REMAKING THE NATION

Place, identity and politics in Latin America

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ne symbolic level the schisms and diversity which multiply and de-centre
social and the nation are suspended in relation to a symbolic inclusivity,
fect, a romance which is the national story. Chapter 5 takes up this story
different way, grounding the discussion in the importance of space
place as the terrain on which 'geographies of identity' are produced and
ained.

5

NATIONALIZED PLACES?

The geographies of identity

How do the popular uses of, and movements around, the nation intervene in the constitution of national identities in Latin America? What effects have the massive migration flows had on the popular expression of senses of affiliation to place? Addressing these questions, this chapter examines citizens' relationships with variegated national places – the neighbourhood, the city, the region and so on. While Chapter 4 discussed the role of popular cultures in providing sites for the expression of national identity at the international/national interface, this chapter examines the interactions between 'local' and 'national' spheres in social practice, and in creative expressions. Non-official imaginative geographies and spatial relations with the nation are the focus, in order to provide an analysis of the 'other side' to the state project of constituting national landscapes. People hold clear ideas about how their nation is organized spatially and socially, ideas informed by popular cultures. Drawing on substantive material from around Latin America, the chapter examines the ways in which conceptions of place and an 'aesthetics of place' are articulated in discourse and practice.

These geographies of identity partially – although contradictorily – engage with, and rearticulate, the official national imaginations. Whereas official versions of nationhood draw upon localities in order to 'stand in' for the nation (Chapter 3), Andean nationals reveal a more complex and contingent relationship between 'local' places and the nation. Rather than 'standing in' in any straightforward sense for the national space, regional and local affiliations create a nuanced discursive relationship with the national, through which ideas about the exact nature of being a national and a 'local' can be expressed. To take one example, migrants to Lima's *barrios* identify themselves as Peruvians in a discourse which highlights the popular provincial inputs to national belonging, and thereby distance themselves from the metropolitan elite culture which has long stood in for Peruvian-ness officially. An imagined community of Peruvians is discursively constituted, as the parameters for defining that same community are re-negotiated.

NAMING PLACES IN LATIN AMERICA

The range of words for 'place' in Latin America is relatively wide, with the nuances of individual terms illustrating the creation of identity through the

juxtaposition of boundaries and places, and even the 'playing off' of one place against another. For example, *lugar* in Spanish means a geographical place, yet *lugareño/a* refers to a rural dweller; *patria* means fatherland or nation, but *patria chica* connotes one's home town (as do the terms *tierra*, *pueblo*) (Robinson 1989). Thus names for place also significantly refer – to varying degrees – to people-in-place, populated spaces, with specific connotations about the *kinds* of communities located there. Similarly, the Quichua word for community *ayllu* refers to people in a place (Allen 1988), as does *llacta*, often glossed as town or *pueblo*. A sense of community relies upon and refers to particular places, whereby a community makes references to itself and the national society and space through a series of practices (festivals, boundary-marking, graffiti and so on). This chapter argues that the social and spatial boundaries between the 'local' and the national are dynamic, contested and multi-faceted; also, due to the mediated relations between official and popular identities, the boundaries drawn by popular citizens are not infinitely malleable, varying with 'race', gender and class positioning.

Such interlacing and complexity automatically raise questions about the supposedly fixed relationship between people and place in nation-states (see Chapter 1; cf. Balibar 1990: 337; Jacobs 1995). That such a relationship is changed through mobility or is more contingent and open to rearticulation has not attracted the scholarly attention given to citizenship relations between subjects. In general legal terms, the relationship between citizens and the space of the nation is assumed to be static: citizenship confers access to most of the national territory (except, interestingly, those areas most concerned with 'national security', such as nuclear military bases). Within the national territory subjects remain citizens through their 'natural' location; outside the territory, they are displaced temporarily (as tourists, workers abroad and so on), or the relation between people and land is broken (through war, exile, refuge).

Yet such formal conceptions of place fail to acknowledge the multi-faceted and complex *affiliations* – 'structures of feeling and attitude' (Said 1994) – to places within, and indeed beyond, the national. Although these structures of feeling are contested, socially produced and constantly negotiated, boundaries are still drawn around certain places as 'ours' or 'theirs', and distinctions between regions and nations affirmed. An understanding of the multiple relationships between the local and the national, between identities, nationhood and politics, focuses on people's uses of places and their embedded practices. By focusing on the mediations between citizens and 'their' territory, this chapter highlights a broad field of geographical imagination among citizens.[1] Such mediation holds out the potential hegemony of official national identities, yet implies too that this can shift or destabilize senses of national identity, as seen in the examples.

The chapter contains four main sections, each detailing a different dimension of the lived and imaginative geographies of national citizens. The section on 'Regionalism' looks at popular conceptions of the differences between areas *within* the nation, the identities accorded to them, and the ways in which these discursively constituted geographies inform collective identities. Rural–urban differences as well as differences between geophysical regions are examined. The section on 'Popular aesthetics of national places' deals with the ways in which imagery and language structure the 'distinctive cultural topography' (Said 1994: 61) of the nation in post-colonial Latin America. While Said traces a cultural topography through novels, our attention here is focused on oral traditions, *dichos* or sayings, and popular discourses and artefacts which express ideas about national aesthetics. The section on 'Living through the nation' examines and analyses the patterns of interaction with the national territory which are developed by subjects during the course of their life trajectories. Focusing specifically on migration experiences, military service and colonization, this section suggests that mobility around the national space may lead to profound, shifting and contradictory senses of identity and belonging with the nation. Supranational affiliations in Latin America also condition senses of national belonging; sharing Hispanic languages and a colonial history, the region's nations have several spheres through which to express common identities. The section on 'Challenging national geographies' examines how counter-hegemonic notions of place and identity are produced and re-created by popular subjects in relation to the national territory. This section argues that among indigenous groups in the Ecuadorean Amazon a process of negotiation over place, nation and identity is occurring, in which the parameters for subjective identification with the nation (as a community and a place) are highly mediated through official senses of nationhood, although the implications include the emergence of new identities unforeseen by the state. An interpretation of the interconnections between place, mobility and national identities is made, in order to formulate the idea of geographies of identity.

REGIONALISM

Strong senses of regional identity cutting across affiliation to nations are found around the world, such as Wales in Britain, Bengal in India or Eritrea in Ethiopia. Whether or not regional affiliations mobilize people into civil conflict with the state, belonging to a region calls upon a sense of community and identity which often questions and nuances national feeling in subtle and distinctive ways. In this sense then, a self-identified region may either claim a centrality for itself in the national imaginary, or feel excluded or different from the nation overall. Regional feeling may be exacerbated by struggles between different regional bourgeoisies, as occurred in Brazil and Argentina during the early republican period, if distinct 'national' agendas and associated economic and political interests are expressed. Certainly the political economic context for regionalism is noticeable in Ecuador, where the highland elite represents government, oil and agricultural interests, while the coastal elite in Guayaquil port relies upon manufacturing and export-oriented extractive and agrarian industries (Cueva 1982; Webb Vidal 1992). Developing around such economic distinctions are popular sayings and conceptualizations of the 'other' region, through which ideas about centrality and the nature of the country are expressed. Guayaquil residents say that Quiteños are dull, early-to-bed,

snobbish, hierarchical, old-fashioned and conservative. The highlanders describe their port counterparts as rough, loud and like *monos* monkeys, associating them with sharp business sense, anti-clericalism and exuberance; the 'promiscuity' of the port city being perhaps attributable to its role as entry point into the nation. In this 'two city dialectic' (Whitten 1985: 35), stereotypes about people in the two cities are also stereotypes about the cities themselves. Guayaquil is described as dirty, chaotic, corrupt and full of crime, while Quito is closed up by 10 o'clock at night. While comparable stereotypes are known the world over, the point is not to reproduce here the simplistic rivalry and dichotomies which such stereotypes circulate. Rather it is to highlight the fact that these widely circulating sayings reinforce an urban-centred, metropolitan and largely 'white' elite picture of the country. Nevertheless, each place also contains social and discursive diversities which unsettle this binary.

Dichos or popular sayings create a discourse which centres on the large metropolitan areas as the significant places in the nation, thereby silencing or overwriting other urban, and especially rural, places. Discursive oppositions between Guayaquil and Quito depend upon and are grounded on an implicit, yet equally powerful, commonsense view of the *rest* of the country. Rural Andean regions of the country are pictured in a 'commonsense' way as backward, uneducated and poor, reliant upon help from outside and blocking further national development.[2] Similar Andean tropes are known in Peru and Colombia, where long-term discursive formations exist, reliant upon popular stereotypes and their selective reinforcement by official documents (Orlove 1993 on Peru; Wade 1994 on Colombia).

The Oriente region of Ecuador was for much of the early republican period off the discursive 'mental map' of metropolitan decision-makers.[3] In the late colonial era, Amazonia was not recognized as a distinctive area, although in the early republican period increasingly detailed discourses about the Amazonian region emerged. Between 1830 and 1852, the first six republican constitutions did not mention the Amazon region *per se*, that is they did not differentiate it as a distinct component of national geographies (Restrepo 1993). From the 1861 constitution, the 'Province of Oriente' appeared, although it was several more years until projects for the material (rather than imaginative) incorporation of the Amazon into the nation were realized.[4] During the course of the nineteenth century, the image of the Ecuadorean Amazon was of an inhospitable, hostile place inhabited by wild animals and 'savage tribes who worshipped the devil' (quoted in Restrepo 1993: 154). In neighbouring Peru, the Amazon region was similarly perceived until the 1930s as a place inhabited by 'aborigines' and 'primitive tribes', 'a place of mysterious allure, containing "exuberant" vegetation and untold wealth, a "zone on which the human foot has not stepped"' (Orlove 1993: 326, quoting the Peruvian geographer Paz Soldán). Given the pervasive gendering of landscapes, such primitiveness also suggested femininity – wildness and uncultured nature (Norwood and Monk 1987; Blunt and Rose 1994). In fiction, the Ecuadorean Amazon territory was feminized: the jungle represented an unredeemed female space, which infuriated male colonizers with its

'flirtatious proliferation of identities' (quoted in Sommer 1991: 269). Only later in the twentieth century has the 'distinctive cultural topography' of the Ecuadorean Oriente changed from a threatening to a promising one. The new discursive surface creating and reflecting the Oriente for the majority of Ecuadoreans (95 per cent of whom reside in other regions) is a land of promise, an unpopulated yet a resource-filled land of plenty awaiting modernization and development (cf. Chirif *et al.* 1991). The abundance of resources, imaginatively placed in the Oriente, replaces the primitive other with feminized notions of fertility, as well as with the possibility of productive development. As one of our respondents in Napo province said, 'the Amazon maintains Ecuador because it generates 67 per cent of the national budget'. However, older discursive imaginaries persist in (contradictory) popular observations that it is underpopulated, 'uncivilized' and crude.

The extent to which Ecuadoreans perceive themselves as living in a country that is defined by its Amazonian territory – which currently represents 45.8 per cent of the national total (compared with 25 per cent in the coastal plain, and 26.2 per cent in the Sierra, the remainder in the Galapagos islands) – is reflected in questionnaire responses. Asked if Ecuador was an Amazonian country, 77 per cent of respondents in highland Cotopaxi province affirmed it was. Asking *why* it was an Amazonian country elicited varying responses, the majority connected with nationalist geography and history, and with their knowledge gained from school. Overall, nearly half (49 per cent) of all Cotopaxi respondents utilized the arguments used in official discourse about the Amazon (whether in school texts and classrooms, or in government announcements). Similarly, one middle-aged, Quichua-speaking man in Coca claimed that Ecuador was Amazonian 'because [various-times President] Velasco Ibarra said it was', referring to the nationalist discourse around the Oriente from the period of the 1950s on.

The imaginative geographies of residents of the Oriente region vary from those expressed in official 'commonsense' notions of regions. Since the nineteenth-century rubber boom, indigenous groups in Amazonia have been mobile, forced to migrate rubber areas or to flee recruitment. Nowadays, the Quichua group, found mostly in Napo and Sucumbios provinces, is one of the largest indigenous groups in Ecuadorean Amazonia (CONAIE 1989; Hudelson 1987). Self-identifying indigenous subjects in Napo persistently referred to the town of Coca or the Oriente region as a whole as the most beautiful part of the country, compared with other ethnic groups who say that the Oriente is the least beautiful region. Such positive views of the local region suggest a closer affiliation to that place than among *mestizo* and white populations, both of which constitute their ethnic-national identities in relation to areas represented as more civilized.

Part of thinking about regions in social terms is that communities also think through the region-nation question in racialized terms. Racial demographics – the distribution of racialized groups around the territory – comes to stand as the signifiers of the regions themselves; 'race' is regionalized, and regions racialized. The Colombian interior is popularly imagined as a white and *mestizo* region, while coastal regions are seen as black (particularly the Pacific

coast), and the Amazon region as more indigenous (Wade 1994). However, the particular conceptions of regional societies take into account specific regional characteristics as well and perceptions of distinct groups; 'there is an opposition between the Atlantic and Pacific coast, the former not so black, poor or peripheral as the latter' (Wade 1994: 64). Such diversity is nevertheless contained within the national place,

> Blacks . . . tend to be seen more easily [than indians] as Colombian citizens, albeit not typical ones nor ones that would be used to represent Colombia in most discourse about national identity.
>
> (Wade 1994: 36)

The particular history of enslavement, settlement and economic development lies behind the 'imaginative geography' which informs the Colombian national imaginary. The association of racialized (regionalized) groups with particular areas of the nation is, in Colombia as elsewhere, a result of a series of historically specific processes.

Interviews with residents of Ecuador's highland Cotopaxi province reveal clear ideas about where different ethnic-racial groups live in the nation (although sometimes they are located outside the nation!). In a diverse ethnic population (comprising 39 per cent indigenous, 21 per cent *mestizos/cholos*, 19 per cent 'whites' according to self-representation, along with 36 per cent non-attributable), there is remarkable consistency in the way those populations are imagined to be distributed, that is the regional (racialized) components of the national community. *Mestizos* are imagined to be located in the major cities (according to 47 per cent of respondents) or around the whole country (22 per cent), whereas whites are seen as predominantly urban (57 per cent of respondents). Moreover, whites are often seen as located specifically within offices! One *runa* (indigenous origin) woman said that whites were found 'in the offices', while Serrano man said, 'Ah yes, those are the ones in the offices'.[5] Blacks are seen as living in the coast, Esmeraldas and to a lesser extent Chota valley (66 per cent). Indigenous groups are identified more accurately in their attribution to rural areas and communities (51 per cent), highland areas (19 per cent), and around the whole country (11 per cent) (cf. Klump 1970; Stutzman 1974). In other words, despite a locally diverse population, comprising almost the entire range of national ethnic groups (excluding blacks), there are persistent stereotypes about where different groups are located in the nation. Such racialized imaginative geographies circulate largely within popular culture, owing their details only slightly to official conceptions of how the national community is organized.[6] Although there is some re-representation of the country as containing picturesque indigenous communities in the Sierra and the Oriente, such official re-mirroring draws heavily from popular imaginative geographies.

Although often racialized, the relations between nation, place and 'race' are historically variable, shifting with the political and social context within which people make affiliations to place and the communities found there. The identification of Bolivian highland indigenous groups reveals profound shifts around different 'scales' of affiliation through two centuries. The evolving

identities of the Aymara group illustrate a high degree of fluidity in the interface between 'race', place and nation. Between the late eighteenth century and the present day, wide regional ethnic identification among the indigenous population in the *altiplano* (highland) was replaced by parish-wide or local identities, based on birthplace (Albó 1987; cf. Platt 1993).[7] Although the denomination *campesino* offered some possibility for a wide regional identification during the mid-twentieth century (in addition to its class connotations), it failed to erase the implications of indianness, inferiority and marginality which adhered to rural *altiplano* dwellers. In this context, a culturally oriented identity based on language and cultural difference arose in the 1970s, mobilizing a wide range of social subjects whose identity as 'Aymara' was successfully interpellated, particularly by the nationwide Katarista peasant movement. Nevertheless, this cultural identity – with its corresponding socio-spatial spread – is underlain by and co-exists alongside an *Andean* identity, into which diverse local identities are articulated. The co-existence of identities at various spatial scales, each with its own particular 'history' and 'geography', thus breaks down any idea of an essential 'Aymara' identity with given social and spatial boundaries and unchanging trajectory (Figure 5.1).

One feeling of affiliation to place found in Latin America is that expressed in the term *patria chica*, literally meaning small homeland. Referring to a migrant's place of origin or a place where one feels at home, the notion of *patria chica* raises immediately the issue of overlapping affiliations to place, the *patria* and the place of origin. While not having such a widespread usage in Ecuador as in Peru or Colombia, popular naming of *patria chicas* raises some interesting issues about belonging and affiliation in light of other facets of identity. In Ecuador's Napo province, a young 'white' man identified his *patria chica* to be Quito and Galapagos, an interesting conflation of two sites (cultural/natural, central/peripheral) which feature prominently in official representations of the nation.[8] Among Cotopaxi residents interviewed (over half of whom spoke Quichua), nearly a third identified a *patria chica*, largely in terms of their birthplace and familial affiliations. Yet a quarter of those affiliating themselves with a *patria chica* in Cotopaxi claimed a sense of belonging with places (either on the Costa or elsewhere in the Sierra) they had migrated to and lived in during the course of their lives.

The above examples from Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador evidence people's understanding of regions and difference *within* the nation, which revise popular senses of place and where different communities 'belong' within the nation. People can feel 'Peruvian' or 'Colombian', yet the ways in which they think about that identification is in relation to non-local places within the nation, organized in terms of regions and racialized populations. The material also suggests that the places through which people imagine their communities and their affiliations to place are not fixed, but are liable to shifts resulting from socio-political mobilization. The Aymara example showed how what appears as an essential social identity is expressed through malleable and spatially contingent communities and places, constantly transformed through Bolivian history. The next section goes on to examine how these cross-cutting identities are also bound up with non-verbal representations and aesthetics.




Figure 5.1 The socio-spatial extent of Aymara identity in 1984, showing the dynamic interaction of Aymara, Quechua and Spanish languages

Source: adapted from Albó (1987).

'The connection between the imaginative geography of landscape and the imagined community of the nation' (Daniels 1993: 243) is one which has largely been explored in terms of landscape painting in metropolitan countries. However, in non-metropolitan countries – in both 'high' and 'popular' culture – the connection between aesthetics, landscape views and national identities is widely appreciated (Rowe and Schelling 1991; Canclini 1993). This section explores the connections between aesthetic representations of the national space, national identities, and the role of material culture in providing national icons. In Latin America, just as elsewhere in the world, the production, circulation and consumption of 'national' aesthetic products results from complex interactions involving relations of hegemony and contestation between 'popular' cultures, the state and nationalist ideologies (Canclini 1993; see also Chapter 4).

In Latin America, in common with English landscape paintings and national identities, there is seldom a secure or enduring consensus about which particular landscapes and legends epitomize the nation (Daniels 1993: 4). This is certainly true for Ecuador where people have very varying ideas about national landscapes, depending on their class, 'race', location and age. One arena for the circulation and consumption of aesthetic representations of nationhood is the Casa de Cultura in Quito, visited by thousands of school children and adult citizens every year. One of the largest rooms is the nineteenth-century room containing portraits of the Independence hero Simón Bolívar, as well as past urban landscapes, former national presidents in interior scenes and allegorical views of '*América*'. The landscapes hanging in the gallery depict specific places and events in Quito reaffirming – through representations of urban squares and historical 'national' events occurring in the capital – the centrality of urban centres in the national narrative.[9] 'National' history is pictured in metropolitan, urban and predominantly 'white' social spaces, and the place of Quito in this national museum 'stands in' for Ecuador. Moreover, the conflation of metropolis with nation reiterates the role of the city as the departure point for the colonizing/development project of progress (Jacobs 1996). Similarly the interior portraits of past presidents refer to the centres of decision-making and domestic spaces of the central elite, in their robes and with various badges of office, such as sashes and documents.

At the same time as these aesthetics are presented through public display, other representations of 'Ecuador' and its people are produced and deployed. One of the most widespread artefacts are small paintings of rural, particularly Andean, settings, known as *pinturas de tigua* (Tigua paintings). Consumed by tourists as well as Ecuadoreans and displayed in numerous streets and parks, the *pinturas de tigua* provide an alternative aesthetics of national landscapes (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Drawing upon patterns of life based on subsistence-oriented mixed-farming economies, the *pinturas* use a naive style with little or no perspective in addition to bright colours to show figures, animals, rural houses, Andean settlements and landscape features. Acrylic paint is used on leather stretched over wooden frames to re-present 'national' spaces, from the perspective of the indigenous peasantry of the Sierra. Domestic scenes (such



Figure 5.2 Pintura de tigua from Ecuador, showing an Andean rural landscape

as the birth in Figure 5.3) represent adobe houses and the networks of family and community which permit daily and generational reproduction. Placing themselves firmly within the national imagined community, the producers of *pinturas de tigua* simultaneously re-centre the nation – in the Andes – and 'nationalize' an area which has long been marginalized and not generally imagined as part of the nation.

Drawing upon distinct ideas of environment, morality and politics, popular representations of the Andean mountains challenge not only the centrality of Quito in 'national' imaginations, but also the socio-economic hierarchies which flow from that. Representations of mountain peaks, and indeed the mountains themselves, draw upon contemporary Andean cosmologies which challenge and limit secular state power (e.g. Guerrero Arias 1993; Silverblatt 1988; Radcliffe 1990a). Juxtaposition of national flags and mountain peaks in the *pinturas de tigua* draw upon complex discourses that specify both the interlinkages and distances between peasants and nation. Linkages are exemplified by state titles and judicial systems which guarantee landholdings and peasant national identities, but are conditioned by peasant distinctions between state political powers and the lifegiving powers of the mountain *apu* (mountain deity), and by peasant scepticism about the state's ability to deliver development to rural areas.

The complex, ambiguous relationship between peasant and nation from the peasants' perspective of *pinturas de tigua* is contextualized by official uses of these artefacts. *Pinturas* are widely promoted by the Ecuadorean state in the tourist business, as well as reproduced in postcards and brochures, thereby in part appropriated by the state. Yet the widespread display and consumption of




Figure 5.3 Pintura de tigua, showing a domestic interior after a birth.

the *pinturas* profoundly reconfigures the 'national' landscapes through which Ecuadoreans imagine their place. Especially with the consumption of *pinturas* by foreigners, the Andean-focused aesthetics of national space are reflected back into Ecuador with subtle effects on identifications. While Canclini (1993) suggests this process is one of 'hegemony allied with subalternity' to produce hybrid cultures, the *pintura* goes beyond this in its reconfiguration of both hegemony and subalternity through the re-territorialization and re-mirroring of the national aesthetics of place.

Elsewhere in Latin America, popular practices are used to renegotiate around official views of the nation, and its representation. The public consumption of a red-and-white striped alcoholic drink in the Andean, largely *mestizo* provincial town of Sicuani, southern Peru, draws upon an aesthetic (as well as economic and political) sense of identity (Orlove 1986). The ingredients chosen to colour the (otherwise colourless) sugarcane alcohol *trago* are trade goods, rare elsewhere in the southern Andes but encountered in Sicuani due to its position at the hub of widespread trading and marketing networks extending to the southern highlands and the coast. The striped colouring of the *trago* mirrors the colours of the Peruvian national flag – red, white, red – and positions Sicuani firmly within the nation, recognizing its legimacy. However, by using local-regional goods to make the image of the national flag, this apparently patriotic practice is linked with demands for regional autonomy and regional capital status. As in the Ecuadorean *pinturas*, the visual representation of the national flag reflects and enlarges upon a discourse of *local* belonging within a (thereby qualified) sense of national identity.

Popular subjects express detailed aesthetic judgements about different places

in the nation, outside the context of formal occasions and particular representational forms. Ecuadorean interviews demonstrate evidence for people's aesthetic discrimination, and imaginative picturing of different national locations. Moreover, very few respondents declined to name one specific pleasing place in Ecuador, although they were more reluctant to name unpleasant places.[10] For popular subjects of diverse ethnic identifications in highland Cotopaxi province, the most beautiful Ecuadorean places were predominantly in the Sierra, reflecting their own experience as well as official national images (cf. Chapter 3). Over half (51 per cent) identified towns or natural features in the Sierra as the most beautiful national place. Quito was the most aesthetically pleasing place for one-fifth of respondents, reflecting its (official/popular) centrality in national imaginations, while 11 per cent identified other towns (Ibarra, Imbambura, Baños, Chilla Grande peasant community, and 'the city' generally). Natural features (including the Galapagos islands, Chimborazo volcano, beaches, the Sierra landscape) were highlighted by nearly half, choices mediated by the externally oriented marketing of Ecuador for international tourists. Despite much official attention paid to the Mitad del Mundo site, only one person mentioned the monument as the most beautiful national place. Discrimination between national features on aesthetic criteria significantly differed from people's sense of what represented Ecuador in the world. Here again natural and landscape features (including the Galapagos, Chimborazo and Cotopaxi) figured prominently, yet nationalistic sites (Mitad del Mundo, the Equator line and other tourist sites), and objects (flag, shield, textiles) became more important.

LIVING THROUGH THE NATION

While knowledge and images of the nation are constituted through verbal and visual representations, the material and experiential procession of citizens through the national space is another (more frequently neglected) aspect of the formation of national belonging. National senses of belonging are dynamic spatial processes, developing over space(-time) and through specific places, through such practices as religious pilgrimages, migration for work and colonization, and military service. A nation has inherently, a dynamic relation with place, as well as comprising a history and a society. While other commentators have rightly pointed to the centrality of territory and internal spatial organization of nations (often equated with the division of territory into administrative areas: e.g. Williams and Smith 1983), the full implications of taking the nation as a geographical imagination and practices have not been fully taken on board.

Anderson's (1991) book on national imagined communities relies upon a (largely unacknowledged) geographical imagination which permits him to link themes of space, mobility and the nation. First, he details the movement of national leaders of colonial states in South-east Asia, discussing how these leaders, as school children and then as university students and administrators, moved through urban hierarchies and institutional networks created by French and British colonial rule in the region. In the pre-independence era,

individuals came to experience, represent and most significantly *embody* a 'nation' through their knowledge and education gained in various parts of the territory (see Chapter 6). Institutions, geographies and life-history came together to offer the possibility of what we might term a 'template' for an alternative, a post-colonial independent nation. A life trajectory was mapped out on to a geographical-social 'national' grid, and subjectivities (ideologies of 'nationalism') were constituted through experiences in diverse places (first colonial, then national). Anderson focuses predominantly on a small elite of mobile 'native' intellectuals, leaders of nationalist movements, anti-colonial ideologues, whose experience was interpreted and then mediated through colonial and post-colonial institutions. The rationalization of their trajectories served a particular function during the foundation and consolidation of a post-colonial nation.

By contrast, the experiences of labourers, domestic workers, migrants and conscripts – to name just a few – are not mediated at such levels, yet reveal other dimensions to identity formation and mobility. In contemporary Latin America the experience of migration is a democratic one, in which large numbers expect to participate as equals and in which ideas of belonging, nation and position are all self-conscious components in discourses around the urban. Migration draws upon notions of individual and family advancement, engagement with national institutions (schools, hospitals, public services, state administrations) and ideas of progress and development, and thereby occurs within a highly loaded arena. Where massive urbanward migration occurred, especially after the 1940s in many Latin American countries, migrants' socio-political situation and experiences conditioned the engagement of popular identities with issues of territoriality and belonging. While movement was not sufficient for the formation of national consciousness, the socio-economic changes attendant upon migration were salient in terms of *how* (in which institutional and social contexts) and *where* (in urban/rural areas, particular cities and/or regions) identities with place were constituted and experienced. With urbanization signifying progress in the developmentalist discourses of nationhood, migrants potentially accessed both cultural capital and social resources through arrival in the city. The imaginary in which the city epitomizes the nation's progress – as shown in the above discussion of paintings – is reinforced materially by the allocation of resources and population movements.

In Latin America's massive urbanward flows of populations, people's experiences of place (and associated cultures, societies and economies) were radically transformed, as were national imaginaries. Although the southern cone countries of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay were highly urbanized early in the twentieth century, other countries saw rapid and permanent urbanward movements of population between the 1950s and 1990s, largely towards the huge metropolitan centres. While 42 per cent of the region's population was urban in 1950, this percentage had risen to 72 per cent in 1990, resulting from urban annual growth rates averaging nearly 4 per cent over those decades. Not surprisingly, such demographic changes brought in train a series of wide-reaching social and economic transformations, not least

in the explosion of marginal *barrios* and poor neighbourhoods on the outskirts of major cities (the downside to discourse of urban progress), the development of informal economic activities, and the creation of new synthetic popular urban cultures. In terms of national identities, the move to the city was significant in many ways. Migrants were often aspiring to greater educational opportunities for themselves and their children, which brought them into greater contact with nationalist schooling procedures throughout the educational system (Chapter 3). As women were predominant in rural–urban migration flows in Latin America through much of the mid-century, and gained more education (especially among younger age groups), this access to urban areas and attendant services was particularly significant for female national identities (Chapter 6). Moreover, the insertion of migrants and their families into the urban political process often appeared to transform their sense of national belonging and articulation of 'community'. Nevertheless, migration and subsequent socio-cultural transformations did not necessarily mean an end to belonging to other places; provincial and village loyalties remained and were even strengthened among certain populations.

These themes can be explored in the case of Peru, a country where migration resulted in a doubling of the urban population between 1950 and 1990 (36 per cent to 70 per cent urban), and whose capital Lima grew to over 6 million inhabitants during the same period. Working in the *barrio* of San Martín de Porres, to the north-west of Lima, Degregori *et al.* (1986) traced the transformations in migrants' senses of place, origin and identity from the initial period of settlement through to the 'second generation' of migrants' adult children. In interviews with migrant families, a multiplicity of 'overlapping' senses of locale and belonging emerged. Whereas before migration identities were expressed in terms of affiliation with a village or town, early migrants to Lima became aware of the diversity of their neighbours' origins and hence the co-existence in homogeneous time of many provincial towns and villages. As one respondent, Mateo, explained,

> I have friends from various places, as many from the coast as the Sierra. I have quite a few contacts, I don't find much difference – when I meet three people from Cusco, Arequipa and Ayacucho, for me they're equal/the same, because I feel like them.
>
> (Degregori *et al.* 1986: 163)

Identifying as Peruvian was the discursive response to a shock of recognition with other migrants; 'I identify myself as a Peruvian that I am', said Pedro, a migrant. Quotidian life in the *barrio* opened out a sense of national belonging, allowing migrants to create discursively 'the image of their communion' made up of provincials like themselves (Anderson 1991: 6).

Yet national identities were also expressed in relation to a plurality of cultures which together make up the 'national': being Peruvian did not cause the automatic loss of diverse regional customs and 'traditions'. Migrants' national identity drew upon their self-conscious proud knowledge of, and participation in, diverse cultural practices associated with subnational regions and not with the whole country. As migrant Elsa explained,

> The customs of one are the customs of all; I'm not a *serrana* [from the Sierra] yet I dance *huaynos* [a dance associated with Andean peasants]; those from Sierra eat food from the North. So it's like that for us, it's the same [*igual*] – we don't say 'I like this because it's from there or here'.
>
> (Degregori *et al.* 1986: 163)

However, recognizing diversity within the national does not guarantee the reproduction of all 'local-regional' practices, as music, dance and song reveal (for other examples of these urban cultural reconversions, see Vila 1991). Upon migration to the city, Andean migrants often become reluctant to use Quechua with their children or other *serrano* migrants, while they also often give up 'typical' Andean clothing styles. By contrast, the general acceptability of Andean music was framed and legitimized by state legislation passed under the corporatist Velasco military regime, which from 1975 required all radio stations to dedicate a minimum of 7.5 per cent airtime to 'folkloric music' (Turino 1991; 1990; Llorens 1991). Defined as music 'born directly from the traditions and customs of the people . . . and especially from the rural zones', folkloric music took an average of 15.2 per cent of Lima's airwaves by 1987 (Turino 1991: 274–5). So in contrast with Guatemala where *traje* (clothing) has been culturally reconverted by the state in a national cultural practice (Chapter 1; cf. Sommers 1991), in Peru it is music, through which the 'national' is re-imagined and reconfigured.

Regardless of changing affiliations to place, first-generation Lima migrants retained links to their areas of origin, via the numerous regional and provincial associations in the capital (Altamirano 1980). By contrast, the youngest *barrio* dwellers often have not visited their parents' birthplace (Degregori *et al.* 1986: 255). Rather than being linked to a specific province, Lima's migrants become identified by others and identify themselves as either *costeño/as* (coastal dwellers) or *serrano/as*, 'members of one of the two great poles of the historic dichotomy which splits the country' (Degregori *et al.* 1986: 255). Nevertheless, the youngest migrant groups have a strong sense of the equal value of *serrano* and *costeño* as broad social cateogries, less tied to the discursive hierarchies that placed *costa* over *sierra*. In this sense, their vision is more 'national', identifying broad regional differences while denying demeaning stereotypes. However, Degregori, Blondet and Lynch question whether this equality is tied specifically to the migrants' location in Lima, where the stigma of regional origin can indeed be minimized by participation in shared activities and spaces.[11]

Yet such historically persistent identities of *costeño/serrano* are contingent, liable to be set aside in favour of an encompassing *provincial* identity when faced with the racist, centralist and seigneurial society of Lima. As one respondent Luisa explained,

> The provincial for me is . . . well, it depends, because also there are lazy provincials, but the provincials are good workers, they don't say 'well, now I'm tired, now I don't want to . . . and my hours' and so on. No, they go on, whereas the Limeño is limited.
>
> (Degregori *et al.* 1986: 270)

Provincial identity – when positioned *vis-à-vis* an imagined Limeño community – is hardworking and uncomplaining; other terms of reference include the *serranos*' honesty and greater willingness to struggle. Containing elements of class identity, the positive provincial identity draws also upon a dynamic popular culture (partly provincial but mostly newly synthesized), an alternative to elite high culture claimed by the Limeño bourgeoisie. As Hugo, a 'second generation' migrant explains, 'I prefer to feel more Peruvian than Limeño' (Degregori *et al.* 1986: 163). Being Peruvian rather than Limeño, as the last respondent says, claims a national identity and simultaneously qualifies it: 'I am Peruvian but not in the old sense of Peruvian, meaning Limeño' is the subtext here. In addition to highlighting other affiliations to place alongside national identities, the responses reveal the negotiations around the 'national' in terms of class and location.

> [The migrants' children] prefer to define themselves – as do a sector of the older migrants – as *Peruvians* of San Martín de Porres, inhabitants of a Lima divested of its creole and colonial attributes to convert itself into a battleground between a predominant tendency to transnationalization and another to 'Andeanization' or 'cholification'.
>
> (Degregori *et al.* 1986: 26, emphasis in original)

The Lima case provides an excellent illustration of the expression of (multi-faceted) identities through references to a diversity of places simultaneously. Moreover, identity is expressed by these migrants in relation to a variety of spatial scales, according to context and biography. Migrants do not replace a provincial or village identity with a fixed national identity, but retain and renegotiate from their multiple positions. Migrants constantly re-express their identities in terms of the neighbourhood, Lima, provincial origin, *serrano/costeño* and Peru, according to the discursive and relational elements associated with each. Each geographical affiliation with its own sense of belonging allows the migrants to intervene in debates about Peruvian nationhood.

Another movement in which large numbers of citizens participate (although limited to certain gender and age groups) is conscription and military service, a masculine civilian obligation in most Latin American states since the early twentieth century (introduced in Chile in 1900, Ecuador in 1902, Brazil in 1916). Military lifestyles and 'traditional' masculinities have often been closely associated in representations and senses of self in Latin America related to modernist discourses of order, hygiene, education and moral duty. While professional armed forces draw upon middle-class, upwardly mobile, often *mestizo* men in most countries, military service recruits more socially and racially diverse groups for short periods of time; in Brazil, 50 per cent of navy crews are black (Rouquié 1987: 97, 64). The gulf between highly educated, socially segregated, professional officers and the conscripts can be large, especially in the most multi-ethnic societies (Duncan 1991; Rouquié 1987). Officers may feel superior to the conscripts, as in Bolivia where enlisted men are predominantly 'indian', and officers are white. In Ecuador, such racialized difference is not so prominent, with *mestizo* officers coming predominantly from small towns and rural areas, mostly in the Sierra (
248).

Voluntary recruitment has rarely been used except in Uruguay, yet contemporary obligatory military service has often been evaded, just as it was in the nineteenth century (Rouquié 1987: 94). Currently, the Ecuadorean constitution requires men over 19 years of age to give 12 months' service in one of the camps around the country (Molina Flores 1994). As the majority of conscripts are not professionals, the armed forces aim to provide 'an opportunity to receive a basic education and training in jobs which will serve once [the conscript] is reintegrated into civilian life' (Molina Flores 1994: 141). Generally such education is predicated upon an imaginative community speaking Spanish and knowing the nation. For example, the Spanish literacy programme introduced into the Guatemalan military dealt with the 14 per cent of conscripts who spoke no Spanish, and the two-thirds who were illiterate (Rouquié 1987: 97). Ecuadorean military education is highly patriotic, with recruits exposed to more intense and frequent veneration of the national symbols – the flag, anthem, arms as well as its territory and history – than school children under national curriculum requirements (Hurtado 1977; cf. Chapter 3).

It is noteworthy, however, that only a small percentage of the male population interviewed in Ecuador had done military service, with figures around 16 per cent in Cotopaxi for example, mostly men over 45 years.[12] Thus although military masculinities are commonly supposed to express national identities in Latin America, in practice it is just one masculinity among several (Chapter 6), and one way of experiencing different regions of the country. In our interviews, it became clear among provincial indigenous and *mestizo* populations that military service was perceived as something to be avoided. Some villagers prefer to pay a fine (equivalent to US$164) freeing them from this obligation, and others risk not paying it (and being forced into a military lorry on market days).[13]

Yet for men who do participate in military service, the effects of being moved into another town or region with a diverse group of co-nationals is a profoundly transformative experience. For one former Ecuadorean conscript now living in a lowland town, the experience did not take him away from the Oriente region (he was posted to Shell Mera), yet it inspired in him a love for the entire country and for the framework of formal citizenship. In contrast to other respondents in Napo province, Eloy claimed that he had no ethnic identity or *patria chica*, but loved the whole country and that citizenship rested on knowledge, indicative of the emphasis placed on continuous education in the military. Ecuadorean indigenous commentators concede that military service succeeds in integrating indigenous groups into the nation. However, racialized relations between conscripts and officers may problematize the imagination of a shared community, where, as in Guatemala, over half the officers felt that indians were inferior. In such circumstances, conscripts are more likely to retain regional, ethnic or village affiliations rather than identify with a national community which discriminates so directly against them.

Enhancing masculinities is also a key component of military service, with

conscripts claiming virility and *machismo* (which is perceived as positive), in opposition to the feminized men evading the draft. Cultural expressions of masculinity change in Ecuadorean highland villages with ex-conscripts identifying themselves as '*buen varón*' (real men), '*un supermacho*', who '*tienen huevos*' (have balls) in contrast with the '*cocineros*' (cooks) who stay behind. Integrating subjects into national identities through military service is then about enhancing masculinities and deepening gender difference, as well as creating a 'national' masculinity through which to claim difference from neighbouring countries (cf. Enloe 1989; see also Chapter 6).

In summary, military service provides perhaps the most structured and 'patriotic' means through which male citizens can take part in movement around their country, meeting co-nationals and re-imagining their community. Nevertheless, the limited extent to which men, especially younger men, are now fulfilling their civil obligation of military service suggests that this avenue for rearticulating affiliations with places and people is not as significant as work- or family-related spontaneous migration in forming national identities.

Oriente colonization and senses of place

As noted on pp. 110–11, a switch in the Oriente's representation pictured a place with resources which promised and underpinned potential development. Such re-presentation entailed the state-promoted move of 'appropriate' populations into the region, in order to exploit the resources and guarantee production (Chiriboga 1988). Although only one of numerous groups in the Oriente (also including missionaries – Protestant and Catholic, oil company workers, non-governmental organizations, merchants, the military and bureaucrats), *colonos* (colonizers) are pictured as having a unique, specifically national-developmentalist, relation with the region. The nationalist emphasis on colonization as an agent of development in frontier regions (as in other countries: Townsend 1995) means that the Ecuadorean colonizers have a particularly significant role in the constitution of national identities. Creating a 'new national cultural space' (Little 1994), colonizers from the coastal and Andean provinces have been encouraged to settle in areas previously inhabited by indigenous groups, missions and oil companies. The founding in 1958 of the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC: National Institute of Colonization) and the *Banco Nacional de Fomento* (National Investment Bank) to oversee colonization prompted the movement of thousands of generally small landowners or landless peasants (Uquillas 1984). Moving to the coast in small numbers, and later to Amazonia, colonizers have been seen as the agents through which Amazonia can be brought into national development, and realize its nationalist goals (Ruiz 1994).

That the colonizers feel themselves to be agents for the realization of nationhood is borne out by interviews in the settlement of Tarapoa, in Ecuador's northern Oriente: 'before the colonizers came, this wasn't Ecuador, this wasn't Colombia, it wasn't anything', said one colonizer explaining the reason for settlement (quoted in Little 1994). Tarapoa identities are constructed from

local, national and international practices. Being a secular society, the *colonos* form a community through social dances, as well as football and beauty contests.[14] In dances on a newly constructed multi-purpose surface, colonizers bring in international and continental culture, via the diverse music such as rock, *cumbia*, *merengue*, *salsa* and *son*. The Tarapoa beauty contests allow for the staged juxtaposition of regional and national elements, through the pacific co-existence of ethnic diversity (also Chapter 3), through the reconversion of international contests broadcast by satellite. For men, weekend drinking sessions, football and cockfights offer opportunities for sociality in place.

Despite the diverse provincial origin of colonizers (thirteen different birthplaces, plus two from Colombia out of a population of 3,000), *colonos* feel themselves to be Ecuadoreans. 'I was born here, I will die here. What else can I do? My flesh is Ecuadorean', according to one respondent (Little 1994: 558); one of our Napo respondents invoked a similar embodiment, saying that 'Ecuadorean blood runs through my veins'. Yet this embodied national identity is qualified by a general sense that the nation has marginalized *colonos* and frustrated their goal of development (which they presumed was shared with the state). Although engaged very fully with the state's developmentalist rhetoric and agenda, colonizers feel their work on clearing forest deserves recognition in the form of land titles, which are not forthcoming. Acting as a workforce for the state, rather than as citizens with land titles, *colonos* lie in an ambivalent and marginal relation to national place. Attempting to carve out a livelihood for themselves in a new ecological and social environment, conflicts often arise between colonizers and indigenous groups particularly over land claims (Ortiz 1987; Albornoz 1971).

CHALLENGING NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIES

> [The missionaries] considered us devil-worshippers, idolators. We were taught to respect authorities which were not Shuar, and taught that we were part of a different homeland [*patria*] so we couldn't visit our brothers who stayed in Peruvian territory, converting us to foreigners in our own territory.
>
> (CONAIE 1989: 9)

> [Amazonia] is neither the salvation of the country nor the lung of the world, but a region which it is necessary to know very well in order to search for development alternatives for the Amazonian peoples.
>
> (Valerio Grefa, President of CONFENAIE, Ecuador, in Grefa 1993: 418)

In the face of frequently incompatible official notions of territory and community, Amazonian indigenous nationalities have been actively involved in creating their own senses of place and nation. Faced with numbers of incoming settlers from the Andes and multi-national oil companies encouraged by the central state, the response of indigenous federations has been to attempt

to clarify their own 'places', namely the large territories upon which their livelihoods depend. Particularly given the discursive construction of the Amazonian region in Ecuadorean national self-representations, the indigenous groups in the Oriente have countered prevailing images of the area and its inhabitants, in order to create a more realistic imaginative geography. Through their confederations, indigenous communities have argued that the Oriente region is *not* empty but widely inhabited, by groups who already use rainforest resources (CONAIE 1989; Mundo Shuar 1983).

Moreover, indigenous confederations argue that the nationalist 'freight' carried by the region – its promise for future national development, as a site for national realization – is not justified. Rather the Oriente is re-represented by indigenous federations as another part of the country, with its own development problems and dynamics (Grefa 1993: 418). Yet official and non-local imaginative geographies have influenced indigenous Oriente populations sufficiently for them to feel alienated in part from the region, and marginalized. As one self-identifying indigenous man told us, 'I don't feel part of the Ecuadorean nation, because we don't have permanence, consistency, in one place, and we are not an integral part of the nation'.

In addition to migration, cartography and mapping are important for providing a screen on to which national imaginative geographies can be projected. The ways in which cartographic practices and visual representations enhanced and 'grounded' colonial and post-colonial identities is by now relatively well documented. Cartography historically produced images which claimed scientific status and objectivity, produced by certain interest groups to convey their (often privileged) view of the world (Harley 1988). While geographers have highlighted the power-driven use of cartography and mapping (usually) by elite interest groups, particularly under colonialism, the current section explores the complexities and slippages around mapping and map-makers (also Jacobs 1995). A more open interpretation of mapping and maps is crucial for understanding cartography's use by non-official Ecuadorean organizations, who have developed map-making procedures to represent alternative discourses and representations of the nation and its territory. The Ecuadorean state has availed itself of cartography as a dimension of the power-knowledge of the nation, its territory and its sovereignty. Rather than taking mapping's inherent power-filled agenda as a premise, the case study from Ecuador's Oriente region suggests that cartography represents a practice through which popular and official senses of place and identity interface. In other words, the process and production of mapping are not inherently restricted to those in power; map-making can embody resistance and alternative agendas to those associated with traditional imperial or state cartographies (e.g. Cant and Pawson 1992).

Since the mid-1980s, indigenous confederations particularly in Amazonian Ecuador have been engaged in mapping projects as the basis for political negotiation with the state over issues of land-rights, social organization and multi-culturalism. The setting up of cartographic teams by various self-identified indigenous unions illustrates a process of taking back the power/knowledge of cartography from the nation-state and using its techniques in

underpinning alternative political projects. Describing these cartographic efforts however reveals the impossibility of setting up stable and fixed oppositions between 'official' and 'indigenous' versions of national place, and the role of mapping in them. Thus while Loomba rightly points to the need to recover 'alternative versions of nationalisms' (Loomba 1993: 306), the contemporary Ecuadorean indigenous topographers, engaging in Spanish-language legal procedures, illustrate the interlacing and blurred edges of official and 'non'-official geographies of identities. In other words, there can be no simple identification of the 'marginal', in this case the indigenous topographers, as the privileged site of resistance; the binary of incommensurate difference assumed to underlie notions of resistance breaks down. Maps are used by indigenous groups to gain a position which, while not unmarginal, engages with the mapping process and offers the possibility for new identities.

Since its foundation, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENAIE: Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorean Amazon) has seen the recuperation and defence of indigenous territories as one of its major mandates from members (Serrano 1994: 437), as have other regional federations such as the Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza (OPIP: Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza Province). By making visual representations of indigenous nationalities' land, the confederations represent political and ideological intervention in state-defined land allocation and titling procedures. The popular geographies exemplified by indigenous confederations' maps refer implicitly to – and are contextualized by – a series of social, political and administrative agendas for change, beyond the land issue *per se*. Currently, some 60 per cent of indigenous nationalities are in the process of recovering their land. However, some two fifths of indigenous lands are under state control, located in reserves, national parks and forests protected by the Ministry of Agriculture (Grefa 1993: 417). Indigenous lands have long been settled by incoming Ecuadoreans, usually indigenous and *mestizo* peasants from the highlands, encouraged by numerous state development projects.

In order to receive official title to lands, indigenous federations negotiate with the state using the judicial system as well as legalistic practices and discourses, presenting petitions to government and lobbying politicians and trans-national oil companies. Within this Spanish-language process, the creation of visual representations of landclaims is important. Topographic teams formed by the confederation create cartographic representations of the landclaims, in order to delineate and name the extent and nature of their territorial claims, as well as to make a cultural product which counters the widespread view that the Amazon is unpopulated. The maps thus serve multiple functions – affirming local knowledges of boundaries and settlements, giving appropriate visual form to landclaims, and reaffirming the geographies of identity which motivate indigenous federations in their actions. Moreover, marking the territory reminds younger villagers of the borders and reinforces the mnemonic function of border-marking festivals in certain Quichua and Shiwiar settlements.[15]

Map-makers in the indigenous federations are thus key actors in the

marking-out and realization of indigenous projects. Topographic teams, formed by various indigenous federations such as the Shuar Federation and the OPIP since the mid-1980s, have mapped out the Amazon territories of indigenous villages. To give an example, the OPIP federation is a multi-ethnic organization including Quichua (the majority), Achuaras, Záparo and Shiwiar nationalities. Trained by a German development agency technician in 1984 during a short course at the headquarters of the CONFENAIE, the OPIP topographic team comprises two or three indigenous men who work for other indigenous organizations as required (also Chirif *et al.* 1991).[16] The topographers tend to work on a temporary basis, as and when required by villagers, and draw upon the knowledge of boundaries held by villagers themselves. Moving through the landscape in teams made up of the topographers and local people who know the settlement frontiers, the topographic team marks the recognized boundaries on a map, as well as clearing vegetation in a three-metre wide strip on the ground. To confirm borders, the teams put up zinc plaques saying 'Quichua territory, so-and-so village, Made by OPIP', and also paint the surrounding trees with kilometre measurements. When borders lie between different indigenous groups, such as between Quichua and Shiwiar, representatives of both groups attend the mapping and marking process in order to gain consensus.

In the most significant piece of work done by the OPIP topographic team, a map was utilized to lobby the state for a major landclaim. During the mapping process, nineteen communities were visited in the boundary-marking work, as well as the colonizers near the Pastaza provincial capital of Puyo. The boundary-marking process – or *autolinderación* (self-boundary-marking) as it is known – resulted in a map which lay claim to a multi-ethnic territory of some 1.1 million hectares, one of the most coherent proposals for territorial organization in the continent at the time (Chirif *et al.* 1991: 58; Radcliffe 1996a). As only two settlements in this area had official land titles, the proposal to recognize all Quichua, Shiwiar and Achuar lands in the province was a high priority for OPIP (Figure 5.4). The proposal, based around the topographic map, was presented to the then-President Borja during the indigenous Uprising in 1990 (Declaración de Quito 1990; Zamosc 1994; Karakras 1992), and in 1993 the Pastaza land rights were recognized.

The confederations' success in creating a space for their identity – a space represented visually (on maps and land titles) and defended politically – cannot be denied. Moreover the legal procedure for landclaims has been changed as a result of the confederations' persistence. Originally the Ecuadorean state conceded individual parcels of land to indigenous families, while later concessions were granted to legally organized and registered communities. Finally, in the case of the Huaorani nationality, indigenous lands were titled without the group having to be recognized legally (Uquillas 1993: 185). However, ancient boundaries between communities are being contested in practice by the colonizers. Encouraged by semi-directed colonization projects, poor peasants from Andean or coastal rural areas have entered the Amazon in relatively large numbers (E. Salazar 1981).[17]

Couched in terms of the rights inherent in citizenship, indigenous landclaims



Figure 5.4 Map showing extent of landclaims under OPIP proposals from early 1990s

utilize the discourses of the state in order to challenge it. One topographer in Puyo explained, 'well, we as Ecuadoreans have full rights to lobby the national government, so that they give us a hand, support us'.[18] Nevertheless, the appropriation and deployment of cartographic techniques in the judicial system has not been without its ironies and contradictions. The two-dimensionality of the topographic maps bypassed and silenced issues of state control over the subsoil, claimed as part of its inalienable sovereignty. Official land titles do not give subsoil rights to indigenous nationalities; as elsewhere, legal title gives ownership of the land surface, not its depths. Indigenous communities thereby remain obliged to permit all types of mining and oil extraction activities on 'their' territories. In this respect, as one CONFENAIE leader acknowledges, 'the granting of titles is not the solution to the problem of indigenous territories' (Grefa 1993). Indigenous political activity has thus shifted to dealing with the multi-national oil companies and their local representatives (Kimberling with FCUNE 1993).

The topographic work carried out by indigenous confederations illustrates the malleability of cartography's use, and some of the politics in its usage. Cartographies are not tied immutably into colonizing and projects of control, but can offer ambiguous spaces for re-identification. Since the late 1980s, the mobilization of indigenous groups for landclaims reveals the shifting political agendas around cartography and the possibility for its subversive appropriation. Yet such appropriation (occurring within the context of the state legal system, the state's sovereignty over subsoil, and the increasing globalized economy of the region) is restricted by the meanings, powers and increasingly de-centred nature of control over land. Amazonian land surfaces have been nominally allocated to indigenous villages and nationalities. However, the

very transferability of cartographic practice did not provide closure and permanence for indigenous geographies due to the ongoing issues of subsoil rights and oil extraction procedures. Resistance to state conceptualizations of national land and livelihoods engage contradictorily in debates around landownership and use, about which community is to benefit from 'development', and the social boundaries between commmunities. Confederations have attempted to interpellate indigenous identities within the discursive framework of a re-negotiated, more inclusive citizenship, while settlers and companies act on the basis of formal citizenship rights, and official norms. Indigenous strategies have emphasized the importance of territorial boundaries (marked on the ground and on maps) as the basis for community maintenance. Yet both projects interlace with identities and practices conjoined by the state and indigenous groups simultaneously, reconfiguring both hegemonic and subaltern national communities.

INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Ecuadoreans perceive themselves in outsiders' eyes as well as in light of their own representations; the screen held up to Ecuadoreans by external images of the country provides a resource for the expression of ideas about identity and nation for many of our respondents. Official ideologies of nationhood, which stress the *internationality* of nationalism, are also drawn upon in popular senses of belonging, such as in opposition to Peru (see Chapter 3). There are a diversity of arenas through which a sense of uniqueness (although often based on stereotypes) can be expressed. The first dimension of this is that Ecuadoreans expect outsiders to highlight the natural features of their country. Natural features are perceived to represent the country externally; products (such as bananas, oil or shrimps) and landscapes are seen by popular subjects as elements through which foreigners identify their country. In Coca, one person said, 'It's a small country but rich in honesty, which the foreign companies recognize'. Moreover, official ideologies of nationalism focus in on certain features (the Galapagos, the mountains of Chimborazo and Cotopaxi for example) as natural sites unequivocally 'standing in' for the nation.

Second, Ecuador is positioned within a 'league table' of countries, on the basis of its economic development. Given the government's emphasis on the importance of homogeneous economic and 'social' development throughout its territory (a relation which is also gendered: see Chapter 6), Ecuadorean subjects perceive themselves within a 'ranking' of nations. Feeling embarrassed or angry about their country's low ranking in this international scale, Ecuadorean respondents self-consciously contextualized their identity in this framework. Many respondents felt that their country is perceived as a poor, *atrasado* ('backward') nation, characterized by its poverty and unequal income distribution. Others felt that this backwardness prevented Ecuador's true value being recognized elsewhere. 'Ecuador is not known because it's backward', said one *mestiza* woman in Saquisilí; the irony of this statement rests on Saquisilí market's growing importance as an (international and national) tourist attraction.

Given the official emphasis on Ecuador's Amazonian region, it is perhaps not surprising to note that among certain groups it is the country's Amazonian identity which is known internationally. One young *mestiza* female student from the town of Tena, Napo, said that Ecuador was represented in the world for 'being an Amazonian country'.

Other identities, which refer to supranational spheres, are expressed by respondents and thereby qualify both the differences set up through outsiders' perspectives, and through official discourse. Through the idioms of religion and shared colonial histories, the possibility of Latin American unity and a common identity are constituted and discursively created. Religion, especially Catholicism, provides a means through which to imagine a supranational community for Ecuadorean respondents. Among Protestants and Catholics in the villages and provincial towns of Cotopaxi province, as much as in Quito's elite, religion was named as the prime source of unity and common identity among Latin Americans. One-fifth in Cotopaxi (21 per cent) claimed that religion and its associated culture united Latin Americans in a supranational community, although over half (56 per cent) declined to, or could not, name a unifying factor. Similarities in colonial histories, and in Hispanic language use, were factors mentioned by a further 12 per cent. Oppositional identities were expressed by members of Quito's economic elite, who identified a fragile Latin American community in contradistinction to the 'other' of the United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union. As one Quiteña white woman said, 'there is beginning to be a feeling that it's necessary to unify against the great powers such as the IMF, the European community, the United States'.[19] Among younger subjects, increased participation in international circuits of taste in music, clothing and lifestyles were perceived as more significant.

In relation to supranational identities, our respondents were more secure in their discussion of factors which are constantly relayed to them via government discourse (position in development, natural features) or in the longterm sites through which Latin American identity has been articulated (religion, language, and anti-US sentiment). Yet the majority of respondents saw only limited, or fragile, unity between Latin Americans, conditioned by their knowledge that the structures of government and the effect of divisive national discourses is to highlight differences rather than commonalities between the region's nations.

Rather than having identities bounded by the territorial borders of the modern nation-state, material from around Latin America suggests that identities are constituted in relation to multiple geographies of identity. The constellation of sites and socio-spatial relationships through which (national) identities are made draws attention to the contingency and tenuousness of affiliations with the 'national place', as if it was a pregiven boundary with which to identify. Collective subjects, in addition to individual expressions of subjectivity, are expressed contingently in relation to different sites and spaces, in which affiliation is expressed in the *juxtaposition* of places and their meanings. In the case discussed above, being Peruvian for second-generation migrants in Lima

is as much about renegotiating discriminatory regional stereotypes and the value of popular, hybrid cultural forms, as it is about adopting unquestioningly any prevailing official versions of national affiliation. Affiliations with multiple places are then cross-cut by relations of class, location, gender, age and 'race', in which a sense of belonging is mediated through these power relations and positionings. Popular everyday expressions of relationships to place and national space are in themselves multiple, frequently contradictory and contested.

Moreover, a sense of national identification and belonging is always already conditioned by local and regional affiliations. In other words, local senses of belonging fundamentally condition or qualify the national identities which are created and re-produced. Localized expressions of national affiliation are often expressed through means of local/regional aesthetics, practice or materials (for example, the ingredients for Sicuani's red and white *trago*) which, through their disposition, origin or use, display the elements of local identities not replicated at the national level, or which are differently expressed at the national level. In other words, there are no unmediated national identities – any identifications with the national are mediated profoundly by local/regional affiliations (anything from neighbourhood, village, district to region, although less at the supranational level). It is in the particular configuration of the local *vis-à-vis* the national in discourses about rights, morals, aesthetics, economies, societies and so on which become the grounds for conditioning an affiliation with the national. Sicuani is happy to identify itself as Peruvian in colouring *trago* like the Peruvian flag. But the choice of materials to colour the drink is one which *conditions* the national identification – it qualifies it, and sets it within a discursive frame placing 'limits' on the national identity of Sicuaneños, at the same time as expressing positive identity and affiliation with a unique local place.

Multiple geographies of identities can be said to refer to the contested spatial dimensions of the multiple processes of identity formation and affiliation to place. In Latin America, geographies of identity reflect on – and build collective and individual subjects through – the interconnections between *patria chicas* and the global economy, between *barrio* neighbourhoods and regionalisms, between domestic/familial places and the official national monuments mapping out national places. A multiplicity of places (imagined through specific places and spatial relations) give meanings and nodes for identification to citizens in Latin American countries. Yet certain boundaries are still maintained and reified, despite this movement and malleability in geographical imaginations and affiliations. For example, despite the common ethnic heritage of groups on either side of the Peru–Ecuador Amazonian border, the majority of popular subjects – including those self-identifying as indigenous – identify with Ecuador and feel themselves to be Ecuadorean citizens, not questioning the affiliations that the international boundary demarcates. To give one example, a 24-year-old Catholic Quichua woman in the Oriente claimed not to know Ecuador, but correctly identified all the national symbols and said she was an Ecuadorean citizen 'because I was born here'. Another Quichua-speaking man of the same age, in Tena, rooted

himself in relation to his birthplace and his ancestors, 'Yes I am part of the nation because I was born here, and for the inheritance left by our grandparents'. A 'mosaic' of places, and the communities associated with those places, are then the means through which identification and affiliation with nations can be expressed. Just as importantly they are the means by which claims to national belonging can be contested and renegotiated. Certain territorial boundaries are recognized as significant and as primary in self- and others' representation – for example, the international boundaries between countries. Yet the contextualization around these relatively 'fixed' social places – provided by regional, local, neighbourhood and supranational affiliations and the connotations of each of these – provide a route into the renegotiation of the power-filled and often officially sanctioned versions of identification with the nation. However, these identifications are of course importantly structured around gender and gendered identities. Discussion of gender and sexualities, and their impact on national identities, is taken up in Chapter 6.