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Planned Operations and Emergency Procedures:

First Responder to Emergency Incidents

Version 2.3

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Authorised Professional Practice

These notes are aimed at learners completing their Initial training to meet the learning outcomes specified on the National Policing Curriculum. The primary source of content is the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) and the supporting evidence based research of "what works" in policing.

APP can be found at: <http://www.app.college.police.uk/>

1. First Responder to Emergency Incidents

These notes are for Police Officers and IL4SC Phase 3.

This chapter looks at what to do as first responders to Specialist Emergency Incidents.

These incidents will involve specialist teams of responders from the police, but may also on occasions; include the Fire and Rescue Service and the Ambulance Service. You will also be able to explain how interoperability can be achieved with joint working with the other blue light services at the scene of a Specialist Emergency Incident.

2. First Responder at a Major Incident

A major incident will require a large number of agencies to work together – the emergency services as well as private sector operators of critical infrastructure – and therefore requires better integration within and between these different organisations. The purpose of these notes is to point you to the correct course of interoperability action at the scene of major incidents.

Major Incidents

A major incident is defined by The Cabinet Office Lexicon 2013 as:

‘An event or situation requiring a response under one or more of the emergency services’ major incident plans’

When incidents are of such a nature that they severely test the response arrangements of the emergency services and require a special mobilisation of their resources, most are likely to declare a major incident.

A major incident may be declared by a single blue-light service or jointly.

It is feasible that only one service may determine an emergency as a major incident, based on the type of incident and scale of their resources required. This may not necessarily mean it is a major incident for all other services.

A major incident may require:

- the involvement of other agencies and organisations
- the initial treatment, rescue and transport of a large number of casualties
- handling a large number of enquiries
- large-scale combined resources of two or more emergency services

- mobilising and organising emergency services and partner organisations to cater for the possibility of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people.

Police objectives when responding to a major incident

When responding to a major incident, the police objectives are:

- saving and protecting human life
- maintaining public order and the rule of law
- preventing, deterring and detecting crime
- securing the scene
- coordinating the multi-agency response
- containing the emergency (limiting its escalation or spread)
- providing warnings, advice and information
- managing the media
- facilitating investigations and inquiries
- protecting the health and safety of responding personnel
- protecting property
- maintaining or restoring critical activities
- maintaining normal services at an appropriate level
- managing traffic arrangements
- clarifying the role and responsibilities of other investigative agencies
- supporting HM Coroner
- safeguarding the environment
- facilitating the recovery process to restore and rebuild the community
- evaluating the response process
- identifying and taking action to implement lessons learned.

3. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP)

The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) was set up at the request of the Home Secretary following a number of public inquiries.

Major and complex incidents do not happen frequently. When they do, there needs to be the most efficient, effective and, essentially, joined-up response that is possible.

The public will expect no less.

Vision and Aim of JESIP

The vision of JESIP is 'Working together – Saving Lives'

The aim of JESIP is 'To ensure the blue light services are trained and exercised together as effectively as possible at all levels of command in response to major and complex incidents so that as many lives as possible can be saved.'

JESIP Doctrine

The JESIP Doctrine which was published in November 2013 focuses on the interoperability of the three emergency services whilst also acknowledging that emergency response is a multi-agency activity and the resolution of an emergency will usually involve collaboration with other Category 1 and 2 responders¹ and partner organisations. Doctrine sets out the way responders should train and operate and is built upon a common backbone which defines terminology, principles and ways of working. Joint doctrine sets out what responders should do and how they should do it in a multi-agency working environment, in order to achieve the degree of interoperability that is essential to successful joint response. It does not constitute a set of rules to be applied without thought, but rather seeks to guide, explain and inform.

This Doctrine provides first responders and commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, with generic guidance on what actions they should undertake when responding to major and complex incidents, and the principles are equally relevant to day-to-day joint operations.

The guidance contained within the Doctrine is reflected within these student notes.

¹ Category 1 and 2 Responders will be dealt with later in this Chapter

The Need for Interoperability


The requirement for joint response is not new to the emergency services and should already be in place for routine, day-to-day working because the principles of interoperability contained within the JESIP Doctrine are already established.

However, the findings of public inquiries and inquests in recent years, and the lessons identified, have highlighted where responders could have worked better together, showing much greater levels of cooperation and coordination. Tragedies at Kings Cross, Hillsborough Football Stadium and Buncefield, the large scale floods of 2007, the terrorist attacks of 7/7 and 21/7, and the shootings in Cumbria and Northumbria in 2010 each offered lessons to be learnt – and usually very similar ones – but in practice recommendations have never been fully implemented.

There is an inescapable requirement for better coordination and cooperation between the three emergency services, and, by extension, to the wider partnership of responder organisations, for both routine and emergency response operations, although the JESIP doctrine is focussing on the emergency services as a first stage.

4. The Joint Decision Model (JDM)

The Joint Decision Model



There are a wide range of decision-making models, including specific models used by the individual emergency services. The police use the National Decision Model, for single agency incidents.

One of the guiding principles of the Joint Decision Model (JDM) is that decision makers will use their judgement and experience in deciding what additional questions to ask, and considerations to take into account, to reach a jointly agreed decision. They must therefore be free to interpret the JDM for themselves, reasonably and according to the circumstances facing them at any given time. Strict adherence to the stepped process outlined in the JDM should always be secondary to achieving desired outcomes, particularly in time-sensitive situations.

NOTE: You will now be taken through the first responder considerations and responsibilities at a major incident around the JDM.

The Overarching or Primary Aim of the JDM (The Central Pentagon)

Joint decisions must be made with reference to the overarching or primary aims of any response to an emergency. This is to save lives and reduce harm. This is achieved through the means of a coordinated, multi-agency response. You as a first responder, should have this uppermost in your mind throughout the decision making process.

Stage One of the JDM – Gather Information and Intelligence

Situational awareness is having appropriate answers to the following questions: what is happening, what are the impacts, what are the risks, what might happen and what is being done about it?

In the context of the **Joint** Decision Model, **shared** situational awareness becomes critically important. Shared situational awareness is achieved by **sharing** information and understanding between the involved organisations to build a stronger, multi-dimensional understanding of events, their implications, associated risks and potential outcomes.

You as a police first responder cannot assume other emergency service personnel see things or say things in the same way, and a sustained effort is required to reach a common view and understanding of events, risks and their implications.

METHANE

The following mnemonic has been recommended in the Doctrine, as the way of passing information between emergency responders and control rooms to enable the establishment of shared situational awareness:

- Major incident declared?
- Exact location
- Type of incident
- Hazards present or suspected
- Access – routes that are safe to use
- Number, type, severity of casualties
- Emergency services present and those required.

An example of a METHANE message:

Scenario:

A plane has overshoot a runway at Chesterton Airport, colliding with a goods train in the yard opposite. This has caused a derailment of the train and some chemical containers have fallen from the carriage on to the track and split open.

The plane was carrying 237 passengers and 9 crew. The yard is a goods yard and there are 3 workers unaccounted for. The chemicals are currently unknown.

The METHANE message should be similar to the one below.

METHANE

Major Incident declared or Standby	Major Incident Declared
Exact location	Westshire Railway Yard, at the North End of Runway 20, Chesterton Airport
Type of incident	A passenger aircraft has overshoot the runway and broken up and come to rest in the Westshire freight yard. It has also collided with a freight train which has derailed losing some of its cargo which is as yet unidentified chemicals. Collision between a passenger aircraft and freight train, persons reported.

Hazards	There is debris from the plane, jet fuel, smoke but no evidence of fire. There are 2 x 1000l containers of unknown chemicals and the train is currently derailed and it is potentially unstable. The goods yard ground is uneven with many trip and slip hazards and sharp objects scattered around. Unknown chemicals involved including aviation fuel, the train is derailed.
Access	The scene can be accessed through the long stay car park at the Northern end of Runway 20; this is directly adjacent to the runway and goods yard.
Number of casualties	There are approx 250 casualties, mostly in the remaining part of plane fuselage. There is currently no information on the types of injuries.
Emergency services	Emergency services required are ambulances, HART, police, fire service.

4.1 Terminology

Providing timely and accurate information to inform and protect communities is key to a joint interoperability working approach.

One of the barriers to achieving shared situational awareness is the use of terminology that either means different things to different people, or is simply not understood across different services. Defining commonly understood terminology is desirable, and to a large degree attainable, but you must always be attentive to the risk that your own understanding of concepts and specific terms is either not understood or is misunderstood by others.

Issues you need to consider are:

- The language and terminology (including scientific concepts) should be commonly understood
- The use of subjective language (e.g. likely, possible, and probable) should be commonly understood
- Acronyms and abbreviations should be recorded in the commanders decision log and commonly understood
- What other sources of ambiguity, miscommunication and confusion exist?
- The Cabinet Office Lexicon should be used as reference for all joint interoperability terminology. A link to the Lexicon can be found on the Cabinet Office site at:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon>
- Maps are widely used in emergency management, but if different organisations use different map symbols to denote the same feature (e.g. an RVP or inner cordon) then there is scope for dangerous confusion, and the potential of the map as a tool to coordinate multi-agency operations is severely curtailed. For this reason, Cabinet Office and Ordnance Survey have collaborated in developing and disseminating a core set of common map symbols for use in emergency management.

These can be found online and there is a link to the download page on the OS website at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-common-map-symbols>

4.2 Social Media Use in Specialist Emergency Incidents

It's not **your** emergency anymore. Today, the public want to **play** the role of the interactive audience and they use social networks and mobile technology, to share their thoughts, views and concerns on what they have witnessed.

Social Media is immediate and allows organisations to proactively push out large volumes of useful and sometimes critical information to ever increasing numbers of people at the push of a button, ensuring there is no vacuum of official information. Social media can help monitor and address issues in specialist emergency incident situations and recovery. The immediacy of social media makes it invaluable in the live monitoring of situations. It is not solely a tool to push out information by warning and informing. Social media should be

monitored to receive information and intelligence, involving your agencies online community throughout the incident.

However it is very important to remember the following:

- Commanders will deal with it at any incident, not just a major incident
- Do not contaminate incident information by using social media at any incident
- Be aware that the public are likely to be tweeting/filming your actions at any incident scene.
- Do not research the victim or the suspect on social media sites after the incident.

4.3 Stage Two of the JDM – Assess Risk and Develop a Working Strategy

Emphasis should be placed upon the importance of the first 60 minutes of response to a major incident, during which responder intervention is recognised to have the greatest impact on saving life.

Understanding risk is central to emergency response, and one of the major challenges in joint emergency response is for you as a first responder to build and maintain a common understanding of the full range of risks, and the way that those risks may be increased, or controlled by decisions made and actions taken by the emergency responders.

In a major or complex emergency the different emergency services will have unique insights into those risks, and by **sharing** that knowledge a common understanding of the various risks can be established, considered in the context of the agreed priorities and can inform a jointly agreed working strategy to resolve the incident.

Key Steps

A joint assessment of the prevailing risks limits the likelihood of any service following a course of action in which the other services are unable to participate. This, therefore, increases the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the response as well as increasing the probability of a successful resolution of the incident.

In order to deliver an effective integrated multi-agency operational response, the following key steps must be considered and undertaken by first responders:

Identification of hazards – this will begin from the initial call received by a control room and will continue as first responders arrive on scene. Information and intelligence gathered by individual agencies must be disseminated to all first responders and control rooms effectively.

The use of the mnemonic METHANE will assist in a common approach.

Dynamic Risk Assessment – undertaken by individual agencies, reflecting the tasks/objectives to be achieved, the hazards that have been identified and the likelihood of harm from those hazards.

Identification of the tasks – each individual agency should identify and consider the specific tasks to be achieved within its own role and responsibilities.

Apply control measures – each agency should consider and apply appropriate control measures to ensure any risk is as low as reasonably practicable.

Integrated multi-agency operational response plan – the development of this plan should consider the outcomes of the hazard assessment, and service risk assessments within the context of the agreed priorities for the incident.

Recording of Decision – the outcomes of the joint assessment of risk should be recorded, together with the identified priorities and the agreed multi-agency response plan, when resources permit. It is acknowledged that in the early stages of the incident this may not be possible, but it should be noted that post-incident scrutiny inevitably focuses on the earliest decision making.

4.4 Stage Three of the JDM – Consider Powers, Policies and Procedures

In the context of a joint response, a common understanding of any relevant powers, policies, capabilities and procedures is essential in order that the activities of one service complement, and do not compromise, the approach of the other services

NOTE: Not every agency specific power, policy or procedure can be mentioned in this chapter. Within this stage, the powers, procedures and policies which are common to all three blue light services have been highlighted.

4.5 Civil Contingencies Act 2004

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 lists the following organisations into category 1 and category 2 responders.

Category 1 Responders:

Local Authorities

Police Forces

The British Transport Police

Fire and Rescue Authorities

Ambulance Services

The National Health Service

Health Protection Agency

Port Health Authority

Environment Agency

Maritime and Coastguard Agency

The Secretary of State is a category 1 responder, in so far as his functions include responding to maritime and coastal emergencies (excluding the investigation of accidents).

Category 2 Responders:

Electricity Distributors and Transmitters

Gas Distributors

Water and Sewerage Undertakers

Telephone Service Providers, Fixed and Mobile

Railway Operators

Airport Operators

Ports

Highways Agency

Health and Safety Executive

Strategic Health Authorities

The Secretary of State is a category 2 responder, in so far as his functions relate to matters for which he is responsible by virtue of section 1 of the Highways Act 1980 (c. 66)

Schedule 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) lists the responders subject to its provisions. The Act splits local responders in to two categories and imposes a different set of requirements on each category.

Category 1 responders are 'core' responders and category 2 responders are 'cooperating' responders.

The purpose of the CCA is to provide emergency service responders and commanders alike, with a framework to enable them to operate effectively together.

The Act is separated into two substantive parts:

Part 1: focuses on local arrangements for civil protection, establishing a statutory framework of roles and responsibilities for local responders.

Part 2: focuses on emergency powers, establishing a modern framework for the use of special legislative measures that might be necessary to deal with the effects of the most serious emergencies.

Further reading on the CCA can be found in – Cabinet Office (2004) Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A Short Guide (Revised)

4.6 European Convention on Human Rights and The Human Rights Act 1998

The blue light services must interpret and apply their powers in a manner which is compatible with the articles contained within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates ECHR into our domestic law.

You as a first responder should always be able to justify your decision-making process in regard to the use of powers.

Always remember to document decisions or the advice given in your pocket notebook. What was the rationale behind making that decision at the time? What was the advice/decision given?

Article 2 of the ECHR imposes a positive duty on the State and public authorities (including the emergency services) to protect the right to life. Where there is a real and immediate risk to life, which the state authorities know or ought to know of, they must take appropriate measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, may be expected to avoid that risk.

If the authorities fail to do all that can reasonably be expected of them to do, then this may amount to an infringement of the positive obligation under Article 2. (This will however, be dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case).

NOTE: Positive obligations in human rights law denote a State's obligation to engage in an activity to secure the effective enjoyment of a fundamental right, as opposed to the concept of the 'negative' obligation which requires the State to refrain from interference with a Convention right.

4.7 Stage Four of the JDM – Identify Options and Contingencies

There will almost always be more than one option to achieve the desired end state, and it is good practice that a range of options are identified and rigorously evaluated. All potential options or courses of action should be evaluated with respect to:

Suitability – does it fit with strategic direction?

Feasibility – in resource terms can it be done?

Acceptability – is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

Whichever option(s) is/are chosen at the scene, it is essential that you as a first responder are clear what they are required to carry out and, where the option is time-critical, there should be clearly agreed procedures for communicating any decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic.

Contingencies are events that may occur and the arrangements that are put in place to respond to them should they occur. For example, strong evidence may suggest that an emergency is being successfully dealt with and the impacts safely controlled, but there remains a low likelihood that the situation could deteriorate with significant impacts. Simply hoping for the best is not a defensible option, and a contingency in this case would be to define measures to adjust the response, should the situation deteriorate.

4.8 Principles of Joint Working

The below principles must be applied by you as a first responder when you are determining an appropriate course of action and should be reflected in **Joint** or **Standard Operating Procedures** for joint working in the response to, and coordination of an emergency:

Co-location

The first meeting of first responders is essential and allows responders to perform your functions of command, control and coordination, face to face, at a single and easily identified location.

Communication

Communication is the passage of clear, unambiguous and timely information relevant to an emergency situation. Meaningful and effective communication underpins effective joint working. The sharing of information, free of acronyms, across service boundaries is essential to operational success. This starts through pre-planning and between Control Rooms prior to deployment of resources. Communication is the capability to exchange reliable and accurate information i.e. critical information about hazards, risks and threats, as well as understanding each organisation's responsibilities and capabilities. The understanding of any information shared ensures the achievement of shared situational awareness which underpins the best possible outcomes of an incident. Common symbols and terminology should be used to communicate common meaning amongst all responders.

Coordination

Coordination involves the integration of the priorities, resources, decision making and response activities of each emergency service in order to avoid potential conflicts, prevent duplication of effort, minimise risk and promote successful outcomes. Effective coordination generally requires one service to act in a “lead” capacity, ensuring an effective response. The lead service will usually be the police service. However, in certain circumstances other services/agencies may be a more appropriate choice, depending upon the nature of the emergency, the phase of the response and the capabilities required.

Joint understanding of risk

Risk arises from threats and/or hazards which will be seen, understood and treated differently by different emergency services. In the context of a joint response, sharing information and understanding about the likelihood and potential impact of risks and the availability and implications of potential control measures will ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the agreed aim and objectives are not compromised. This will include ensuring the safety of you as a first responder and mitigating the impact of risks on members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

Shared situational awareness

This is a common understanding of the circumstances and immediate consequences of the emergency, together with an appreciation of the available capabilities and emergency services’ priorities. Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability in the emergency response and can be achieved by using the Joint Decision Model (JDM). Shared situational awareness relates not only to a common understanding between control rooms and all tiers of the command structure.

4.9 Multi-Agency Communications in Incident Management

There are many forms of communications possible – the best form will normally be face to face but this will not always be possible – for instance all Silver commanders for all agencies may not be present at the same place. Therefore other forms of communications will be required.

Airwave is the preferred tool (where face to face is not practical) as a means of interoperable communications – it is expected, following high profile cases and inquests, to be something that the emergency services are able to use together when required.

Airwave (unlike mobiles) can easily be used to relay the same message to multiple people using group calls – this helps to keep everyone in the loop, so it is more likely that all have the same basic understanding of what is happening.

Airwave is the only system generally available to staff which is secured to **restricted** and has a high level of protection.

4.10 Stage Five of the JDM – Take Action and Review What Happened

Building situational awareness, setting direction and evaluating options all lead to taking the actions that are judged to be the most effective and efficient in resolving an emergency and returning to a new normality.

As the JDM is a continuous loop, it is essential that the results of those actions are fed back into the first box – Gather and share information and intelligence – which establishes shared situational awareness.

This will, in turn, shape any revision to the direction and risk assessment, and the cycle continues.

Post Event

In order to take part in operational debriefing and to provide evidence for inquiries (whether judicial, public, technical, inquest or some other form), it is essential to keep records. Even in your pocket notebook.

Single-agency and inter-agency debriefing processes should aim to capture information while memories are fresh. For this reason a joint hot debrief should be undertaken by commanders as soon as practicable following the event which, you as a first responder should attend.

Joint Learning

Joint learning describes both the identification of lessons relevant to joint working, and the process of learning those lessons. Individual services have their own approaches for identifying and learning lessons, but building and sustaining interoperability requires that these lessons are shared in order that unintended consequences (e.g. change that enhances the efficiency of single service operations but to the detriment of the effectiveness of joint operations) are minimised, and opportunities for greater interoperability are realised.

This requires a commitment to sharing and prioritising lessons with implications for joint working.

5. Stay Safe at Firearms Incidents

This chapter is designed to assist unarmed police officers and PCSOs who are initial responders to an incident involving the use or suspected use of firearms or other potentially lethal weapon.

Subject to an appropriate risk assessment however, you as an initial responder may be able to provide a visible deterrent or reassurance or gather information to help inform the police response. They may also be able to mitigate the risk to potential victims or other vulnerable persons by excluding or evacuating them the scene of the incident.

What is a Firearms Incident?

The deployment of 'Authorised Firearms Officers' (AFOs) should only be authorised in the following circumstances:

Where the officer authorising the deployment has reason to suppose that officers may have to protect themselves or others from a person who:

- Is in possession of, or has immediate access to, a firearm or other potentially lethal weapon, or
- Is otherwise so dangerous that the deployment of armed officers is considered to be appropriate, or
- As an operational contingency in a specific operation (based on the threat assessment), or
- For the destruction of animals which are dangerous or suffering unnecessarily.

You are more than likely going to respond to incidents which meet the first two of the above criteria, and are at greatest risk when called upon to deal with armed subjects if they act upon their own initiative.

Armed officers have a range of generic tactical options and specific firearms tactics that can be used to respond to the incident. Prior to the attendance of armed officers it may be possible for you as unarmed initial responders to take action as previously described. You may also be required to perform specific roles in support of armed officers.

5.1 What are the generic tactical options that may be considered by Firearms Commanders and armed officers?

- Waiting
- Taking mitigating action
- Keeping the subject under observation
- Carrying out an investigative assessment
- Containing the area around the subject, thereby minimising the opportunity for harm
- Communication with the subject
- Taking decisive action

You as an unarmed initial responder, should consider these generic tactical options when responding to a firearms incident. It may be necessary for you, in consultation with the Tactical or Operational Firearms Commander, (TFC or OFC), to implement some of the options prior to the arrival of armed officers.

5.2 What are your responsibilities under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)?

Under the ECHR, the police, as a public authority, have a positive obligation to ensure that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR are protected.

In keeping with the principles of the ECHR the rights of all people must be considered, including those of the subject. Each individual's right to life is absolute. However potentially lethal force may be used if it is absolutely necessary for the legitimate aims outlined in Article 2 of the ECHR.

Police officers must not be expected to endanger their own lives or the lives of their colleagues in ill-considered attempts at rescue, or to affect an early arrest.

5.3 What can you expect when you arrive as an unarmed initial responder?

- Support from Initial Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC)
- Confusion from the public

- Armed support

You as the initial responder are a vital link in the gathering of relevant information to assist firearms commanders and armed officers in determining an appropriate response. Armed officers may wish to speak to you prior to deployment. The TFC/OFC should provide advice to you at the earliest opportunity.

Remember

You are most likely to be initial responder to incidents which meet the first two of the above criteria, and are at greatest risk when called upon to deal with armed subjects if they act upon their own initiative.

Armed officers have a range of generic tactical options and specific firearms tactics that can be used to respond to the incident. Prior to the attendance of armed officers it may be possible for you to take action as previously described. They may also be required to perform specific roles in support of armed officers.

What can YOU do at the scene?

- Stay Safe Think about your own and the public's safety
- See What is happening and where
- Tell Communicate, describe incident/type weapon
- Act Stay Safe, update, observe/contain

Stay Safe

- Use the National Decision Model (NDM)
- Do not approach unnecessarily
- Use cover
- Consider safe approach/escape routes
- Consider safety of others
- Wear correct Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Use the National Decision Model

Use the NDM to guide your actions and help you identify information and intelligence important to incident commanders.

Do not approach unnecessarily

It is important that you consider your own safety. Do not unnecessarily expose yourself to danger and do not go straight to the scene without a dynamic risk assessment of the dangers.

The first police officer who attended the scene of the Hungerford massacre in 1987 was shot and killed by the subject. The officer had just arrived at the scene in response to reports of gunfire. He died sitting in his patrol car, radioing colleagues that he had been shot. Michael Ryan, the subject, had fired 23 rounds at the officer as he arrived. Remember you may become the focus of the subject's attention.

Use of Available Cover

The use of effective cover can offer a degree of protection. There are two types of cover.

- Cover From Fire
- Cover From View

You must consider the type of weapon that the subject may possess. This will alter your risk assessment and cover required.

Firearms generally fall into three categories:

- Handgun
- Shotgun
- Rifles

The bullet or shot fired from any weapon can travel over some distance and still cause injury. Remember that rifles are normally more powerful and accurate than other firearms and their ammunition is capable of travelling the greatest distance (in some cases miles). If you cannot confirm the type of firearm 'Treat it as a Rifle'.

Treat All Firearms as Real and Loaded until proved otherwise (normally when in possession of the police).

Not all firearm incidents involve firearms carried by the subject. You may have to consider:

- Bladed weapons
- Other potentially lethal weapons or devices

Types of Cover

The most effective type of cover would be:

Cover From Fire

Examples would include:

- substantial brick
- stone walls (not breeze block)
- substantial tree
- earth banks
- vehicles engine block – Vehicles offer very little ballistic protection with the possible exception of the engine block.

Where cover from fire is not available it may be possible to make use of:

Cover from View

If the subject cannot see you, they may not fire at you. However it is possible to anticipate where you are and shoot through the cover.

Examples would include:

- Wooden fence
- Hedgerow
- Vehicles

Consider Safe Approach and Escape Routes

Ideally the subject should not be able to see your approach and will therefore be unaware of your presence or position. Whatever the cover you have been able to utilise always ensure that you have a safe approach and escape route from it. If a subject approaches you or identifies where you are, you may need to move.

If utilising cover of darkness consider how safe your escape route would be during daylight hours.

Consider your colleagues and members of the public and prevent them from coming into the danger areas. Direct them positively using a safe route to containment positions or rendezvous point away from the scene.

Consider Safety of Others

Remember your duty under the ECHR.

Wear Correct Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Do you know what protection your force issue patrol body armour gives you?

- Is it stab/slash resistant?
- Does it protect you from firearms?
- What size/type/calibre firearms/ammunition will it stop?

If you cannot answer these questions you are at risk. Find Out.

Most issue patrol body armour is only effective against short barrelled handguns! (Not shotguns or rifles).

See

- Where are the subjects now/going
- How many casualties/subject(s)
- What weapons, actions

The initial responder is vital to the gathering of first hand 'real time' information and intelligence. Accurate information from the scene will enable armed officers to be deployed more quickly and effectively.

Where are the subjects now/going? How many casualties/subjects?

Confirm, as far as possible, the exact location of the subject(s) and the nature of the incident, without unnecessarily exposing yourself to danger.

Gather relevant intelligence on the subject(s) and related premises or vehicles, potential victims and casualties. Accurate information and descriptions are important.

The subject(s) location is vital to directing armed officers to the right place as quickly as possible. Where the subject(s) are moving about, real time updates allow the effective redirection of those officers.

What weapons, actions?

The type of weapon will have an impact on the equipment and tactics used by armed officers.

- Is it a firearm or other type of weapon?
- What type of firearm/weapon is it? Describe what you see or have been told at the scene.

Detail is important, for example, type and size of knife. Not just that it is a knife.

- What is the Subject/s doing with the weapon?
- Have threats been made?

Tell

- **Communication**
- **Describe** Location and subjects
- **Explain Type of Incident**
- **Accuracy, Brevity, Clarity**

The information that you as the initial responder gather at the scene needs to be passed accurately, briefly and clearly to the control room. The picture in the control room may not be as clear as you think.

If you think you have a firearms incident – say so!

Ensure descriptions are accurate. If you don't know details, guard against guessing or speculating. In many firearms incidents different descriptions of the same subject have led to confusion about the number of subjects involved.

The TFC and the Firearms Tactical Advisor will be relying on accurate information from you at the scene in order to plan an effective response and to deploy suitable resources to protect the public and assist you as an initial responder.

Act

- Stay safe
- Update

- Observe/Contain
- First Aid

Stay Safe

Consideration needs to be given to minimising the risk to the public. Direct them to a place of safety or prevent them from approaching the scene if appropriate. Each incident will be different and you should seek advice from the TFC as soon as practicable.

Remember your obligations under the ECHR.

Update

Where you gain additional relevant information, provide updates whenever possible. You are the eyes and ears on the ground supplying 'real time information'.

Observe/Contain

Remember the generic tactical options that may be considered by armed officers that were discussed earlier. Two of these options, (Observation and Containment), may be viable for use by unarmed officers and staff.

Keeping the subject under observation, either overtly or covertly, will assist with the gathering of intelligence and the subsequent deployment of armed officers.

Containment is an option when the subject is known or believed to be in a particular location, the intention being to isolate the subject or place limits on their permitted movement. Where the subject is in possession of a firearm it is less likely that their movement can be constrained safely by unarmed officers or staff. Where viable, containment may be either static or, in some circumstances, may move with the subject. It may also allow time for more detailed planning of a police response. When considering this option, consult with the TFC as soon as practicable.

First Aid

You have an obligation under the ECHR. Render first aid if safe to do so.

Overarching Advice in Relation to Subjects with High Explosive (HE) Grenades

Whilst the criminal use of HE grenades is extremely rare in the United Kingdom, the tragic murders of PC Fiona Bone and PC Nicola Hughes in Greater Manchester in September 2012 have highlighted the potential that both armed and unarmed initial police responders may be required to respond to such a threat.

The characteristics of HE grenades are inherently unpredictable. The following guidance should therefore be considered to be indicative rather than prescriptive.

General Considerations

The capability of a grenade will vary depending upon its type and environment in which it is deployed. As a general rule, where no protection exists, a grenade will be lethal within a range of 5 metres of where it detonates and may cause death or serious injury within a range of 50 metres of where it detonates. The characteristics of a grenade mean that it will create a 360 degree threat and it should therefore be remembered that protection from all sides may be necessary to prevent injury being caused.

Distance

In the absence of any appropriate PPE persons in line of sight are likely to suffer fatal injury within 5 metres, serious and possible fatal injuries within 20 metres and injury within 50 metres. To minimise the likelihood of any injury being caused a person in direct line of sight without PPE or without any suitable cover would need to be 200 metres or beyond from the point of detonation.

Characteristics of the Blast

A grenade blast and accompanying fragmentation tends to travel upwards and outwards in a conical shape from the ground. The angle of this blast direction depends upon factors such as the type of ground but as a general rule the person will be safe from the blast/fragmentation if they are prone and flat to the floor when the device explodes.

Cover

Effective hard cover will generally protect a person from the effects of a grenade even when it is deployed in close proximity. Effective cover could be provided by structures and objects such as brick walls, vehicle engine blocks, mounds of earth etc. Generally hard cover that would stop conventional firearms ammunition would also be effective against grenades. The potential for the grenade to be thrown and subsequently explode behind or to the side of the cover being used should be considered.

Immediate Reaction to the Deployment of a Grenade

You as the first responder may be aware that a grenade has been deployed against you in several ways:

- Physical sighting of the grenade being thrown/deployed towards you.

- Physical sighting of components of the grenade such as the fly-off lever or extracted pin as the grenade is deployed.
- Sound of a sharp 'crack' as the grenades fuse is initiated prior to detonation. (About 4 to 6 seconds later).

Where it is believed, or becomes evident that a grenade threat exists, immediate action should be taken to find hard cover/or create distance from the grenade. If possible this should be simultaneously accompanied by a clear shout of **"GRENADE"** in order to warn others.

If a grenade is thrown, any hard cover used must be very close by as the unpredictability regarding where and when the grenade will detonate creates a danger of being caught in the open ground. In the absence of immediate hard cover, or ability to create an effective safe distance you as the first responder should lie on your front with legs and feet facing towards the threat. When deciding whether to adopt this position the proximity and nature of any other weapons that the subject has should be considered. This should allow the blast to pass over head and enable you to then react by taking up a position to respond to any continuing threat.

What do you need to remember?

- **Stay Safe** Think about your own and the public's safety
- **See** What is happening and where
- **Tell** Communicate, describe incident/type weapon
- **Act** Stay Safe, update, observe/contain

6. Unarmed Response to Active Shooters

What is an "Active Shooter"?

An active shooter may be defined as an armed person who has used deadly force on other people and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims.

There is no exact profile of an active shooter, however past incidents indicate that they may display some of the below characteristics:

A non-terrorist active shooter will often choose a site which represents their source of disaffection, such as a school or place of work. They are most likely to be alone or have one other accomplice, and when accompanied will ordinarily target one venue at a time. They often commit suicide before they are confronted by the police. Shooting a loved one or family member may also be a pre-cursor to becoming an “active shooter”. Active shooters have come from a variety of ethnic origins and social backgrounds, but are pre-dominantly male.

Examples of **non-terrorist** active shooters:

Sandy Hook School Connecticut (USA 2012) Twenty year old Adam Lanza fatally shot twenty children and six members of staff. Before driving to the school Lanza shot and killed his mother at her home. As the first officers arrived at the scene Lanza committed suicide by shooting himself in the head.

Oslo massacre (Norway 2011) Anders Breivic detonated a bomb near a government building in Oslo killing eight people. He then went over to an island retreat, where a Norwegian youth camp was taking place, and shot and killed sixty-nine young people. Breivic was arrested and sentenced to a maximum of 21 years in prison.

Terrorist active shooters will often work in pairs and choose venues that are iconic or that attract large numbers of people such as railway stations, airports and major shopping centres. They may operate with other pairs and attack multiple venues simultaneously. They are more likely to keep shooting until they are stopped/shot by the police.

Example of **terrorist** active shooters:

Mumbai attacks (India 2008) Ten coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai, India’s largest city, by Islamic Extremist Terrorists from Pakistan. The attacks began on 26 November 2008 and lasted until 29 November 2008, resulting in the killing of at least 173 people and the wounding of at least 325 people.

In the majority of cases active shooters will fire at the first police officers to arrive, if they come into contact with them.

Identifiable Stages

Active Shooters very rarely act on the spur of the moment, and will often progress through a series of identifiable stages. These stages may occur in rapid succession or over a period of months or even years. If recognised and correctly identified, the first four stages may offer an opportunity to intervene before the subject is able to execute their plan.

Stage 1: Fantasy. The process usually begins with the subject imagining the event. They may romanticise the resulting media coverage and the notoriety gained. In non-terrorist cases the subject may express these fantasies via social media, writings, artwork, or even discussions of the event. If this information is passed on to the police, intervention is possible.

Stage 2: Planning. The next stage is target selection. Decisions on who, what, when and where are made during this stage (although “when” may be reserved until all other preparations are complete). The subject will need to select a weapon and determine the logistics of travelling to the site, transportation of weapons and other details. If this information is passed on to the police, intervention is possible.

Stage 3: Preparation. During this stage, the subject obtains the weapons and supplies necessary to carry out the planned event. The subject may strategically place weapons in preparation for their use. The subject may also warn certain individuals to avoid the target location during a given time period. If this information is passed on to the police, intervention is possible.

Stage 4: Approach. At this point, the subject has a plan, a weapon and is acting. They are travelling to the target location and in most cases are armed. You may encounter the subject through a routine stop or following a report of suspicious behaviour. Contact with the subject at this point is very dangerous. However, if approached in a tactically sound manner, with armed support where appropriate, it may be possible to stop the subject before anyone is harmed.

Stage 5: Implementation. The subject is executing the plan. Because they are highly focused on their targets, the subject will not stop until they have run out of ammunition or victims, or until they take their own life. You as a responding officer should rely on your training and take immediate appropriate action.

6.1 What can you do?

Always use **Stay Safe** but some areas will need to be considered as below:

- **Stay Safe** Think about your own and the public's safety

1. Firearms Incident	2. Active Shooter
Do not approach unnecessarily	Secondary Threat RVP/Cordon
Use Cover	Multiple Active shooters
Safe approach/escape routes	Your moves may be anticipated
Consider safety of others	Beware of cries for help
Wear correct PPE	Wear correct PPE

You as the uniformed initial responder have often been targeted by active shooters such as in Mumbai where uniformed police officers were shot and killed.

Particularly in the context of terrorist active shooters; consider the potential threat from high explosive grenades, secondary threats such as 'Improvised Explosive Devices' (IEDs) and other active shooters; especially when establishing Rendezvous Points (RVPs) and cordons (mainly Terrorist threat).

Be aware of the possibility that cries for help may not be genuine and may be an attempt to cause you to leave a position of cover or to gain access to further victims.

See What is happening and where

Tell Communicate, describe incident/type weapon. If you think you have an active shooter SAY SO!

Act Stay Safe, update, observe/contain

3. Firearms Incident	4. Active Shooter
Stay safe	Direct and/or disperse
Update	Cordons
Observe/Contain	RVP
First Aid	Be patient

Direct and/or Disperse

Directing everybody to move in a single direction, or allowing them to congregate in one place, may make them more vulnerable to secondary attacks or devices. Consider allowing or encouraging the public to disperse in multiple directions if appropriate.

First Aid

Attending to casualties will be instinctive for you as an initial police responder. Consideration should however be given to the potential for the number of casualties to overwhelm you and for the continuing existence of a threat to those you whilst administering assistance.

The priority for armed responders will be to locate and confront the subjects in order to neutralise the threat that they pose. Whilst this may necessitate armed officers initially leaving casualties unaided, it may create a more permissive environment in which you as unarmed colleagues can then operate and administer assistance.

Cordons/RVPs

Cordons and RVPs have often been targeted in terrorist related incidents, although rarely by non-terrorist active shooters.

In a non-terrorist incident cordons may minimise the risk to the public by preventing them from entering the area which the subject(s) is located. Following some school based active shooter incidents parents have attempted to enter buildings to rescue their children.

Be Patient

The airwave system is likely to be affected by the volume of radio traffic and this may result in delays in deploying responders.

7. Explosive Incidents/Bomb Alerts

Terrorism and violent extremism are a continuous and sustained threat to the United Kingdom. During recent years this threat has evolved with new methods and new ideology. These have led to an increase in both the scale and intensity of the threat directed towards the public as a whole.

You as a first responder need to be confident in your own actions if you are directed to a suspected terrorist incident. You will also need to be better able to assist colleagues who are dealing with a suspected terrorist incident, by being able to anticipate their requirements; together you can help to coordinate a safe, consistent and effective response.

7.1 Initial Assessment of a Suspicious Object

By “suspicious”, in this context, it is meant that the object could potentially be a terrorist device.

The following procedure has been designed to give clear guidance to you as a first responder who has:

- Been deployed to a suspicious object by their control room, or
- Been alerted by a member of the public or security staff, or
- Discovered a suspicious object directly.

The suspicious object could be anything, including:

- A letter or package
- A bag or suitcase
- A car or lorry
- A powder or canister

Due to the surrounding circumstances either you as a first responder or a member of the public perceives it to be suspicious.

A terrorist device is designed to create fear and cause harm to people or damage to property, for example:

- A homemade explosive
- An incendiary device
- A toxic chemical package
- Conventional weaponry

It is the duty of you as a first responder to make an initial assessment of any suspicious object and to decide whether it should be treated as a potential terrorist device or confirm it is an innocent object.

You will have to make your own visual assessment of whether an object is innocent or suspicious. The only exception to this is where the circumstances are so compelling that the object is already believed to be a potential terrorist device.

The guidance that follows is intended to be appropriate to any object, device, item, article or substance in any circumstance. It has been designed to give a clear framework for the assessment, decision-making and resulting actions for that object. It should not be assumed that every piece of unattended luggage is suspicious. The assumption should always remain that an object is innocent, unless information, observation, its location and/or intelligence indicate otherwise.

As soon as any assessment has been completed you must immediately inform your control room and Duty Officer of their decision. If the decision is that the item is suspicious, the Duty Officer will then request an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Officer, while you and other responders continue to deal with the incident.

7.2 Considerations for assessment and approach to a suspicious object

PROTECTS

Place:

- Consider the location and use your local knowledge.

- Is it at or near a prominent or vulnerable structure, building, travel infrastructure or crowded place?
- Are there any potential terrorist or extremist targets nearby?

Request Intelligence:

- Ask for intelligence checks on the location or vehicles nearby.
- Ask if there is any change in the current Threat Levels.
- Ask if there have been any recent attacks, bomb hoaxes or other relevant incidents.

Obtain Informant:

- Where possible speak to the informant in person.
- Listen to the informant's account first-hand and question what they have seen, heard or done. Record what you are told.
- Locate and speak with any other witnesses.

Think Safety:

- Inhibit your radio transmissions and turn off your mobile.
- Survey your surroundings for suspicious activity.
- Remember STEP 1-2-3 for collapsed casualties, consider cross contamination and avoid direct contact.
- Do not approach closer than necessary to confirm and complete the assessment.

Evaluate:

- Is it in an unusual location or position?
- Have attempts been made to hide or disguise it?
- Does it appear to have any component parts of a terrorist device?
- Are there any unusual smells or substances, CBRN signs or symptoms?

Decide whether you suspect it to be a Potential Terrorist Device or NOT.

Confirm and Withdraw:

- Confirm the object's presence.

- Note its precise location.
- Clear the public away from the immediate area.
- Now withdraw to a safe location behind hard cover.

Transmit:

- Inform your control room that the object is suspicious.
- Update your Duty Officer who can request the EOD Officer's attendance.
- Ask for any further assistance you will require.

Scene Actions:

- Always consider the possibility of secondary devices or secondary hazards near the device.
- Continue to evacuate and coordinate appropriate cordons.
- Direct those affected by CBRN to a safe area to await medical aid.
- Nominate and search the RVP.

Prepare for the EOD Officer's arrival.

8. Safety and Health Considerations

You as the first responder will need to carry out a dynamic risk assessment of the hazards and control the risk to ensure the safety of yourself and the public.

8.1 Cordon Guidance

The guidance for cordons should always be considered the **minimum** safe distance to use, based on the size of the suspicious object. If there is a secondary hazard or a concern over the size of the object, a larger cordon should always be used for safety.

As the first responder, you are advised to remember that any cordon you use must be realistic and manageable otherwise they will become ineffective:

- To **maximise** protection, all cordons should **not** be in direct line of sight to the suspicious object and **behind** hard cover.
- To **minimise** injuries, those cordons should also be **away** from glass or parked vehicles, which could become shrapnel after a blast.

8.2 Rendezvous Point (RVP)

The RVP is established to coordinate the briefing and deployment of arriving resources. It is especially important to recognise the need to facilitate the arrival of the EOD Officer during this critical time.

- You should not use an RVP which is predictable.
- You should not use an RVP which has recently been used before.

Whenever the site of a cordon or an RVP is considered you must actively look and search for secondary devices.

If the cordon or RVP can be anticipated it can also be targeted with a secondary device.

8.3 Use of radios and mobile telephones

You as the first responder must be aware that transmitting with any Airwave Radio or mobile telephone near to a terrorist device could potentially cause the device to detonate.

When you are searching for or approaching a suspicious object, you are advised to leave your radios on. However, you should inhibit your radio's ability to transmit. On the Airwave radio this will allow it to safely receive transmissions, but prevent it from transmitting.

- To enter Transmit Inhibit Mode, press and hold down the number 0 button until the radio beeps.
- To leave Transmit Inhibit Mode, press and hold down the number 0 button again until the radio beeps.

Mobile telephones should be turned off, as they actively transmit at routine intervals to maintain contact with the nearest cell site.

8.4 Casualty Hazard Awareness

Any suspicious object could potentially be a terrorist Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear device. You should always remain alert to this possibility.

When approaching any suspicious object officers must always remember their STEP 1-2-3 PLUS² casualty hazard awareness. If you as the first responder suspect an object is a

² Further guidance on STEP 1, 2, 3 PLUS can be found in the Student Notes for Initial Operational Response at a CBRN Incident and Responding to Incidents of White Powder.

CBRN device you should not deploy closer to the scene, but instead withdraw to a safe distance and organise a suitable RVP for the EOD and specialist CBRN assistance.

Recommended **minimum** cordon distance guidance

100m Smaller items, e.g. rucksacks or briefcases.

200m Medium items, e.g. suitcases, wheelie bins or cars

400m Larger items, e.g. vans or lorries.

Debris from an explosion may travel further than the recommended **minimum** distance. So all cordons must also be – **not** in direct line of sight, **behind** hard cover and **away** from glass or parked vehicles.

8.5 RVP Guidance

- It should be near a main road to facilitate the arrival of the EOD Officer, but should avoid predictable locations which could be targeted with secondary devices.
- It should be easily locatable and have sufficient space for the marshalling of vehicles.
- It should be out of line of sight from the device, behind hard cover and away from secondary hazards.
- Search the vicinity of the RVP, consider secondary devices and check with the control room for previous use as an RVP.

8.6 Radio transmission guidance

The minimum distance from the device for safe transmission:

15m Handheld radios or mobile phones.

50m

Vehicle mounted radios.

9. Preparation for the arrival of the EOD Officer

Once an object had been assessed by you as a first responder, and designated as a potential terrorist device, no one else should approach that object.

Consideration should then be given to informing neighbouring policing areas so they may consider the possibility of coordinated secondary terrorist incidents.

If the device is located inside a building, you should withdraw to keep a clear route to the device by keeping all internal doors to it open: this will provide the EOD Officer a clear access route to reach the device.

- If it is considered to be a potential CBRN device then the room it is located in should be isolated by closing, but not locking, the door.

If the device is located beside other similar objects or may be difficult to find, then you should consider leaving a marker which is easily visible near the device. They can then direct the EOD Officer to the marker and the device will be easier to locate.

Consideration should be given to placing a marker near the device when it is one of the following:

- A car in line of cars.
- A bag under the seat on a bus.
- A room in a long corridor.
- A cupboard in a kitchen.

The following items could be used as a marker:

- Police cordon tape.
- Police jacket or hat.
- A traffic cone.
- Anything which will not be mistaken or moved.

No attempts should be made to return to the device to disturb it, draw it, mark it or gather any further details.

The next person to approach the potential terrorist device should be the EOD Officer.

Every time a person returns to the potential terrorist device, this significantly increases the probability of it triggering and causing injury.

- With the resources available to first responders, you must endeavour to minimise the risk to the public by moving them safely away from the potential terrorist device.
- They must then endeavour to maintain a sterile cordoned area around the device, in which the EOD Officer can make their own approach and assessment of the object.

It should be emphasised that placing your RVP at a location that facilitates the early arrival of the EOD Officer is strongly recommended, to ensure the fastest and safest resolution to the incident.

If you have followed the PROTECTS mnemonic you will be prepared for the EOD Officers arrival. The EOD Officers have their own guidance, which is listed below. They will expect you to be following the actions and preparing the answers to their questions, for their arrival at the RVP.

- The actions required are referred to as the Five Cs.
- The information required is referred to the Five Ws.

The EOD Officer will expect the following actions to have been considered and completed – **Five Cs**

Confirm:

- Have you confirmed the presence of the object and designated it as a Potential Terrorist Device.
- Its exact location, position and characteristics have been noted.

Clear:

- The public has been cleared away from the potential device safely.
- Evacuation or invacuation of nearby premises has been considered.
- Direct those affected by CBRN to a safe area to await medical aid.

Cordon:

- Cordoned to appropriate distances 100/200/400m.
- Not in direct line of sight and behind hard cover.
- Away from glass and parked vehicles.

Control:

- Ensured the control room and Duty Officer is informed.
- Designated an RVP and it has been searched.
- Use Terrorism powers if necessary.

Check:

- The cordoned area has been checked to ensure it is clear.
- Secondary devices and hazards have been considered and potential locations searched.
- Checks for CCTV and potential suspects have been made.
- More resources requested if necessary.

9.1 The information which should be prepared and readily available for when the EOD Officer arrives – Five Ws

What:

- What is it?
- Its size, components and description?
- The confirming officer should prepare a drawing from memory.

Where:

- Where is it? Its exact location and position.
- Consider preparing a map of the route used to approach it.
- Is it marked? How can it be located?

When:

- When was it found? The exact time if possible.

- Has it been moved by anyone?

Why:

- Why is it considered a potential terrorist device?
- Are there any potential targets nearby? People or places?
- Are there any suspects?

Who:

- Who are the witnesses/informant?
- Keep them available at the RVP for the EOD Officer to speak with them separately.

10. Actions on arrival at a Terrorist Major Incident

The following guidance is for you as a first responder, arriving at the scene of an incident where it is believed a terrorist device has been activated.

This will, in all likelihood, result in a Major Incident which has been discussed in the previous chapters and **METHANE** should be used to communicate information at the scene to the control room.

If you become involved in any rescue at the scene of an explosion you should always consider the secondary dangers that a blast may have revealed, e.g. live electrical cables, gas pipes and falling glass. If CBRN is suspected always consider cross contamination.

10.1 Initial Scene Management at an Explosion or Terrorist Incident

Remember this is the scene of a serious crime. Although your priority will always be to save lives, you as the first responder must not forget the importance of preserving the integrity of all scenes and any evidence, wherever possible.

Immediately after a terrorist incident, there is likely to be a period of confusion. There is nothing you can do to prevent this; however our aim is to reduce the length of the period of confusion to a minimum.

As initial control of the incident is established it should be remembered that everybody present at the time of the incident, whether injured or uninjured is a potential witness to a very serious criminal act.

Therefore wherever possible the details of ALL survivors must be recorded, for the following reasons:

- It will allow them to be contacted at a later date in the investigation for a statement to be requested.
- It will also enhance the speed at which Casualty Bureau will be able to document those who were present at the time of the incident, and in turn it will help to identify those who may be the deceased.

The integrity of all crime scenes should be preserved as early as possible. A multiple sited incident or secondary devices will result in multiple inner crime scenes.

No attempt should be made to move or cover those who are obviously deceased, unless it is absolutely necessary. Where the presence of the body is likely to cause distress, then it may be covered with a body sheet or blanket. However once placed the cover must not be removed under any circumstance.

Finally consideration should also be given to the possibility of suspects involved in the crime being amongst the survivors.

10.2 Terrorist Cordon Powers

Section 33 and 34 of the Terrorism Act 2000, gives police the power on the authority of an officer of at least the rank of Superintendent (or in cases of 'urgency' any constable), to designate cordoned area for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000, if it appears expedient to do so for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.

Any constable authorising the setting up of such a cordon must as soon as reasonably practicable:

- Record the facts in their pocket book.
- Inform their control room as soon as possible. Their control room will cause an officer of or above the rank of Superintendent to be informed immediately; the Superintendent must review the authorisation and either confirm or cancel that authorisation; the Superintendent's decision must be recorded on the appropriate form as soon as practicable.

Section 36 of the Terrorism Act 2000 states that a constable in uniform may order a person in a designated cordoned area to leave it immediately; they may also prohibit or restrict

access to a cordoned area by pedestrians or vehicles. A person commits an offence if he fails to comply with an order, prohibition or restriction given by the constable.

A suitably designated Community Support Officer has the same powers as a constable under Section 36, of the Terrorism Act 2000 (under paragraph 14 of Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the Police Reform Act 2002.)

Under this section a constable in uniform may also order a person immediately to leave premises which are wholly or partly in or adjacent to a cordoned area; (see Section 7 Evacuation.)

11. Bomb Threats

11.1 Background Information

Whether the threat is real or not, an offence has still been committed. The potential panic and disruption caused by a bomb hoax has often been exploited in the past by Irish Republican Terrorists and Violent Domestic Extremists. The Irish Republican Terrorist methodology on the UK mainland has depended heavily on the use of threat calls including 'authenticated' code words in order to maximise disruption.

Their strategy has been to intersperse hoax threat calls, where there is no device, with real threat calls where a viable Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has been placed. The calls have generally been made to large organisations with 24 hour switchboards, but have included taxi firms and take away restaurants. The record of the conversation is dependent on the level of alertness of the individual who receives the threat call.

Historically the police have recorded thousands of bomb threats – very few of which were followed by an attack. However, analysis shows that 'real threats' have contained a wide-range of variables. There are instances of:

- Attacks following threats made with and without code words
- Attacks preceding the receipt of an anonymous threat
- Authenticated code words used when a threat did not result in an attack
- Threats giving misleading information, concerning the location of the device or timing of its detonation
- Threats specifying multiple devices where only one IED was actually deployed

- Multiple threats relating to a single incident but each giving slightly different information or combinations of detail.

‘Therefore every bomb threat must be assessed and graded’

A bomb threat is defined, for the purposes of grading, as a malicious statement of intent indicating that an attack may be imminent. The grading process does not apply to incidents involving unattended items or suspicious behaviour (including suspected suicide bombers).

Bomb threats are often passed via third parties, contain confusing information and always need to be dealt with quickly. It is accepted that the grading process will be especially difficult when threats are:

- not supported by intelligence in advance of receipt
- significantly different to threats encountered previously
- corrupted, incomplete or delayed prior to receipt by police
- intended to mislead.

The effectiveness of the police response to a bomb threat message is dependent entirely upon the level of preparedness, competency and alertness of those receiving it. Some degree of corruption within the wording of the threat may also be expected as the message is passed.

It is impossible to predict the wording of all threat calls and some may demand an immediate deployment of police resources. There must therefore be NO DELAY in responding to bomb threats upon receipt in the force control room, with any immediate action required taken and advice disseminated in accordance with local force procedures.

The grading of bomb threats is carried out in accordance with the guidance contained within Terrorism a Safe Response (TaSR)³. The gradings, as set out in TaSR, are as follows:

Red Grading: A threat believed to have come from a terrorist group, with specific information as to Time and Location. Evacuation **must** always be considered.

³ TaSR v4, page 36, Grading refers to ‘quite specific information’. This will be amended in TaSR v5 to read ‘specific information as to time & location’

Amber Grading: A threat believed to have come from a terrorist group, but with non-specific information. Evacuation should be considered if a suspicious object is located.

Standard Grading: A threat not believed to have come from a terrorist group. Evacuation should **only** be considered if a suspicious object is located.

Note: The phrase “terrorist group” incorporates individuals acting alone.

Telephoned bomb threats have often provided vague, inaccurate and misleading warnings, including the location of the device and time of detonation. The time lapse between receipt of the threat and device initiation may be very short.

11.2 Direct and Indirect Threats against the Railway

Bomb threat messages against railways (naming a station, train or simply including a location that involves the railway) are dealt with by British Transport Police (BTP). The railway-specific response applies to threats involving railway locations in England, Scotland and Wales and a national agreement to deal with this. If you as a first responder receive such a threat, you must immediately contact your Force Control Room.

Threats close to or adjacent to railways remain the responsibility of the local force. In the event of those threats that affect both the railway and ‘non railway’ locations, cooperation throughout the response is essential between BTP and the local police.

11.3 Receiving a Terrorist Threat

Considering the ‘**PROTECTS**’ guidance and the information that you as the first responder will need to know at the site of the threat is extremely important, when receiving a terrorist threat.

The exact wording of the threat should always be recorded or written down. It is advisable to have a template or prompt easily available to operators or any staff who may potentially answer a threat call, so that where possible, further questions can be asked to clarify the information:

- What kind of bomb is it? What does it look like?
- Where exactly is it?
- When will it detonate? And how?

- Why is it there? Was a code word used?
- Who put it there? Who is making the call?

Using the Five Ws to gather all the information will assist. The number the call was made from should be recorded if caller ID is visible, or 1471 used if possible. The time, date and duration of the call should also be noted. You should then pass the information immediately to the police control room. Your first priority must always be to attempt to locate any suspicious objects at the location given and confirm if any potential terrorist devices are present.

11.4 Questions to consider upon receiving a Terrorist Threat Call

Consider the number the threat call was received on:

- Is the number publicly available?
- Does it need an extension number?

Consider how the caller's voice sounded.

- Did the voice sound male or female?
- How old did the voice sound?
- Did the voice sound like it had an accent? (e.g. a foreign accent or a regional accent.)
- Did the voice have any speech impediment? (e.g. slurred, crying, stutter, coughing, etc.)
- Did the voice sound familiar? Consider how the message was spoken.
- What was the intonation of the threat? (e.g. angry, calm, abusive, incoherent, fast, slow, etc.)
- Did the threat sound like it was read out or pre-recorded?
- Did the voice sound like it was being disguised?

Consider the background noise to the message.

- What type of phone did the call sound like it was being made from? (e.g. Mobile, kiosk or a landline.)
- Did it sound like it was made from inside or outside a building? (e.g. any echo, music, engine noise, crowds, cars, etc.)

- Were there any other noises in the background? (e.g. other voices, animals, interference, etc.)

You should record any answers to these questions for the later investigation and the Police control room updated. This can help provide valuable extra information to the other responding officers to the scene of the terrorist threat call and give them the best opportunity to make an informed threat assessment.

12. Initial Operational Response to a CBRN Incident

This 'Initial Operational Response' (IOR) to a CBRN Incident guidance has been created in light of developments in scientific understanding and lessons identified from exercises and real incidents.

The focus of the IOR is to save as many lives as possible; to do this the emergency services must be aware of their role and responsibilities, what you can do to save lives safely, and the most effective time in which this action needs to be achieved.

The IOR starts from the very first call to the emergency services, or a self-presenter at a health care premise. The role of the call handler/supervisor or first responder in identifying a potential CBRN incident and giving the correct, but simple, advice to the caller and dispatching the right resources is critical. As the first responder you must work together quickly and efficiently to save life, including conducting a joint dynamic hazard assessment to inform multi-agency decision making, achieve a safe multi-agency response, and deliver a safe resolution to the incident for the public and emergency responders alike.

A first responder includes any member of the emergency services who is likely to be the first operational resource to be deployed to a CBRN incident. You are unlikely to be trained in specialist CBRN response or have specific CBRN Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

Research has indicated that a rapid response is critical for effective lifesaving following a CBRN incident. Specific actions, which include the removal of casualties from the area of gross contamination and the removal of their outer clothing during the first fifteen minutes, can save life and can be achieved without putting you and your colleagues at undue risk of exposure. A significant change to current procedures is the introduction of disrobing and decontamination at the first response.

Essential Information

Saving life

In the event of a CBRN incident, a rapid response is critical to the saving of life.

By Evacuating, effective Disrobing and Decontaminating the casualties, ideally within 15mins, the vast majority of the skin contaminant will be removed.

Safety of first responders

You as the first responders must ensure your own safety by carrying out a Hazard and Risk Assessment.

Evacuation

The removal of casualties from the scene of contamination or point of release should be carried out as a priority. Casualties should be moved to an area upwind and ideally uphill of the incident.

Communication and advise

It is important to clearly and continually communicate to casualties throughout the incident response including what you know about the incident, what you are doing to help affected people, and how they can help themselves. This will help foster public trust and confidence in responding organisations and help promote compliance with emergency interventions.

Disrobe

Casualty disrobing/undressing is a critical step in the decontamination process and is highly effective at reducing exposure to CBRN materials. Undressing should be systematic and consistent with the steps outlined in the disrobe procedure. Consideration should be given to ensuring the welfare and dignity of casualties as far as possible.

Decontamination

Improvised decontamination is the use of an immediately available method of decontamination. This should be performed on all disrobed casualties as a priority. DRY decontamination – should be considered the default process – primarily for chemical incidents – is the use of dry absorbent material such as paper tissue or cloths to blot and rub the exposed skin. WET decontamination – only to be used if signs and symptoms of


caustic substance – is the use of water from any available source such as taps, showers, hose-reels, sprinklers, etc.

13. Initial Role & Responsibility of Police Service

Your overall response at the scene will involve:

- Provide an environment which facilitates the lifesaving response, in full collaboration with the other responding emergency services.
- Jointly initiate the Risk Assessment process at scene. Individual services will be responsible for undertaking their own risk assessments which will be task dependent and necessitate cross agency communication.
- Coordinate scene assessment utilising available resources both at and off scene, and disseminate to all.
- Where possible, and in collaboration with other emergency responders, establish, if appropriate, and maintain cordons to secure the scene.
- Liaise with/share information with other responders with direct responsibilities in the emergency, e.g. local authorities who have to identify and advise on safety of vulnerable groups.
- Assume on scene coordination role of the incident.
- Coordinate at scene communication to the public, taking advice from other emergency responders.
- Assist in the coordination of the movement of casualties to a safer clearing location.
- Direct members of the public not directly involved in the incident to take shelter and/or evacuate as the situation requires, always upon expert advice.
- Assisting the FRS and Ambulance Services with disrobe and decontamination advice to the casualties.

13.1 CBRN First Responder Flow Chart



14. Identify a Potential CBRN Incident

14.1 CBRN Release Indicators – What to Ask/Look for!

In the early stages of an incident, it may be difficult to establish whether a CBRN event has occurred.

14.2 STEP 1-2-3 Plus – Safety Triggers for Emergency Personnel

STEP 1-2-3 is a familiar and well-established protocol for assessing the likelihood of hazardous materials being present at an incident scene, and determining subsequent actions. In this guidance, first responders are directed to consider a range of life saving actions once they have established that the situation requires a STEP 3 response. This is known as STEP 1-2-3 Plus:

Step 1: One person incapacitated with no obvious reason

- Approach using standard protocols

Step 2: Two people incapacitated with no obvious reason

- Approach with caution using standard protocols

Step 3: Three or more people in close proximity, incapacitated with no obvious reason

- Use caution and follow plus

Plus: Follow the CBRN First Responder Flow Chart to consider what actions can be undertaken to save life, using the following principles:

Evacuate – get people away from the scene of contamination

Communicate and advise – immediate medical advice and reassurance that help is on its way

Disrobe – remove clothing

Decontamination – dry decontamination should be the default process

14.3 Visual Indicators

Visual indicators of a CBRN event may include all or some of the following:

- Dead or distressed people, birds and animals

- Multiple individuals showing unexplained signs of skin, eye or airway irritation; nausea;
- vomiting; twitching; sweating; pin-point pupils; runny nose; disorientation; breathing difficulties; and convulsions
- The presence of hazardous materials or unusual materials/equipment
- Unexplained vapour or mist clouds
- Unexplained oily droplets or films on surfaces or water
- Withered plant life and vegetation

Note: Symptoms of exposure to a biological or radiological attack may not be present within the first minutes and hours of an attack occurring. Chemical releases are often, but not always accompanied by a more rapid onset of symptoms.

15. First Response – All Emergency Services

15.1 Initial information from the scene, and report to Control Room

As a first responder you may be faced with affected people in the open air away from the source, starting to disrobe and carrying out improvised decontamination.

15.2 Situation Reporting

Effective situation reporting from the scene of contamination is vital to ensure that the correct information can be disseminated appropriately to enable all agencies to maintain shared situational awareness. METHANE should be used at all times.

Control Rooms can start to gather the required information from the first call, and must share any information gathered with other Control Rooms and attending resources as soon as practicable.

You as a first responder, should gather the required information as a priority on arrival at scene, and disseminate to your Control Rooms and other agencies on scene as soon as possible. The lack of one piece of information should not delay the sending of the first situation report; this can be added as soon as the further information becomes available.

Further situation reports should be compiled and disseminated at regular intervals, or whenever further or updated information becomes available. Each agency should maintain a log of the situation reports completed.

The identification of the hot zone (the contaminated area(s) where the initial release occurs or disperses to) may be difficult. Many variables exist: material, quantity, quality of contamination, the location and weather conditions.

Where an explosive device is suspected, the hot zone will be initially set as per bomb scene management guidelines (Police) i.e. 100mtrs, 200mtrs and 400mtrs. FRS will work to their existing guidance for incidents involving explosives.

16. Life Saving Actions

16.1 Evacuation Disrobe and Decontamination

Moving casualties away from the scene of contamination followed by immediate disrobing and decontamination is the most effective measure in saving life and improving casualty outcomes in a CBRN event. Maximum benefit of this will be achieved within fifteen minutes of exposure.

These early operational activities should be considered an absolute priority.

Casualties should be directed away from the scene of contamination and point of release.

Identify an area away from the main area of contamination i.e. the suspected point of release and any subsequent contamination spread. The identified area of safety should, where practicable, be upwind and ideally uphill of the incident.

Any casualties who are able to walk should be directed to this area with the minimum of direct physical contact from you. Consider telephone/mobile phone, loud hailer or other means.

This area will still be deemed to be within the warm zone and should not be entered by you as a first responder without the most appropriate level of PPE.

16.2 Communication to casualties – on scene

If members of the public believe that you as a first responder are withholding information about an incident, trust and credibility can be quickly lost. Research into public responses to emergencies has shown that the public are willing to accept that much about the situation will be unknown in the early stages, particularly if they believe that emergency responders are working in their best interests. Therefore it is important to clearly communicate what you know about the incident, what you are doing to help casualties and how they can help themselves. This will help foster public trust and confidence in responding organisations and help promote compliance with emergency interventions.

You should consider communicating:

- What they know of the nature of the incident, even if it is just that more help is on its way.
- What the emergency services are doing and that these actions will help
- That medical assistance is coming to them – they should not leave the scene
- To follow the advice and instructions from the emergency services
- To assist others who are less able or injured to carry out tasks – if they can.

It is essential that an effective risk assessment is carried out as soon as possible and in consultation with emergency service partners. In a high risk, time pressured environment, you as a first responder must implement greater levels of control measures, in order to reduce risk to an acceptable level. This requires balancing the need to save life with the need to reduce risk to personnel. Only then can personnel be committed to the hot/warm zone.

The risk to and for you as a first responder must be reviewed continuously and updated as required.

16.3 Improvised Decontamination

Improvised decontamination should be performed on all disrobed casualties, unless medical advice is received to the contrary. Dry decontamination should be considered the default process for an incident involving chemicals unless the use of water is justified.

Generally, in the very early stages of an incident and dependent on the symptoms and needs of contaminated people, improvised decontamination may be initiated by casualties, other people or emergency service personnel.

Before specialist resources arrive on scene, you as a first responder should consider:

16.4 Dry Decontamination

Unless casualties are demonstrating signs or symptoms of exposure to caustic or irritant substances for example, redness, itching and burning of the eyes or skin, exposed skin surfaces should be blotted and rubbed with any available dry, absorbent material such as paper tissue (e.g. 'blue roll'). All waste material arising from decontamination should be left for disposal at a later stage.

16.5 Wet Decontamination

Water should not be used for decontamination unless casualty signs and symptoms are consistent with exposure to caustic substances such as acids or alkalis or the contamination has been identified as biological or radiological in nature. Wet decontamination may be performed using any available source of water such as taps, showers, fixed installation hose-reels, sprinklers, etc.

When using water, it is important to try and limit the duration of decontamination to between 45 and 90 seconds and, ideally, to use a washing aid such as a cloth or sponge.

17. Responding to Incidents involving White Powder or other Suspicious Substances

Whilst the majority of these types of incidents dealt with by the police are classified as non-explosive white powder, the terminology and procedures applied must be robust and sufficiently flexible to deal with the potential threat that may come from any non-explosive powders, (of any colour), solids, liquids, gels, crystals or granules.

Whilst experience shows that the majority of incidents involve letters/postal packages, the procedures adopted must be flexible enough to consider wide-ranging types of containers or methods of delivery.

It is imperative that the response to reports of white powder or other suspicious substances is proportionate to the assessed threat.

The purpose of this chapter is to point the way to the correct course of action at the scene of major incidents and crimes which will always be the subject of further investigation.

17.1 Definitions

Definition of White Powder

A suspicious unidentified powder, of any colour, not believed to be explosive or drugs.

Definition of a Suspicious Substance

A suspicious, unidentified, solid, liquid, gel, crystal or granular material, of any colour, not believed to be explosive or drugs.

Definition of a CBRN Incident

The National CBRN Tacticians Forum published the National CBRN Tacticians Forum (2005) edition 1 (September 2005) Multi-Agency National Concept of Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, which defined CBRN terrorism as:

CBRN terrorism entails the assumption or knowledge, based on intelligence or actual evidence, of actual or threatened dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material (either on their own or in combination with each other or with explosives), with deliberate criminal, malicious or murderous intent, targeted at a given population or economic or symbolic points.

CBRN terrorism includes the release of chemical hazards where this has been done deliberately or where it is not likely that the release is accidental, (i.e. incidents eventually classified as HAZMAT) and incidents involving biological infections which are confirmed as not having occurred spontaneously. It involves an immediate, coordinated, multi-agency response, requiring concurrent investigations, including specialist advice, a clear and consistent media and public reassurance strategy and customised procedures, plans, training and equipment (e.g. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), detection equipment, decontamination, evacuation and managing fatalities).

CBRN terrorism has the potential to create massive media, public and political interest at home and abroad. The scale of this interest is not necessarily proportionate to the level of material or agent released. Even the smallest release, once shown or believed to be deliberate, will have a significant impact on public or political opinion. It can also be expected to produce deep, searching and prolonged media coverage.

Definition of Terrorism

Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as:

The use or threat of action where:

- It is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and
- It is designed for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

The action is relevant if it:

- Involves serious violence against a person
- Involves serious damage to property
- Endangers a person's life, other than that of a person committing the action
- Creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public
- Is designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)

If at any point during the on-going assessment of an incident, it is suspected that the item or substance may be explosive in nature or may in fact be some form of incendiary or Improvised Explosive Device (IED), the relevant force procedures in relation to bomb threat assessment must be followed.

18. Initial Action at the Scene

As soon as possible following notification of an incident, the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the police control room will be responsible for carrying out an Initial Incident Assessment (IIA). This assessment will be based on the information and circumstances surrounding the incident that has been established at that time, and will be made in consultation with the Counter Terrorist Command Initial Response Coordination Cell (CTC IRCC), and the PN-CBRN Ops Centre.

The first responder, whether CBRN trained or not should:

- Establish an RVP, which should be upwind of the incident and, if practicable, uphill, and have good access routes to the scene
- Assume the role of Police Incident Commander unless relieved by an appropriately trained officer or an officer of senior rank

- Liaise with multi-agency incident commanders (if attending).

The multi-agency commanders, having liaised, must carry out a dynamic risk assessment before deploying resources to or into the scene.

The multi-agency commanders must determine the most appropriate resource and equipment required to be deployed to identify the item or substance. They must then decide on the correct level of PPE required to deal with the incident, in line with their own operating procedures.

Where available a Chemical Biological Crime Scene Investigator (CSI) should be deployed to forensically recover any exhibits/productions, as per the requirements of the National Network of Laboratories (NNL).

18.1 General incident questions to consider as the first responder

- How many people are involved?
- How are they injured/affected?
- Are they inside or outside a building?
- What is involved? – Liquid, vapour, explosion etc.
- Describe any container seen
- Any visible markings?
- What colour?
- What size?
- Is it leaking?

What can you SMELL? TASTE? HEAR?

- Is there any smoke or unusual low-lying cloud/fog?
- If so – What colour is it?
- Is there any wind?
- What direction is the smoke or cloud moving?
- Is there any noticeable change to surrounding vegetation/grass at the location? If so, HOW?

- Is there any visible effect on local pets, wildlife or birds etc.? If so WHAT?

If dealing with a package or article, consider the following questions:

- 5 W's
- **WHAT** IS IT? (Container, bag, gas cylinder, vehicle etc.)
- **WHERE** IS IT (If in open air or public space – to nearest junction/landmark etc. If within a building – room/floor number)?
- **WHY** IS IT SUSPICIOUS? (Is the caller a known target? Are the premises a known target – government, military or foreign interest?)
- **WHO** FOUND IT/PLACED IT? (Identity or description of anyone seen acting suspiciously in the vicinity)
- **WHEN** WAS IT FOUND/PLACED?

18.2 General information to consider at the scene

General:

- Remain calm.
- Caller should be encouraged to remain on the phone.
- Be alert as the situation could change very quickly.
- Keep a safe distance from the scene and be aware that there may be secondary devices.
- Do not move any casualties unless they are in danger and it is safe to do so
- Wait for CBRN Responders to arrive – follow their instructions.

If in the open air:

- Move away from source upwind and/or uphill.
- Do not make your own way to hospital – your best care is coming to the scene.
- Avoid eating, drinking, or smoking.
- Remove outer clothing.
- Move away again upwind.

- If possible locate water source and:
 - Wash hands
 - Wash other exposed areas (face and hair etc.)
 - Wash hands again
- Move away again upwind and/or uphill.
- Walk slowly towards police, fire or ambulance assistance and comply with their instructions.

If in a building:

- Leave the item/package alone. Do not cover, immerse, or move it.
- Close windows and doors in the immediate area, if safe to do so.
- Prepare to shut down air-conditioning, fans and air circulation systems, if necessary.
- If suspect package is within a room (post-room or office etc.), isolate the item so far as possible and secure room against further access.
- Isolate any persons having contact with the item, to minimise spread of possible contamination and facilitate medical aid.
- Evacuate the affected area but do not leave the building.
- Move to the upper floors.
- If the building is too small to stay indoors – follow ‘outdoor advice’ above.
- Do not operate any electrical switches or appliance.
- If trapped within a building, do not attempt to move rubble etc. as there is a danger that further collapse may occur.
- Avoid eating, drinking, or smoking.
- If possible locate water source and:
 - Wash hands
 - Wash other exposed areas (face and hair etc.)
 - Wash hands again.

- Do not make your own way to hospital – your best care is coming to the scene.

All persons with knowledge of item must remain available to brief Police/EOD etc.

19. Revision Questions

- How does The Cabinet Office Lexicon 2013 define a 'major incident'?
- What are the police objectives when responding to a major incident?
- What is the aim and vision of JESIP?
- What are the five stages of the Joint Decision Model (JDM)?
- What does the mnemonic METHANE stand for?
- When would Authorised Firearms Officers be deployed?
- As an unarmed first responder to a firearms incident, how might you minimise the risk to both your own and public safety?
- What is an 'active shooter'?
- How would your use of 'Stay Safe' differ when responding to an Active Shooter (as opposed to a firearms incident)?
- What should you consider when assessing and approaching a suspicious object?
- Why should you turn off mobile phones near to a terrorist device?
- How would you inhibit your radio's ability to transmit whilst searching for or approaching a suspicious object?
- What are the respective recommended minimum distances from a device for cordons and radio transmission?
- Why should cordons be away from glass or parked vehicles?
- What are the 'Five Cs' and the 'Five Ws'?
- As a first responder, what actions should you take when arriving at the scene of a suspected Terrorist Major Incident?
- How are bomb threats graded?
- What should you consider upon receiving a terrorist threat call?
- Which protocol would you use to identify the likelihood of hazardous material being present at an incident scene?

- What are the visual indicators of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) event?
- How long after a CBRN event do you have to achieve the maximum benefits of evacuation, disrobe and decontamination?
- When should wet decontamination be used instead of dry decontamination?
- What is meant by White Powder?
- As a first responder, what should your initial actions be at the scene of a CBRN terrorism incident?

20. Key Legislation

Key pieces of legislation applicable to this topic are:

- Civil Contingencies Act 2004
- Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974
- Human Rights Act 1998
- Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
- Terrorism Act 2000

21. E-learning

In addition to this book the following e-learning is available via the College of Policing Managed Learning Environment (MLE):

This e-learning is suitable for IPLDP but not for CKP students:

- Stay Safe at a Firearms Incident. **Note:** This is a restricted training module which must be accessed from a PNN account. However, it is **not** audience managed.
- Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)
- Terrorism a Safe Response
- Initial Operational Response to a CBRN Incident

The MLE is regularly updated with new learning programmes and materials.