

THE WAR OF BROTHERS, THE THIRD
SYRIAN WAR, AND THE BATTLE OF ANKYRA
(246–241 BC): A RE-APPRAISAL*

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I. Introduction

The first three generations of the Seleukid House reflect a remarkable degree of dynastic stability, if not harmony. With the – possible, though no longer probable – exception of Seleukos, son of Antiochos I Soter,¹ kings ruled for an extended period unchallenged by their own kin, and were able to pass on their empire smoothly to their eldest surviving sons after appointing them co-rulers years before. The situation changed dramatically with the death of Antiochos II Theos in 246 BC. The succession of Seleukos II Kallinikos, the eldest son of his first wife Laodike, was contested from two sides within the family: by his brother Antiochos Hierax as well as by the offspring of his father's second wife Berenike (nicknamed *Syra* or *Phernophoros*), daughter of Ptolemy II Philadelphos – or rather by the boy's uncle Ptolemy III Euergetes, who pretended to act in the names of his relatives.

The two sets of conflicts that arose from this challenged succession led to the outbreak of the 'Third Syrian War', which Seleukos fought with Euergetes from 246 to 241, and of the 'War of Brothers', which Hierax forced upon him. The start of the latter conflict is traditionally dated after or around the end of the Third Syrian War, that is 241, or occasionally even as late as 236. With some possible interruptions, fighting between the brothers is believed to have continued until Hierax died in 227.² However, in this chapter it will be argued that such a chronological sequence is mistaken: the conflict with Hierax started around the same time as the war with Euergetes, that is during the summer of 246, and it ended for good prior to the peace between Syria and Egypt, thus in 242 or early 241. If this revision holds true, the history of a complete generation of hellenistic rulers needs to be rewritten.

Unlike many other cases of dynastic transition, the difficulties for this period do not stem from the lack of evidence. On the contrary, the ancient sources are relatively numerous. Rather, the problem is to make judicious

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choices amongst the novelistic narratives and fragmentary reports, as well as to account for their frequent contradictions, if not for the tensions within their own broader contexts. It will be argued that nearly all modern views have been trapped by the distortions of ancient historiographers and Ptolemaic propagandists. What is required is to disentangle the various threads and to establish a solid chronology of the major events, as the single most important basis for any further historical interpretation.

The argument will proceed as follows: first, we have to look at the prehistory of the succession crisis, to better understand the aggressive role the Ptolemies were playing. Likewise, the propagandistic strategies of their courtiers and historiographers, who laid the blame for the Third Syrian War on the Seleukids, need to come under scrutiny. It will be shown that Euergetes was not responding to wrongdoings perpetrated by Laodike. Rather he himself escalated the conflicts in a vigorous attempt to reset the balance of the Second Syrian War, thereby causing the deaths of his sister and his nephew (Section II). Next, the crisis that triggered the violent chain of events will be revisited: the betrayal of Laodike by Sophron, the commander-in-chief of the Seleukid fleet of Ephesos, as well as the immediate effects this had on most of the north-eastern Mediterranean coastline (Section III). Thereafter, an investigation of the main historiographical sources will show how the chronological confusion in Justin's narrative came about (Section IV). Subsequently, Laodike's role as the alleged instigator of Hierax' usurpation needs to be challenged (Section V). We are then prepared to reconstruct the chain of events from Seleukos' defeat at Ankyra to his 'Beautiful Victory' (Section VI), his war against Hierax in Syria, Mesopotamia and Armenia (Section VII) as well as in Asia Minor until the reconciliation of the brothers in 242 and the peace with Egypt in 241 (Section VIII). The results of this study are first summarized in a very brief account (Section IX), and next unfolded in a detailed chronological table (Section X).

II. The pre-history of the wars: two Seleukid queens and the Ptolemaic drive for expansion

When Antiochos II died around July 246, the most immediate danger lurked from Ptolemy III Euergetes. He would inflict the heaviest damage on the Seleukid Empire since its foundation: while his generals occupied Ephesos and some other places in Ionia, Karia and Kilikia by September 246, the king himself invaded Syria and launched an attack on Babylon in December. This advance happened with tremendous speed, which is as remarkable for ancient as for modern warfare.³ In this undertaking, Euergetes acted on behalf of his sister Berenike, a widow of Antiochos II,

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and their little son – at least if we continue to believe the court propaganda, which has been spiced with highly dramatic and moralizing distortions in the historiographical tradition. Along these lines, scholars claim that, at the end of the Second Syrian War (260–253), Antiochos had promised to marry Philadelphos' daughter Berenike and to designate their expected offspring as successor to the Seleukid throne.⁴ The same sources accuse Laodike of the poisoning of her husband as well as of the slaughter of the rival queen and her son; all perpetrated with the intention that Laodike's eldest son Seleukos might rule.⁵ In an inscription from Kildara in Karia, the latter's half-brother is even called 'King Antiochos'.⁶ But that the boy was ever appointed king effectively is in stark contradiction with the remaining evidence, even with the official propaganda of the court at Alexandria as reflected in the Gourob Papyrus. The document from Kildara thus clearly reflects pro-Ptolemaic improvisation in times of turmoil.⁷

As I have tried to show in a recent study, criticism of the chain of events has to start with the end, if not the course, of the Second Syrian War. At the same time, a revision of the accusations laid against Laodike is required, and the various propagandistic and misogynist layers of the tradition need to be teased out. In any event, Philadelphos had suffered many set-backs during the war. When he sued for peace in 253 to prevent further harm to his empire, he was in no position to impose conditions on Antiochos. The views that Laodike and her offspring were abandoned in 253/52 or that the succession of Seleukos had been questioned by Antiochos any time prior to his death in 246 can now safely be rejected.⁸

Soon after the Second Syrian War, however, Egypt regained strength. Cyrene was reunited to the main land, and Antigonid control in southern Greece and the Aegean was curbed. At the same time, the secession of some satrapies weakened Seleukid power. Particularly the revolt of Andragoras in Parthia in 247 put significant pressure on Antiochos and absorbed the resources needed for further expansion into Thrace. What has to be pointed out, though, is that the situation was brought under control, again, shortly before Antiochos died.⁹ However, it might well be that the Ptolemies' decision to wage war on their rivals had been made in the fall or winter of 247/46, without taking the defeat of Andragoras into account. Since Philadelphos passed away in January 246, it cannot be decided with ultimate certainty whether Philadelphos had been planning a direct attack on Seleukid possessions or only a campaign in western Thrace; the latter option would not break the peace of 252 immediately, but might still result into an open war with Antiochos. At all events, the forceful presence of the Egyptian fleet west and south of Asia Minor clearly demonstrates that Philadelphos' successor Euergetes was out for an opportunity to challenge

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his rival. Thus he did not hesitate to launch a major attack when hearing of Antiochos' death in July 246.¹⁰

The traditional chronology has Euergetes leave Egypt for Syria in September 246. The surviving (pro-Ptolemaic) sources present his departure as a reaction to the oppression of Berenike and her son.¹¹ This, in turn, followed soon after the death of Antiochos, which most likely occurred early in July.¹² But September is barely compatible with the start of Ptolemaic aggressions in western Asia Minor. In July or early August, Ptolemy Andromachos, the commander of the Aegean fleet, was ready to strike, as we shall see in the next section which discusses the events in and around Ephesos in 246. No later than August or early September, Tlepolemos, the commander in Karia, acted with similar instructions. At the same time Euergetes must have been on the watch, not in Alexandria, but on Cyprus, having with him the main body of the Egyptian fleet.¹³ How else should we understand the speed of Euergetes' campaign into Syria and Mesopotamia (his troops arrived at the gates of Babylon in December) – unless he had made long-term preparations for such an unprecedented invasion?¹⁴ As will be argued in the subsequent sections, the Ptolemaic incursions into Ionia, Kilikia and Syria induced pro-Seleukid courtiers to eliminate Berenike and her son, lest Euergetes use them as pawns in his conquest of the empire.

III. The betrayal by Sophron and the outbreak of the Third Syrian War in 246 BC

The decisive event which escalated the tensions between the two major powers was the betrayal by the *stratēgos* Sophron, commander-in-chief of the Seleukid fleet that was harboured in Ephesos. Our main source is an anecdote about his consort Danae. It is told by Athenaios, who draws – as ultimately all of our surviving literary sources – on the *Histories* of Phylarchos of Naukratis:¹⁵

Danae was a chosen companion of Laodike, and was trusted by her with all her secrets; and, being the daughter of that Leontion who had studied with Epicurus the natural philosopher, and having been herself formerly the mistress of Sophron, she, perceiving that Laodike was laying a plot to murder Sophron, revealed the plot to Sophron by a sign. And he, understanding the sign, and pretending to agree to what Laodike was saying to him, asked two days to deliberate on what he should do. And when she had agreed to that, he fled away by night to Ephesos. But Laodike, when she learnt what had been done by Danae, threw her down a precipice, discarding all recollection of their former friendship. And they say that Danae, when she perceived the danger which was impending over her, was interrogated by Laodike, and refused to give her any answer; but, when she was dragged

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to the precipice, then she said, that ‘many people justly despise the Deity, and they may justify themselves by my case, who having saved a man who was to me as my husband, am requited in this manner by the Deity. But Laodike, who murdered her husband, is thought worthy of such honour.’¹⁶ (Transl. C. D. Yonge (1854) adapted from Attalus.org)

The friction between the queen and Sophron must have occurred very shortly after the death of Antiochos, most probably still in July 246. Ephesos and its *stratēgos* were then at least nominally under the control of Laodike. The naval campaign that Antiochos had been planning to conduct was put on hold, and soon the queen moved the court back from Ephesos inland to Sardis. This had been the main royal residence in Asia Minor since the 6th century,¹⁷ and was certainly a more suitable place during the height of summer, as long as the fleet was lying anchored in the harbour. An independent source – fragments of the Ptolemaic ‘War Bulletin’ preserved in the Gourob Papyrus – confirms how closely the execution of Danae must have followed upon the death of Antiochos. A few days after the outbreak of hostilities, when Ptolemaic ships landed in Kilikia and caught the *stratēgos* Aribazos by surprise, the latter was still of the belief that Laodike was residing in Ephesos.¹⁸ Apparently, Seleukid communication on horseback had been overtaken by the enemy fleet. At that time, Seleukos was on his way back from the east. He had accompanied, if not directed nominally, the successful campaign against Andragoras in Parthia, who would have been defeated in 247 or by early spring 246; at least, Seleukos and his siblings Hierax and Apama are attested in Babylon in May.¹⁹ Seleukos’ elevation to the position of a co-ruling king must have taken place around mid-July, when he departed from Babylon towards Asia Minor at the head of his victorious army. He was probably back later in Lydia in September, where he was opposed by his uncle Alexander and his brother – events that we shall consider later in sections IV and V.²⁰

At this point, it is of interest to return to the allegations laid against Sophron. While Athenaios explains the conflict in purely personal terms, which is typical of hellenistic historiography, the motivations for Sophron’s and Laodike’s actions remain opaque, as long as our perspective rests on the just-quoted anecdote. Previous explanations contextualized the conflict against the background of the succession crisis caused by the second marriage of Antiochos. But it is remarkable that the anecdote does not acknowledge any honourable motivation of Sophron, let alone claim his innocence. Phylarchos would have been likely to mention such circumstances, if he had known about them, given his anti-Seleukid and pro-Ptolemaic sentiment. Neither would Athenaios have filtered out such nuances entirely, since it would have strengthened the moral authority of

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Danae. We are thus safe to assume that the *stratēgos* was facing punishment for a serious crime, which Seleukos would not have condoned either. This conclusion is further strengthened by my recent study of the position of Berenike: the view that her son had been the designated successor to Antiochos has been shown to be a later fabrication, which not even the official version of the Ptolemaic court claimed. Hence, there is no reasonable way around accepting that Seleukos had been appointed co-ruling king – and thus sole successor – during his father's life time. This is not at all surprising, given that Seleukos was the only son fit for kingship at the time.²¹ As a result, whatever the historical Sophron had done or was planning to do, it had nothing to do with a potentially ambiguous position of the court of Antioch.

The ensuing events should therefore leave little doubt that a conspiracy with Euergetes, through his admiral of the Aegean fleet, Ptolemy nicknamed Andromachos,²² is a much more probable motive. For it would not only fit the kind of diplomacy that Philadelphos had deployed very successfully in Greece right after the Second Syrian War, but also be compatible with the outcome of the conflict: Sophron – and with him Ephesos – were driven straight into the arms of the Ptolemies.²³ In fact, Phylarchos' anecdote gives further support to this assumption, because Laodike was not openly pursuing the *stratēgos* for a specified crime, but she was rather attempting to ascertain a suspicion. This is why she was trying to trap him, but this way eventually gave him the opportunity to escape.

If more proof were needed for this reconstruction, such would be provided by the speed of the backlashes after Sophron's flight. The invasion of Kilikia in August 246 has been mentioned before. We also have positive evidence for Kildara in Karia, which went over to the Ptolemaic commander Tlepolemos. Since Berenike and her son were still believed to be alive, these events occurred around the same time, in August or September at the latest.²⁴ Less certain is the evidence for nearby Mylasa, which seems to have been conquered by the same Tlepolemos early during the Third Syrian War, possibly also still in the later summer of the first year.²⁵ Several other violent incidents fall into the summer or autumn of 246, even though they need some further discussion.²⁶

The first of those incidents takes us back to the case of Sophron. It appears to be closely linked with the naval battle of Andros, in which Antigonos Gonatas inflicted a major defeat on the aggressor and thus seems to have regained supremacy over the Aegean for a few years. The conquered admiral is called *Oprona* in the manuscript tradition of Trogus' *Prologi*, but C. Müller's correction <S>*op**rona* found wide acceptance (either form represents a Greek accusative).²⁷ While the context of the

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Prologi seemed to imply a date sometime during the War of Brothers, the identification with Laodike's opponent speaks for a time following more closely the death of Antiochos. Accordingly, K. Buraselis' argument for 246/45 has been received favourably. While Buraselis shows a preference for early 245, August 246 can now be established with a high degree of certainty.²⁸

However, before the historical context is looked at in more detail, it has to be conceded that Müller's correction has not remained uncontested. A. N. Oikonomides points out that *Opron(a)* is not a *bapax legomenon*. M. D. Gygas adds that our sources do not even state that Sophron went over to the Ptolemies.²⁹ But these objections seem to have little weight. *Opron* remains extremely rare, with not a single attestation in LGPN. And the chronological, geographical and political implications are so strong that it is difficult not to accept Müller's emendation. With the new chronology of the wars established, the case appears to be even more clear-cut. Phylarchos' anecdote attests Sophron's escape to Ephesos, where the Seleukid fleet was harboured; Ptolemaic control of the city can now be dated to about September thanks to Porphyry's *Chronicle*;³⁰ and even the strongest Ptolemaic fleet would not have had the resources to strike nearly at the same time in Thrace, Ionia, Samos, Karia, Kilikia and Syria without the unexpected support of the Ephesian fleet.

We may still consider two choices at this point: either Sophron at once called in Ptolemaic reinforcements and therewith a new supreme commander, or Ephesos was sufficiently fortified, as long as the *stratēgos* could count on the cooperation of the Ptolemaic fleet. The second must have been much more attractive to Sophron, and possibly even to Andromachos. The latter had to be careful not to overstretch his forces, part of which were likely to be deployed further east. The fact that 'Ptolemy' (Andromachos) was holding Ephesos as early as September (which is argued in section IV) might at first seem to contradict this view; but the conclusion to draw is rather that Sophron (and not Opron) had joined the blitz attacks on former Seleukid allies in the Aegean. It would indeed have made sense to strike as quickly as possible, as long as Antigonos Gonatas would still have been thinking that the Ephesian fleet was siding with him rather than Andromachos. The latter, in turn, was then free to chase down Thracian allies of Seleukos and Gonatas, who could not count on support from either Macedon or the Seleukids. But, for whatever reason, Gonatas prevailed at Andros and Sophron perished, so that our sources are henceforth silent about the traitor. Andromachos, in turn, decided not to try to avenge Sophron, but to secure the possession of Ephesos.³¹

IV. The historiographical sources, the Battle of Ankyra and the synchrony of the wars

In the previous section, it has been taken for granted that the Third Syrian War and the War of Brothers did not happen subsequently, as Justin wants to make us believe, but rather that they started around the same time in the summer of 246 BC. This synchrony is clearly implied in Porphyry's account: the first combat between Hierax and Seleukos took place after the betrayal by Sophron (by August), but prior to Euergetes' landing in Syria (early October). While scholars have hitherto rejected this relative chronology as garbled, and have preferred the sequence offered by Justin, I would rather suggest taking the Battle of Ankyra as the decisive hinge to date the early events of the two wars, and also as a key to explain the temporary success of Euergetes' campaign.

A closer look at Justin's narrative reveals that it is much less clear-cut than appears at first glance. The persona of Hierax is introduced prior to the end of the Third Syrian War, more precisely after the failed naval campaign of Seleukos,³² which may date to 243 or 242. In chapter 2 of his 27th book, Justin writes:³³

From there Seleukos wrote a letter to his brother, Antiochos, begging for his assistance and offering as remuneration for his aid the port of Asia within the boundaries of the Tauros range. Although Antiochos was only fourteen, he had a lust for power beyond his years, and he grasped this opportunity, but not with the brotherly love with which it was being offered. Instead, he harboured a larcenous desire to take everything from his brother; and boy though he was, he was possessed of the villainous audacity of a man. This is why he was given the nickname 'Hawk' – he resembled a bird of prey more than a human being, making his living by preying on the possessions of others. In the meantime, Ptolemy had learned that Antiochos was coming to Seleukos' aid and, to avoid fighting both at the same time, he made a ten-year peace treaty with Seleukos. But the peace which the latter was granted by his enemy was broken by his brother, for Antiochos hired an army of Gallic mercenaries, and the man whose help he had sought brought Seleukos not assistance but war, and behaved not as a brother but as a foe. In the ensuing battle Antiochos was, indeed, the victor, thanks to the valour of the Gauls; but then the Gauls, thinking that Seleukos had fallen in the engagement, turned their weapons against Antiochos himself, expecting to have a freer hand in pillaging Asia if they wiped out the royal line entirely. When Antiochos realized this, he paid them a ransom for himself as one would to bandits, and made an alliance with his own hired soldiers. (Transl. adapted from Yardley 1994)

In the third chapter, Justin first turns to Hierax' problems with 'King Eumenes of Bithynia' (a weird conflation of Eumenes and Attalos of Pergamon with

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Ziaelas of Bithynia), and further fights with Galatians, conflicts that were indeed carried out for the most part after 241. But when Justin resumes the theme of the War of Brothers, it is surprisingly intermingled with Euergetes' drive for revenge, the main subject of the first chapter:³⁴

The brothers Seleukos and Antiochos were at war over Asia, while Ptolemy, king of Egypt, though ostensibly wishing to avenge his sister, was really lusting after Asia. (Transl. Yardley 1994)

The next paragraph speaks of a war fought almost by all against all in Asia Minor,³⁵ before Hierax' successive defeats are listed up until his very end (in 227).³⁶

Thus Asia was being ransacked by the Bithynian Eumenes, on one side, and by the Gauls, ever the force hired by the weaker camp, on the other; and while she was beset by all these brigands, no one could be found to defend her. / After defeating Antiochos, Eumenes had seized most of Asia, but not even then could the brothers come together, although the prize for which they were at war was lost. Ignoring the enemy from without, they revived hostilities in order to destroy each other. In these hostilities Antiochos was once more defeated. Exhausted by a flight which lasted many days, he came finally to his father-in-law, Ariamenes, king of Cappadocia. At first he was given a cordial welcome by Ariamenes; but within a few days he discovered that a plot was being hatched against him and he fled to save himself. Finding no safe haven in his flight, he went to his enemy Ptolemy, whom he thought he could rely on more than his brother (for he had in mind either what he had intended to do to his brother or what he had deserved to suffer at his brother's hands). But Ptolemy was no more sympathetic towards Antiochos when he surrendered than when he was a declared enemy, and he had him placed under close arrest. Antiochos escaped from here, too, with the help of a courtesan he had come to know a little too well; he gave his guards the slip, but in his flight he was killed by bandits. (Transl. adapted from Yardley 1994)

Book 27 ends only after likewise referring to the inglorious death of Seleukos, which happened soon afterwards (225): he is said to have fallen from his horse allegedly after losing his kingdom, whatever this is supposed to mean.³⁷ Justin makes the moral clear: they had to pay for their trespasses.³⁸

Not all difficulties of this narrative can be tackled here, but only those that are most relevant for our chronological problem and the main chain of events. To begin with, why would Seleukos ask his brother Hierax for help when the former was supposed to be the sole legitimate king whereas the latter was not king at all and only 14 years old? There is no mention at all of either Laodike as ruler of Asia Minor or of her brother Alexander as the successor of Sophron as *stratēgos* of western Asia Minor. Next, why

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would Seleukos pay his brother a tremendous price for such a support: the rule of all Asia Minor beyond the Taurus? And why was Hierax dissatisfied with the offer, so that Justin cannot hold back his rant against the youngster's rapaciousness even before the revolt was supposed to start, i.e. after Euergetes had offered peace? Most importantly, what was so terrifying for the king of Egypt that Hierax was supporting Seleukos? The traditional view (based on Justin) takes for granted that there had not yet been a dynastic rift within the House of Seleukos. In other words, what was so spectacular about Seleukos' attempt at also drawing on the resources of the Anatolian part of his kingdom around 242?

Only occasionally, some scholars have noticed that this seems to imply an earlier start of tensions among the brothers, if not in fact of the outbreak of the war. However, such observations were confined to passing remarks.³⁹ Conspicuously, Justin condenses all military confrontations between the brothers into one major combat which saw Hierax victorious over Seleukos very soon after the peace with Euergetes. Justin deliberately does not name the battlefield. For whoever knows the tradition preserved by Porphyry would have been aware that not Hierax, but Mithradates II won the decisive combat. That this battle took place at Ankyra, we also know from Trogus, Justin's source.⁴⁰ The implication of the location goes beyond the name of the warlord: it also raises the question why Hierax, who had generously been offered trans-Tauric Asia Minor, was fighting against his brother in Asia Minor and not in Syria or Mesopotamia. According to the apparently pseudo-historical framework that Justin has created, the war against the Ptolemies was already over and Asia Minor had been ceded, so that Seleukos' strong military presence near Ankyra would have made him the aggressor, not Hierax.

Justin, as it appears, is less interested in history than in moral education, book 27 being a teaching unit on brotherly love, or on the perils of falling short of this affection. In chapter 1, Seleukos' murder of his half-brother, the son of Berenike, leads up to the loss of nearly his whole kingdom to Ptolemy Euergetes. The latter was only incidentally forced to reduce his engagement in the Seleukid Empire due to turmoil in his own kingdom. But he was effectively overcome only when the brothers Seleukos and Hierax joined forces towards the end of chapter 2. Instead of learning the lesson, however, those decadent epigones resumed war immediately after the peace with Egypt, throwing Asia Minor and further parts of the empire into complete anarchy. Throughout their lives as kings, they either fought for survival or sought safety in flight, and finally neither escaped his deserved punishment. Both first lost their realm and then died most unworthy deaths.⁴¹

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It will not come as a surprise that in nearly all cases for which we have a parallel tradition Justin can be shown to have altered substantially, or at least re-contextualized, individual events, to make them fit into his overall plot.⁴² How useless his testimony can be to reconstruct even the fundamentals of a war is perhaps best illustrated by the conflation of three kings of two different realms, to yield the 'king of Bithynia Eumenes' (< Eumenes + Attalos + Ziaelas). When it comes to explaining causality, arguably one of the main tasks of historiographers since Herodotos, Justin can be utterly ingenuous: all cities are said to have turned away from Seleukos for the murder of his brother, but to have forgiven him out of pity for his losing the entire fleet. This is as remote from historical analysis as it may possibly be.⁴³

Porphry's *Chronicle* will in fact help us understand that Justin very clumsily covers up the fact that the conflict among the brothers had been ongoing since the start of the Third Syrian War. Admittedly, Porphry's own narrative is not without difficulties, due at least in part to the fragmentary state of transmission. But if one is alert to the aforementioned problems, a fresh reading of the relevant sections of the *Chronicle* will immediately show its superiority. Drawing on Porphry, Eusebios reported in some detail on the events in his *Chronicle* (F 32.8). The Greek original is lost, so here I present an adapted version of Toye's English translation; this, in turn, is based on Jacoby's German, which translates the Armenian rendering of Eusebios' *Chronicle* (the subdivisions by letters are my own):⁴⁴

a) When Seleukos Kallinikos was still alive, Antiochos, his younger brother, did not desire to behave peaceably and to concern himself with his own affairs. He had an ally and supporter in Alexander, who had control of the city of Sardis and who was also the brother of his mother Laodike. He also had Galatians as allies in two battles.

b) Seleukos was victorious in Lydia, but he captured neither Sardis nor Ephesos since Ptolemy had possession of the city. But when he went into a second battle against Mithradates in Cappadocia, 20,000 of his soldiers were slain by the barbarians, and he himself was missed as if killed in battle.

c) But Ptolemy, also called Tryphon, seized a stretch of Syria and his siege of Damascus and Orthosia ended in the third year of the 134th Olympiad when Seleukos returned to this region.

d) Yet Antiochos, the brother of Kallinikos, passing through Greater Phrygia, subjected the inhabitants to tribute

e) and unleashed his generals and armies in the field against Seleukos. After he was handed over to the barbarians by his own courtiers, Antiochos escaped from them with a few men and reached Magnesia. On the following day he formed his battle lines. Once again with the hard-earned assistance of his ally Ptolemy, Antiochos was victorious.

f) And he married a daughter of Zielaas.

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g) In the fourth year of the 137th Olympiad Antiochos went into battle twice in Lydia and was defeated. Also he offered battle against Attalos in the area of Koloe. In the first year of the 138th Olympiad Antiochos fled to Thrace to escape Attalos after a battle in Karia and he died.

Paragraph a) sets the scene for the revolt of Hierax. Similarly to Justin, though much more concisely, Porphyry presents a moralizing explanation for the usurpation: the youngster's immoderate desire to rule. This alone, of course, does not yet explain how the ambitious prince found support for his plan. While the fragmentary version does not allow us to reconstruct the political motivations, it does substantiate the physical power base needed to pursue the endeavour. His uncle Alexander and the Galatians are specified as supporters. The former implies also those Seleukid forces that had remained in or near the royal residence of Sardis, and the second, since Porphyry seems to have spoken of *symmachoi*, are to be identified not with mercenaries, but with allies, likely the Galatian Tolistobogioi and their following.⁴⁵

A third source of Hierax' power is alluded to in paragraph b): Ptolemy, who was holding Ephesos. Independent sources allow us to understand that this was not Euergetes, but his half-brother Andromachos, *stratēgos* of the Aegean.⁴⁶ Admittedly, these particular lines of Eusebios' excerpt from Porphyry do not make it explicit that Andromachos was siding with Hierax, but since, in the later course of events, Ptolemy's support is qualified as a 'renewed alliance', the interpretation appears to be justified. There is further support for this reconstruction. An inscription from Priene attests a certain 'Antiochos appointed by King Ptolemy' as a leading official in Western Asia Minor. Although the context is fragmentary, it is still sufficiently clear to rule out any identification of Antiochos other than with Hierax, and of King Ptolemy other than with Euergetes.⁴⁷ This conclusion is further corroborated through Porphyry's narrative of the Third Syrian War, which he deployed in his *Against the Christians*: as we shall see later, Euergetes would pass on the control of Kilikia to his 'friend' Antiochos, who was none other than Hierax.⁴⁸

At any rate, paragraph b) is about the direct military engagements of Seleukos. The first was with his brother, whom he defeated, though did not yet annihilate, in Lydia. Given the overall speed of the events, one may doubt that Seleukos laid siege to Sardis or Ephesos; he probably did not even reach the coast. If the 'second' combat is located in 'Cappadocia', it can be assumed that his western campaign was aborted, for the king's intervention was required further east even more urgently. Seleukos must have learnt about the Ptolemaic invasion of Kilikia or of Mithradates' occupation of eastern Phrygia; either intrusion put his supply lines at risk

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and required an immediate response. The disastrous outcome of Mithradates' attack implies that Cappadocia has to be understood in its broadest sense, encompassing eastern and central Anatolia. Porphyry thus refers to the Battle of Ankyra, the only place in Asia Minor where Seleukos is known to have suffered a defeat.⁴⁹

According to Porphyry, Hierax was not directly involved in the Battle of Ankyra; he names Mithridates II as the victor. Trogus, in turn, ascribes the victory to the Gauls, i.e. Galatians, as if they were fighting in their own right; in all likelihood, these were the Tektosages who had been hired two generations before by Mithradates I. It was only after this conquest that the king of Pontos allowed them to settle in the area. Justin, in turn, combines all of Seleukos' combats in Asia Minor and has Hierax defeat his brother with the aid of Galatians, though without locating the decisive fight at Ankyra, as has been discussed above.⁵⁰

The deleterious outcome of the battle is confirmed by three anecdotes which we shall look at in section VI. But not a single source offers a precise date. Suggestions in modern scholarship vary between 241 and 235, which implies that all have so far agreed that the battle post-dated the peace with Euergetes. However, Porphyry's account requires a day late in September or very early in October 246: following the news of the king's death, Ptolemy 'Tryphon' (i.e. Euergetes) was emboldened to intrude even into Syria (c). His arrival there must have happened by October, as the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries allow us to conclude.⁵¹

The narrative of the Syrian War is then reduced to a minimum in Eusebios' *Chronicle*, one sentence each being dedicated to its beginning in 246 and its end in 242/41. The choice of information offered appears so arbitrary that it is easy to fathom that Eusebios picked the first and last sentences he found in Porphyry's account on the war as these conveniently offered absolute dates. He did not make an effort to smooth the transition by using connecting particles other than a vague δὲ – which is of course typical for the genre.

The account as it has come down to us is confusing in a further regard, for it is uncertain whether the remaining events presented from d) to f) happened after the start or after the conclusion of the war in Syria. The account becomes more precise when it turns to the final steps of Hierax' life (g): now Olympiad years are used, thus for the (last?) war with Attalos in 229/28 and his murder in Thrace in 228/27. Since Hierax must have exploited the opportunity that Seleukos was occupied with the war against Euergetes, we should indeed assume that section d) followed soon after the invasion of Syria. The second sentence which reports the end of the Third Syrian War should thus be regarded as a kind of chronological digression

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or completion of a topic before the narrator returns to the main thread of events. Parallels for this method abound among historiographers and chroniclers.⁵²

Accordingly, Hierax immediately set out to consolidate his rule over western Asia Minor after his brother had been defeated at Ankyra and vanished from the scene (d). Moreover, the fact that Hierax later attacked Seleukos (e), and not the other way round, seems to suggest a time when the latter had not yet recovered Syria, which means soon after his 'Beautiful Victory' over the Ptolemaic bulwark on the Euphrates in 245 or 244 (below, section VI). The revolt of his own courtiers and his extradition to the barbarians – probably the Tolistobogioi – seems to match Justin's allegation that the Galatians turned against Hierax after Seleukos' defeat, in order to establish their own rule over Asia Minor. Justin then speaks of large payments, followed by an alliance, which would recognize that the Tolistobogioi were not his subjects, but shared in the rule over the newly gained territory.⁵³ This does not exclude that, in the course of the conflict, there had been a battle with the same Galatians at Magnesia.

Most likely, the revolt of the Galatians occurred very soon after Seleukos had defeated his brother for the first time: probably, Hierax had been camping outside Sardis, but was then chased down the Hermos valley towards Magnesia at the Sipylos. He apparently fled into the city after having been beaten first by his brother and then pursued by the Tolistobogioi.⁵⁴ If indeed he dared to give battle to those Galatians, this must have been due to the arrival of the troops of Ptolemy (sc. Andromachos) that came from Ephesos. Eusebios calls this support 'repeated'. Following the logic of the transmitted text, this seems to imply that holding Ephesos would have been the first support, unless a more active role mentioned by Porphyry has simply been suppressed by Eusebios. But since the alliance with Ptolemy was still so fresh, probably dating from early September, it may well be that no troops from Ephesos had reached Hierax prior to his arrival in Magnesia.

It is worthwhile pointing out the implications of insisting on 242/41 as a *terminus post quem* for the events d) to f): this would imply a renewed alliance between Hierax and the Ptolemies, which could have resulted in new tensions with Seleukos, rendering Justin's characterization of the hostility between Hierax and Ptolemy even less clear. It is definitely more convincing to date this Ptolemaic support for the usurper prior to 241, and most reasonably to the later part of 246. After Seleukos had left Asia Minor, Hierax worked towards extending his control of Anatolia, depending on Tolistobogian support on the one hand, but, on the other, also on Ptolemaic aid to keep the upper hand in this dangerous game.

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The *Chronicle* is silent about any further incidents relating to either the War of Brothers or the Third Syrian War. I therefore suggest synchronizing the beginnings of the two wars. The sequence of events in 246 thus appears to have been as follows: the betrayal by Sophron, the loss of Ephesos, the betrayal by Hierax, Seleukos' victory in Lydia, the Battle of Ankyra, and finally Ptolemy's invasion of Syria. At the other end, we should accept from Justin that Seleukos' agreement with Hierax shortly preceded the peace with Euergetes in 242/41. As will be seen, all remaining events that are attested as relating to the War of Brothers can reasonably be fitted into the time span between 246 and 241. While the time after 241 was anything but peaceful and harmonious for the Seleukid Empire, at least open hostilities between the two brothers or between Seleukos and Euergetes seem to have been avoided throughout.

V. Laodike, Ptolemy Andromachos and Alexander

A better understanding of the War of Brothers requires a closer look at Laodike's role, since she is commonly regarded in modern scholarship as the instigator of Hierax' revolt.⁵⁵ Sometimes it is specified that she first forced Seleukos to appoint Hierax as king in Asia Minor as a reward for support against Euergetes around 242.⁵⁶ Since none of the main narrative sources studied so far make any such allegation, we have to turn to a passing remark in Plutarch's *On Brotherly Love*:⁵⁷

But Antiochos might be condemned because of his lust for dominion, yet admired because his love for his brother was not altogether extinguished thereby. For he went to war against Seleukos for the kingdom, though he was the younger brother, and had the aid of his mother. (Transl. adapted from W. C. Helmbold, Loeb ed., 1939)

True enough, Laodike's splendid reputation among ancient and modern scholars alike has seemed to be sufficient to confirm Plutarch. Her lust for power and her recklessness appear almost as self-evident conditions for the coup against her son. And the young age of the pretender – he was only fourteen⁵⁸ – would speak against his capability of revolting without the guidance from his own kin, an impression that is confirmed by the naivety of Hierax implied in the anecdote on his brotherly love. Indeed, the very active role Laodike played after Antiochos' death seems to make her the ideal candidate for the crime. Although the various accusations of her violent interventions in the succession of Seleukos have been discarded, we can still point to the persecution of Sophron and the execution of Danae. Her position as ruling queen is further implied in the report on the invasion of Kilikia transmitted in the Gourob Papyrus.⁵⁹ Above all, the fragmentary reference to a 'Laodikean War' on the abovementioned inscription from

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Priene underlines her political prominence.⁶⁰ Hence, Laodike definitely assumed control of the court of Ephesos as Antiochos' widow.⁶¹

These considerations notwithstanding, Laodike deserves to be acquitted of the accusation of stirring up Hierax against his brother, just as much as of the purported murder of her husband or the liquidation of Berenike and her son. As far as I can see, only K. L. Nourse has until now presented an argument in her defence: Plutarch's allegation remains vague and is possibly mere literary flourish, reminiscent of Parysatis' role in Kyros' rebellion against his brother Artaxerxes II.⁶² While these observations are pertinent, they have not been compelling. But stronger arguments can be invoked.

First of all, if indeed Laodike has been behind the fraternal discord, this partisanship could not have escaped contemporaries: she would have stayed at the court of the son she was supporting (that is Sardis in the case of Hierax, while Seleukos was itinerant during his first two years). But the entire ancient tradition agrees that the queen perpetrated, ordered or at least encouraged up to three dynastic murders, in order to secure the succession of Seleukos – and not Hierax! This is even more important since the revised chronology allows us to date the first military confrontation between the brothers to September 246, thus at a time when Berenike and her son might still have been alive.

Next, with the single exception of Plutarch, no ancient author alludes to tensions, let alone frictions, between Laodike and Seleukos. In an excerpt preserved by Jerome, Porphyry even claims that Laodike was ruling together with Seleukos when Euergetes mistreated them.⁶³ Since this statement must relate to Laodike's sole rule of Asia Minor during the absence of Seleukos in the summer of 246, it at least implies that Porphyry was unaware of a rift between the mother and her eldest son. In fact, by the time that Seleukos showed up again in western Asia Minor, she had disappeared from all of our literary sources. Justin and Porphyry, who have been quoted extensively in the previous section, make no more mention of her. Of course, one has to be careful when it comes to *argumenta e silentio*, and, admittedly, Justin's silence could still be explained away by the fact that he is showcasing the lack of fraternal love. Previously in the same book, however, Justin has at least granted a passing remark to Laodike's share of the guilt for the dynastic murders.⁶⁴ In addition, one may point towards a decree of Smyrna dating to late 245 or 244, in which the citizens emphasize the king's piety as shown by his 'affection towards his parents'.⁶⁵

Moreover, Seleukid forces in western Asia Minor were very much weakened when Seleukos had taken a major part of the troops into the east in 247 and Ephesos had gone over to the Ptolemies together with the fleet in 246. As a result, resistance against Seleukos would have stood a chance

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only in alliance with Euergetes, and it can barely be doubted that Hierax could only have been the junior partner. Porphyry attests such a relation three times: prior to the Battle of Ankyra, shortly thereafter and in the spring of 245. Additional indirect support can be drawn from Justin, for his claim that the cooperation between the two brothers compelled Euergetes to end the war would imply that, beforehand, it had been up to Euergetes to either use the resources of Asia Minor against Seleukos or at least neutralize them.⁶⁶ In the face of this, it is hard to see what Laodike was supposed to gain by allying with her most dangerous enemy, other than the self-laceration of the most powerful empire that existed at the time. After all, she had just lost Sophron and killed her friend Danae out of enmity for the Ptolemies.⁶⁷

Most critical is Porphyry's report of Seleukos' return to the west. Sardis closed its gates to him when he was trying to take control of Lydia. As the commander-in-chief of the city, Alexander, the brother of Laodike and thus son of Achaïos the Elder, is named. He is attested elsewhere in a prominent, probably vice-regal, position under Antiochos II.⁶⁸ Shall we construe, on the basis of this relation, also the involvement of the sister (or mother respectively)? This would be a questionable conclusion, not least since the two other brothers of Alexander and Laodike remained loyal to Seleukos.⁶⁹ The accusation against Laodike depends on the assumption that she continued to stay in the main royal residence of Asia Minor, which, however, is neither attested nor likely.⁷⁰ After all, would it not be awkward to mention Alexander, the second most important supporter of Hierax, while being silent about his foremost ally Laodike? Skepticism of Laodike's involvement in the usurpation gains further support from the above-quoted section of the inscription from Priene: this mentions 'Antiochos (Hierax) appointed by King Ptolemy (Euergetes)' as a leading official in Western Asia Minor.⁷¹ The aforementioned friendship between Hierax and Euergetes had thus started in September 246, and this certainly without the instigation of Laodike.

The only plausible solution to the problem is that Laodike had died before Hierax and Alexander usurped power. This assumption is not only fully compatible with Porphyry's account, but also matches precisely Appian's brief sketch of the dynasty's history, according to which Ptolemy had killed Laodike before the War of Brothers broke out.⁷² To date, scholars have either ignored, rejected or redated this assertion. Such a suspicion did make sense within the traditional chronological framework. According to this, the usurpation occurred after Seleukos and Euergetes had ended the war, and since the Third Syrian War lasted until 241 BC, little room was left for further hostilities between the Ptolemies and Laodike.⁷³

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However, with the new chronology established, the conflict with Sophron did offer an opportunity for Euergetes to get rid of Laodike. Sophron or Ptolemy Andromachos, who took control of Ephesos by the end of August 246,⁷⁴ could have fought against the troops loyal to the queen late in August or very early in September. This might have taken place by the walls of Ephesos; Laodike would then have been reclaiming the city with force. An alternative location would be the lower Maeander valley, which was not too far south of Ephesos. For it is in the territory of Priene that the name ‘Laodikean War’ has been attested.⁷⁵ Yet another possibility is that Sophron still had friends at the court of Sardis who could have murdered the queen soon after the execution of Danae. If a wild speculation were allowed, we might even think of her own brother Alexander. One way or another, Laodike became the victim of Ptolemaic machinations while defending the interests of her dynasty with vigour – interests that Alexander and Hierax blatantly betrayed.

There are several further conclusions to draw. We might reconsider the notion of ‘Laodikean War’. It can barely have denoted the war between Seleukos II and Euergetes (‘Third Syrian War’), as common opinion has it. Antiochos’ first wife neither brought about the conflict nor played a noticeable role once Seleukos arrived in western Asia Minor to confront the aggressor, Andromachos, in the first place. The term ‘Laodikean War’ was more likely created for the local conflict around Ephesos, in which she lost her life. At any rate, we do not have sufficient evidence to confirm that it ever became an official designation.⁷⁶

The reasons for Alexander’s and Hierax’ usurpation remain uncertain. In all likelihood, the initiative was taken by Andromachos. Even after the losses Laodike had just suffered, he was facing the counter-attack of Seleukos, whose victorious land forces would arrive within one or two weeks, while Gonatas’ fleet was aggressively reclaiming supremacy over the Aegean.⁷⁷ Ptolemy was thus in urgent need of a strong ally. He will have approached Alexander in the first place, offering him and possibly Hierax much more than they were expecting under the rule of Seleukos, most likely the control of major parts of Asia Minor. In fact, a few years later this would be the price Seleukos would pay to buy peace with his brother.⁷⁸

How, then, did Plutarch’s confusion about Laodike’s role in the usurpation come about? The latter, or an intermediary authority who was drawing on Phylarchos, would have read about the active involvement of ‘Alexander, the brother of Laodike’, as can still be found in Porphyry or, more precisely, Eusebios, quoting the latter. It is not too difficult to fathom that a quick reading can lead to the distorted recollection of Laodike as the

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instigator, especially after she had been ascribed so many other misdeeds shortly before. We cannot even exclude that Plutarch made the change deliberately, replacing the less known Alexander by his more prominent sister. At any rate, the Hierax he presents is still more a child than an adult, and identifying a plausible driving force behind his usurpation would give more credibility to Hierax' inconsistent display of brotherly love after the Battle of Ankyra.

VI. From Seleukos' defeat at Ankyra to his 'Beautiful Victory' at the Euphrates

Porphyry specifies that 20,000 troops of Seleukos were slain at Ankyra. While casualties given in myriads need to be read with some caution, the fact that the king had vanished gives further credence to the decisiveness of Mithradates' victory. Without providing these details, Justin and the *Prologi* of Trogus emphasise its importance.⁷⁹ Moreover, three anecdotes have been transmitted elsewhere that illustrate some remarkable behaviour within the broader context of the same battle. All of them further attest to the severity of Seleukos' losses. The first of them we have already touched upon: Plutarch's portrayal of Hierax' somewhat naive reaction to his brother's fate at Ankyra. He grieved when hearing about Seleukos' death and burst out in happiness when learning of his survival.⁸⁰

The other two anecdotes come from Polyainos. In one case, he reports on the fate of Seleukos' mistress Mysta:⁸¹

When Seleukos, surnamed Kallinikos, was defeated by the Gauls at Ankyra, and fell into the hands of the enemy, his wife⁸² Mysta threw aside her royal robe, put on the ragged dress of a lowly servant, and as such was sold amongst the prisoners. After having been conveyed amongst the rest of the slaves to Rhodes, there she revealed her true identity. The Rhodians immediately re-purchased her from the buyer, dressed her in a manner suitable to her rank, and conducted her to Antioch. (Transl. adapted from Attalus.org)

Apparently, Seleukos' court had been routed completely at Ankyra. And if we can rely on the information that Mysta was conducted to Antioch, it would have taken some three years for the couple to be re-united.

Given the outcome of the Battle of Ankyra, it emerges why Euergetes felt emboldened to set sail from Cyprus to Syria. Those in charge of Seleukeia-in-Pieria were quickly persuaded that, after the deaths of Seleukos and Laodike, resistance was futile. Accordingly, Euergetes received a friendly welcome in the harbour city and soon thereafter in Antioch, too. This, at least, is what he reported back to Alexandria. The Gourob Papyrus, which contains the official court version of these arrivals, will thus be

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mainly correct, except from a few deliberately misleading details.⁸³ The claim that Euergetes visited his sister in Antioch is certainly fictitious. Berenike must have been killed shortly before his arrival. But when the rumour of Seleukos' death was about to be superseded by the news of his survival and Euergetes decided to pursue him, Euergetes' further intrusion into Syria and Mesopotamia could be helped by the pretence that he was acting at the behest of the royal widow Berenike.

The moment of Seleukos' resurfacing from the dusts of the Battle of Ankyra is remembered in another anecdote told by Polyainos:⁸⁴

Seleukos, after an unsuccessful battle with the barbarians, fled towards Kilikia. To conceal himself, in those circumstances, even from his own troops, he was attended only by a few friends, and took on the appearance of the armour-bearer of Amaktion, the general of the royal forces.⁸⁵ But as soon as a sufficient number of cavalry and infantry, the shattered remains of his army, had assembled, he put his royal clothes back on, revealed himself to his army, and again put himself at their head. (Transl. adapted from Attalus.org)

Polyainos allows us to trace, if only vaguely, one stage of Seleukos' retreat. Marching into Kilikia was evidently not without risk, given that Ptolemaic forces had occupied much of it. That he still headed for Kilikia seems to reveal that he intended to reach Antioch as quickly as possible, secure the Seleukis and reorganize his forces there to return into Asia Minor.⁸⁶ But soon he would learn that Seleukeia and Antioch had fallen into Euergetes' hands. The remains of his defeated army were apparently insufficient to confront the invader directly. At least, the forces at his disposal provided him with some protection and authority on his way further east where he had better chances to recruit new troops. This would have led him through the Kilikian hinterland, which cannot yet have been firmly under Ptolemaic control. Next, it would have been obvious for him to cross the Euphrates at Zeugma as soon as possible. There he would have two alternatives: either to move through Edessa straight into Media, or to turn south-east to reach Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris. The latter option, however, was less likely, since it implied a higher risk of being intercepted by Euergetes, who had left Antioch soon after hearing of Seleukos' escape. Euergetes would probably try to confront him on his march to Babylonia, passing through either Beroia or Palmyra.⁸⁷

For a better understanding of Euergetes' actions, it would be helpful to know more precisely under which 'flag' he was campaigning. Contrary to modern opinion, his gains in Asia Minor and Syria had been in his own name, not in that of his sister or nephew. This much is clear even from Ptolemaic propaganda transmitted to us in the Gourob Papyrus and the

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Adoulis Inscription. To these can be added the semi-official version expressed in the – widely misunderstood – letter that Tlepolemos addressed to the citizens of Kildara.⁸⁸

According to the Gourob Papyrus, the peaceful handing over of Antioch was interpreted as a submission of the whole empire, including the eastern territories. One can imagine that the festive *adventus* and the council held subsequently in Antioch included public homage to Euergetes by individuals from many different provinces. Despite the document's explicit claim to the opposite, there is no reason to assume that any of the eastern satraps would have been amongst those who received him in Antioch.⁸⁹ The highest representatives of the royal administration were not expected to leave their districts.⁹⁰ It is further noteworthy that those satraps and *stratēgoi* remain without name or geographical specification, although the term satrap would normally refer to a governor of an eastern province, not of the Seleukis. What matters is that the council assembled in Antioch explicitly assumed responsibility for the whole empire (περὶ τῶν ὅλων βουλευόμενοι).⁹¹ We are certainly facing an ideological construction that reveals Euergetes' best hopes at an early stage of the campaign, but tells us little about the factual extension of his influence, let alone the reach of his army.

More detailed in geographical terms is the Adoulis inscription. It generously describes the inherited territories of Euergetes as 'the kingdom of Egypt, Libya, Syria, Phoinikia, Cyprus, Lykia, Karia and the Cyclades islands' before boasting that his own conquests put him:⁹²

in control of all the territories this side of the Euphrates and of Kilikia, Pamphylia, Ionia, the Hellespont, Thrace and of all the forces and Indian elephants in these lands, and having reduced to his obedience all the rulers in the regions, he crossed the river Euphrates, and subdued Mesopotamia and Babylonia, Sousiana, Persis, Media and all the remaining territory as far as Baktria. (Transl. adapted from Austin 2006, no. 268)

One gains the impression that, in this version, the very crossing of the Euphrates constitutes the claim over all the eastern territories.⁹³ From what else we know of his campaign, advancing to or even beyond the Tigris seems to be as much out of the question as the voluntary submission of the governors beyond the Euphrates.⁹⁴

A short version of such an 'uninhibited' piece of propaganda found its way into Polyainos' novelistic account on the death of Berenike, for it ends with an outlook on the peaceful subjection of the territory 'from the Tauros to India'. These gains, however, are styled as the result of Panariste's fabulous ruse: as the queen's female retainer, she falsely asserted her survival after her assassination in Daphne near Antioch. This stratagem

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allowed Ptolemy to send out letters in the names of both Berenike and her son to all parts of the empire. But a comparison with the documentary evidence demonstrates that the replacement of the corpse by the retainer was a later fabrication, though based on Euergetes' decision to pretend that his sister was still alive.⁹⁵ This change of his official PR version was in all likelihood due to the latest news of Seleukos' survival, which belied the condition on which Euergetes had been received into Seleukeia and Antioch. The pretence of acting also on Berenike's or her boy's behalf had at least the potential of smoothing opposition to Euergetes' illegal acquisitions in that it offered a bridge to those ready to collaborate but shrinking from outright treason (as in the case of Kildara). Otherwise, we need not assume that the fabrication found credence in Antioch, where the murders had happened publicly, or that they mattered among Seleukid loyalists, who cared as little about Berenike as about her brother. However, the invention of Panariste's ruse met with great success in the sensationalist historiography: through the pro-Ptolemaic writer Phylarchos, it reached a large audience in antiquity and beyond. While not all modern scholars were inclined to believe in the feasibility of the ruse itself, the story still seemed to confirm that Euergetes' reaction was a response to Seleukid wrongdoing, rather than a cold-blooded aggression.

At any rate, all other ancient testimonies that have come down to us show more restraint as to Euergetes' military achievements. Some of them are panegyric in nature and thus seem to go back to an official Ptolemaic version. Take, for instance, Justin's allegation *totum regnum Seleuci occupasset*. Although it sounds similar to the initial boasting, the counterfactual subjunctive indicates that this would have been the result only without the domestic insurgence in Egypt (on which see below).⁹⁶ Also the 66th poem of Catullus deserves to be taken into account, since it is closely following a now-lost love elegy for Euergetes and his wife Berenike composed by the famous courtier Kallimachos. The Latin version asserts that the intention of the campaign had been 'to pillage the Assyrians', whereas the result was the 'conquest of Asia and its addition to the territory of Egypt'. Both geographical terms are deliberately ambiguous. This said, Asia should probably be understood in the Roman sense as the province of Asia: Ephesos and Miletos were the most important gains in Ionia besides some places in Karia, whereas Kilikia had been given up to Hierax by this time.⁹⁷

More detailed is Porphyry, according to whom the initial result of the campaign was the capture of Syria, Kilikia and the upper parts of the Euphrates. To this is added 'nearly all of Asia'. The first three territories mentioned correspond to the dispositions the king made when he returned to Egypt in the spring 245, although at least a semi-independent status

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seems to be implied for Kilikia and the provinces beyond the Euphrates.⁹⁸ ‘Nearly all Asia’ is therefore less likely to be recalled by Catullus’ reference to Asia Minor, but rather Justin’s vague claim about the potential conquest of the whole Seleukid kingdom.

Brief but relatively precise appears the circumscription that Appian offers in his overview of the Seleukid dynasty: Euergetes ‘invaded Syria and advanced as far as Babylon’.⁹⁹ Babylon as the furthestmost point of his campaign seemed to be confirmed by the fact that, as early as 11 July 245, a document from Uruk mentions King Seleukos in its dating formula. Based on this evidence, the domestic revolt in Egypt, Euergetes’ withdrawal from Mesopotamia and the establishment of a certain Xanthippos as *stratēgos* (*dux*) of the provinces beyond the Euphrates, i.e. of Assyria or northern Mesopotamia, tend to be dated to spring 245.¹⁰⁰ However, the use of the source from Uruk as a *terminus ante quem* is not without difficulty: it implies that previously either Euergetes or Berenike or her son had been recognized in the area, for which view there is no positive evidence. Instead, it can be demonstrated that Seleukos had been acknowledged as king even prior to the death of Antiochos II, whereas not a single document confirms that he had ever been rejected in Babylon, let alone further south or east of it.

While, in theory, Ptolemaic control of Mesopotamia north of Babylon might have lasted a few years, the chain of events suggests that Euergetes’ presence east of the Euphrates was very short indeed. Fragments of a recently found Babylonian chronicle, which have been pre-published by B. van der Spek and I. Finkel, shed more light on the turning point of Euergetes’ campaign. The latter reached ‘[Seleukeia, the royal city on the] Euphrates and at the Canal’ as early as December 246. While the name and titulature of the city can be reconstructed with confidence due to the formulaic nature of the text, the localization of this Seleukeia is more controversial. Nearly all scholars have argued for Seleukeia-Zeugma, the most important crossing of the Euphrates in north-eastern Syria or north-western Mesopotamia respectively. However, van der Spek and Finkel have put forward strong arguments against this identification, especially the lack of a canal in the area.¹⁰¹ They argue for Sippar slightly north-west of Babylon which would have been refounded as Seleukeia under Seleukos I.¹⁰² The argument can be corroborated through further information provided in the same inscription: this Seleukeia functioned as the basis for at least two campaigns against the giant city of Babylon, to which even siege engines were transported. This would fit Sippar, but not Zeugma.¹⁰³

The inscription also mentions several military engagements within the city, extending at least from later December into February. Most

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remarkable is that the loyalists under the ‘chief guardian’ continued to hold the highly-fortified palace area, after they had also held out in the Bêlet-Ninua Citadel until mid-January. About the same time (20 January), the Egyptian prince gained access to Esagila, the most famous temple of Marduk. Since the Babylonian source is clearly anti-Ptolemaic, it is noteworthy that the extant fragments tell about rituals performed without mentioning any looting. This implies that the mission was still to take permanent possession of Babylon rather than to pillage and leave.¹⁰⁴

However, the chief guardian renewed his resistance, attacking the invaders on the very day that their commander was visiting Esagila, and once more in the course of the next month (24 Jan–22 Feb). While the chronicle emphasizes the many losses on the guardian’s side, it needs to be pointed out that the palace was held continuously, and the defeats had not discouraged further counter-attacks by the defenders.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, in the course of February, relief came from outside under the lead of a certain ‘Seleukos, the *epistatēs* (*pahat*) of Seleukeia’. As far as the remaining fragments can be reconstructed, they report one defeat of this Seleukos and yet another defeat of the troops under the guardian, while the reference to events in Seleukeia are too fragmentary to allow any certain conclusions, at least at the current stage.¹⁰⁶

Without discussion, van der Spek and Finkel take for granted that the latter city was identical with Seleukeia-Sippar, ‘the royal city on the Euphrates and at the Canal’. This is surprising in two regards. First, we would have to assume that the *epistatēs* had recovered Sippar and was then turning against the invading troops in Babylon, where, however, he failed, at least initially; alternatively, he would have fled from Euergetes in December, but two months later came to the support of the chief guardian of Babylon with his remaining or newly recruited forces. Such sequences of events cannot be ruled out, but are not very probable. Second, all three occurrences of Seleukos’ Seleukeia remain without epithet, whereas Seleukeia-Sippar is three times called ‘the royal city which is on the Euphrates’, and once with an additional reference to the canal. Terminology thus speaks against the identity of the two homonymous cities. Moreover, the area north-west of Babylon would not have been the most promising recruitment area for a local commander during the Ptolemaic occupation. I would therefore suggest that Seleukos was the *epistatēs* of Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris. It would thus appear that the city under his command was not only safe from Ptolemaic attacks, but also loyal enough to rally support for the chief guardian of Babylon.¹⁰⁷ The latter assessment seems to reflect that the satrapies east of the Tigris were stable, too, and possibly that

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further relief from Media or Persia, if not under the lead of the king himself, was to be expected soon.¹⁰⁸

At any rate, there is no indication that Euergetes himself ever made it to Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, let alone beyond that river. Nor is there any hint at collaboration with the grandees of the east. That Andragoras remains unmentioned seems to confirm the view that Seleukos had done away with him prior to his father's death. And since Euergetes could not enlist the *karanos* Arsakes or Diodotos of Baktria either, we are safe to assume that they rather sided with Seleukos.¹⁰⁹

Hence, key to understanding the king's return to power is the loyalty of most if not all of the eastern satrapies: the amount of resources that Seleukos could draw from them was sufficient to induce Euergetes to retreat.¹¹⁰ This may have been as early as mid-February or as late as autumn 245. I would suggest that it was Euergetes' fear of a direct confrontation with Seleukos that induced him to withdraw. It is easily imaginable that the new troops outnumbered those of the invader by far, so that open defeat or siege in Sippar seemed to be a realistic possibility. But even an undecided combat would have left Seleukos with the advantage of easy access to further recruits and supplies, whereas Euergetes' return to Egypt would have been like running the gauntlet. So it must have been the unexpectedly quick and powerful return of Seleukos that tipped the balance towards withdrawal, rather than the uprising in Egypt, however important it may have been.¹¹¹ Once the decision had been made, the areas that could not be held were plundered mercilessly. Porphyry (Jerome) specifies the harvest of this raid as 40,000 talents of silver and 2,500 valuable objects such as vases and sculptures, an amount which may have included also the booty from Kilikia and Syria.¹¹²

Further revealing is the report of Porphyry (Jerome) on the strategic dispositions Euergetes made at his departure: 'And Syria, at any rate, he maintained himself, but Kilikia he gave to rule to his friend Antiochos, and to Xanthippos, the other leader, the provinces beyond the Euphrates'.¹¹³ Based on the evidence of Porphyry (Eusebios) and the inscription of Priene, it has been argued above that this Antiochos is none other than Hierax, who had previously cooperated with Ptolemy Andromachos in western Asia Minor. That Porphyry concedes Antiochos the title *philos* reveals a certain degree of independence. In fact, he based his claim to rule on his royal descent. The notion that Euergetes effectively gave up on Kilikia is also implied in the antithetic statement that he kept Syria for himself: given that he did not remain in Antioch either but moved on to Alexandria, there is clearly a different kind of sovereignty implied. One may well assume that he left behind a *stratēgos* also for Syria, who remains unnamed.¹¹⁴

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As regards 'the other leader' Xanthippos: his position appears to have been somehow detached from the king, too. Possibly he was a former Seleukid official who had changed sides for personal advancement. Thus he would have been a good candidate first to support the invasion of Euergetes and then to lead the defence against Seleukos.¹¹⁵ In all likelihood, Xanthippos tried to fortify the valley of the middle Euphrates from Sippar up to Zeugma and was also given control of a major part of north-eastern Syria to supply his garrisons. But the organization of such a defence line would have needed more time and resources, if indeed it was designed to become a permanent bulwark against Seleukos. Ultimately, Xanthippos did no more than buy Euergetes time for an orderly retreat of the camel caravans richly laden with booty.

At all events, Seleukos must have defeated Xanthippos either later in 245 or in the first half of 244. This was the 'Beautiful Victory' that regained him access to Syria and won him the acclamation *Kallinikos*.¹¹⁶ Direct evidence for the motivation of the cognomen is no longer extant, but the *Chronicon Paschale* reports the foundation of the city of Kallinikos by Seleukos Kallinikos in Mesopotamia around 244. Since this city maintained strategic and administrative importance until the Byzantine period, it can be identified with the Umayyad re-foundation Ar-Raqqah on the Euphrates, about 160 km east of Aleppo.¹¹⁷

VII. The second phase of the War of Brothers: from the fight for Syria to the assumption of the diadem by Hierax

The location of Kallinikos is of some importance for the further development of the conflicts. On the one hand, it was still at some distance from Zeugma, which lay on the most direct road to the royal cities of the Seleukis; on the other hand, it provided access to southern Seleukis and thus to the northern boundaries of Ptolemaic Phoenicia. Without substantial reinforcements, the progress of Seleukos into Syria could not be stopped. This was probably the occasion when Euergetes decided to concentrate his available forces near the re-emerging frontier along the Eleutheros River.¹¹⁸ It would be a plausible assumption that, to this aim, his troops evacuated Seleukis, certainly not without carrying away tons of loot, before allowing Hierax to take possession of the area. Hierax was well positioned in Kilikia where he seems to have gained the support of Armenia and Cappadocia as well. The fresh troops he could bring into Syria from Asia Minor, together with the dynastic prestige that Euergetes was lacking in the area, would enable Hierax to halt Seleukos' further progress for about two years.

There is a possible alternative to this reconstruction: Seleukos might

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have taken back the Seleukis swiftly from Euergetes (with the exception of Seleukeia and Orthosia); he could then have taken his land forces against his brother in Kilikia, while attacking Euergetes with a new-built fleet; if so, he would have failed on both fronts. But the random evidence we have for Arados seems to speak against this view (see below). In addition, we should keep in mind that Euergetes was weak in mustering and supplying large-scale armies. This shortcoming explains why he had to cede Kilikia to Hierax in the first place, and likewise telling will be Justin's explanation of the end of the war: with Hierax changing sides, Euergetes' defence lines crumbled nearly immediately. Against this background, the subsequent attempt at a reconstruction of the history of Syria from 244 to 241 will be based on the plausible, though ultimately unproven, assumption that Euergetes ceded at least Seleukis, if not a larger part of Syria as far south as Arados, to Hierax; this way, he secured the retreat of his followers laden with booty.

No consistent narrative of this phase of the war has come down to us. Justin's (fanciful) account of the Third Syrian War entirely omits Hierax' presence in Syria. But the latter seems to be implied in Strabo's report on Arados. For the geographer mentions that Arados opted for Seleukos when having to choose between the two brothers.¹¹⁹ Various suggestions for the history of this Phoenician harbour city during the Second and Third Syrian Wars have been made. They are all based on the assumption that the civic era of Arados begins with year 259/58, although it is admitted that the first autonomous coin types were issued only in 243/42. The role of Hierax could, however, not be understood adequately, since his potential influence was dated only after 241. Within the framework of the revised chronology, a more convincing outline may now look as follows: Arados had been granted far-reaching autonomy by Antiochos II in 259/58, which was subsequently respected also by Euergetes, Hierax and Seleukos. This allowed the Aradians to avoid a specific commitment during the first years of the war, but to opt openly for Seleukos once he had returned into the area in 244 or 243. It is to be assumed that a parcel of further privileges went along with this choice.¹²⁰

Especially, the peculiar grant of *asylia* to the city attested by Strabo fits much better into the new chronological framework. Seleukos promised to respect the safety of all refugees in Arados, but in return it was conceded that none of them was to leave the narrow confines of the city (which was in fact an island) without his explicit permission. Such conditions would have been of little benefit, if indeed the War of Brothers had been opened only after the peace with Euergetes, for the new conflict would not have affected Syria directly. Given Seleukos' defeat at Ankyra (traditionally dated

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to 241 or later) and his previous failure to seize further cities in Asia Minor, there would have been no need for the elites attached to Hierax to emigrate; at the same time, seeking protection from Seleukos in his immediate vicinity would have been absurd. The fugitives mentioned by Strabo rather came from among the compromised elites of Syria, especially Antioch. Offering such a safe haven would weaken the support for Hierax in Seleukis as much as it would strengthen the cause of Seleukos. In addition, if the refugees opted for Arados rather than Euergetes' or Hierax' dominions, a reconciliation with Seleukos and thus an eventual return home (as mentioned by Strabo), would be more likely.¹²¹

It cannot be decided, however, whether the formal agreement with Arados preceded or post-dated Seleukos' return to Antioch. Justin's account is once more of little help. He speaks of a naval campaign against the cities that had defected, which, on the one hand, resulted in shipwreck, but, on the other, led up to a voluntary submission of the cities 'out of pity'. Whether the king's 'return' to Antioch thereafter is to be understood literally, i.e. that Antioch had been the starting point of this campaign, or if Justin simply assumes that Seleukos had resided in Antioch prior to the defection of the cities to Euergetes, remains open, too.¹²² Given the traces of Seleukos' re-conquests that we have so far identified, one may at least hypothesize as follows: he moved northwards from Arados by land and sea, gradually regained Laodikeia, Apameia and Antioch, but then suffered a shipwreck, so that Seleukeia could not be taken back.¹²³ At any rate, Hierax seems to have held a firm grip on the main royal residence for about two or three years, thus until 243 or even 242. This reconstruction would make him a viable candidate also for authorizing the highly controversial *Antiochos Soter* coinage (unless we ascribe it to his father Antiochos II). The traditional motifs struck onto the coins and the general trend of commemorating deceased Seleukid kings would certainly align well with Hierax' later coinage in Asia Minor, and the avoidance of his own portrait would reflect the anomalous situation that, as a ruler of minor age and acting at least partly under the authority of Ptolemy Euergetes, he did not yet bear the royal title.¹²⁴

This title he would only assume in a later phase of the war, when he had lost all his stakes in Syria. Once again, it is Polyainos who provides us with further information: after suffering defeats in Mesopotamia and Armenia, Hierax' soldiers pretended that he had died and offered to surrender their camp; the persecutors ceased being cautious and were thus trapped and defeated. The episode ends as follows: 'But Antiochos showed himself bestowing the royal symbol on himself (σχῆμα τὸ βασιλικὸν ἀναλαβὼν), demonstrating that he was alive and victorious'. Based on Justin's confused

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series of events, this battle has traditionally been dated close to the end of Hierax' life.¹²⁵ As a result of this apparent misdating,¹²⁶ little attention has been paid to the bestowal of the diadem.¹²⁷ Its full implication only emerges in its effective chronological context around 242: Hierax had, after a couple of setbacks, re-asserted his position, and decided to have himself acclaimed king at the age of ca. 18 years. The beginning of the anecdote helps us to further define the context:

After having revolted, Antiochos, the brother of Seleukos, fled into Mesopotamia; Arsames, since he was his friend, received him, when he was marching through the mountains of the Armenians from there. The *stratēgoi* of Seleukos Achaïos and Andromachos chased him with a strong army.

The initial march into Mesopotamia seems to have happened when Hierax was in possession of his dominions in Asia Minor and continued to enjoy the loyalty of Arsames of Armenia. The most convincing situation would have been around 243 when he was still in control of Antioch and other parts of northern Syria; he would have been trying to cut Seleukos off from his supplies that were coming in through Mesopotamia. In hindsight, one may well interpret this bold attempt at halting his brother's further progress into the Seleukis as flight. But in the case of his effective defeat in Syria, he would probably have withdrawn into Kilikia rather than into Mesopotamia. At any rate, Seleukos sent his most experienced generals, who, as members of the royal family, would also counteract Hierax' dynastic claims in Mesopotamia.¹²⁸ Seleukos himself could now slowly proceed towards Antioch. News of Hierax' defeat in Mesopotamia, in combination with the offer of exile to Arados for those who had compromised themselves, would ease the surrender of the royal city by 242.

So far, Seleukos had come a long way: he had regained Mesopotamia and occupied most of Seleukid Syria. But it appears that the defeat of his troops in Armenia and the loss of his fleet off Laodikeia or Seleukeia meant major setbacks very soon thereafter. It is easy to imagine that Euergetes responded with increased pressure on the coastal cities. This was the time to buy peace from Hierax by acknowledging his royal status and supremacy over Asia Minor. I would question Justin's allegation of an active cooperation between the brothers, and suggest that Hierax tried to maintain neutrality instead. At least, there is no evidence that he attacked Ptolemaic positions in Asia Minor.¹²⁹ This notwithstanding, the agreement allowed Seleukos to concentrate his forces on southern Syria and press into the Ptolemaic Kingdom. As Seleukos' last military operations, Porphyry reports that he laid siege not only to Orthosia, which is just north of the Eleutheros River, but also to Damascus, which is much farther to the south, in the Syrian

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hinterland, where Seleukos was apparently prevailing. This discrepancy seems to reflect well that Euergetes had been able to defend his naval supremacy, which slowed down Seleukos' progress along the Levantine coast.

Justin may at least be right that it was Euergetes who sued for peace.¹³⁰ In all likelihood, the latter offered to end all hostile naval operations in return for Seleukos' withdrawal from the territories south of the Eleutheros, while otherwise respecting the status quo. Seleukos must have seen the risk of over-exploiting his subjects by prolonging this costly war.¹³¹ And perhaps he was not certain either about the worth of the peace with his brother. So he was ready to accept the offer, despite the painful loss of Seleukeia-in-Pieria. He understood that, in the near future, he would not be able to compete with the Ptolemaic fleet, while further gains in Koile Syria would have to be paid for by ongoing raids on the Syrian coasts. As a result, ending the war was in the interest of both kings in 242/241.

VIII. Digression: the War of Brothers in Asia Minor

After analysing the impact of the Battle of Ankyra, our attention has shifted away from western and northern Asia Minor, partly because the main confrontations happened further to the east, partly because the current source basis prevents us from writing a coherent narrative of the Greek cities and principalities of Asia Minor between 246 and the accession of Antiochos III.¹³² In what follows, at least a few spotlights will be thrown on the more active players, with no claim to completeness. The problematic alliance of Hierax with the Tolistobogioi and the Bithynian King Ziaelas, whose daughter he married, as well as the uncertain roles of Eumenes and Attalos of Pergamon will be omitted here, as their treatment would mainly be based on the evidence for the wars that took place after the end of the Third Syrian War. Their study would exceed the scope of the present paper.¹³³

Let us start with Mithradates II who brought about the first major defeat of Seleukos probably late in September 246. Hierax or Alexander cannot have had much to do with his involvement, since they were so much at the losing end that they would have little to offer. Thus either Ptolemaic diplomacy was reaching as far as Pontos, or Mithradates took the initiative himself. It is telling that he is never mentioned among the allies of Hierax or Euergetes, whether before or after 241, although in the later course of his rule, Hierax held hostage the young daughter of Mithradates II for whatever reason.¹³⁴ In a different context, Justin claims that Seleukos Kallinikos offered the hand of his sister Laodike to Mithradates, adding Eastern Phrygia as a dowry.¹³⁵ Previous scholarship has wrestled not only with the date, but also with identifying the relative of Laodike responsible

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for marrying her off. But the tradition can be trusted: Seleukos' active role implies a date between 246 and 242. Most likely would be the time after his return into Syria when he was trying to increase the pressure on Hierax. The support of Pontos and the Tektosages could be enrolled at an affordable price: the concession of an undetermined chunk of Phrygia which was out of his own reach anyway. The peace with Hierax in 242 or by 241 would be the *terminus ante quem*, for otherwise Seleukos would have impinged on the agreement with his brother.¹³⁶ And as to the king of Cappadocia, he probably decided to establish more friendly terms with Seleukos, when Hierax was returning from Armenia. This at least is a more likely context for Ariamenes' attempt to plot against him than in the 220s, when Hierax was unlikely to return to eastern Asia Minor.¹³⁷

As regards Lykia and Karia, we can assume that most of these areas remained under Ptolemaic control. A leading position was held by Tlepolemos of Xanthos, who has been mentioned before in the context of the treason committed by Kildara. Ptolemy of Telmessos, a relative of Euergetes, may well have been active beyond his own city of residence.¹³⁸ However, thanks to the decision of Olympichos of Alinda, major parts of north-western Karia were regained for Seleukos, including Mylasa and Labraunda, most probably in 244. It is in fact unclear how he behaved after the brothers had made peace. There is no evidence for a conflict with, or subjugation to, Hierax. A high degree of autonomy he seems to have held also under Antigonid rule which started in 227. Olympichos' attitude in this critical year will have been important to everyone involved, but it cannot be specified with any certainty.¹³⁹

Among the most important allies of Seleukos were the citizens of Smyrna. This can be deduced from a very detailed decree regulating their *sympoliteia* with Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos and the adjacent garrison colony of Old Magnesia. Very explicitly, this political unification was styled as a measure to overcome local hostilities by choosing joint citizenship under the overall rule of Seleukos.¹⁴⁰ The same document states that Smyrna showed allegiance to the king at two different times when he crossed into Seleukis.¹⁴¹ The first occasion must have been when he returned from Babylon after his father's death in 246, the second time followed the 'Beautiful Victory' in 245 or 244. While previous scholarship assumed that Magnesia had been under Ptolemaic control, Ihnken proposed that it had chosen the side of Hierax. Since the latter fled to Magnesia after his defeat by his brother in September 246, Ihnken's suggestion is much more likely, although his argument is based on several difficult premises.¹⁴²

Smyrna's political decisions can now be contextualized within a chronologically coherent narrative. The city's initiative seems to reflect

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Hierax' absence in the east (probably together with a strong Tolistobogian contingent), whereas Ptolemy Andromachos does not seem to have commanded sufficient troops to control the hinterland of the Ionian coast. At any rate, Seleukos reacted to this welcome support of his cause with a declaration of freedom, tax exemption and *asylia* to both the city of Smyrna and its temple of Aphrodite Stratonikis in 244 or 243. While we do not hear anything further from the city under either brother's rule, it is likely that even Hierax was supposed to respect this freedom. Whether he did so, is of course a different matter.¹⁴³

More controversial is the case of Miletos. It is only certain that this city was very quick to react with homage after Seleukos had become king. Traditionally, the honorary decree of the Milesians has been dated shortly after Antiochos' death. However, our only source, Seleukos' friendly reply, which was inscribed at Didyma, does not allow us to exclude a slightly earlier date following Seleukos' appointment as co-ruling king around June 246. It appears more certain that the correspondence was composed before the king received news of the outbreak of the 'Laodikean War', although this view is controversial, too.¹⁴⁴ Some scholars claim that, despite the exchange of such flatteries, Miletos did not hesitate to go over by the end of 246, as it had done in 279, despite the high regard in which it was held by the Seleukids. But the vague boasting of the abovementioned Adoulis Inscription, which counts Ionia among Euergetes' conquests, has very little weight in this discussion. Rather it seems that the city gradually regained effective autonomy, while two Seleukid parties and the Ptolemies paralyzed each other for a couple of years.¹⁴⁵

A final note is owed to the dossier which assembles the letters recognizing the *asylia* of Kos in the summer or autumn of 242.¹⁴⁶ While there is relatively little controversy as to the documents composed at the courts of Ziaelas of Bithynia, Ptolemy Euergetes of Egypt and Eumenes (or Attalos) of Pergamon, the one so far ascribed to Seleukos needs to be reconsidered. The text implies that the author (whose name is lost) ruled somewhere over western Asia Minor. The attribution to Seleukos is based on the assumption that a) he still ruled over the area in 242, b) he visited this part of his kingdom in the same year, and c) Hierax' rule only started later.¹⁴⁷ However, all three conditions have been shown above to be erroneous: Hierax usurped power over some western parts of Asia Minor in 246, moved eastwards in 245 and returned to Ionia after assuming the diadem in Armenia around 242. Seleukos, in contrast, was operating in Syria that year; whether or not he was also approached by the Koans to endorse their *asylia* remains open. At any rate, opting for Hierax would also explain the stylistic discrepancies as compared to the letters by Antiochos II and Seleukos.¹⁴⁸

*The War of Brothers, the Third Syrian War, and the Battle of Ankyra***IX. Results: revised chronology of Seleukos' wars with Euergetes and Hierax**

The preceding investigation has tried to demonstrate that the Third Syrian War resulted mainly from three factors: the sudden death of Antiochos II, the absence from Ionia of Seleukos and a large part of the army, and Euergetes' desire for military glory and territorial expansion. The defection of Sophron in July or early August 246 accelerated the Ptolemaic attack on Asia Minor, which however would have been likely to happen anyway. Within a few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, Laodike had been killed and the Seleukid grip on Western Asia Minor was shattered. At the same time, the Ptolemies lost the advantage of the newly-gained Ephesian fleet nearly immediately with Antigonos Gonatas' naval victory at Andros in August. When Seleukos was returning westwards unexpectedly, immediate reinforcements were necessary to retain Ephesos. Ptolemy Andromachos won over Laodike's brother Alexander, who was then *stratēgos* based in Sardis, and with him the young prince Antiochos Hierax. This coup notwithstanding, Seleukos curbed their revolt by the end of September, but instead of bringing about their surrender, he had to abort his campaign upon notice of the invasion of Eastern Phrygia (and perhaps also Kilikia).

Having turned east, he was attacked by Mithradates II of Pontos and the Galatian Tektosages. He suffered the most crushing defeat of his life, was reported dead himself, but still managed to escape into Syria and hence into Mesopotamia. The notice of his defeat was of the utmost benefit to Euergetes, who could then negotiate a peaceful reception in Seleukeia-in-Pieria and Antioch-on-the-Orontes in October. By the time of Euergetes' arrival, Seleukid loyalists had done away with his sister Berenike and her son, preventing them from serving Euergetes as puppet rulers. They effectively became relevant for his campaign only after their death, when it became known in Antioch that Seleukos had survived and escaped. From then on, the king of Egypt had to pursue him quickly, hoping that his march eastwards would be aided by spreading news of the survival of his sister. Early in December, he reached Seleukeia-Sippar on the Euphrates, and a few weeks later, his troops began fighting within the city of Babylon.

Despite serious losses, the Seleukid commander-in-chief of Babylon held out in loyalty and effective relief probably came in from Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris in the later course of winter. At the same time, Seleukos had gathered a new army, with which he pursued the retreating invaders. By the end of the summer of 245, Euergetes may have been back to Egypt, having ceded Kilikia to Hierax, who was supported by Tolistobogian allies. Xanthippos had the task of hindering Seleukos' return into Syria, but was defeated on the Euphrates probably later in 245. By 244, Seleukos was

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back in the Levant, operating in the southern parts of Seleukis (around Arados), whence he slowly worked his way through to Antioch by 242.

His main opponent of those years was Hierax, who had been called into Antioch by Euergetes after the defeat of Xanthippos. In 243 or 242, Hierax took the war into northern Mesopotamia, but was defeated and retreated back into Asia Minor. After managing to slaughter his pursuers in Armenia, he assumed the diadem for the first time. Seleukos, who was then in possession of Antioch, but had lost his fleet before being able to recapture Seleukeia-in-Pieria, decided that a compromise with his brother was needed to finally overcome Euergetes. He bought peace from Hierax by acknowledging his royal rule over Asia Minor in 242 or 241, which allowed him to march all his available troops into Koile-Syria. This move induced Euergetes to offer peace on the basis of the status quo.

Both the Third Syrian War and the War of Brothers had thus begun in 246 and ended by 241. There is no evidence for further military conflicts between Seleukos and Hierax or Euergetes respectively. As a result, the history of the remaining years of those kings will also have to be rewritten (see below, section X, for an outline).

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Appendix: revised chronicle for the years 253 to 226

By 253/252: Antiochos II prevailed over Ptolemy Philadelphos in the Second Syrian War. The marriage with Berenike sealed the peace treaty, whereby the enormous dowry served as a disguised war indemnity; Ptolemy was not able to insist that Seleukos divorce Laodike or disinherit his sons from her.

252–246: Philadelphos persistently worked towards weakening the Antigonid grip on central and southern Greece and re-establishing Ptolemaic thalassocracy in the Aegean and possibly in the south-western parts of the Black Sea.

247/46: Seleukos II was sent at the head of strong military forces to fight the usurper Andragoras in Parthia. The latter was also attacked by Arsakes, leader of the Parnians, who became *karanos* (*stratēgos*) of Parthia; Andragoras was soon defeated.

246: Philadelphos' death in January 246 delayed the planned naval campaign in the Aegean, but, in the summer of 246, his son and successor Ptolemy Euergetes was waiting on Cyprus for an opportunity to strike.

246: In spring, Antiochos decided to appoint Seleukos as his co-ruler; he was proclaimed king in Babylon later in July. It is possible, though by no means certain, that, around the same time, Antiochos acclaimed Laodike *basilissa*, thus empowering her to rule the court in case of his own or his son's absence.

246: Probably in early or mid-July, Antiochos died in Ephesos; he was reported dead in Babylon in the course of September.

246: Still in July, Laodike moved the court back to Sardis. She soon suspected the *stratēgos* Sophron of conspiring with Euergetes or the latter's admiral in the Aegean, Ptolemy Andromachos. Her attempt to trap him failed due to the betrayal of Danae, who was immediately executed.

246: By the beginning of August, Sophron had escaped to Ephesos and, together with the city and the fleet, he openly went over to the Ptolemies. Andromachos launched an attack in southern Thrace (thereby killing the dynast Adaios), while Sophron fell upon the fleet of the former ally Gonatas in Samos. When the latter prevailed unexpectedly, Andromachos quickly retreated from Samos to take control of Ephesos no later than September.

246: In August or September, the Ptolemaic *stratēgos* of Karia, Tlepolemos, extended his control over some Seleukid places: Kildara went over to him voluntarily, while Mylasa may well have been conquered around the same time.

246: In August or early in September, Laodike died, either through machinations of Sophron or in the context of an open war ('Laodikian War') that she waged to recapture Ephesos or to curb further Ptolemaic encroachments on Seleukid territory.

246: After news of Sophron's cooperation with Andromachos had reached Euergetes in Cyprus, he ordered the invasion of Kilikia, where the satrap Artabazos was killed later in August.

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246: In the face of Sophron's defeat and Seleukos' near arrival, Andromachos was in urgent need of allies to maintain old and new Ptolemaic acquisitions in the west. Perhaps early in September, he won over Alexander, Laodike's brother, and through him her younger son Antiochos Hierax, aged 14. In all likelihood, he promised them the control of all remaining Seleukid possessions in Asia Minor as a reward for collaboration.

246: In September, Seleukos arrived in Lydia, but was excluded from Sardis by Alexander. Hierax was staying in a garrison outside the walls. He was defeated and possibly pursued by Seleukos, but escaped to Magnesia-at-the-Sipylus.

246 In the course of September, Mithridates II invaded the Ankyra region (with Galatian Tektosages), possibly to relieve Hierax and Andromachos. Seleukos now had two urgent reasons to abort his campaign in the west and decided to deal with Kilikia only after putting down Mithradates. But the king of Pontos managed to destroy his army (20,000 victims are reported) and even sack his court (his concubine Mysta was sold into slavery). Seleukos was thought to have been killed, but escaped via Kilikia, northern Syria and Mesopotamia into Media.

246: Early in October, Euergetes heard about Seleukos' defeat and immediately set course to Seleukeia-in-Pieria. Berenike and her son were likely under house arrest since the conflict with Sophron had broken out, but were murdered by Seleukid loyalists once news of Euergetes' operations in Kilikia or Syria reached Antioch. But rumours of Seleukos' death undermined further resistance. Euergetes was received as the new king in Seleukeia and in Antioch. But when it was becoming clear that Seleukos had survived, Euergetes pretended that Berenike was still alive, to facilitate his further campaigns.

246: In December, Euergetes' troops arrived first in Seleukeia-Sippar and next in Babylon, where loyalist troops were resisting under the 'chief guardian'.

245: In January, the acropolis and the temple of Marduk were lost to the invaders, who had been reinforced by a 'prince' of Egypt, but the guardian continued to hold the royal palace.

245: In February, the loyalists were relieved through forces under Seleukos, the commander (*pahat*) of Seleukeia (-on-the-Tigris?). The defenders suffered further setbacks, but the Ptolemaic forces never gained full control of Babylon.

245: Between February and summer 245, Euergetes decided to retreat from Babylonia, from which point his campaign turned into a raid. One may doubt that the uprising in Upper Egypt was the only reason. More likely, Seleukos was approaching with a strong army gathered in the Upper Satrapies. Euergetes left behind Xanthippos as *stratēgos* (?) of the provinces beyond the Euphrates, which probably relates to the north-western parts of Mesopotamia from where access into Syria and Armenia was to be blocked. Kilikia was entrusted to his 'friend Antiochos' (Hierax). He was hoping to keep Syria for himself.

245/244: Seleukos achieved the 'Beautiful Victory' over Xanthippos which yielded

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him both his cognomen 'Kallinikos' and access to Syria. The city of Kallinikos (Ar-Raqqah) was founded on the Euphrates.

245/244: Once it became clear that Seleukos was returning into Syria, Euergetes called Hierax into the Seleukis, hoping that his descent and fresh troops from Asia Minor might halt the progress of Seleukos. Euergetes kept Seleukeia-in-Pieria and possibly also southern Syria, while Hierax took control of Antioch and probably most other cities in north-western Syria.

245/243: Hierax may have fortified Antioch, profiting from the alliance with Ptolemaic Seleukeia and the resources coming from nearby Kilikia. Still a teenager, he abstained from the royal title and issued coins with motifs celebrating the ancestors of his dynasty.

244/43: Seleukos gradually moved into Syria, trying to win over as many cities with as little violence as possible. While the northern coastal area was inaccessible at first, he probably reached the Mediterranean shore for the first time in Arados, which voluntarily opted for him.

244: Smyrna had so far resisted the Ptolemies and Hierax; upon hearing of Seleukos' return into Syria, it took his side openly. *Sympoliteia* was offered to the citizens of Magnesia-at-the-Sipylos and a garrison established at Old Magnesia as a prize for changing sides.

244: Around this time, Olympichos from Alinda in northern Karia also showed open support for Seleukos, receiving the order to 'free' Mylasa (and Labraunda) from Ptolemaic control.

244/242: The allegiance of most other cities of Asia Minor remains uncertain. Miletos slipped into independence; Pergamon remained in a 'splendid isolation' under Eumenes I.

246?/227?: Sardis probably continued to be controlled by Alexander and Ephesos by Andromachos, although it is unclear if they outlived the year 246. Andromachos was assassinated in Ephesos, either soon after the Battle of Andros or only in the 220s in the context of Antigonid intrusions into Asia Minor. Ephesos remained Ptolemaic until its reconquest by Antiochos III in 197.

244/243: Hierax continued to control Kilikia and most of Seleukis, enjoying the support of the Tolistobogioi and possibly of the kings of Cappadocia and Armenia, too. His marriage with the daughter of Ziaelas of Bithynia also seems to date to these years.

244/242: Seleukos actively wooed kings and dynasts in Asia Minor, to exert pressure on Hierax. He married off his sister Laodike to Mithradates II of Pontos, granting him the possession of Phrygia as a 'dowry'.

243/242: Philetairos, *hēgemōn* of Cretan mercenaries, and Dionysios of Lysimacheia, possibly a leader of a Thracian contingent, are attested among Hierax' forces during the invasion of Mesopotamia. This was less likely the result of his flight

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from Syria than a bold attempt to cut Seleukos from his power base. However, he was beaten by Achaïos and Andromachos, brothers of Queen Laodike and the traitor Alexander. Despite his flight, King Arsames of Armenia was still friendly to him, but Seleukos' generals defeated Hierax again. He overcame his pursuers through a ruse. In his victory celebration, he assumed the diadem and was hailed king, aged around 18. He then returned to Kilikia.

243/242: Seleukos gained control of Antioch and other parts of Seleukis except Seleukeia-in-Pieria. His fleet was wrecked through storm.

242/241: The recent setbacks taught Seleukos that a compromise with Hierax was required to overcome Euergetes. By acknowledging his brother as king of Asia Minor, he reduced the costs of securing the northern frontiers of his kingdom, while Euergetes had to invest more in maintaining his holdings in Asia Minor. There are no clear indications regarding the conditions of Smyrna and Mylasa or the allegiance of Olympichos after the agreement. It is likely that they maintained a high degree of autonomy.

By 241: Seleukos recovered Syria except Seleukeia-in-Pieria. Operations along the coast went more slowly than deeper inland, so that he was laying siege simultaneously to Orthosia just north of the Eleutheros River and to Damascus deep in Koile Syria. Euergetes offered peace, probably on the basis of the status quo, if not allowing Seleukos some further gains in northern Koile Syria in return for Seleukeia-in-Pieria and Ephesos.

Outlook

240–227: It appears that Hierax maintained peace with his brother for the rest of his lifetime. Initially, Kilikia and Lydia will have been the centres of his power, whereby the Bithynians and at times also the Tolistobogioi allied with him. He worked successfully towards extending his rule into Ionia, Aiolis and Mysia as well as into southern and western Phrygia, while eastern Phrygia (later 'Galatia') remained under Tolistobogian and Tektosagan (or Pontic) control. Conflicts with Attalos I of Pergamon may date rather late, and seem to have brought about his downfall, when Euergetes (or Andromachos, if still alive) refused to support him. The condition of Seleukid possessions in Thrace after 246 remains uncertain, but Hierax' hopes to find there a safe haven when escaping from Attalos were not fulfilled. His murderers, however, may have been from among his own Galatian mercenaries.¹⁴⁹

241–225: Whether or not Seleukos and Euergetes had really intended to uphold the peace for long, may well be doubted. But apparently both had to consolidate their kingdoms, and having overstrained their subjects, revolts in Upper Egypt as well as in Parthia and Baktريا respectively (plus one in Antioch around 238)¹⁵⁰ should not have come as a surprise.

226/25: According to Justin, Seleukos died by falling from a horse. This report was designed to vilify the king, but it is nevertheless indicative of his relentless efforts to regain lost parts of the realm.¹⁵¹

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¹ Cf. Holton (in this volume) for a sophisticated argument on the traditional view of a revolt of Seleukos the Son. However, according to Del Monte 1995 (cf. idem 1997, 37; 228; Savalli-Lestrade 2003, 73), the eldest son of Antiochos I never revolted against his father nor was he executed, but rather fell terminally ill. His brother Antiochos II was thus appointed co-ruling king prior to his death. This created the rule of three kings for the transitional period 268 to 266. Cf. also Corsten 1997 ad *I.Laodikeia* no. 1 for the complex evidence, though not yet with this solution.

² For the traditional chronology, cf., e.g., Jacoby on *FGrH* 260 F 32.8, p. 870; Dodd 2009, 73; Kosmin 2014, 19; for more references, see below, n. 55 f. Occasionally, however, the beginning of Hierax' rule in Asia Minor, whether peaceful or violent, is dated to sometime between 246 and 242, though never with a consistent argument; see below, n. 39.

³ Main sources: *P.Gourab* = *FGrH* 160 = Piejko, *APF* 36, 1990, 13–15 = Austin² 266 on Kilikia and Seleukis; Adoulis Inscription = *OGIS* 54 = Austin² 268, listing nearly all parts of the Seleukid Empire (but cf. Hauben 1990, 30–2 on Babylon as the farthest point; differently Otto 1928, 51); on Kildara and Mylasa in Karia see below, nn. 6 and 25. Cf. also Just. 27.1; Polyæn. 8.50; Hieron. in *Dan.* 11.6–9 = Porphyr. *Contra Christianos*, *FGrH* 260 F 43. On the Babylonian sources for the death of Antiochos, the succession of Seleukos as well as the arrival and withdrawal of Euergetes, see below, VI. On the speed of Euergetes' campaign, see below, n. 14. More recently, another inscription was found in El-Khazindariya near Alexandria, the tri-lingual 'Synodaldekret' of Alexandria (i.e. decree of the priest council) dated to 17 Sep. 243 (ed. princeps and German translation by el-Masry, Altenmüller, and Thissen 2012, 153); it describes the splendour of the booty Euergetes brought home from 'both Retenu, Charu (= Syria), Chereg, Seger and Susa'. I would like to thank C. Lorber for bringing this document to my attention.

⁴ According to Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43 ll. 11 f., Laodike was repudiated together with her sons, but later became a *concubina*; this demotion is completely isolated in the ancient record. By stressing the young age of the son of Berenike, the pro-Ptolemaic account of Polyæn. 8.50 ultimately confirms that Antiochos never challenged Seleukos' role as his crown prince. With the exception of Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 90, Laodike's disgrace was accepted almost universally, e.g., by Bevan 1902b, 158; Macurdy 1932, 83; Hölbl 1994/2001, 42; Kobes 1996, 137 f.; Ogden 1999, 128: 'he constrained Antiochos II by war to marry his daughter Berenice "Phernophoros" and to divorce Laodice and reduce her to the status of concubine'; Huss 2001, 338 f.; Errington 2008, 120. This view has recently been contested by Martinez-Sève 2002/3, 693–7; 701 f. and Coşkun 2016a, 112–8.

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⁵ Phylarch. *FGrH* 81 F 24; App. *Syr.* 65.344 f.; Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43 ll. 14 f.: *quae metuens ambigui viri animum, ne Berenicen reduceret, virum per ministros veneno interfecit*. However, a natural death is implied in the Armenian version of Porphyrus's *Chronicle*, *FGrH* 260 F 32.6 (sickness) as well as in Trog. *prol.* 27; Polyæn. 8.50; Val. Max. 9.10 ext. 1. Just. 27.1.1 alone blames Seleukos for the murder of Berenike and her son, though he is said to have been encouraged to this deed by his mother. For an in-depth discussion of the representation of Laodike in ancient historiography, cf. Coşkun 2016a.

⁶ *I.Kildara* = Blümel, *EA* 20, 1992, 127–33 = *SEG* 42.994 = Gauthier, *BE* 1994, 571–3 no. 528 = Austin² 267. The boy's designation as king by Antiochos II or his proclamation by Berenike is believed, e.g., by Bevan 1902b, 181; Otto 1928, 52 f.; Will 1979, I 249; Blümel 1992; Sartre 1995, 27; Shipley 2000, 289; Huß 2001, 338–40; Houghton and Lorber I.1, 2002, 225–7; Savalli-Lestrade 2003, 75; Grainger 2010, 150; 155 f.; McAuley 2011 f. s.v. Antiochos II.

⁷ Cf. Coşkun 2016a, 128–30. We cannot even be absolutely sure that Antiochos was the boy's name and not a (fictitious) throne name.

⁸ Cf. Coşkun 2016a, 112–22, with in-depth discussion.

⁹ The challenges to Seleukid rule in the eastern satrapies are currently a major focus of scholarly attention. According to the traditional views (as still prevalent, e.g., in Kosmin 2014, 19), secessions began under Antiochos II and attempts at redressing the balance of power were either short-lived or complete failures. Such pessimistic verdicts are now yielding to more nuanced arguments. However, recent attempts to date the revolt of Andragoras to the beginning of the Third Syrian War (e.g., Coloru 2009, 157–63; Plischke 2014, esp. 228 f.) do not convince: their chronological premises (two phases of the War of Brothers 241–236 / 230–228/27 framing Seleukos' failed eastern campaign) are no longer tenable. The late date further ignores the relevance of the beginning of the Arsakid era on the 1st Nisan 247 BC (on which cf. Luther 1999), the role of Arsakes as *karanos*, which is Persian for 'satrap' (cf. Coşkun 2016a, 120 with reference to Engels 2013; Engels in this volume; differently, Coloru 2009, 158). See also below, n. 110. But also see differing views of Strootman and Wenghofer in this volume.

¹⁰ On Philadelphos, cf. Coşkun 2016a, 130–2, with Grainger 2010, 142–55; also Pfeiffer 2004, 19: based on the political climate in Egypt, he regards Euergetes' desire to gain military glory as the main motivation for his campaign. Note that even the pro-Ptolemaic account of Justin (on which more below) does not avoid a note on the aggressive intentions of Euergetes in 246: Just. 27.3.4, quoted below, n. 34. Cf. also Lehmann 1998, 93–5 who emphasizes the preparation required for the campaign, in contrast to, e.g., Otto 1928, 66–74. – On July, see below, n. 12.

¹¹ The ancient sources are inconsistent as to whether Euergetes embarked on his campaign to rescue or to avenge his sister and nephew. Justin is the only one who reflects awareness of both traditions. But he first applies the latter motivation (revenge), then the former (rescue), before somehow blending them by stating that Berenike and her child were eventually dead when Euergetes arrived (27.1.2–7). This may be seen as symptomatic for the whole of Justin's account: moral indignation is what matters (cf. § 5 *tam indignae fortunae*, § 7 *indigna res*), whereas he remains unconcerned with a precise chronology.

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¹² Cf., e.g., Hauben 1990, 29; Ehling 2003, 308; van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11. Definitely too late is August, as implied or claimed by Del Monte 1997, 47 f.; Lehmann 1998, 87; Martinez-Sève 2002/3, 703 n. 77; for, even if the fragmentary entry in the Babylonian Chronicles for August should relate to the notification of the king's death, he would have passed away in Ephesos about a month before.

¹³ Scholars tend to agree that Euergetes first landed on Cyprus before invading Syria: cf., e.g., Lehmann 1998, 90; Ehling 2003, 308 f. Spuler 1953, in turn, assumes that 'sailing along the coast' (*P.Gourob* II) implies that Euergetes sailed northwards along the Levant coast; the first landing place in Seleukid Syria mentioned in the papyrus is Posideon, which is located in-between Laodikeia and Seleukia-in-Pieria; however, the papyrus confines this movement to one single day. For a combination of both ways, cf. Grainger 2010, 156 f.: 'Meanwhile Ptolemy with a larger naval force had sailed, probably from Egypt, as far as Posideion, a minor port north of Laodikeia on the Syrian coast, where he waited for word that all was arranged for his landing in Syria'; 158: ships came from both Cyprus and Egypt; likewise Piejko 1990, 17.

¹⁴ With amazing speed (Just. 27.1.6 *advolat*), Ptolemy arrived in Seleukeia-in-Pieria 'with all his forces' (Just. 27.1.6) and at a time when most subjects of the Seleukid territories would still believe that at least Berenike, if not also her son, was still alive, he was welcomed in Antioch as liberator. Polyæn. 8.50 explains how the ruse of Berenike being still alive was made up by her maidens after her murder, though according to the same source, it was her father Ptolemy II who came to her support. *P.Gourob* III–IV in fact pretends she was alive and even visited by her brother. Also the inscription from Kildara (n. 6) presupposes that both Berenike and 'King Antiochos' were alive during the initial stage of the Third Syrian War.

¹⁵ Phylarch. *FGrH* 81 F 24 = Athen. 13.64 (593b–d). On Phylarchos as the most likely source of the entire literary tradition on Laodike, cf. Primo 2009a, 124.

¹⁶ The quotation is preceded by this summary: 'And Sophron the governor of Ephesos had a mistress, Danae, the daughter of Leontion the Epicurean, who was also a courtesan herself. And by her means he was saved when a plot was laid against him by Laodike, and Danae was thrown down a precipice, as Phylarchos relates in his twelfth book in these words.'

¹⁷ Cf. Martinez-Sève 2002/3, 702; Errington 2008, 120; note also the forthcoming work by G. Ramsey on Seleukid residences in Asia Minor.

¹⁸ *P.Gourob* II. – Lehmann 1998, 90 f., too, takes this as an indication of a very early date of the papyrus and the invasion. Otto 1928, 53, followed by Ehling 2003, 10, claims that Syria was invaded first, then Kilikia. But this contradicts both *P.Gourob* and Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8.

¹⁹ On the 11th day of month II (12/13 May), Seleukos celebrated the Akitu Festival together with his brother Antiochos (Hierax) and sister Apammu (Apama, an otherwise unknown daughter of Laodike, or identical with Laodike, the later wife of Mithradates II of Pontos?). The female sex of the latter has now been firmly established by van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11, Text A 13; cf. Coşkun 2016a, 121 n. 63 for a bibliography. Seleukos is further mentioned alone in month III (after day 12) = (after 11) June 246, though probably not yet with the royal title. This is compatible with the view that Hierax returned westwards earlier.

²⁰ According to Sachs and Hunger 1989, II 68–72 to year 66 SE = 246/45 BC,

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Antiochos II was still supposed to be alive (in Babylon) at least until month VI, which started on 28 August; there is barely space for the arrival of the news of his death before day 27 (23 September). Seleukos II, in turn, was known as co-ruler (in Babylon) in month V (starting on 28 July) 246; his appointment must have been reported in a lost part of the inscription (after month IV, day 15 = 14 July and before month V day 26 = 24 August). Previously, however, the arrival of the news of Antiochos' death was dated to 20 Abu (month V) 66 SE = 19 August 246: del Monte 1997, 48; Savalli-Lestrade 2003, 76; van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 in their commentary on *BM* 34428), but on rather shaky grounds, cf. Coşkun 2016a, 119–20.

²¹ Coşkun 2016a, 118–23, who points out that Phylarchos, in his narrative of Antiochos' death, does not question the legitimate succession of Seleukos. Differently, e.g., Otto 1928, 58: Berenike had stirred up Sophron (similarly, Heuß 1975, 405; Ehling 2003, 311); Jacoby ad *FGrH* 81 F 24 and *FGrH* 260 F 32.6: Ephesos was part of the dowry of Berenike, so that Sophron was attached to her; Will 1979, I 249: Sophron may have had the order to control Laodike after her repudiation and later opted for Berenike; Buraselis 1982, 134 f. argues for Sophron's disagreement with Laodike's dynastic politics (though differently 137: 'Der Feind seines Feindes musste sein natürlicher Freund sein'); similarly, Hölbl 1994, 46 f.; Lehmann 1998, 88 regards the episode as pro-Ptolemaic apology. Cf. also Errington 2008, 120 f. – Note that Gygas 2000 denies Sophron's transition to the Ptolemies. According to Grainger 2010, 158, Sophron seized the dynastic crisis as an opportunity for self-promotion (but to what end?); however, id. 160 regards the revolt as a reaction to Berenike's murder.

²² *Ptolemaios epiklesin Andromachou* (thus named in *P.Haun.* 6, with Bülow-Jacobsen 1979) is mostly considered a natural son of Philadelphos, adopted by a certain Andromachos, and thus identical with the priest of Alexander and the Theoi Adelphoi of 251/50 (cf. Bennett 2001–2013 s.v. Ptolemy Andromachou; *contra* Buraselis 1982, 136 f.), or as a natural son of the Diadoch Lysimachos and Arsinoe (II), later adopted by Philadelphos, and nicknamed Andromachos possibly because of his defeat at Andros (e.g., Huß 1998). Cf. also Crampa 1969; Oikonomides 1984a; Ravazzolo 1996; Grainger 1997, 167; Tunny 2000; Gygas 2000 and 2002. More plausibly, he should be distinguished from both: Ptolemy the Son of Ptolemy (sc. Philadelphos) and co-ruler 267–259 and the homonymous son of a Lysimachos; he is rather identical with Ptolemy the Brother of King Ptolemy (sc. Euergetes) mentioned by Olympichos around 244/242; cf. Coşkun 2016b.

²³ Similarly, and within the broader context of the Ptolemaic-Antigonid rivalry, Buraselis 1982, 135–76. This is denied, however, by Gygas 2000, 359; 366.

²⁴ *I.Kildara* (as n. 6), esp. ll. 5–8, with the discussion of Coşkun 2016a, 128–30, modifying the views of Blümel 1992.

²⁵ The 'liberation' of Mylasa through Olympichos (*I.Labraunda* 3 l. 30; 5 l. 34; 7 ll. 9 f.) had previously been dated to 246 (cf. Crampa 1969, 80–5; Ma 1999, 44; 68; 168; Virgilio 2003b, 174 with n. 449; 175) or 240 (Blümel 1987, 11; Austin² no. 179 p. 326). But since Olympichos acted at the behest of Seleukos, the most likely context is provided by the year 244, cf. Coşkun 2016b, also on 'Ptolemy the

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Brother of King Ptolemy' (=Ptolemy Andromachos) mentioned in *ILabraunda* I 3 ll. 4–8.

²⁶ August: the Battle of Andros resulting in Sophron's death, the occupation of Ephesos by Ptolemy Andromachos, and the Laodikean War in Ionia which cost Laodike's life. September: Andromachos reached an agreement with Hierax, Alexander and Mithradates II, resulting in Seleukos' battle against Hierax at Magnesia and Seleukos' defeat at Ankyra. October: Euergetes took Seleukeia-in-Pieria and Antioch; December: his troops reached the walls of Babylon. Incursions into the *chōra* of Smyrna may also be dated to autumn 246. All of these events are accounted for in the subsequent sections.

²⁷ Pomp. Trog. *prol.* 27, followed by O. Seel in his ed. of Justin and by most scholars, e.g., Heuß 1975, 405.

²⁸ Battle of Andros in 245: Buraselis 1982, 123–41; 145, followed by Walbank 1988, 306; 587–95; 599 f.; Reger 1985/93, 155; 158; id. 1994, 33 et al. (with the most detailed geo-strategic evaluation of the effect of the battle, concluding that Antigonid control of the Cyclades was short-lived and that the islands soon slipped into independence); Lehmann 1998, 93; Huß 2001, 348 f.; Ehling 2003, 311. Differently, however, Grainger 2010, 158, who dates the Battle of Andros after the death of Antiochos II, but before the 'coup' of Sophron: 'The crisis in the Seleukid kingdom will have frightened Antigonos as much as it encouraged Ptolemy, and he no doubt acted in the Aegean to reduce Ptolemy's local naval power while he still had the chance. In the circumstances Ptolemy, seeing the possibility of a much greater prize available in Syria, could afford to ignore the defeat.' Cf. also Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 103: ca. 246/243; Crampa 1969, 105–13: 262 BC; Hölbl 1994/2001, 41; 43: by ca. 250 BC, followed by a quick recovery of the Ptolemaic fleet.

²⁹ Oikonomides 1984b (with reference to *P.Tebt.* III 2.890.14 f. and 2.174; 2nd cent. BC), followed by Grainger 1997, 118 (differently, idem 2010, 154; 158); Gygax 2000, 359; 366. – Cf. also the fanciful interpretation of Crampa 1969, 100; 103 f.: ὁ(μ)π(ά)ρ(ι)ον ἀ(δελφόν), identifying the aforementioned conqueror of Adaios as Ptolemy Euergetes.

³⁰ See below, after n. 43.

³¹ On Ptolemy Andromachos, cf. *P.Haun.* 6 = Bülow-Jacobsen 1979, and see above, n. 22.

³² Just. 27.2.1–5, on which see below, with n. 122.

³³ Just. 27.2.6 ff.: Inde ad Antiochum fratrem litteras facit, quibus auxilium eius inplorat oblata ei Asia intra finem Tauri montis in praemium latae opis. **7** Antiochus autem cum esset annos XIV natus, supra aetatem regni avidus occasionem non tam pio animo, quam offerebatur, adripuit, sed latronis more fratri totum eripere cupiens puer sceleratam virilemque sumit audaciam. **8** Unde Hierax est cognominatus, quia non hominis, sed accipitris ritu in alienis eripiendis vitam sectaretur. **9** Interea Ptolomeus cum Antiochum in auxilium Seleuco venire cognovisset, ne cum duobus uno tempore dimicaret, in annos X cum Seleuco pacem facit; **10** sed pax ab hoste data interpellatur a fratre, qui conducto Gallorum mercenario exercitu pro auxilio bellum, pro fratre hostem imploratus exhibuit. **11** In eo proelio virtute Gallorum victor quidem Antiochus fuit, sed Galli

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arbitrantes Seleucum in proelio cecidisse in ipsum Antiochum arma vertere, liberius depopulaturi Asiam, si omnem stirpem regiam extinxissent. **12** Quod ubi sensit Antiochus, velut a praedonibus auro se redemit societatemque cum mercennariis suis iungit.

³⁴ Just. 27.3.4: Seleucus et Antiochus fratres bellum propter Asiam gerebant, Ptolomeus, rex Aegypti, sub specie sororiae ultionis Asiae inhiabat.

³⁵ Just. 27.3.5: Hinc Bithynus Eumenes, inde Galli, humiliorum semper mercennaria manus, Asiam depopulabantur, cum interea nemo defensor Asiae inter tot praedones inveniebatur.

³⁶ Just. 27.3.6–11: Victo Antiocho cum Eumenes maiorem partem Asiae occupasset, ne tunc quidem fratres perduto praemio, propter quod bellum gerebant, concordare potuerunt, sed omisso externo hoste in mutuum exitium bellum reparant. **7** In eo Antiochus denuo victus multorum dierum fuga fatigatus tandem ad socerum suum Ariamenem, regem Cappadociae, pervehitur. **8** A quo cum benigne primum exceptus esset, interiectis diebus cognito quod insidiae sibi pararentur, salutem fuga quaesivit. **9** Igitur cum profugo nusquam tutus locus esset, ad Ptolomeum hostem, cuius fidem tutiorem quam fratris existimabat, decurrit, memor vel quae facturus fratri esset vel quae meruisset a fratre. **10** Sed Ptolomeus non amicum dedito quam hosti factus adservari eum artissima custodia iubet. **11** Hinc quoque Antiochus opera cuiusdam meretricis adiutus, quam familiarius noverat, deceptis custodibus elabitur fugiensque a latronibus, interficitur. – The year of his death is attested by Porphyr. *Chron. FGrH* 260 F 32.8.

³⁷ This may relate to revolts in Baktria and Parthia, but ignores the fact that the areas from Persia to Syria had remained under his control, and even parts of Asia Minor had been recovered. – His year of death is given as 227/26 by Porphyr. *Chron. FGrH* 260 F 32.7,9.

³⁸ Just. 27.3.12: Seleucus quoque iisdem ferme diebus amisso regno equo praecipitatus finitur. Sic fratres quasi et germanis casibus exules ambo post regna scelerum suorum poenas luerunt.

³⁹ Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 105 explains the strange tone of the correspondence between Seleukos and Hierax towards the end of the Third Syrian War with Justin's anticipation of Hierax' treason. The following explanations are useless speculations: Seleukos is reproached for having abandoned Asia Minor, which led to the revolt of Hierax, though Ptolemy III did not even show an interest in it. Walbank I 600 concedes that Seleukos made his brother king of Asia Minor during the Third Syrian War, 'and failed to recover this area when the war was over'. Grainger 1997, 47 (cf. 168) suggests that the War of Brothers began in 244, without further discussion. Toye, in his commentary on *BNJ* 260 F. 32.8, points out that the war must have broken out before the end of the Third Syrian War; Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 240 f. specifies that the marriage of Seleukos's sister with Mithradates II pre-dated the Battle of Ankyra around 245. Ihnken 1978, 32 f. dates the beginning of the usurpation (though not yet of the effective war) to 246 or 245. More traditionally, Heinen 1984, 422 dates the beginning of Hierax' rule (still in agreement with Seleukos) to 242. See also above, n. 2, and below, n. 55 f., for further references.

⁴⁰ Trog. prol. 27: Seleuci bellum in Syria adversus Ptolemaeum Tryphonem;

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item in Asia adversus fratrem suum Antiochum Hieracem, quo bello Ancuræ victus est a Gallis.

⁴¹ On their deaths, cf. Coşkun 2016b, section 7, with Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8.

⁴² On Justin as a non-historiographer, cf. Bartlett 2014; on his sloppiness in chronological matters, cf. Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 197 f.

⁴³ Just. 27.2.1–5; 27.3.1.

⁴⁴ Jacoby, *FGrH* 260 F 32.8, translates: a) ‘nachdem es sich begeben hatte zu lebzeiten eben des Kallinikos Seleukos, daß Antiochos der jüngere Bruder desselben sich friedlich zu verhalten und lediglich seine sachen zu versehen nicht gewillt war – er hatte nämlich bundesgenossenschaft und unterstützung von Alexandros, der die stadt der Sardier inne hatte, der auch der bruder war von seiner mutter Laodik; und hatte auch die Galater zu bundesgenossen in zwei treffen –’ b) ‘siegte im Lydierlande Seleukos, nahm jedoch weder Sardis ein noch Ephesos, da Ptolemeos die Stadt besetzt hielt. Als es aber in Cappadocia und mit Mithridates zum zweiten Zusammenstoße kam, wurden zwei Myriaden desselben von den Barbaren niedergemacht, und er selbst war als erschlagen verschollen.’ (incorrect Toye: ‘...was struck down and died’). c) ‘Ptolemeos aber, der auch Tryphon, nahm die syrischen Striche ein; und die belagerung, die gegen Damaskos und Orthosia stattfand, nahm ihr ende in der 134. olympiade <im> 3. jahre (242/1), als Seleukos dorthin zurückgekehrt war.’ d) ‘Antiochos jedoch, der bruder des Kallinikos, unterwarf, Großphrygien durchziehend, die bewohner dem tribute’ e) ‘und ließ feldherrn auf Seleukos los. da ward er ausgeliefert von seinen höflingen den barbaren, von welchen entkommend mit nur wenigen er nach Magnesia gelangte. und am folgenden tage stellte er sich in schlachtordnung auf. abermals bundesgenössische hilfe von Ptolemeos erlangt habend, siegte er;’ f) ‘und heiratete die tochter des Zielas.’ g) ‘und im 4. jahre der 137. olympiade (229/8) im Lydierlande zweimal in ein treffen sich einlassend, unterlag er. auch gegenüber Koloe lieferte er eine schlacht wider Attalos; und im 1. jahre der 138. olympiade (228/7) nach Thrakien flüchtig geworden vor Attalos nach der schlacht, die in Karia stattgefunden hatte, starb er.’

⁴⁵ Porphyry. *Chron.* *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 speaks of ‘bundesgenossen’ in Jacoby’s version, admittedly odd for the role of Alexander. But for the Galatians, cf. also Just. 27.2.12 (*societatem*). On the Tolistobogioi, cf. Coşkun 2011.

⁴⁶ See above, with n. 22.

⁴⁷ *LPriene*² I (=IK 69) 132, l. 175: [Ἀν]τίοχον τὸν ὑπὸ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου τεταγμένον. Since he is mentioned only very briefly after [King Alexa]nder (l. 167), Ant[igonos] (sc. Monophthalmos) (l. 170), [King Lysima]chos (l. 172) and King Antiochos (II) (l. 173), Blümel (p. 326) is right to identify him with the official mentioned by Porphyry.

⁴⁸ Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 43 ll. 28–30. According to Bevan 1902b, 189 n. 5 and Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 103 f., this identification goes back to Niebuhr, though it has been rejected on the ground that the revolt of Hierax has normally been dated to 241; since he was 14 years old when he revolted (Just. 27.2.7), he would have been too young in 245 to become a *philos*. This argument is worthless, since becoming a *philos* of Euergetes in 245 implies revolt. Hierax had thus been born in 260 or 259.

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⁴⁹ On the wide notion of Cappadocia encompassing the domains of the Mithradatic kings, cf. Ballesteros Pastor ca. 2016.

⁵⁰ On Mithradates, the Tektosages and Ankyra, see below, with n. 134 f. on Just. 38.5.3. The military conflict is attested by Porphyry. *Chron. FGrH* 260 F 32.8; Trog. *prol.* 27; Just. 27.2; see also below, section VI.

⁵¹ On which see below, VI around n. 101.

⁵² For the former, I recall the ‘Schleifentechnik’ of Herodotos; for the latter, we only need to look into the context of Porphyry’s *Chronicle*: he first mentions the rule of Seleukos Kallinikos from his succession to his father to the succession by his own son Seleukos Keraunos (F 32.7 f.), and then goes back in time to relate the conflict with Hierax.

⁵³ Just. 27.2.11 f. One is reminded of the alliance that Leonnorios struck with Nikomedes of Bithynia in 278: Memn. *FGrH* 434 F 11 = Phot. 4.227b–228a (Henry pp. 63 f.); cf. Liv. 38.16.

⁵⁴ Magnesia remained under his control, before Smyrna won it over around 244; see below, with nn. 140–3.

⁵⁵ E.g., Bevan 1902b, 191–3 (pressure before 241, revolt thereafter); Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 107 (around 237); Macurdy 1932, 86 f. (in 241); Ihnken 1978, 32 f.; Kobes 1996, 136; Ogden 1999, 131 (‘cannot be doubted’); Boehringer 1993, 44 (the royal aspirations of Hierax in 246 reflect Laodike’s effort to counter the rule of Berenike); Duyrat 2005, 232; Plischke 2014, 229. See also above, n. 39. D’Agostini and McAuley 2012b s.v. Alexander have Laodike only siding with Hierax.

⁵⁶ Cf., e.g., Schmitt 2005, 967.

⁵⁷ Plut. *mor.* 489a = *De fraterno amore* 18: Ἀντιόχου δὲ τὴν μὲν φιλαρχίαν ψέξειεν ἄν τις, ὅτι δ’ οὐ παντάπασιν αὐτῇ τὸ φιλάδελφον ἐνηφανίσθη, θαυμάσειεν. ἐπολέμει μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας Σελεύκου νεώτερος ὢν ἀδελφὸς καὶ τὴν μητέρα συλλαμβάνουσαν εἶχεν.

⁵⁸ On his age, see above, n. 48.

⁵⁹ *P.Gourab* II; see also above, n. 6, on the evidence of Kildara.

⁶⁰ Blümel and Merkelbach, *I.Priene*² I (=IK 69) 132, l. 129 (date of the inscription: 197/190 BC); cf. Hiller von Gärtringen, *I.Priene*¹ 37, l. 134. Traditionally, this reference is identified with the entire Third Syrian War: e.g., Bevan 1902b, 181; 184; Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 95; Otto 1928, 48; Macurdy 1932, 86; Ihnken 1978, 32; Heinen 1984, 419; Savalli-Lestrade 2003, 74; Ehling 2003, 304; Schmitt 2005, 966; Errington 2008, 111; Kosmin 2014, 19; Toye on *BNJ* 260 F 32.8 and F 43. But see below, with n. 75 f., for some specification.

⁶¹ According to Bielman Sánchez 2003, 49, the influence of queens was strongest during the rule of their sons, not husbands, thus slightly contrasting with Macurdy 1932, 6–8, who also allowed for the absence of the husband, but mentions as a further requirement ‘an extremely strong character and will’ of the queen.

⁶² Nourse 2002, 269 f.

⁶³ Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 43: [lacuna] Seleuci cognomento Callinici, qui cum matre Laodice regnabat in Syria, et abusus est (sc. Ptolemaeus Euergetes vel Tryphon) eis et obtinuit in tantum, ut Syriam caperet... Of course, ‘rule in Syria’ in this case must mean rule of the Seleukid Empire or part thereof.

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⁶⁴ Just. 27.1–2.

⁶⁵ *OGIS* I 229 = Ihnken, *I.Magnesia* (=IK 8) 1 = Petzl, *I.Smyrna* II.1 (=IK 24.1) 573 = Austin² 174, l. 6. For the date and context, see below, section VIII with n. 140.

⁶⁶ See section IV on Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 and Just. 27.1–2. For a similar argument, cf. also Ihnken 1978, 33; but, despite his early date of the usurpation (246 or 245), he does not seem to let the effective War of Brothers start before 241.

⁶⁷ Ihnken 1978, 33 justifies Laodike's usurpation with Seleukos' complete failure against Euergetes, but the defeats that he adduces do not fit his own chronology (p. 41): a revolt in 246 or early 245, nor does Ihnken date the events of the War of Brothers reported by Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 prior to 241. See also above, n. 55 on Boehringer 1993, 44.

⁶⁸ Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8. Some scholars take *I.Bargylia* (= *I.Iasos* II) 608 and *I.Smyrna* II 1 = *I.Magnesia* l. 101 to attest the start of his career under Antiochos I (e.g., Billows 1995a, 97; Grainger 1997, 75; Capdetrey 2007, 295–7), but the Antiochos mentioned seems rather to be II (cf. Bevan 1902b, 307), and Alexander's interaction with Magnesia need not be contemporary with the concessions of King Antiochos (e.g., Welles, *RC* p. 134 dates it after 244, which may be too late though). Since there is no clear reference to Alexander after 246, he likely did not survive the War of Brothers. At any rate, it is unclear why D'Agostini and McAuley 2012b s.v. Alexander prefer to assume, if only hypothetically, his survival into the 220s (without source reference). Possibly, they think of the Alexander mentioned in a letter to Mylasa in the 220s (Welles, *RC* 29 l. 4), whom Welles identifies as Laodike I's brother (dating to sometime after 244). But since he is called 'Son Alexander', this must be the son of Seleukos II before his accession to the throne as Seleukos III in 225; cf. Robert and Robert 1970, 454 f. On Alexander and the House of Achaïos, cf. also Merkelbach 2000; D'Agostini 2014, and see next n.

⁶⁹ Polyain. 4.17 mentions Achaïos and Andromachos serving as the *stratēgoi* of Seleukos in a campaign in Armenia against Hierax; Polyb. 8.20.11 specifies that the Younger Achaïos was the son of a certain Andromachos, who in turn was the brother of Laodike II, the wife of Seleukos II. Billows 1995a, 96–8 (with stemma on p. 110) very tentatively identifies Achaïos the Elder with a son of Seleukos I and the father of Laodike I, Alexandros, Andromachos (Billows dates his campaign against Hierax to ca. 228 and regards him as the father of Laodike II and Achaïos the Younger), and Antiochis (the mother of Attalos I). But on p. 97, he calls for more caution: 'Perhaps we should be content to state that Achaïos I was most probably a close relative of the early Seleukids, and hence almost certainly a Macedonian.' D'Agostini and McAuley 2012c follow the traditional date of the campaign (ca. 227 BC) and identify Andromachos with a grandson of Achaïos the Elder and thus a nephew of Alexander and Laodike I, and the Achaïos mentioned by Polyainos with Achaïos the Younger who later usurped against Antiochos III. In fact, the usurper is known to have been the son of an Andromachos; but since Polyainos mentions Achaïos first and Andromachos second, this genealogy appears to me counter-intuitive. No more convincing is Plischke 2014, 54, who

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regards Achaios as the son of Alexander and (as it would seem) opponent of Andromachos. More plausibly, Grainger 1997, 5; 8; 47; 693 considers Andromachos a son of Achaios the Elder and the father of the later usurper Achaios the Younger, even though Grainger 1997 seems to be unaware of the involvement of an Achaios in the Armenian campaign (which he dates to ca. 229 BC); likewise, Schmitt 2005, 959; 967, pointing out that Andromachos was also the father of Laodike II, wife of Seleukos II; also Ehling 2007, 497 n. 4. Note, however, Grainger 2010, 178: Hierax ‘was defeated by an army commanded by Andromachos and Akhaios, brothers-in-law of both of the Seleukids (their elder brother, Alexandros, was governor of Sardis, and perhaps of Lydia, for Hierax)’; also 171 f.: Achaios I, son of Seleukos I and a noblewoman of Asia Minor (cf. p. 176); his children included Laodike I and Andromachos, the latter being the father of Laodike II. I suggest that the campaign took place around 243/242 BC (see below, section VII). Given this early date, the *stratēgos* Achaios probably was the oldest brother of Andromachos and Alexander, which explains why he bore their father’s name.

⁷⁰ See above, with n. 17 on Sardis.

⁷¹ *I.Priene*² I (=IK 69) 132, l. 175, see above, n. 47.

⁷² App. *Syr.* 65.346; cf. Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 43 (as quoted above, n. 63) for the punishment, though without mentioning Laodike’s death. The donation of estates to Babylon, Borsippa and Kutha by Laodike and her sons Seleukos and Hierax, which the Lehmann Document attests to have been written down in 236, does not require that the transaction took place that year, as is often assumed (e.g., Crampa I 55 n. 1; Kobes 1996, 138; Plischke 2014, 83 n. 473); much more likely, it took place in the times of Antiochos II; cf. also Virgilio 2003b, 153–6. Moreover, Seleukos (II) and Antiochos (Hierax) are called ‘the sons’ without the royal titles, which both of them held in 236.

⁷³ For a rebuttal, cf. Macurdy 1932, 86; Lehmann 1998, 87; Nourse 2002, 267. For a later date, cf. Bevan 1902b, 328 (230s BC), even though he concedes that Appian’s testimony as such would seem to require a date in 246; Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 107 (after a failed but unattested attempt to recapture Ephesos); Brodersen 1989, 202 (during the War of Brothers and during the Third Syrian War); Huß 2001, 342 n. 30.

⁷⁴ On *Ptolemaios epiklēsin Andromachou* = Ptolemy Andromachos (not Ptolemy, the son of Andromachos), see above, with n. 22 and 26. For further references, also on Sophron, see below, with n. 77.

⁷⁵ *I.Priene*¹ 37 l. 134 = *I.Priene*² I 132, l. 129; see above, n. 60, for further references. Note also Ihnken 1978, 32: the term was coined by someone loyal to Euergetes, as Priene would have been.

⁷⁶ See above, n. 60.

⁷⁷ We do not know precisely when Ptolemy’s fleet prevailed over Adaios, the Thracian ally of Antiochos II and Gonatas, or when Sophron was defeated at Andros, though the former battle may have taken place in 246, while the latter must fall between autumn 246 and spring 245. Cf. Trog. *prol.* 27; Buraselis 1982, 123–76, esp. 138–40, followed by Reger 1985/93, 155; 158; id. 1994, 33 et al.; Walbank 1988, 306; 587–95; 599 f.; Gabbert 1997, 57; Gyğax 2000, 354; Coşkun

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2016a, 131 and 2016b (with further discussion, e.g., of Grainger 2010, 154). No longer tenable is a date around 250 or during the Second Syrian War, as considered by Will 1979, I 235–8.

⁷⁸ Just. 27.2.

⁷⁹ Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8; cf. also Just. 27.2.10 and Trog. *prol.* 27. See my discussion in section IV.

⁸⁰ Plut. *mor.* 489ab = *De fraterno amore* 18, on which see above, section V.

⁸¹ Polyæn. 8.61. On Mysta, cf. also Athen. 13.64 (593de), who specifies Phylarch (*FGrH* 81 F 30) as the common source; also Primo 2009a, 124.

⁸² Athenaios more convincingly regards her as a mistress, which is confirmed by Ogden 1999, 132; cf. also Schmitt 2005, 967.

⁸³ *P.Gourob*, with Polyæn. 8.50 and Coşkun 2016a, 123–7 on the ruse. For an analysis of the social strata involved in the welcome of Euergetes, cf. Ehling 2003, 310 f., even though his conclusion on the broad support for Euergetes does not sufficiently account for the tendentious nature of the source. Such criticism is likewise missing in Kosmin 2014, 151–7, but his analysis of the king's reception within the wider context of the ceremonial arrival of a Near Eastern king in a subject city (*apantēsis*), especially the focus on the demonstration of consensus, remains very valuable.

⁸⁴ Polyæn. 4.9.6. This section is the last attributed to Seleukos I, but it is hard to see which crushing defeat by barbarians he might have suffered in Asia Minor. Note that book 4 contains anecdotes on Antiochos I, II and Hierax, but none that is explicitly attributed to Seleukos II. Similarly, though without discussion, Grainger 1997, 124 s.v. Anon. (2), attributes this anecdote to Seleukos II.

⁸⁵ There is no entry for Amaktion in Grainger 1997; *LGPN* I–VA.

⁸⁶ Alternatively, one might consider that he avoided Armenia deliberately, perhaps out of a suspicion arising from the unexpected betrayal of Mithradates II. Note also that Arsames, king of Armenia, would soon become a friend of Hierax (Polyæn. 4.17 ad ca. 442 BC), though I would prefer to regard this as a result of Hierax' presence in Kilikia as of 245.

⁸⁷ Still in December, he arrived at Sippar-Seleukeia and his troops even entered Babylon. Had Seleukos safely taken control of Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris by then, he could have gathered forces to relieve Babylon by February. And this would likely have been noted in *BCHP* 11, on which see below, with nn. 100–7.

⁸⁸ *P.Gourob* II–IV, on which see above, with n. 83; Adoulis Inscription, on which see above, n. 3. The letter of Tlepolemos (*I.Kildara*, see above, n. 6) has been understood as an expression of the official Ptolemaic propaganda by Blümel 1992, whose views have been widely accepted; cf., e.g., Lehmann 1998, 88; Ehling 2003, 311: 'Aus Polyæn läßt sich schließen, daß der Ptolemäer mit Hilfe schriftlicher Erlasse, die den Namen der Berenike und ihres Sohnes trugen, regierte, als dessen *epitropos* der 3. Ptolemäer sehr wahrscheinlich fungierte.' According to Toye ad Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8, he was acting in the boy's name. With slight modification, Piejko 1990, 22: 'In Seleucia and Antioch Ptolemy appears (at least for the moment) in the role of the supreme arbiter of all things in the Seleukid Empire.' Such views are as incompatible with the historical context as with the text from Kildara itself, cf. Coşkun 2016a, 128–30.

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⁸⁹ The allegation is taken at face value, e.g., by Hölbl 1994, 47 f.; Ehling 2003, 313; Schmitt 2005, 967; Toye ad Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8. But cf. Piejko 1990, 24: 'It is hardly possible that too many of the "satraps" were at hand to greet Ptolemy, or had time to send messages of their allegiance, or submission. This must be partly an exaggeration, and it probably happened only later in the campaign that the governors of the more remote eastern provinces offered their nominal adherence. This may explain the supposed subjugation of Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Susiana, Persis, Media, even Baktria!'

⁹⁰ And even if someone had arrogated to himself the authority to summon them, this would have been after the Battle of Ankyra, so that the messengers might not yet even have reached any eastern satrap.

⁹¹ *P.Gourab* IV 24 f.; similarly, Lehmann 1998, 89, even though it is uncertain which of the leading officials of the empire had remained in Antioch after Antiochos II had left the city a few years previously. It is thus questionable to call Antioch the 'seleukidische Zentrale' for this particular time.

⁹² Adoulis Inscription (see n. 3). For assessments of the territories held by Philadelphos by 246, cf. Grainger 2010, 139–55; Coşkun 2016a, 111; especially for Thrace, cf. also Avram 2003 and Dumitru 2011.

⁹³ Similarly, Lehmann 1998, 92, with further remarks on the territories in Asia Minor on p. 93.

⁹⁴ See below on the Babylonian epigraphic sources.

⁹⁵ Polyæn. 8.50 (who confuses the father Philadelphos with the brother Euergetes), with Coşkun 2016, 125–7.

⁹⁶ Just. 27.1.9. Note, however, that Just. 27.1.8 claims: *universae civitates...Ptolomeo se tradunt*. This is accepted by Ehling 2003, 313, despite the evidence to the contrary (see sections VI–VIII); likewise counterfactual is the same scholar's claim 'Nirgends stieß er auf militärischen Widerstand.'

⁹⁷ Catull. 66.12,36. For the anachronistic use of *Asia*, also cf. Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 23.

⁹⁸ Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 43: *obtenuit in tantum, ut Syriam caperet et Ciliciam superioresque partes trans Euphratem et prope modum universam Asiam. ...et Syriam quidem ipse obtenuit, Ciliciam autem amico suo Antiocho gubernandam tradidit, et Xanthippo alteri duci provincias trans Euphraten.*

⁹⁹ App. *Syr.* 65.346. Ehling 2003, 308; 311 assumes that *P.Gourab* also included a report on Euergetes' campaign into the Upper Satrapies.

¹⁰⁰ Thus the common opinion based on Otto 1928, 66, with reference to the document from Uruk and Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 43 naming Xanthippos. Otto is followed, e.g., by Ehling 2003, 312 f.; van der Spek and Finkel, Commentary on *BCHP* 11. On the domestic revolt, see below, with nn. 111 f. I mention only in passing the *terminus ante quem* of Sep. 243 for Euergetes' return to Egypt, see above, n. 3.

¹⁰¹ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 obv. 2'–3', with commentary. Less compelling is the lack of direct evidence for the title 'royal'.

¹⁰² van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 obv. 4' (operational base); 6'–8' (equipment); 12'–14' (further attack by the Egyptian 'prince', whom the editors identify as Xanthippos).

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¹⁰³ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 obv. 6'–11'; 11'–14'; possibly also rev. 1'–5' (unless this is the continuation of the second attack; in the preserved text, it is not specified where the battle equipment came from); rev. 6'–7' (though it is not stated where the new attack had started; the inimical troops might have remained in Babylon after their previous attack); rev. 9'–11' (if at all it was the same Seleukeia, see below, with nn. 105–107).

¹⁰⁴ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 obv. 4'–15'; rev. 1'–4'; rev. 3' ('they gave to the Babylonians') may imply an attempt to win over the populace, perhaps by food donations? – For Euergetes' intention to make permanent conquests, cf. also Hauben 1990, 29 and 37.

¹⁰⁵ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 rev. 4'–8'.

¹⁰⁶ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 rev. 9'–15'. The impression of upheavals on the streets of Seleukeia is mainly based on a supplemented text (rev. 12'; cf. rev. 11').

¹⁰⁷ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 rev. 8': 'Seleukos *pabat* of Seleukeia'; the same city seems to be mentioned in ll. rev. 11'–12', too (see previous n.). – 'Seleukos *pabat*' is further mentioned in *BCHP* 10 obv. 5', the subsequent line being highly fragmentary. van der Spek and Finkel read '[of Seleucia which is on the Euphrates, and the King's Canal]', but the river's name may well have been the Tigris, to which this Seleukeia was also connected through a canal. Possibly, the city was once more mentioned in ll. rev. 11' and 12', though the lacunae do not allow us to ascertain whether epithets followed after the city's name. In theory, one might even hypothesize that ll. 12' relates to fighting in the streets of Seleukeia-Sippar, which would then mark the turning point of the Ptolemaic invasion. But it is better to await the full commentary before indulging in wild speculation. At any rate, van der Spek and Finkel regard *BCHP* 10 as the 'Seleukid Accessions Chronicle', whereby rev. 5' is thought to refer to 246 and 245; this is possible, though far from certain. Only referring to the latter inscription, Grainger 1997, 116 surprisingly speaks of a 'district officer of Babylon'.

¹⁰⁸ See Engels (in this volume).

¹⁰⁹ See Strootman and Wenghofer (in this volume).

¹¹⁰ If he had really suffered all the losses that ancient sources and modern voices claim, his return to power would have been miraculous. Apparently, the defection of Andragoras had been checked by Seleukos with the loyal support of the *karanos* Arsakes in 247 BC (see above, n. 9). Moreover, there is no need to doubt the loyalty of the Frataraka of Persia around that time (see n. 9). There is admittedly some uncertainty regarding Diodotos of Baktria, but Wenghofer (in this volume; also Wenghofer and Houle 2016) and Rolf Strootman (in this volume) have shown that they had not seceded permanently. For an exhaustive discussion, though partly with different conclusions, cf. Plischke 2014, 204–39.

¹¹¹ For a defence of the official version of Euergetes' court, cf. Hauben 1990, esp. 33; 35; 37, though still with concessions to the vigour of Seleukos' military response. The revolt has received much scholarly attention, mainly as the first indigenous movement against the rule of the Ptolemies: Hauben 1990, 32–7; Hölbl 1994, 48; Huß 2001, 374. However, the ethnic focus may well be misconceived, and a hunger crisis would be more likely: Pfeiffer 2004, 20; 304 et al. For numismatic evidence on the revolt, which might confirm its seriousness,

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see Lorber, forthcoming. As an important reason for Euergetes' return, the uprising is also adduced by Lehmann 1998, 95 n. 25; 100 and Ehling 2003, 312. Differently, Otto 1928, 67–70: Euergetes returned from the east to Antioch when hearing of Berenike's murder and a revolt in Antioch (cf. Ehling 2003, 211, though with doubts regarding her late death expressed in n. 68); Otto further claims Justin confused this with a *seditio domestica* in Egypt.

¹¹² Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43: cumque audisset in Aegypto seditionem moveri, diripiens regnum Seleuci quadraginta millia talentorum argenti tulit et vasa pretiosa simulacraque deorum duo millia quingenta, in quibus erant et illa quae Cambyses capta Aegypto in Persas portaverat. The revolt is the cause for Euergetes' premature departure also in Just. 27.2.8 f.: universae civitates... Ptolomeo se tradunt, qui nisi in Aegyptum domestica seditione revocatus esset, totum regnum Seleuci occupasset. Loot brought back to Egypt is further mentioned in the Adoulis Inscription (n. 3), ll. 20 f., the decree of Alexandria (n. 3), and the Kanopos Decree (*OGIS* 56 = Pfeiffer 2004 = Austin² 271, ll. 10 f.); the latter's reference to a hunger crisis is often regarded as an allusion to the abovementioned domestic revolt. On the booty, cf. also Pfeiffer 2004, 20 et al.

¹¹³ Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43: ...et Syriam quidem ipse obtinuit, Ciliciam autem amico suo Antiocho gubernandam tradidit, et Xanthippo alteri duci provincias trans Euphraten.

¹¹⁴ Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 and *I.Priene*² I (=IK 69) 132, l. 175, discussed above in section IV. On further documentary evidence for Ptolemaic presence in Syria (esp. Seleukeia, Laodikeia, Poseidion), cf. Duyrat 2005, 230 f.

¹¹⁵ However, van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 regard him as an Egyptian prince, see above, n. 102. It is unclear whether Grainger 1997, 121 s.v. Xanthippos really means what he writes: 'appointed to be the ruler of the trans-Euphratean provinces – perhaps, that is, Mesopotamia – by Seleukos II after 246'.

¹¹⁶ For his cognomen, but without historical explanation, cf. Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 32.7, 8; F 43; for a complete documentation, cf. Muccioli 2013, 342 f.

¹¹⁷ *Chron. Pasch. Ol.* 134.1 (244/43 BC). The date is also accepted by Grainger 1997, 168. Note, however, how unreliable the dates of this work are; the preceding entry on the accession of Ptolemy Euergetes ("Tryphon") is dated to *Ol.* 132.2 (250/49 BC). 244 for the victory or for the order to found the city is still a good guess; on the date, cf. also Huß 2001, 350 f. On Ar-Raqqa, cf. Meinecke 1995. It is a re-foundation of Nikephorion, a colony established by Seleukos I or Alexander (also Plischke 2014, 132 f.); in the Byzantine period, it was temporarily renamed Leontopolis (Mango 1991).

¹¹⁸ For Seleukos' return into Syria, see below, with n. 141. On the Eleutheros as long-term division between the two kingdoms, cf. Kosmin 2014, 122.

¹¹⁹ Strab. *Geogr.* 16.2.14.

¹²⁰ Most developed is the reconstruction of Duyrat 2005, even though it is still based on the traditional narrative of the War of Brothers (pp. 230–2: 241?–239? BC): the beginning of the civic era in autumn 259/58 marks the grant of freedom by Antiochos II, which was meant to secure lasting loyalty against the Ptolemies (pp. 227–9). However, the first coins with this era date were minted in 243/42 (pp. 229 f.), while previous issues without era may have started ca. 246/45 (pp. 37–9

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and 231). Among the latter, tetradrachms with Alexander's portrait are of interest; they were used until 240/39, then only sporadically until 219/18 (pp. 231–3). Duyrat points out 'leur parfaite intégration à la circulation monétaire du royaume séleucide' (p. 231) in times of crisis, since they were expressions of continued loyalty to Seleukos II. The rewards may well have included territorial gains on the *peraia* north of the Eleutheros river, though, ultimately, the conditions of their acquisition are uncertain (p. 233). Less convincingly, Grainger 1997, 61; 168 dates the grant of freedom to ca. 242.

¹²¹ According to Duyrat 2005, 232 f., Seleukos attempted to regain the territories he had conceded to Hierax in Asia Minor during the Third Syrian War, and was hence defeated at Ankyra in 240 or 239; but still the war was restricted to Asia Minor, and the grant of privileges, such as *asylia*, was a means to ensure loyalty during his Anatolian campaign; Duyrat further specifies that the asylum was not sacred, but administrative. But the political value of such an asylum was much higher when Hierax was still active in Syria or just about to be driven out. Cf. also Rigsby 1996, 11 on the conditions offered to the asylum-seekers in Arados and the mutual benefits for the city and the king. At the same time, Kosmin 2014, 122 may be right to explain that the privileges ensured that Arados would be an autonomous, but pro-Seleukid buffer between Seleukis and the Ptolemaic Kingdom; alternatively, one might follow the view of Duyrat 2005, 232 f. (even if somewhat inconsistent) that the grant was instrumental to gaining the support of the Aradian fleet.

¹²² Just. 27.2.1–5. Grainger 1997, 168 dates the shipwreck to 244 soon after Seleukos' recapture of Antioch.

¹²³ Differently, Kosmin 2014, 170 locates the shipwreck in the Aegean, claiming that Seleukos' fleet probably had Ephesos as its base – which is incompatible with the permanent loss of this city under Sophron in 246.

¹²⁴ Previous views were undecided between Berenike, Euergetes or a pro-Seleukid party before the arrival of Euergetes (cf. Hoover 2009, 56), but the new reconstruction of the year 246 is incompatible with such identifications. Erickson (in Coşkun 2012a, 1 f. and 2012b, 2) was the first to suggest Hierax as the minting authority, but more recently prefers to argue in favour of Antiochos II (Erickson in this volume).

¹²⁵ Polyæn. 4.17; Just. 27.3.7. Cf. esp. Jacoby on *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 (p. 871) for the unfortunate harmonization of the differing accounts, by which the campaign into Mesopotamia was connected with the flights to Cappadocia, the Ptolemaic Kingdom and Thrace.

¹²⁶ Justin only speaks of Cappadocia as the eastern-most refuge of Hierax, whereas Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 does not allow for a flight to the east after his defeat by Attalos. Cf. Coşkun 2016b, section 7.

¹²⁷ For the connection of verb and noun, cf. also the documents prescribing annual ceremonies commemorating the assumption of the diadem by Antiochos I of Kommagene: Wagner and Petzl 1976, 213 (l. 17) and 220.

¹²⁸ See above, n. 69 on the offspring of Achaïos the Elder.

¹²⁹ Differently, e.g., Boehringer 1993, 45 f., according to whom Hierax attacked Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor in ca. 241.

¹³⁰ Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 and Just. 27.2, discussed above in section IV.

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Cf. also Huß 2001, 351 with n. 106, who accepts incursions into Ptolemaic territory, but concludes from *Dan.* 11.9 that Seleukos was driven back.

¹³¹ The uprisings in Parthia and Baktria within a few years may well be seen within this context.

¹³² For an attempted summary, cf. Ma 1999, 44–9, who lists Ephesos, Miletos, Samos, Priene, Kolophon, Lebedos and perhaps Teos as well as Nagidos and Arsinoe in Kilikia among those cities which went over to Euergetes, while Mylasa is (erroneously) believed to have remained loyal to Seleukos.

¹³³ For the time being, cf. Coşkun 2011a.

¹³⁴ Laodike, the daughter of Mithradates II (and thus also the daughter of Laodike, the sister of Seleukos and Hierax, see below, nn. 135 f.) was held hostage by Hierax: Polyb. 5.74.4 f.; Walbank I 600; she was later married to Achaios the Younger: Polyb. 8.20.11. Walbank II 96 rejects the older view that she was also his fiancé (Bouché-Leclercq I 1913, 148). Ambiguous is Petkovic 2009, 379: ‘The legal or pseudo-matrimonial position of Laodike implies that Mithridates, formerly an ally of Seleukos, was the junior partner of Hierax.’ Petkovic pp. 380–3 goes on to suggest that Mithradates and Hierax allied around 228, though operated independently, with Mithradates trying to capture Sinope (in vain). Recently, Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 240 has tried to reinstate the idea that Laodike was Hierax’ wife, arguing that Just. 27.3.7 (*Antiochus...ad socerum suum Ariamenem, regem Cappadociae, pervehitur*) confuses Ariamenes of Cappadocia with Mithradates II.

¹³⁵ Just. 38.5.3; cf. also Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.6 on a time prior to the Battle of Ankyra. Note that Stephanos of Byzantium s.v. Ankyra, following Apollonios of Aphrodisias, Karika, claims that the Galatians (i.e. the Tektosages) had allied with Mithradates I against Ptolemy II before ‘founding’ Ankyra; the alliance seems to be factual and can be dated to 277 (cf. Coşkun 2011a, 88 f.; id. 2018), whereas the ‘foundation’ of Ankyra has been conflated with the take-over of the Ankyra region by the Tektosages under Mithradates II as of 246.

¹³⁶ Most scholars agree to date the marriage prior to the (traditional late date of the) Battle of Ankyra: Bevan 1902b, 327 (under Antiochos II or very early in the reign of Seleukos, though without entirely excluding a date after Ankyra); Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 103 (ca. 243); Macurdy 1932, 83 and Grainger 2010, 175 (ca. 245: the dowry of Phrygia was to keep Mithradates and the Galatians busy with each other; cf. p. 171); Erciyas 2006, 14 (245, to keep Euergetes and Hierax occupied – without explaining the role of Hierax though); Petkovic 2009, 378 (ca. 245); Toye ad Porphy. F 32.6 (ca. 250/246). The very early date under Antiochos II, as first suggested by Bevan, has recently regained popularity: McAuley 2011 ff. s.v. Laodike I of Pontus (with Bevan); D’Agostini 2013a (250s); Plischke 2014, 30 n. 70.

¹³⁷ Just. 27.3.9–11; cf. Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8.

¹³⁸ See above, n. 88, on Tlepolemos; cf. Coşkun 2016b on Ptolemy of Telmessos, disagreeing with Huß 1998.

¹³⁹ Some scholars believe that Mylasa was freed by Seleukos in 246, but see above, n. 25.

¹⁴⁰ *OGIS* I 229 (ca. 244 BC) = Ihnken, *I.Magnesia* 1 (=IK 8) (first half of 245) = Petzl, *I.Smyrna* II 1.573 (= IK 24.1.573) = Austin² 174 (ca. 241), l. 6. Cf. also Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 102 (ca. 243 BC); Crampa 1969, 86 (ca. 246 BC); Cohen

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1978, 60 (ca. 243); Billows 1995a, 98 (ca. 240). Without precise year, but in the course of the Third Syrian War, the inscription is dated by Ma 1999, 44 f.; 49 f. (extension of Smyrna disguised as act of loyalty for Seleukos); 118 (the soldiers of Old Magnesia stood under the command of Seleukos, but see below). But Ma later supposes (p. 161) that the grant of freedom, tax exemption and *asylia* (on which see below, n. 143) predates the *sympoliteia* decree. More pertinently, he states (p. 235): ‘The Smyrnians conducted their annexation of a Seleukid colony at Magnesia under Sipylos in the language of loyalty towards Seleukos II and concern for his interests’. At any rate, Ma (p. 44 f.) seems to confuse Magnesia-on-the-Maiandros with Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos.

¹⁴¹ *OGIS* I 229 = Ihnken, *I. Magnesia* (=IK 8) 1 = Petzl, *I. Smyrna* II.1 (=IK 24.1) 573 = Austin² 174, ll. 1 ff.: Ἐδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ, στρατηγῶν γνώμη: ἐπειδὴ πρότερόν τε καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὁ βασιλεὺς Σέλευκος ὑπερ- / 2 ἔβαλεν εἰς τὴν Σελευκίδα, πολλῶν [κ]αὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων περιστάσεων τῇ πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν / χώραν, διεφύλαξεν ὁ δῆμος τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν, οὐ καταπλαγεῖς τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔφοδον / 4 οὐδὲ φροντίσας τῆς τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀ[π]ωλείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα δεύτερα ἡγησάμενος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ διαμεῖ- / ναι ἐν τῇ αἰρέσει καὶ ἀντιλαβεῖσθαι τῶν π[ρ]αγμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν καθότι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπέστη. – Traditionally, the king’s arrivals in Seleukis were understood as his departures from Asia Minor into Syria in order to confront Euergetes, cf., e.g., Will 1979, 257; Ihnken 1978, 31 f.; 41.

¹⁴² Cohen 1978, 60 assumes that Smyrna’s initiative was about keeping Magnesia and Old Magnesia loyal to Seleukos ‘in the face of the omnipresent Ptolemaic Aegean fleet’, cf. Austin 2006, 65. *Contra* Ihnken 1978, 18; 31–41: the rule of Hierax (and Laodike) results from the geostrategic assumption that the Ptolemies could not have occupied a territory east of Smyrna without controlling the harbour city itself. His suspicion that the usurpation of Hierax predates 242/41, is convincing, but the argument remains inconsistent, since he ignores the loss of Ephesos to Ptolemy in 246 (p. 31 f.).

¹⁴³ The rewards for Smyrna are specified in a decree from Delphi: *OGIS* I 228 = Rigsby 1996, 102 f. Based on a completely different argument, Rigsby 95–105 (with further documentation) is undecided between 245 and 244 or 243 for the *asylia* grant. Ma 1999, 89, in turn, dates Smyrna’s independence as late as the 220s.

¹⁴⁴ *OGIS* I 227 = Welles, *RC* 22 = *I. Didyma* II 493 = Austin 2006 no. 175. This inscription probably dates to July or August 246. Note that Seleukos was depending on his ‘father’s advisors’ as much before the latter’s death as shortly afterwards. – Welles, *RC* 22, p. 107 dates this letter a little later, while Seleukos was already marching from western Asia Minor to Syria, which was thought to be under Euergetes’ control. Welles further speculates about the grant of *asylia* for the Didymeion; but this should be dated to the rule of Antiochos III; cf. Rigsby 1996, 172–8.

¹⁴⁵ Welles, *RC* 22, p. 107 for the Adoulis Inscription (on which see also above, with n. 92); cf. also Ma 1999, 44; 49 (though suggesting on p. 47 that it was free in the 220s). – Ehling 2003, 311: Miletos remained loyal in 246; cf. Günther 1971, 67 f.

¹⁴⁶ Welles *RC* 26 = Rigsby 1996, no. 9 = *IG* XII 4.1.210, esp. ll. 22–8: παραδεχόμεθα / δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀσυλίαν καθό- / τι ὁ δῆμος ἡξίωσεν καὶ εἰς / (25) τὸ λοιπὸν δὲ πειρασόμεθα / τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὄντων ἐν ἡ- / συχαίαι μὴ ἀχαριστεῖν ἡμῖν / ἐν τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις.

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The date (ca. summer 242) has been firmly established by Rigsby 1996, 106–9. Welles, *RC* 25–8 dates the texts to ca. 240.

¹⁴⁷ Herzog 1930, 463–7 attributes the letter to Seleukos II, since the same ambassadors were involved that would then go on to Ziaelas in Bithynia (*RC* 26 ll. 16 f. with *RC* 25.3); the Ptolemies (*RC* 27) and Attalids (*RC* 28) are excluded as recipients of *RC* 26. Cf. also Rigsby 1996, no. 9. The lack of a reference to a previous relation with Kos (cf. Welles p. 128 on ll. 12–16), which was within the Ptolemaic sphere of interest, does not help us decide between the brothers.

¹⁴⁸ Wells *RC* 26 p. 127 discusses stylistic discrepancies in comparison with *RC* 15 (Antiochos II); 22 (Seleukos II to Miletos); 31 (Antiochos III). – For further references indicative of links between cities of western Asia Minor and Seleukos II between 246 and 241, cf. Capdetrey 2007, 356 n. 262 on Pitane.

¹⁴⁹ Cf., e.g., Boehringer 1993; Primo 2009b; Coşkun 2011a. That Hierax died in Thrace is confirmed by Polyb. 5.74.4.

¹⁵⁰ Stratonike, sister of Antiochos II and repudiated wife of Demetrios II of Macedon, held out in Antioch for six months, but failed to get the support of her nephew Seleukos II whom she expected to marry according to Ios. *Contra Apionem* 1.22 (= Agatharchides *FHG* 3.196 = *FGrH* 86 F 20); cf. Macurdy 1932, 9; 70 f.; 81; 229; 233. On different grounds, Ehling 2003, 313 f. rejects the view that Hierax was involved, but rather wonders if Stratonike was hoping for support from Euergetes. Less convincingly, Nourse 2002, 270–2 (with reference to Just. 28.1.4) dates the riot to the lifetime of Antiochos II.

¹⁵¹ The year is controversial: Toye *ad* Porphyr. F 32.7 discusses the years 228–225, accepting 226 with Grainger 1997, 61.