

working class—exemplified by much-touted programs like the Worker Propaganda Teams, Worker Theory Troops, and Worker Ambassadors—do seem to have encouraged a general belief among industrial workers that, at last, the PRC was trying to live up to its pretensions as a proletarian state. On these other initiatives, see Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*, chap. 6.

205. For a description of militia involvement in these massacres of rebels, see Song Yongyi, ed., *Wenge da tusha* [Massacres during the Cultural Revolution] (Hong Kong: Open Press, 2002). In one confrontation in Shanxi's Pingyao County, six thousand militiamen from four surrounding counties were mobilized by local military leaders and were issued guns to suppress rebel forces. "Kang Sheng jiejian Henansheng junqū ji zhujun fuzeren de jianghua" [Talk by Kang Sheng while meeting with military leaders from Henan Province], August 14, 1967, in Song Yongyi, ed., *Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku*.

206. Jonathan Unger, "Cultural Revolution Conflict in the Villages," *China Quarterly*, no. 153 (March 1998): 100–02.

207. For a statist explanation of CR violence, see Gong Xiaoxia, *Repressive Movements and the Politics of Victimization*, (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1995). For a societal approach, see Wang Youqin, "1966: Xuesheng da laoshi de geming" [1966: The revolution in which students beat up teachers], *Ersihui shiji shuangyuekan* 31 (August 1995). A synthetic work that portrays the violence of the CR as a reflection of societal contradictions born of state policies under the PRC is Lynn T. White III, *Policies of Chaos: Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

6

PATROLLING THE
POST-MAO REFORMS

The post-Mao state, in terms of societal reach, is generally portrayed as a pale shadow of its Maoist predecessor. David Shambaugh observes: "If one of the hallmarks of the Maoist state was the penetration of society, then the Dengist state was noticeable for its withdrawal. The organizational mechanisms of state penetration and manipulation were substantially reduced or dismantled altogether."¹ With the Chinese state ostensibly attempting to retreat from its former project of social mobilization, it seemed likely that militias, and worker militias in particular, would be among the first casualties of the post-Mao reform era. Surely Deng Xiaoping's bold decision in 1979 to abolish class labels undercut the rationale for an institution so deeply rooted in the doctrine of class struggle.

If militias were to have any place at all in the post-CR order, one might have predicted that they would be strictly limited to that of an auxiliary military force under tight PLA supervision. The doctrine of people's war was not a dead letter in military circles, suggesting that community-based militias (especially in rural areas) might still be permitted to function under the auspices of their local People's Armed Forces departments. But the transgressions committed by worker militias in the CR—operating in the name of the proletariat and independently of PLA control—would seem to have foreclosed the desirability of resurrecting this particular revolutionary institution.

Moreover, popular resentment against the urban militias was palpable. When Ma Xiaoliu of Beijing's Capital Militia (see chapter 5)

returned to his factory post in 1979, three years after the April Fifth Tiananmen Incident, fellow workers jeered, "Cudgel Corps leader . . . executioner!" Rank and file militiamen who had received merit certificates and prizes for participating in the Capital Militia's suppression of the 1976 demonstrations at Tiananmen Square publicly burned these paraphernalia at mass meetings convened to condemn the CR. At one such convocation, an erstwhile member of the Capital Militia dramatically ripped up a photograph that showed her being received by Jiang Qing. Declaring that "this hand shook Jiang Qing's hand and now I can't bear the stench," the former militia-woman rubbed her hand again and again with a handkerchief that she eventually threw on the ground in disgust.² Orchestrated as such anti-CR performances surely were (see photo 6.1), they seem to have reflected genuine relief at the demise of the Gang of Four and their radical programs.³

The public distaste for urban militias, combined with the PLA's suspicion of their rebellious potential, might be expected to have militated against the likelihood of this institution outliving the CR. In fact, however, post-Mao China witnessed a resurgence of both



Photo 6.1. Shanghai citizens join orchestrated demonstrations to celebrate the downfall of the Gang of Four in October 1976. Taken from Zhongguo gongchandang 70nian tuji, Volume II, page 452.

military and union traditions of militia organization. The PLA moved swiftly to tame those units associated with the Gang of Four, but then proceeded to reassemble a significant militia force—in city and countryside alike—under its own command. More surprising still, trade unions (in collaboration with public security agencies) soon revived worker patrols as a means of restoring order in urban areas. The post-Mao state was seeking a new accommodation with society, to be sure, but it had not entirely abandoned either its aspirations or its institutions for popular mobilization.

MILITARY-SPONSORED MILITIAS

Most problematic among the remnant CR units was of course the Shanghai Militia. Immediately following the arrest of the Gang of Four, the SPC decreed a reorganization of the Shanghai Militia that returned direct supervision to the Garrison Command and its subordinate Armed Forces departments. To strengthen political leadership over the militia, party secretaries at all levels of government became the political commissars of Armed Forces departments at their same levels: Shanghai Party Secretary Peng Chong was assigned current responsibilities as political commissar of the Garrison Command, and so on down the line.⁴ Meanwhile, the garrison sent a work team to occupy the city Militia Command Post, while district and county People's Armed Forces departments carried out similar takeovers at their respective levels.⁵

A purge of militia cadres was undertaken in districts across the city to eliminate remnant rebels; in Xuhui District, for example, more than a third of the militia cadres at the battalion and regiment levels were dismissed. Factories quickly followed suit. At the General Petrochemical Factory, eight out of twelve division commanders were considered problematic; at the Number Five Cotton Mill, seven of eight regimental leaders were so designated; at the China Clock Factory, all eight battalion cadres were deemed unreliable, and so forth. Investigations, suspensions, and dismissals followed.⁶ Ordinary militiamen were also subject to review and removal. At the Red Thread Factory, which had served as a model militia unit during the

CR because of its arrogation of public security operations, nearly half of the regular militia and 80 percent of the core members were discharged on grounds of being overage.⁷ Thorough as this housecleaning was, its techniques were notably moderate by comparison with CR practices.

The Shanghai experience was part of a national process in which the PLA moved to disarm and disband militia units whose loyalties were suspect. Militias that survived this scrutiny were once again placed under firm military command.⁸ Restoring the militia was officially justified as a means of "consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing a military invasion, and aiding the liberation of Taiwan."⁹

To enhance commitment on the part of ordinary militiamen, a new annual training program of two to three weeks' duration was introduced. Factories and communes were required to guarantee the regular wages of those who participated, so that they would not suffer any loss of income.¹⁰ Nevertheless, in a manner familiar from previous efforts at militia mobilization, discipline was a continuing source of disappointment. As a frustrated militia instructor in Shanghai complained: "In some work units, militia members constantly ask to be excused from drills. In quite a few work units, some male militiamen grow their hair long, give it a permanent wave, and wear bell-bottom trousers."¹¹

In June of 1977 the PLA undertook a major campaign to reform and strengthen the militia organizationally, politically, and militarily. The goals and procedures of this movement resembled those of the Everyone a Soldier Campaign two decades before (see chapter 4). Once again the military was assuming the central role in ensuring the political reliability and combat readiness of a paramilitary force whose principal mission was not to engage in domestic class struggle, but to assist in national defense.¹² The fruits of this reorganization were apparent in 1979, when the militia provided significant logistical support for China's ill-fated attack on Vietnam.¹³

Although the Chinese military remained committed in principle to the Maoist notion of people's war, in the reform era it modified this strategic concept, first to "people's war under modern conditions," and then to "limited war under high-technology conditions."¹⁴ One element in the modification, according to Solomon Karmel, was a shift "away from the least organized militias of the people and toward the

most organized divisions of the PLA."¹⁵ Another element in the new formula was a shrinking and streamlining of the militia forces themselves; gone was the Everyone a Soldier Campaign's vision of universal conscription. In the reorganization of the post-Mao era, only townships (formerly communes), administrative villages, urban districts, and large urban factories were permitted to retain militias; schools, government agencies, research units, and smaller factories were required to dispense with their forces. The age eligibility was also narrowed, becoming eighteen to thirty-five years for men and eighteen to twenty-eight years for women. This had the effect of retiring the vast majority of those who had served during the CR. As a result of these reforms, 40 percent of urban militia units were disbanded in the early 1980s, and enrollment in the militia (in city and countryside alike) dropped to about 10 percent of the population. By 1987 the militia had shrunk still further—to 4.3 million core and 6 million ordinary members.¹⁶

A major reason for this reduction in the size of the militia was the inauguration in June 1982 of the People's Armed Police (PAP), a specialized branch (composed largely of demobilized soldiers) of the PLA with particular responsibility for internal security.¹⁷ Mindful of the Capital Militia's poor showing during the April Fifth Tiananmen Incident, the post-Mao authorities decided to turn the task of crowd control over to the newly constituted PAP. In the spring of 1989, therefore, it was the PAP that was initially ordered to quell the student demonstrations in Beijing. But the new force proved no more adept at this assignment than the militia had been. The PAP's abysmal performance resulted in the decision to resort to PLA soldiers in carrying out the infamous June Fourth Massacre around Tiananmen Square. The PAP was subsequently retrained and rearmed, however, and in the 1990s the special force was deployed repeatedly against tax protesters in the countryside, laid-off workers in the cities, and disgruntled minorities in the border regions.¹⁸ By the end of the century, the manpower of the PAP had doubled (to nearly a million) and its funding had ballooned in tandem.¹⁹

The regular militia, despite its dwindling size and budget, continued to perform certain extramilitary functions in the post-Mao era. In the month of December 1983, militia forces across the country were credited with subduing more than two million criminals. In

Shanghai at that time, more than twenty thousand militiamen operated checkpoints at major thoroughfares, and staffed hundreds of patrol units to deter crime along roads, wharfs, and train stations.²⁰ The impressive statistics belied an ugly reality, however. These initiatives were undertaken as part of the "Stern Blows" Anti-crime Campaign, which Murray Scot Tanner characterizes as plagued by "widespread abuses, false and vengeful arrests and punishments, faked crime statistics, widespread confessions under torture, and severe prison overcrowding."²¹ More benignly, the reinstated militias were also deployed for public works projects that included irrigation construction, flood control, reforestation, road building, and firefighting.²²

Nevertheless, the main mission of the post-Mao militia is clearly to provide logistical support for military actions—even as such undertakings are understood to require ever greater technological sophistication (see photo 6.2). A National Urban Militia Working Conference, convened by the Central Military Commission in December 2001, stressed that "Militia are a component of the national armed forces, and urban militia construction is a focus of national de-




Photo 6.2. Refurbished urban militia joins a parade on October 1, 1999, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Corbis

fense strength." Despite the professed commitment to urban militia building, the conference concluded with an admission that "Providing sufficient funding is becoming increasingly difficult."²³ The heyday of the PLA-sponsored militia was seemingly behind it.

UNION-SPONSORED WORKER PICKETS

The military was not the only agency whose post-Mao recovery was accompanied by a renewed interest in militia organization, however. In the years immediately following the CR, China's trade unions enjoyed a "phoenix-like growth" as part of the general trend to resuscitate institutions that had been debilitated by radical assault during the "ten years of turmoil."²⁴ At the same time that the PLA was deploying militiamen to shore up its floundering war effort in Vietnam, the newly restored unions moved to revive their own proletarian patrols. Although these units were ostensibly quite unlike the urban militias of the CR, in fact they bore a certain family resemblance to both CR and pre-CR antecedents.

The resurrection of worker patrols was triggered by a crime wave that swept across Chinese cities in the immediate aftermath of the CR.²⁵ As restless young people who had been sent down to the countryside streamed back to the cities, urban unemployment and criminal activity escalated in tandem. In Shanghai, punks and petty hoodlums began to take control of some of the less-traveled streets. Working-class districts of the city reported frequent robberies and rapes. For a time, women who worked the night shift were afraid to commute to their factories alone. To guarantee the safety of its workers and restore a sense of public order, the municipal union decided to organize worker pickets (*gongren jiuqiaodui*). After discussions with party and government authorities, it was agreed that the patrols would first be reinstated in Luwan District. On the night of November 6, 1979, more than two hundred workers, wearing armbands marked *worker pickets* and carrying billy clubs, began to patrol the streets of Luwan.²⁶ A month later, *Workers' Daily* gave national publicity to the experiment in an article headlined "Maintain social order and protect the four modernizations; Shanghai's Luwan District establishes worker pickets."²⁷

In August of 1980 the SPC approved a report from the municipal trade union that portrayed worker pickets as part of a long-term strategy for maintaining social stability in urban China. The party called upon unions at all levels to organize picket units, for which public security agencies would provide professional instruction and supervision. The link to public security harkened back to a tradition, developed under the KMT and continued in the 1950s and during the CR, whereby proletarian patrols were coordinated with government intelligence and police activities.

At this time picket work was extended to all districts and counties in Shanghai. By the end of 1980, six thousand pickets a day were being deployed across the city.²⁸ As Martin Whyte and William Parish describe the institution shortly after its revival:

Workers' picket corps (*gongren jiucha dui*) were organized and armed with staves and clubs to patrol the immediate neighborhoods of work unit compounds. These corps were sometimes used to patrol other neighborhoods in the city and were called upon to help put down the remnants of factional violence of the Cultural Revolution. In later years, the organizations achieved a semi-permanent basis. Workers were released from their regular jobs but continued to receive their normal pay while they trained and served in workers' militia units that patrolled city streets and alleys.²⁹

Over the next decade, the SPC approved a series of reports from the union and the PSB advocating various means for beefing up the worker pickets. The first concern was to improve the quality of the recruits. Every work unit was asked to select 0.3 percent of its employees to serve as pickets, taking care to include a substantial number of party and Youth League members as well as a critical mass of experienced older workers to act as "backbones." Requirements for joining the pickets included union membership, a "firm standpoint," progressive outlook, upright demeanor, and good physical health. Young or middle-aged males provided the bulk of the recruits. Patrolling was a part-time occupation for these individuals, who also held down regular factory jobs.³⁰ Those designated for this service received their usual factory wages while on patrol duty.³¹

As had been the case with the Shanghai Militia during the CR, the reconstituted pickets were organized according to the city's administrative divisions. Brigades (*dadui*) were established at the district level, and teams (*dui*) at the street office level. At residential committee levels, small groups (*xiaozu*) were formed. Street office teams worked in cooperation with the local police station to undertake regular patrols; on average, seventy pickets—led by members of the People's Police—were on duty each day in each street office team. In the spring of 1988, the union and the PSB decided to establish a joint Shanghai Worker Pickets Office to oversee picket activities throughout the city. The office was housed within the municipal public security building.³²

The operations of the reestablished pickets, like those of worker militias during the CR, ranged from regular patrols to sudden sweeps. According to official statistics, the regular patrols were remarkably successful—accounting for the arrests of more than 38,000 criminals in the first nine months of 1983, for example. Moreover, these routine rounds were augmented by surprise initiatives. The pickets were credited with staging hundreds of successful ambushes each year. In December of 1979, for instance, pickets in Changning District swooped down on unsuspecting hoodlums in Zhongshan Park who had been harassing young women by spraying hydrochloric acid on their nylon blouses.³³ Even more impressive were the dragnets aimed at prostitution rings, drug dealers, and other illegal traffickers. In the period from 1979 to 1994, the Shanghai pickets were credited with uncovering more than 13,400 cases of prostitution and apprehending nearly a million criminals. Less dramatically, they were said to have deterred countless cases of bicycle theft and other petty crimes simply by their vigilant patrols of local neighborhoods.³⁴

These patrols were conducted under the supervision of the police, who provided training in crime-fighting skills such as spotting likely criminals and apprehending culprits. Aside from their nighttime patrols, pickets were supposed to engage in preventative propaganda—reminding residents to lock their doors and bicycles, for example. They were also expected to perform various good Samaritan services: escorting pregnant women to the hospital, and helping the lost or mentally retarded to get their bearings.³⁵ In the fifteen years

following the revival of the workers pickets in 1979, thousands of members received awards for various degrees of meritorious service. Nine died in the line of duty, of whom three were honored as revolutionary martyrs by the city government.³⁶

As the designation *revolutionary martyr* suggests, the pickets' contributions were not confined to mundane crime control. Combating counterrevolutionaries was another key task, linking the contemporary pickets to earlier incarnations of this institution from the mid-1920s, the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign of the early 1950s, and the CR. The largest deployment of worker militias for this purpose came during student demonstrations in the spring of 1989, when the city of Shanghai called up more than 100,000 pickets to clear the streets of protesters:

On June 8 . . . after Mayor Zhu Rongji's televised address, more than five thousand pickets at thirty-three large and medium-sized enterprises throughout the city formed propaganda teams to converge from all directions on three command posts in the city center. By four in the morning on the 9th, more than five thousand propaganda team members together with armed police and public security personnel, riding in trucks and holding high banners, took to the streets to clear away all obstructions. At the same time, more than 100,000 worker pickets organized by each district sprang into action. By dawn, the forty-eight remaining obstructions had all been removed . . . Zhu Rongji offered praise: "The Shanghai worker pickets took action early this morning, restoring Shanghai's transportation and ending the disorderly situation. You have performed a great service for the people of Shanghai!"³⁷

Among this sizeable force of worker pickets was a fellow by the name of Li Hongbao who, together with sixteen comrades, was praised for capturing eight "desperadoes" responsible for setting fire to railway cars.³⁸

Ironically, an institution that had taken shape during the May Fourth Movement to complement student protesters, was now—seventy years later—marshaled by the Communist state to crush student protesters. Institutional inversion had come full circle. To be sure, government authorities offered a plausible rationale for their reliance on

worker pickets as strikebreakers. In terms recalling Zhang Chunqiao's justification for founding the Attack with Words–Defend with Weapons force during the factional strife of the CR, the 1989 Shanghai leadership explained its deployment of worker militias as a means of quelling popular unrest without resorting to military force. And indeed, the contrast between the relatively swift and smooth suppression effort in Shanghai and the massacre that occurred in Beijing, where first the PAP and then the PLA itself were called upon to quell the student demonstrators, was glaring. The mayor of China's largest industrial city was determined to use Shanghai's most valuable political resource, its proletariat, as a substitute for military might in order to avoid massive bloodshed:

Mayor Zhu Rongji . . . emphasized that martial law would not be declared in Shanghai. "Many comrades have asked us to call in the People's Armed Police, and some have even suggested bringing in the army. As mayor, I solemnly declare that neither the Party Committee nor the Municipal Government has considered calling in the army. We have never envisaged military control, *let alone* martial law; we seek only to stabilize Shanghai, to steady the *situation*, to insist on production, and to ensure normal life." That evening tens of thousands of workers were sent out to clear away the roadblocks.³⁹

Further replicating the experience of the CR, worker militias were not only deployed to suppress public protests; they also occupied residential neighborhoods: "Reserve teams of ten thousand to twenty thousand more [workers] were mobilized in every district to maintain order."⁴⁰

The use of worker pickets to stabilize industrial neighborhoods during the unrest of 1989 was a national phenomenon: "In Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Liaoyang, and other urban areas, worker pickets were formed with workers as the mainstay . . . to protect factories and preserve social order. They assisted the party and government in suppressing the turmoil and quieting the counterrevolutionary chaos."⁴¹ Nationally, more than 2.5 million proletarian patrols were mobilized to help restore public order that spring. The worker militias were credited with arresting more than seven thousand criminals in conjunction with the suppression campaign.⁴² It was in light of such contributions

that the newly tapped general-secretary of the party, Jiang Zemin, asserted at the eleventh congress of the ACFTU in the summer of 1989 that "we must put our complete faith in the working class."⁴³ Worker militias remained a powerful agent for patrolling the revolution.

The prominent role of the proletariat in the 1989 suppression campaign suggests the moral authority that workers, as premier revolutionary citizens, continued to represent in post-Mao China. Although the post-Mao state abandoned some of the more draconian methods of social mobilization and control wielded by its immediate predecessor, it nevertheless continued to draw upon both the institutional and the ideological legacy of the Chinese Revolution. At moments of crisis, worker militias were deployed as a potent weapon for coping with class struggle. The role of workers in the spring of 1989 recalled scenes from the CR when truckloads of workers (armed with *Quotations from Chairman Mao* as well as with staves) were deployed to put an end to factional fighting.⁴⁴ That the revolutionary tradition remained salient in the minds of the party leaders was made crystal clear when they chose to characterize the student protests of 1989 (like the April Fifth Incident of 1976, in which worker militias had also put down the unrest) as a "counterrevolutionary rebellion." At a national public security conference to sum up the Tiananmen experience and plan for the future, a statement by Deng Xiaoping was cited as the watchword of the day: "Under conditions of continued class struggle, under conditions of continued imperialist hegemony, we cannot fantasize about the withering away of the state's dictatorship capacities."⁴⁵

Despite the many respects in which Deng's regime had repudiated its Maoist roots, it failed to develop an alternative understanding of citizenship. When faced with a life-or-death challenge, the post-Mao leadership reverted to stale clichés about "class struggle" directed against "hidden enemies." Once again, the "broad masses" were called upon to "expose and report on counterrevolutionaries."⁴⁶ In conjunction with this effort, the Ministry of Public Security reported that in Shanghai "one hundred forty-three members of illegal organizations have come to Public Security to register or confess; 273 turmoil elements of various kinds have been arrested; three counterrevolutionary groups and two Taiwan-KMT spy rings have been cracked."⁴⁷

CHALLENGING THE STATE

As the active involvement of labor in the protests that spring indicated, however, the working class was not an unproblematic ally of the post-Mao state. In Shanghai, even the official trade union dominated a considerable sum of money to support the hunger-striking students in Tiananmen Square.⁴⁸ And workers around the country, blaming party leaders for double-digit inflation and declining living standards, called for independent unions dedicated to representing the interests of labor. This demand was most forcefully articulated by the Workers' Autonomous Federation in Beijing, but the challenge was by no means limited to that one organization or city.⁴⁹ Unofficial labor unions sprang up in at least nineteen provinces, with two or more reported in several major cities.⁵⁰

Accompanying this burgeoning labor movement was a flourishing of unauthorized militia-type organizations. Sociologist Andrew Walder estimates that, among the thousands of citizen associations formed by workers and other urbanites in the spring of 1989, the most numerous were probably self-defense forces known as pickets (*jiucha dui*) and Dare-to-Die Corps (*gansi dui*), whose purpose was "to maintain order at demonstrations, protect students and other political groups from security forces, and later would play an active role in resistance to martial law."⁵¹ Such groups posed a major obstacle to the state's repression effort. Political scientist Daniel Kelliher elaborates, "As the 1989 confrontation became more heated, it was workers and other nonstudent residents who for two weeks thwarted the government's attempts to enforce martial law in Beijing. Ordinary citizens erected roadblocks, reasoned with the troops, organized security groups to replace the police (who had disappeared from the streets), and formed 'dare-to-die squads' committed to keeping the soldiers from entering the city."⁵² In some cases, these citizen militias enjoyed quasi-official sponsorship:

The "Capital Workers' Picket Corps" was established during the hunger strike and appears to have been organized by, or to have a close association with, staff or students in the Chinese Workers' Movement Institute under the All-China Federation of Trade

Unions. It published one handbill, in which it called for nonviolent resistance to troops, the protection of hunger-strikers, and the maintenance of order around the site of the hunger-strike.⁵³

In other cases, pickets operated as appendages of unofficial unions. A team of pickets under the auspices of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation was especially active in providing assistance to student protesters. After martial law had been declared, this force was dispatched to help secure the release of students who had been arrested and were being held in the suburban county of Daxing:

The workers' union sent out one of its picket teams in a truck borrowed for the occasion. In a scene reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, a rescue party set out for Daxing: a brigade of motorcyclists from the Flying Tigers set out in front, and behind them six trucks filled with members of the picket corps of the workers' union and other picket corps of citizens and students. When the procession stopped in front of the county party headquarters and demanded the release of their comrades, the officials denied knowledge of the arrested students. After camping out in front of the building for a period, word was leaked to them that the students were being held elsewhere in town, and the procession rushed off and freed eight imprisoned students. Angered at the officials' lies, they stopped by the local public security bureau on their way out of town, shouted curses and slogans, and pelted the building with stones.⁵⁴

In Nanjing and Xi'an as well, protesting workers dubbed their rebel organizations Worker Pickets (*gongren jiuchadui*). In Lanzhou, a dog-beating command post (*dagou zhihuibu*) was established by aggrieved citizens.⁵⁵ The revolutionary heritage of China's urban militias, in other words, remained a frame of reference not only for state authorities, but also for those who questioned the state's actions.⁵⁶

RETURN OF THE PEACE PRESERVATION CORPS

The searing experience of 1989 led to an official reassessment of the institution of union-sponsored pickets. Despite the crucial contributions of state-sponsored worker pickets in helping to quell the upris-

ing that spring, the mushrooming of maverick militias raised suspicions within the party leadership about the wisdom of relying upon worker pickets as guardians of revolutionary order. In 1991, party branches were set up within each level of picket organization so as to carry out "investigation, cultivation, and political thought work."⁵⁷ And soon the economic problems attendant upon industrial restructuring convinced the state to dispense with the worker pickets altogether.

Faced with the difficulty of providing for an ever expanding reserve army of laid-off workers, Shanghai decided to replace its worker pickets with a Peace Preservation Corps (*baohan dui*) whose members would be mostly unemployed workers for whom patrol activities would constitute a full-time job. Like its namesake at the time of the Communist takeover of Shanghai in 1949 (see chapters 3 and 4), this latter-day Peace Preservation Corps (PPC) would operate under party (rather than union) supervision, in close cooperation with public security agencies.

The revival of the PPC was prompted by several considerations. In addition to the pressing need to take care of unemployed workers, there was a sense that security measures had to be heightened both because of the increasing number of outsiders (*wailai ren*) milling about the city and because of the decline of the Residents' Committees that had served as the pillar of neighborhood control during the days of strictly enforced household registration regulations.⁵⁸ Moreover, with the command economy crumbling in the face of market reforms, it was no longer possible to require enterprises to commit a certain percentage of their workforce to nonproductive patrol duties. Unions were utterly incapable of enforcing such a requisition. The closure of many state enterprises further reduced the supply of volunteers available for assignment to picket duty.⁵⁹

The PPC was actually an amalgamation of three previously separate units; in addition to the Worker Pickets, the United Defense Corps (*lianfangdui*) and the Outsiders' Management Committees (*wailaizhe guanli weiyuanhui*) were folded into the new operation. About a quarter of the corps members had served in one of the three constituent units; these "backbones" were retained to provide continuity. Most corps members were newly recruited, however. In some cases, the new members were taken directly from factories that were

in the process of declaring bankruptcy. In other cases, they were attracted through advertisements posted in local neighborhood offices. To be eligible, one needed to be between thirty-five and fifty years of age, and a local resident. Although a few women were hired to staff the office and to handle problems of the floating population, the great majority of those selected were men. A background check and physical examination were completed on all applicants to ensure good health, an upright character, and absence of any criminal record. Not surprisingly in these times of economic trouble, the jobs were in considerable demand. In Nanshi District, for example, more than one thousand individuals applied for four hundred openings when the corps was announced. Upon admission, new recruits were required to undergo a one-week training course that emphasized ideology, discipline, and police techniques. The curriculum also included a rudimentary legal education—with particular emphasis on the newly promulgated labor law. Successful completion of the training was rewarded with a work permit issued by the Bureau of Labor. In contrast to the pickets, whose wages had differed widely according to their original workplace, members of the PPC were paid a standard wage.⁶⁰ They were also supplied with uniforms, raincoats, armbands, and billy sticks, as well as medical coverage (to be paid by their original work unit), and a life insurance policy.⁶¹

Like the worker pickets that preceded them, PPC members carried out night patrols (11 p.m. to 5 a.m.) and crime prevention activities. But they were charged with additional responsibilities as well: managing the floating population and monitoring labor standards. They checked up on outsiders to see whether the newcomers had been issued proper work permits, for example. And they inspected local factories (particularly foreign-owned enterprises) to make sure that the workplace was safe, that child labor was not being used, that employees were not forced to work overtime, and that proper medical coverage was provided to the workers. Suspected infringements were reported to the Bureau of Labor, which might then call upon regular police forces to handle the problem.⁶²

The substitution of the PPC for the union-sponsored Worker Pickets symbolizes the current plight of China's once-proud revolutionary class. With state-owned enterprises on the ropes, the indus-

trial proletariat has lost both jobs and political status. A police officer responsible for training new recruits to the PPC in Shanghai's Nanshi District, when questioned about the historical pedigree of the corps, pointed at once to the site of a nearby guild hall that had housed Communist-sponsored pickets during the Workers' Three Armed Uprisings of 1926–1927. Asked then whether his instruction program included any lessons in the revolutionary history of worker militias, the officer paused for a moment, smiled ruefully, and then shook his head emphatically: “No,” he replied. “No mention of that ‘glorious workers’ revolutionary tradition.’ It would be too dangerous to teach today’s workers about that!”⁶³

CONCLUSION

Although state authorities may sometimes be reluctant to remind people of their revolutionary heritage, there is mounting evidence that ordinary citizens have not forgotten the subversive potential of the militias. Disgruntled members of society—whether acting in the name of the proletariat or the people—routinely invoke revolutionary rhetoric and repertoires to bolster their demands. The countless groups of unauthorized pickets that sprang up across China during the 1989 demonstrations offered dramatic proof of the continuing importance of this legacy for contemporary popular protest.

For some critics of the post-Mao order, China's revolutionary inheritance could be traced from the Paris Commune, through Maoist radicalism, to the uprising of 1989. Zhang Xudong, a Shanghai-born scholar of Chinese and comparative literature, offers the following personal account:

In 1971, when I was six, I witnessed a celebration of the centennial of the Paris Commune at my grandpa's house in Xuzhou, a mid-sized industrial/military town on the Jiangsu/Shandong border. My grandpa, who joined the CCP in 1929, and was then a retired political commissar of a PLA unit in Xuzhou, threw a big banquet for his comrades at his house, which was decorated with all kinds of pictures and posters about the Paris Commune. Before starting to eat, everybody stood up and sang “The Internationale”

and "The East is Red." For me the festive atmosphere was strangely and refreshingly European and stood in dramatic contrast to the guests (as well as the hosts) who were—in the eyes of a young boy from Shanghai—nothing more than a bunch of Chinese peasants attending a village wedding (many guests brought with them live chickens and fresh-water fish, hard liquor, and farm produce, along with their professional cooks in military uniform).

When I saw my grandpa in the summer of 1989, he was a firm sympathizer with the students at Tiananmen. He told me how touched he was when he heard the students sing "The Internationale" on TV. He had no trouble seeing the connection between the rebellious students and Mao, to whom he remained loyal till his death. Sometimes I wonder if my grandpa wasn't more Parisian than some of my post-structuralist colleagues, busy deconstructing the "grand narratives" of modernity and revolution.⁶⁴

The singing of "The Internationale" was by this time a staple feature of popular protest in China, having served to unify demonstrators during the Tiananmen Incident of 1976, the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978–1979, and the student unrest of 1986–1987.⁶⁵ Its stirring lyrics, urging workers to "rise up," had originally been penned in the spring of 1871 just as the French army was closing in on the Paris Commune.⁶⁶ More than a century later, when the citizens of Beijing took to the barricades to block PLA tanks from entering their city in the spring of 1989, the historical link to the Commune seemed obvious to many. Sociologist Craig Calhoun, who was living in Beijing at the time, recalls:

The Paris Commune sprang to my mind; similar thoughts occurred to Beijing citizens . . . the analogy to 1871 was in fact made by some Chinese students in the middle of the protests, especially when barricades were first erected against the threatening army. They were familiar with the Paris events from Marx's essay "The Civil War in France" or its more generic summaries in Chinese texts on the history of Communism.⁶⁷

Striking though the parallels between the two events appeared, the analogy was far from perfect. The suppression of the Paris Commune by the Versailles troops is generally regarded as marking the

end of the French Revolution era—the moment at which a strong, centralized nation-state won a decisive and permanent victory over localized aspirations for communal autonomy. In China, however, despite valiant philosophical efforts to bid "farewell to revolution,"⁶⁸ revolutionary authority has not yet been relegated to the dustbin of history. On the contrary, both state cadres and societal challengers continue to draw heavily upon this heritage in ways at once familiar and inventive.

To be sure, Deng Xiaoping's successor as paramount leader, Jiang Zemin, attempted to articulate a new basis of party-state legitimacy capable of supplementing, if not superseding, the inherited revolutionary ideology.⁶⁹ Jiang's Three Represents theory, which proposes that the CCP is the representative of (1) advanced productive forces, (2) advanced culture, and (3) the interests of the broad masses, has been put forward to justify a major overhaul of the CCP that includes recruiting successful capitalists for party membership.⁷⁰ This formulation is noteworthy for its absence of any mention of either revolution or the proletariat, but just how influential the Three Represents theory will turn out to be remains unclear. Moreover, with Jiang's own rise to the pinnacle of power having been tied to the state's verdict on the 1989 protest movement as a "counterrevolutionary rebellion," his latitude for ideological innovation was limited. Not surprisingly, then, Jiang's much-publicized campaign against Falun gong, which got underway in the summer of 1999, branded this so-called evil cult as counterrevolutionary.⁷¹ And Jiang's successor as general-secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Jintao, has repeatedly summoned revolutionary symbolism in justifying his party's claim to rule. On a visit to the site of the former Jiangxi Soviet in the summer of 2003, for example, Hu enjoined officials at all levels of the party to "carry on the revolutionary tradition." As Hu put it, "Comrade Mao Zedong and other revolutionaries of the elder generation not only made historical achievements by realizing national independence and liberation, but also bequeathed to us precious spiritual wealth." A front page article in *People's Daily* elaborated on Hu's remarks: "Such revolutionary spirit and tradition, which were fostered through arduous struggles, provide strength for overcoming difficulties and risks of all kinds in our way forward."⁷²

As we have seen, however, party-state officials are not the only claimants to this precious spiritual wealth (see photo 6.3). And 1989 did not ring down the curtain on ordinary citizens' efforts to turn the revolutionary tradition to their own purposes. At the Anyuan Coal Mine, where Li Lisan had organized worker pickets during the first strike to take place under CCP auspices (see chapter 1), retired workers in 2004 recalled that history in pressing their current grievances: "During the years of revolutionary struggle, Anyuan workers suffered and sacrificed for the sake of the Chinese Revolution . . . Under the reforms, thanks to the exertions of our generation of miners, the enterprise has profited and prospered and yet we have not enjoyed the fruits of reform. Our wages have been cut and our pensions are very, very meager."⁷³

Faced with the threat of bankruptcy triggered by the post-Mao industrial policies, disgruntled workers have once again been forming picket forces to protect their factories—in conscious imitation of the revolutionary exemplar. But this time their actions are directed against the Communist party-state, in an effort to "liberate" their workplaces from forced closures. Political scientist Feng Chen reports on a recent scene at a Shanghai plastics factory:

As some workers proudly describe it, their action of defending the factory is similar to that of their predecessors on the eve of the Communist takeover in 1949 when pro-Communist workers formed "worker guard teams" [*gongren jiuchadui*] to protect factories from sabotage by the Guomindang. Ironically, however, the workers are now using the same method to ward off capitalistic takeovers endorsed by a party-state that still labels itself socialist.⁷⁴

Similar confrontations, pitting unofficial worker militias against government authorities, have taken place in other parts of the country as well. In an antiprivatization protest at the Zhengzhou Paper Mill in Henan Province in the summer of 2000, workers produced three hundred red armbands for members of their Factory Defense Corps (*huchangdai*). (See chapter 3 for a discussion of the historical antecedents of this nomenclature.) Participation in the defense force was open to any worker or staff person who supported the protest.




Photo 6.3. Older revolutionary passes along his experience to a younger generation of militiamen. Photo purchased at the Anyuan Labor Movement Memorial Hall in Jiangxi Province.

Women and retired workers took the daytime shift, while young and middle-aged workers patrolled the premises at night. The workers' defiance continued for two months until the police finally broke through the barricades and arrested two of the ringleaders, including the captain of the makeshift militia.⁷⁵

China's mobilizational state, powerful and pervasive as it remains, has not robbed its citizens of the capacity for resistance. On the contrary, popular protest—often framed in class terms—has flourished in recent decades, posing a formidable challenge to state control.⁷⁶ To what extent class-centered claims will continue to carry moral weight in the rapidly changing context of contemporary China is an open question. Opposition to the privatization of state-owned enterprises has rekindled a discourse of class and class struggle among some industrial workers.⁷⁷ Yet other workers have started to shy away from class-based identities, portraying themselves during protest actions as weak and deprived groups (*ruoshi qunti*) rather than as working class or proletariat.⁷⁸ And the tendency of the central state to look more favorably upon protests that are territorially limited may well encourage future protesters to present their grievances as reflective of local community, rather than of class, concerns.⁷⁹ The Chinese revolutionary tradition, having developed over the course of a century in vastly different geographical settings, under competing bureaucratic and ideological auspices, encompasses contrasting conceptions of citizenship.

NOTES

1. David Shambaugh, "The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era," in *The Modern Chinese State*, ed. Shambaugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 183. For a contrasting image of the Dengist state, as in some respects more powerful than its Maoist precursor, see Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988).
2. Fang Shike and Ruan Shenji, "Emeng xinglai" [Awakened from a nightmare], in "Wenhua dageming" *fengyun renwu jiangtan lu* [A record of interviews with "Cultural Revolution" notables], 387.
3. In Shanghai, millions of residents poured into the streets in mid-October 1976 to participate in day after day of festivities celebrating the downfall of the Gang of Four. Shanghai Party Committee Cultural Revolution Materials

Small Group, ed., *Shanghai "wenhua dageming" shihua* [Historical narrative of the "Great Cultural Revolution" in Shanghai] (Shanghai, 1992), 971. The state orchestration that underlay these public displays is described in Nien Cheng, *Life and Death in Shanghai* (London: Collins, 1986), 483–84. Official videos of these demonstrations (held by the Shanghai Municipal Archives) feature the Shanghai Militia—in their signature wicker hard hats and overalls—marching down the major thoroughfares of the city in celebration of the overthrow of their former commanders.

4. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 23:1–2.
5. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 23:38.
6. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 23:4, 22–23.
7. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 23:23.
8. Thomas C. Roberts, *The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of People's War* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983), 79–80; Donald H. McMillen, "Civil Defence in the People's Republic of China," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 8 (July 1982): 37–38.
9. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 23:53.
10. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 23:71–72.
11. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 24:23.
12. Roberts, *The Chinese People's Militia*, 88–94.
13. Roberts, *The Chinese People's Militia*, 101–03.
14. David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 60–107. Shambaugh explains that the Gulf War of 1991 triggered a decisive transformation in Chinese strategic thinking, away from the doctrine of people's war toward a greater appreciation of advanced technology (69).
15. Solomon M. Karmel, *China and the People's Liberation Army* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 28.
16. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1989), 80–81.
17. Tai Ming Cheung, "Guarding China's Domestic Front Line: The People's Armed Police and China's Stability," *China Quarterly* (June 1996): 525–47; Liu Xiaohua, "Armed Police Force: China's One Million Special Armed Troops," in FBIS-CHI, May 14, 1998; Chinese People's Armed Police History Office, ed., *Wujing chongjian ershinian* [Twenty years of reconstituting the Armed Police] (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Arts Press, 2003).
18. David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military*, 170–73; Timothy Brook, *Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
19. Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 74. Just how effective a riot control force the PAP constitutes remains unclear, however. Scobell notes that in February 2000 the PAP was unable to cope with a miners'

protest in Liaoning Province; the regular PLA was once again called in to subdue the unrest.

20. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, 360.
21. Murray Scot Tanner, "State Coercion and the Balance of Awe: The 1983-1986 'Stern Blows' Anti-Crime Campaign," *China Journal*, no. 44 (July 2000): 123.
22. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, chap. 13.
23. *Jiefang junbao* [Liberation Army Daily], December 15, 2001, p. 1.
24. Richard Morris, "Trade Unions in Contemporary China," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 13 (January 1985): 51.
25. Harold M. Tanner, *Strike Hard! Anti-Crime Campaigns and Chinese Criminal Justice, 1979-1985* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell East Asia Series, 1999).
26. Li Jiaqi, ed., *Shanghai gongyunzhi* [Shanghai labor movement gazetteer] (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1997), 432; *Shanghai Radio* (November 9, 1979) in FBIS-CHI, November 26, 1979, p. O3.
27. *Gongren ribao* [Workers' Daily], December 5, 1979.
28. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 432-33. The district of Minhang was slow to undertake picket work, but by 1981 it too had followed suit; by 1992 there were several hundred worker pickets operating within the district. *Minhang qüzhi* [Minhang district gazetteer] (Shanghai, 1996), 387. In 1990, more than seven thousand pickets were engaged in daily patrols across the city. *Shanghai gong'an zhi* [Shanghai public security gazetteer] (Shanghai, 1997), 233.
29. Martin King Whyte and William L. Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 243.
30. *Shanghai gong'an zhi*, 233.
31. Since wages varied a good deal, there was a considerable pay differential among pickets.
32. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 433; *Nanshi qüzhi* [Nanshi district gazetteer] (Shanghai, 1997), 367; *Luwan qüzhi* [Luwan District gazetteer] (Shanghai, 1998), 535.
33. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 433.
34. *Shanghai gong'an zhi*, 234; Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 434.
35. Interview at Nanshi district government offices, July 2, 1999.
36. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 434.
37. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions, ed., *Shanghai gongyunzhi* [Gazetteer of the Shanghai labor movement] (Shanghai, 1996), 514. This unpublished draft provides more information on sensitive topics than the published version that came out the following year under the editorship of Li Jiaqi.
38. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 433; *Yangpu qüzhi* [Yangpu District gazetteer] (Shanghai, 1995), 683; *Zhabei qüzhi* [Zhabei District gazetteer] (Shanghai, 1998), 675; *Luwan qüzhi*, 536; *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], June 10, 1989.
39. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., *The Tiananmen Papers* (New York: Perseus, 2001), 410.

40. Nathan and Link, *The Tiananmen Papers*, 413.
41. Zhang Yongkang, *Zhongguo gongren jieji de diwei he zuoyong* [The status and role of the Chinese working class] (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party School Publications, 1991), 241.
42. Yi Yuanqiu and Liu Guofu, eds., *Minbing zongheng tan* [A comprehensive discussion of the militia] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1994), 195.
43. Jiang Zemin, "Zhengque renshi gonghui de zuoyong" [Correctly understand the role of the union] in *Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin lun gongren jieji he gonghui gongzuo* [Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin discuss the working class and union work], ed. All-China Federation of Trade Unions (Beijing: Central Documents Press, 2002), 161.
44. Graphic descriptions can be found in William Hinton, *Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University* (New York: Monthly Review, 1972).
45. He Yumin, *Zhongguo renmin gong'an shigao* [Draft history of Chinese public security] (Beijing: Police Officers Education Press, 1997), 418-20.
46. Nathan and Link, *The Tiananmen Papers*, 449.
47. Nathan and Link, *The Tiananmen Papers*, 450.
48. FBIS-CHI, May 18, 1989, p. 49.
49. Andrew G. Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, "Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 29 (January 1993).
50. Andrew G. Walder, *Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization*, USC Seminar Series, no. 8 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1992), 3.
51. Walder, *Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement*, 4.
52. Daniel Kelliher, "Keeping Democracy Safe from the Masses: Intellectuals and Elitism in the Chinese Protest Movement," *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 4 (July 1993): 386-87.
53. Walder, *Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement*, 4.
54. Walder, *Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement*, 8.
55. *Beijing ribao* [Beijing Daily], June 4, 1989; *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], June 11, 1989; Walder, *Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement*, 9-10.
56. As Craig Calhoun notes, however, "not all 1989 protesters were aware that the term 'jiucha' or the translation 'pickets' had roots in 1919. Some must have made the connection explicitly, whereas others simply recognized *jiucha* as the appropriate term or learned it from fellow protesters." Craig Calhoun, *Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 287.
57. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 433.
58. Interview with Wang Lijuan and Sun Huimin, researchers at the Institute of Sociology, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (October 9, 1998). For a discussion of the impact of the economic reforms on residential committees, see

Benjamin L. Read, "Revitalizing the State's Urban 'Nerve Tips,'" *China Quarterly*, no. 163 (September 2000): 806–20.

59. Interview at Nanshi district government offices, July 2, 1999.
60. In 1999, wages for corps members were 750 to 800 yuan a month; in a few cases, bonuses for outstanding performance could raise the monthly pay to something approaching 1000 yuan.
61. Interview at Hongqiao Street Office of Changning District, July 9, 1999; interview at Nanshi District Office, July 2, 1999.
62. Interview at Hongqiao Street Office of Changning District, July 9, 1999; interview at Nanshi District Office, July 2, 1999.
63. Interview at Nanshi District Office, July 2, 1999.
64. Zhang Xudong, personal communication, October 31, 1999.
65. For the singing of "The Internationale" during the 1976 Tiananmen Incident, see Jin Chunming, "Siwu yundong shuping" [A critical narrative of the April Fifth Movement] in Zhang Hua et al., eds., *Huishou "wenge": Zhongguo shimin "wenge" fenxi yu fansi* [Looking back at the "Cultural Revolution": Analysis and reconsideration of China's ten-year "Cultural Revolution"] (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2000), 1241; for the Democracy Wall Movement, see John Fraser, *The Chinese: Portrait of a People* (New York: Summit Books, 1980); for the 1986–1987 student protests, see Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 299, 301, 320–22.
66. Calhoun, *Neither Gods nor Emperors*, 239, 301.
67. Calhoun, *Neither Gods nor Emperors*, 111, 239.
68. Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, *Gaobie geming: huiwang ershishiji Zhongguo* [Farewell to revolution: Looking back on twentieth-century China] (Hong Kong: Tiansi Book Company, 1997).
69. Gang Lin, "Ideology and Political Institutions for a New Era," in *China after Jiang*, ed. Gang Lin and Xiaobo Hu (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003).
70. Bruce J. Dickson, *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
71. Notice on Various Issues Regarding Identifying and Banning of Cultic Organizations (Beijing: Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China, 2000), reprinted in "Religion and Public Security in China, 1999–2002," *Chinese Law and Government* 36, no. 2 (2003).
72. *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], September 3, 2003.
73. "Ladong tiaojian zui cha, gongzuo zui jianku, zui weixian, dui guojia he qiye gongxian zui da de pingkuang tuixiu zhigong tuixiu yanglaojin dixia" [The dwindling pensions of retired Pingxiang miners whose labor conditions were the worst, whose work was the most difficult and dangerous, yet whose contribution to country and enterprise was the greatest], unpublished manifesto (Anyuan, 2004).

74. Feng Chen, "Industrial Restructuring and Workers' Resistance in China," *Modern China* 29, no. 2 (April 2003): 250. In the countryside as well, there are reports of unruly militias challenging state authority. See, for example, *China Focus* 6, no. 9 (September 1, 1998): 4.

75. Feng Chen, private e-mail communication, June 6, 2004. Professor Chen notes that at all four antiprivatization protests that he investigated in Zhengzhou, workers took factory-protection measures. I am very grateful to Professor Chen for sharing these findings.

76. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, eds., *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance* (London: Routledge Press, 2000 and 2003). On the continuing use of class rhetoric, see Ching Kwan Lee, "The Revenge of History: Collective Memories and Labor Protests in Northeastern China," *Ethnography* 1, no. 2 (2000): 217–37; and Elizabeth J. Perry, "'To Rebel is Justified': Cultural Revolution Influences on Contemporary Chinese Protest," in *Beyond Purge and Holocaust: The Chinese Cultural Revolution Reconsidered*, ed. Kam-ye Law (New York: Palgrave Press, 2003).

77. Feng Chen, "Privatization and its Discontents in Chinese Factories," *China Quarterly* (forthcoming).

78. Ching Kwan Lee, "'Made in China': Politics of Labor, Law and Legitimacy" (paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center, May 2004).

79. For emphasis on the importance of confining potentially subversive activities, such as the practice of sectarian religion, to one's neighborhood, see the editorial in *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], June 6, 1997. Further discussion of the Chinese state's effort to limit the geographical reach of protest can be found in Elizabeth J. Perry, introduction to *Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); and Perry and Selden, *Chinese Society*, introduction.