

12 What is peace?

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Jesus said that peacemakers are to be blessed as children of God, but in the real world they are often dismissed as utopian dreamers or worse, quaking defeatists who live in denial of reality. Jane Addams was one of the most admired persons in the United States in the years before World War I, but when she opposed US entry into the war she was ridiculed and reviled. Those who advocated peace during the 1930s were accused of helping Hitler and aiding appeasement. Disarmament activists during the cold war were sometimes considered dupes of the Soviet Union. Throughout history the cause of peace has been on trial, standing like a forlorn defendant before the court of established opinion, misunderstood and maligned on all sides. Peace is "naked, poor, and mangled," wrote Shakespeare.² To be called a pacifist is almost an insult, to be labeled cowardly or selfish, unwilling to fight for what is right. It is easy to arouse people to war, said Hermann Goering at the Nuremberg trials. "All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism . . ."

This piece is a response to the charges against pacifism. It is an attempt to set the record straight by exploring the history of movements and ideas for peace – an opportunity for the cause of peace to have its day in court. This is not an apologia for or paean to pacifism, however – far from it. I am often critical of peace advocacy, especially absolute pacifism, and I try to present both the strengths and weaknesses of the various movements and theories for peace that have emerged over the centuries. I write as one who has been engaged with these issues for decades. I strive for rigorous scholarly standards and objective analysis but I am hardly neutral in this debate. Questions of war and peace intruded into my life when I was drafted for the Vietnam War, and they have remained with me ever since. I spoke out against that war as an active duty soldier, was the director of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) during the disarmament campaigns of the 1980s, and helped to found the Win Without War coalition to oppose the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. I have written about nuclear disarmament, economic sanctions, and nonviolent social change and have taught peace studies courses. I know only too well the many limitations of movements for peace and the inadequacy of theories on the causes and prevention of war. It is precisely because of my engagement with these issues that I feel qualified to offer this witness for the defense, to present the case of peace, and to examine its practices and principles.

Idealism and realism

The book of Isaiah called believers to study war no more but offered little instruction about learning peace. The study of peace has been neglected over the ages and has emerged as a proper discipline only in recent decades.¹ The first academic programs and scholarly institutes dedicated to peace did not appear until after World War II, and refereed journals such

as the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the *Journal of Peace Research* did not begin publication until 1957 and 1964 respectively. Pioneers in the field included Kenneth and Elise Boulding, who helped create the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan in the 1950s; Johan Galtung, who founded the International Peace Research Institute in Norway in 1959; and Adam Curle, the first chair of a peace studies program in Britain, at the University of Bradford in 1973. Major studies and books about peace appeared in earlier decades, of course, but the systematic application of rigorous scholarship and empirical analysis to the problems of peacemaking did not begin until quite recently.

This partly explains the inadequacies of many of the theories of peace. For much of history the cause of peace has predominantly been a religious concern. Moral reformers embraced the teachings of love and compassion in religious doctrine, but they often overlooked the challenges of political realism. Classical liberals extolled the virtues of democracy and free trade, but they underestimated the virulence of nationalism and the power of imperialism. Immanuel Kant probably came closest to crafting a comprehensive philosophy of peace, but his theory did not address questions of social equality. Socialists and feminists brought these issues to the fore and broadened the peace agenda to include problems of economic injustice and patriarchy. In recent decades social scientists and political theorists have made progress in verifying and explaining the components of the so-called Kantian triad – mutual democracy, economic interdependence, and international cooperation – as predicates of peace. Links have been discovered between gender equality and a lessening of violence. Unresolved political grievances and a lack of economic development have been identified as factors that contribute to armed conflict. Many questions remain unanswered, but progress has been made in understanding the causes of and cures for war.

Peace societies emerged in the nineteenth century, but it was only in the twentieth century that peace movements as we presently understand them came into existence. Large-scale mobilizations against war took place in the years before and after World War I, during the 1930s, and especially in response to the Vietnam and Iraq wars. These movements challenged government policy, particularly that of the United States, and were generally anti-imperialist in outlook. Mobilizations for disarmament occurred during the interwar years and re-emerged in the cold war as a response to the threat of nuclear war. Disarmament activism reached a peak with the massive nuclear freeze and disarmament campaigns of the 1980s. Some of those organizing antiwar and disarmament campaigns were absolute pacifists, rejecting the use of force for any purpose, but most were more pragmatic and conditional in their rejection of war. They opposed dangerous weapons policies and unjust wars, but not all uses of force. Still the purist position often predominated, conveying an impression of implicit pacifism that limited the peace movement's public appeal.

Many opponents of war have emphasized the need for constructive alternatives. During the 1934–5 Peace Ballot in Britain the League of Nations Union (LNU) organized an informal vote on British security policy in which 11.6 million citizens participated. Among the options presented and endorsed was the use of multilateral sanctions, economic and even military, to counter aggression by one nation against another. The ballot results pressured the British government to propose League of Nations sanctions against Italy. During the nuclear freeze campaign of the 1980s US activists urged a bilateral halt to the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. European disarmament campaigners urged an end to both Soviet and US intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, which NATO officials effectively adopted as the "double zero" proposal, with zero INF weapons in Europe on both sides. During the Iraq antiwar debate many activists called for continued weapons inspections and targeted sanctions as alternatives to war and effective means of containing

Saddam Hussein. In the debate over the so-called "war on terror" peace scholars and activists have insisted that terrorism as a tactic cannot be defeated by war. They have advocated alternative strategies for countering terrorism based on multilateral action, cooperative law enforcement, and the amelioration of political grievances.

The strategies and proposals of peace scholars and activists are often fully compatible with the requirements of sound security policy. Throughout the cold war disarmament advocates insisted that a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought; this became Ronald Reagan's mantra during the 1980s. Those who opposed the Vietnam and Iraq wars did so not only on humanitarian grounds but on the basis of solid political reasoning. Hans Morgenthau spoke out against the Vietnam War because it was based on an erroneous theory of monolithic communism, was justified with false information, and ignored the history of southeast Asia.⁵ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt opposed the war in Iraq for similar reasons: it misjudged the terrorist threat, was based on deceptive claims about Iraqi capabilities, and risked eroding US power and prestige in the world.⁶ Peace advocates warned that the invasion and occupation of Iraq would play into the hands of Osama bin Laden and lead to an increase in terrorist violence. Warmakers are often wrong – disastrously so in the cases of Vietnam and Iraq. Peace advocates are sometimes right, especially when their ideas are not only morally sound but politically realistic.

New wars

The nature of war has changed dramatically in recent decades. The old paradigm of industrial interstate war "no longer exists," declared General Rupert Smith in 2006.⁷ Raimo Väyrynen, John Mueller, and other political scientists have written of the "waning of major war."⁸ No instances of full-scale war have occurred between major industrialized states since the end of World War II. This is in part because of the extreme lethality of all forms of modern weaponry, nuclear and non-nuclear. It is also the result of the development of an integrated community of prosperous, secure, and interdependent nations in the heart of Europe where previous world wars originated. While interstate war has largely disappeared, intrastate conflicts have increased markedly. The new paradigm, wrote Smith, is "war amongst the people."⁹ Of the thirty-one wars in the world in 2005 (as measured by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program), all were armed conflicts fought within nations between communities divided by ethnicity, language, religion, and/or geography.¹⁰ Nearly all military deployments, UN peacekeeping operations, and peace-building missions in recent decades have taken place in settings of intrastate conflict.

This change in the nature of war has not meant an end to the scourge of deadly violence. On the contrary the number of people dying in war in recent years has been extremely high. Since the 1990s millions have died in the Congo, Sudan, and other African countries, and hundreds of thousands in former Yugoslavia and Iraq. In today's "new wars," to use peace scholar Mary Kaldor's phrase, methods of terror, ethnic cleansing, and genocide are deliberate strategies to target civilians. The result is that more than 80 percent of the casualties are civilian, and the number of refugees and displaced persons has increased sharply. "Violations of humanitarian and human rights law are not a side effect" of armed violence, wrote Kaldor, "but the central methodology of new wars."¹¹ The strategy of violence in the new paradigm utilizes terror and destabilization to displace populations and gain control of territory and sources of income.¹²

In response to the rise of intrastate war international humanitarian action and peace-building efforts have increased. Those who seek to prevent war have recognized the need to

act in the midst of violent conflict to ameliorate its consequences and prevent its recurrence. The responsibility to protect civilians has emerged as a new principle of global action, part of what Kaldor has termed "cosmopolitan politics." The urgency of stemming genocide, oppression, and terrorism has sparked a new wave of action and inquiry, and has led to an intensified search for ways to resolve and prevent deadly conflict.

At the international level peacemaking programs have expanded and become institutionalized at the United Nations and in other multilateral and regional organizations. In the 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace* UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali identified four phases of inter-national action to prevent and control armed violence: preventive diplomacy, which includes early warning, mediation, and confidence-building measures; peacemaking efforts such as arbitration and the negotiation of peace accords; peacekeeping, the deployment of impartial forces to monitor and implement peace settlements; and peace-building, which the UN defines as post-conflict efforts to rebuild war-torn societies and prevent the recurrence of violence.¹¹ These contemporary strategies correspond directly to peace principles and traditions in earlier periods of history.

Defining terms

At the outset we face definitional challenges and the need to differentiate among different terms and concepts. What exactly do we mean by peace? The term is highly emotive, historian Michael Howard wrote, and is often abused as a tool of political propaganda.¹² When peace is defined narrowly it can imply passivity and the acceptance of injustice.¹³ During the cold war the word had subversive implications and was often associated with communism. Moscow sponsored ersatz "peace councils," which gave the word a negative connotation. Hesitancy about the meaning of peace existed long before the cold war. In the years before World War I Andrew Carnegie lavishly funded programs to prevent war and advance international cooperation, but he was uncomfortable with the word peace and wanted to leave it out of the title of the international endowment he left as his legacy.¹⁴

Peace is more than the absence of war. It is also "the maintenance of an orderly and just society," wrote Howard – orderly in being protected against the violence or extortion of aggressors, and just in being defended against exploitation and abuse by the more powerful.¹⁵ Many writers distinguish between negative peace, which is simply the absence of war, and positive peace, which is the presence of justice. "Peace can be slavery or it can be freedom; subjugation or liberation," wrote Norman Cousins. Genuine peace means progress toward a freer and more just world.¹⁶ Johan Galtung developed the concept of "structural violence" to describe situations of negative peace that have violent and unjust consequences.¹⁷ Violence in Galtung's expansive definition is any condition that prevents a human being from achieving her or his full potential. Leonardo Boff, the Brazilian priest and theologian, employed the term "originating violence," which he defined as an oppressive social condition that preserves the interests of the elite over the needs of dispossessed and marginalized populations.¹⁸ Originating or structural violence can include impoverishment, deprivation, humiliation, political repression, a lack of human rights, and the denial of self-determination. Positive peace means transcending the conditions that limit human potential and assuring opportunities for self-realization.

Gandhi spoke of nonviolence rather than peace and emphasized the necessity of overcoming injustice. Gandhi's meaning was deftly summarized by Jonathan Schell: "Violence is a method by which the ruthless few can subdue the passive many. Nonviolence is a means by which the active many can overcome the ruthless few." Yet the word nonviolence is "highly

imperfect," wrote Schell. It is a word of "negative construction," as if the most important thing that can be said about nonviolence is that it is *not* something else. It is a negation of the negative force of violence, a double negative which in mathematics would yield a positive result. Yet English has no positive word for it. Schell attempted to resolve this dilemma by defining nonviolence as "cooperative power" – collective action based on mutual consent, in contrast to coercive power, which compels action through the threat or use of force.¹

Peace does not mean the absence of conflict, argued peace researcher and former Australian ambassador John W. Burton. Conflict is intrinsic in human relationships, although it does not have to be and usually is not violent. The challenge for peace practitioners is to find ways in which communities can resolve differences without physical violence. In this context peace is understood as a dynamic process not an absolute end point. The goal of peacemakers is to develop more effective ways of resolving disputes without violent conflict, to identify and transform the conditions that cause war.

What's in a word?

The term "pacifism" especially needs deconstruction. It entered the lexicon at the beginning of the twentieth century as a general term to describe the stance of those opposed to war. After World War I the term became synonymous with an earlier, more specific tradition of religiously based refusal to condone or participate in war in any form, also known as nonresistance. This purist position was distinct from the more widely accepted traditions of pragmatic or conditional pacifism, which opposed war in principle but accepted the possibility of using force for self-defense or the protection of the vulnerable. It also contrasted with internationalism, which along with political realism traced the causes of war to the condition of anarchy among nations, and which advocated transnational cooperation and the strengthening of international law and institutions as the means of preventing armed conflict. Absolute pacifism also differed from "just war" principles, developed by Augustine in the fifth century and accepted by official Christianity, which set limits on war but gave it justification.

Pacifism existed as a movement and set of ideas long before the actual word was coined in 1901. The term emerged during the tenth Universal Peace Congress in Glasgow, at a time when organizations seeking to prevent war were spreading throughout Europe and the United States. Proposals for arbitration and the development of international law were gaining support among political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. Bertha von Suttner's book *La, Down Your Weapons* was an international bestseller, published in thirty-seven editions and translated into more than a dozen languages. The ideology of the peace movement was maturing. The narrow religious base of the early Anglo-American peace societies was giving way to more secular, humanitarian perspectives, especially in continental Europe.

Prior to the Glasgow congress members of the various peace societies and international organizations generally referred to themselves as "peace workers," "peace advocates," or, most commonly, "friends of peace." These were awkward terms that satisfied no one. Activists sought to develop a better term that would more effectively convey the growing maturity and sophistication of the movement. It was Emile Arnaud of France, president of the *Ligue internationale de la paix et de la liberté*, who first introduced the word "pacifism." He and others used it in a generic sense to describe the broad international peace movement. It was meant to suggest a coherent body of thought and developed set of political beliefs and policies for preventing war and assuring peace. The term elevated the philosophy of peace into an official "ism." It had international appeal and could be integrated easily into different languages. The term was officially adopted at the Glasgow congress. Thereafter those who participated

in the various peace organizations and societies around the world began to refer to themselves as "pacifists." It was a term of distinction and had a broad social connotation. It was meant to encompass all of those who worked to preserve peace and prevent war.

Pacifism also meant social action. It was not merely a philosophy but a political program and a commitment to social change. It was distinct from the quietist tradition of some religious sects, whose members tended to withdraw from public life and cede to the state the realm of practical politics. This was not what the early twentieth-century pacifists had in mind. Arnaud sought to distinguish pacifists from those who merely hope or pray for peace. "We are not passive types . . . we are pacifists."²² Pacifism included a personal commitment to take action, to work for peace. It implied, historian Roger Chickering wrote, a "high degree of engagement in activity" to help reduce the level of violence in international relations.²³ The study of peace is thus a history of social action as well as of ideas, an examination of social movements and of intellectual development.

Soon after the term pacifism emerged debates developed over its exact meaning and application. Should it encompass the traditional peace societies, which were often quite conservative and in some cases supported military "preparedness?" Did it apply to internationalism, which tended to focus narrowly on promoting arbitration and international law and institutions? Internationalists could be either conservative or progressive, favoring the status quo (including the system of imperialism) or advocating greater equality of status among nations. Was the term pacifism appropriate for the socialist parties, which opposed imperialist war but were prepared to support the class war? What about the democratic nationalists who supported the use of force for the just cause of national liberation? Could all of these diverse approaches, each in its distinctive way claiming to embody the path to peace, fit within one broad pacifist movement? These differences came to a head with the outbreak of war in 1914, when the peace movement collapsed and fractured. Most peace advocates, including internationalists and socialists, abandoned their commitment to transnational solidarity and marched off to war. Only a small remnant of the previously broad international movement stood apart from the nationalist frenzy and remained steadfast in opposing war.

In the years after World War I there was much recrimination and debate about the meaning of pacifism. The purists who had opposed the march to war claimed the term for themselves. They narrowed its definition to the unconditional rejection of war in all its forms. As revulsion at the horrific bloodletting of the war deepened, a growing number of people pledged never again to participate in or support war. These "pacifists" played a major role in the peace movement of the interwar era, which grew to unprecedented scale. Internationalists remained an important force, especially in Britain, where the LNU attracted widespread public support, but the influence of those who rejected war under all circumstances was substantial. The restrictive meaning of pacifism became the accepted standard and was adopted by A. C. F. Beales in his influential 1931 volume, *The History of Peace*.²⁴ Thereafter it became the standard in both scholarly and popular discourse.

This narrow definition of pacifism left most of the peace community out in the cold. Many of those who considered themselves pacifist were uncomfortable with the absolutist stand. As the menace of fascism mounted pacifism became increasingly marginalized and associated with isolationism. The term sank into disrepute and was largely abandoned, even by those who considered themselves advocates of peace. Many peace supporters, especially the internationalists, urged vigorous action to confront aggression. Some, such as Albert Einstein, tried to redefine pacifism to include rearmament and collective military resistance against Hitler. Others adopted a "peace with justice" perspective, arguing that the prevention of war depended on resolving political and economic grievances. The majority of peace advocates

found themselves in a state of confusion and uncertainty. They were part of a broad social movement amorphaously defined as for peace, but they lacked a coherent program for preventing the impending war and had no commonly accepted "ism" to describe the prevailing philosophy.

Scholars have attempted to remedy this frustrating imprecision by providing definitions for the various philosophies and political tendencies that exist within the peace community. The most elaborate and sophisticated attempt to parse the meaning of pacifism was provided by the historian Martin Ceadel in his masterful volume, *Thinking about Peace and War*. Ceadel identified five distinct theories of war and peace, ranging from militarism to pacifism. He differentiated absolute pacifism from "pacifism." The latter term was coined by the historian A.J.P. Taylor to describe those who believe that war is always irrational and inhumane and should be prevented, but who accept that it may be necessary at times.⁴⁵ Ceadel defined pacifists as those who believe that war can be prevented and with sufficient commitment to justice can be abolished, or nearly so.⁴⁶ This is an apt description of the position of most peace advocates. The distinction that Ceadel and others make between absolute and pragmatic pacifism is vital although often obfuscated. Few have adopted the "pacifist" label, however, which is awkward, confusing, and difficult to write or pronounce. It will not appear again in this volume. The general concept of pragmatic or conditional pacifism is nonetheless valuable, and will serve as the foundation for the definition employed here.

"Pacifist" Japan?

In Japan absolute pacifism is official national policy, as enshrined in Article 9 of the postwar Constitution:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerence of the state will not be recognized.

This extraordinary and unequivocal rejection of war has no precedent in history. Other countries have renounced war in their constitutions but never with such totality. Japan's Constitution was imposed by US occupation authorities, but many Japanese nonetheless supported its rejection of war, and a vigorous peace and disarmament movement developed over the decades – although the traditions of nationalism also retained their appeal among some conservatives.

Support for peace in Japan is understood as both a personal moral commitment and a social-political position that is linked to human rights, democracy, and economic well-being. The common term for peace advocacy is *heiwa shugi*, which is a combination of the Japanese words for "peace" and "ism." The ambiguity of the term makes it difficult to differentiate between absolute and conditional pacifism, and for many the meanings overlap and often coexist. The term *heiwa shugi* has no equivalent in English, although the original Glasgow definition of pacifism was intended precisely to convey the principled yet pragmatic commitment to peace conveyed by the Japanese term.⁴⁷

Article 9 is absolute in its language, but the political and legal interpretation of the clause has been more pragmatic. In practice pacifism in Japan has meant a "presumption against

the employment of force, rather than its absolute rejection," according to scholar Robert Kisala.²¹ The common understanding is that force may be used in self-defense or in humanitarian or peacekeeping missions authorized by the United Nations, but that other uses of military force are unacceptable. The government has pursued its foreign policy objectives mostly through economic means, principally through overseas development assistance.²²

Latin American and African traditions

In Latin America absolute pacifism is rare, but the use of nonviolent action as a method of social change is widespread. The commitment to nonviolence is often more pragmatic than principled, based on the calculation that violence leads to further oppression, and that *firmeza permanente* ("relentless persistence") can be a powerful means of achieving justice. The use of active nonviolence is rooted in the historical example of Latin America's indigenous communities, which struggled over the centuries to resist assimilation by Spanish conquerors and national governments, often through nonviolent methods of mass noncooperation. In recent decades numerous Latin American social movements have utilized nonviolent action to overcome repression, end military dictatorship, and defend human rights. The commitment to nonviolent action gained momentum after the Second Vatican Council of 1962-5 and the Latin American bishops conference in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, as liberation theology emerged to proclaim a "preferential option for the poor." Some appropriated the new theology to justify armed revolution, but most agreed with Leonardo Boff that liberation theology and active nonviolence were "two facets of a single reality." Both are rooted in the Gospel and seek to transform a society of violence and oppression into one of compassion and justice.²³

In African traditions peace means order, harmony, and equilibrium, not merely preventing war.²⁴ Western concepts of absolute pacifism or non-resistance have little meaning in societies that place primary value on maintaining social harmony. Peace is a function of social justice. It depends on preserving the integrity of communities. This concept of shared humanity is embodied in the African phrase *ubuntu*, which literally means "I am because we are." The truth of *ubuntu*, wrote philosopher Augustine Shutte, is that we become ourselves by belonging to community.²⁵ Peace can only be realized in community with others, through the embrace of the other. Community elders are often called upon to preserve peace by adjudicating and resolving conflicts.

Africa remains deeply scarred by the brutal legacies of colonialism. In recent decades no continent has suffered more from war and pervasive economic deprivation. The presence of conflict and the absence of development are bound together in a downward spiral of violence and misery. In response African leaders have argued that peace is impossible without economic development and political freedom. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere wrote: "for the sake of peace and justice, these economic inequalities in the world must be reduced and the mass of the people must be able to relieve themselves from the burden of poverty."²⁶ Bishop Desmond Tutu said in his Nobel Peace Prize speech in 1984: "There can be no real peace and security [in South Africa] until there be first justice enjoyed by all the inhabitants of that beautiful land."²⁷ In Africa, as in Latin America and Asia, peace is inextricably linked to economic and social justice.

Pacifism and "just war"

Pacifism and the just war tradition are analytically distinct and are often considered opposites. The concept of pragmatic pacifism helps to bridge the gap and provides a more

holistic framework for understanding peace advocacy. It reflects the dominant position of those who consider themselves peace supporters. Absolute pacifists have always been a minority, even within peace movements. The majority of those who work for peace seek to avoid war but are willing to accept some limited use of force for self-defense or to uphold justice and protect the innocent. Some uses of military force are more objectionable than others. This is evident from the fact that certain wars, such as those in Vietnam and Iraq, arouse vociferous movements of protest, while other uses of force, such as the multinational operation in Bosnia, are broadly accepted, even by many peace supporters. As the United States prepared to take military action in Afghanistan following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Scott Simon of National Public Radio wrote "Even Pacifists Must Support This War."²⁶ Some peace advocates accepted the attack against Al Qaida as justified self-defense but many cautioned against militarizing the struggle against terrorism. Because just war language is often abused by political leaders to justify military aggression there is concern that misuse of the framework can be a slippery slope toward the legitimization of indiscriminate violence. As Michael Walzer emphasized, just war reasoning is a challenge to political realism.²⁷ The just war doctrine establishes a rigorous set of moral conditions that must be met before armed conflict can be considered. If thoroughly and honestly applied these criteria would rule out most of the armed conflicts that political leaders claim to be just and would make war a rare occurrence.

Pragmatic pacifism can be understood as a continuum of perspectives, beginning on one end with the rejection of military violence and extending across a range of options that allow for some limited use of force under specific conditions. The presumption is always against the use of force and in favor of settling differences without violence, but reality dictates that some uses of force may be necessary at times to assure justice and prevent the greater violence that often results when exploitation and aggression are unconstrained. Even strict pacifists acknowledge that at times soldiers can play a role in preventing the spread of violence. I once asked a class of Mennonite students who described themselves as pacifist if they would support the continued deployment of NATO troops in Bosnia to keep the peace among the previously warring factions. All but one of the twenty students said yes. Pacifists may accept the use of force if it is constrained, narrowly targeted, and conducted by proper authority within the rule of law.²⁸ Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder differentiated between war and the use of police power: the latter is subject to legal and moral constraints and is ethically superior to war.²⁹ Distinctions matter, and a vast difference exists between unilateral, unprovoked military aggression and multilateral peace operations to protect civilian populations. No one who considered herself pacifist would accept the former but a great many would accept the latter.

The just war position also contains a continuum of perspectives, extending from limited police action to all-out war, based on a set of moral criteria that can vary significantly in different settings. Views on whether a particular use of force is justified range from a restrictive interpretation that permits military action only under narrowly constrained circumstances, to more expansive claims that seek to justify large-scale military operations and even the unprovoked invasion of other countries. Analysts often differ on whether a particular use of force, such as the 1991 Gulf War, meets the classic moral criteria of a just war.³⁰ Most ethicists within the tradition agree, however, that the just war framework is based on a presumption against the use of military force. All share Walzer's insistence on addressing the moral reality of war.³¹ The use of military force is not merely an extension of politics. It is a moral act of supreme importance that must be judged according to the strictest ethical standards.

The continuum of pacifism can be combined with that of just war to form a continuous range of options extending from absolute nonviolence at the one end to the justification of

war at the other. All the differing perspectives on war and peace thus can be considered in relation to one another. This is the approach employed by Ceadel in his classification of five major perspectives on peace and war.¹¹ John Howard Yoder also combined the two traditions in a standard lecture I had the privilege of hearing on several occasions. Yoder argued that a systematic and rigorous application of just war principles – just cause, right authority, last resort, probability of success, proportionality, discrimination – would make war extremely rare. Philosopher John Rawls wrote that justice demands a form of “contingent pacifism.” The possibility of just war is conceded in principle, but the far greater likelihood is that war will be unjust, especially when waged by large and powerful states against weaker nations. Given the often predatory aims of state power the demands of justice may require resistance to war.¹²

An honest appraisal of war through the lens of just war criteria would forbid any consideration of nuclear strikes and would rule out virtually all forms of large-scale, unilateral military intervention. It would leave only self-defense and limited, legally constrained uses of multilateral force to protect civilians and restore conditions of justice. The “responsibility to protect” principles that have recently gained international endorsement embody this perspective. Walzer argued that the only morally justified reason for fighting is the defense of rights, most essentially the right of self-defense.¹³ Rawls likewise acknowledged the principle of self-defense and the right of people to determine their own affairs without the intervention of foreign powers.¹⁴ Combining the pacifist and just war traditions allows for a broader and richer examination of the peace tradition, one that more accurately reflects the thinking of those who consider themselves part of the peace movement. It takes into account the full range of peacemaking options and traditions that are part of the history of peace. It also conforms with the original definition and meaning of pacifism.

An outline of peace history

Peace societies first emerged in the United States and Britain in the early part of the nineteenth century and later spread across Europe and beyond. Peace advocates focused on proposals for the arbitration of interstate disputes and the strengthening of international law. The internationalist agenda was partly realized in Woodrow Wilson's vision of the League of Nations. Although the League was flawed in design and fatally weakened by the lack of US participation, it established a precedent for the gradual strengthening of international institutions and laid the foundations for the United Nations.

Pacifism and internationalism attracted very broad public support during the interwar era. Peace advocates and internationalists were early opponents of fascist aggression in Manchuria and Abyssinia, and many urged the defense of the Spanish republic. They demanded League of Nations action to impose sanctions against Japan and Italy. The LNU organized the Peace Ballot as a way of demonstrating support for mutual disarmament and collective action against aggression. The decisions to betray Ethiopia and the Spanish republic and appease Hitler were taken by Western government leaders not peace advocates. Interwar pacifists can be faulted for many things – clinging too long to the failed promise of the League of Nations, supporting the illusion of neutrality, believing that diplomacy could stop the Nazi menace – but they were not culpable for war.

In the early years of the cold war peace advocacy fell to its lowest ebb of the century. Anticommunism and a suffocating atmosphere of political conformity combined with a backlash against pacifism to undermine the legitimacy of progressive internationalism. A

significant movement for world federalism emerged in the late 1940s but rapidly declined with the onset of the Korean War. Peace scholars and activists addressed the problem of militarization and the growing tendency toward military interventionism. The development of atomic weapons and their terrifying spread created new dangers and sparked significant waves of disarmament activism. The first wave of anti-nuclear action was initiated by the atomic scientists who created the bomb. The second wave came in the late 1950s in response to atmospheric nuclear testing. Led by groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain and SANE in the United States, the ban the bomb movement exerted significant pressure that led to the 1963 atmospheric test ban treaty. The arms race continued and intensified in the 1980s, prompting a third and even larger wave of disarmament activism. The nuclear freeze campaign in the United States and disarmament movements in Europe paved the way for significant nuclear reductions and the end of the cold war.

The movement against the Vietnam War was one of the largest and most intensive peace campaigns in history. Antiwar efforts influenced the Johnson and Nixon administrations and exerted sustained pressure for US military withdrawal. Antiwar activism developed even among active-duty soldiers and veterans, as I personally experienced. Conscientious objection reached an unprecedented scale and spread not only in the United States during the Vietnam era but in Europe and beyond in subsequent decades. Antiwar activism rose again in response to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. In February 2003 an estimated 10 million people demonstrated against the Iraq war in hundreds of cities across the globe. This vast movement was unable to stop the US-led invasion, but it prevented the Bush administration from gaining UN endorsement and contributed to the political defeat of the administration's war policy.

An overview of peacemaking ideas

The religious traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity all contain principles and practices to sustain peacemaking – although justifications for war can also be found in many sacred texts. The Gospel of Jesus is unequivocal in its commitment to love and nonretaliation for injury, as reflected in the absolute pacifism of the early Christian communities. Although the just war tradition replaced pacifism within official Christianity, the tradition of nonresistance continued and reemerged during and after the Reformation in the Anabaptist and Quaker movements. The Social Gospel of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought peace and social justice issues into the mainstream of Christianity, but it also sparked renewed debate about the limitations of pacifism. The leading voice in this reappraisal was Reinhold Niebuhr, whose philosophy of Christian realism became a dominant influence in the twentieth century. John Howard Yoder's response to Niebuhr sought to preserve the integrity of pacifism through a more realistic, minimalist understanding of the possibilities for Christian perfectionism.

Niebuhr and Yoder were influenced by the achievements of Gandhi and the power of non-violent action to achieve social justice. The Gandhian method inspired Martin Luther King, Jr. and the US civil rights movement. Nonviolent citizen movements have since become a "force more powerful," bringing democracy to the Philippines, a "velvet revolution" to eastern Europe, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the overthrow of corrupt regimes in Serbia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics. Nonviolent action is the key to more realistic pacifism, a bridge between idealism and realism. Assertive nonviolence as developed by Gandhi provides an answer to the challenge of Niebuhr, transcending the passivity of nonresistance while offering a strategy for fighting effectively to resist social evil.

The rise of peace advocacy in recent centuries is directly tied to the spread and deepening of democracy. It is no accident that peace societies first emerged in democratic Britain and the United States, and that the largest peace mobilizations have occurred in democratic countries. Pacifism is by its very nature an activist commitment that depends for its expression on the right of people to assemble and speak freely. The rise of socialism influenced pacifism by focusing attention on issues of equality and social justice. Relations between pacifism and socialism were decidedly cool at first, the result of different theories about the causes of war and the requirements for peace. Gradually the movements began to converge, as peace advocates broadened their agenda and socialists became less doctrinaire. In recent decades peace advocates and Internationalists have supported more equitable economic development as an essential strategy for preventing war.

The advent of feminism and the growing involvement of women significantly influenced the agenda for peace. Women tended to give greater emphasis to the social dimensions of peace, and linked the concerns of family and community life with the larger realm of state and international affairs. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries feminists noted the heavy burden of war on women, including impoverishment from the loss of male breadwinners. In the twentieth century they emphasized the rising death toll among women and children caused by the increased lethality of war and the spread of civil conflict. Feminists pointed to the connection between the institutionalized violence of war and violence against women. They sought to achieve greater equality for women as an essential requirement for creating a more just and peaceful world. They enlarged the definition of peace beyond narrow legalistic and institutional concerns to encompass a more holistic social, economic, cultural, and political strategy for preventing violence.¹⁵

Support for human rights has become an essential element of the strategy for peace and was a key factor in ending the cold war. The cause of political freedom is sometimes misused by governments, however, as when US and British leaders claimed a human rights argument for the invasion of Iraq. More legitimate human rights challenges were posed by genocide and the abuse of civilians in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur – although in these instances the response from the major powers was initially timid. The moral and political imperative of responding to the slaughter of innocents has sparked an intense international debate about the responsibility to protect. Peace and human rights advocates are finding common ground in advocating more vigorous international action, including the use of force under specified conditions, as necessary means of ending oppression and securing peace with justice.

Patriotism is often pitted against pacifism. Throughout history the call to arms has trumped the appeal for peace. The phenomenon of mass belligerence was the subject of a famous 1932 correspondence between Einstein and Freud and motivated philosopher William James's search for "a moral equivalent of war" a generation earlier. Gandhi sought to harness the desire for patriotic service into a commitment to social justice through the idea of a nonviolent army. His concept echoes today in various citizen nonviolent peacemaking initiatives and conciliation programs in conflict zones around the world. Recent trends toward greater peacemaking duties for armed forces and proposals for a "human security response force" within the European Union suggest that the gap between traditional military service and peacemaking may be narrowing. Peace advocacy is itself a form of patriotic service, not only to nation but to the wider human community.

My goal is to forge a synthesis among peacemaking traditions, giving the principles of nonviolence cardinal importance. This synthesis incorporates advances in the theory and

practice of international peace-building, while also drawing from the contributions of democracy theory, feminism, socialism, and human rights. It addresses the rise of antiwar movements, the imperative of disarmament, and the contemporary challenges of countering terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Over the decades new possibilities have emerged for resolving conflict and achieving justice through nonviolent means. History's most violent era has also seen the dawning of an age of nonviolence. While the dominant narrative has been and continues to be written in blood, a different, more hopeful story has emerged in the development of movements and ideas for peace. Gandhian principles of nonviolence have inspired new strategies and possibilities for achieving justice and overcoming social evil while remaining true to religious principles of peace. Growing numbers of people now recognize and act upon the realization that the peaceful resolution of conflict is both necessary and possible.

Notes

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