This assignment will look briefly at the history of Britain’s life with the European Union (EU), then look at the major talking points of economy and prejudice and how the intergroup attitudes from both sides view the situation,
When Britain joined the European Economic Committee (EEC) in 1973, it was a different Europe to the present-day European Union that came into effect in 1993 and absorbed the EEC (Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2016). A public referendum was instituted in 1975 to see if Britain should remain in the EEC or leave, the result was a majority in all districts to remain in the EEC (Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2016) a stark contrast to the 2016 referendum (Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2016). 
A majority of research and the media highlight the issue of prejudice and immigration having a huge impact on the way people voted in the ‘Brexit’ referendum in 2016 (Kite & Whitely, 2016). However, immigration levels may have been an influencing factor in some parts of Britain, prejudice may not have (Kite & Whitely, 2016). According to Locke (1632-1704), every individual is unique and a blank canvas when they are born, and as they grow, their environment and the world at large influences them (Kite & Whitely, 2016). They absorb the views of their parents, politicians, peer-group members and ad these to their own views. Thus, intergroup contact theory can be defined as people interacting with one another and adopting others beliefs and feelings (Amir, 1976), which can lead to positive intergroup attitudes (Allport, 1954).
In order to achieve a positive result from intergroup contact, all members of the group have to have equal status, work cooperatively to achieve common goals, have acquaintance potential and institutional support. Intergroup contact involves people holding similar beliefs (Stephan, 1985).  Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) identified that some groups in society, such as politicians are afforded greater status than others. Hence, they raised that lower status groups have a weaker contact prejudice relationship than groups of higher status. Furthermore, acquaintance potential undermines stereotypes (Davis, Tropp, Aron, Petigrew, & Wright, 2011).
Institutional support is provided by authorities, social norms and the law and acknowledges clear expectations to reduce discrimination and prejudice (Brown, 2010). Festinger (1957)  and later, Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) both identify that a person’s attitudes may not fit in with the groups, which can cause conflict and unpleasantness.
Hence, intergroup contact theory identifies that by increasing individual’s knowledge of the outgroup can decrease negative emotional responses to outgroup members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Furthermore, anxiety and empathy have a huge impact on prejudice than knowledge.
Hutchings and Sullivan (2019) argue that prejudice towards others played a part in the Brexit vote. They argue that prejudice played a large part in the numerous discussions leading up to the referendum, which is identified by Berry (2016), Geddes (2016) and Vasilopoulou (2016). However, immigration, jobs, austerity measures and financial insecurity of Britain’s population played a part in people’s voting in 2016. For example, Lambeth in London voted to remain which has a large immigrant population, whereas, Great Yarmouth voted to leave and has a minimal immigrant population (Goodwin & Heath, 2016),
Furthermore, Kaufmann and Harris (2015) identified that areas of Britain that had a high immigration level voted to stay in the EU, whilst those with low levels of immigration voted to leave. Hutchings and Sullivan (2019) highlight from de Zavala, Guerra, and Simao’s (2017) study that social dominance goes along with negative attitudes towards immigration and that this was an influencing factor in the 2016 referendum. Muller (2017) identifies that this prejudice exists across the globe. Thus, Hutchings and Sullivan (2019) state that more than 70% of Britain is prejudiced. Hutchings and Sullivan (2019) continue to highlight that principled conservatives do onot identify themselves as prejudiced but give people what they are worth in society.
There were other issues besides prejudice that affected the voting of British people in the 2016 referendum (Meleady, Seger, & Vermue, 2017). Immigration has always been a contentious issue, not just in Britain but also across the gloge (Blinder, 2011; Burnett, 2011). Cowburn (2016) argues that the campaign to leave the EU was built around the immigration issue, which is some respects is true (Elgot, 2016). However, Lawton and Ackril (2016) identified that areas with a low immigration population voted to leave (85%) and areas with a high proportion of immigrant population only 44% voted to leave.
There may be a variety of reasons for theis such as local economy, job situation or it may be an ‘elite’ area. Barlow, et al., (2012) and Hayward, Tropp, Hornsey, & Barlow (2017) argue that whilst positve contact is made, negative episodes of intergroup contact can have a hard impact on independence and attitudes of outgroups.
Thus, Meleady, Segar and Vermue (2017) stated that individuals who had more prejudice towards EU immigrants voted to leave. Furthermore, Meleady, et al., (2017) identified that prejudice towards EU immigrants was a significant factor in the support for Brexit and intergroup contact played a part. Graf, Paolini and Rubin (2014) and Hayward, et al., (2017) identified that negative contact was less of a factor than positive contact and played a vital independent role in Britain’s voting intentions. Barlow, et al., (2012) and Hayward, et al., (2017) stated that anger resentment and fear were mediating factors. Meleady, et al., (2017) highlighted from their sample population that older voters who remember pre-EU , poorly educated and more politically conservative voters were the ones that were more likely to vote to leave in the 2016 referendum.
Intergroup contact could pomote flexibility in liberal belief structures (Crisp & Turner, 2011), which offers further research. Furthermore, Meleady, et al., (2017) specify that people who stated they were going to vote, may not have voted or voted opposite to what they originally were going to vote (Atkeson, 1999; Wright, 1990).
In Britain, 2016-2017 saw a vast amount of social and political change (Van de Vyver, Leite, Abrams, & Palmer, 2018), Van de Vyver, et al., (2018) further argue that peoples’ sentiments and motives pushed the Brexit vote. For example, for Great Britain to be great again. Furthermore, multidimensional intergroup anxiety has a negative effect on an independent relationship (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).
Van der Vyver et al., (2018) further identified that negative European identity and positive British identity solely predicted voters decisions and they further suggest that voting to leave was driven and precipitated by the need to have a better certainty and control over perceived threats as opposed to voting to stay in the EU, where people wished to stay as a part of a superordinate family. Hence, worldview and conservatism (person factors) and European identy and realistic threat (social factors) gave a prediction as to voting decisions.
It has also been identified that people vote in acknowledgement with their political beliefs, whach have been acquired and established throughout their lifetime via family tradition and peer group identification. Thus, because a person has been raised on Labour politics they feel pressured to vote with this even though they may believe differently (Passini, 2019). Furthermore, those that did not vote could be seen as bystanders, which includes groups and nations, which become complicit in acknowledging perpetrators and enabling intergroup conflicts (Staub, 2013). Hence, people who did not vote adopeted the role of passive bystander which enables perpetrators (Monroe, 2008; Staub, 2014).
Hence, Passini (2019) argues that people’s indifference is correlated to prejudice and hs equality deemed as low importance. Also, hierarchical regression predicts further dependent variables other than authoritarianism and social dominance orientation for example, intolerant attitudes (Passini, 2019). Passini (2017) further identifies that a social, worldwide view overrides competitive dangerous beliefs.
European “free movement” and rules have been adopted by Britain, which has created social inequalities (Kvist, 2004). The EU has removed national state borders and increased social claimants states (Kvist, 2004). Cappelen & Peters (2018) identify that EU members are not permitted to choose to who they give social rights to, Hence, the welfare state beneficiaries from Britain are outsourced by the vast influx of EU immigrants which puts pressure on the already fragile welfare systems (Andersen & Bjorklund, 1990; Cappelen & Peters, 2018).
Immigration can affect social preferences (Luttmer, 2001; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009). Even the EU, not just Britain, has had a growing concern with the right to social security when the right of freedom of movement is carried out (Cappelen & Peters, 2018). Thus all European workers within the EU maintain their rights to equal benefits (Freeman, 1986). Furthermore, Britain has been very protective of its welfare state, which it can no longer afford to be due there being no borders meaning all outsiders can be given full access to the welfare state in Britain  (Cappelen C. , 2016). Therefore, protection of Britains welfare state could have been a factor in the way that people voted. Furthermore, the media’s influence in portraying immigrants from Eastern Europe especially in a negative way would have influenced peoples’ minds to leave the EU (Johns, 2014).
Some individuals cojuld have seen immigrants as giving native Britain’s lower wages as well as putting extra strain on the welfare system, and Johns (2014) specifies that mainstream politicians and government agencies have often reinforced this. However, the strain on the welfare system already existed pror to immigration as there are nor enough working people to keep it going (Banting, Soroka, & Koning, 2013; Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka, & Soroka, 2010; Soroka, Johnston, & Banting, 2007). Furthermore, many of Europe’s welfare state institutions are widely acceptable and therefore can not be the sole economic self-interest (Koning, 2011).
Many people belong to the welfare chauvinists who identify that welfare should not be across the board, but should be for natives of a country, in this case, Britain (Crepaz & Damron, 2008).
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, (2009) and Mewes and Mau (2012) acknowledge that most European countries would adopt restrictions on access to their welfare systems, which, then reduces the onus of financing it on tax payers who are now being hit hard. Hence, the ingroup who have similar attitudes and beliefs outweigh the outgroup whose attitudes and beliefs are more individual (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004).
Shayo (2009) argues that a high income class or a nation that are less redistributive have followers from the original identity group such as the low-income class of natives. Further studies have shown that attitudes of discrimination and perceived threats are directly affected by the size of a migrant population (Kunovich, 2004; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 206). However, studies undertaken demonstrate that immigrants contribute a considerable amount more to the welfare system than they take out of it (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014).
In conclusion, it can be stated that the Brexit vote may have been influenced by intergoup attitudes, but as discussed other factors could have been present, also todays media plays an influential part in forming and persuading public attitudes and beliefs, and social media has a huge impact as well. Immigration factors played a small part in the Brexit vote as areas in Britain that had a low immigration population voted to leave the EU, whereas high immigration areas voted to remain.
Institutional support which is provided by authorities, the laws and social norms have also played a part in the Brexit vote. Dependent upon individuals status in society European laws can be seen to be over the top and, in a way has voiced what trade unions  used to do (i.e.) protect people’s rights. Furthermore, a persons attitude and beliefs may not fit in with a group which makes a mockery of politicians and democracy as Brexit was the people s vote, thus hwy have politicians been involved? Basically, it is to protect their European rights and benefits not to protect the natives (de Zavala, Guerra, & Simao, 2017). Politicians could be seen as being the largest instigators of immigration negativity, and should have involved the people of Britain in what they wanted from a Brexit deal.
It is now three years since the British public voted to leave the EU and there is still no clear cut deal due to there being being divisions among the politicians individually and as members of their own political party. Intergroup attitudes may have had an effect on the outcome of the referendum though the economic migrants in the country did not get a vote. If the politicians eventually decide to exit or stay in the EU what future for democracy.
 
References
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. New York, NY: Perseus.
Amir, Y. (1976). The role of intergroup contact in the change of prejudice and ethnic relations. In P. A. Katz (Ed.), Towards the elimination of racism (pp. 245-308). New York: Pergamon.
Andersen, J. G., & Bjorklund, T. (1990). Structural changes and new cleavages: The progress parties in Denmark and Norway. Acta Sociologica, 33(3), 195-217.
Atkeson, G. W. (1999). "Sure I voted for the winner!" Overreport of the primary vote for the party mominee in the national election studies. Political Behaviour, 21(3), 197-215.
Banting, K., Soroka, S., & Koning, E. (2013). Multicultural diversity and redistribution. In K. Banting, & J. Myles (Eds.), Inequality and the fading of redistributive politics (pp. 165-186). Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press.
Barlow, F. K., Paolini, S., Pedersen, A., Hornsey, M. J., Radke, H. R., Harwood, J., . . . Sibley, C. G. (2012). The contact caveat: Negative contact predicts increased prejudice more than positive contact predicts reduced prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(12), 1629-1644.
Becker, S. O., Fetzer, T., & Novy, D. (2016). Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-level analysis. CAGE Working Paper No. 305.
Berry, M. (2016). Understanding the role of mass media in the EU Referendum. In D. Jackson, E. Thorson, & D. Wring (Eds.), EU Referendum analysis 2016: Media, voters and the campaign (p. 14). Bournemouth University: The Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and Community.
Blinder, S. (2011). UK public opinion toward migration: Determinants of attitudes. University of Oxford. Oxford: The Migration Observatory .
Brown, R. (2010). Prejudice: Its social psychology (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Burnett, J. (2011). Eastern European workers under attack. The Institute of Race Relations. Retrieved November 1, 2019, from http://www.irr.org.uk/news/eastern-european-workers-under-attack/
Cappelen, C. (2016). Intra-EU migration adn the moral sustainability of the welfare state. In Y. Peters, & M. Tatham (Eds.), Democratic transformations in Europe 31-challenges and opportunities (pp. 43-63). Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Cappelen, C., & Peters, Y. (2018). The impact of intra-EU migration on welfare chauvinism. Journal of Public Policy, 38(3), 389-417.
Cowburn, A. (2016, June 6). EU referendum: Brexit campaign accused of 'fanning flames of division' with controversial map. The Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-vote-leave-accused-of-fanning-the-flames-of-division-after-publishing-controversial-a7067701.html
Crepaz, M. M., & Damron, R. (2008). Constructing tolerance: How the welfare state shapes attitudes about immigrants. Comparative Political Studies, 42, 437-463.
Crisp, R. J., & Turner, R. N. (2011). Cognitive adaptation to the experience of social and cultural diversity. Psychological Bulletin, 137(2), 242-267.
Davis, K., Tropp, L., Aron, A., Petigrew, T. F., & Wright, S. C. (2011). Cross-group friendships and intergroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15(4), 332-352.
de Zavala, A. G., Guerra, R., & Simao, C. (2017). The relationship between the Brexit vote and individual predictors of prejudice: collective narcissism, rght wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation. Frontiers in Psychology, 8. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02023
Dustmann, C., & Frattini, T. (2014). The fiscal effects of immigration to the UK. The Economic Journal, 124(580), F593-F643.
Elgot, J. (2016, June 20). Sayeeda Warsi quits leave campaign over 'hateful, xenophobic' tactics. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/20/sayeeda-warsi-quits-leave-campaign-over-hateful-xenophobic-tactics
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Freeman, G. P. (1986). Migration and the political economy of the welfare state. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 485, 51-63.
Geddes, A. (2016). The referendum and Britain's broken immigration politics. In D. Jackson, E. Thorson, & D. Wring (Eds.), EU Referendum analysis 2016: Media, voters and the campaign (p. 18). Bournemouth University: The Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and Community.
Goodwin, M., & Heath, O. (2016). Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Gorodzeisky, A., & Semyonov, M. (2009). Terms of exclusion: Public views towards admission and allocation of rights to immigrants in European countries. Ethinic and Racial Studies, 32(3), 401-423.
Graf, S., Paolini, S., & Rubin, M. (2014). Negative intergroup contact is more influential, but positive intergroup contact is more common: Assessing contact prominence and contact prevalence in five Central European Countries. European Journal of Social Psychology, 44(6), 536-547.
Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. S. (Eds.). (1999). Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Associaton.
Hayward, L. E., Tropp, L. R., Hornsey, M. J., & Barlow, F. K. (2017). Towards a comprehensive understanding of intergroup contact: Descriptions and mediators of positive and negative contact among majority and minority groups. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(3), 347-364.
Hutchings, P. B., & Sullivan, K. E. (2019). Prejudice and the Brexit vote: a tangled web. Palgrave Communications, 5(1), 1-5.
Johns, M. (2014). The new minorities of Europe: Social cohesion in the European Union. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Johnston, R., Banting, K., Kymlicka, W., & Soroka, S. (2010). National identity and support for the welfare state. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 43(2), 349-377.
Kaufmann, E., & Harris, G. (2015). "White Flight" or positive contact? Local diversity and attitudes to immigration in Britain. Comparative Political Studies, 48(12), 1563-1590.
Kite, M. E., & Whitely, B. E. (2016). Psychology of Preju (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.
Koning, E. (2011). The real and perceived economics of immigration: Welfare chauvinism and immigrants' use of government transfers in twelve countries. Waterloo: Canadian Political Science Association Conference, 16-18 May.
Kunovich, R. M. (2004). Social structural position and prejudice: An exploration of cross-national differencesin regression slopes. Social Science Research, 33(1), 20-44.
Kvist, J. (2004). Does EU enlargement start a race to the bottom? Strategic interaction among EU member states in social policy. Journal of European Social Policy, 14(3), 301-318.
Lawton, C., & Ackril, R. (2016, July 8). Hard evidence how areas with low immigration voted mainly for Brexit. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-how-areas-with-low-immigration-voted-mainly-for-brexit-62138
Luttmer, E. F. (2001). Group loyaltiy and the taste for redistribution. Journal of Political Economy, 109(3), 500-528.
Mau, S., & Burkhardt, C. (2009). Migration and welfare state solidarity in Western Europe. Journal of European Social Policy, 19(3), 213-229.
Meleady, R., Seger, C. R., & Vermue, M. (2017). Examining the role of positive and negative intergroup contact and anti-immigrant prejudice in Brexit. British Journal of Social Psychology, 56(4), 799-808.
Mewes, J., & Mau, S. (2012). Welfare chauvinism, class and economic uncertainty. In S. Svallfors (Ed.), Contested welfare states: Welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond (pp. 119-157). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Monroe, K. R. (2008). Cracking the code of genocide: The moral psychology of rescuers, bystanders and Nazis during the holocaust. Political Psychology, 29(5), 699-737.
Muller, J. W. (2017). What is populism? St Ives, UK: Penguin Books.
Passini, S. (2017). Subtle prejudice and conformism: The intergroup indifference . The International Jounal of Psychological Research, 10(1), 25-34.
Passini, S. (2019). Backing unequal policies: The complicit role of intergroup indifference. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 25(2), 122-129.
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2011). When groups meet: The dynamics of intergroup contact. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., & Gorodzeisky, A. (206). The rise of anti--foreigner sentiment in European societies 1988-2000. American Sociological Review, 71(3), 426-449.
Shayo, M. (2009). A model fo social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class adn redistribution. American Political Science Review, 103(2), 147-174.
Sniderman, P. M., Hagendoorn, L., & Prior, M. (2004). Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities. American Political Science Review, 98(1), 35-49.
Soroka, S., Johnston, R., & Banting, K. (2007). Ethnicity, trust and the welfare state. In F. Kay, & R. Johnston (Eds.), Social capital, diversity and the welfare state (pp. 279-303). Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press.
Staub, E. (2013). Building a peaceful society: Origins, prevention and reconciliation after genocide and other group violence. American Psychologist, 68(7), 576-590.
Staub, E. (2014). Obeying, joining, following, resisting and other processes in the Milgram studies, and in the holocaust and other genocides: Situations, personality and bystanders. The Journal of Social Issues, 70(3), 501-514.
Stephan, W. G. (1985). Intergroup relations. In G. Lindzey, & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 599-658). New York, NY: Random House.
Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In Reducing prejudice and discrimination (pp. 23-45). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Van de Vyver, J., Leite, A. C., Abrams, D., & Palmer, S. B. (2018). Brexit or Bremain? A person and social analysis of voting decisions in the EU referendum. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 28(2), 65-79.
Vasilopoulou, S. (2016). Campaign frames in the Brexit referendum. In D. Jackson, E. Thorson, & D. Wring (Eds.), EU Referendum analysis 2016: Media, voters and the campaign (p. 114*115). Bournemouth University: The Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and Community.
Wright, G. C. (1990). Misreports of vote choice in the 1988 NES Senate elections study. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15(4), 543-563.