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
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Three General Theories of Ethics and the Integrative Role of Integrity Theory¹

Muel Kaptein en Johan Wempe

The three competing approaches to ethical analysis are consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.² In consequentialist ethics, the moral content of an action is determined by the real and expected consequences of an action.³ Deontological ethical theories regard the action itself as the object of moral evaluation whereas virtue theory is concerned with the intention behind the action.⁴ The difference in the object of analysis and evaluation of the respective approaches is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 1: Three General Theories of Ethics



This paper consists of a discussion of the three approaches, on the one hand as a framework for “solving” ethical dilemmas and on the other, as a stepping-stone for the ethical analysis and evaluation of behavior and practices. We conclude this discussion with an exposition of the Integrity Approach that integrates consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethics.

1. Consequentialist Ethics⁵

According to consequentialist ethics, the moral content of an action is determined by the real and expected consequences of that action. An action is morally good if its consequences are desirable and bad if they are not.

Consequentialist ethics employs a certain standard (the purpose or end) against which the consequences of an action are judged. This is why it is also referred to as teleological ethics (from the

Greek *telos*, “end”). Actions are taken to achieve a certain end, often with a view to a more distant goal. When ends are a means to a more distant goal, they are referred to as instrumental ends. Ends that are achieved for their own sake are intrinsic.

Teleologists are particularly interested in the latter kind of ends. One or more of such ends are chosen as a standard for judging the moral content of actions. The ends that function in teleological theories are not moral in itself. They become morally charged in their use as a standard for the moral content of actions.

Depending on the number of intrinsic ends that a teleological theory employs, we call it either monistic or pluralistic. Monistic theories hold that there is only one intrinsic end to which all other ends lead, and on the basis of which all actions can be morally evaluated. Pluralistic teleological theories hold that there is more than one such intrinsic end. Teleological theories are also subdivided according to the nature of the end employed. Hedonism, for instance, holds that this end is pleasure or delight. This criterion for action dates back to the beginning of classical antiquity.

One problem that the hedonists have been up against is how to rank different dimensions of pleasure. How is it possible to compare a brief, yet, intense, pleasure with one that lasts longer but that is not quite so intense? The Greek philosopher Epicurus (342/341-270/271 BC) draws the conclusion that the end is not physical pleasure but the satisfaction of the needs of the spirit. As powerful as physical pleasure may be, it remains short-lived. Moreover, the pursuit of physical pleasure as an end would lead to all kinds of evil. Feeding one’s spiritual pleasure is, to his mind, significantly more valuable and leads to a lasting sense of well-being.

Teleological theories revolve around this targeted end, which can differ from person to person. As individual ends often conflict with each other, the question arises as to which end should be employed as the criterion for moral action. This question subdivides teleological theories once again. At this third level, ethical egoism (a theory we reject as a normative ethical theory given that it falls short on generalizability) holds that individual pleasure and pain should serve as the ultimate criterion, whereas utilitarianism holds that the common good forms the true end.

Classical utilitarianism

Adam Smith advocated the pursuit of individual self-interest in the belief that this would indirectly serve the common good. According to utilitarianism, the criterion for evaluating actions is the welfare of society. Utilitarianism is the general term for all ethical theories that hold that actions should

be judged on the basis of their total costs and benefits for society. The action that produces the greatest benefits at the lowest costs for society is the action we are morally obliged to follow.

Jeremy Bentham

(1748-1832) is widely considered the father of utilitarianism. Just as in the case of most other theorists Bentham, too, relied on a number of pioneers such as Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), David Hume (1711-1776), and Adam Smith. Bentham was a true revolutionary of his times. His theory of utilitarianism constitutes a break with ideas on social status common at the time. His criterion is the “greatest pleasure for the greatest number” on the basis of which all actions must be judged. In this regard, he considers the pleasure of a vagabond just as important as that of a well-to-do citizen. Everyone counts as one and no one counts for more than one. The core of his universalistic hedonism is articulated in several passages in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* published in 1789.

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it . . . The principle of utility seeks to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law . . . By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual . . . The community is a fictitious *body*, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its *members*. The interest of the community then, what is it? The sum of the interests of the several members who compose it . . . Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done.⁶

For Bentham it is possible to formulate the utilitarian criterion in quantitative terms. Ethics in his opinion is simply a matter of counting. The meaning of the “greatest pleasure” can be explained in quantitative terms. Happiness lies in the greatest possible amount of pleasure and the absence of pain. To achieve the greatest pleasure for the greatest number, he devises a hedonistic calculus to

weigh pleasure and pain. To Bentham's mind, pain and pleasure are quantifiable units. He sets this out as follows:

To take an exact account of the general tendency of any act, by which the interests of a community are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose interests seem most immediately affected by it:

- Take account of the value of each distinguishable *pleasure* that appears to be produced by it in the *first* instance.
- Take account of the value of each *pain* that appears to be produced by it in the *first* instance (...).
- Sum up all the values of all the *pleasures* on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it is on the side of pleasure, will give the *good* tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that *individual* person; if on the side of pain, the *bad* tendency of it upon the whole.
- Take an account of the *number* of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process with respect to each. *Sum up* the numbers expressive of the degrees of *good* tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is *good* upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is *good* upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is *bad* upon the whole. Take the *balance*, which if on the side of *pleasure*, will give the general *good tendency* of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned; if on the side of pain, the general *evil tendency*, with respect to the same community.⁷

The significance of this empirical theory of ethics is that it was formulated primarily to serve state policy and legislation, especially criminal law. The way in which Bentham argues about the function and the severity of punishment, is characteristic of the classical utilitarians.⁸ The aim of legislation is to promote the well-being of citizens. Care must be taken that laws are not used to other ends, such as to enforce divine or natural rights. Punishment is, in and of itself, suffering. Accordingly, the punishment should fit the crime: it may not cause more suffering than that caused by the crime. Nor is punishment justified if no one has suffered any damage caused by the crime. In this, Bentham turns against punishment for sexual "offences" committed by consenting minors, a position rather progressive for those times.

Another significant feature of his theory is that punishment is not justified if it is not effective in preventing the same offence from being committed again. This also applies if other (cheaper) means are available for achieving the same effect, such as corrective instruction. Most importantly, there must

always be a relation between the gravity of the crime and the severity of punishment. The gravity of the crime is determined by the harm caused by the crime. With respect to the severity of punishment, Bentham applies the fundamental rule that punishment must be severe enough to counteract any benefits that the perpetrator may have gained from committing the crime. At the same time, it must not be harsher than necessary to keep the offender from committing the crime again.

John Stuart Mills' criticism

It is probably because of John Stuart Mill's (1806-1873) criticism of Bentham that he was forgotten and Mill came to be seen as the key exponent of utilitarianism. In *Utilitarianism* (first published in 1861), Mill argues that it is not only intensity and duration that have to be taken into account in measuring pleasure. The nature of the pleasure itself is also relevant. Pleasure, according to Mill, is largely *qualitative*. The pleasure of Socrates cannot be compared with that of a pig. Pleasure can be divided into higher and lower pleasures.

The intrinsic good

Utilitarianism is a term that covers many theories. The different strands of utilitarianism share a number of features. All utilitarian theories depart from the assumption that an intrinsic good exists that can serve as a criterion for evaluating actions. Monistic utilitarianism holds that there is only one value that should be used as a criterion: pleasure or enjoyment. Pluralistic utilitarians reject the idea that all values can be reduced to one value, holding instead that there are several values that are intrinsically good. According to preferential utilitarianism, a value is that which people find valuable.

Bentham and Mill are known as hedonistic utilitarians. They hold that there is only one intrinsic good: pleasure or enjoyment. Pleasure is a good unto itself. Pleasure and enjoyment are synonymous to them. Pluralistic utilitarians disagree with the assumption that all values are a means to pleasure. Aesthetic values and knowledge (e.g., a researcher who examines something out of scientific curiosity) can be pursued for their own sake as well. An exponent of pluralistic utilitarianism is (1873-1958). His *Principia Ethica* (1903) gives an account of the intrinsic good and the actions that should be promoted to further these intrinsic goods.

Besides the hedonistic and pluralistic variants of utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism is another dominant strand in utilitarian thinking. Preference utilitarianism has its origins in neo-classical economics and game theory. Instead of using certain desired states or situations (such as pleasure) as the criterion for moral action, this variant of utilitarianism is based on the satisfaction of individual

needs. People's actions are a reflection of their needs and the value or utility of a good can be inferred from the price that someone is willing to pay for it. If the buyer pays a given price for something instead of using the money for something else, the product apparently represents so much utility that he or she is willing to pay the price. Preference utilitarianism holds that people strive to achieve the greatest satisfaction of their individual needs with as little means possible (the principle of efficiency).

There are several problems with this perspective. Preference utilitarianism fits in well with the market system. However, not all needs can or may be expressed in this system. The need for love, friendship, recognition, health, and a clean environment can only be factored into this system to a limited extent - or perhaps not at all. Consequently, they run a high risk of falling by the wayside.

The second problem with preference utilitarianism is the question of whether all needs are fit to be satisfied. What about the needs of a perverse sadist? In one way or another, a distinction needs to be drawn between preferences that are acceptable and those that are not. This calls for a moral criterion that can be used for selecting the "right" preferences.

Aggregating and comparing utility on an interpersonal level

A second feature that utilitarian theories share, is the assumption that the intrinsic good or the common good can be aggregated. According to utilitarian thinking, it is possible to sum the different goods that people attribute to an action. Moreover, it is possible to compare the consequences of an action for some with the effects it has on others. The common good is thus comparable on an interpersonal level, which means that it is possible to aggregate the well-being of different individuals.

Utility as criterion for action

The third feature of utilitarian theories is that utility or the common good is used as the moral criterion for action. This means that people should act with a view to maximizing the common good of society as a whole. The consequences for all people, directly and indirectly involved, need to be factored into their actions. This drive towards maximization and the emphasis on efficiency is an essential feature of dominant Western economic theories. Our limited means of production (labor, capital, nature, and technology) need to be utilized in such a manner that they satisfy human needs to as great an extent as possible. The production requirements currently placed upon companies are a concrete translation of the utilitarian criterion for moral action.

We can distinguish two variants of utilitarianism: act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. The act-utilitarian judges every action separately on the basis of the criterion of the common good. Rule-utilitarianism tests each action against a rule that is evaluated against the criterion of utility. According to rule-utilitarianism, the right action is that action which conforms to the set of rules that, if accepted and acted upon by most people, would maximize utility. Contrary to act-utilitarianism, not every action is judged separately. Instead, it is the rule, provided it is accepted by most people, that lies at the root of the act that is judged in terms of its utility for society. The final criterion is utilitarian in nature: maximization of the common good.

Rule-utilitarianism is much more practical than act-utilitarianism. For a rule-utilitarian, it is unnecessary to keep track of all the consequences of a particular action in order to evaluate an action. Well-founded and accepted rules can be relied upon instead. Besides its practicality, it also entails another dimension that can be best illustrated with an example. From an act-utilitarian perspective it is strictly speaking better to leave an unsolved crime as it is. It is better to let the offender go free, particularly if a repeat of the crime by the same person is virtually impossible. After all, the crime has already been committed and damage or suffering has already taken place. Punishing the offender would only diminish the total welfare of the community. According to rule-utilitarianism, it makes sense to have generally accepted rules in place that prohibit crime and make it punishable. Even though it might be better to deviate from the rule in certain situations for the sake of the common good, it is not desirable because such a rule would then tend to lose its authority.

Comparing actions

Finally, the fourth feature of utilitarian theories is that the extent to which one action promotes the intrinsic (common) good is comparable with that of others. In this regard, preference-utilitarianism uses the price of the goods. The amount of money someone is willing to pay for a product is a quantitative measure that can also be compared from person to person. If two people are prepared to pay \$2.50 for a particular item, preference-utilitarianism holds that the utility that both people believe they can gain from that product is the same. If the price were to rise to \$3.00 and only one is prepared to pay, we can deduce that the utility of that item is greater for the one than for the other.

A practical and powerful theory

Consequentialism is a powerful theory that resonates well with our moral intuitions.⁹ In everyday life, we very often think in terms of consequences for the persons involved. A common example illustrates this: anyone who buys a car and uses the highway system knows that he or she runs the risk of

getting involved in an accident. Cars can be made safer for passengers by improving their brakes or adding safety belts for the back seat. Yet, safer cars are more expensive. Everyone in the market for a car has to decide what is more important: safety or price. We weigh the extra cost of a safer car against the extra benefits of greater safety. The government often reasons in exactly the same fashion. For example, the benefits of giving the public the opportunity to view a painting by Picasso needs to be weighed against the benefits of constructing a new cultural center. Political decision-making often takes place along consequentialist lines of reasoning.

Objections to consequentialism

As remarked above, consequentialism is a powerful theory that resonates well with our moral intuitions, particularly within the corporate context and with regard to state policy. Nevertheless, it still has two practical and two very fundamental problems.¹⁰

Figure 2: Objections to Consequentialism

Practical problems
1. The problem of measurement.
2. The problem of comparison.
Fundamental problems
1. The problem of justice.
2. The problem of rights.

In the first instance, consequentialism faces a problem of measurement: is it desirable to quantify the costs and benefits and by implication, the common good? A real danger exists that non-quantifiable consequences fall to the wayside. Mill criticizes Bentham on this point in particular. If we were to follow Bentham's train of thought, a happy pig would be preferable to an unsatisfied Socrates. In Mill's opinion, it is primarily the qualitative pleasures that play a role in happiness. A quantitative method would not do anyone much good. To conceive of pleasure in qualitative terms, however, is also problematic. How can it be determined which situation contributes most to the common good? How for example, do we calculate damage to people's health in qualitative terms?

The problem of comparison follows from the above point of criticism. How is it possible to compare fundamentally incomparable goods in order to determine the extent to which they promote happiness or the common good? For example, how is it possible to compare health with employment? In order

to determine which situation represents the greatest common good, we have to be able to make a comparison between different goods.

The response to these objections (an answer that Mill actually already provides) is that the idea is to weigh up the pros and cons of various alternatives as conscientiously and accurately as possible, given our limited time and knowledge. For this purpose, we may rely highly on our common sense and experience. After all, in everyday life we are able to choose between the most incomparable of options. If it turns out that the wrong decision was made, it does not necessarily follow that an action was not responsible. To judge an action gone wrong we must look to the intention behind the action.

Of a more fundamental nature is the problem of justice. How can the benefits for one person be weighed against the costs for another? The utilitarian criterion of the greatest pleasure for the greatest number says nothing about how the costs and benefits of that pleasure must be distributed. Bentham himself recognizes this problem. In a thought-experiment, he reflects on how a society consisting of 4001 people should be judged if the total amount of happiness of 2000 people is taken away and awarded to the majority. This can be achieved if 2001 people take the remaining 2000 people into slavery. Would the total amount of happiness remain the same? According to Bentham, it would decrease. However, this does not lead him to advance a non-utilitarian criterion such as the principle of distributive justice. Bentham's response is that utilitarianism also places demands on how pleasure is distributed in society. The aim remains the greatest pleasure for the greatest number but he fails to indicate at what point this maximum spread is reached.

The problem of rights corresponds to the problem with justice. On what grounds can people's rights be abused in the name of serving the common good? Is it acceptable to simply push aside rights that are based in a contractual agreement or in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948) if it promotes the common good? A rule-utilitarian would try to elude this criticism by asserting that the common good is served by accepting such rules. Nevertheless, it still fails to address the fundamental problem. As soon as a principle of distributive justice or rights proves to be generally detrimental to the common good, the same rule-utilitarian would change his mind and revise his theory.

Conclusion

Of the various theories we have covered that focus on realizing a particular end, we can eliminate the theory of egoism on the grounds of internal inconsistency. Rule-utilitarianism and preference utilitarianism (which is well suited to neo-classical theories) in particular, are two powerful variants for

determining what morally responsible action actually means in concrete situations. This is certainly true with regard to state policy and corporate functioning. In many cases, these theories place clear limits on actions. However, consequentialist theories (and this applies to the above two variants too) fall short where justice needs to be done to certain principles such as people's claim to rights and fairness.

2. Deontological Ethics¹¹

Duty-based or deontological ethics solves a number of problems associated with consequentialist ethical theories such as utilitarianism. According to deontology, all persons have certain obligations. These obligations are non-negotiable: they cannot be bought off or disposed of. Different kinds of inalienable rights form the basis of these obligations.

Rights, obligations and justice are concepts that consequentialism has no answer to. In a duty-based ethic, however, this is the focal point. According to this theory, an action is morally good if it honors a given obligation (which does not depend on the consequence of the action). Such a theory entitles certain people or groups to rights or a claim to justice. Deontological theories stipulate duties that must be observed irrespective of their consequences: legitimate rights must be respected and unjust action is prohibited. The word "deontological" comes from the Greek *deon*, "one must." The essential difference between deontological and teleological theories lies in the role that is attributed to the consequences of the action under review.

Principles of deontology

The fact that an action's consequences do not determine its moral character does not imply that deontologists (or at least most of them) do not take consequences into consideration. An action that violates a moral obligation is immoral without doubt. However, acting in accordance with moral obligations does not necessarily mean that such actions are morally right. In a secondary sense, the consequences of a given action could very well be factored into the obligation itself. However, a deontologist would not go as far as committing herself to a specific, superior consequence. The action's correspondence with certain principles is primarily what determines whether it is morally right or wrong. Keeping a promise is important because it is a moral duty, and not because of the consequences.

What principles do deontologists use to judge people's actions? In the course of history, a divergent variety of theories and imperatives have been formulated. Examples include "Do unto others what you would have them do unto yourself" and "Don't do to others what you would not like done to yourself." This principle is known as the golden rule. A promise made is a promise kept. Equal treatment for equal cases. This forms the basis for various theories of justice.

The foundation of the principles

An important difference between the various deontological theories concerns the foundation of these principles and how they can be identified. Three types of deontological theories can be distinguished in this regard. The first holds that duties are God-given, the second that they are based on common sense, while the third holds that they are founded by a social contract. The basis for a deontological theory can be sought in God's commandments. Frequently, the rightness or wrongness of an action can be sought in the nature of the action itself. Some deontological theories appeal to a kind of social contract as the foundation for the principles that are endorsed. Most religions of revelation rely on a kind of deontology. The rules are God-given and communicated in the Bible or the Koran, for example. It is our obligation to follow these revelations because it is the will of God.

When the moral rightness or wrongness of an action is based on the nature of the action itself, the question shifts to how it can be determined whether an action is moral or immoral. Some deontologists hold that this insight can be obtained from rational arguments (this is the view of Immanuel Kant), intuition (the golden rule), or by following the "voice of one's conscience." By grounding principles in a social contract, one presumes the implicit consent of all parties involved. The basis of the obligatory principles thus lies in the mutual consent to the conditions of the contract.

Act-deontology and rule-deontology

Just as with utilitarianism, we can draw a distinction between act-deontological and rule-deontological theories. The act-deontologist holds that every situation is so unique that it is undesirable or even impossible to formulate general rules of action. One must determine in each individual situation which action is morally obligated and how it should be judged. The agents in such situations normally proceed on the basis of their intuition or "listen to their conscience." Act-deontology is generally seen as a weak basis for normative judgments. For example, how is it possible for a board of management to reach consent on the basis of intuition in deciding whether or not to sink an oil platform in the ocean? That's why deontologists generally advocate a form of rule-deontology.

The rule-deontological variant holds that we should not evaluate actions individually but rather that we should judge types of actions on the basis of general principles or rules. The advantage of the rule-deontological approach is that it is much more practical for the purposes of decision-making. It is virtually impossible to contemplate every single aspect of each and every decision. Reliance on a number of rules of conduct makes it possible to implement the deontological approach in practice. Moreover, the use of rules in society helps us to better understand what we mean to one another. The moral judgments on the basis of act-deontology are too fickle.

Monism and pluralism

Another distinction that can be drawn between various deontological theories concerns the principles that are applied as criterion of morality. In monistic theories, all moral judgments can ultimately be related back to one universal principle. Kant's theory is an example of a monistic theory. In opposition to this, pluralistic theories employ various principles - not necessarily corresponding with one another - together.

The advantage of a monistic theory is that it excludes a conflict between principles. There is ultimately only one principle for judging all actions. Pluralistic theories must therefore provide an answer to the question of what we should do if there is a conflict between principles. Which principle should be given precedence? David Ross (1877-1971) developed a pluralistic theory that addresses precisely this problem.¹² According to Ross, a distinction can be drawn between "prima facie" and "actual" duties. Our intuition allows us to acknowledge various general obligations to which we are morally bound. Only, we do not know which obligation is right for which situation. This is where our ability to reason comes into play. In each concrete situation, we have to look for the most powerful obligation. This is the obligation that, if discharged, will lead to the greatest preponderance of good over evil. If more than one principle is relevant in a given situation, we have to examine which would yield the best result.

According to Ross, moral principles fall under a prima facie duty that must always be honored unless they conflict with other, more weighty obligations in a given situation. The *actual* duty is the highest and most binding obligation in a given situation. According to Ross, always being on time for one's appointments is a prima facie duty. This is generally binding. It is only in extraordinary cases that we are relieved of this duty. Take the example of someone on her way to an appointment coming across a person in dire need of medical attention. It remains her duty to keep the appointment. However, at this time she is bound by a more pressing obligation: to help the wounded person.

Kant's categorical imperative

Kant developed a powerful theory in which moral rules are based in pure reasoning instead of intuition, our conscience, or the consequences of action. His theory can be characterized as a monistic, rule-deontological theory. That is to say, Kant does not subject incidental actions but rather types of actions (such as lying, keeping promises) to moral judgment. All moral rules can be traced back to a general rule: the categorical imperative.

Kant (1724-1804) is without doubt one of the greatest philosophers in the history of Western philosophical thinking. He was a true representative of Enlightenment thinking and active in various fields. His writings covered physics, gnoseology, ethics, and peace issues. He was able to resolve - or at least shine a new light on - many of the problems Enlightenment philosophers contended with.

In the field of epistemology, for example, he was able bridge the gap between empiricism and rationalism. Radical empiricists such as Hume hold that all knowledge comes from sense experience. On the other hand, exponents of rationalism such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz argue that truth, as opposed to appearance, is arrived at through reason. Thus, true knowledge depends on reason. Since Kant, speaking of the way knowledge is acquired purely in terms of either rationalism or empiricism is no longer possible. He argues that our observation of the world is more than the passive function of the mind; there is always an aspect of reason involved. This is first of all because experience is located in space and time. These are not properties of the things themselves but of the intellect. He calls these "forms of observation." Second, the intellect presides over a number of categories - such as "unity," "denial," and "causality" - which make knowledge of experience possible. The nature of reality itself, the *Ding an sich* ("the thing-in-itself") cannot be known. All knowledge of experience relies on our forms of observation and the categories.

Kant's ethic is similar to his epistemology on several points. Moral law is not something that can be deduced from reality, or that is imposed from the outside. Instead, morality is part of human nature. People are human precisely because they know and acknowledge moral law. For Kant, humans are distinct from the material world because apart from being biological beings, we are also spiritual beings. As natural beings, people are heteronomous. That is, they are subject to the physical laws of nature. As moral beings, they are autonomous: they are rational and free and can thus be held responsible for their actions. As Kant presupposes the existence of true knowledge in his epistemology (which would include Newton's laws, for example), he also presupposes the existence of a moral conscience. What he seeks to achieve in his normative ethics is simply to identify those suppositions that reinforce existing moral rules.

Kant maintains that there is one principle at the root of all moral rules. As such, Kant's normative ethic can be classified as a monistic deontological theory. Instead of judging the actions themselves, this general principle is used to evaluate the underlying concrete rules of action (maxims). This is therefore a clear case of rule-deontology.

According to Kant, every action, no matter how trivial it may be, falls under a certain rule of action or maxim. No action is without a maxim. For example, "If I have to work tomorrow, I'd better not stay up too late tonight" and "I don't usually eat breakfast because I'm never hungry that early." A maxim is morally neutral. It is a rule that categorizes an action into a group of actions. The fact that every action is driven by a maxim is the crucial difference between behavior and action. Beings that are not able to act are not able to develop guidelines for their actions and cannot be judged in moral terms. This applies to animals and the mentally disabled. A maxim describes actions and they are formulated on a descriptive level. The aim is to find the right criterion on the basis of which it can be asserted which maxims should or should not be followed. The term "should" suggests the normative nature of this endeavor.

Kant formulates a moral principle as a kind of "moral litmus test" for determining whether or not a maxim is to have moral status. The general principle at the root of all moral rules according to Kant, is "the categorical imperative." This is an imperative - a command that is unconditional or categorical. Kant sets "categorical" off against "hypothetical." An imperative is hypothetical if its validity were tied up with specific conditions. For instance, "If you want to achieve this or that goal (e.g., succeed in your job), then you need to do such and such (e.g., work hard)." These rules of behavior are not unconditional in nature; they only apply if the relevant conditions are established, in this example, the desire to succeed in one's job.

The categorical imperative applies to everyone in all situations. A categorical imperative often takes the form of "Thou shalt . . ." for example, "Thou shalt not tell a lie." Commandments like these are unconditional. What exactly is the categorical imperative? Kant formulates this general moral law in several different ways. The most formal variant reads: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."¹³ Another formulation of the categorical imperative is: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature."¹⁴ To act morally, the agent must determine whether it is reasonable to expect others in a similar situation to follow the maxim that he is about to follow. What if an immoral maxim is considered as a law of nature? In this regard, Kant points out that to elevate an immoral maxim to a universal law would be contradictory. Promoting immoral maxims to universal laws should be refrained from, as it is logically inconsistent.

Kant's examples

Kant employs several examples to illustrate the moral nature of actions. His examples are quite extreme. However, this is a conscious strategy to capture the essence of morality. In his first example, he poses the question as to whether a person weary of life may kill himself. His maxim would be: "From self-love I make it my principle to cut my life short when its extension threatens to bring more misery than happiness."¹⁵ The essential question is whether this maxim may be elevated to a universal law. Kant's thoughts on this are as follows:

[A] nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contradict itself and would therefore not subsist as nature; thus that maxim could not possibly be a law of nature and, accordingly, altogether opposes the supreme principle of all duty.¹⁶

Kant thus assumes that self-love ultimately serves to preserve humanity. If this first example concerns the agent's duty to himself, the one that follows entails a duty towards others. Say someone finds herself forced by circumstances to borrow money. She is well aware that she will not be able to repay the debt. However, she realizes just as well that no one in would lend her money if she does not solemnly swear to pay it back. She is on the verge of making this promise, yet her conscience is bothering her. She also ponders whether freeing herself from distress in this manner does not run counter to her duty. Let's assume that she decides to take the money after all. The maxim behind his action would then be: "If I believe I desperately need money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, even if I know that that will never happen." Can I will that this maxim should be made a universal law?

For, the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses.¹⁷

In the third example, Kant poses the question as to what a person stands to do who is extremely talented and who could be of great service to society but who would rather spend his time on the pleasures of life? It is impossible to elevate "neglecting to develop one's natural talents" to a law of nature. According to Kant, a rational being will necessarily aspire to developing his or her potential. It can serve a person in all sorts of ways, which is why he or she was endowed with it the first place.

Finally, in his fourth example, Kant examines what someone who has run into good fortune should do for those who are less fortunate. Can we assert that it is morally justified to not help others who are less fortunate than ourselves? According to Kant, we cannot will such a maxim to be made a law of nature.

For, a will that decided this would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others and in which, by such a law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself.¹⁸

The version of the categorical imperative quoted above is relatively formal in nature. A more practical variant Kant formulated reads as follows: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”¹⁹ Kant holds that this version has the same meaning as the first one above. A key term in the first two versions of the categorical imperative is the word “will.” The categorical nature of the imperative suggests the autonomy of this will, which means that there must be no outside force upon which this will depends. Humans (both the agent and the receiving party) must thus be viewed as an end in itself, as inherently valuable. Kant contends that the latter formulation is merely another way of stating the categorical imperative.

This new formulation of the categorical imperative can be employed to reflect on the examples above. Suicide as way to escape difficult circumstances does not withstand the test of treating a person as an end in itself. A human being is not simply a means to a life filled with pleasure from beginning to end. In the second example of making a promise in bad faith, the person lending the money is reduced to an instrument if she is unaware of the actual plans of the person borrowing the money. And while neglecting to develop one’s talents in order to dedicate oneself to the pleasures of life may not necessarily threaten the future of the human race as a goal in itself, it would not promote it either. That would be improper from a moral point of view. Helping others reach their potential can be seen a similar light. It furthers the human race as an intrinsically valuable goal, thus rendering it a moral duty.

The above version of the categorical imperative does not suggest that people may never be used as a means to an end. If I sell a product to a customer, I use the consumer partly as a means to boosting my sales and to help secure the future of my business. However, people may never be used solely as a means to others’ ends; they must also be treated as an end. This implies that I also need to see my customer as a person with a legitimate claim to all the information he needs. I must also refrain from trying to pass off a hazardous product to him, at least not without informing him of the danger. This

more practical version of the categorical imperative resembles the golden rule to a certain extent: “Don’t do to others what you would not like done to yourself.” However, it is not exactly the same. One could regard the golden rule a special instance of the categorical imperative. After all, the golden rule says nothing about one’s duty to oneself.

John Rawls

With *A Theory of Justice*, John Rawls established himself as a contemporary normative political philosopher.²⁰ In his theory of justice as fairness, Rawls departs from the assumption that people are motivated by self-interest. With the view to formulating the fundamental principles for regulating society, he constructs a hypothetical contracting situation called the “original position” in which contracting parties set down the basic principles behind “a veil of ignorance.” Parties behind the veil of ignorance are bereft of knowledge about their position in society and the position they will occupy after the contract has been concluded. Due to the veil of ignorance, the contracting parties are free of unbridled self-interest. It is still assumed that they will do their best to secure their own interests but with the qualification that they will take into consideration all the possible positions they might occupy once the veil is lifted.

Absence of knowledge about social circumstances, gender, or natural endowments therefore ensures the fairness of the terms of the contract. As all rational, free, and equal people can consent to the principles of justice, the legitimacy of the institutions that embody these principles is secured. The principles of justice read as follows:

- 1 Each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with similar liberties for all (the principle of “equal liberty”).
- 2 Social and economic inequalities are arranged so that they are both
 - a) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (the principle of “fair equality of opportunity”) and
 - b) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons (the “difference principle”).

The first principle comprises the fundamental political and civil liberties and includes the right to hold property and freedom of expression. The second principle concerns the distribution of wealth. According to Rawls, these principles of justice apply to a society that has reached a sufficiently high standard of living. This is the case where basic needs of the poorest level of society have been adequately satisfied. In such a society, these principles are lexically ordered: the first principle takes precedence over the second while the principle of fair equality of opportunity takes precedence over

the difference principle. Finally, the difference principle takes priority over the efficiency principle and the principle of wealth maximization. Rawls holds that in sufficiently wealthy societies, citizens are capable of making effective use of his or her political and civil rights. In this context, a rational agent has no interest in exchanging his or her political and civil rights for an increase in wealth. For Rawls, less affluent societies are governed by a more general principle of distributive justice. All social goods (freedom, equal opportunities, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect) need to be shared equally, unless an unequal share of these goods would be to the benefit of everyone.

The two principles of justice mentioned above can be seen as special variants of this general principle of justice, the former of which only takes force in sufficiently affluent societies.

Deontological ethics and consequentialism

A fundamental shortcoming of consequentialism concerns the problem of measurement. Others include the assumptions that all consequences of an action can be measured against one criterion (the problem of comparison) and that the effects of a given action are easy to predict. Consequentialism also fails to take the historical context in account and neglects issues of rights and justice. Deontological ethics overcomes most of these problems. The measuring problem and the uncertainty of an action's consequences have nothing to do with deontological ethics. An action either does or does not honor a given principle. In addition, deontological ethics allows for a whole range of obligations in special relationships. For example, the relationship between employer/employee, buyer/seller, lessor/lessee, and parent/child all imply special obligations. Consequentialism recognizes only the relationship between the agent and the recipient of the benefit or disadvantage. Deontological ethics also takes the past into consideration. Actions in the past can engender obligations in the present. Finally, a deontological ethical approach also makes possible an evaluation of the intentions behind an action. For the consequentialist, only the anticipated results count. Rule-utilitarianism is incidentally a response to the criticism advanced by deontologists. In concrete situations, rule-utilitarianism and deontological ethics often lead to the same conclusion. Nevertheless, the ultimate criterion remains of a fundamentally different nature.

Objections to deontological ethics²¹

A point of critique that Mill in particular raises against Kant's deontology, is that in the final analyses, Kant still reverts back to ends or goals. Mill illustrates this by pointing out that lying is immoral because it undermines the trust we place in one another, which is vital to society. The final criterion that is thus employed is goal-orientated: the well-being of society. This observation can be countered

by pointing out that although it is evident that deontological ethics also includes ends of an action in moral evaluations, the moral content of an action is not *conclusively* determined by its consequences.

The second objection to deontological ethics, especially as Kant formulates it, is that all moral judgments seem to be either-or judgements. A moral principle is either violated or not. As such, a deontological ethic like Kant's leaves no room for exceptions. Exceptions to each and every rule are, however, very well imaginable. For example, if a murderer were to ask where his potential victim was hiding, the universal duty to tell the truth would no longer apply. In the case of pluralistic deontological theories in particular, it is impossible to determine which duty should be honored in a conflict. The introduction of *prima facie* duties seems to remedy this situation, although it still remains unclear how a trade-off between different obligations can or should be made.

The final objection to deontological ethics is that, like consequentialism, this approach is at a loss when it comes to altruism and exemplary behavior. Deontological ethics requires one to act simply in accordance with certain principles, doing more than one's duty is never necessary. Everything beyond moral obligations cannot be captured in moral terms.

In conclusion, we can assert that deontology is a powerful approach to ethics and that it resonates well with accepted (even religious) moral intuitions. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it easily leads to a rigid application of rules. The introduction of the concept "prima facie" duty addresses this shortcoming. However, it remains inadequate especially in situations where major economic interests and specific principles are at stake. In situations like these, deontological ethics offers no adequate, watertight solution.

3. Virtue Ethics²²

In addition to the theories of moral obligation that focus on action as the object of moral evaluation, there is another where the agent, not the action, takes in center-stage. In this approach, it is not the action or the consequences that are evaluated but the person in question. Instead of judging what people do, it looks to who people are. The object of analysis is the qualities of a person.

A person can be ascribed a wide variety of characteristics. These are not only physical attributes like age, height, and size but also intangible ones such as abilities, intentions and motives. It is particularly the latter class of traits that is relevant from a moral perspective. These qualities determine how an individual will act in morally problematic situations and can be evaluated in moral terms. For example, it is possible to say someone is honest, just, or reliable. These are morally desirable traits that are traditionally designated as moral virtues.

The concept “virtue” has its origins in classical antiquity. The etymological origin of the term “virtue” can be traced back to both the Greek *arete* and the Latin *virtus*. *Arete* means “virtue” and “excellence.” This refers to someone’s or something’s ability to achieve a specific goal. The Latin *virtus* means “manliness” or “bravery.” This also refers to an ability or capability. *Virtus* thus refers to a person’s capacity to perform what is expected of him or her. An ethical theory that formulates norms that are related to the moral characteristics or qualities of a person is called “virtue ethics” or “aretical ethics.” This approach in ethics dates back to classical Greek philosophy. In addition to virtue ethics, one can also refer to it as “quality ethics.” Virtue or quality ethics refers to every ethical theory that formulates norms on the basis of human characteristics or qualities.

Virtue ethics in Greek philosophy

The Greek concept of *arete* is, as mentioned above, rather broad in meaning. It refers to a quality (virtue, excellence, and perfection) which can in principle be ascribed to almost anything, including people and states of affairs. It designates a state of affairs or a person as good or virtuous. A knife is good (or bad) but that can also be said of a school. Goodness or virtue is that which makes a knife or a school stand out or excel. In the same way, one can say that a person is good or bad. In this context, “good” is not used in an absolute sense. A person is good or bad in comparison with other people. Nevertheless, goodness is a decisive characteristic. Whether a knife or a person is good or bad is determining for that knife or that person’s character.

Still, people and objects do differ. A person can stand out in various ways, while a knife can only excel one particular manner. A person could, for example, be good at cooking or writing. Someone is a good cook if he is able to combine various ingredients in a way that produces a fine meal. Someone excels as a writer if she is able to captivate people with the written word. In both these areas, it is possible to specify how a person can be good. These qualities do make a person a good cook or a good writer, but not necessarily a good person. A good writer can be a bad person at the same time. What makes a person good? This is one of the most fundamental questions the philosophers of Greek antiquity wrestled with.

It was Aristotle who synthesized the ideas about virtues that were current among the Greeks at the time in a comprehensive theory. Aristotle is the founder of practical philosophy that was practiced until long after the Middle Ages. Practical philosophy embraces both ethics and politics as both are concerned with gaining insight into and achieving the good life as well as attaining the means to do so. Aristotle’s virtue ethic is part of his philosophy of the good. With this, he takes a stand against

the Platonic teachings and its focus on ideas. For Plato, the “good” as such exists – but as an idea. The idea of good exists not only as an intellectual concept, but also as an independent, actual object.

According to Aristotle, however, the good does not exist independently of concrete reality. It is only with the help of reason that it can be abstracted as a concept, a thought constructed on the basis of concrete reality. By using the term “good,” we apply a norm to that which we regard as “good.” To deem something “good” implies for Aristotle that it is desirable or that it is strived for. All human conduct focuses on the achievement of certain goals:

Every art and every scientific investigation, and every action and every conscious decision strives, according to men, towards some good. That is why people have correctly called good that what everyone strives for.²³

The various objectives that people pursue are hierarchically ranked. Most goals are pursued because their achievement is a means to reaching an even higher objective. Everything in nature harbors a specific goal. In pursuing that goal, nature strives to realize its potential to the best of its ability. For this reason, Aristotle’s philosophy is teleological, which should not be confused with contemporary consequentialism. What is being pursued is not an external objective. It is already present, a potential. Aristotle calls the highest human good *eudaemonia*. This is often translated as “happiness.” For Aristotle, *eudaemonia* has both an objective and a subjective dimension towards an inner state of contentment while it is also externally recognizable. In English, the concept “flourishing” best approximates the broader meaning of *eudaemonia*. The greatest good that a person can achieve is to give expression to her own, typically human nature. The ultimate goal of a human life is to realize this “highest good,” which is attainable through virtuous activities. Virtues are the necessary condition for achieving the highest good, *eudaemonia*. It is unclear whether Aristotle also considered acting virtuously as a sufficient condition for achieving the highest good. We suspect not. That also goes against common sense: virtuous conduct is not a guarantee for success. What then, is a virtue precisely?

In every action and situation, it appears to be something else: something different in medicine, something different in strategy, and so forth. What is, then, the good of each one? Is it not that for which everything else is done? In medicine, this is health, in war, victory, in construction, the house, etc., in all actions and designs the goal, for this is the reason why everyone does everything else. If there is, therefore, a goal for all our actions, this will be the good we are able to achieve, and if there are more than one, then these will determine the good. . . . Because there are apparently multiple objectives and we want one objective above the other, such as, for example, wealth, a flute, a tool in

general, it is clear that they are not all ultimate objectives. But the highest good is apparently something ultimate. If there is, however, only one ultimate objective, it will be the ultimate of it. Now, we call that which we pursue on its own merits more ultimate than that which is pursued in the pursuit of something else and never is chosen for something else, more ultimate than something that is chosen on its own merits and can be chosen because of something else, and so, we call something that consistently is chosen on its own merits and never in the pursuit of something else completely ultimate. According to common wisdom, happiness is the highest of these. We seek this at all times on its own merits and never because of something else. We also choose honor, pleasure, insight and all the virtues, because of themselves (because even if nothing should result from them, we would still choose them for themselves), but we also choose them in pursuit of happiness, because we believe we can become happy through them. In contrast, happiness is desired by no one because of the other things mentioned or for anything else.²⁴

A virtue is a state of character, a necessary condition for being happy. A virtuous person derives pleasure from acting virtuously. A person is virtuous when acting correctly has become habitual. In human activities or better yet, typically human behavior (as distinct from how plants and animals live), two levels can be distinguished: a lower level of activity that obeys reason and a higher level of activity that possesses reason and also exercises it. Parallel to these two levels of human activity, virtues can also be divided into two groups: intellectual virtues (such as wisdom) and moral virtues (such as moderation and generosity). Characteristic of intellectual virtues is that they grow through training, while moral virtues arise and develop through habit or custom. Virtues are acquired by using them, as is the case with all skills:

Because what we must learn to do, we learn in the doing: we become a master builder by building and a zither-player by playing the zither. So, too, do we become just by carrying out just deeds, moderate through acts of moderation, brave through acts of bravery.²⁵

Virtue is a certain condition that renders good that of which it is a virtue. Furthermore, this condition ensures that the subject or object also carries out its function well:

[A]nd so the virtue of the eye makes both the eye itself and its functioning good, for through the virtue of the eye, we see well. Equally, the virtue of the horse makes the horse itself good, and that it runs well, that it carries the rider well, and stands well against the enemy. If this is so for every case, then the human virtue will also be a condition by which the person becomes good and by which he carries out his own tasks well.²⁶

A virtue is a mean between two undesirable extremes. The two extremes are vices, which are diametrically opposed to each other and which, together, stand in opposition to virtue. Courage is the mean

between fear and recklessness and generosity is the mean between wastefulness and greed. What a moral virtue precisely consists of in a concrete situation cannot be described in general terms. That depends on the nature of the person involved. Depending on the inclination towards a given extreme, one must strive in the direction of the opposite extreme.

Virtue ethics in the history of Western philosophy

Although great differences exist between classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, they shared the same cultural frame of reference. Virtues played a central role in this context and were common in ancient Greek thought. In the various ethical theories of the time, the concept has more or less the same meaning. The double meaning of “virtue,” both in its more technical sense as “capability for a particular goal” and, in the moral sense, one’s “capability as a person” is characteristic of these classical Greek theories. The discussion was never really about what this concept meant or should mean. Everyone knew what virtues were. Plato and Aristotle’s dialogues were more concerned with the characteristics of virtues and whether virtues can be learnt or not.

During the Middle Ages, the theological framework borrowed from scholastic thought - also shared by virtue ethics - was more or less commonplace. Although the technical meaning of virtue was pushed to the background, the moral meaning of the term remained intact. Just like in classical thought, virtues were viewed as those qualities that make a person fit for his destination. However, for Christian theologians and philosophers in the Middle Ages, humankind’s destination was divine in nature. Because the human destination is not realized here on earth, but in the hereafter, the nature of the virtues changed radically. Humility, meekness and the recognition of human weakness and sin, were the qualities that encouraged people to focus on the divine, the perfect, and the transcendent. In his time, the apostle Paul identified the divine virtues by which people could submit to the power of God: faith, hope, and love. Together with the classical virtues (wisdom being replaced by practical insight or prudence) these three divine virtues make up the seven cardinal virtues of medieval Christian theology and philosophy: prudence, courage, moderation, justice, faith, hope, and charity.

Thomas Aquinas may be considered the greatest neo-Aristotelian thinker. He wrote not only the very influential *Summa Theologiae*, but also a number of philosophical texts such as *De Virtutibus*. Because virtues were an integral part of the prevailing cultural climate and thus fulfilled an important guiding role, it made sense for most of the ethical theories from that time to devote attention to virtues. Contemporary virtue-ethical theories have to make do without such a commonly accepted framework. In everyday usage, virtuousness is predominantly associated with the *bourgeoisie*. When

the term is used, it encapsulates rudimentary references to the scholastic tradition from before 1800. In a theory where virtues play a role, no special justification is required.

Various Renaissance philosophers (including Machiavelli, Campanella, and Telesius) explicitly rejected the scholastic school of thought. In doing so, they fell back on the concept of virtue as derived from Roman philosophy. Campanella even goes as far as saying that virtues are limited to those qualities that serve the self. Although the concept of virtue continued to play a role in modern philosophy (after 1600), it gradually came to be seen as less of a guiding principle, and virtue ethics also began to lose ground.²⁷ Aristotelianism and the scholastic framework were forced to give up ground bit by bit. Especially the distinction between facts and values, and the increasing importance attached to facts (this happens to an extreme degree in neo-positivism), led to the situation where the primary interest became discovering natural laws. Normative questions were no longer regarded a suitable subject in the realm of scientific thought.

These developments have led to a situation where modern virtue-ethical theories have to make do without a generally accepted framework. As a result, supporters of a virtue ethical approach face a number of questions. What characteristics or qualities can be called virtues? What are these moral virtues based on? How do moral virtues relate to other (amoral) characteristics? Can the moral subject influence virtues? How do virtue ethics relate to or how do they differ from the common ethical theories of moral obligation?

Despite the fact that the concept of virtue is no longer a dominant guiding principle in Western thinking, ethical theorists have taken up the study of virtue ethics anew. Contemporary virtue ethical theorists include Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, and Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre has rekindled public interest in virtue ethics with his highly acclaimed book *After Virtue*.

Characteristics of virtues

A broad range of virtues feature in the various virtue ethical theories. Depending on the basis of the theory, different tableaux of virtues are advanced. Plato recognized four cardinal virtues, those virtues to which all other moral qualities can be traced. These are wisdom, courage or bravery, moderation, and justice. Plato devoted several dialogues to virtues: courage in *Laches*, friendship in *Lysis*, and wisdom in *Charmides*. In the dialogue *Meno*, Plato attempts to describe what virtues actually are. Virtue appears to be neither an innate characteristic nor something that can be acquired through instruction. He relies upon a sort of divine inspiration:

Socrates: We shall only have certainty when we, before asking the question of how virtue comes to a person, first attempt to ascertain what the virtue - taken purely of itself - might be.²⁸

In *The Republic*, Plato also devotes some attention to human virtues, which could be realized both in the individual and in the ideal state. Plato uses the state as a model for natural persons. The virtues can also be found in natural persons. In this way, he distinguishes four principal virtues. Aristotle draws a distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. He classifies the moral virtues according to his division of desires and passions. The moral virtues include for example courage, sobriety, generosity, and justice. Friendship lies on the dividing line between the intellectual and the moral virtues.

What qualities or characteristics (virtues) should a person possess? According to Plato, virtue or excellence is expressed in the proper execution of a specific function or task. For Aristotle, a virtue is a characteristic, a “state of character,”²⁹ which renders a person good and able to carry out his function well.³⁰ Hume considers every quality of the spirit which results in “love and pride” a virtue. Among the vices, Hume includes those qualities of the spirit that foster hatred and cause humiliation.³¹ Kant offers an interesting definition. A virtue is “*die festgegründete Gesinnung seine Pflicht genau zu erfüllen*” (an internalized inclination to properly fulfill one's duties). Here, the concept of virtue is synonymous with morality. MacIntyre describes virtues as a type of “obtainable human qualities.”³² That the concept of virtue is used in various ways is apparent from its wide variety of definitions.

Five characteristics of moral virtues can be distilled from the various theories of virtue. Moral virtues are characteristics or qualities. These qualities

1. are desirable, they are perceived as worthy of pursuing and therefore imply a moral norm;
2. are expressed in actions;
3. have a more or less stable, durable character;
4. are constantly, albeit often latently, present; and
5. can be influenced by the subject.

1. Moral virtues express a moral norm

Virtues presume a goal or ideal that is worthy of being pursued. Virtues are those qualities that contribute to the realization of the ideal, or, more concretely, the goal. For Aristotle, virtues rely on a reasonable order (the Logos), which is present in nature. Everything - people and objects - plays a special role in that order. For people, it is the destination of being a person. Fulfilling that role well makes a virtue of the thing or of the particular person. For Aristotle, order resides in concrete every-

day reality. Plato, on the other hand, locates virtues in a transcendent order. The good exists as a transcendent reality. A thing is good to the extent that it expresses the idea of “Good.” The virtue of a thing is the excellent fulfillment of its specific function. In his writings, Thomas Aquinas links Plato’s transcendent order to Aristotle’s order of reason. Like the contemporary ethical theorist Geach, this medieval theologian and philosopher places virtues in a divine order. Virtues rely on a divine hierarchy. Only if we allow ourselves to be led by these virtues are we able to live in a state of love of God or in accordance with God’s will. Campanella and Hobbes value virtues as functional for the self-preservation of mankind. MacIntyre paints virtues against the background of a social order, which exists thanks to the exaltation of these virtues.

The ideal that is being pursued is not necessarily an external goal that applies in all circumstances and for everyone. The standards of excellence for people differ from culture to culture and perhaps even from individual to individual. Moreover, to name a person good or bad, just or unjust, is something other than describing an actual state of affairs. A number of arguments can be used to make this clear.³³ For instance, someone who formulates his goal in life also says something about himself. In making a statement about the goal of a person, it is impossible to abstract from the fact that we ourselves are people. Secondly, knowledge about the meaning or goal of human life is not theoretical in nature. It is practical wisdom that also implies action. Insight into the aim of human life has direct consequences for what people do and how they live their lives. The practical nature of this knowledge also implies that it cannot be universal in nature. The ideal for a person is always concrete and related to the context.

2. Moral virtues are expressed in action

A second characteristic of virtues is that they pertain to a person’s actions. This refers to the capabilities a person has and, therefore, indirectly to the actions she is capable of. How will the agent act in morally critical situations? Characteristics that cannot be or are not expressed in the actions of the subject are, in fact, morally irrelevant. Characteristics are judged as good or bad to the extent that they are related to actions that we conceive as good or bad:

There is no such thing as a good tree producing bad fruit, or a bad tree producing good fruit. Each tree is known by its own fruit: you do not gather figs from brambles or pick grapes from thistles. Good people produce good from the store of good within them; and evil people produce evil from the evil within them. For the words that the mouth utters come from the overflowing of the heart.³⁴

3. Virtues have a more or less stable and long-lasting character

A third important characteristic of moral traits is that they make it possible to focus one's attention on the more lasting, structural bases of behavioral expressions:

Human good consists of the activities of the soul in accordance with virtue, and, as there are multiple virtues, in accordance with the best and most perfect. That must go on for an entire life. A single swallow doesn't make a spring, or a single day; equally, a single day or a short period doesn't make a man content and happy.³⁵

The key to virtue ethics lies not in isolated actions, but in the structure that is recognizable in the actions and that is related to the qualities (the virtues) that an agent has developed. People trust each other when they experience the trust-inducing action of the other as a disposition rather than whimsical or opportunistic.

4. Virtues exist in a latent form

A fourth trait of moral characteristics is that they relate to capabilities and dispositions. The subject has certain qualities, which may never have to be expressed. However, if they are needed (in morally precarious situations, for example) they can and will be used. Someone can be described as reliable only if they have resisted opportunistic behavior under circumstances where unfair benefit or breaking one's word was tempting. We say someone is reliable on the basis of past behavior even though the person cannot prove it at the moment it is said of him or her. By calling someone reliable we express the expectation that the person will be worth the trust we place in him in situations where his reliability has to be trusted. We call someone courageous only if someone has proven to be courageous in circumstances that required courage.

5. Virtues are subject to influence

A fifth trait of moral characteristics or virtues is that they can be cultivated to a certain extent. In this regard, virtues differ from passions. Passions are based in overwhelming emotions. The concept "passion" suggests, furthermore, a sort of determinism. We can say, for example, that someone "acts in a fit of rage." Virtues, by way of contrast, can be cultivated to become habits. If one has cultivated certain character traits, they can start to function as embedded habits. Virtues, are, however, closely related to passions. They give emotions and passions shape.

According to Aristotle, it is a parent's task to raise children to acquire certain virtues so that these become habits. It should not be necessary to decide whether you are going to tell the truth or not. Honesty must come automatically, something you don't have to think about. This can coincide with a feeling of happiness. The reverse is also true: for the virtuous person for whom acting virtuously has become a habit, acting improperly results in discontentedness. Not all habits are virtues, they can also be bad character traits or morally neutral. Taking sugar and milk in your coffee is a morally neutral habit. Virtues are moral qualities that are developed, which people are aware of, and that can be influenced. With regard to unconscious characteristics, people need to be able to become aware of them and to influence them.

Consciousness and freedom are preconditions for morality. The qualities we classify as moral are therefore distinct from innate characteristics. Qualities that are "imposed" by caregivers, that have become habits, also fall beyond the category of moral qualities. If one speaks of qualities or habits that are passed on through child-rearing practices, one must also speak of qualities that can be influenced by the person in question. The way a child is reared does shape its character. Nevertheless, he or she can very well decide to change by developing other character traits. That there exists the possibility of learning and that a subject can undertake this out of her free will implies - partially at least - consciousness and a focused choice.

4. The Integrity Approach

In this paragraph, we examine the extent to which the three ethical approaches above are complementary and how the integrity approach can effect coherence between these three approaches. First, we address the question of the extent to which a deontological approach contrasts with a consequentialist ethic, and the extent to which virtue ethics precludes an action-orientated approach.

Deontological ethics versus consequentialist theories

Consequentialism, especially the utilitarian strand, and deontology are powerful ethical theories that generally capture our moral intuitions well. In utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories the danger exists that the end can be used to justify the means. The objection to deontological ethics lies in the risk of rigidly holding on to moral principles and losing sight of the consequences of actions. Acknowledging the pitfalls of both approaches, John Dewey asserts that we should learn to think more technically about ends and more ethically about means, and avoid investing all ethics in ends and all technology in means.³⁶

Often, both deontological and consequentialist arguments play a role in discussions about a controversial moral issue. No general rule can be formulated to indicate when one approach should be favored above another or when another line of argumentation should be employed. Sometimes the consequences of an action should be considered and sometimes an appeal to principles is most suited for analyzing and evaluating the issue at hand. The choice for a given approach is not arbitrary. A deontological approach is most appropriate in the event that the fundamental rights or the distribution of benefits and burdens among different (groups of) people are at stake. If people's well-being is threatened, a consequentialist approach should also be included in the argumentation. The two approaches frequently complement each other well. Often a number of minimum requirements will be formulated on the basis of deontological arguments that set the boundaries within which, on utilitarian grounds, a course of action can be carved out that contributes optimally to the general welfare of all parties involved.

Action-orientated theories versus a virtue approach

Virtues become visible in actions. Why do we need virtue ethics? Is a theory of action not sufficient?

Given the relationship between obligations and virtues, it is understandable why theories of moral obligation focus on virtues. Virtues are regarded as a predisposition to act in keeping with moral obligations. The value of virtues lies in their contribution to making moral obligations concrete. The utilitarian John Stuart Mill sees virtues as internal sanctions that lead to desirable actions. In general, however, virtue ethics goes much further. Proponents of a virtue ethics approach presume that virtues have intrinsic value, that is, that their moral value does not depend on anything else.

If one considers actions only, one runs the risk of losing sight of the intentions that lie at the base of an action. Consequently, whether a given objective is realized intentionally or by coincidence or whether a principle is respected is irrelevant. A somewhat related argument - which holds that in addition to criteria for action, characteristics also merit attention - is that acting purely according to the letter of the law, is morally defunct. Morality also concerns the spirit in which one acts. A moral system of rules of conduct must be based in a predisposition to act according to moral rules. Geoffrey James Warnock (1923-1995) therefore considers virtues fundamentally as moral standards that provide arguments to justify given obligations.³⁷ In general, a theory of moral qualities supplements a theory of moral obligations.

Philosophers who advocate a virtue ethic generally tend to subordinate virtue ethics to theories of moral obligation. For William Klaas Frankena (1908-1994),³⁸ virtues exist separately from moral

obligations. He considers them as two sides of the same moral coin. Every obligation has a corresponding virtue. For every principle, there is a characteristic, which often has the same name and which motivates people to act morally. The reverse is also true, as for every virtue there is a moral obligation. Principles without character attributes are powerless and character attributes without principles are blind.

Frankena attributes to moral qualities a corresponding moral obligation and to obligations a corresponding moral quality. The question is whether this is necessary. Some virtues have no corresponding moral obligation. This applies, for example, to the virtues of self-control, diligence, and courage. No obligations that meet the criteria of morality (universally applicable, reversible) correspond to these virtues. These examples concern qualities that give direction to life in that they describe a particular ideal. In that sense, they describe a norm. However, one may never impose an ideal that may only be achievable for a select few as a general norm for everyone.

Frankena posits that moral virtues can be reduced to two fundamental virtues: benevolence and justice. These two cardinal virtues correspond to moral obligations. According to him, any quality that defies this classification is not a moral virtue:

Having accepted that, it still seems to be that, if someone's ideal is really a moral ideal, there will be nothing in it that cannot be covered by the benevolence principle and the justice principle.³⁹

This seems rather simplistic. Virtues such as diligence, courage, and self-control cannot be universalized; therefore, they do not qualify as moral virtues. Frankena in effect places the burden of proof on the critics. It should be noted here that Frankena assigns a broad meaning to the concept of the word "must" and by analogy, to duty ethics. A second shortcoming of Frankena's theory is that his quality ethic rather thinly reproduces what theories of moral obligation already do. Virtues only describe those characteristics that move one to act in accordance with moral obligations. Thus, a theory of moral qualities is worthwhile only as a supplement to theories of moral obligation. With the help of a virtue-ethical approach, something can be done that cannot be done well or at all by the commonly accepted theories. The way Frankena engages with virtue ethics actually renders this approach superfluous.

Virtue ethics should do more than simply provide a reason for an agent to act morally. A set of moral characteristics cannot be reduced to obligations to act. Although virtues often correspond to a given obligation, they cannot be reduced to obligations.

Some authors go much further than Frankena and hold that virtue ethics is a moral theory that can and should replace the commonly accepted concept set. Exponents of this vision include Anscombe, Prichard, MacIntyre, Foot, and Gauthier.⁴⁰ In a controversial article written in 1958, Elizabeth Anscombe writes:

[I]t is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking.⁴¹

In this article, theories of moral obligation in particular are rejected in no uncertain terms. If possible, the term “obligation” should be thrown overboard completely. In fact, these concepts are the remains of outdated ethical theories that no longer apply in contemporary society.

In reviewing these contributions, one can assert that Anscombe goes too far in saying that virtue ethics can and should replace the commonly accepted set of instruments. Acting cannot simply be reduced to qualities of the agent. Theories are instruments that can be used in an ethicist’s analytical and normative work. Where the instrument set of the duty-based ethic fails, virtue ethics can jump in. Similarly, duty ethics can supplement where virtue ethics fails. Because all moral norms (both with respect to qualities and with respect to obligations) ultimately rely on moral values, a theory of moral qualities does not necessarily exclude a duty ethic. Ethical theories are, just as other scientific theories, instruments that ethical theorists use in their analytical and evaluative research. It is therefore understandable that they want to avoid relinquishing tools unless they are forced to do so.

Monism, pluralism and dilemmas

In the preceding sections, we presented the three ethical theories as competing approaches, each with its own dominant point of view. In practice, these theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Deontological and consequentialist theories complement each other in many instances. Criteria for action and virtue-ethical norms are often two sides of the same coin and support each other. Virtue ethics describes the disposition or character that is required to satisfy the action-orientated norms. At the same time, the one cannot be reduced to the other. Moreover, the choice for one criterion is no arbitrary choice. Arguments can be given to substantiate when a particular criterion is appropriate or not.

The more use is made of ethical theories to back up a moral choice, the stronger its basis. The question, however, is what to do when prescriptives of these theories conflict. In real-life situations, this means that one must first acknowledge and appreciate the value of each concept. Then one must apply these respective concepts to the situation at hand and pay close attention to their discrepancies

and how they complement each other. If the situation is clear-cut (i.e., if the different theories all point in the same direction), a well-founded and clear standpoint can be formulated. In conflicting situations (i.e., if the different theories advance different alternatives), well-considered and sometimes refreshing insights are the outcome.

A person is often called to account precisely when others feel that he or she should have adopted a more appropriate approach - or the one they advocate themselves. Lack of understanding of such requests can easily lead to resistance and even condemnation from others. To enter into a constructive discussion is to set aside personal and preconceived opinions and to be receptive to others' viewpoints. To truly understand the "counterparty" is to appreciate their standpoint and arguments against the background of the theories set out above. Being equipped to give an account of the three different approaches, both individually and comparatively, is an indispensable skill in the field of morals. So is the ability to explain in a conflict situation why the one approach is preferred over the others or why a compromise is called for. Individuals therefore need to be aware of the correlation between the three perspectives and why the one sometimes excludes the other.

It thus appears that we are dealing with a diverse range of norms and values, each of which can be appropriate depending on the circumstances. This points in the direction of value pluralism. Is it not possible to weigh the different criteria up against each other in a suitable fashion? If action is urgent and the different theories all point in different directions, is it not possible to justify the chosen action? In other words, does an eventual choice not show that an all-encompassing or ultimate norm for testing everything against can be found? If such an ultimate norm or value does exist, which is it? And is it utilitarian, deontological, or of a virtue-ethical kind? Along with the utilitarians, both Kant and Aristotle's approach is monistic. For Aristotle, the virtues ultimately form a coherent whole. For Kant, the categorical imperative ensures that all moral duties are consistent. For utilitarians, the unifying criterion is the common good. Do situations arise where moral demands are truly mutually exclusive? Do dilemmas truly exist? Or are these situations that just require proper reflection to come up with an all-embracing criterion?

Dilemmas, in our view, are not simply difficult issues. A dilemma concerns situations where we are morally obliged to act and to refrain from acting at the same time. It may be that we are required to act to achieve a certain end but that other counter-effects render the action unacceptable. One of the important duties of a doctor is to relieve terminal patients of pain. If it results in ending a life, the doctor has consciously taken someone's life. Dilemmas of this kind form the central theme in many literary works. In Dostojevski's *Crime and Punishment*, the student Raskolnikow takes his landlady's life, an impossible woman who made life unpleasant for everybody. Dilemmas can also involve

situations where honoring an obligation can prevent one from honoring another for the simple reason that it is practically impossible to perform both actions at one and the same time. You may have promised your partner that you'd leave work early to fetch the children from school without realizing that you had an appointment with a client to discuss a report you compiled. Your partner is counting on you and you have a duty towards your client, especially since the appointment was difficult to arrange with everyone's schedules being so full. Not only is your spouse relying on you but your company and your client are also counting on you. In situations like these conflicting demands are made of the person involved. It is in cases like these that "real" dilemmas present themselves.

It is sometimes possible to resolve a dilemma by prioritizing (see the discussion of Ross and the *prima facie* character of duties), but often it is impossible. Practical hurdles can make it impossible to prioritize. Perhaps there is an order of priority and good reasons to make trade-off, but we lack sufficient knowledge, insight, information, and the analytical skills to successfully make such a trade-off. In that case, we could try to resolve these dilemmas with still further research to fill the gaps in our knowledge and insight. This impossibility to come to a rational decision can also be due to the incomparability of the values, norms, and ideals that are at stake. In that case, we are dealing with what we referred to as a "real" dilemma.

"Real" dilemmas are present in situations where:

- resources (time, money) are scarce, and/or
- we lack the knowledge and insight to make a responsible choice, and/or
- incomparable values, norms, and ideals that are mutually exclusive are at stake, and
- it is imperative to choose.

Thomas Nagel identifies five different types of moral criteria that can cause conflict between different demands: obligations, rights, utility, personal commitments, and perfectionist ideals.⁴² In his view, these moral requirements are incomparable. He is also of the opinion that we cannot expect our moral system to always be consistent.

There is quite a bit of discussion about the question of whether dilemmas truly exist. Are we faced with conflicting moral obligations that cannot be realized simultaneously and where the realization of the one offers no excuse for neglecting the other, or is it a case of difficult issues that we simply have to think through better in order to judge which deserves priority?

One argument against the existence of true dilemmas is that to do so would amount to a logical inconsistency. On the one hand, obligations have to be honored. On the other hand, "ought implies can." We are not bound by impossibilities.⁴³ Another argument that is often advanced against the ex-

istence of true dilemmas concerns the unacceptable consequences of accepting their existence. To do so would undermine all ethics. According the critics, we should hold on to the ideal of coherence, as without it ethical reflection is meaningless or even impossible.

For Bernard Williams,⁴⁴ true moral dilemmas do exist. In his view, norms and values that clash should be compared with desires and not with beliefs. In choosing between two beliefs, no regret is felt at relinquishing one of the two. With desires, it is different. Sometimes one has to choose which need to satisfy. In doing so, the need that cannot be satisfied remains. Usually, one would experiences regret at not having been able to satisfy the unfulfilled need. In the event that one has to choose between conflicting demands one would feel uncomfortable and perhaps even guilty. This feeling of guilt shows that meeting one of the obligations is not to imply that it is justified to not meet the other. Williams offers an interesting argument but it is not conclusive. Regret is a psychologically complex feeling. It is possible to make the right moral decision and still feel regret. Besides, the feeling of regret does not necessarily mean that there is not one ultimate moral criterion for evaluating action.⁴⁵

The question as to whether real moral dilemmas exist where a choice has to be made between values and norms is not yet resolved. On the one hand, we argue that different norms and values apply that cannot be reduced to one measure. On the other hand, ethical reflection requires that decisions be made rationally. If the choice for a given criterion is ultimately arbitrary, both the meaning and possibility of ethics are undermined. From a theoretical perspective, it is difficult to place dilemmas. In everyday practice, however, a pressing need for placing dilemmas is felt. As McConnell observes, “Common sense and ordinary moral discourse are on the side of the friends of dilemmas.”⁴⁶

The question of dilemmas arises in applied ethics in particular. In this context, concepts and theories are employed that render classification in terms of one of the previously discussed approaches difficult. The concept “responsibility” is a good example.⁴⁷ “Responsibility” can be a characteristic of a person, for example: “she is a responsible person.” The concept “responsibility” can also be used with reference to an action, for example: “he acts responsibly.” One can also talk about “responsibility” with reference to the effects of actions, for example: “we think it is a responsible use of resources.” In applied ethics in particular, concepts are employed in a manner that integrates the respective approaches.

In our view, “integrity” is a concept that is well suited to be used in the analysis and evaluation of organizational functioning and functionaries within an organization. This concept, too, is multi-layered and makes possible the integration of the different approaches. We view the notion of inte-

grity as offering a way to move beyond the monism-pluralism debate. It is a concept that is rich in meaning and one that promotes the pursuit for coherence.

The integrity approach advocates the simultaneous and balanced use of the three ethical approaches. Sound decisions based upon integrity preclude the denial of moral complexity or settling for a simple, narrow-minded resolution based upon less than the three key ethics approaches. An understanding of ethics can only be achieved by grappling with the diversity of perspectives it offers. Moreover, the integrity approach comes down to guaranteeing wholeness in instances where one or more of the theories of ethics have been violated. A compromise may still preserve one's integrity.⁴⁸ Or as ethicist Linda Sharp Paine succinctly states:

When dilemmas arise, integrity requires that individuals deal with such conflicts and overcome the tensions inherent in them.

Integrity

The concept "integrity" is derived from the Latin word *integritas* and also means "wholeness," "completeness," and "purity."⁴⁹ The everyday usage of the term "integrity" (in a moral sense) generally centers on lapses or deficiencies in integrity. Integrity is thereby defined as "unimpeachable," "intact," or "incorruptible."⁵⁰ From this perspective, integrity comes down to safeguarding against infringements: making sure that one does not become tarnished or corrupted or that one does not overstep the mark. "Wholeness" can also be given a positive meaning. From this perspective, integrity refers to the implementation of good practices to ensure that one remains whole, in one piece, or unblemished.

"Wholeness" concerns the values and principles a person upholds. Later in this chapter, we will argue that the values and norms that guide the conduct of a person of integrity are complete and consistent. That is, that the values and principles, actual conduct, and the consequences that are strived for form a coherent whole. The words and deeds of a person of integrity are in conformance with each other. Integrity concerns the degree to which people are integrated, both on a personal level (towards oneself) and in relation to society (towards others).

In our view, integrity is not limited to one aspect of human character, such as the inclination not to get involved in corruption or - in positive terms - being honest. Nor do we see integrity as something solely related to character in the sense of integrity being the catchall for all virtues.⁵¹ Integrity refers to the integrative judgment and control of character, conduct, and consequences.

Prototypes that fall short of integrity

In outlining the contours of the concept of integrity, we follow Martin Benjamin's approach by first studying the ways individuals are customarily said to fall short of integrity.

[L]ike the darker parts of a black and white photograph, the network of negative characterizations may, by contrast, throw into relief a more positive and literal understanding of what we mean by it.⁵²

It is possible to distinguish several prototypes that fall short of integrity.⁵³ In practice, those who embody these characteristics do so in very subtle, varied, and complex ways. Moreover, these characteristics appear in varying combinations and degrees. The aim here is to distinguish the hallmarks of integrity.

A person can lack integrity or fall short of integrity when the values, norms and ideals the person upholds are incomplete or inconsistent.

- The moral chameleon is a person without strong personal convictions. He is someone who is anxious to accommodate others and inclined to evade moral controversy and disagreement. The moral chameleon is quick to modify or abandon currently held principles in order to placate others. He will "change colors" for the sake of fitting in. The moral chameleon lacks a coherent and stable set of values and principles.
- Similarly, the opportunist will alter his beliefs and behavior whenever he thinks that doing so will lead to personal gain or advancement. What he does and aspires to, depend entirely on the circumstances. Both the moral chameleon and the opportunist lack a stable and substantive set of values and principles. The opportunist lacks a set of values and principles that takes precedence over self-interest.
- A narrow-minded person adopts a narrow point of view by simply opting for one line of reasoning. He does not take the trouble - generally owing to prejudice or a lack of competence - to engage with other moral points of view. Instead, he looks for quick fixes to complex moral problems, which often finds its expression in rigidity. The narrow-minded person lacks a well-considered set of values and principles.
- The pragmatist has put aside all values and ideals. He no longer believes in values and ideals, and his conduct is led purely by pragmatic considerations.

A person's integrity falls short or lacks because the values, norms, and ideals are not consistent with actual conduct and actual effects that are strived for in conduct.

- In contrast to the moral chameleon and the opportunist, the hypocrite has a more determinate center, in the sense of being calculating and manipulative. A deliberate inconsistency between words and deeds can be identified in the hypocrite. “The hypocrite pretends to live by certain standards when in fact he does not.”⁵⁴ Hypocrites may be “rotten to the core,” but they are not wholly without center. Hypocrites have two different sets of principles, one for public consumption and one that actually guides their behavior. From the outside, the hypocrite is not “all in one piece.”
- Weak-willed persons have a reasonably coherent set of principles but lack the courage of their convictions or fail to make a conscientious effort to act in accordance with these principles. Their words or deeds will deviate from these principles in the face of external, but not irresistible, pressure or constraints. The weak-willed person lacks any real commitment, resolution or tenacity regarding the chosen values and principles.
- The self-deceiver lacks self-understanding. A discrepancy exists between the values and principles he likes to think he is acting upon, and the different, incompatible interests and desires that actually motivate his actions. To resolve this tension and to preserve his idealized self-image, he deceives himself about what he is in fact doing. For this reason, he is able to retain his internal integrity. From an external point of view, the integrity of the self-deceiver is everything but intact.
- The capricious (unreliable, whimsical) person is led by his mood and coincidence. His actions are characterized by ad hoc decisions.
- The pawn shifts the responsibility for his deeds onto others. He perceives himself as driven entirely by forces beyond his control and sees himself as a slave to his desires.⁵⁵ He seeks exoneration with excuses such as “he made me do it,” “I was just following orders,” and “I had no choice.”
- An alienated victim of external coercion is a person who is coerced into acting and speaking in ways that are at odds with his deeply held and cherished convictions. The alienated victim experiences an inconsistency between internal convictions and words and deeds. This person is in some ways the opposite of the hypocrite who may be consistent from his point of view, but not from others’. The alienated victim of external coercion differs from the pawn in that the latter is not conscious of any deeply held and cherished convictions.
- Customs and traditions lead the conduct of the traditionalist: “This is the way we have always done it” and “Everyone does it this way.”

A person’s integrity can fall short or even lack because he takes no account of the environment and the role he plays in it.

- The rigid dogmatist follows her own values and principles, and races after her own ideals. The dogmatist is not receptive to the questions and expectations from her environment.
- The rigid bureaucrat is simply led by the rules and is insensitive to signals from her environment.
- The hypochondriac wears blinkers and is not receptive to signals from her environment. The hypochondriac does not consider the effects of her actions on her environment.

Figure 3: Prototypes of Persons Lacking in Integrity

I. Absence of a coherent or complete set of values:

1. The moral chameleon
2. The opportunist
3. The narrow-minded person
4. The skeptic

II. Incoherence between values and deeds:

5. The hypocrite
6. The weak-willed person
7. The self-deceiver
8. The capricious person
9. The pawn
10. The alienated victim of external coercion
11. The traditionalist

III. Disconnection from the environment:

12. The rigid dogmatist
 13. The rigid bureaucrat
 14. The hypochondriac
-

Characteristics of integrity

How can we, following the advice of Benjamin, “by contrast, throw into relief a more positive and literal understanding” of what we mean by “integrity”? Three positive aspects of meaning can be deduced from the negative meaning of the concept “integrity”:

- I. A person of integrity is an autonomous thinker, she has a stable set of values and norms, and what she promotes is authentic: she stands and strives for something and is true to her ideals;
- II. A state of internal integration: the words and deeds of a person of integrity conform;
- III. A state of external integration: a person of integrity pays attention to social issues and is willing to account for herself.

I. A person of integrity is first and foremost autonomous and authentic: she stands for something, strives for something, and is true to her ideals

First of all, we can say that a judgment of integrity is a judgment of character.⁵⁶ Persons of integrity have a set of steadfast beliefs that define who they are and what they stand for. They have a high degree of self-control, self-awareness, and autonomy.⁵⁷ In contrast with the moral chameleon, external forces do not sway them. Integrity stands for the wholeness of motives. As the psychoanalyst and developmental psychologist Erik Erikson states in his book *Childhood and Society*,⁵⁸ integrity can be regarded as an encompassing wholeness and as the final and highest stage of personal development. Accordingly, persons of integrity accept responsibility for themselves, for what they do, and what they have done. They rarely appeal to external forces to explain or justify their behavior. The norms and values of a person of integrity flow forth from the individual and are determining of her character. The norms and values of the person of integrity are autonomous and authentic.

II. A person of integrity is capable of integrating her values, deeds, and their effects in her life in a natural way

Integrity is not a matter of intentions alone.⁵⁹ Intentions are a necessary but insufficient condition for speaking of integrity. Integrity is also a matter of conduct. Good intentions alone are a job half done.⁶⁰ Not only is the quality of one's intentions evident from one's actions, but the quality of one's actions is evident from one's intentions. A good deed that lacks substance is as empty as no good deed in the presence of substance. Persons of integrity match their intentions with deeds. They conscientiously translate their intentions into actions, which can be traced back to good intentions. To say that a person has integrity is to judge not only specific actions, but also the extent to which the actions flow from commitments that are integral to a person's self-understanding. Bernard Williams observes that "one who displays integrity acts from those dispositions and motives which are most deeply his and has the virtues that enable him to do that."⁶¹ Someone who acts merely out of habit or on impulse is not a person of integrity. A person of integrity acts from a sense of what is right. "Persons of integrity generally strive for harmony between principle and practice, and for coherence

among who they are, who they perceive themselves to be and how they present themselves to the world.”⁶² A person with integrity does the right thing for the right kinds of reasons. In contrast, a person who weighs the pros and cons of an action and makes decisions on the basis of profitability does not act with integrity. Even though it is not always possible to systematically translate intentions into actions, they at least offer stability. Conduct must be consistent with commitment and *vice versa*.⁶³

Also significant when we speak of integrity, is that whereas a single action can betray a lack of integrity, no single action can definitively establish a person’s integrity. A single slip can be fatal whereas a lifetime of good deeds can still leave one’s character open to question.⁶⁴

Thus, integrity is about constant alignment. It is not an ad hoc affair. It has diachronic as well as synchronic dimensions in the sense that it involves a pattern, stability, and self-integration. Persons of integrity only alter their behavior for very serious and well-considered reasons. That means “certain underlying principles of judgment, principles on which, at the deeper level, their on-going stability of character is founded” are present.⁶⁵ At the same time, stability requires courage (the will to do what one knows is right) in the face of external, but not overwhelming, pressures, temptations, or constraints. According to Benjamin, integrity is precisely the ability to remain oneself in trying situations. It is exactly in situations like these that integrity materializes. For him a “person of integrity does not have the split in the timber which would cause him or her to break under pressure.”⁶⁶ The way in which events unfold may serve either to reinforce one’s integrity or jeopardize it. That’s why it is so much easier to point out a person who lacks integrity than one who has integrity.

The strength of a person’s character that is revealed in moments of pressure enables us to predict future action. Not surprisingly, integrity is about an integrated life. The unity of the self “resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end.” MacIntyre continues, “Given the constraints of biology, society, and fortune, what will my life as a whole look like when it is nearly over?”⁶⁷ Solomon is perfectly right in saying that integrity goes beyond resisting temptation. Integrity more often requires action and proactive behavior. It is not just a matter of “not giving in.”⁶⁸ Integrity must therefore be continually affirmed in action. It follows that the motivational self-sufficiency of a person of integrity surpasses by far that of reasonably decent person.

III. A person of integrity is integrated into her environment and sensitive to social issues, and willing to account for herself

Integrity also means wholeness in the sense of being an integral part of something larger than the individual.⁶⁹ Not only are persons of integrity internally consistent - both at certain points in time and throughout time - they are also in harmony and connected with others. Others who depend on such persons therefore have reason to trust them.

Being integrated into one's environment also means making a contribution to the smooth functioning of the whole. In the society and organizations we function, everyone fulfills specific roles. Persons of integrity fulfill their social roles and tasks. The question of whether a functionary acts with integrity depends on the function the person fulfills. If conflicts arise between the various tasks that someone fulfills, a clear and unprejudiced choice must be made. The fact that a mixture of motives plays a role in actions is not necessarily unacceptable and does not raise questions with respect to a person's integrity as such. However, the situation changes when a function is used - or misused - to realize other (covert) ambitions. Because integrity is related to tasks or functions carried out, the demands that are placed on people are achievable. Integrity requires of each person to do what is necessary to fulfill the function as well as possible.

The business ethicist Henk van Luijk⁷⁰ argues for an operational notion of integrity. What he has in mind is integrity principally as the responsibility for fulfilling a given role. A person of integrity accepts the responsibility that comes with her function. For van Luijk, this involves amongst other things that the person is willing to account for the manner in which she gives content to her responsibilities. Accountability for actions is central along "with the willingness to take other views on proper conduct seriously, to the point of acknowledging that one's interpretation of integrity is less defensible than the alternatives offered."⁷¹

Integrity not only involves an individual's commitment to principles that are in accordance with personal or public opinion. Integrity also implies loyalty to those principles that can be consented to on legitimate grounds. Contrary to the arguments of some scholars,⁷² integrity requires more than adherence to some arbitrary set of values and more than adherence to a set of values acceptable to some other individual or group. Integrity refers to an express commitment to a morally justifiable set of principles and values. For example, we cannot label a guard at a Nazi concentration camp as a person of integrity if he ebulliently escorted Jews and gypsies to the gas chambers. Integrity means acting in accordance with the *legitimate* expectations of those around us.⁷³ Integrity means wholeness in conduct also from an outside perspective. As Bob Solomon puts it, "Integrity does not mean being the

moral rock around which the rest of the earth revolves.” Solomon’s view of integrity encompasses an understanding that one’s principles are not necessarily universal. Different people of integrity might very well subscribe to different principles. Nevertheless, cooperative relationships with other people and conforming to legitimate principles remain of primary importance. At the same time integrity also implies independence and may sometimes even require disobedience and disloyalty. As a result, people of integrity may not always be particularly likeable. Integrity requires flexibility, an ability to adjust to some situations while holding onto one’s norms and values.

Characteristic of a person of integrity is the will to make a contribution to the greater whole. According to Van Willigenburg, it is in this aspect of meaning that the moral character of the concept of integrity lies.⁷⁴ It is not only about a formal alignment of values, norms, and effects. A person of integrity has the expectation that the norms and values that she upholds are also subscribed to by others. That implies a willingness to analyze and discuss the norms and values that are advanced and to relinquish them for better norms and values should it be necessary.

Integrity and the “resolution” of dilemmas

Previously in this chapter, we gave an overview of two types of dilemmas. In the first, deontological duties and consequentialist criteria conflict with each other. In the second, requirements for actions clash with desirable characteristics. The question is whether it is possible to resolve these kinds of dilemmas by formulating one fundamental criterion against which all values and norms can be weighed. If it is not possible, it seems that we will have to accept that norms and values are ultimately relative or subjective in nature. Dilemmas put people’s wholeness (and as we will see below, also that of organizations) in question. People who are confronted with dilemmas oscillate between conflicting demands.

The notion of integrity offers a way out of this choice. Integrity means “working on wholeness” in three respects. First, by aligning values, norms, and ideals. Second, by striving for coherence between words and deeds. And finally, by making a contribution to the greater whole. What does this mean in concrete terms? Do the dilemmas that arise between values, norms, and principles get solved of their own accord as long as we are dealing with persons of integrity?

It seems that even by choosing for the integrity approach as solution to dilemmas, we are making things very difficult for ourselves. Integrity, after all, seems to be incompatible with making concessions and compromises. According to Van Willigenburg, it is


[N]ot only a matter of our personal integrity being at stake, it concerns ‘the matter’ itself. It is about upholding moral norms and values. It is not only about staying true to commitments that are determining of identity, it is about being true to that which counts for all of us or should count for us all. How could one compromise on that?⁷⁵

A “real” dilemma can be “resolved” in several ways:

- A simple choice can be made for one of the two values.
- Another possibility is to do nothing. None of the conflicting values are realized.
- Sometimes a compromise can be sought where both values are partially realized. It implies falling short with respect to both values at the same time.
- A compromise can be optimized where solutions are sought that realize both values to as great an extent as possible and an optimal situation is achieved.

The following figure depicts the logical possibilities for solving dilemmas.

Figure 4: Alternative Solutions to Dilemmas⁷⁶



An important reason for the acuteness of moral dilemmas can be found in the fact that we tacitly assume that honoring one of the conflicting values is to reject the other value.

However, we believe that in the face of dilemmas, value pluralism can ensure “wholeness” in the three senses discussed. Value pluralism recognizes the validity of a plurality of values, norms, and ideals. This is not to suggest that all values, norms, and ideals are equally good or that mistaken responses to moral issues are no longer possible. Value pluralism should be distinguished from moral relativism and moral subjectivism. Value pluralism holds that people find valuable a diverse range of irreducible values, norms, and ideals that regularly clash. This, in short, is what lies at the basis of

moral dilemmas. That a choice has to be made, for example, due to a scarcity of resources (time, money), does not imply that the obligation that is not fulfilled or the value that is not honored is no longer valid. Choosing for one value does not necessarily imply a choice against the other conflicting value.

Value pluralism holds that norms (of both the utilitarian and deontological kind) and ideals ultimately rest on values. Characteristic of values is that they are not mutually exclusive.

Charles Hampden-Turner and Fons Trompenaars, both experts in the field of strategic intercultural management, have conducted extensive research on managing intercultural differences. In their view, values exist by virtue of differences. Something is a value because it possesses a distinguishing feature we deem valuable. Tension can arise between the things we value. This can readily be seen in products:

Consider the differences incorporated into an automobile. We wish it to be *high-performing* yet *safe*, to *economize on fuel* yet *accelerate sharply*, to be *sporty* yet *reliable*, to give *freedom* to the driver yet *reassert control* in emergencies, to be compact yet *roomy* inside, to *absorb* the impact of a collision so that occupants *escape* that impact. We want it to be *low-cost* yet *distinctive*. Clearly this list of values is full of contrasts. A car that performs more sluggishly is safer; acceleration uses up fuel; a compact car, all things being equal, is less roomy; and so on. These values are in tension with each other. The conventional wisdom is that we must choose between these values, so that a Volvo, for example, is safe and reliable but not high-performing and sporty. But if we look deeper, we see that despite some trade-offs, automobiles are considerably safer *and* better performing, more fuel-saving *and* more responsive to the throttle than they were just a few years ago. The industry consistently improves *both* values-in-tension.⁷⁷

According to Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, the tension between values is the source of value creation. Conflicts between values should thus be seen as a challenge. This applies not only to products but also to processes aimed at producing these products.

Value conflicts and clashes emerge within research, development, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and after sales service departments, and many conflicts erupt *between* them.⁷⁸

In launching a new pharmaceutical product on the market, the approach of a marketer is different from that of a medical researcher. Every professional has her own values and with it, her own professional culture. Value conflicts can arise not only between national cultures but also between corporate cultures. In most instances, it is possible to search for optimal situations where the different values at stake can be honored as best as possible. For the process aimed at uniting clashing values

Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars use the term “reconciliation” which entails thinking together these conflicting values to as great an extent as possible.

Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars’ description of conflicting cultural values also applies to conflicting moral values. Conflicts between particular rights and the common good for example can often be “resolved” in practice. The solution has to be sought in reconciling clashing demands. In doing so, it is important not to treat each situation as an isolated case. The reconciliation of clashing demands can consist in frankly admitting to the impossibility of meeting all demands, expressing regret, showing compassion for the victim, striving for minimum damage, and seeking a way to compensate damages. It can also involve seeking creative compromises. This approach often means making oneself vulnerable, being willing to learn from mistakes, and being open to better ideas.

Dealing with moral dilemmas places demands on behavior but in particular on the disposition of the person involved. This person is to stand up and make known the values he believes in. The person of integrity does not hide behind others and makes sure forces beyond him do not control him. Over and above this, he has the disposition to search for unity in the different demands. A person of integrity strives towards understanding and realizing the respective conflicting values, norms, and ideals as an interconnected whole.

Against the background of the alternative responses to dilemmas, we can now describe the choice a person of integrity would make.

For a person of integrity, alternative (A) is never acceptable. The person in question actually leaves the choice to others and in doing so, he actually relinquishes his autonomy. He becomes a plaything of the forces around him and lets it happen.

Alternative (B) is unappealing to a person of integrity. It implies that only one value is realized and the other is negated, which raises doubts about how strongly one feels about the value that is not realized. A choice for (B) requires a clear explanation for the absolute importance of the one value or interest over and above the value that is ignored.

The compromise (C) is similarly unattractive for a person of integrity if it is simply to appease others superficially. In seeking a compromise so as to realize an optimal solution (alternative (D)), it must be clear that the person in question is confronted with a tragic dilemma that forces him to choose but that he is trying to fulfill all moral obligations to the best of his abilities. Only if these requirements are met is it clear that he takes both values to heart. The search for the correct balance is expressed in the willingness to enter into dialogue and to subject choices to discussion.

Integrity concerns a disposition that is aimed at holding on to values, norms, and ideals. The search for an appropriate course of action involves a willingness to analyze and discuss one's choices and seeking richer solutions. "Richness" refers to finding solutions that do justice to the different values at stake. By combining where possible the positive dimensions of the one-sided (B) alternatives, we gain sight of an optimal solution (D). Integrity is visible in a disposition, conduct, and ambitions that are aimed at continuous improvement and in striving for a (more) optimal solution. Integrity implies holding on to values, norms, and ideals; openness to other values, norms, and ideals in words and deeds; and striving for improvement. Integrity is therefore expressly non-relativist. The notion "improvement" is an explicitly normative concept. Integrity leaves room for other norms and values.

In this chapter integrity was analyzed from two perspectives. On the one hand we examined the different types of moral criteria that could involve mutually conflicting prescriptions in practice. From this point of view, an appeal is made for value pluralism. From this perspective, integrity is described as striving for coherence between values without suggesting that differences should be erased. On the other hand integrity was analyzed as coherence between input, conduct, and outcome. The two perspectives in fact form two layers of the notion of integrity. The coherence between qualities, principles, and objectives is repeated as coherence between input, conduct, and outcome.

Conclusion

Individual integrity requires that one's words and deeds conform to a substantive, coherent, and relatively stable set of qualities, behavioral principles, and goals/ideals to which one is genuinely and freely committed.⁷⁹ The call for "integratedness" does not exclude conflict between the different ideals and commitments of one and same person. Sometimes, one has to let go of one goal to be able to retain another. A compromise need not threaten one's integrity. In fact, it may even be called for to a certain extent to safeguard "integratedness."⁸⁰ At the same time, there are some ideals and goals that are so intertwined with one's identity that renouncing them would result in "losing face" or the trust of others. Integrity therefore requires a certain degree of integration and standing strong in the convictions and values that make one unique. At the same time, limitations and responsibilities do exist that have to be respected by everyone irrespective of individual identity or principles - even if it requires sacrifice. Sometimes it may even be important *not to do* something. To say someone has integrity is not to suggest that outsiders necessarily approve of a person's convictions and conduct. Aspiring towards something (having goals), standing for something (being steadfast), and feeling concern for something (having affinity with the outside world) are key elements of a person of integrity.

A life is “whole” when it is integrated from both the point of view of the agent and from the perspective of others. Integrity regulates the connection between intentions, deeds, and consequences. Integrity requires consistency in thoughts and action. Moreover, it requires sincere dedication to convictions.⁸¹

The three chief characteristics of the concept of integrity are as follows:⁸²

- I. Internal coherence in the motives for what one would like to be, what one will (not) do, and what one would like to realize.
- II. Coherence between motives (what one is), actions (what one does (does not do)), and the effects of these actions (what one achieves).
- III. Coherence in motives, actions, and effects with respect to the outside world.

The concept of integrity is not entirely distinct from consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethics. In consequentialist ethics, moral judgement is based on the effects of an action whereas in deontological ethics, the nature of the action itself is evaluated. In making a moral judgement, virtue ethics looks to the character of the actor, the motives and intentions behind the action. The integrity approach emphasizes the coherence between these approaches. The integrity approach takes seriously the whole: the individual, the context, and the past. The concept is flexible in the sense that it does not take an initial stand by prioritizing either virtues or principles or consequences. The integrity approach offers connections for an exchange of ideas among the advocates of the different perspectives. Another advantage of the concept is that it does not make unrealistic demands but achievable ones that are related to the function people perform. In this approach, an action is chosen which is justifiable but not totally determined by others' expectations. In theory, a person who fulfills a role according to the book could be viewed as a person of integrity. However, because situations arise that cannot simply be resolved by following the rules, practical wisdom is required in performing a function properly. To be able to assess a situation and determine a sound course of action in the light of the nature of the role and its moral dimensions, the appropriate values and principles must be internalized. When a person has the knowledge and skills to interpret rules, she is also able to use her critical faculties to determine her own position in relation to the conventional interpretation of the rules.⁸³

Notes

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- ¹ This slightly revised paper has been published as chapter in: Kaptein, M., & Wempe, J. 2002. *The Balanced Company: A corporate integrity approach*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ² See, for example, Baron, M.W., Pettit, P., & Slote, M. 1997. *Three Methods in Ethics*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
- ³ Consequentialists also regard the nature of an action and the intentions as morally relevant. A moral judgement is however ultimately based on the consequences of an action.
- ⁴ In practice, the difference is not as sharp as is suggested here. Many deontologists regard intentions morally relevant.
- ⁵ For an extensive discussion of consequentialist ethics, see: Scheffler, S. 1997. *Consequentialism and its Critics*, Oxford Readings in Philosophy.
- ⁶ Bentham, J. 1789. *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*. In Ryan, A. (Ed.) 1987. In *Utilitarianism and other Essays*. Penguin Books: p.65.
- ⁷ Bentham, J. 1789. *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*. In Ryan, A. (Ed.) 1987. In *Utilitarianism and other Essays*. Penguin Books: p.88.
- ⁸ See chapters 13 and 14 of Bentham's *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*.
- ⁹ See Velasquez, M.G. 1992. *Business Ethics: Concepts and cases*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Third edition: pp.62-63.
- ¹⁰ See also Velasquez who identifies several similar problems. Velasquez, M.G. 1992. *Business Ethics: Concepts and cases*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Third edition: pp.62-63.
- ¹¹ For another exposition of deontological or Kantian ethics, see Baron, M.W., Pettit, P., & Slote, M. 1997. *Three Methods of Ethics*. Blackwell Publishers.
- ¹² Ross, W.D. 1930. *The Right and the Good*. London: Oxford University Press.
- ¹³ Kant, I., 1785. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*: 421. Edited by Gregor, M. 1997. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press : p.31.
- ¹⁴ Kant, *Ibid.* 421.
- ¹⁵ Kant, *Ibid.* 422.
- ¹⁶ Kant, *Ibid.* 422.
- ¹⁷ Kant, *Ibid.* 422.
- ¹⁸ Kant, *Ibid.* 423.
- ¹⁹ Kant, *Ibid.* 429.
- ²⁰ Rawls, J. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- ²¹ Velasquez discusses three lines of critique against Kant's theory. A first problem is that Kant's theory is not exact enough to be consistently useful. Secondly, some critics claim that there is substantial disagreement concerning what the limits of the moral rights are and how conflicting rights should be balanced. Thirdly, there are counter-examples that show that the theory sometimes goes wrong, for example with regard to the criteria of universalizability and reversibility. Velasquez, M.G. 1992. *Business Ethics: Concepts and cases*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Third edition: pp.84-86.
- ²² For an extensive account of virtue ethics, see for example Crisp, R., & Slote, M. (Eds.) 1997. *Virtue Ethics*. Oxford Readings in: Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
- ²³ Aristotle. *Ethica Nicomachea*. Edition of McKeon, R. 1941. New York: Random House: p.935.

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- 24 Aristotle. *Ethica Nicomachea*. Edition of McKeon, R. 1941. New York: Random House: p.942.
- 25 Aristotle. *Ethica Nicomachea*. Edition of McKeon, R. 1941. New York: Random House: p.952.
- 26 Aristotle. *Ethica Nicomachea*. Edition of McKeon, R. 1941. New York: Random House: p.957.
- 27 See MacIntyre, A. 1981. *After Virtue: A study in moral theory*. London: Duckworth.
- 28 Plato, *Meno*, 110b.
- 29 Aristotle. *Ethica Nicomachea*. Edition of McKeon, R. 1941. New York: Random House: pp.956-957.
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- 31 Hume, D. 1739. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edition Dolphin Books 1961. New York: Doubleday & Company: p.512.
- 32 MacIntyre, A. 1981. *After Virtue. A study in moral theory*. London: Duckworth: p.178.
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- 42 Thomas Nagel distinguishes five categories: personal commitment, obligations, rights, utility, and perfectionist ideals. Zie Nagel, T. 1979. *Moral Questions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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- 45 See: McConnel, T. C. 1996. Moral residue and dilemmas. In: Mason, H.E. (Eds.) 1996. *Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also: Dahl, N.O., Morality, moral dilemmas, and moral requirements. In: Mason, H.E. (Eds.) 1996. *Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 46 McConnel, T. C. 1996. Moral residue and dilemmas. In: Mason, H.E. (Eds.) 1996. *Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.37.
- 47 See also, Bovens, M. 1998. *The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and citizenship in complex organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 48 See also Berlin, I. 1969. *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford University Press.

- 49 See, for example, Taylor, G. 1981, Integrity. *Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol. 55: 143-159; Benjamin, M. 1990. *Splitting the Difference: Compromising and integrity in ethics and politics*. University Press of Kansas: 52; Montefiore, A., & Vines, D. (Eds.) 1999. *Integrity: In the public and private domains*. London: Routledge. The Oxford English Dictionary describes integrity as: “1. The condition of having no part or element wanting; unbroken state; material wholeness, completeness, entirety. 2. Unimpaired or uncorrupted state; original perfect condition; soundness. 3.a. Innocence, sinlessness. B. Soundness of moral principle; the character of uncorrupted virtue, honesty, sincerity.”
- 50 See Benjamin, M. 1990. *Splitting the Difference: Compromising and integrity in ethics and politics*. University Press of Kansas: p.46.
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- 63 As Bob Solomon eloquently formulates: “Before we can *do*, we must *be*, even if what we become, surprisingly, is the accumulation and outcome of, among other things, our actions. But that means that among the consequences of our actions, indeed, foremost among them or prior to them, we must keep in mind who we are and what we are making of ourselves, our own ideals, and how we see ourselves

and how others see us, too.” Solomon, B. 1999. *A Better Way to Think about Business: How personal integrity leads to corporate success*. New York: Oxford University Press: p.63.

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values and principles that is consistent with what one says. Benjamin, M. 1990. *Splitting the Difference: Compromising and integrity in ethics and politics*. Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas: p.51.

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