

## South-East Asia


Muslim Politics Module

Gary R. Bunt

1

### Regional Distribution of Muslims

Population by region as of 2010



Percentage of world Muslim population in each region as of 2010



Population estimates are rounded to the ten thousands. Percentages are calculated from unrounded numbers. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life • Global Religious Landscape, December 2012

<http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-muslim/>

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## Malaysia

Muslim Politics Module


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
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
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
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
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
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The Muslim population within Malaysia reflects a diversity of Islamic interpretations, with many customary practices - or *adat* - that are closely identified with being 'Malay' and being 'Muslim'.

*Adat*, taken from the Arabic word '*ada*', is Bahasa Malay for "custom; customary law; customary behaviour".

Another Arabic equivalent for 'custom' would be transliterated as '*urf*'.

*Adat* reflects continuity with pre-Islamic Malay peninsular religious beliefs. Contemporary Islamic interpretations in Malaysia represent - in some contexts - the changing values and aspirations of Malaysian society.

Malay Muslims are associated predominantly with **Shafi'i madhhab** or 'school', whilst those of Indian sub-continent ancestry are linked with the **Hanafi madhhab**.

13

The Malay Muslim population has been exposed to varied approaches towards Islamic interpretations, as improved communications have made the world 'smaller'.

The government has to balance Islamic rhetoric with practical realities, in a predominantly secularly oriented global context.

Selected Islamic systems and infrastructures will, after their implementation, only appeal to a proportion of Malaysia's population.

Questions arise as to whether Malaysia's intended role as an economic super-power in the twenty-first century - one of the 'Asian Tigers' - can be fully reconciled with the demands by some parties for an 'Islamic State'.

14

"... it is really the stark constituent realities of Malaysian society - a heterogeneous ethnic matrix, intra-ethnic disunity within all major ethnic-groups, the different socio-political culture of Sabah and Sarawak *vis-a-vis* peninsular Malaysia, and the secular-capitalist orientation of the whole country - which must suggest that the road ahead would indeed be arduous if pressures to see a much greater role for Islam in Malaysia were to escalate."

Hussin Mutalib, "Islamisation in Malaysia: Between Ideals and Realities", Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (Eds.) Islam, Muslims, and the Modern State, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1994), 169.

15

Recognition of the population diversity in the Malaysian Federation is significant, in terms of understanding issues relating to Islamic decision-making.

Malaysia itself was inaugurated in 1963 from the Federation of Malaya (which became independent in 1957, and comprised of the nine peninsular states, together with Melaka and Penang) together with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (the latter seceding in 1965).

Since independence, political attention has been drawn to relations between the principal communities in Malaysia - Chinese, Indian and *Bumiputra* ('ethnic Malay').

16

The question of 'who is a Malay?' is a fundamental one, because to many people who identify themselves as Malay, being 'Malay' is also directly linked to Muslim identity.

Long-established 'non-Malay' communities resident in Malaysia are not recognised as 'Malay' - but as 'Malaysian'.

Inter-mixing between different ethnic groups has compounded issues surrounding Malay identity.

This impacts upon interpretations of Islam in Malaysia, on relations between and within Islamic interests in Malaysia, and on Malaysia's global relations with external Islamic interests.

17

The emphasis upon *dakwah*, or 'propagation', by Islamic interests in Malaysia - including federal government departments - incorporated varied elements of Islamic and Malay identity, including specific pronouncements on Islamic sources.

The Bahasa Malay word *dakwah*, taken from the Arabic word *dawa*, holds specific Malaysian social, religious and organisational connotations relating to the propagation and promotion of Islam.

18

"... *Dakwah* has become the all-embracing and all-meaning term, intuitively understood and experienced, but less often deeply analyzed, to cover the spectrum of deepened religious consciousness and culture now prevailing. Its *Verstehend*\* to participants clusters along the lines of 'returning to the holy faith' (*kembalikan ke agama suci*) or 'for the sake of God' (*kerana Allah*)."

\**Verstehend* = "empathic understanding of human behaviour."

Judith Nagata, *The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Religious Radicals and Their Roots* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984), xx

19

Interpretations can reflect 'rigid' aspects of Islam, with limited flexibility, confirming or promoting existing understandings of practice.

The requirements for interpretation of the 'flexible' aspects of Islamic sources in a rural Malaysian environment may be different to those of an urban environment, influencing the form of decisions or opinions made, especially within a political-religious framework.

20

The 'details of everyday life', *remeh temeh*, can differ from Islamic issues dealt with on a governmental level. The action of pragmatic understanding and interpretation of Islam, in reaction to specific issues and circumstances, may be considered more important than the actual labelling of the process.

Nagata, 1984, 30

21

Compartmentalising 'reform' and 'tradition' can be interpreted as too rigid, as there can be interaction between these categories.

This is reflected within analysis of political groupings in Malaysia: individuals may attend meetings of (and join) several different Malay-Muslim interests.

There can be links with *dakwah* movements, seeking to promote (interpretations of) Islam amongst Muslims and non-Muslims.

Not all these groups have 'reform' on their agenda. Others made compromises to acquire a degree of political leverage.

22

Creation of **state religious councils** gives regional administrations limited control over Islamic affairs, including:

- appointments of imams,
- implementation of *shari'a* interpretations (primarily in matters of personal law),
- Islamic services' provision (i.e. pilgrimage organisation, and Islamic education).

There has been conflict between individual states' and Malaysian Federation interests, which has ramifications in interpretations of Islam.

23

Sabah and Sarawak, for example, with their considerably different ethnic compositions and substantial non-Muslim influences, have departed from government agendas on Islamic policies.

Mutalib 1983, 163-164.

24

Reference towards *ijtihad*-related concepts by various platforms indicates **diversity in Islamic understandings**, reflected within Malaysian political dialogues nationally and locally, particularly in areas of interpretation seen as '**flexible**' rather than '**rigid**'.

25

Promoting *ijtihad* comprises a component of the **United Malay's National Organisation's (UMNO)** strategy to Islamize aspects of Malaysian governmental activities, and to broadly appeal to different Islamic interests, and to other members of the government coalition.

26

Areas of governmental Islamization interests include: politics, finance, technology, education, and foreign policy. ***Syariah Courts*** utilise Islamization in cases requiring an expert understanding of Islamic issues and sources.

The issuing of *fatwa* is promoted as providing 'expert opinions' on interpretative issues lacking 'clarity'.

The extent to which *fatwa* represent the results of *ijtihad* is open to discussion.

Reference to the concept may be more important than defining the methodology of application.

\*The Bahasa Malay spelling '*syariah*' is used within the legal framework, including for the court structures, and represents an equivalent of the Arabic transliterated as '*shari'a*'.

27

Rural leadership roles cannot be diminished, with their close proximity to specific regional interests, providing approaches towards issues requiring pragmatic Islamic interpretation.

In certain cases, local religious leadership maintains higher prestige than state- or federal- authorities.

28

Individuals may utilise decision-making and opinion forming 'services' of diverse Islamic 'authorities', whilst retaining other personal or community Islamic interests and loyalties.

Islamic decision-making is also associated within the Malaysian Federation with the Sultan's role within each State - deemed to be the 'Head of Religion' or *Ketua Ugama*,\* with the powers to appoint officials in the religious hierarchy.

The power of Malaysia's Sultans has been open to abuses and criticism, perhaps indicative of a declining status for Malay royalty, exacerbated by negative newspaper headlines.

\*The Bahasa Malay word '*ketua*' means 'elder', whilst '*ugama*' is Malay for 'religion'. bin Yusop, 136 & 282.

29

In terms of affiliations within the spectrums of Islam, Malays are predominantly associated with the Shafi'i *madhhab*, whilst those of Indian sub-continent ancestry are predominantly associated with the Hanafi *madhhab*.


The Muslim population of Malaysia represents considerable diversity in its interpretations of Islam, with many traditional practices and understandings closely identified with being 'Malay' and being 'Muslim.'

30

The history of such tradition demonstrates links with religious beliefs associated with the Malay peninsular prior to the arrival of Islam. It would be incorrect to imagine that the introduction of Islam was a rapid orchestrated procedure.

Rather, it was a gradual process, which affected different areas of the peninsular at different times, frequently linked with the activities of Arab or Indian traders - who often integrated **Sufi** practices within their Islamic beliefs.

31



32

The peninsular was strategically and financially attractive to Arab traders, who may have visited the region in the first Islamic century after *hijra* - less than one hundred years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.

33

These ties included Islamic practices from the Middle East, uninfluenced by Malay custom. This led to a conflict of interpretation:

"... The Arabs, on the one hand, claiming the 'natural' superiority and enforcing it through particular gestures and body language, while the modernist Muslims adopted an 'inward' attitude of rejection of false sainthood and of elevating themselves within the local contexts by returning to the original sources through interpretation."

Mona Abaza, "Islam in South-east Asia: Varying Impact and Images of the Middle East", Chapter in: Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, 1994, 145.

34

Inter-marriage and conversion led to the establishment of Muslim-led kingdoms on the peninsular, notably the state of Malacca, which became one of the first centres for Islam in South East Asia, producing a **Shafi'i-derived digest of Islamic Law and Customary Practice** in the reign of Sultan Muzaffar Shah (1446-1459 CE).

Isma'il bin Mat, 61.

35

Contemporary Islamic decision-making and political models in Malaysia reflect historical patterns of development:

Malay peninsular affairs were dominated by European powers between the sixteenth to the twentieth century.

The British presence led to increased migration of workers from the Indian sub-continent and China, and coincided with the continued migration of Indonesian-Sumatran peoples to the Malay peninsular - with which Malays have ethnic, linguistic, ancestral, and socio-religious links.

Several states were under British patronage (between 1824 and 1957), influencing approaches towards authority and Islamic interpretation:

36

"The secularizing elements that the British injected into Malay society emphasized achievement rather than ascription, a system of authority legitimized by rulers rather than mere charisma and descent, a pragmatic rather than a magico-mystical view of life and a strict compliance with a distinct body of rules rather than blind obedience to individual chiefs."

Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, *From Saints to Bureaucrats: A Study of the Development of Islam in the State of Kedah, Malaysia* (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, USA, 1985), 158.

37

Longstanding contacts with Middle Eastern traders were an influential factor within the Malay peninsular.

**Hadhrami Arabs** were prominent in the region, especially from the seventeenth century onwards.

Hadhrami, from Yemen, intermarried with the local Muslim population, but maintained close ties with the Middle East, including Islamic practices uninfluenced by *adat*. This led to conflicts in Islamic interpretation.

38


"External" **Islamic political-religious influences** have been prominent in Islamic interpretations in South East Asia, especially when communications between the peninsular and the Middle East improved, through development of mass-steamship travel and the promotion of fulfilment of the hajj.

A secondary effect of this was exposure to 'reform'-centred Islam (and its associated political models), and an increase in Malays studying in religious seminaries, particularly in Mecca and Cairo.

39

"In the late nineteenth century, the haj contributed significantly to actualizing the egalitarianism that Islam promoted. Malay Muslims were brought into direct contact with Mecca where Islamic egalitarianism and universalism were symbolically portrayed in the cosmopolitan setting of the Holy Land, the pilgrimage ritual itself and in learning activities."

40



41

Promotion of *ijtihad* in the Malay peninsular is linked to these changes, especially exposure to Egyptian 'reformers', including Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (1839-97) and Rashid Ridha (1865-1935).

Foundation in 1906 of *Al-Imam*, a Malay-language publication, demonstrates these influences, and promoted *ijtihad*.

This was partially through advocating the Qur'an and Hadith as primary sources, for dealing with issues of concern to Malay Muslims. *Al-Imam* included translations of Arabic articles, together with readers' questions, and discussions on *fatwa*.

42

In the early twentieth century, exposure to Islam in the Middle East accentuated differences between those promoting customary practices, and those seeking reform-centred approaches towards Islam.

This conflict was not unique to Malays, and there is correlation with approaches of Muslims in other parts of the world during this period, for example in the Indian sub-continent.

Whilst broad generalisations cannot be made, these differences often developed into conflicts between (and within) generations, and between urban and rural-centred interpretations of Islam.

43

**Different Malay Muslim factions** that emerged were divided into

'*Kaum Muda*' (young party) and '*Kaum Tua*' (old party):

"Arguments about whether it was permissible for a Muslim to wear trousers and a tie, and whether taking interest from post office savings banks and rural cooperatives was lawful or not, divided people along the same lines as arguments about whether it was proper to pray at the local *keramat* (spirit shrine) or what was the correct interpretation of a verse of the Qur'an ...

"To be '*Kaum Muda*' was to espouse modernism in any form and go against tradition; to be '*Kaum Tua*' was to be in favour of all that was familiar, unchanging, and secure."

Roff, 86-86.

44

The 'reform-centred' *Kaum Muda* promoted *ijtihad*, and sought a 'return' to perceived values of 'classical' Islam, and utilisation of 'Islamic' values, in an interaction with new social concepts and technologies introduced from outside the Malay states.

Advocacy of *ijtihad* influenced understanding of Malay state legal systems, especially through interaction of customary law, *shari'a*, and British-Malay statutory law.

The implications included increasing bureaucratization of religious affairs, gradually taken from the domain of village imams to the departments of government.

45

Malay Muslim organisations reflect differences within the spectrum of Islamic interpretation and understandings, especially regarding decision-making processes.

*Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar Islam Malaysia* (PKPIM) or the National Organisation of Muslim Students (founded in 1961) demonstrated Middle Eastern reform movement influences, taking as a model the Egyptian *Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, as it expanded from a student base, into the *kampungs* or villages during the 1970s. PKPIM activities were linked to *dakwah* movements, and provided impetus for 'Islamization' by later UMNO governments, for example through promotion of ritualistic Islamic practices, mosque-building programmes, and Qur'an Reading Competitions.

*"Kampung" means "village, homestead, house and garden." Haji Abdul Rahman bin Yusop, 115.*

46

Malay-Chinese riots in May 1969 were seen as a reaction to the prospect of a left wing, Chinese-dominated government. The riots left hundreds of people dead, and government was suspended until February 1971.



47

Tun Abdul Razak (1922-1976), previously the deputy in the Alliance, became government leader in 1969, and later Prime Minister in 1970, and attempted to legislate a balance between different ethnic interests in Malaysia under the UMNO dominated *Barisan Nasional* or National Front.




48

Tun Hussein Onn (1922-1990), who won 1978 elections, continued this policy after Razak's death in 1976.



49

Onn was succeeded in 1981 by **Tun Mahathir bin Mohamad** (1922-), who promoted his own '20:20' vision based upon Islamic (Malaysian) values.



50

Mahathir remained prime minister until 2003, when there was a transition and his UMNO deputy Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (1939-) came to power.



51

**Mohammad Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak** (1953-) became Prime Minister in 2009, until 2018. After losing the election he was arrested on corruption charges - and in 2020 convicted on multiple counts, sentenced to 12 years and fined (currently out on appeal).

President of UMNO, part of national coalition (Barisan Nasional) until 2018  
Son of second PM Abdul Razak Hussain



52

**Mahathir bin Mohamad** returned to the office between 2018-20, as candidate of the new Pakatan Harapan coalition party (representing the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (BERSATU)). He resigned (at the age of 92) when BERSATU linked up with UMNO. Mahathir then formed the Homeland Fighters party



53

**Muhyiddin Yassin (Mahiaddin bin Md. Yasin.)**



Prime Minister 2020-21 for coalition Perikatan Nasional (as founder of BERSATU).

54

**Ismail Sabri Yaakob**



Prime Minister 2021. VP UMNO.

55

#### Key trends and issues

A reassertion of Malay identity, in an effort to retain political control, sought to bring Malay economic and educational aspirations in line with the majority of the Chinese population.

An increase in rural Malay attendance in urban universities stimulated reassertion of 'Islamic values'.

"Uprooted from the integrated life and security of their rural environments and thrust into modern westernized cities dominated by Chinese, many Malay youth at campuses like the prestigious University of Malaya and the *kebangsaan* (National) University turned to their Islamic heritage to preserve their sense of identity and to provide the context, language, and rationale for their reformism." [Esposito, 1991]

56

This influenced the foundation in 1971 of *ABIM* (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia*, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), which promoted a return to 'values' contained within Islamic sources. (ABIM) principal founder was **Anwar bin Haji Ibrahim** (1947-), who subsequently played a significant role in the development of 'Islamic values' within the Malaysian Federation, as a co-opted member of UMNO.



57

ABIM rapidly expanded, mobilising support against the 'old guard' within the United Malay National Organisation government.

ABIM emphasised its Islamic basis, as a means of asserting Muslim Malay rights - particularly in rural areas.

ABIM promoted the study of Islam, and made available Malay translations from Arabic of the writings of Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qutb. Malay students were also exposed to concepts from other Islamic environments, whilst attending European and U.S.A. universities.

58

Islamic-Malay values were promoted abroad: for example,

*dakwah* groups in Britain monitored students, and provided the 'security' of Malay Muslim values in a non-Muslim environment.

ABIM's increasing influence led to assertive Islamic expressions on campuses, including

'Islamic dress-codes',

formation of *ustah* cells creating 'Islamic environments' together.

59

In the late 1970s, ABIM allied with the rural-centred, religiously 'conservative' *Parti Islam Se-Malaysia* (PAS - Islamic Party of Malaysia)), indicating that it was not 'tied' to any specific political platform.

PAS advocated a theocratic model of an 'Islamic State' in Malaysia, and the implementation of *shari'a*.



60

It was previously known as the PMIP, or Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party, and has traditionally been strongly affiliated with the state of Kelantan, which it has held since 1990 (it also held the state of Terengganu between 1999 and 2004). It has lost some popularity since 9-11, because of an association with 'radical' Islam.

Within the spectrum of Malaysian Islamic understandings, outside of the governmental sphere, there are several different platforms promoting Islamic decision-making models.

61

As a reaction, in part, to organisations with 'Islamic' agendas, after the 1982 election, Mahathir Mohamad promoted selective Islamic 'reform-centred' concepts in educational, economic, and broadcasting spheres. ABIM's co-founder, Anwar Ibrahim, was co-opted into the government in 1982, claiming he could implement Islamization more effectively within 'the system'.

Islamization processes within the Malay Federation have differing time-scales and emphases. Whilst there have been infrastructures in place for the administration of Muslim personal law, the political agendas of some parties represent demands for greater implementation of *shari'a*, often going beyond the remit of the Federal Malaysian government.

62

In Kelantan's local state elections, for example, PAS sought implementation of 'Islamic' laws (even for non-Muslims) and sought advice from Islamic legal experts on related procedures. PAS continued to criticise the UMNO government's 'reluctance' to implement a rapid Islamization programme. The UMNO selective implementation of Islamic principles continued through Mahathir Mohamad's economic and social policy plan *Wawasan 2020* (Vision 2020), with an emphasis on Malaysian identity within a fully industrialised economy.

63

Islamic decision-making or opinion-forming authorities within Malaysia reflect different *adat* practices and Islamic value systems. For example, on an informal level, there is (theoretically) access to authorities within local mosques, including imams. On a rural level on the Peninsular, there is also the option of consulting within the framework of *kampung penghulu* systems.

On a more formal level, there are *Syariah* Courts, *Fatwa* Councils, and access to religious offices and authorities at local, state and federal level. Information about opinions and decisions is promoted through various methods. Information about 'Islamic' decisions is available through the media: for example, internet sites, newspaper articles, television programmes, and radio 'phone-ins' all disseminate information about approaches towards 'Islamic' issues. NGOs also promote Islamic decision-making frameworks - through service provision, which may have an Islamic component

64

### Anwar Ibrahim

Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1993 to 1998 and Finance Minister from 1991 to 1998 when he was a member of UMNO, the major party in the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition.


Removed from his post by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and jailed for corruption and sodomy.

Released in 2004, Anwar became the leading figure in the opposition.


Anwar helped coalesce the opposition parties into the Pakatan Rakyat, which contested the 2008 and 2013 general elections.

Anwar is currently serving a five-year prison sentence, commencing in 2015, after his sodomy conviction was upheld.

65



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**WAKTU SOLAT PUTRAJAYA**

Isaak 5:32  
Subuh 5:42  
Syuruk 7:03  
Zohor 1:03  
Asar 4:25  
Maghrib 7:00  
Isyak 8:13

02:06:48

Thursday 26 Nov 2015  
14 Safar 1437  
e-Solat JAKIM

**Penerbitan Jakim**

Keselamatan Masjid Bagi Tiga Masjid Jakim  
• Sep 15, 2015, Kursus Pengurusan Rekod Kenderaan Jabatan 2015 Bagi Pemandu Berotori Jakim  
• Aug 20, 2015, Majlis Perhimpunan Merdeka Raya Jakim 2015

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- Unique Visitor: 364,412
- Visitors:
  - Today: 414
  - This week: 40378
  - This month: 106270
  - This year: 1487619

Last Updated : November 25, 2015 - 8:42pm

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69

**Bahagian Pengurusan Fatwa Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia**  
Government Official

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**ABOUT**

Page name: Bahagian Pengurusan Fatwa, Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia.

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**STATUS**

**Bahagian Pengurusan Fatwa Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Jakim)'s post.**  
22 November at 01:39 · 48

**KENYATAAN MEDIA:**  
Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Jakim)  
27 November at 05:30 · 18

**KENYATAAN MEDIA**  
KETUA PENGARAH  
JABATAN KEMAJUAN ISLAM MALAYSIA (JAKIM)

70

**Portal Masjid Malaysia**

Utama Profil Organisasi Statistik Berita E-Aktiviti Persebaran Hubungi Kami JAKIM TV

**HADITH HARIAN**  
Berita harian yang memuatkan ayat-ayat suci Al-Quran dan tafsiran yang bermakna dan indah.

**WAKTU SOLAT Putrajaya**  
Subuh: 5:42  
Syuruk: 7:03  
Zohor: 1:03  
Asar: 4:25  
Maghrib: 7:00  
Isyak: 8:13

**Carian Info Masjid**

| Info Terkini                                                              | Statistik                                                              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p><b>Info Terkini</b></p> <p>6,329 +</p> <p>17,614 +</p> <p>10,377 +</p> | <p><b>Statistik</b></p> <p>6,329 +</p> <p>17,614 +</p> <p>10,377 +</p> |

**BAKUTIBAH**  
ASAS BERKUALITI ALA BERKUALITI  
SILA BERKUALITI ALA BERKUALITI  
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**BERITA TERKINI**  
KUALITI TERKINI ALA BERKUALITI  
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**AKTIVITI**  
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71

**e-Fatwa**  
Portal Resmi Fatwa Malaysia  
Khamis, 26 Nov 2015 | 14 Safar 1437 H

Utama Apa Itu Fatwa? Latar Belakang Senarai Fatwa Informasi Rujukan Hubungi Kami

**Selamat Datang**

Portal ini memuatkan keputusan Jawatankuasa Fatwa Kebangsaan, Fatwa Negeri Negeri, penjelasan isu-isu semasa hukum dan berita/aktiviti semasa berkaitan fatwa dari semasa ke semasa.

**Majlis Menandatangani Memorandum Persefahaman (MoU) Dalam Bidang...**


**Majlis Ahi-Ahi Jawatankuasa Fatwa Seluruh Malaysia**

**Majlis Jawatankuasa Penyerahan Pencapaian Dan...**

**Isu Isu Kelelahan Dalam Bidang Bioetika Diperhalusi Dalam Seminar...**

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72



73



74