

I

Husserl's Phenomenological Method

Klaus Held

Translated by Lanei Rodemeyer

1. Husserl's Phenomenology Today

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) was the founder of one of the major current movements in philosophy, phenomenology. It was especially significant for German philosophy during the first decades of the twentieth century and for French philosophy during the middle of the twentieth century. Fundamental philosophical works of our time, such as Max Scheler's *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values* (1913/16), Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927), Jean-Paul Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (1943), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) are programmatically considered phenomenological investigations.

Several phenomenological goals have been influential in other philosophies and academic areas not based in phenomenology, such as literary criticism or the social sciences, but especially in psychology. Today the influence of phenomenology extends well beyond the reaches of the German- and French-speaking world; here we must point first to Latin America and Japan. But phenomenological ideas are also being discussed within the realm of Yugoslavia's unorthodox Marxism, in Czechoslovakia and Poland, in Italy, and increasingly in the area of Anglo-American thought, where at first a broad Husserlian influence was absent. Thus we could speak justifiably of a "worldwide phenomenological movement."

Experts consider Edmund Husserl, who launched this movement, to be one of the classical philosophers of the twentieth century. But little more than Husserl's name is known by the average person interested in philosophy—even in Germany. There is one main reason for this: Husserlian phenomenology may easily constitute the most important presupposition for the important early works of Heidegger and Sartre (mentioned above), but because Husserl was Jewish, his later writings could no longer appear in the Third Reich. Thus continued analysis of Husserl's thought was interrupted, whereas in the 1950s and 1960s, Heidegger and Sartre were again discussed intensely—both inside and outside of the German university.

The silence with regard to Husserl in Germany's "period of economic

miracles" remains a disgraceful posthumous triumph of National Socialism, even if we must concede two things. First, from the beginning, the dry diction of Husserl, the "armchair philosopher," hardly offered as much for public debate as the handy formulations offered by existentialism. Second, the complete edition of Husserl's writings, which have been historically critically edited since 1950, unfortunately did not appear in Germany.¹

In the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s, one heard even less mention of Husserlian phenomenology, as interests returned strongly to Heidegger's later philosophy, to existentialism, and to Gadamer's hermeneutics (which also shared important goals with phenomenology). In addition, "Critical Theory" in the Frankfurt School, linguistic analysis following the later Wittgenstein, so-called French structuralism, and academic theory and history appeared with alternating intensity in the foreground of not only professional but also public interests. The name Husserl has only resurfaced more frequently in recent decades—even in discussions outside of the university—because the main concept of his unfinished later philosophy, the "life-world,"² increasingly draws attention.

2. Life and Work

There is nothing "spectacular" to tell about the inconspicuous scholarly life of Edmund Husserl. He was born on 8 April 1859, in Prossnitz in Moravia. From 1876 until 1882 he studied mathematics and philosophy, first in Leipzig and then in Berlin. His graduation in mathematics, in the winter semester of 1882–83, was followed closely by in-depth philosophical study under Franz Brentano in Vienna. In Halle, Husserl graduated with his habilitation, entitled "On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses." He remained there to teach as a university instructor from 1887 to 1901. In 1900–1901 Husserl published his first main work, *Logical Investigations* (in two volumes), with which he established his phenomenology. Because of this work, he was called to take a position as associate professor in Göttingen. He was only made full professor there when he was forty-seven, in 1906. Then from 1916 until he retired in 1928—to be succeeded by Martin Heidegger—Husserl was chair of philosophy at Freiburg in Breisgau. He died there on 27 April 1938.³

A circle of friends and students already formed around Husserl when he was in Göttingen, called the "Göttingen School" of Phenomenology. The School was soon joined by a philosophical movement native to Munich. Together with two Munich philosophers, Moritz Geiger and Alexander Pfänder, as well as his student from Göttingen Adolf Reinach (who later fell in World War I) and Max Scheler (who was then lecturing in Berlin), Husserl founded his *Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* in 1913, which became a reservoir of works in phenomenological research. In this yearbook appeared not only the above-mentioned works of Scheler and Heidegger, but also other outstanding philosophical works up through the 1930s. Edith Stein was one of

the names that remain even if we must concede two things. First, from the beginning, the dry diction of Husserl, the "armchair philosopher," hardly offered as much for public debate as the handy formulations offered by existentialism. Second, the complete edition of Husserl's writings, which have been historically critically edited since 1950, unfortunately did not appear in Germany.¹ became known as the *Husserliana* and Aron Gurwicz and States after the Second World War. Husserl started to publish *Logical Investigations* in 1900–1901. With *Logical Investigations* which his companions returned later to the thought of the earlier period and thought in his Freiburg. Once again, a long works of his to appear made up of parts of his Edith Stein, the new *Consciousness*. In 1928 Husserl presented at the *Phenomenology of the Mind and Transcendental* he had presented at the phenomenology: these *Meditations*. The German *Husserliana* edition the *Husserliana* edition side of Germany—one a new introduction to *Transcendental Phenomenology* as volume 6 of the *Husserliana* together by Husserl's able to appear outside of worked on and published. Excluding *Logical Investigations* and *Inner Time-Consciousness*, Husserl's lifetime, a works, one of them not concentrate on such cal analyses. Husserl was ingly from 1890 to 1938. in Gabelsberger stenography devotion to the subject

the names that became especially well known, although also known independently of the *Yearbook*; she was Husserl's first assistant, a Jew who converted to the Catholic church, later became a Carmelite, and eventually died in a concentration camp. Other famous names include Roman Ingarden, an influential Polish philosopher; Jan Patocka, a noted Czechoslovakian philosopher who later became known as the speaker of the human rights declaration "Charta 77"; and Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schütz, both of whom lectured in the United States after the Second World War.

Husserl started off his yearbook with a programmatic work, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, which was supposed to come out in three volumes, but of which only the first was published during his lifetime.

With *Ideas I*, which was his second main work—published thirteen years after *Logical Investigations*—Husserl took a turn in his phenomenology, one which his companions in Göttingen and Munich could not accept. We will return later to the old and new forms of phenomenology: the "study of essence" of the earlier period and the transcendental-philosophical stamp of Husserlian thought in his Freiburg period.

Once again, a long time passed before Husserl allowed more important works of his to appear. In 1928 he prevailed upon Heidegger to publish a text made up of parts of old lectures and research manuscripts, put together by Edith Stein, the now renowned *Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness*. In 1929 Husserl himself published a new introductory text, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. He then expanded two longer lectures, which he had presented at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1929, into an introduction to phenomenology; these appeared in French in 1931 under the title *Cartesian Meditations*. The German version was not published until 1950, as volume 1 of the *Husserliana* edition. Finally, in 1936 Husserl was able to publish—only outside of Germany—one more part of his last work, which was once again to be a new introduction to phenomenology: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. The completed work did not appear until 1954, as volume 6 of the *Husserliana*. An arrangement of research manuscripts, put together by Husserl's former assistant Ludwig Landgrebe, was likewise only able to appear outside of Germany; under assignment from Husserl, Landgrebe worked on and published *Experience and Judgment* in 1938.

Excluding *Logical Investigations* and *Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness*, only programmatic introductory texts appeared during Husserl's lifetime, and these—as mentioned—were sometimes unfinished works, one of them not even in German. Husserl's actual work, however, did not concentrate on such introductions, but rather on concrete phenomenological analyses. Husserl wrote as he was thinking. Day after day, working untiringly from 1890 to 1938, he filled around 45,000 pages with his analyses, written in Gabelsberger stenography. Neither his creative power nor his unconditional devotion to the subject were broken, even when the Nazis forbade him to set

foot in the university. After Husserl's death, the danger arose that his research manuscripts, the actual product of his life's work, might fall into the hands of the Nazis. A Belgian Franciscan monk, Hermann Leo Van Breda, rescued Husserl's posthumous work in a daring move before it could be seized by the National Socialists.⁴ In 1939 Van Breda founded a Husserl-Archive at the University of Leuven in Belgium. Since 1950, working together with another Husserl-Archive founded later at the University of Cologne, the Leuven archive has been publishing the aforementioned *Husserliana* edition. This historical and critical complete edition includes those works already published by Husserl himself or which he intended to publish, his most important unpublished course lectures, presentations, and essays, and—as appendices or as individual volumes—thematically grouped selections from Husserl's research manuscripts.

One cannot penetrate Husserl's world and thinking without effort. For this reason, the reader might welcome some guidance. Husserl's *Encyclopedia Britannica* article is recommended for those who seek a short and easily readable conception of phenomenology from his own pen. His foundational introduction to phenomenology in *Ideas I*, "The Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook," goes a bit deeper. His text on perception in his writings on "passive synthesis" contains a short outline of an especially typical concrete phenomenological analysis, although his most famous detailed analyses can be found in his texts on "inner time-consciousness" and "intersubjectivity." Finally, certain later texts offer access to Husserl's problematic of the "life-world," which we mentioned earlier.

Those who wish to study Husserl more intensely, beyond these recommended selections, should first read Husserl's main programmatic introductory works from 1913, 1931, and 1936: *Ideas I*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and *Crisis*. Husserl's two lectures from 1907 and 1925 (*Husserliana*, volumes 2 and 9) are also appropriate introductions. One piece that Husserl wrote in 1911, *Philosophy as a Strict Science*, is characteristic of the pathos evident when phenomenology was just beginning; Husserl caused quite a sensation with this work, and its title became a controversial phrase in twentieth-century philosophy. The lecture *First Philosophy*, from 1923–24, is especially informative for a more intensive struggle with the fundamental problematic of transcendental phenomenology. If one wishes to study more concrete analyses, then, aside from the texts already mentioned, the second volume of *Logical Investigations* is indispensable. The following *Husserliana* volumes contain other analyses of issues that, relatively speaking, are fairly approachable: the second book of *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (volume 4); *Thing and Space* (volume 16, from a lecture course in 1907); *Analyses to a Passive Synthesis* (volume 9, from texts written between 1918 and 1926); and the first text ("Fantasy and Image-Consciousness") in *Fantasy, Image-Consciousness, Recollection* (volume 23, from a lecture course in 1904–5). In addition, I should include the aforementioned joint work from Husserl and Landgrebe, *Experience and Judgment*.

The title "The
phenomenology of
a new philosophical
science, that leads to
designated through
in his aforementioned
Husserl turns again
the last century, the
so doing, he fights
rationalism," the idea
write its own history
though, Husserl did
as certain influential
He also did not mean
natural sciences.

Husserl's actual
in no way a new idea
has wanted to distin
Plato originally form
of *doxa*, opinion. O
certain vacillations w
True knowledge sho
tions, and in this sen
we just have an opin
example, when some
think that the Pytha
point of view could b
actually carrying out
refers through its m
proved, fulfilled, con
matter at hand, whic
through opinions.

In this respect, we
selves into specific ex
necessary to the matte
edge requires first of a
edge must be independ
to determine true kno
with a certain tension
ting close to the matt

3. The Basic Problematic of Phenomenology

The title "The Phenomenological Method" reveals the motif for which phenomenology originally became famous. Husserl's primary demand was for a new philosophical method. By "philosophical method" we mean a way, a procedure, that leads to a recognition of truth. The way to such a recognition is designated through its goal, and Husserl formulates this goal programmatically in his aforementioned paper from 1911, *Philosophy as a Strict Science*. Here Husserl turns against the conception of philosophy disseminated at the turn of the last century, that philosophy is not a science but rather a "worldview." In so doing, he fights against the relegation of philosophy to philosophical "historicism," the idea that the only task basically remaining for philosophy is to write its own history. By rehabilitating the scientific character of philosophy, though, Husserl did not intend that philosophy be reduced to scientific theory, as certain influential schools wished during his lifetime—and wish again today. He also did not mean for philosophy to conform to the methods of the modern natural sciences.

Husserl's actual goal was for a radically unprejudiced knowledge, which was in no way a new ideal for philosophy. By freeing itself of prejudice, philosophy has wanted to distinguish itself from simple opinion since ancient times. As Plato originally formulated it: *epistēmē*, true knowledge, should take the place of *doxa*, opinion. Opinion falls short of true knowledge in two ways. First, certain vacillations which are "due to the situation" always underlie opinions. True knowledge should be free from subjective biases in changing lived situations, and in this sense, it should be "objective" and lasting. Second, whenever we just have an opinion, we are making an unfulfilled knowledge claim. For example, when someone says, "I think it is too hot in Italy in August," or "I think that the Pythagorean theorem is provable," that person is saying, My point of view could be verified by my driving to Italy in the summer, or by my actually carrying out the proof of the theorem. In this way, simple opinion refers through its meaning to situations in which what is meant would be proved, fulfilled, confirmed. Such situations bring us close to the issue or the matter at hand, which is only given to us "from a distance," so to speak, through opinions.

In this respect, we carry opinion over into true knowledge by moving ourselves into specific experiences or general events that bring us as close as is necessary to the matter at hand. As we pointed out above, however, true knowledge requires first of all that it be lasting and objective—meaning that knowledge must be independent of its respective lived situations. Thus, when we want to determine true knowledge by distinguishing it from opinion, we are faced with a certain tension between the requirement of objectivity and that of getting close to the matter at hand. We could basically say that this tension is

unleashed by Husserl's philosophy, and yet at the same time, it is held in suspense. Husserl strove for an unprejudiced "strict science" where this tension would not be dissolved by simply choosing one side or the other.

The claim that one must be close to the matter at hand takes precedence over the call for objectivity in one way: I can only talk about an issue—whether it is objective or just my opinion—because I assume that, in principle, I can realize the possibility of experiencing it through some kind of closeness, which is to say, through "intuition" or "bodily." Without this possibility, I would not know about the issue at all; it would not even exist for me. So in every situation, I know that whatever I encounter in my experiences or thoughts refers to situations in which the experienced event or thought originally—Husserl says, "originarily"—arose or could appear within the compass of my experiences and thinking. However an issue may appear, each appearance of something relates back or ahead to its *being originarily given* for me, and, in the last analysis, it obtains its sensible content from that originary moment.

In the situation of an originary appearance, I take up the relation to the issue; it appears *for me* as something experienceable, livable, or knowable on the world's stage. In this sense, as Husserl says, everything that appears originarily has the character of being *subject-relative*; in other words, an object can appear only when it presents itself to a subject in a specific situation. On the other hand, objective knowledge requires that it not be bound to changing subjective situations; that which is objectively known cannot just be subjectively relative—"for me"—rather, it must be "in itself," that is, it must exist independently of a relation to subjects and their situated experiences. But since every experience and thought is based upon situations of originary appearance, then even the knowledge of objects—no matter how "in itself" an object may seem—presupposes subjectively situated types of originary givenness.

At this point we can already recognize the philosophical question, arising out of these considerations, which reveals the inner beginnings of Husserl's philosophizing: how are the *manners of givenness* of objects, in which we comprehend them as things in themselves, that is, as objectively existing, connected back to originary, subject-relative manners of givenness? A correspondence, a correlation, whose concrete character depends upon the type of object in play, exists between the in-itself-ness of objects and their subjective, situated manners of givenness. Sticking to the above examples: a country's climate is given originarily to me in a completely different way than the content of a mathematical theorem, and the originary ways that these two issues appear are not interchangeable.

The two sides of this correlation are inextricable from one another: the object-in-the-How-of-its-givenness—the "*noema*" as Husserl says in *Ideas I*—corresponds to the *noesis*,⁵ the accompanying manifold of actualized experiences and knowledge through which a specific type of object originarily appears to me, and only can appear to me; I cannot, as it were, push this manifold aside and then look at the object. This correspondence between type of object and

manner of givenness can be formulated in the *How of its givenness* the "phenomenon" from which is nothing other than the only in such a way and as subjectively.

That the originary subjectivity of Husserl's thinking is based upon his life's

The fact that the general as the able truth is connectedness of the world of aroused in of "transcendental" it was resolved here only its own philosophical scientific that each

And in one aspect of the conceptual for

The first level of experience through the life's world prior to

That which the issue," of the tradition as call it evident implies this idea of givenness upon the originary Without insinuating its closeness philosophical thought such conceptual based on evidence

manner of givenness is a rule that can be formulated "*a priori*," meaning it can be formulated with unconditional universality, before any experience. *The objects in the How of their appearances* with their associated manners of givenness are the "phenomena," the "appearances," that "phenomenology" deals with, and from which it obtained its name. In the Husserlian sense, phenomena are nothing other than the existing things which are "in themselves" in the world, but only in such a way that they show themselves in their respective situatedness and as subjectively "for-me."

That the question regarding the *correlation* between objective thing and originary subjective manner of givenness shaped the inner beginning of Husserl's thinking is confirmed at one point in the *Crisis*, where Husserl reflects upon his life's work:

The fact naively taken for granted, that we see each thing and the world in general as they appear to us, concealed, as we recognize, a great horizon of remarkable truths which never entered, in their uniqueness and in their systematic connectedness, into the purview of philosophy. The correlation of the world (the world of which we always speak) and subjective manners of givenness never aroused in philosophy a philosophical awe (that is, before the first breakthrough of "transcendental phenomenology" in the *Logical Investigations*), even though it was resoundingly present in pre-Socratic philosophy and sophistry—although here only as a motive for skeptical argumentation. This correlation never aroused its own philosophical interest that might have made it the topic of an appropriate scientific attitude. We remained trapped in what was taken for granted, that is, that each thing appears differently for each person.⁶

And in one annotation, Husserl uses a tone of personal confession that is exceptional for him:

The first breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between an object of experience and its manners of givenness (about 1898, while I was working through my *Logical Investigations*) shook me so deeply that, since then, my entire life's work has been dominated by the task of systematically working out this a priori of correlation.⁷

That which we have called "closeness to the matter at hand," "closeness to the issue," or *originarity* has been known for a long time in the philosophical tradition as a foundation or norm of philosophical knowledge: philosophers call it evidence. Husserl takes up this concept because he also consistently applies this idea—that of referring each world-experience to originary manners of givenness—to philosophical knowledge itself. Even phenomenology draws upon the original "bodily" appearance of that about which it makes claims. Without insight ("*intuitio*," "intuition"), which "makes things clear" through its closeness to the matter at hand and thus its factuality ("evidence"), philosophical thought remains an empty reasoning and construing. Husserl contrasts such conceptual play with phenomenological representation, with description based on evidence. Kant's observation is still always valid: "Concepts without

devoted primarily to the critique of *psychologism*, an approach that, at that time, had widely dominated philosophy. Husserl had himself still tended toward this position in his habilitation work, "On the Concept of Number." In fact, his subtitle was characteristic of this approach: "Psychological Analyses." More than anything else, the critique of the mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege gave Husserl the impetus to develop his ideas, which in turn led to his classical refutation of psychologism in the *Prolegomena*. Psychologism had many faces, but in view of the main problem of Husserlian thought, which we just mentioned above, we can say here that the basic tendency of psychologism consisted in dissolving the tension in understanding truth one-sidedly in favor of subjectively situated achievements.

Husserl's focus in the *Logical Investigations* was laying the foundation of logic as a normative "scientific teaching"—today we would say "scientific theory"—because, for him, logic was fundamental for scientific knowledge in general. True knowledge shows itself to be independent of situations, especially in the "objectively valid" logical structures that establish thinking and, further, in "objectively valid" norms of all other types that guide human activity. Such norms are universal laws. But where is the "place" that universals exist, especially the laws of logic? We can make these laws an object of our thought, but do they possess an independent being over against that thinking? Psychologism answers no. According to this position, logical laws are nothing more than a natural regulation of the psychic processes we call "thinking"—just like there are laws of nature for processes in the material world.

Husserl refuted this conception in the *Prolegomena* so convincingly that psychologism could then simply be filed away into the archives of the history of philosophy. Today we consider the untenability of psychologism self-evident because of Husserl's reasoning, but the fact that this refutation was actually (at that time) in no way self-evident can already be seen in the large number of authors with which Husserl takes issue. Indeed, his text includes numerous annotations referring to these authors.

Husserl, originally a mathematician, explains the untenable consequences of psychologism as applied to the laws of thought through a comparison with the functioning of a calculator¹¹ (which today has been superseded by the computer). The mechanics of a calculator—or the electronics of a computer (i.e., hardware)—follows a completely different set of laws (namely, physical laws) than the chains of symbols that one calculates with the machine (i.e., software). Psychologism cannot explain this difference. It replaces the question about the right kind of thinking with what is essentially a scientific, empirical description of thought processes—for example (in the terms of today's clinical psychology), the structure of the neuro-physiological circuits in our brain.

Basically, a double meaning of the concept of "thought" is sacrificed by psychologism. Thought is the universality of the standardizing logical laws in our thinking; that is, "thought" is understood as that which we think when we carry out our thinking. But we can also understand "thought" to mean the

transcendental Logic, in which he looks back and interprets his own earlier thinking, but also already in the fifth and the sixth of his *Logical Investigations*, his position becoming finally clear in his *Ideas* of 1913. Husserl, too, wanted to go "to the things themselves." "The things themselves," though, only appear originarily in the subjective processes or achievements of intuitive self-givenness. These achievements take place in human consciousness. Thus, in the first decade of this century, *consciousness* had already become the field of research in Husserlian phenomenology, but this program was only announced explicitly in his 1913 *Ideas*.

5. Phenomenology as a Study of Essence¹²

What protects phenomenology—which understands itself as an exploration of consciousness—from falling back into psychologism? Here we must first mention one of Husserl's central concepts: the intentionality of consciousness.

Husserl first discovered the philosophical implications of the *a priori* of correlation when he considered theoretical judgment; at the time, he was concerned with laying the groundwork for logic in his *Logical Investigations*. He never completely lost sight of this more philosophical problematic, and, in 1929, he explicitly took it up again in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Already in the first decade of this century, though, he had extended his investigation of correlation to all experiential consciousness. Everything that we can talk about sensibly must be accessible to us in some specific kind of originary givenness. Not only in the case of theoretical knowing, but also in the case of all "acts"—in perceiving, feeling, desiring, aspiring, loving, believing, practical appraising, etc.—that toward which we refer (with the respective activities of consciousness) appears either "bodily intuited" for us (in the manner of "self-givenness") or in such a way that consciousness must be dependent upon or referred to such "fulfillment" or "verification," even though it is not actually realized at that moment.

In this sense, consciousness, in all its variety, is concerned with an "object" in the broadest sense of the word: a pole toward which certain activities of consciousness refer. To every perceiving there is something perceived, to every thinking something thought, to every loving something loved; every act has something as its focus. Husserl was able to latch this onto the theory of intentionality developed by his mentor in philosophy, Franz Brentano—who himself recovered a scholastic idea. Consciousness is "intentional," which means that, in every one of its acts, consciousness is *consciousness-of-something*.

The coinage "Consciousness is consciousness-of-something" has become, since Husserl, commonplace in philosophy. Put this way, it neither contains anything new when compared with how Descartes or the German Idealists already conceived consciousness, nor does it express what was special about Husserl's teaching about consciousness. Specific to Husserl, first of all, is the idea that consciousness depends upon and refers to originary manners of given-

ness, that is, to "evidence" in the very broad meaning of the term about which we spoke earlier. If consciousness were not a referring consciousness, possessing the capacity, the "ability" (*Vermögen*) to bring the empty, indirect, indefinite "intended" to fulfillment, then it would not have any intentionally given object. In order to be able to be consciousness-of-something at all, consciousness must know of its own potential (*Möglichkeit*)—Husserl coins a striking conceptual term here, "potentiability" (*Vermöglichkeit*)—to allow the related "something" to appear in intuition. Consciousness's intending of an object is, therefore, not a static relation-to-something, but instead is animated with its tendency toward originarity; Husserl uses the words "intention" and "intending" throughout his works in a way similar to our daily usage, indicating a purposeful striving. Intentional consciousness is, in all its forms, focused on finding satisfaction in the intuited self-having of lived experience. Consciousness wants to go toward evidence; that is what forms its goal, its telos. In this sense, all conscious life—as Husserl would say in his later work—rests under the rule of a "teleology."

The idea of the *a priori* of correlation, the second specification of Husserl's concept of intentionality, is closely connected with this characterization of consciousness: Consciousness cannot be imagined as an empty beach, with the ocean washing random objects ashore. It is not a container indifferent to what fills it. Rather, consciousness is made up of various acts whose character is determined by a corresponding type of objectivity, an objectivity that appears exclusively to consciousness in the manners of givenness appropriate to it. This is independent of whether the related object is factually there or not. For example, even when I only imagine the existence of a perceived thing in a visual perception, the type of conscious activity (in this case, seeing perspectively) is still determined by the object (in this case, the object-in-space). As these acts are nothing without the objects *of which* they are conscious, we can say that intentional consciousness carries a relation to the object in itself. With the concept of intentionality, the classical problem of the modern "theory of knowledge"—how a consciousness which is at first world-less could take up a relationship with an "outer world" that lies beyond itself—is basically brought to a close.

The treatment of consciousness as intentional no longer permits the objectivity subsisting in its own right and standing over against the activities of consciousness to be dissolved psychologically into these activities because the character of the act is determined precisely by this standing-over-against. In addition, and even more importantly, this takes place independently of whether the intentionally intended object is factually there or not. The character of the activities of consciousness is not dependent on the empirically given objects that happen to be there, but instead on "*Essence*," that is, on the universal determination of types of objectivities. Thus there are areas of objectivities, "*regions of being*," as Husserl says, that are differentiated according to the special characteristics of their being, their "*Eidos*," that is, the mental view that they

after a certain
corresponds. A
struction of the

Because the
domain of empir
indicated, is an
of givenness of
therefore" exte
made facts its
variable by the
phenomena. Phen
and objects, d
construction of
this include. F
escape them; a
Husserl calls th
ined experience
them—and fo
—eidetic redu

Psycholog
that of the no
natural law th
psychologism.
to the object.
above all as th
cal research, t
universality. F
ration of the c
constituted th
became know
nomenologist
meant, as the
cally, pressing
view," the "*ia*
essence," and.

Husserl a
ments. It is n
Yearbook, the
with the chap
quence of his
the Göttinger
Ideas I, "The
of minds. He

offer in a corresponding originary intuition. *Eidetic* objective determination corresponds, according to the *a priori* of correlation, to a universal, eidetic condition of the intentional acts that are related to the objectivity in question.

Because these acts and their objectivities can be characterized independently of empirically determinable facts, their correlation, as has already been indicated, is an *a priori*; the multitude of types of objects and their manners of givenness comes to philosophical research as a field of knowledge that comes "before" external experience. As Husserl argues, phenomenology does not make facts its topic—that is, its topic is not individual situations that are ascertainable by individual persons in their intentional experience and their objectivities. Phenomenology abstracts from contingent, factual conscious processes and objects, directing its view toward the essential laws that determine the construction of these acts and the regions of being that appear in them. These laws include, first of all, *necessity*, that is, no single case of intentional life can escape them; and second, *universality*, that is, they include all individual cases. Husserl calls this activity of going back from the factual qualities of intentional lived experiences and their objects to the eidetic determination which underlies them—and for which the factual qualities are merely interchangeable examples—*eidetic reduction*.

Psychologism denied the existence of a certain type of universality—that of the normalizing logical laws of thinking—by interpreting it as a quasi-natural law that governs our thought processes. With Husserl's refutation of psychologism, universality gained a new prominence in philosophy. The "turn to the object," which was celebrated due to Husserl's efforts, was understood above all as the rescue of the objectivity of universality. Within phenomenological research, the theme of universality became primarily understood as eidetic universality. For Husserl's associates from Göttingen and Munich, this exploration of the eidetic state of objective regions and their related intentional acts constituted the phenomenological project. Phenomenology, in its first years, became known primarily as a method of essential knowledge, due to these phenomenologists' subtle analyses of essences. The phenomenological method meant, as the phenomenologists from Göttingen and Munich stressed emphatically, pressing forward to the originary mental intuition, a "bringing into view," the "*ideation*" of eidetic circumstances, striving toward an "*insight into essence*," and, in this sense, attaining "the things themselves."

Husserl always included the eidetic reduction among his methodical instruments. It is not by accident that the *Ideas*—with which Husserl launched his *Yearbook*, the body of publications shared by all phenomenologists—begins with the chapter "Fact and Essence." In this study of essence, the first consequence of his refutation of psychologism, Husserl continued to overlap with the Göttingen and Munich schools of phenomenology. But in the next part of *Ideas I*, "The Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook," there was a separation of minds. Here Husserl drew radical consequences from his thematization of

intentional consciousness, consequences which went far beyond a phenomenology of essence. In fact, to his friends from Göttingen and Munich, he seemed to be sliding back into modern subjectivism.

One consequence of this step was that, in the 1920s, there was a critical examination of his study of insight into essence. For example, if we are required to search for the subjective conditions of an appearance in consciousness—that is, for the originary manners of givenness—for every objectively existing thing, then this should also apply to the givenness of eidetic situations. Thus phenomenology imagined its task to be the development of a phenomenology of its own way of knowing, of intuiting essences, and Husserl tried to work through this project in his teaching of “eidetic variation.” This teaching first became accessible with the publication of *Experience and Judgment*, which Landgrebe edited; in these investigations, Husserl takes up some of the programmatic promises made in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.

All areas of study—even the empirical—focus on universal statements. Empiricists attain such universality by way of the particular and the factual; using observation and experiment, they establish universality through induction, that is, through universalizing the results of observation in methodical steps. The empirical universalities which are gained in this manner remain “comparative,” as Kant puts it, because the universal statements attained are only relatively the most universal, to be compared with the provisional results taken along the way of this process of universalization. This means that a comparative universal always remains open to revision. By contrast, the universality of necessary eidetic determinations comprises from the very beginning—“*a priori*”—every possible thinkable situation; neither can it nor does it ever need to be revised. The theory of eidetic variation explains how this unconditional universality of thinking comes to be originally given.

Just like the consciousness assumed by those scholars who were led astray by empiricism, phenomenological consciousness, which comprehends essential universals, must also be based on individual cases. That which is empirical—experience—rests finally in perception. But an empirical investigator can only universalize in inductive steps because he is bound to the examples of factual perception; he has to wait to see what facts show themselves in perception. A phenomenologist of essence, on the other hand, can attain unconditional universalities precisely because she is not dependent upon such waiting for perceived factual events. When she bases her conclusions on individual exemplary situations, she does not have to perceive them. Consciousness that is not bound to the factual perception of individual situations is called fantasy; such consciousness can think up all sorts of examples for itself.

In fantasy, we have the possibility of imagining an intentional, lived experience or some given object in that experience over and over; according to Husserl, we can arbitrarily “run through the variants” of its determinations, always differently, in free variation. But in this arbitrary consciousness, the universality of essence can end up as originary givenness. In other words, when

In a certain sense, essence, still remains understood since it is reason. Aristotle, in respect to what is called this whole the lack of bias, precisely as long as our knowledge, we continue in the regions of reason, Husserl, which seeks the world.

Because it can of the world, i.e., their eidetic determination, knowledge of the world of being are not yet words, of the proper unbiased philosophy, phenomenology could

we run through the variants of an object, we can pay attention to its limits, that is, how far we can go before the imagined object or its comprehending act becomes something else, before it loses its identity. In this way, certain identical determinations jump out from all these conceivable situations, certain invariant determinations from this variation of examples—and it is precisely these determinations which make up the essence of the act or object in question. Thus we consider the essence of a thing originally in "eidetic variation" by reflecting on its limits while thinking through it in our fantasy.

Obviously, one question remains open in this theory: those limits which are discovered by consciousness while running through the variants are clearly already given to it. Consciousness does not invent these limits. Rather, it bumps into them; they are the boundaries beyond which such a running through of the variants cannot go. What sets such boundaries for fantasy in its free play? What engages varying consciousness in such a way that reflection can bring the invariants in it forward? Husserl did not answer these crucial questions in his theory of eidetic variation. One possible solution to this problem—which we do not find in Husserl, however—could be this: essence as invariant brings forward, in objectified form, the rules according to which the referential interconnections (*Verweisungszusammenhänge*) of horizontal consciousness are structured.¹³ We will explain horizontal consciousness in the following sections.¹⁴

6. World-Belief and Epochē

In a certain sense, phenomenology, when taken as a method of insight into essence, still remains in front of the gates of philosophy. Philosophy has been understood since the very beginning as a knowledge of the whole. For this reason, Aristotle characterized philosophy as the study that views existence with respect to what is common to everything that exists: being.¹⁵ Husserl simply calls this whole the "world." Because he is concerned with establishing a radical lack of bias, philosophy for Husserl must be knowledge of this world as whole; as long as our knowledge remains limited only to individually knowable sections, we continue to face the danger that unrecognized prejudices will remain in the regions of being within the world that are as yet unknown. For this reason, Husserl must again take up the most basic question of a philosophy which seeks the whole.

Because it can be used, and was used, to light the way from partial regions of the world (i.e., specific regions of being and their related types of acts) to their eidetic determinations, this insight into essence as such is still not a general knowledge of the world in the sense of a whole. The determinations of regions of being are not yet the determinations of existence-as-a-whole, or in other words, of the proper object of philosophy. If phenomenology is to be a radically unbiased philosophical method, then Husserl has to ask whether and how phenomenology could make world-knowledge possible.

Because he strove for such a lack of bias, Husserl obtained his concept of philosophical truth by contrasting it to natural opinion. For this reason, the next question for him was: might people in natural, pre-philosophical life already have something to do with the whole as such, or is it philosophical knowledge which first opens for them an access to the "world"? Husserl's fundamental answer was: people already have a consciousness of the world before any philosophy. For this reason, that which changes through philosophy can only be an *attitude* toward the world. According to this, the question, "How can the whole of the world become a topic for phenomenology?" is given the following wording: "How does the '*natural attitude*' of people lead to a new, philosophical attitude?"

The question to be asked before the last one mentioned, however, is: Why do people have consciousness of the world already before any philosophical knowledge? Going from his idea of correlation, Husserl characterized the natural attitude in the following way. The objects in my world are encountered in manners of givenness that are contingent upon their situations. A perceived thing, like this table here, for example, can appear to me only in such a way that it shows me one side at a time. In order to see the "entire" table, I must go around it, and in this way it is given to me irrevocably "perspectively." But when I actualize any one of these perspectival views—one of the table's *adumbrations*, as Husserl says—as a manner of givenness, it is clear to me at the same time that the being of the table is not exhausted in this one aspect, which it offers me at this moment. "More" is intended with the object than that which happens to appear in its manner of givenness.¹⁶ In my intentional, lived experience, I ascribe an existence to the object which transcends its changing givenness, its difference from situation to situation. These perspectival adumbrations are subject-relative. The existence of the object, on the other hand—according to my understandable belief—transcends its subjectively situated appearance; it exists "in itself," "objectively." In this way, an existential judgment about objects constantly—tacitly, so to speak—invades consciousness in the natural attitude, saying: they *are*, that is, objects have an existence that is independent of both subject and situation.

In normal cases, intentional lived experience takes its object as existing; in this sense, it contains a "*positing of being*." The relation of people in the natural attitude to objects is their understandable belief in the existence of objects. This "*belief of being*" relates, first of all, to the individual objects of individual intentional, lived experiences. If we look at it closer, though, we see that this belief encompasses the whole of all such objects, that is, the "world."

Intentional consciousness constantly posits being; in other words, certain objects or their characteristics are taken as existing. This "*validity of being*," however, is something fundamentally unstable. Intentional, living consciousness keeps moving forward in its search for the fulfillment and verification of its intentions which are, more or less, "vague" or "empty." At the same time, it is always the case that some objects, which consciousness has taken as existing or

constituted as such, are not exhausted in their being. We have to take into account the indefinite pre-fulfillments or verifications which remain. This is the *primordial* nature of the world. It is always leading us to a complete and *unending* validity of the manner of being in the world the

This inexpressible single consciousness of the world, my attention to the world, is an intentional act. I turn the front side of the table and see its back. I stand; then I can see further objects; I trace out for me the next step, always thematically. I do not stop. My further is governed by the world. Accordingly, I have to ever further object

Husserl called this "horizon"—by which I can see further—and he called the "horizon" Husserl's "horizon." In a complete reference which is a shift according to experience, the "horizons" to be already who has control of within my full power in any direction I am—using a concept of tentiabilities."

Belonging to the further in its theme less "and so on." Intentional, lived exper

constituted as such and such up to that point, prove suddenly and inevitably to be nonexistent, or at least constituted in some other way. Thus, time and again we have to "cancel" certain validities of being. Through transferring our indefinite pre-intentions to originary manners of givenness, we gain not only fulfillments or verifications but also "*disappointments*." One fundamental conviction remains untouched throughout, however: the belief that the world exists as the *ground* upon which we, in a way, place all objects. Every disappointment always leads, namely, only to a "not like this, but some other way," never to a complete nothingness. Thus the world's existence remains intact, as "*ultimately valid*," even when we must set aside the existence and the particular manner of being of this or that object. Husserl calls this belief of being related to the world the *general thesis of the natural attitude*.

This inexpressible conviction of the being of the world accompanies every single consciousness of an object. In addition to this, the possibility of turning my attention to other objects from the object given at this moment belongs to every intentional, lived experience. For example, in the case of perceiving the front side of the table here, I am conscious of the fact that I can go around it and see its back side; I can let my gaze wander around the room in which it stands; then I can glance out of the window of this room and discover even further objects; and so on. My concrete, intentional, lived experience thus traces out for me a certain margin of possibilities from which I can, step by step, always thematize more objects. While I might make use of these margins freely, I do not do so in a completely arbitrary fashion. *How* I can thematize further is governed by a regulation with which I am inexpressibly acquainted. Accordingly, I have a consciousness which refers from one experienced object to ever further objects.

Husserl called this acquaintance with regulated referential interconnections —by which I can proceed with my concrete experience—*horizontal consciousness*, and he called these margins of possible experience which are thereby opened *horizons*. Husserl took up and broadened the daily meaning of the word "horizon." In a comprehensive sense, a horizon is my circle of vision, the circumference which is around me (as the center of orientation for my world), and it shifts according to my change in position. As the margin of my possibilities of experience, the horizon is something subjective; I may find these "potentialities" to be already there, but they are there in such a way that *I* am the one who has control over them: I have the consciousness "I can . . ." Because it is within my full power, my "capability," to follow the referential interconnections in any direction I choose, Husserl is able to characterize horizontal consciousness —using a concept we already mentioned above—as a consciousness of my "potentialities."

Belonging to our potentiality is a consciousness that can always proceed further in its thematizing of new objects, that is, a consciousness of an endless "and so on." We are confident, as we mentioned above, that our intentional, lived experience will never run up against complete nothingness—even

when individual experiences of disappointment cancel the validity of individual objects—because of the strength of this consciousness. Thus we have, in the endlessness of horizontal consciousness, the assurance of a final horizon that cannot be canceled; a *horizon for all horizons* opens up: the world.

With this determination of the world as the *universal horizon*, the concept of the general thesis becomes concrete. In the same way that manners of givenness belong to an individual object, the consciousness of this individual object is embedded in a *world-belief*. The object, that toward which my acts are directed, the pole of my attentiveness, is something identical, as opposed to the manifold of its manners of givenness (i.e., its changing adumbrations), through which it is able to present itself to me. Similarly, the world is something identical, persevering, as opposed to the individual, lived experiences of objects. The validity of being of objects might be confirmed or weakened in originary givenness, but the one world remains as ultimately valid.

The natural attitude of people is this general thesis, world-belief. But how does this relationship to the world get carried over into a new, philosophical relationship? Husserl points out that the analysis of the appearance of objects in manners of givenness already requires a shift in attitude. In the intentional, lived experiences that we carry out in the natural attitude, objects are our "*theme*." We already somehow know that objects can appear to us only in manners of givenness—for example, perceived objects can appear only in "adumbrations"—but, normally, we never direct our attention to this situated-subjective appearing, or if we do, then only sporadically. Thus this appearing-in-manners-of-givenness is carried out *unthematically*. Husserl says: It "*functions*" as a medium through which we relate to the object that exists for us. In this functioning, situated-subjective appearing remains in the shadows of our attention—to the benefit of the light in which the object, taken as existing, presents itself. Similarly to manners of givenness, world-belief also functions unthematically. When we follow the referential interconnections of horizontal consciousness in some direction, we are only thematically interested in the objects and types of objects that we run into along the way. We never thematize our belief that, in spite of individual experiences of disappointment, our intentional, lived experience will never completely disappear into nothingness.

Thus, intentional consciousness in the natural attitude is, as Husserl formulates it, "infatuated" with thematic objects. It "*just-lives*"—this, too, an expression characteristic of Husserl—in its devotion to objects taken as existing. The functionings of manners of givenness and of the horizon of the world—the latter remains fundamentally unthematic in the natural attitude—then become themes of phenomenological analysis. With this, however, the phenomenologist no longer just-lives. Both the direction of her attention and her interest in the validity of the being of objects are broken. The intentional "gaze" of the phenomenologist no longer focuses on objects taken as existing, but rather on objects in the How of their unthematic appearance and in the embedding of this appearance in horizontal consciousness. In this way, the phenomenologist's gaze is bent back upon the subjective aspect, first, of the actualization of

manners of givenness
and phenomena

Reflection is per-
fect herself from be-
jects. Instead of sw-
no longer carries o-
stead becomes an
out of the relation
ending person and
this relationship in
is now within the
explanatory analog
the observation win-
thing—we must co-
assumptions about
for us.

In just-living, o-
t encounters: as lo-
grants, affirms exist-
sciousness switches
les between affirm-
similar. The disinte-
of position-taking.
if she were not to
ects, and that which
of givenness and no-

This *abstention*
with all of its poss-
from ancient skept-
oneself back," in ti-
of the epoché is the
through which phi-
discovery of this p-
method can become
zation of the whole
as the horizon of a
natural attitude. Th-
from a phenomeno-
logical method.

The regions of
by insight into esse
minology of the ph-

manners of givenness, and second, of a horizontal referential consciousness. In short: phenomenological analysis has the quality of *reflection*.

Reflection is based upon a position that requires that the phenomenologist free herself from her infatuation, from her belief in the being of thematic objects. Instead of swimming in the stream of just-living, she rises above it; she no longer carries out her interest in the existence of intended objects, and instead becomes an "*uninterested*" or "*disinterested observer*." She holds herself out of the relationship that takes place between herself as a naturally experiencing person and the objects appearing as existent to such a person. She places this relationship *in brackets*, so to speak, and observes the intentional life that is now within the brackets from outside. Perhaps I should briefly mention an explanatory analogy: the jostling, bustling life of just-living is put behind an "observation window," as it were; although we, as observers, cannot stop living—we must continue to do so necessarily—we also cannot make any more assumptions about this just-living as we study it, and thus it is "neutralized" for us.

In just-living, consciousness takes a position on the existence of the objects it encounters: as long as a being is valid and is not canceled, consciousness grants, affirms existence; if it becomes invalid or somehow questionable, consciousness switches over to negation or to some position toward existence that lies between affirmation and negation, to "maybe," "perhaps," or something similar. The disinterested, reflecting observer must refrain from any of this kind of position-taking. She lets such things be, holding them in abeyance, because if she were not to do this, she would remain infatuated with the being of objects, and that which is unthematic in the natural attitude—that is, the manners of givenness and horizontal consciousness—could not make it into view.

This *abstention from every type of position-taking*, this *neutrality* compared with all of its possible modifications, Husserl calls "*epochē*," a concept taken from ancient skepticism. This description literally means "to stop" or "to hold oneself back," in this case, from taking a position on existence. This position of the epochē is the new position sought with regard to the world, the position through which philosophy distinguishes itself from the natural attitude. The discovery of this position contains the answer to how the phenomenological method can become philosophy, which means, how it can become a thematization of the whole. The whole of the world—where the "world" is understood as the horizon of all horizons—is that which is absolutely unthematic for the natural attitude. Thus it is the epochē that first makes possible the transposition from a phenomenology of "insight into essence" into a strict unbiased *philosophical* method.

7. The Phenomenological Reduction¹⁷

The regions of being, whose eidetic determinations are brought to light by insight into essence, consist of types and species of being—using the terminology of the philosophical tradition. Those determinations which relate to

the whole of existence overall "transcend" and go beyond the determinations of types and species. In scholasticism they were called "transcendentals." Pre-Kantian thinking, because it was a study of transcendentals, was itself already a *transcendental philosophy*. In order to correspond with this pre-Kantian transcendental philosophy, phenomenology cannot limit itself to being a study of the essences of the specific regions of being and their corresponding intentional, lived experiences. Kant then gave a new meaning to the concept of "*transcendental*" in that he described "all knowledge," as that "which has to do not only with objects, but rather with our way of knowing objects, insofar as this way of knowing might be *a priori* possible."¹⁸ At this point, philosophy becomes universal knowledge because it makes existence in general its topic, through the *a priori* relation of being to consciousness.

In the "Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook" of *Ideas I*, Husserl sets up phenomenology in the tradition of transcendental philosophy as it was established by Kant. He can do this because the phenomenological investigation into correlation coincides with both conditions of Kant's definition: On the basis of the position established by reflection under the epochē, phenomenology views objects in the How of their appearing for intentional consciousness. In other words, phenomenology does not ask directly and simply about these objects, but rather about their "way of being known." And, as a method of insight into essence, phenomenology sets forth that which is *a priori* in this relation to consciousness. But how does *consciousness* now move into the focal point of phenomenology? In other words, how does phenomenology become transcendental philosophy in the Kantian sense?

One kind of epochē is possible, one which limits itself to neutralizing our position on existence in individual, intentional, lived experiences. The world as a whole does not yet come into view, however, through such a partial abstention from our "belief in being." The epochē must become *universal* if the phenomenological method is to become philosophy. It cannot allow any position with regard to existence to remain untouched. But a difficult problem arises here: even the claims that phenomenology makes about the intentional appearance of objects take a position on existence. By making judgments about appearance-in-manners-of-givenness, these manners of givenness are taken as existing. But if phenomenology were to refrain from making these claims about existence as well, then it could make no more claims at all. The universal epochē bases itself on a renunciation of every claim to knowledge, and thus of philosophy as *science*; it had this very same function in ancient skepticism. Phenomenology as a science therefore must make a sustainable claim from a region that is an exception to the epochē.

Phenomenological claims refer to intentional acts of consciousness. For this reason, the region that we seek can only be consciousness. But how can retaining the validity of being for consciousness be consistent with the "air-tightness" of the universal epochē? The universal epochē is the abstention from the general thesis of the natural attitude; it neutralizes the validity of the *world*. If the being

of consciousness
to which the
the phenomenon
the being of
of objects in
to our pre-ph
their part, are
tional conscio
the world, in

At the same
in general, the
in general is it
called this To
thing "next to
with the world
would be phe
tionally appear
existence, the
in relation to
objects is that
ade are convi
sciousness. Th
only that the
appearing-for-
natural attitude

With this
idealism. It is
ence between
titude. The la
the world and
sciousness. Th
remains unthe
objects, that t
not to the sub
tion of "just-l
correlations re
sciousness and
he leads this ex

Husserl ca
other than the
epochē the bei
itself as appear
cal method be
Kant. In the ei

consciousness were the same kind as the being of the objects in the world (to which the natural belief in the world relates), then it would be impossible for phenomenological philosophy to assign being to consciousness. Accordingly, the being of consciousness must be of a fundamentally different kind than that of objects in the world. This thesis at first appears surprising, because, according to our pre-philosophical belief, consciousness is based in people, and they, for their part, are a component of the world. Thus it must be shown that intentional consciousness, contrary to how it appears naturally, does not belong to the world; in its way of being, it is not "mundane," as Husserl says.

At the same time, a second project presents itself: if the world is the whole in general, then there is nothing "next to" or "outside of" it, because the whole in general is itself defined as having nothing external, nothing other to it. Hegel called this Totality. Accordingly, it is impossible that consciousness be something "next to" or "other than" the world; in other words, it must be identical with the world. This thesis can be put into concrete form in only one way that would be phenomenologically meaningful: the world is the whole of all intentionally appearing objects. In the natural attitude, people distinguish objective existence, the being-in-itself of objects, from their subject-relative appearance in relation to consciousness, their manners of givenness. The being-in-itself of objects is that aspect of objects' existence of which people in the natural attitude are convinced, namely, that objects are subject-irrelative, unrelated to consciousness. The identity of the world and consciousness, however, can mean only that the being-in-itself of the world is nothing other than its intentional appearing-for-consciousness, which goes against the belief of its being in the natural attitude.

With this thesis, Husserl presents phenomenology as a variety of modern idealism. It is in this idealistic position, though, that we find the actual difference between the phenomenological-philosophical position and the natural attitude. The latter maintains, as an unthematic world-belief, that the being of the world and the objects in it are independent of their appearance in consciousness. The concrete form of this natural conviction is that this appearance remains unthematic. The natural attitude leads only to the being-in-itself of objects, that they are independent of consciousness and subject-irrelative, and not to the subject-relative givenness of objects. This attitude is the basic position of "just-living." Contrary to this, the phenomenologist who is researching correlations relates this existence, which is supposedly independent of consciousness and not subject-relative, to subject-relative appearances. And further: he leads this existence back to such appearance (as its foundation).

Husserl calls this leading back the *phenomenological reduction*. It is nothing other than the radical universalizing of the epochē. Whereas in the universal epochē the being of the world is robbed of its validity, this being now reveals itself as appearing-for-consciousness. With this reduction, the phenomenological method becomes transcendental in the sense of the tradition established by Kant. In the eidetic investigation of correlations, objects are already viewed in

the How of their appearance for consciousness, but the matter of their existence may still remain open. Only with the phenomenological reduction is the being of objects clarified *as* being-conscious. Insofar as the phenomenological reduction is understood as a radically universalized epochē and insofar as it amounts to an idealistic position, Husserl calls it *transcendental-phenomenological* in his later notes to his *Ideas I*, as well as in his projects in the 1920s.

This transcendental position of looking for the foundation of existence by going back to the actualization of appearances by subjective consciousness was rejected by Husserl's friends from Göttingen and Munich as a relapse into subjectivism. They limited themselves to what Husserl called the eidetic reduction, disregarding facts in favor of eidetic universality. This reduction, too, contains a type of epochē, a holding-in-suspense of the assumption of factual existence: essential circumstances exist independently of whether there are specific factual situations or not. According to Husserl, though, we must distinguish sharply between the phenomenological and the eidetic reduction because the phenomenological reduction is the consequence of the epochē (the abstention from *every* position on existence), and because I can also apply the epochē to factual, individual, lived experiences without examining their eidetic structures. The reduction of objectivities in general to my consciousness (that which allows for their appearance) is very different from a reduction of facts to their essences.

Those critics of Husserl from within phenomenology saw an impoverishment in his transcendental-phenomenological reduction. According to them, relating back to consciousness cuts philosophy off from the richness of objective existence; the call "to the things themselves" thus atrophies in a new subjectivism. But this was a misunderstanding of the concept of reduction. The phenomenological reduction is hardly "reductionistic." Not taking part in the belief that objects exist independently of consciousness, the belief of the natural attitude, does not mean that we no longer pay attention to objects. On the contrary, it is only through reflection that the matter of objects allows itself to be analyzed in such a way that we can see, unreduced, how it presents itself originally to consciousness, and it is only through the epochē and the phenomenological reduction that reflection opens itself unconditionally to the analysis of originary manners of givenness. Transcendental phenomenology does not disregard the world in favor of consciousness; rather, its interest arises precisely *in* its illumination of the phenomena that make up our consciousness of the world. In fact, the transcendental phenomenologist is interested in consciousness only as the site of the appearance of the world.

8. The Way to the Reduction¹⁹

Given the conclusions we have just made, two projects arise—if the phenomenological method is to become philosophy. First of all, Husserl must prove that intentional consciousness is not mundane, or in other words, that it exists

in a different
the trans-
ow a kind
it does s
the way
that which
Husserl wa
the trans-
If we h
transcend-
also in the
reduction
of the red-
objects in
in-trans-
epoch ques
this need
action that
structural

Husserl
of a thing
example, in
which are f
ample, the
sensible con-
a more of
that in each
in Critical
which is exp
Every object
where its be-
to be actual
momentary
the trans-

This tra-
unrelated to
which is tra-
principle a
extent, in th
nary form o
ence of an
dence may
but this is

in a different way than the objects of the world. Second, he must really carry out the transcendental-phenomenological reduction through, meaning he must follow a conceptual path by which we discover that the presumed being-in-itself of objects is nothing other than subject-relative appearance. Husserl formulated this way to the reduction in his "Fundamental Outlook" in *Ideas I* in a manner that, along the way, also provided the first proof we mentioned. Later, however, Husserl was no longer satisfied with this proof. For this reason, beginning in the 1920s, he intensely sought a more convincing way to the reduction.

If we first disregard Husserl's questionable proof that consciousness is not mundane, however, then we see that he does justify his phenomenological idealism in the "Fundamental Outlook" with the following considerations. The conviction that the being of the world is independent of consciousness is part of the belief of being in the natural attitude; this attitude also assumes that objects in the world are subject-irrelative, that is, they exceed their appearance-in-manners-of-givenness and thus are transcendent. The genuine phenomenological question must then be: how does intentional consciousness carry out this lived experience of transcendence in its originary form? How does the conviction that objects and the world are "more" than that which is given in each situational appearance originally arise?

Husserl's typical example for our experience of an object is the perception of a thing.²⁰ In actualizing the momentary adumbrations of this table here, for example, my consciousness is also co-conscious of horizontal potentialities, which are further perceptions. The momentary manners of givenness (for example, the view of the front side of this table) refer me through their own sensible content to potential experiences in which more of the table, or beyond it, more of the world in general, would become given. In this sense, we can say that, in each experience of an object there lie "motivations" which lead beyond it. Crucial here is the difference between what is given at this moment and that which is experienceable through the actualization of motivated potentialities. Every object is known as something existent on the basis of this difference, where its being is not absorbed into the manner of givenness that then happens to be actualized. The fact that the being of an object itself exceeds my direct (momentary) perceptual experience of its being is my originary experience of the transcendence of objects and the world.

This transcendence does not immediately mean that the object is totally unrelated to consciousness, but rather the opposite; it means that, while that which is transcendent may not itself be presently given to consciousness, in principle a motivated transition to its actual appearance already lies, to some extent, in the referential interconnection of potentialities. In short, the originary form of the lived experience of transcendence is the fact that the experience of an object is embedded in horizontal consciousness. Objective transcendence may originally emerge in its not being related to consciousness directly, but this is just the reverse side of a latent relation to consciousness, one which

actualized in perception, for example, are not once again given through unthematic manners of givenness in reflection; they do not appear to reflecting consciousness as subject-*relative* in adumbrations, but rather as *absolute*. Consciousness is thus given to itself in reflection as free of adumbrations. According to the *a priori* of correlation, the way whatever is given exists corresponds to its manner of givenness. Therefore, consciousness possesses absolute existence as opposed to the subject-relative existence possessed by the objects in the world.

In order to illustrate the absoluteness of consciousness, Husserl makes use of the classical methodological doubt found in Descartes's *Meditations*. According to Descartes, I can doubt the existence of everything conceivable, but not the existence of my self, insofar as and as long as I conceive. The existence of the ability to conceive—the existence of consciousness—is the indubitable remainder which cannot be questioned, even by a general, comprehensive doubt. This is similar to Husserl's position: because mundane objects are given as subject-relative, their validity of being can be canceled out at any time; to be subject-relative entails the possibility of error. In principle, because we can be mistaken, it is imaginable that our entire belief in the world could collapse. On the other hand, the validity of the being of consciousness, because of its absolute givenness, is unable to be canceled, and thus it is absolute.

Even if the existence of the entire world were to lose its validity, and, in this sense, the world were to be "destroyed" for consciousness, something would be left over: absolute consciousness as a "*residuum of the destruction of the world*." Phenomenological reflection affirms this residuum. As this reflection looks deep into consciousness-as-absolute, it discovers manners of givenness as a part of what is "immanent" to it. These are contained as indubitable "*reell*," or immanent, pieces in the stream of intentional, lived experiences. From these, we must distinguish the objects in the world as "*real*," which possess only an insecure transcendent existence and which are beyond the stream of lived experience immanent to consciousness.

This is where the method of the reduction begins to cause the distinct paths within traditional Cartesian dualism—the paths of consciousness and "outer world"—to converge. In the long run, such a dualism did not satisfy Husserl for several reasons. We will mention only three here. First, it results in a confusing interplay between the concepts of "immanent" and "transcendent." Insofar as the transcendent existence of the world is traced back to its appearance in manners of givenness, which are immanent, this transcendence of objective existence proves to be immanent. But can it be reasonably understood with the term "transcendence" if it is really "immanent transcendence"?

Second, this paradox of a consciousness which exceeds itself and yet remains in itself also contradicts the very spirit of the investigation of correlations at its most basic level. Husserl's concept of intentionality basically settles the classical Cartesian problematic of what is "inner" versus "outer" with regard to consciousness. This problematic returns, however, because Husserl over-

interprets the subjective character of "manners of givenness." Because they are naturally unthematized, manners of givenness are undoubtedly subjective insofar as they can be brought to light only through reflection. But for Husserl, they are also subjective in the sense that they can be carried out only inside consciousness. This is a one-sided interpretation, though. Certainly, manners of givenness are the way in which intentional consciousness carries out its lived experiences, but in the same stroke these are appearances *of* something; in other words, they are manners of self-revelation, of existing things presenting themselves. If we were to apply the Cartesian question, asking whether we should add these lived experiences to the category of consciousness's "outer" or "inner" world, then we could not appropriately comprehend their richness. Lived experiences break down this dualism; they are the In-between, that which originally opens the dimension of intentional appearance within which consciousness and the world have already met—before any subject-object rift.²¹ Husserl discovered this In-between through resolving this subject-object rift by understanding truth in a way that was not one-sided; he was thereby the first to push open the door to entirely new possibilities in thought for twentieth-century philosophy.

Third, the Cartesian proof that consciousness is not mundane, in *Ideas I*, also contravenes the method of the epochē. In the beginning of his "Fundamental Outlook," Husserl explicitly separates this method from Cartesian doubt. According to Husserl, Descartes also sought a way to suspend the natural attitude. Descartes believed that the way to do this would be methodically to set up a universal negation in opposition to the natural, positive position on existence. But negation is still a variety of position-taking. The natural attitude can only be overcome through setting aside *all* possible positions, that is, through the epochē. Husserl, however, covertly retracted this insightful aspect of his critique of Descartes when he considered the possibility that extreme disillusion could call the existence of the world into question, and when he explained that non-mundane consciousness is the "residuum of the destruction of the world." Thus consciousness for Husserl—as with Descartes, basically—joins the remainder of affirmable being which survives the negation of the world.

When Husserl engaged Descartes again much later, in his *Cartesian Meditations*, he did criticize him on this point, saying that consciousness for Descartes was still "a little leftover piece of the world."²² As long as consciousness is still a piece of the world whose existence is affirmed in the natural attitude, it does not distinguish itself from mundane objects in the way it exists. This accusation also affects Husserl's "Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook." Thus Husserl, after *Ideas I*, was pressed to clarify the phenomenological conception of consciousness from the perspective of his method. In the 1920s, Husserl conceived a way to the reduction, documented in his article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, which went through "*phenomenological psychology*." This way prefigures transcendental phenomenology, in which consciousness is still understood as mundane, that is, as the soul that retains the character of a

being-in-the-world. It is pure intentionality, that is, it relates to the world. As such, it is not derived from the sciences. Lived experiences are not reduced in the reflection. This introspective method of foundation is completely run as an introspective method according to the transcendental attitude, but only the change, which is of the mundane, in the transcendental philosophy.

Wherein lies the point, as pointed out, is that Husserl also spoke of the transcendences are unified lived experiences. "I am the ego," as Husserl called that is, of the unexperiences, I am my own ego an object of the natural attitude. This objectification is a role player, in experience.

During such a reduction, itself somewhat of each experience of objectification, as I am basically a being. Here "pure" means worldly." Apprehending the transcendental, method also calls it the "other than the mundane division of consciousness a being that is not serving my freedom thought out the

Because they are
edly subjective in-
n. But for Husserl,
ed out only inside
Certainly, manners
carries out its lived
something; in other
s presenting them-
whether we should
s's "outer" or "in-
their richness. Lived
n, that which origi-
n which conscious-
object rift.²¹ Husserl
object rift by under-
by the first to push
twentieth-century

mundane, in *Ideas I*,
ing of his "Funda-
m Cartesian doubt.
nd the natural atti-
methodically to set
ve position on exis-
natural attitude can
ns, that is, through
ghtful aspect of his
extreme disillusion
en he explained that
ction of the world."
cally—joins the re-
f the world.

his *Cartesian Medi-*
consciousness for Des-
ng as consciousness
the natural attitude,
e way it exists. This
nological Outlook."
nomenological con-
thod. In the 1920s,
in his article in the
nological psychology."
which consciousness is
ns the character of a

being-in-the-world. The whole world of objects is already reduced to the How of its pure intentional appearance, and yet phenomenology remains mundane here, that is, it remains a pre-philosophical science that is trapped in a belief in the world. As such, it is no different from non-empirical psychology, no different from the science which establishes the identifiable essential structures of all lived experiences through eidetic reduction in such a way that they can be analyzed in the reflective inner examination of the epochē. According to Husserl, this introspective-eidetic psychology has a double function. First, it is the *a priori* foundation of all empirical psychology; psychology today, which is almost completely run as a pure natural science and which believes it can get by without any introspective-eidetic foundations, is groundless and will thus eventually falter, according to Husserl. Second, phenomenological psychology is the first step to transcendental phenomenology. The former already contains the latter in its entirety, but only as mundane. According to Husserl, all we need is an "indicative change," whereby consciousness will be grasped as transcendental instead of mundane, in order to transfer this new type of psychology into transcendental philosophy.

Wherein lies this indicative change? Consciousness, as we have occasionally pointed out, is the stream of intentional, lived experiences, and thus Husserl also spoke of the "*stream of experiences*." In this stream, all of my lived experiences are unified, and this unity is known to me because I describe all of my lived experiences as "mine." That they are "mine" means that they belong to "me," "I" am the one who actualizes them. Thus I am—as the "*performing-ego*," as Husserl calls it—the basis of all of my experiences' belonging together, that is, of the unity of my stream of consciousness. In my intentional, lived experiences, I am directed toward objects-in-the-world, but I can also make my own ego an object of my reflection. Through such objectification, the ego in the natural attitude appears to itself as something existing in the world. In fact, this objectification is a making-worldly: I apprehend myself sociologically as role player, in experimental psychology as an experimental subject, and so on.

During such self-objectification, this act of making-worldly withdraws itself somewhat: I myself as performing-ego—as I, the one who carries out each experience of objectification—remain to some extent on this side of the objectification, as the performer. Understood in this way as performing-ego, I am basically a being that is not mundane; I am "*pure ego*," as Husserl says. Here "pure" means "unable to be captured by any objectification that makes-worldly." Apprehending consciousness no longer as mundane, but instead as transcendental, means considering this pure performing-ego. Husserl therefore also calls it the "*transcendental ego*."²³ The transcendental ego in us is nothing other than the mundane ego; phenomenological reflection is in no way a literal division of consciousness. It is just a reminder that, in the final moment, I am a being that is not completely absorbed into any objectification, thereby preserving my freedom and responsibility. In whatever way Husserl might have thought out the method of realizing this indicative change in the transition

from phenomenological psychology to transcendental phenomenology, it is clear that his primary concern was considering myself in my free responsibility.²⁴

Husserl did not follow the concrete way to the reduction in his reflections on method that we just problematized. The "reduction" or "leading back" of existence from objects and the world to their intentional appearance can only mean explaining this existence on the basis of appearance. The fact that certain types of objects are taken as existing in-themselves by consciousness must be made comprehensible through their appearance in related manners of givenness. Given that consciousness transcends ordinary situated-subjective givennesses in a motivated way, then the integral nature of the world must be constructed through its eidetically distinguishable regions of objects. This construction of the world out of consciousness's motivated achievements of transcendence is called "*constitution*" by Husserl.²⁵ The actual project of investigating correlations in transcendental phenomenology, then, is analyzing the constitution of different categories of objects.

As a method of eidetic and transcendental-phenomenological reduction, phenomenology developed into one of the very few comprehensive systematic projects of twentieth-century philosophy. In spite of its questionable aspects—a few of which we have just indicated—this project is an essential link between classical German transcendental philosophy and those new departures characteristic of the twentieth century, such as existentialism, the philosophy of Being, hermeneutics, academic theory, and linguistic analysis, all of which are somewhat linked to phenomenology. For this reason it is worthwhile to follow the way Husserl's phenomenology has gone as a method in order to "re-construct" systematically the transition from the age of Idealism to our epoch. Only in this way can we assess, in a somewhat authoritative manner, the far-reaching effects and consequences of the endeavors of contemporary philosophy. In another respect the study of Husserlian texts is attractive insofar as working through the investigation of constitution in concrete analyses enriches our philosophical understanding of people's experience of the world from many different angles.

Notes

This essay was first published as Klaus Held, "Einleitung," in *Edmund Husserl: Die Phänomenologische Methode, Ausgewählte Texte* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam), I: 5–51.

1. This comment does not at all detract from the merit deserved by the Nijhoff publishers in the Netherlands for their work with regard to Husserl.

2. On the problem of the life-world see Section 7 of the next essay in this volume. Husserl's discussion of this is found in *Krisis; Crisis*, §§8, 9, 33, 34, *Beilage II* (Appendix 5);

- and the texts in *The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology*, ed. David Welton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), §§20 and 21. So as to facilitate access to the texts under discussion, references will be given not only to Husserl's individual works but also to any corresponding selections found in *The Essential Husserl*.
2. For more about Husserl's life, see K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik: Denk-und Lebensgeschichte Husserls. Husserliana Dokumente*, vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).
3. Cf. H. L. Van Breda, "Die Rettung von Husserls Nachlaß und die Gründung des Husserl-Archivs," in *Husserl und das Denken der Neuzeit*, ed. H. L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959), 42ff.
4. More in-depth explanations of these concepts can be found in Section 2 of the next essay in this volume.
5. *Krisis*, 168; *Crisis*, 165.
6. *Krisis*, 169; *Crisis*, 166.
7. *Ideen I*, 43-44; *Ideas I*, 44; italics deleted.
8. *Ideen I*, 44; *Ideas I*, 44.
9. *The Essential Husserl*, §1.
10. Cf. Husserl, *Prolegomena, Logische Untersuchungen*, I, 68; *Logical Investigations*, 103.
11. *The Essential Husserl*, §§7, 14, 15.
12. This plausible thesis can be found in U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Bewusstseinskonstitution* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 29ff.
13. See Section 6 of the next essay in this volume as well.
14. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003a.
15. For a more exact analysis of all these relations, cf. Section 2 of the next essay in this volume; *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, 3-24; and *The Essential Husserl*, §12.
16. *The Essential Husserl*, §5.
17. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 25.
18. *The Essential Husserl*, §19. See also §§20 and 21.
19. For a more exact analysis of the perception of a thing cf. Section 2 of the next essay in this volume; *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, 3-24; and *The Essential Husserl*, §12.
20. This whole problematic is taken up again in a more concrete form in Section 3 of the next essay in this volume.
21. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, 63; *Cartesian Meditations*, 24.
22. For a closer look at this whole problematic, cf. Section 4 of the next essay in this volume.
23. Cf. the last section of the next essay in this volume.
24. For a closer look at this concept, cf. Section 1 of the next essay in this volume.