

Faking and Personality Assessment in Personnel Selection: Advancing Models of Faking

Richard D. Goffin and Allison C. Boyd
The University of Western Ontario

Personality testing is a particularly valuable preemployment assessment tool when one matches personality traits to job requirements. The authors explain that, unlike most other common personnel selection methods, the unique value of personality assessment in personnel selection stems from its tendency to predict the choice to perform, or “will-do” aspects of job performance. The effect of faking on the value of personality testing is discussed, and the authors suggest that personality testing’s contribution to personnel selection could be leveraged if more were known about the psychological process underlying applicant faking behaviour. To this end, the authors present an improved general model of the applicant faking process as well as a new “faking decision tree.”

Keywords: personality, personnel selection, faking, models, deception

In recent years, industrial–organisational psychology has experienced an explosion of interest in the use of personality assessment (Hough & Oswald, 2008). Nowhere has this explosion had more impact than in the area of personnel selection (Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). However, the initial wave of almost unbridled enthusiasm for personality assessment as a pre hiring assessment tool has recently been somewhat tempered by apprehension that the correlations of personality scores with job performance (i.e., criterion validities) are generally weak (Morgeson et al., 2007). Figuring prominently amongst the possible reasons for weak personality–job performance relations is the concern that test takers tend to fake their responses to personality tests (e.g., Goffin & Christiansen, 2003; Luther & Thornton, 1999; Putka & McCloy, 2004; White, Young, & Rumsey, 2001; Zickar & Robie, 1999). Moreover, even if one does not accept the premise that faking may attenuate criterion validity, there is reason to believe that faking may, nonetheless, negatively affect the utility of hiring decisions (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). We define faking as a tendency for test takers to deliberately provide inaccurate responses to personality items in a manner that they believe will increase their chances of obtaining valued outcomes, such as a favourable hiring decision. Moreover, in consonance with common personnel selection situations, our consideration of faking focuses on situations wherein job applicants are motivated to increase their chances of being hired. Therefore, we deal specifically with “faking good.” The phenomenon of “faking bad” is not outside the realm of possibilities in personnel selection, but in terms of overall preva-

lence, it is likely to be relatively rare and limited to situations such as testing for military placement, in which the motivation to avoid hazardous work may be evident.

The study of faking as it relates to preemployment personality testing has been elevated to a place of prominence, and the published literature on this topic has grown considerably. Responding to the concern that faking may lower the potential contribution that personality testing could make to personnel selection, the vast majority of this literature has focused on either the effects of faking or on strategies for contending with faking (see Rothstein & Goffin, 2006, for a review). Although some noteworthy findings have emerged, it would be fair to characterise this literature as largely atheoretical (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggstad, & Thornton, 2006). We suggest that, to better measure and control faking, it is important to better understand and articulate the psychological process underlying faking. Accordingly, a main goal of this work is to review extant models of the psychological process underlying applicant faking and suggest new ones.

In the section that follows, we first summarise the importance of personality assessment in personnel selection. After this, with the ultimate goal of leveraging the contribution that personality assessment can make, we turn our attention to models of applicant faking.

The Importance of Personality Testing in Personnel Selection

Personality Testing and Criterion Validity

The gold standard by which personnel selection methods are judged is the extent to which their scores provide an indication of whether applicants will tend to be successful performers on the job. Thus, as we alluded to earlier, criterion validity, operationalized as the correlation between a personality test score and a job performance score, is of utmost importance. In consonance with reviews by Hough and Oswald (2008); Ones,

Richard D. Goffin and Allison C. Boyd, Department of Psychology, The University of Western Ontario.

This work was supported by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada to Richard D. Goffin.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Richard D. Goffin, Department of Psychology, SSC, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2 Canada. E-mail: goffin@uwo.ca

Dilchert, Viswesvaran, and Judge (2007); Rothstein and Goffin (2006), and Tett and Christiansen (2007), our perspective is that the evidence supporting the criterion validity of personality testing is overwhelming—personality scores *do* predict job performance. Moreover, although we understand recent concerns that the criterion validity of personality measures *can* be somewhat weak (Morgeson et al., 2007), we agree with Tett and Christiansen (2007), Rothstein and Goffin (2000, 2006), and others that the manner in which one utilizes personality assessment within personnel selection determines whether criterion validity is substantial or abysmal.

The Ideal Application of Personality Testing in Personnel Selection

One factor that is particularly important in the application of personality testing is the matching of personality traits to the nature of the job. Although some personality traits are generally more predictive across jobs than are others (e.g., conscientiousness), one cannot expect all traits to be relevant to performance in all jobs. More to the point, greater attention devoted to matching personality traits to the nature of the job is associated with considerably higher criterion validity (Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991; Tett, Jackson, Rothstein, & Reddon, 1999). Unfortunately, there is a dearth of job-analytic methodologies for picking, a priori, the most job-related personality traits (e.g., Goffin et al., 2009; Raymark, Schmit, & Guion, 1997). The further development and more widespread application of these methodologies promises to elevate the common denominator of personality testing's criterion validity substantially.

Also likely to be of great value in more precisely matching personality traits to jobs is precise measurement of the multifaceted domain of personality. There has been considerable debate as to the relative value of using broad Five-Factor Model (FFM) personality traits (i.e., agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness) versus the more narrowly defined traits that they comprise (e.g., extraversion comprises the narrow traits of dominance and affiliation, amongst others; see Tett & Christiansen, 2007, for a review of the debate). We suggest that narrow traits provide the potential for more precise matching of traits to the nature of the job. This is consistent with Rothstein and Goffin's (2006) finding that narrow traits have clearly exceeded the predictiveness of broad traits in all 11 of the empirical studies of this issue that have been published over the past decade.

Personality Tests Predict Unique Aspects of Job Performance

As discussed, scores on personality tests do predict job performance, and the predictiveness of personality can be enhanced by more precise matching of traits to jobs. It is only fair to point out, however, that there are many other preemployment testing approaches whose criterion validity tends to equal or exceed that of personality testing. Nonetheless, one of the clear advantages of personality assessment is that it tends to predict variance in job performance that is not predicted by other selection methods. It has been demonstrated that the addition of personality testing to a selection testing program that uses the venerable assessment centre, for example, will result in a significant gain in validity (Goffin,

Rothstein, & Johnston, 1996). Furthermore, McManus and Kelly (1999) provided evidence of the ability of personality assessment to add incrementally to the validity of another revered selection testing method, biodata. Finally, tests of general mental ability (GMA), alternatively referred to as *intelligence*, "*g*," or, *general cognitive ability*, are often regarded as the most utile of all selection methods (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Thus, it is particularly noteworthy that the addition of personality testing to a selection testing program based on GMA has been shown to significantly increase the overall level of criterion validity (Day & Silverman, 1989; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). It is interesting that, whereas the criterion validity of GMA tends to decrease as the complexity level of the job decreases (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), the criterion validity of integrity tests (a subset of personality tests) tends not to decrease (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993). Thus, personality testing may provide the largest benefit beyond GMA in the case of low-complexity jobs, although its increment in validity is still likely to be valuable in high-complexity jobs.

However, what is the mechanism behind personality's propensity to increment the predictiveness of other preemployment testing methods? There is evidence that many preemployment testing approaches tend to assess individuals' *capacity* to perform well on the job (i.e., "can-do" antecedents of job performance) but are deficient in their potential to predict whether individuals necessarily *will choose* to perform well on the job (i.e., "will-do" antecedents of job performance; Marcus, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 2007; Murphy, 1989). Personality scales, on the other hand, tend to assess the will-do antecedents more so than the can-do antecedents (Marcus et al., 2007). Thus, within personnel selection situations, personality has great potential for complementing and adding to the predictiveness of existing selection tools by predicting unique parts of the job performance domain. Moreover, failure to include personality testing within a selection battery increases the likelihood that new hires will be less productive after they master the challenges of their jobs and enter "maintenance" stages, at which point the will-do antecedents account for increased variance in job performance (Murphy, 1989).

Faking and the Use of Personality Assessment in Personnel Selection

Thus far, we have reviewed evidence that personality assessment can be a particularly useful tool in the arsenal of preemployment testing practises; but we would be remiss if we did not address what is apparently the most pervasive concern that personnel selection practitioners and researchers alike have regarding personality assessment—namely, faking (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003; Griffith & Peterson, 2006). There is ample evidence that personality scores contribute meaningfully to the prediction of job performance even in situations where faking is likely to have occurred (Hough et al., 2008; Ones et al., 2007; Tett & Christiansen, 2007). Criterion validity might be expected, however, to increase notably, and greater confidence might be inspired in practitioners who use personality testing, if substantially more were known about faking. As discussed earlier, although the literature on faking is growing, there has been comparatively little attention devoted to explicating the process underlying faking. Here we review the few extant models of the faking process and advance two new models.

The Process of Faking Personality Test Responses *Extant Models of the Faking Process*

One of the earliest models proposed by Snell, Sydell, and Lueke (1999) identified “ability to fake” and “motivation to fake” as two separate constructs that could affect an individual’s tendency to fake. Ability to fake referred to test takers’ capacity to distort their responses and was believed to be influenced by variables such as dispositional factors, experiential factors, and test characteristics (Snell et al., 1999). Motivation to fake referred to the intention or willingness to fake and was anteceded by demographic factors, dispositional factors, perceptual factors, and contextual factors (Snell et al., 1999). This early model was recognised for providing a useful initial framework for applicant faking behaviour (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006).

Shortly thereafter, a model of faking was proposed by McFarland and Ryan (2000), which involved possible interactions between antecedents, as well as more specific potential influences on faking behaviour. Of particular interest, McFarland and Ryan (2000) argued that beliefs toward faking would be influenced by variables including values, morals, religion, and personality traits. In turn, beliefs toward faking would influence an individual’s intention to fake, which would subsequently influence the prevalence of faking behaviour. Various moderators were also proposed to affect the aforementioned relationships. Specifically, McFarland and Ryan (2000) believed that situational influences, such as desire for the job and faking warnings (described later), would moderate the relationship between beliefs toward faking and intention to fake. Ability to fake and opportunity to fake were also proposed as moderators influencing the relationship between intention to fake and faking behaviour (McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Ability to fake was said to increase as a function of “knowledge of the construct being measured” and the transparency of the item (McFarland & Ryan, 2000, p. 819). On the other hand, opportunity to fake referred to how close the individual’s true score on the trait being measured was to the highest possible score (assuming positive keying; McFarland & Ryan, 2000). For example, an individual who is already very high in extraversion has little opportunity to increase his or her score on extraversion by faking.

More recently, McFarland and Ryan (2006) expanded their previous model by integrating the theory of planned behaviour (TPB). Specifically, they predicted that attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behaviour control (the components of TPB) would predict faking by influencing an individual’s intention to fake. McFarland and Ryan (2006) integrated their (McFarland & Ryan, 2000) model by including situational influences and ability to fake as potential moderators. Although some initial testing provided support for their suggestion that the TPB might predict intentions to fake, their results failed to provide general support for the hypothesised moderators (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). On the basis of this expanded model, and integrating Snell et al.’s (1999) model, Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) proposed another model of the psychological processes underlying faking. They proposed that “perceptions of the situation,” “willingness to fake,” “ability to fake,” conscientiousness, and emotional stability were antecedents that each influenced the intention to fake, which subsequently predicted faking behaviour (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006, p. 291). Initial tests of their proposed model provided only partial support (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006).

Further Articulation of the Faking Process: Description of a General Model of Faking

Although the various models described earlier have been helpful, they have some conceptual limitations that could be improved upon. Consequently, we present a model in Figure 1 that incorporates the key aspects of previous models but improves upon them in three main regards.

The first key improvement that our model offers over most previous models is its focus on item-level responding. The most predominant models of the faking process (McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2006; Snell et al., 1999) have been geared toward predicting faking in a given situation across an entire personality test consisting of numerous items. However, a study conducted by Donovan, Dwight, and Hurtz (2003), revealed that faking is likely to vary considerably, depending on the nature of the item to which the individual is responding. For example, 16.7% to 32% of Donovan et al.’s (2003) respondents admitted to exaggerating “personal characteristics or traits on a test to make myself look better than I actually am,” whereas a noticeably higher percentage (53.8% to 62.2%) admitted that they “tended to de-emphasise or play down” (Donovan et al., 2003, p. 92) their unflattering traits. It is clear that many popular personality tests contain a diversity of items, some of which provide opportunities to exaggerate positive attributes or tendencies and some of which provide opportunities to downplay or deny negative attributes or tendencies. Thus, depending on the specific nature of the personality item, a test taker may not be inclined to fake his or her response to “Item 1,” whereas his or her response to “Item 5” may be affected by considerable intentional distortion. Thus, we believe that there is value in conceptualizing the faking process at the level of the test taker’s response to each successive individual item rather than at the level of the entire personality test as has been the case in the past.

Second, the predominant existing models of faking (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999) present ability or




Figure 1. General model of faking.

capacity to fake as an objectively defined factor. However, we argue that this factor should be defined in more subjective, perceptual terms. Specifically, we define *perceived* ability to fake as an individual's perception regarding whether he or she is able to fake the response to an item in such a way that it will increase the likelihood of being hired. Regardless of the test takers' true objective ability to fake, their tendency to fake will be affected only to the extent that they perceive they have the ability to appropriately fake their response. Thus, perceived ability to fake is much more proximal to the act of faking. Perceived ability to fake an item is similar to self-efficacy in its focus on confidence in performing a specific task. However, we do not use the self-efficacy label because this would tend to imply a particular developmental progression involving, for example, past mastery experiences or exposure to others' mastery experiences (Landy & Conte, 2004; Wood & Bandura, 1989), which are not likely to occur in the case of faking. Because test takers generally lack hard data on whether their faking efforts have been successful, they may develop false impressions regarding their degree of success, or mastery, of faking. Thus, test takers' perception of their faking ability is likely to diverge from their actual faking ability, but their perception is much more relevant to their inclination to fake.

Third, besides further developing the nature of the ability domain as it relates to faking, we also recognised the need to clarify how "perceived ability to fake" and "motivation to fake" are interrelated in their influence on faking behaviour. We propose that ability is likely to influence motivation: An individual is less likely to be motivated to fake if he or she does not have a self-perception of being able to fake. Hence, unlike previous models of faking (McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2006; Snell et al., 1999), we argue for a direct causal effect of perceived ability on the motivation to fake a given item (see Figure 1). We cannot specifically rule out the possibility that these variables might interact because the necessary empirical data do not yet exist. Perhaps once the most potent direct antecedents of faking behaviour are substantiated, future research can then move on to studying the more complex realm of possible moderator effects.

Delving more deeply into the present model (see Figure 1), we have also proposed a more exhaustive array of factors, categorized as either individual differences or contextual antecedents, which may affect one's motivation to fake, or perceived ability to fake, a given item.

Individual Differences and the Motivation to Fake

We suggest that self-monitoring, Machiavellianism, integrity, need for approval, conscientiousness, and emotional stability are personality traits with the potential to affect an individual's motivation to fake. Self-monitoring can be defined as "self-observation and self-control guided by situational cues to social appropriateness" (Snyder, 1974, p. 526). In consonance with McFarland and Ryan (2000), Levashina and Campion (2006), and Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006), we are persuaded that individuals who are high in self-monitoring would likely be conscious and aware of how they were presenting themselves in each item response and would tend to be motivated to fake to manage the impression they create.

Second, Machiavellianism, refers to individuals who are "likely to behave in a cold and manipulative fashion" (Paulhus & Williams, 2002, p. 557). Machiavellianism has clear links to the motivation to fake because it is associated with a tendency toward

lying, cheating (Snell et al., 1999), and strategic self-presentation (Levashina & Campion, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006).

Integrity, defined as honesty, reliability, and trustworthiness (Sackett & Wanek, 1996), has clear conceptual (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2006; Snell et al., 1999) and empirical (McFarland & Ryan, 2000) links to one's motivation to fake. We also include need for approval, because those who are high in this trait may be more motivated to distort their responses to present themselves in a more favourable light (Levashina & Campion, 2006).

With regard to the popular FFM of personality, conscientiousness and emotional stability have been suggested most often in previous models as antecedents of the motivation to fake (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Nonetheless, we believe that it would make more sense conceptually and empirically to consider narrow facets of conscientiousness and emotional stability. Perhaps certain narrow facets of these two broad traits would be linked to a higher motivation to fake, whereas other narrow facets within the same broad dimension may be negatively related or unrelated to faking behaviour.

Considering the narrow facets of conscientiousness (competence, order, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline, and deliberation; Costa & McCrae, 1992), we suggest that individuals scoring high in dutifulness would be less motivated to fake because such individuals tend to "adhere strictly to their ethical principles and scrupulously fulfill their moral obligations" (Costa & McCrae, 1992, p. 18). Additionally, individuals scoring high in deliberation would be expected to have lower motivation to fake because they are known to be cautious (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and might therefore be very concerned that faking could be detected and have negative consequences. On the other hand, the achievement striving facet of conscientiousness might tend to be associated with an increased motivation to fake. Those who are high in achievement striving tend to "have high aspiration levels and work hard to achieve their goals" (Costa & McCrae, 1992, p. 18). This heightened ambitiousness suggests that such individuals would be more motivated to do anything it takes, including faking, to increase their chances of being hired. Goffin and Anderson (2007) provide some empirical support for the link between achievement striving and faking—higher scores on the trait of achievement were associated with inflated self-ratings of job performance.

Considering the narrow facets of emotional stability or, rather, its flipside "neuroticism" (anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability; Costa & McCrae, 1992, p. 16), low anxiety, low depression, and low vulnerability appear to be promising antecedents of the motivation to fake. Costa and McCrae (1992) described those who score low on anxiety as being calm and relaxed and not prone to worrying that "things that might go wrong" (p. 16), which might include getting caught faking. In terms of depression, "high scorers are prone to feelings of guilt, sadness, hopelessness" (Costa & McCrae, 1992, p. 16), and we surmise that such feelings could be associated with a diminution of the motivation to fake. Finally, those who score high in vulnerability generally feel unable to deal with challenging situations (Costa & McCrae, 1992), which suggests lower motivation to fake.

Another narrow facet of emotional stability, impulsiveness, may have the opposite relation to the motivation to fake. Impulsiveness has been described as the "inability to control cravings and urges . . . low scorers find it easier to resist such temptations" (Costa & McCrae, 1992, p. 16). Those who score low in impul-

siveness might well have lower motivation to fake because they have more control over the urge to fake a response to an item.

The aforementioned suppositions regarding the potential predictiveness of narrow traits that are facets of conscientiousness and emotional stability are consistent with the clear trend in the literature for narrow personality traits to be generally more predictive than FFM traits (discussed earlier; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). In addition to the aforementioned likelihood that certain narrow traits within conscientiousness or emotional stability may predict motivation to fake in opposite directions, and thereby partially cancel each other out, there is also the issue of the various facets that are included in conscientiousness (self-discipline, order, and competence) and emotional stability (angry hostility and self-consciousness) but have no clear linkage to the motivation to fake. Assuming that these facets correlate near zero with a motivation to fake, including them within the FFM traits will tend to dilute the predictiveness of the more potent facets.

Another individual difference that could influence one's motivation to fake, separate from the category of personality traits, is one's moral code. We agree with McFarland and Ryan's (2000) proposition that some individuals simply believe that faking is wrong, regardless of the circumstances, whereas others do not. Snell et al. (1999) put forth a similar argument. In terms of supportive empirical work, Robie, Brown, and Beaty (2007) provided evidence that applicants who are motivated to provide honest responses often do so because they feel it is morally wrong to fake. We realise that moral code may overlap to some extent with personality traits such as dutifulness (described earlier). However, we decided to include moral code in addition to dutifulness, because a moral code may be adopted as a result of indoctrination (e.g., religion), whereas dutifulness is more akin to a dispositional attribute. Including both of these individual differences affords broader coverage of the possible predictors of the motivation to fake.

Contextual Antecedents of the Motivation to Fake

We first consider the "perception that faking will have negative consequences" as a contextual antecedent of the motivation to fake. There is considerable evidence that the presence of a warning that faking can be detected may reduce faking (e.g., Goffin & Woods, 1995; Rothstein & Goffin, 2000, 2006), and particularly so when negative consequences of being caught faking are emphasised (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). In a similar vein, Klein and Owens (1965) suggested that using items that are amenable to verification (e.g., items pertaining to actual events in one's life) will reduce faking because they increase the fakers' perception that they will be caught. Although we concur that these measures aimed at faking prevention will generally tend to discourage faking, it also seems likely that there will be considerable variability in the extent to which such measures will influence individual test takers. For example, some individuals may simply be less convinced that faking detection is possible and/or that it will result in negative consequences for them (Goffin & Woods, 1995). Accordingly, unlike previous models of faking (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2006; Snell et al., 1999), our model places the emphasis on the test taker's perception that faking will have negative consequences, not on the mere presence or absence of factors such as the faking warning. The perception that faking will have negative

consequences incorporates the respondent's perception of the link between faking and negative outcomes, such as a reduced chance of being hired. This link has proven to be important in predicting faking behaviour (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). Also, the perception that faking will have negative consequences is intended to encompass possible *tangible*, but not *psychological*, consequences of faking, such as a guilty conscience. Avoidance of faking for reasons of conscience is quite plausible, but this is already encompassed by including moral code in the model.

Also in the category of contextual antecedents of the motivation to fake is the test taker's perceived need to fake the respective item response (see Figure 1). Two factors are likely to be implicated in this need. First, in consonance with McFarland and Ryan (2000) and Snell et al. (1999), we suggest that job need and desire, as influenced by such factors as employment status and prospects, career aspirations, and level of competition for the position, is part of the need to fake. Second, we suggest that the test taker forms a perception of the discrepancy between the ideal item response (from the perspective of attaining the job he or she is applying for) and his or her most self-descriptive response. To the extent that this discrepancy is large, s/he will perceive a greater need to fake. Our theorizing here bears some resemblance to McFarland and Ryan's (2000; also described earlier) rationale that the extent to which a test taker's true score (on the trait being measured) is lower than the most desirable score affects opportunity to fake, which then affects faking behaviour. However, we contend that a perceived discrepancy between ideal and self-descriptive responses reflects the need, rather than the opportunity, to fake. This is because a deficit in one's suitability for a desired job seems more likely to be perceived as a need than as an opportunity. Moreover, McFarland and Ryan (2000) suggest that the actual difference between the person's true level of the trait and the most desirable level will play a role in affecting faking behaviour. By contrast, we emphasise that the test taker's perception of the discrepancy between ideal and self-descriptive item response may differ substantially from the actual difference, but it is the perceived discrepancy that is most relevant.

Individual Differences and the Perceived Ability to Fake

We propose that the personality traits of narcissism, social astuteness, innovation, self-esteem, and two narrow facets of conscientiousness—competence and achievement striving—have potential links to one's perceived ability to fake. Characteristics of narcissism include "grandiosity, entitlement, dominance, and superiority" (Paulhus & Williams, 2002, p. 557), and Paulhus and Williams reported that narcissists tended to engage in frequent self-aggrandizement. Thus, we expect narcissism to be positively associated with a perception of the ability to fake.

Individuals high in social astuteness are described as "manipulative of others; socially intelligent; and skillful at persuading others," as well as being, for example, "sophisticated, influential, persuasive, and tactful" (Jackson, 1994, p.5). Such individuals would likely perceive themselves as better able to fool testing professionals with their faked responses. Also, social astuteness is conceptually related to social skills in general, which Levashina and Campion (2006) suggested as a component of one's capacity to fake during employment interviews. Furthermore, Riggio, Tucker, and Throckmorton (1987) provided empirical evidence

that participants who were high in attributes resembling social astuteness were more successful deceivers than were those who were low in these attributes.

A high score on the trait of innovation denotes someone who is creative, original, and “motivated to develop novel solutions to problems” (Jackson, 1994, p. 4). It is likely that such individuals would perceive themselves as quite skilled at figuring out the most beneficial response to provide to a personality item. Because “liking to improvise” is also a characteristic of an innovative individual (Jackson, 1994, p. 4), such an individual might also feel able to think quickly “on the spot” to strategically distort his or her response to a personality item.

Self-esteem has an illustrious history of being associated with a general sense that one is very capable (Goffin & Anderson, 2007; Zaff & Hair, 2003). Consequently, we suggest that those with higher self-esteem will also perceive themselves as generally more able to fake.

The definition of achievement striving (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Jackson, 1999) emphasises ambition, diligence, goal orientation, competitiveness, and resourcefulness—attributes that we suggest would be associated with a higher perceived ability to fake to achieve the goal of being hired for the job. Finally, individuals high in the trait of competence, described as “capable, sensible, prudent, and effective” would also likely perceive themselves as more able to fake (Costa & McCrae, 1992, p.18).

The second category of individual characteristics that we propose will have an influence on one’s perceived ability to fake is the combination of skills, abilities, and experience. Snell et al. (1999) and Levashina and Campion (2006) proposed that GMA is a dispositional factor influencing the ability to fake. Logically, there is link between GMA and the capacity to figure out which item response will maximise one’s chances of being hired. Empirically, there is evidence that higher scores on personality tests that involve the faking warning or the forced-choice method are correlated with higher levels of GMA, again suggesting that “successful” faking may, at least partially, reflect higher GMA (Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery, 2005; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006; Vasilopoulos, Cucina, & McElreath, 2005). Thus, higher GMA should tend to increase one’s perceived ability to fake a given item. Additionally, Hough and Oswald (2008) pointed to the importance of test taking experience. Individuals who believe they have successfully faked their responses to personality test items in the past could be expected to perceive themselves as more able to successfully distort their responses in the future, compared with someone completing a personality test for the first time.

Contextual Antecedents of Perceived Ability to Fake

Here we refer to factors that affect an individual’s perceived ability to fake but are specific to the particular personality assessment situation. First, we propose that perceived opportunity will influence one’s perceived ability to fake. The nature of the personality item is a key aspect of perceived opportunity to fake in that standard agree–disagree type items may be more susceptible to faking than forced-choice items (Snell et al., 1999; see also Rothstein & Goffin, 2006, for a review) and would therefore tend to increase perceived opportunity. Also, *transparent* items, those with obvious correct answers, tend to be easier to fake (Furnham, 1986; Lautenschlager, 1994) and would therefore be expected to

generally increase perceived opportunity (Klein & Owens, 1965; McFarland & Ryan, 2000).

Our second proposed contextual antecedent of perceived ability to fake is perceived knowledge of job and requisite personality traits. Snell et al. (1999), as well as Levashina and Campion (2006), argued that individuals who have knowledge of the job for which they are being considered would be aware of desired behaviours for that position and therefore would be better able to appropriately fake their responses. Additionally, Snell et al. (1999); McFarland and Ryan (2000, 2006), and Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) have suggested that knowledge of the traits being measured in the personality test is likely to contribute to one’s ability to fake the corresponding items in the correct direction, and Tett and Christiansen (2007) have reviewed empirical evidence of this. Whereas the aforementioned researchers focused on *actual* knowledge of the job and requisite traits, we emphasise that, in reality, the test-takers’ *perceived* knowledge has the greatest potential to contribute to faking behaviour. To the extent that individuals believe they are in possession of relevant knowledge, their perceived ability to fake will be elevated, regardless of whether their knowledge is valid.

As described in detail earlier, our model improves upon past models of faking in three main respects. Moreover, we have tried to be more exhaustive than previous models in terms of identifying potentially relevant individual differences (e.g., broad and narrow personality traits; discussed earlier). We hope that the delineation of these factors and their proposed interrelationships (see Figure 1) will stimulate further confirmatory empirical research. Ultimately, we hope that further knowledge of the psychological process underlying faking will lead to better control of this problem within personnel selection settings.

A Decision Tree of Faking Behaviour

Whereas the aforementioned model is useful in explicating the various distinct influences on faking behaviour, we also sought to more clearly illuminate test takers’ dynamic thought processes in this context. In Figure 2, we propose a decision tree that is designed to capture the step-by-step thought process culminating either in faking a response to an item or responding honestly. This is the first such decision tree of which we are aware. We doubt that it will constitute the final word; nonetheless, we hope that it will be helpful in motivating new research and contributing to new insights regarding the decision-making process that results in faking.

The ideas behind our decision tree were derived through inferences from the literature (Robie et al., 2007, was particularly helpful), as well as our general process model (see Figure 1), and were sharpened and modified through discussions with various individuals who had recently completed preemployment tests.

For illustrative purposes, assume that Faiza, a job applicant, is responding to a personality test while applying for a nursing position, and a particular item states, “I make people feel at ease” (International Personality Item Pool, 2009). The item requires a response on a common 5-point agree–disagree scale. Question 1 (see Figure 2) requires Faiza to decide whether faking would violate her moral code. If her answer is “yes,” then honest responding is the only option—faking is not considered. Supportively, results from Robie et al. (2007) indicated that the partici-




Figure 2. Faking decision tree.

pants who chose not to fake often appeared to be adhering to a moral code, which ruled out faking from the start. In our example, Faiza decides that faking would not violate her moral code and then considers Question 2, which asks whether her response to the item would be seen as relevant to the job. Because Faiza believes that her response to an item about making others feel at ease will be seen as relevant to the job of nurse, she answers “yes,” which leads to Question 3. With regard to Question 3, assuming that Faiza honestly believes that she exhibits the behaviour referred to in the item (making people feel at ease), she will follow the “yes” path to Question 4. Now Faiza considers whether making people feel at ease would be advantageous for the job of nurse. This is distinct from Question 2, which was merely assessing whether her response to the item would be seen as relevant to the job. In the example, Faiza concludes that “yes,” the tendency to make others feel at ease, is advantageous for a nursing position, which leads her to the terminal point, “respond honestly.”

On the other hand, consider another hypothetical test taker, Lyle, who is responding to the item, “I often forget to put things back in their proper place” (International Personality Item Pool, 2009), also with a 5-point agree–disagree response scale. Lyle is taking the test as part of the selection process for an administrative assistant position. We assume that, for the same general reasons as Faiza, Lyle answers “no,” and “yes” to Questions 1 and 2. To Question 3, Lyle responds “yes,” because he considers the negative tendency described in the item to be characteristic of him. In Question 4, he then considers whether the tendency would be advantageous for the job. Lyle responds “no,” as a tendency to forget to put things back in their proper place would not be advantageous in an administrative assistant position, which requires organisation and order. Question 5 causes Lyle to consider

whether faking would result in his not being hired. If the administration of the personality test included a faking warning (described earlier) and Lyle believed that his faking would be detected and would result in an unfavourable hiring decision, he would opt to respond “yes” to Question 5.

However, we assume that there was no faking warning, or perhaps there was one but Lyle perceived it to be a ruse; either way, he answers “no” to Question 5. This leads him to the final question in the decision tree. In Question 6, Lyle considers whether he would be capable of demonstrating the desired aspect of the behaviour or tendency described in the item if he were hired into the administrative assistant position. As discovered in our conversations with test takers, and reported by Robie et al. (2007), before faking an item response, test takers tend to consider whether they could fake the desired behaviour or tendency on the job if they were hired. They also consider whether they would likely be caught in a lie to the extent that they were not able to successfully fake the desired behaviour or tendency. Considering the personality item in question, Lyle might conclude that he could successfully demonstrate the desired behaviour on the job by making an extra effort to keep things in their proper place, leading to a “yes” response to Question 6 and a decision to fake by disagreeing with the statement, “I often forget to put things back in their proper place.”

In summary, Lyle’s faking behaviour resulted from successive decisions that (a) faking would not violate his moral code; (b) his response to the item would be seen as relevant to the job; (c) the (negative) tendency to forget to put things back in their place is characteristic of him; (d) this tendency would not be advantageous for the position; (e) faking the item was unlikely to result in an unfavourable hiring decision; and (f) he could successfully dem-

onstrate the desired aspect of the behaviour (i.e., putting things back in their proper place) on the job. This decision process points to three intriguing issues regarding the control of faking.

First, although morality is sometimes mentioned in the faking literature (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000), the prevailing trend is to place faking outside the moral sphere and treat it as logical instrumental behaviour to the extent that it might lead to a favourable hiring decision (e.g., Rosse et al., 1998). However, morality is directly incorporated in our Question 1 and supported by Robie et al.'s (2007) results, as well as our own conversations with test takers. Consequently, we suggest that test-taking instructions that appeal to the test takers' moral compass (by emphasising that faking is a form of lying or cheating that violates most accepted standards of moral behaviour) might add to the success of existing faking warnings. There is some room for variation in the content of existing faking warnings (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Goffin & Rothstein, 2006; Goffin & Woods, 1995), but to the best of our knowledge they have failed to take advantage of a morality element.

Second, Question 2 of our decision tree suggests that items that engender the perception that their responses are relevant to the job will be processed more thoroughly by test takers. Conversely, we suggest in Figure 2 that items with responses that are perceived to be clearly irrelevant to the job (see the "no" path from Question 2) will not be the subject of much thought, because an honest or distorted response is perceived as unlikely to affect the hiring decision. One might infer from this that the use of "disguised" personality items that are generally perceived to be job irrelevant, even though in reality they are relevant, would be a useful way to reduce faking. However, past research suggests that the use of disguised items does not tend to be helpful in "fake good" conditions (Holden & Jackson, 1985), because they generally suffer from lower construct validity. Moreover, there is evidence that adding a work-related frame of reference to the wording of a personality item, thereby making it clearer that the response is job-relevant, may tend to increase validity (Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995). Thus, we do not recommend the use of disguised items as a way of reducing faking.

Third, consideration of Questions 5 and 6 in tandem highlights the fact that test takers worry not only about the immediate possible consequence of faking (i.e., failing to get hired because faking might be detected; Question 5) but also about the long-term consequences. The likelihood that test takers are concerned with the immediate consequences of faking has been well established in research on the faking warning. When warned that faking, if detected, could negatively affect the hiring decision, test takers seem to fake less (see Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). However, as supported by Robie et al.'s (2007) results and our conversations with test takers, Question 6 draws attention to test takers' concerns about whether their faked responses will come back to haunt them on the job. This highlights another avenue for possible enhancement of the faking warning. In addition to including a morality element (described earlier) and mentioning possible adverse effects of faking on hiring decisions, faking warnings could emphasise to test takers that if they fake their test responses, for example, by indicating a tendency to be a "natural leader," they might very well be unable to live up to expectations in their new job. As a result, they may be setting themselves up for failure on the job if their faking is not detected and they end up being hired. Furthermore, if it conforms to ethical standards, it might be possible to develop a system whereby employees whose on-the-job performance dramatically belies their personality

test responses, can be identified. Thus, the person who consistently fakes a tendency to spontaneously and effectively assume leadership roles in his or her test responses, then consistently shrinks from leadership roles when hired, might eventually be challenged regarding the honesty of his or her test responses. To the extent that such a practise is feasible and ethical, it could also be forewarned of as an enhancement to the faking warning. The fact that test takers to whom we have spoken, and those surveyed in Robie et al. (2007), have shown genuine concern about being found out in this way suggests that such an addition to the faking warning has real potential.

It is appropriate to point out the limitations of our decision tree. First, we do not have conclusive evidence that the succession of decisions delineated in Figure 2 is normative. Aside from Robie et al.'s (2007) work and our own inferences, there appears to be a general lack of empirical research along these lines. In terms of specific future research directions, we are sanguine that interviewing test takers who have been involved in preemployment personality assessment is a key source of information that will contribute to further knowledge regarding the decision-making processes involved in faking. Moreover, elements of the decision process gleaned from such interviews and from Figure 2 should be tested empirically, using experimental methods where appropriate. Nonetheless, in the empirical literature that deals with faking as it occurs in fairly realistic personnel selection scenarios, there is a general tendency for faked responses to pre hiring personality tests to take longer than honest responses (Holden, 1998; Robie et al., 2000; Robie et al., 2007). Similarly, there is a tendency for fakers in these scenarios to go through a more elaborate decision process than do honest responders (Robie et al., 2007), to the point where such faking can best be described as "nuanced" (Sackett & Lievens, 2008, p. 426). Our decision tree is consistent with these findings—the decision to fake is portrayed as entailing more processing (i.e., more decisions) than do most of the respond-honestly points on the tree.

A second limitation is that our decision tree represents faking as a simple "fake my response"/"respond honestly" dichotomy. In reality, faking is likely to occur on a continuum. Figure 2 does not predict whether individuals will choose to severely distort their responses by choosing an extreme response or choose to only slightly distort their responses by choosing a less extreme, but still dishonest, response. A more elaborate decision tree, involving 5-point agree-disagree responses to the six questions rather than yes-no answers, might aid in predicting the degree of faking that occurs. However, we intend for Figure 2 to be used as a heuristic device that facilitates research on understanding and controlling faking, rather than as a method of predicting the actual extent of faking. We believe that the unwieldiness of a decision tree with five paths from each question would detract from its value as a heuristic device.

Summary and Conclusions

Our review of the literature and consideration of the psychological processes that may underlie faking behaviour in preemployment personality assessments leads us to the following:

1. Personality tests can have substantial criterion validity in personnel selection applications when applied optimally.
2. Ideal application of personality assessment includes matching the traits to the nature of the job and measuring

traits precisely (i.e., narrowly) enough so that accurate matching can occur.

3. The value of personality assessment in personnel selection stems from its tendency to predict the choice to perform, or will-do, aspects of job performance, whereas most other common selection methods predict the capacity to perform, or can-do, aspects of job performance.
4. Faking does not undo the usefulness of personality testing. However, if more were known about the psychological processes underlying faking, the value of personality testing could be magnified.
5. The few extant models of the process underlying faking leave room for improvement. Common problems include conceptualization of faking with respect to the entire test rather than a focus on dynamic item-level faking, and consideration of the ability to fake as an objective attribute rather than a subjective evaluation by the test taker.
6. A revised general model of the faking process, which takes the aforementioned problems into account, is proposed here and may have value in stimulating productive research.
7. To further illuminate test takers' dynamic thought processes as they consider whether to fake or not, a unique faking decision tree is proposed here. Implications for the improved control of faking and suggestions for future research are extrapolated from the decision tree. The decision tree is consistent with the evolving perspective that faking has no "absolute" meaning because it reflects a complex process with multiple contextual and dispositional determinants and is, itself, likely to be multidimensional (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Paulhus, 2002; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006).

Résumé

Les tests de personnalité constituent un outil d'évaluation pré-embauche particulièrement valable lorsque les traits de personnalité sont liés aux exigences d'un emploi. Les auteurs expliquent que, contrairement à la plupart des autres méthodes de sélection de personnel, la valeur unique des tests de personnalité dans la sélection de personnel repose sur leur capacité à prédire la volonté de performer ou les aspects « exécution » de la performance au travail. L'effet de la désirabilité sociale sur la valeur des tests de personnalité est discuté et les auteurs avancent que la contribution des tests de personnalité à la sélection de personnel pourrait être optimisée si les processus psychologiques sous-tendant les comportements de désirabilité des postulants étaient mieux connus. À cette fin, les auteurs présentent un modèle général amélioré du processus de désirabilité sociale du postulant ainsi qu'un nouvel « arbre décisionnel de la désirabilité sociale ».

Mots-clés : personnalité, sélection de personnel, désirabilité sociale, modèles, déception

References

- Christiansen, N. D., Burns, G. N., & Montgomery, G. E. (2005). Reconsidering forced-choice item format for applicant personality assessment. *Human Performance, 18*, 267–307.
- Christiansen, N. D., Goffin, R. D., Johnston, N. G., & Rothstein, M. G. (1994). Correcting the Sixteen Personality Factors test for faking: Effects on criterion-related validity and individual hiring decisions. *Personnel Psychology, 47*, 847–860.
- Costa, P. T. & McCrae, R. R. (1992). *NEO PI-R professional manual*. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.
- Day, D. V., & Silverman, S. B. (1989). Personality and job performance: Evidence of incremental validity. *Personnel Psychology, 42*, 25–36.
- Donovan, J. J., Dwight, S. A., & Hurtz, G. M. (2003). An assessment of the prevalence, severity, and verifiability of entry-level applicant faking using the randomized response technique. *Human Performance, 16*, 81–106.
- Dwight, S. A., & Donovan, J. J. (2003). Do warnings not to fake reduce faking? *Human Performance, 16*, 1–23.
- Furnham, A. (1986). Response bias, social desirability and dissimulation. *Personality and Individual Differences, 7*, 385–406.
- Goffin, R. D., & Anderson, D. W. (2007). The self-rater's personality and self-other disagreement in multi-source performance ratings: Is disagreement healthy? *Journal of Managerial Psychology, 22*, 271–289.
- Goffin, R. D., & Christiansen, N. D. (2003). Correcting personality tests for faking: A Review of popular personality tests and an initial survey of researchers. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 11*, 340–344.
- Goffin, R. D., Rothstein, M. G., & Johnston, N. G. (1996). Personality testing and the assessment center: Incremental validity for managerial selection. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 81*, 746–756.
- Goffin, R. D., Rothstein, M. G., Reider, M. J., Poole, A., Krajewski, H. T., Powell, D. M., Jelley, R. B., Boyd, A., & Mestdagh, T. (2009). *Choosing job-related personality traits: Criterion-related evidence of validity*. Paper accepted for presentation at the 117th Annual Conference of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
- Goffin, R. D., & Woods, D. M. (1995). Using personality testing for personnel selection: Faking and test-taking inductions. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 3*, 227–236.
- Griffith, R. L., & Peterson, M. H. (2006). *A closer examination of applicant faking*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.
- Holden, R. R. (1998). Detecting fakers on a personnel test: Response latencies versus a standard validity scale. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 13*, 387–398.
- Holden, R. R., & Jackson, D. N. (1985). Disguise and the structured self-report assessment of psychopathology: I. An analogue investigation. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 53*, 211–222.
- Hough, L. M., & Oswald, F. L. (2008). Personality testing and industrial-organizational psychology: Reflections, progress, and prospects. *Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 1*, 272–290.
- International Personality Item Pool. (2009). A scientific collaboratory for the development of advanced measures of personality traits and other individual differences. Available online at <http://ipip.ori.org>
- Jackson, D. N. (1994). *Jackson personality inventory—Revised*. Port Huron, MI: Sigma Assessment Systems.
- Jackson, D. N. (1999). *Personality research form*. Port Huron, MI: Sigma Assessment Systems.
- Klein, S. P., & Owens, W. A. Jr. (1965). Faking of a scored life history blank as a function of criterion objectivity. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 49*, 452–454.
- Landy, F. J., & Conte, J. M. (2004). *Work in the 21st century*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Lautenschlager, G. J. (1994). Accuracy and faking of background data. In G. S. Stokes, D. Mumford, & W. A. Owens (Eds.), *Biodata handbook* (pp. 391–419). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

- Levashina, J., & Campion, M. A. (2006). A model of faking likelihood in the employment interview. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, 14, 299–316.
- Luther, N. J., & Thornton, G. C. III. (1999). Does faking on employment tests matter? *Employment Testing Law and Policy Reporter*, 8, 129–136.
- Marcus, B., Goffin, R. D., Johnston, N. G., & Rothstein, M. G. (2007). Personality and cognitive ability as predictors of typical and maximum managerial performance. *Human Performance*, 20, 275–285.
- McFarland, L. A., & Ryan, A. M. (2000). Variance in faking across noncognitive measures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 85, 812–821.
- McFarland, L. A., & Ryan, A. M. (2006). Toward an integrated model of applicant faking behavior. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 36, 979–1016.
- McManus, M. A., & Kelly, M. L. (1999). Personality measures and biodata: Evidence regarding their incremental predictive value in the life insurance industry. *Personnel Psychology*, 52, 137–148.
- Morgeson, F. P., Campion, M. A., Dipboye, R. L., Hollenbeck, J. R., Murphy, K., & Schmitt, N. (2007). Reconsidering the use of personality tests in personnel selection contexts. *Personnel Psychology*, 60, 683–729.
- Mueller-Hanson, R. A., Heggstad, E. D., & Thornton, G. C. III (2006). Individual differences in impression management: An exploration of the psychological processes underlying faking. *Psychology Science*, 48, 288–312.
- Murphy, K. R. (1989). Is the relationship between cognitive ability and job performance stable over time? *Human Performance*, 2, 183–200.
- Ones, D. S., Dilchert, S., Viswesvaran, C., & Judge, T. A. (2007). In support of personality assessment in organizational settings. *Personnel Psychology*, 60, 995–1027.
- Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C., & Schmidt, F. L. (1993). Comprehensive meta-analysis of integrity test validities: Findings and implications for personnel selection and theories of job performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78, 679–703.
- Paulhus, D. L. (2002). Socially desirable responding: The evolution of a construct. In H. Braun, D. N. Jackson, & D. E. Wiley (Eds.), *The role of constructs in psychological and educational measurement* (pp. 67–88). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 36, 556–563.
- Putka, D. J., & McCloy, R. A. (2004). Preliminary AIM validation based on GED Plus program data. In D. J. Knapp, E. D. Heggstad, & M. C. Young (Eds.), *Understanding and improving the assessment of individual motivation (AIM) in the Army's GED Plus program* (pp. 3–19–3–30). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
- Raymark, P. H., Schmit, M. J., & Guion, R. M. (1997). Identifying potentially useful personality constructs for employee selection. *Personnel Psychology*, 50, 723–736.
- Riggio, R. E., Tucker, J., & Throckmorton, B. (1987). Social skills and deceptive ability. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 13, 568–577.
- Robie, C., Brown, D. J., & Beaty, J. C. (2007). Do people fake on personality inventories? A verbal protocol analysis. *Journal of Business Psychology*, 21, 489–509.
- Robie, C., Curtin, P. J., Foster, T. C., Phillips, H. L. IV, Zbylut, M., & Tetrick, L. E. (2000). The effect of coaching on the utility of response latencies in detecting fakers on a personality measure. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*, 32, 226–233.
- Rosse, J. G., Stecher, M. D., Miller, J. L., Levin, R. A. (1998). The impact of response distortion on preemployment personality testing and hiring decisions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 83, 634–644.
- Rothstein, M. G., & Goffin, R. D. (2000). The assessment of personality constructs in industrial–organizational psychology. In R. D. Goffin & E. Helmes (Eds.), *Problems and solutions in human assessment: Honoring Douglas N. Jackson at seventy* (pp. 215–248). Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic.
- Rothstein, M. G., & Goffin, R. D. (2006). The use of personality measures in personnel selection: What does current research support? *Human Resource Management Review*, 16, 155–180.
- Sackett, P. R., & Lievens, F. (2008). Personnel selection. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 59, 419–450.
- Sackett, P. R., & Wanek, J. E. (1996). New developments in the use of measures of honesty, integrity, conscientiousness, dependability, trustworthiness, and reliability for personnel selection. *Personnel Psychology*, 49, 787–829.
- Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998). The validity and utility of selection methods in personnel psychology: Practical and theoretical implications of 85 years of research findings. *Psychological Bulletin*, 124, 262–274.
- Schmit, M. J., Ryan, A. M., Stierwalt, S. L., & Powell, A. B. (1995). Frame-of-reference effects on personality scale scores and criterion-related validity. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 80, 607–620.
- Snell, A. F., Sydell, E. J., & Lueke, S. B. (1999). Towards a theory of applicant faking: Integrating studies of deception. *Human Resource Management Review*, 9, 219–242.
- Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behaviour. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 30, 526–537.
- Tett, R. P., & Christiansen, N. D. (2007). Personality tests at the crossroads: A response to Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, and Schmitt (2007). *Personnel Psychology*, 60, 967–993.
- Tett, R. P., Jackson, D. N., & Rothstein, M. G. (1991). Personality measures as predictors of job performance: A meta-analytic review. *Personnel Psychology*, 44, 703–742.
- Tett, R. P., Jackson, D. N., Rothstein, M. G., & Reddon, J. R. (1999). Meta-analysis of bidirectional relations in personality–job performance research. *Human Performance*, 12, 1–29.
- Vasilopoulos, N. L., Cucina, J. M., & McElreath, J. M. (2005). Do warnings of response verification moderate the relationship between personality and cognitive ability? *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 90, 306–322.
- White, L. A., Young, M. C., & Rumsey, M. G. (2001). ABLE implementation issues and related research. In J. P. Campbell & D. J. Knapp (Eds.), *Exploring the limits of personnel selection and classification* (pp. 525–558). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Wood, R. E., & Bandura, A. (1989). Impact of conceptions, of ability of self-regulatory mechanisms, and complex decision making. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56, 407–415.
- Zaff, J. F., & Hair, E. C. (2003). Positive development of the self: Self-concept, self-esteem, and identity. In M. H. Bornstein, L. Davidson, C. L. Keyes, & K. A. Moore (Eds.), *Well-being: Positive development across the life course* (pp. 235–251). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Zickar, M. J., & Robie, C. (1999). Modeling faking good on personality items: An item-level analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 84, 551–563.

Received January 31, 2009

Revision received March 23, 2009

Accepted March 23, 2009 ■