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Beyond European and American Exceptionalisms: towards a Global Perspective

José Casanova

We have reached an impasse in the secularization debate between European and American sociologists of religion (Swatos, 1999). The traditional European theory of secularization, the 'inherited' (Wilson, 1985) or 'orthodox' (Bruce, 2000) model, offers a relatively plausible account of European developments, but is unable or unwilling to take seriously, much less to explain, the surprising vitality and extreme pluralism of denominational forms of salvation religion in America. The emerging American paradigm (Warner, 1993) offers a convincing explanation of the US religious market, but is unable to account for the significant internal variations within Europe. Hence the impasse. The orthodox model works relatively well for Europe but not for America, the American paradigm works for USA but not for Europe. In order to overcome the impasse and surmount the fruitless debate, we first of all need to make clear the relative agreements and disagreements between the European and American positions.¹ But, more importantly, we need to refocus our attention beyond Europe and the West, historicize and contextualize our categories, and adopt a more global perspective.

The European–American Secularization Debate

Terminological Disagreements

The first and most basic disagreement is terminological. Europeans tend to use the term 'secularization' in a double sense, constantly switching back and forth between two related meanings. There is, firstly, secularization in the broader sense of the secularization of societal structures or the diminution of the social significance of religion. There is, secondly, secularization in the narrower sense of decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals. The broad meaning of social secularization is related to the long-term historical processes of social differentiation and the emancipation of the secular spheres (state, capitalist economy, science, and so on) from religious institutions and norms; and the concomitant relegation of religion to its own greatly reduced and delimited sphere.

This has always been the traditional meaning of secularization, a term which derives etymologically from the mediaeval Latin word *saeculum*, with its dual temporal-spatial connotation of a secular *age* and a secular *world* counterposed to the religious age and the religious world (Casanova, 2001). As the dictionary of any Western European language will show, to secularize means 'to make worldly', to convert or transfer persons, things, meanings, and so on, from religious or ecclesiastical to secular or civil use. In the European context, therefore, secularization is a concept overloaded with multiple historically sedimented meanings which simply point to the ubiquitous and undeniable long-term historical shrinkage of the size, power and functions of ecclesiastical institutions *vis-à-vis* other secular institutions. The second, narrower meaning of the term, the decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals, is secondary, posterior and mainly derivative from the primary meaning. Europeans, however, see the two meanings of the term as intrinsically related: for they view the two realities, the decline in the societal significance of religious institutions and the decline of religious beliefs and practices, as structurally related. Supposedly, one necessarily leads to the other.

Americans tend to view things differently and practically restrict the use of the term 'secularization' to its secondary and narrower meaning, to the progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals. It is not so much that they question the secularization of society, but simply that they take it for granted as an unremarkable fact, as a *fait accompli*. The USA, they assume, has always been, at least constitutionally since independence, a secular society, as secular, if not more so, as any European society. Yet they see no evidence that this unquestionable fact of the *desacralization* of society has led to a progressive decline in religious beliefs and practices among Americans. If anything, the historical evidence, as historians and sociologists of American religion have amply documented (Butler, 1990; Finke and Stark, 1992; Greeley, 1989), points in the opposite direction: to the progressive growth in religious beliefs and practices and the progressive *churching* of the American population since independence. Consequently, many American sociologists of religion tend to discard the theory of secularization, or at least its postulate of the progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices, as a European myth (Stark, 1999; Stark and Bainbridge, 1985).

Factual Agreements: Relative Consensus

Despite some lingering disagreements concerning the factual evidence of the extent of religious vitality on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a relative consensus that religion, in its institutional as well as in its individual manifestations, is generally doing much better in America than throughout most of Europe. Even after discounting the tendency of Americans to inflate their rates of church attendance (Hadaway *et al.*, 1993) and to exaggerate the depth and seriousness of their religious beliefs, the fact remains that Americans are generally more religious than most Europeans, with the possible exception of the Irish and the Poles. Moreover, the

very tendency of the Americans to exaggerate their religiousness, in contrast to the opposite tendency of Europeans to discount and undercount their own persistent religiosity, tendencies which are evident among ordinary people as well as scholars, are themselves part of the very different and consequential definitions of the situation in both places. Americans think that they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that they are supposed to be irreligious.

The progressive, though highly uneven, secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact (Martin, 1978). An increasing majority of the European population has ceased participating in traditional religious practices, at least on a regular basis, while still maintaining relatively high levels of private individual religious beliefs. In this respect, one should perhaps talk of the *unchurching* of the European population, rather than of secularization. Grace Davie (1994; 2000) has characterized this general European situation as 'believing without belonging'. A majority of the European population in every European country, except the Czech Republic and East Germany, still affirms 'belief in God', and the proportion of those who declare themselves to be 'not atheist or agnostic' is consistently even larger. Only in East Germany do 'atheists' constitute a majority of the population (51 per cent). In every other European country 'atheists' remain below 20 per cent of the population.²

Moreover, the rates of religiosity vary significantly across Europe. East Germany is by far the least religious country of Europe by any measure, followed at a long distance by the Czech Republic and the Scandinavian countries. At the other extreme, Ireland and Poland are by far the most religious countries of Europe with rates comparable to those of the USA. In general, with the significant exception of France and the Czech Republic, Catholic countries tend to be more religious than Protestant or mixed countries (West Germany, Netherlands), although Switzerland (a mixed and traditionally pillarized country comparable to Holland) stands at the high end of the European religious scale, with rates similar to those of Catholic Austria and Spain. In general, former communist countries in East and Central Europe have rates of religiosity lower than the European average, but many of them, most notably Russia, have experienced remarkable religious growth since 1989 (Greeley, 1994).

Theoretical Disagreements: Competing Analytical Frameworks

European social scientists tend to view these European facts through the analytical lenses of the inherited theory of secularization (Wilson, 1966). According to the orthodox model of secularization, most forcefully restated by Steve Bruce (1992; 1996; 2000; 2002), secularization is intrinsically and structurally linked to general processes of modernization. Social differentiation, and other components of modernization like societalization and rationalization, lead to a decline in the societal significance of religious institutions, which in turn leads eventually to the decline of religious beliefs and practices. As a general rule the theory postulates that the more modern a society the less religious will be its population.

Generally, the theory holds well against the European evidence. The core European countries – Great Britain, France, Holland and Germany – the ones which have led the processes of European modernization, fit well the orthodox model. The theory is less able to account for the significant internal European variations, particularly at the extremes. Some countries, particularly East Germany, the Czech Republic and the Scandinavian countries, are relatively oversecularized. The higher levels of secularization of East Germany simply cannot be explained in terms of higher levels of modernization. At the other extreme, countries like Italy, and particularly Poland and Ireland, are relatively, almost absolutely, undersecularized. The assumption that it is only a matter of time before they more closely follow the general European rule is highly questionable. Moreover, traditional explanations of European secularization in terms of general theories of modernization, by reference to either increasing institutional differentiation, increasing rationality or increasing individualism, become even less persuasive when confronted with the evidence from other equally modern societies, like the USA, which do not manifest comparable levels of religious decline.

When faced with any internal or external counter-evidence, however, European defenders of the orthodox model tend to offer *ad hoc* historicist explanations of the deviations from the norm, rather than to question or revise the general rule itself. Bruce (1996) exemplifies such an analytical strategy when he argues that generally 'modernity undermines religion except when it finds some major social role to play' (p.96) or 'work to do' other than relating individuals to supernatural powers. Bruce offers as examples the work of cultural defence and the social role of ethnic and national collective identity production and reproduction. Although theoretically problematic, as will be pointed out later, Bruce's strategy may seem plausible in accounting for the inordinate religiosity of Ireland or Poland, but is less helpful in accounting for the American deviation from the European rule.

European visitors have always been struck by the vitality of American 'salvational' religion. In comparison with Europe, at least since the early 19th century, the USA appeared simultaneously as the land of 'perfect disestablishment' and as 'the land of religiosity *par excellence*' (Marx, 1975, p.217). Yet until very recently Europeans rarely felt compelled to call into question the thesis of the general decline of religion in view of the American counter-evidence. Progressive religious decline was so much taken for granted that what required an explanation was the American 'deviation' from the European 'norm'. The standard explanations have been either the expedient appeal to 'American exceptionalism', which conveniently does not require questioning the European rule, or the casuistic strategy to rule out the American evidence as irrelevant, because American religion is supposed to have become so 'secular', so 'commercialized' or so 'privatized' that it should no longer count as authentic religion (Weber, 1946a; Luckmann, 1967; Wilson, 1979).

It is in reaction to the European failure to confront seriously the evidence of American religious vitality that a new American paradigm has emerged offering an

alternative explanation of the American religious dynamics; a paradigm which challenges the basic premises of the European theory of secularization. In and of itself, the explanation of religious vitality in terms of the beneficial effects of the dual clause of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, 'no establishment' and 'free exercise' of religion, is not novel. Tocqueville (1990), and Marx (1975) following him, had already maintained this basic insight. The combination of high secularization in the broad primary sense of social differentiation ('perfect disestablishment') and low secularization in the narrower secondary sense of religious decline ('land of religiosity *par excellence*') already call into question the alleged structural relationship between the two dimensions of secularization in the orthodox model. Tocqueville (1990, vol. 1, p.308), moreover, had already used the American evidence to question two basic premises of modern theories of secularization which, as he pointed out, had their origins in the Enlightenment critique of religion under the *ancien régime*: that the advancement of rationalism (education and scientific knowledge) and individualism (liberal democracy and individual freedoms) would necessarily lead to the decline of religion.

What is refreshingly new in the American paradigm is the move to turn the European 'orthodox' model of secularization on its head and to use the American evidence to postulate an equally general structural relationship between disestablishment or state deregulation, open, free, competitive and pluralistic religious markets, and high levels of individual religiosity. With this reversal what was until now the American exception attains normative status, while the previous European rule is now demoted to being a deviation from the American norm. But it is this very move to turn what is a highly illuminating account of the exceptionally pluralistic and competitive American religious market into a universal general theory of religious economies that is problematic. The perils are precisely the same as those which led the European theory astray by turning a plausible account of the exceptional European historical pattern of secularization into a general theory of modern development. A peculiar fusion of ethnocentrism and scientism leads in both cases to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

According to the American paradigm, the low levels of religiosity in Europe ought to be explained by the persistence either of establishment or of highly regulated monopolistic or oligopolistic religious markets (Caplow, 1985; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994; Finke, 1997). As a general point indicating the crucial relevance of church-state relations in accounting for differential patterns of secularization within Europe as well as between Europe and the USA, this is an important insight much neglected by the orthodox model of secularization. But as Bruce (2000) has convincingly shown, internal comparative evidence within Europe simply does not support the basic tenets of the American theory. Monopolistic situations in Poland and Ireland are linked to persistently high levels of religiosity, while increasing liberalization and state deregulation elsewhere are often accompanied by persistent rates of religious decline. Hence the impasse. The orthodox model works relatively well for Europe but not for America, the American paradigm works for the USA, but

not for Europe. Neither can offer a plausible account of the internal deviations within Europe. Most importantly, neither works very well for other world religions and other parts of the world.

Towards a Global Perspective

In order to move beyond the fruitless secularization debate between the 'European' and the 'American' positions we need to adopt a global perspective. Such a perspective should help to historicize our categories, our theories and the stories we tell about religious change. From a global historical perspective the series of changes we call secularization evince an internal dynamic unique to a particular form of religious regime, Western Christendom and its Catholic and Protestant derivatives, which has very few parallels in other world religions, or even in the oldest and most traditional forms of Christianity, the Eastern Churches. In order to facilitate genuine comparative historical analyses, we need to dissociate the historical theory of European secularization from general theories of modernization. The secularization of Europe is a particular, unique and 'exceptional' historical process, not a universal teleological model of development which shows the future to the rest of the world.

But the same can be said about the historically unique and 'exceptional' American religious market. It owes its existence to a series of peculiar historical circumstances that are unlikely to be repeated elsewhere.³ There are, no doubt, important lessons to be learned from the American story of denominationalism. And there are important insights to be gained from the analogical discourse of religious economies. But we need to dissociate the historical lesson of the benefits of no establishment and free exercise of religion from specious general supply-side theories of religious economies. Above all, the American sociology of religion should refrain from imperialist attempts to impose the 'American way' of religion upon the rest of the world, in the name of spurious scientific claims.

It is time to abandon the universal general claims of both theories and accept the fact that from a global perspective both the European and the American experiences are exceptional and unique, and neither serves as a model of development for other parts of the world which also follow their own exceptional and unique paths. Indeed, one could expand almost endlessly the model of exceptionalism. Ernest Gellner (1992), for instance, while basically upholding the European orthodox model of secularization, has formulated a theory of Islamic exceptionalism, according to which Islam (thanks to a combination of factors which it is not pertinent to analyse here) has been uniquely immune to modern processes of secularization. Islamic countries, one could add, are not only exceptions to the orthodox model of secularization insofar as processes of modernization there are accompanied by religious revivals and religious growth rather than by religious decline, something which a Tocquevillian theory of democratization may have anticipated; they are also

clearly deviations from the American supply-side model of religious economies since their high levels of religiosity are linked, not to free competitive religious markets, but to monopolistic conditions even in the absence of state churches.

Surely, scholars of Hinduism could easily develop similar theories of Hindu exceptionalism to explain the current 'saffron revival' in India; students of Japanese religion could readily stress the unique developments of modern Japan; and so on. Indeed, when faced with such a proliferation of exceptionalisms not much is left of the rule of secularization. It is now Europe and European settler colonies which appear as the exception to the global rule of religious vitality. The new concept of 'European exceptionalism' (Davie, 1999), which I myself have promoted (Casanova, 1994), while helpful in undermining the old universal claims of European secularization, becomes problematic and misleading if it is meant to imply that there is some general global pattern or rule of religious development or resurgence, be it the American paradigm or 'the desecularization of the world' (Berger, 1999), to which Europe would be the exception.

Indeed, we need to go beyond exceptionalisms as much as against invidious misleading contrasts between the secular liberal West and the religious fundamentalist 'Rest' (Juegensmeyer, 1993). It is not proposed here, however, that we altogether abandon the concept or the theory of secularization as meaningless. The theory of secularization is still useful, not only as a way of reconstructing analytically the transformations of modern European societies, but also as an analytical framework for a comparative research agenda which aims to examine the historical transformation of all world religions under conditions of modern structural differentiation, as long as the outcome of this transformation is not predetermined by the theory, and as long as we do not label as religious fundamentalism any counter-secularization, or any religious transformation which does not follow the prescribed model.

The story of secularization is primarily a story of the tensions, conflicts and patterns of differentiation between religious and worldly regimes. The European concept of secularization refers to a particular historical process of transformation of Western Christendom and might not be directly applicable to other world religions with very different modes of structuration of the sacred and profane realms. It could hardly be applicable, for instance, to such 'religions' as Confucianism or Taoism, insofar as they are not characterized by high tension with 'the world' and have no ecclesiastical organization. In a sense, those religions which have always been 'worldly' and 'lay' do not need to undergo a process of secularization. To secularize, that is, 'to make worldly' or 'to transfer from ecclesiastical to civil use', are processes which do not make much sense in such a civilizational context. But to ask how 'religions' like Confucianism, Taoism or any other religion for that matter respond to the imposition of the new global worldly regime of Western modernity becomes a very relevant question.

In such a context, the study of modern secularism (Asad, 1999) as an ideology, as a generalized world view and as a social movement, and regarding its role as a

crucial carrier of processes of secularization and as a catalyst for counter-secularization responses, should be high on the agenda of a self-reflexive comparative historical sociology of secularization. Otherwise, teleological theories of secularization themselves become conscious or unconscious vehicles for the transmission of secularist ideologies and world views. What makes the European situation unique and exceptional when compared with the rest of the world is precisely the triumph of secularism as a teleological theory of religious development. The ideological critique of religion developed by the Enlightenment and carried out by a series of sociopolitical movements throughout Europe from the 18th to the 20th century has informed European theories of secularization in such a way that these theories have come to function, not only as descriptive theories of social processes, but also, and more significantly, as critical-genealogical theories of religion and as normative-teleological theories of religious development which presupposed religious decline as the telos of history.

Three dimensions of the Enlightenment critique have been particularly relevant: the cognitive critique of religion as a primitive, pre-rational world view to be superseded by the advancement of science and rational thought; the political critique of ecclesiastical religion as a conspiracy of rulers and priests to keep the people ignorant and oppressed, a condition to be superseded by the advancement of popular sovereignty and democratic freedoms; and the humanist critique of the very idea of God as human self-alienation and as a self-denying other-worldly projection of human aspirations and desires, a critique which postulated the death of God as the premise of human emancipation. Although the prominence and pertinence of each of these three critiques may have changed from place to place, each of them to varying degrees has come to inform most modern European social movements, the political parties associated with them, and European theories of secularization (Casanova, 1994).

In this respect, theories of secularization in Europe have functioned as self-fulfilling prophecies to the extent that a majority of the population in Europe has come to accept the premises of those theories as a depiction of the normal state of affairs and as a projection of future developments. The premise that the more modern and progressive a society becomes the more religion tends to decline has assumed in Europe the character of a taken-for-granted belief widely shared not only by sociologists of religion but by a majority of the population. The postulate of progressive religious decline has become part of the European definition of the modern situation, with real consequences for church religiosity. It is the assumed normality of this state of affairs, accepted even by the main religious institutions, which points to the exceptional character of the European situation, a situation which tends to reproduce itself and to appear increasingly irreversible, in the absence of either a general religious revival or a radical change in the European *Zeitgeist*.

Bruce (2000) is correct when he implies that this 'secularization of demand' imposes almost insurmountable constraints on 'supply-siders' (p.40). These

constraints work upon both the many new and unsuccessful religious entrepreneurs in Europe supplying 'supernatural compensators' for which there is apparently little religious need, and supply-side theories of religion which assume that there is a universal constant demand for supernatural compensators and that one only needs to liberalize religious markets in order to generate supply, competitive pluralism and religious growth (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985; Finke, 1997). The notion of a constant demand for supernatural compensators is ahistorical, asociological and flies in the face of European facts.

It may be instructive to return to Bruce's (1996) attempt to offer an explanation for the Polish and Irish 'deviations', in terms of the proposition that modernization undermines religion *except* in situations where religion finds or retains 'work to do' other than relating individuals to supernatural powers. The proposition seems paradoxical in that, despite the radically different conclusions they draw from it, Bruce seems to share with his theoretical opponents – the supply-siders – a definition of religion which may be part of the problem in trying to grasp the European religious situation. Implied in Bruce's formulation is the assumption that the essence or primary function of religion is to offer salvation or supernatural goods to the individual. However, for Bruce it is this very function of individual supernatural mediation which alone cannot withstand the corrosive forces of modernization. Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge (1985), by contrast, might share this definition of religion but insist that only the proper discharging of this function makes religion immune to forces of secularization, and that in the long term supernatural compensators will always prove superior to any secular equivalent because of their unfalsifiability.

But at times religions can also assume the additional, apparently non-essential, function of societal integration of imagined communities, that is, collective identity formation, particularly in conflictive situations. It is this secondary work of 'cultural defence' which paradoxically explains the resilience of some religions in the face of secularizing trends. What seems surprising, if not ironic, in such a formulation is that what appears for Bruce to be only additional non-essential work is precisely what Durkheim's (1995) sociological theory of religion defines as the essence of religion. It is worth noting here that Bruce's explanation of Irish and Polish 'exceptionalism' is almost identical to Gellner's (1992) explanation of Islamic 'exceptionalism'. In both cases religion becomes apparently immune to secularization because it serves as carrier of nationalism. What is remarkable is not the parallelism but the fact that an anthropologist of Islam and a student of European nationalism like Gellner could make the claim that there is something unique about this Islamic 'exceptionalism', when similar fusions appear repeatedly throughout modern European history and indeed throughout the world today (van der Veer and Lehmann, 1999; Juergensmeyer, 1993).

What if we were to invert the order of the question and see the Irish and Polish cases as confirmations of Durkheim's theory of religion: to ask ourselves why other religions in Western Europe have apparently lost their ability to function as

'churches' which unite individuals into a single moral community, hence serving to create and recreate the bonds of social solidarity? It is our tendency to link processes of secularization to processes of modernization, rather than to the patterns of fusion and dissolution of religious, political and societal communities, that is of churches, states and nations, that is at the root of our theoretical impasse. The Christian church and the Islamic *umma* are particular historical fusions of two types of religion which, following Weber (1946b), we should distinguish analytically: the community cult and salvation religions (Casanova, 1994, pp.45–8). Not every salvation religion functions as a community cult, that is, is coextensive with a territorial political community or plays the Durkheimian function of societal integration – think of the many denominations, sects or cults in America which function primarily as religions of individual salvation. Nor does every community cult function as a religion of individual salvation offering the individual *qua* individual salvation from sickness, poverty and all sorts of distress and danger. Think of state Confucianism in China, Shintoism in Japan, or most caesaro-papist imperial cults. Individual healing in those contexts is supplied by lesser forms of 'folk' religion (Sharot, 2001).

The truly puzzling question in Europe, and the explanatory key in accounting for the exceptional character of European secularization, is why churches and ecclesiastical institutions, once they ceded to the secular nation-state their traditional historical function as community cults, that is, as collective representations of the imagined national communities (Anderson, 1991) and carriers of the collective memory (Hervieu-Léger, 2000), also lost in the process their ability to function as religions of individual salvation. The issue of greater or lesser monopoly is relevant, but not the most crucial one. We could rephrase the question and ask: why is it that individuals in Europe, once they lose faith in their national churches, do not bother to look for, or actually look disdainfully upon, alternative salvation religions? Such a kind of brand loyalty is hard to imagine in other commodity markets. Why does religion today in Europe remain 'implicit', instead of taking more explicit institutional forms? It is this peculiar situation that explains the absence of a truly competitive religious market in Europe. The culprit is not so much the monopolistic laziness of the churches protected by state regulation, but the lack of demand for alternative salvation religions among the unchurched, even in the face of new, enterprising yet generally unsuccessful, religious suppliers.

Weber's (1946b) distinction between 'community cults' and 'salvation religious communities' is primarily analytical, pointing more to two crucial dimensions of religion than to two different separate types of religion. But any sociological theory of religion that emphasizes exclusively one of these two dimensions, the communal or the individual, dismissing the latter (for example) as 'magic' (Durkheim, 1995) because it is too individualistic and does not produce community, or as an inauthentic secularized substitute because it does not cater to the individual's need for supernatural compensators (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985), is necessarily a partial and incomplete theory of religion. Actually, any theory that claims to be a 'general' theory of religion ought to function simultaneously at three analytical levels: at the

individual level, at the group level and at the societal level. In a certain sense, Troeltsch's (1931) three types of religion – 'individual mysticism', 'sect' and 'church' – correspond to these three levels of analysis. It is true that Troeltsch in typically Hegelian fashion constructed his theory as progressive stages in the development of Christian religion from church, to sect, to individual mysticism. But one does not need to share this teleological vision, or Bruce's (1996) gloomy reformulation 'from cathedrals to cults'. Nor does one need to share Stark and Bainbridge's (1985) reformulation of 'cult', 'sect' and 'church', as three stages in an ever-recurring cyclical process of secularization and resacralization, a new myth of eternal return. One can also view them as three types of religion coexisting in many societies, indeed in the global village today, and more importantly as three dimensions coexisting within the same religions.

The sociology of religion should be less obsessed with the decline of religion and more attuned to the new forms which religion assumes at all three levels in all world religions: to new forms of individual mysticism, 'invisible religion' and cults of the individual; to new forms of congregational religion, from new religious movements to the global expansion of Pentecostalism and charismatic communities in all world religions; and to the re-emergence of the world religions as transnational imagined communities, vying with if not replacing the nation-state for a prominent role on the global stage.

Current patterns of globalization force us to rethink our secularization stories and the criteria we should use to measure the declining or ascending significance of religion. At a time when processes of globalization are leading to new transformations of worldly and religious regimes, and the Weberian definition of both states and churches as territorial monopolistic institutions is becoming less and less relevant, it may also be time to look for evidence of the social significance of religion in the emerging world order, not so much in national settings but elsewhere: in the re-emergence of the transnational dimensions of religious regimes, in new civilizational and intercivilizational dynamics, and in the formation of a global civil society (Casanova, 1997; 2001). Sociologists of secularization may be able to predict with exact accuracy the hour of death of Christianity in Britain in 2030 (Bruce, 2001; see also his chapter in this volume), only to find out that the Anglican Communion thrives globally and that other world religions are growing in Britain. Like the death of Mark Twain, the repeated announcement of the death of religion may turn out to have been greatly exaggerated.

Notes

- 1 I call them 'European' and 'American' not so much because of the place of origin of their proponents, but because of the place of origin of the evidence for both theories. Not every European holds the European position. David Martin, for instance, has been a prominent critic of the orthodox model of secularization. Most American sociologists, by contrast, at least outside the field of religion, tend to share the inherited model.

- 2 The figures are based on four general European surveys – the European Values Studies (EVS) of 1981, the EVS of 1990, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) of 1991 and the ISSP of 1998, as provided by Andrew Greeley (unpublished manuscript). The data from EVS 1981/1990 and ISSP 1991/1998 can be obtained from Zentralarchiv fuer empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitaet zu Koeln (www.za.uni-koeln.de). The home page of the EVS is http://cwis.kub.nl/~fsw_2/evs/info.htm and of ISSP www.issp.org.
- 3 Although the current situation of competing national churches in independent Ukraine resembles the structural situation in the USA at the time of independence (Casanova, 1998).

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