of 9.1% among officers in their probation by Police Federation (2022), thus further exacerbating the issue.

The implications of this data are that the investigation of crime will be negatively affected as there will be less officers to attend calls or gather evidence, potentially

resulting in 'golden hour' opportunities being missed and time-critical evidence being lost, which may result in cases in being lost. Additionally, this data suggests that officers may have less time to fully investigate all crimes which are allocated to them in a timely manner. The direct results of these budget cuts have been reported on by Dearden (2018) who has written "the British public are being "failed" because huge demand and stretched resources mean police are not responding to crimes they would have dealt with in the past". Additionally, Dearden has also reported that the police failed to properly investigate a quarter of thefts and assaults after years of cuts (2019) and that the police were not investigating "40% of crimes reported in Manchester because of budget cuts" (2019). Additionally, Gallop (2020) argues that as a result of police budget cuts, police are "selecting fewer evidential items for forensic examination" and that accredited private forensic laboratories are now less frequently used than non-accredited, police laboratories to examine items. Gallop expands on these points and states "without the in-depth knowledge and experience necessary to make informed choices, there is now the potential for vital evidence to be missed or lost, and for incomplete interpretation of results". These findings demonstrate that police budget cuts have had a profoundly negative impact on the investigation of volume and priority crime.

In addition to police budget cuts which have led to fewer resources, another challenge which police in the United Kingdom face is increasing demand on forces through rising crime rates and adapting to new types of crime, as well as dealing with non-crime incidents. When discussing the issues of rising crime rates and new types of crime, Lynch (2018) has argued "we have seen not just an increase in traditional crimes but also a surge in cyber-crime, human trafficking, historic sex abuse allegations and, of course, the ever-growing threat of terrorism". Additionally, Fittes (2018) has listed some of the numerous other roles of the police as: managing sex offenders in the community, looking for missing persons, dealing with people with mental health problems, policing football matches and policing pubs and clubs. This combination of rising crime rates, new types of crime and dealing with non-crime incidents has had a negative effect on the investigation of volume and priority crime as already stretched resources are allocated to combatting these issues. The result of this is investigations taking longer, as highlighted by the Home Office (2021) which found that since 2018, the average time taken for a crime outcome to be applied has risen from six days to

eleven. The ONS has attributed this rise to “an increasing volume of offences and complexity of caseloads being dealt with by the police”. Another result of this is investigations of new types of crime not being investigated adequately, as is highlighted by Loveday (2017, pp. 101-109). Loveday argues that although residents within the United Kingdom are now twenty times more likely to be a victim of fraud than robbery, and that fraud now represents a new type of volume crime, police investigations in this area have been poor and that many victims have reported feeling let down. Additionally, when writing about the police investigation of online crime, Barrett (2015) has written that police officers have shown a “worrying lack of understanding both of the threat and risk to the victim and as a consequence, a failure positively to support them”. He has also reported that one victim of fraud received “no contact whatsoever from his local police force after reporting the crime”. These failures may arise from difficulties such as a lack of resources and officers’ knowledge, the complexity of investigations or the need to track suspects across different countries. However, the findings demonstrate that these issues have led to poor investigations in now just new areas of crime, but also traditional areas.

Another challenge which police in the United Kingdom face is issues with body worn cameras. Body worn cameras have been issued to police officers across the United Kingdom as a means of tackling police corruption and assisting with the investigation of crime. They have been the cause of debate amongst officers and members of the public since their introduction to police forces. There is evidence to suggest that the presence of body worn cameras can assist with the investigation of crime. For example, research conducted by Owens, Mann and McKenna (2014) found that 81% of incidents which were attended by an officer who was wearing a body worn camera resulted in a charge, whereas as 72% of those which were not attended by an officer who was wearing a body worn camera did not. This suggests that body worn cameras can assist with investigations, provide evidence and are more likely to result in a suspect being charged. However, the results of this research are limited as only one in six officers involved in the study reported using their body worn cameras in all incidents. Therefore, the success in the increased number of charges can not be directly attributed to the presence of body worn cameras. Despite this, additional research conducted by Sousa et al (2018, pp. 100-108) found that 91% of people agreed that body-worn cameras increase police-citizen relations and 92% agreed that

body worn cameras increase citizens' trust in the police. This suggests that body worn cameras are beneficial and one may surmise from these findings that they therefore assist with in the investigation of volume and priority crime as members of the public may be more willing to cooperate with the police and provide evidence. However, this survey was only available to members of the public who had access to the internet, and therefore the sample is not an entirely accurate representation of the population. This must be taken into consideration when reviewing the findings.

Alternatively, it can be argued that body worn cameras have created challenges for the police and can negatively affect the investigation of volume and priority crime. It can also be argued that they may make people reluctant to provide information to the police. Rowe, Pearson and Turner (2018, pp. 83-90) support this argument and state "members of the public, who had provided intelligence in the past, will not now because the BWC (body worn camera) is on, or they think it is on". This suggests that body worn cameras may reduce citizens' trust in the police, and therefore negatively affect the investigation of crime. Not only this, but the reliability of body worn cameras in gathering evidence has also been questioned by some. White and Coldren (2017) argue that body worn cameras have "numerous limitations that affect the likelihood that they will capture a complete visual and audio record of what has transpired", such as: officers activating the cameras late or not at all, camera views being obstructed or being affected by poor lighting, cameras not picking up what an officer may be able to see out of their peripheral vision or by turning their head, footage of foot chases or altercations being unwatchable due to the camera's movements or cameras falling off an officer's body. Additionally, research conducted by Miranda (2021, pp. 18-34) found that some officers have encountered instances where body worn cameras have moved unintentionally, resulting in officers' feet being recorded rather than the incident, due to a fault with a camera's mechanism, or being knocked out of position during altercations, resulting in vital evidence being missed. Furthermore, the research also highlighted the issues of body worn cameras being deactivated accidentally during altercations, again resulting in evidence not being recorded, the risk of officers losing their cameras and therefore evidence, and problems with storing evidence on computer systems. This highlights that whilst body worn cameras can increase charges and trust in the police, they can also negatively affect investigations due to their unreliability in certain situations in capturing retrievable evidence.

Another challenge which police forces within the United Kingdom face is a negative perception by the public as a result of some officer's behaviour. Issues involving police integrity and corruption as well as officers' misunderstanding of cross-cultural differences and the needs of different communities can lead to non-cooperation of members of the public and a poor public view of the police. Recent cases of police corruption such as the murder of Sarah Everard by Wayne Couzens have negatively affected the public's perception of the police. Following this incident, Farrow (2022) wrote: "more people appear to have lost confidence in the police (48%) than have sustained confidence in them (43%). This is a 10-point drop from late February/early March of 2021."

Additionally, barriers can arise between officers and residents from different cultural backgrounds through officers not matching communication styles with residents, lack of knowledge of cultures, differences in language, stereotyping, differences in religious beliefs and social differences. This is highlighted by research conducted by Awan et al. (2017, pp. 172-184) which found that members of ethnic minorities have the lowest rate of satisfaction and trust towards the police within the United Kingdom. This distrust from members of the public towards the police may lead to a lack of cooperation with the police during investigations, such as proving statements or evidence and may therefore negatively affect the investigation of volume and priority crime. Dixon (2002, pp-44.45) highlights the importance strong relationships between the police and communities by stating: "we know that police intelligence relies on good communication with the overall community. It is thus imperative that we learn about the reasons behind poor communication". If the police foster trusting relationships with communities, this is likely to have a positive effect on the investigation of volume and priority crime. These issues of trust may be overcome through increased police training about different cultures within the communities that they serve.

In conclusion, operational police within the United Kingdom faces many issues and challenges such: budget cuts, high workloads, poor mental health of officers, new types of crime, dealing with non-crime related incidents, issues with body worn cameras and negative public perceptions as a result of problems with officers' integrity, corruption and misunderstanding of cross-cultural differences. All of these issues have a negative impact on the investigation of volume and priority crime. Whilst there are a number of issues which need to be addressed, it would appear that overall causes of

these challenges are a lack of funding and adequate resources as well as the behaviour of officers. If these areas can be addressed, the quality of investigations of volume and priority crime may be improved.

Word count: 2,153

References

Aplin, D., & Rogers, M. B. (2020) “Alert not alarm’: The UK experience of public counter-terrorism awareness and training, with explicit reference to Project ARGUS’, *The Police Journal*, 93(3), pp. 167–182. Available at: <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk/10.1177/0032258X19851537> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Awan, I. et al. (2017) ‘Understanding the public perception and satisfaction of a UK police constabulary’, *Police Practice and Research*, 20(2), pp. 172-184. DOI: 10.1080/15614263.2018.1428098

Barrett, D. (2015) *Police ‘dismissive’ of online crime, finds watchdog*. [online] Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/12064353/Police-dismissive-of-online-crime-finds-watchdog.html> (Accessed 20 February 2023).

Basu, N. (2021) ‘Learning lessons from countering terrorism: the UK experience 2017–2020’, *Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing*, 5, pp. 134-145. Available at: <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk/10.1007/s41887-021-00068-1> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Clarke, R., and Lee, S. (2008) ‘The PIRA, D-company, and the crime-terror nexus’ *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20(3), pp. 376-395. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073334> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

College of Policing (2019) *Disrupting Criminality*. [online] Available at: <https://www.college.police.uk/app/roads-policing/disrupting-criminality> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Counter Terrorism Police (2021) *Latest Home Office statistics reveal 7 late-stage plots foiled since March 2020*. [online] Available at: <https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/latest-home-office-statistics-reveal-7-late-stage-plots-foiled-since-march-2020/> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Counter Terrorism Policing (2023) *Prevent* [online]. Available at: <https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/what-we-do/prevent/> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Counter Terrorism Policing (2023) Project Servator. [online] Available at: <https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/servator/> (Accessed 28: February 2023).

Dahl, E. J. (2011) 'The plots that failed: Intelligence lessons learned from unsuccessful terrorist attacks against the United States', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34(8), pp. 621-648. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.582628>

Dearden, L. (2018) *police forces are 'failing the public' due to cuts, Police Federation chief warns.* [online] Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-uk-stop-responding-crime-budget-cuts-demand-federation-violence-demand-officers-a8485316.html> (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Dearden, L. (2019) (a) *Police failing to properly investigate quarter of thefts and assaults after years of cuts, inspectors find.* [online] Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-cuts-budget-crimes-investigated-public-safety-a8895281.html> (Accessed 20 February 2023).

Dearden, L. (2019) (b) *Police not investigating 40% of crimes reported in Manchester 'because of budget cuts'.* [online] Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-manchester-crime-budget-cuts-tories-a8883236.html> (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Dixon, L. (2002) 'Crime, Policing and Ethnic Minorities', *Probation Journal*, 49(1), pp. 44-45. DOI: 10.1177/026455050204900108.

Duran, F., Woodhams, J. & Bishopp, D. (2019) 'An Interview Study of the Experiences of Police Officers in Regard to Psychological Contract and Wellbeing', *Journal of Police Criminal Psychology*, 34, pp.184–198. Available at: <https://doi.org.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk/10.1007/s11896-018-9275-z>. (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Elliot-Davies, M. (2018) *PFEW Demand, Capacity and Welfare Survey 2018 Headline Statistics December 2018.* [online] Available at: <https://www.polfed.org/media/14060/demandcapacityandwelfaresurveyheadlinestatistics2018-06-02-19-v1.pdf> (Accessed 20 February 2023).

Etomi, E. E. and Onyishi, D. U. (2021) 'Automated number plate recognition system', *Tropical Journal of Science and Technology*, 2(1), pp. 38-48. Available at: <https://credencepressltd.com/journal/uploads/archive/202116272321515622211361.pdf> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Farrow, K (2022) *Legitimacy and Confidence in Policing*. [online] Available at: https://www.cumberlandlodge.ac.uk/sites/default/files/legitimacy_confidence_in_policing_-_briefing_document.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Fittes, A. (2018) *Increase in crime after police cuts*. [online] Available at: <https://www.polfed.org/Leics/news/2018/increase-in-crime-after-police-cuts/> (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Gallop, A. (2020) *If the UK cares about justice, it must fund forensic services properly*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/13/uk-justice-fund-forensic-services-budget-cuts> (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

HM Government (2018) *Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*. [online] Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf (Accessed: 28/02/2023).

Home Office (2019) *Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2019 second edition*. [online] Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/831726/police-workforce-mar19-hosb1119.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Home Office (2021) *Crime outcomes in England and Wales 2020 to 2021*. [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/crime-outcomes-in-england-and-wales-2020-to-2021/crime-outcomes-in-england-and-wales-2020-to-2021> (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Home Office (2022) *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, quarterly update to June 2022*. [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-the->

terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-june-2022/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stop-and-search-great-britain-quarterly-

Home Office (2023) Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2021 to March 2022. [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Jackman, P. (2021) 'We are fighting a tide that keeps coming against us: a mixed method exploration of stressors in an English county police force', *Police Practice and Research*, 22(1), pp. 370-388. DOI: 10.1080/15614263.2020.1789463.

Loveday, B. (2017) 'Still plodding along? The police response to the changing profile of crime in England and Wales', *International Journal of Police Science & Management*, 19(2), pp. 101–109. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461355717699634> (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Makarenko, T. (2004) 'The crime-terror continuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organised crime and terrorism', *Global crime*, 6(1), pp. 129-145.

Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1744057042000297025> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

McGarrell, E.F., Freilich, J.D. and Chermak, S. (2007) 'Intelligence-led policing as a framework for responding to terrorism', *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 23(2), pp. 142–158. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986207301363> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

MI5 (no date) Threat levels. [online] Available at: <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels> (Accessed: 10 February 2023).

Miranda, D. (2020) 'Body-worn cameras 'on the move': exploring the contextual, technical and ethical challenges in policing practice', *Policing and Society*, 32(1), pp. 18-34. DOI: 10.1080/10439463.2021.1879074.

Owens, C., Mann, D. and Mckenna, R. (2014) *The Essex Body Worn Video Trial: The impact of Body Worn Video on criminal justice outcomes of domestic abuse incidents*. [online] Available at: http://www.bapcojournal.com/wp-content/themes/0czvmz76vrxmhp7oaz5few72299/files/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/BWV_ReportEssTrial.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Parmar, A. (2011) 'Stop and search in London: counter-terrorist or counter-productive?', *Policing and Society*, 21(4), pp. 369-382. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2011.617984> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Police Federation (2022) *Attrition rates show more must be done to retain new recruits*. [online] Available at: <https://www.polfed.org/news/latest-news/2022/attrition-rates-show-more-must-be-done-to-retain-new-recruits/#:~:text=Data%20from%20the%20National%20Police%20Chiefs%E2%80%99%20Council%2C%20obtained,November%202019%20and%20the%20leavers%20from%20April%202020.> (Accessed: 20 February 2023)

Quinlan, T.L. and Derfoufi, Z. (2015) 'Counter-Terrorism Policing' In: Delsol, R. and Shiner, M. (eds) *Stop and Search*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 163. Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/52/section/163/enacted> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 164. Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/52/section/164> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 165. Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/52/section/165> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Rowe, M., Pearson, G., and Turner, E. (2018) 'Body-Worn Cameras and the Law of Unintended Consequences: Some Questions Arising from Emergent Practices', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 12(1), pp. 83–90. Available at: <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk/10.1093/police/pax011> Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Serious Crime Act 2015, s. 45(6). Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/section/45/enacted>. (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Smith, J. (2019) *Home grown: how domestic violence turns men into terrorists*. London: Riverrun.

Sousa, W., Miethe, T., and Sakiyama, M. (2018) 'Inconsistencies in Public Opinion of Body-Worn Cameras on Police: Transparency, Trust, and Improved Police–Citizen Relationships', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 12(1), pp. 100–108. Available at: <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk/10.1093/police/pax015> (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Spalek, B. (2013) *Terror Crime Prevention with Communities*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Terrorism Act 2000, s. 44. Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/44> (Accessed: 27 February 2023).

Terrorism Act 2000, s. 47A. Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/47A> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Terrorism Act 2000, s.1. Available at: [https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1#:~:text=1%20Terrorism%3A%20interpretation.,U.K.&text=\(c\)the%20use%20or%20threat,%2C%20racial%5D%20or%20ideological%20cause.&text=\(e\)is%20designed%20seriously%20to,to%20disrupt%20an%20electronic%20system](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1#:~:text=1%20Terrorism%3A%20interpretation.,U.K.&text=(c)the%20use%20or%20threat,%2C%20racial%5D%20or%20ideological%20cause.&text=(e)is%20designed%20seriously%20to,to%20disrupt%20an%20electronic%20system). (Accessed: 28/02/2023).

Trajan Evans (2017) 'The Link Between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking,' GlobalJusticeBlog.com. 6 November. Available at: <https://law.utah.edu/the-link-between-terrorism-and-drug-trafficking/> (Accessed: 15 February 2023).

Viano, E. C. (2020) 'Unholy alliances and their threat: the convergence of terrorism, organized crime and corruption', *International Annals of Criminology*, 58(1), pp. 91-110. Available at: <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2456360653?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:primo&countid=130472>. (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

White, M. and Coldren, J. (2017) *Body-Worn Police Cameras: Separating Fact from Fiction*. [online] Available at: <https://icma.org/articles/pm-magazine/pm-article-body-worn-police-cameras-separating-fact-fiction> (Accessed: 20 February 2023).

Wong, J. (2022) 'Sharing terrorism intelligence: insights from UK law enforcement agencies', *Journal of policing, intelligence and counter terrorism*, 17(2), pp.218-228. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2021.2016898?needAccess=true> (Accessed: 28 February 2023).

Zimmermann, M. (2018) 'The relationship between domestic violence and terrorism: A comparison between the United Kingdom and the United States', *The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*. Available at: <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2059154830?fromopenview=true&pq-origsite=gscholar>. Accessed: 28 February 2023)