

2

A REALIST AGENDA FOR PEACE

Survival and a victor's peace

Introduction: realist silences

The implications of the Realist tradition for a concept of peace are associated with a victor and its norms, institutions, and perspectives of social, economic, and political systems. A victor's peace has often been summarised as: "[t]hey make a desert and call it peace."¹ It is also seen as a foil for the idealist and liberal hybrid version of peace that was partly being contested in the first 'great debate.' While idealist and liberal versions offered a positive epistemology of peace, realism offered a negative epistemology based upon survival as Wight argued, and a victor's peace that Tacitus might have recognised. The resultant version of peace and its sustainability are dependent upon a victor's hegemony:

[p]olitical theory and law...are the theory of the good life. International theory is the theory of survival.²

Realism sees IR as a state of war that cannot be overcome by anything other than a Leviathan.³ It is a debate rather than a concrete argument, but it suggests a continuing cycle of violence and coercively induced stability (which is the nearest it comes to peace), as opposed to liberalism's progressive view. It rests upon what Jim George has argued to be a set of crude characterisations of the thought of the likes of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Morgenthau, and Carr,⁴ who are represented both as the founders of realism and of the discipline of IR. Common assumptions are shared across the spectrum of realist thought that draws together a selection of 'great texts' specifically about the problem of anarchy because of the lack of an overarching power, and the eternal laws of self-interest that govern human and state behaviour. There are many subtle differences between what are known as classical, scientific positivist,

neo-realist, structural, offensive, and critical realist strands of the tradition, of course. However, power, sovereignty, national interest, and human nature are taken to be perennial and tragic, reflecting the Augustinian notion of 'fallen man' and, of course, the whole range of normative assumptions upon which this was based.⁵

According to Wight and others, the state ensures survival in a system of international anarchy, and security for some inevitability means insecurity for others. Thus, there can be no general welfare or security except at a minimal level determined by a fragile and costly balance of power.⁶ This has been the tragedy of the realist representation of IR.⁷ This chapter examines how this modern realist tradition has developed a limited concept of peace that many would find either pragmatic in the light of inter-state relations, or unacceptable on pragmatic, normative, ethical, and ontological grounds, and would only accept if there was no other choice other than war. Yet, realism establishes this environment – a state of nature – as a basis for IR via a specific interpretation of a wide range of thinkers. What is often forgotten is that realism benefits certain groups on social and international levels: elites with access to resources, material, technological, and military. This is made possible because war and violence represent the origin of IR in realist thought made possible by the 'state of nature.' It represents a conservative refusal of progress, equality, and social norms. Indeed, from this perspective, realism appears both anachronistic and silent on the concept of peace.

Classical realism and the first great debate

According to Buzan, realism represents an

...ever-changing discourse about the nature, application and effect of power in an ever-changing historical environment.⁸

Yet, the discourse appears not to change because its focus is on power rather than discourse (which reflects materiality more than is shaped by it). Indeed, the deep differences between claims of realism to describe the world and more interpretative reflections mean that it hardly even makes sense to talk of a debate between positivist and post-positivist debates in the discipline. Peace is a concept which highlights this exclusion *in extremis*.

For realism, peace is zero-sum. The implications of the work of key realist thinkers for the conceptualisation of peace underline rejection of a universal ethic of peace and an acceptance of a limited understanding of peace contained within state boundaries, and projected by powerful actors according to their own interests. Within the realist tradition, there also exists an implicit version of peace, unobtainable and probably undesirable because of its equation with imperialism or a Leviathan and its implied exchange of insecurity for domination in order to receive security in exchange, but by which the inadequacies of the international order can be measured. At their most basic level, realist debates represent

a peace that is at best an absence of open violence between self-interested states, but not an absence of threat. Hobbes argued that,

For every state war is incessant and lifelong against every other state... For what most men call 'peace,' this is really only a name – in truth, all states by their very nature are always engaged in an informal war against all other states.⁹

For realism, this confirms that insecurity is the central problem of IR, framed by Hobbes' framework of sovereignty, broken contracts, and fear.¹⁰ According to Hobbes, the law of nature demands that humans seek peace, which is based upon the establishment of contracts. In order to prevent the 'natural' impulse towards breaking those contracts, a commonwealth is formed that uses its sovereign authority, provided by a social contract, to ensure its survival through creating a fear of punishment by the Leviathan. Commonwealths are founded on institutional agreement or forcible acquisition and sovereignty – equated with the sovereign knowledge of truth required to ensure a civil peace – may rest on democracy, or more feudal frameworks for governance. Hobbes' civil peace works best according to him through monarchy, where there is no chance of disagreement over policy. Because the international is an anarchic state of nature, the implication is that war can lead to an international peace only if a victor is capable of imposing its will on all other states. This results in a limited peace focused upon survival and resting on one state's – or an alliance of states' – hegemony – perhaps more familiar as imperialism. This envisages a constant struggle for hegemony to quote Hobbes:

the nature of War consisteth not in actual fighting: but in the known pre-disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is Peace.¹¹

Peace is therefore limited by the requirement of a constant state of domestic preparation for war. Yet, the nature of the domestic polity is also assumed to be subject to a more ambitious concept of peace, based upon shared values, identity, and interests, within a homogenous community. This indicates that the dominant realist line of thought about peace is heavily influenced by perceptions of threat though it also offers a possibility at the domestic level of a 'minimally liberal' peace in which liberty is ensured by a Leviathan, but only when individuals submit to the rules and contracts of the commonwealth.

Yet, in practice, states have been subject to an internal peace that may be self-sustaining, viable, and far-reaching domestically, even if this is heavily constrained by the need for the state to be geared towards war with other states, either for survival or for the pursuit of grander interests. Paradoxically, Hobbes' representation of a lifelong state war for every state beyond the domestic level may be misleading because it divides the domestic from the international

and more importantly ignores the broader implications of his suggestion of a commonwealth.¹² States have long realised the potential derived from domestic stability and from international cooperation despite the fact that their domestic situation is likely to be partially based upon the requirements for a permanent preparedness for war. Hobbes, writing in the context of the English Civil War, was well aware of this problem as his discussion of the need for a civil peace, a social contract, and a commonwealth indicated. This paradoxical and modern realist interpretation, not to mention contextualisation, courtesy of the trauma of the wars of the 20th century, underlines one of the signal failures of the realist tradition: its projection of a violent and fragile future for many individuals and states within the international space, while simultaneously claiming that it offers a pathway to domestic stability and liberty upon submission to a sovereign.

This is also rooted in an essentialist understanding of human nature as inherently evil, which is consequently then reflected in the nature of political and social organisation and their conflictual relations. Amongst homogenous populations in a domestic order, a limited peace is possible, but this is not the case at the international level. This ontology and methodological binary formed the basis of a general realist acceptance that international and domestic order revolves around constraint and enforcement according to the interests and ideology of the powerful. Human nature, the imperatives that national interest and security place upon states that pursue incompatible interests, the belief that the balance of power is probably the only structural constraint available in IR, and that every state is subject to, and driven by, a security dilemma,¹³ mean that the peace on offer from this perspective is delineated and enforced by the Westphalian, Weberian state. In the context of the states of the 20th century, the best this territorial entity could offer IR is to amass power and resources, control the means of violence to govern or coerce its population where necessary, to protect it from the predations of other states.

If it can be disregarded that this account rests upon a distinct and flawed division between the international and domestic and supposes that a domestic peace can survive international stress, this means that any international peace is fleeting and limited, rests on the capacity for violence, and can never become self-sustaining without a hegemon. Even at a domestic level, the nature of the international system provides an obstacle to peace. Of course, in maintaining the capacity for violence, states ensure that the means of violence could, at some point, be deployed offensively. Even if this is not the case, defensive capacities for violence reproduce threats and fear. Much of the modern realist tradition therefore focuses its energy on the conditions necessary for violence to be deployed. It takes as read that self-defence is a sufficient reason for this, but self-aggrandisement, 'national interests,' and pre-emption of future threats remain more controversial areas in the realist canon. There is little subtlety about how large the margins that might repulse security threats might be before they begin to exacerbate those threats. Thus, the escalation of threats and insecurity is reproduced by realism, which is then taken as an ontological reason for realism's objective claims. But

the ontology of escalation and violence realism offered as a 'victor's peace' is, of course, constructed through its generally positivist reading of historiography, which provides some basis for an understanding of war between states, but little basis for an understanding or construction of a broader peace.

Doyle has outlined four main aspects of realism: fundamentalist versions stem from Machiavelli, complex versions from Thucydides, constitutional versions from Rousseau, and structuralist versions from Hobbes.¹⁴ Complex realism sees IR as a state of war and anarchy. Fundamentalism versions see all human and states interact as driven by the quest for power. Structural versions see all states as similar in goals, but not in capacities. Constitutional versions add a concern with cultural, social, economic, and politic variations.¹⁵ These variations offer a narrow concern with moral issues (Thucydides), the probability of imperial expansion (Machiavelli), rational and unitary states which engage in war for survival or at best short-term balancing alliances (Hobbes), and a combination of just social contracts, national interest, isolation, defence, and democracy, which may mitigate the general state of war (Rousseau).¹⁶ The traditional linear historiography of realism reaches back to Thucydides to show that conflict and violence outweigh cooperation in IR because states can do little other than pursue power and influence if they are to survive. Thucydides is often taken to have offered a universal reading of what powerful actors may do in his infamous Melian dialogue, which is generally interpreted to be a pragmatic endorsement of such practices.¹⁷ In this milieu of the inherency of violence in humanity and states, as Machiavelli pointed out, there is little room for moral codes and cooperation, but rather cynicism and amorality, through which realism is deployed to read history and to explain IR as a Hobbesian state of nature. For Machiavelli, human nature was self-interested and morality and justice could be nothing more than a reflection of the hegemony of great powers.¹⁸ In a similar vein, Rousseau is represented as focusing on the darker side of human nature.¹⁹

These texts have been appropriated in certain ways by the realist canon and methodology to prove that power and violence underpin the workings of the international system in an ahistorical and irredeemable way. History and politics prove that there is no alternative, and so given this position, IR is about managing interests, balancing power, and at most making alliances between 'like-minded' states. As Hobbes infamously pointed out, peace was extremely limited, and war extremely far-reaching. His notion of a 'state of nature' posited that a disposition towards war in international relations was simply a reflection of human nature. What is more, for Hobbes and for realists since Hobbes, this approximated a scientific law – the nature of the individual is reflected by the international state of nature. It is from these strands that contemporary realist thought has drawn upon a tradition of states as unified, and rational, and able to act as one in their pursuit of a 'national interest,' thereby maximising their latent capacity for both defence and offensive international engagements.

Of course, as George has pointed out, these readings are particular to modern realism because of its methodological approach: other, perhaps more optimistic,

though just as subjective, readings can also be gleaned from the same texts.²⁰ Indeed, the rationalisation of fear that Hobbesian thought offered can be taken as a starting point for thinking about peace.²¹ Though Hobbes saw peace as limited, he also argued that it could be achieved through a Commonwealth overseen by a Leviathan, representing a civil peace and social contract. Indeed, Hobbes offered education rather than the use of force as a path to peace.²² This is a rather more sophisticated account than a balance of power between states in which peace is simply the fragile moment in between conflicts. In other words, Hobbes is concerned with a peace within and between societies, even if his prescriptions for a Leviathan appear to lead to anarchy or authoritarianism rather than freedom.²³ Indeed, for Hobbes, peace was a state of non-interference in the lives of others in a commonwealth where a civil association existed, which appears to reflect the modern liberal state very closely.²⁴ This begs the question as to why realism focuses on the anarchy offered by Hobbes' work, and why it assumes that a domestic peace can coexist with international instability. The assumption is that international instability interferes with domestic peace, rather than the possibility that the Commonwealth Hobbes envisaged might tame the international:

Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that War shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.²⁵

However, on balance, the sum of his thinking seems to indicate that a basic level of peace is the best that could be aspired to in the absence of a commonwealth. He was also aware of the dangers of universalism,²⁶ and the claim that there was a universal framework that powerful actors could then deploy through war and violence to their advantage, on the assumption that other actors and states could be coercively assimilated. This would mean an imperialist victor's peace, and Hobbes was clear that he would rather see a limited peace that reflected the norms and sentiments of its local and integral actors. In asserting this position, Hobbes identified one of the key dilemmas in the consideration of peace for idealists, liberals, and realists. The position that peace can only be very limited and every state or commonwealth defines its own version of peace has served as a reason why more sophisticated agendas for peace are not worthwhile in realist thought, because they are implausibly interventionary and not pragmatic, particularly given the limited resources of any one state, and competition between states. What is clear, however, is that even amongst the founding canon of realist works, there are also discourses of peace focusing upon the alleviation of the state of nature.²⁷ Despite such subtleties, texts such as *Leviathan* are taken to provide validification of modern realism's denial of peace, and the view that war is part of the 'fall' of humanity along the lines envisaged by Augustine.

Hegel offered another critique of peace. He argued that war maintained the ethical health of the nation and '...prevents a corruption of nations which a perpetual peace would produce.'²⁸ Yet, Hegel was also able to argue that generally

individuals were concerned with the well being of others as Kant was also able to see that perpetual peace might be subject to hegemony. Hegel's account of the dimensions of ethical life in his *Philosophy of Right* included the family and civil society, as well as the state. However, the state was the most significant component of this attempt to promote an ethical life and was duty bound to retain its sovereignty and its capacity for war.²⁹ Indeed, for Hegel, war provided a context in which individuals might demonstrate their capacity for an ethical life in society. Peace for Hegel would produce a 'corruption of nations.'

The view that war may be inevitable, and even desirable, became suffused throughout modern realism as it drew selectively on this canon, even though it also contained notions of peace. The notion of peace that emerges is bounded, spatial, and temporally limited within specific states. It represents a victor's peace, founded upon the use of force and form of imperialism. Imperialism was a key part of a realist notion of peace (and contributed to the later development of the liberal peace). The British Empire's exploration of new sea routes during the Elizabethan era led to a rapid realisation of the potential for trade, and ultimately the financial and military benefits of territorial acquisition and control. In 1570, John Dee wrote his *Brytannicae Republicae Synopsis*,³⁰ which famously became the basis for imperial expansionism. It soon became acceptable to talk of imperial or colonial hegemony as a realist form of peace. 'Superior' races, technology, and expertise, probably god-given, became the intellectual and normative basis of Western imperialism across the world. The highest form of realpolitik had become imperialism, as Morgenthau later explained.³¹ The development of imperialism reflected the requirements of capitalist states in the developing international political economy. This later developed into what was known as 'liberal imperialism' during the late 19th century in which the imperial power had a responsibility towards the development of subject people (who were implicitly seen as primitive and/or barbaric). However, its strong territorial nature meant that competition between imperial powers over territory meant that along with its serious ethical problems, imperialism was also very unstable, open to challenges from the colonised, and from competing imperial powers.

These tensions within the realist tradition meant that in practice, it was gradually modified by a more liberal notion that war should only be waged by a legitimate authority as a last resort and in response to an act of unjustified aggression. After the Congress of Vienna, for example, peace now depended upon territorial states and their international arrangements for government, which preserved a patchwork of interests between states through the balance of power. This supported a peace resting upon international treaties and alliances, as was envisaged by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and many others to follow. Territorial, secular, state sovereignty emerged as the guarantee and arbiter of territory and hence peace, envisaged as a balance of power between juxtaposed territorial units, which mounted a possible threat against others. This was the nature of what might be called the Westphalian peace. War was the painful process through which the balance of power mechanism corrected itself. Peace was more or less

what existed in between such corrections (as according to Hobbes). Gradually, however, the view that war was part of the natural fabric of international life was displaced by the view that peace should be so, as was bitterly contested in the first great debate of IR. The realist hypothesis that peace could only exist as an ideal form in a utopian future ruled by a Leviathan was countered by the idea that a form of peace could and did exist in the context of well-governed nation-states where a social contract existed. Yet, the notion that war was a normal part of international life continued to underpin the thinking of many of the elites who oversaw international relations.

What emerged at the beginning of the 20th century was a continuation of an understanding of war as part of the 'natural order,' now modified by the progressive agency of enlightened actors with liberal views and objectives for the relationships of both states and peoples. This drew on both Hobbes' and Locke's thinking, amongst others. Locke, for example, argued that a law-based government would produce consensus, legitimacy, and therefore a domestic peace.³² Soon, realist thought was under pressure because the peace it offered was unacceptable to a growing number of social actors within states, and representative of states. An understanding of IR based upon rational progress emerged, in which humanity was believed to be progressing towards a more or less utopian ideal via a growth in interdependence, international law, non-state actors, advocacy and lobbying for disarmament, enfranchisement, and women's rights, amongst others. Even *statesmen* seemed to believe, with the exception of a notable minority, that a version of peace of benefit to at least most of the visible world (from the perspective of Western imperial and colonial states) was possible. For a time, the realist interpretation of the world and of the texts it had appropriated seemed to have failed.

Yet, the idealist challenge broke down catastrophically with Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939. As a result, for much of the remainder of the century, realism provided both a mode of analysis and a *modus operandi*. The resurgence of realism, and, of course, E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau's famous studies, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* and *Politics Among Nations*, respectively, revived the view that idealist versions of peace were simply too progressive, indeed dangerously naive, to be possible. State interests were generally focused on self-interest in economic, military, and territorial terms, which defined international relations, and only alliances between states could induce a certain stability – through a balance of power – but this would be constantly undermined by competition between states. Idealist and even liberal views placed too much faith in the goodwill of other states.

Carr attempted to recast realism as the science of IR in the emerging methodological style of the day. This, as George has shown, was based upon the pre-eminence of '...fact over value, is over ought, and object over subject...' though Carr was also well aware of the significance of the normative aspects of IR. Peace was seen to be a 'value,' an 'ought,' a 'subjective' concept,³³ and therefore inferior to, or limited by the realist version of 'fact,' and 'objective' approaches. Indeed, for Carr, a form of peace defined as morality at the international level

was merely the projection of the interests of dominant states.³⁴ Peace was merely a hope, though it must also be noted that he was concerned with the inseparable relationship between power and morality, and the problems of crude amoral, realism, and of universal claims for a specific morality:

...the utopian who dreams that it is possible to eliminate self-assertion from politics and to base a political system on morality alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes that altruism is an illusion and that all political action is based on self-seeking.³⁵

Bull also thought that 'idealist' claims simply rested upon a passionate hope for IR, rather than an understanding that had any intellectual depth.³⁶

For Morgenthau, a balance of power emerged from the struggle between states in order to regulate the worst effects of that struggle.³⁷ This was developed in the context of a Weberian 'verstehen' approach to observing the role of statesmen in deploying 'interest defined as power' in international politics.³⁸ Out of this came a very limited victor's peace, theorised to reflect interest defined as power and the competition between 'nations',³⁹ with little acknowledgement of its related value systems and norms. Morgenthau developed perhaps the most important explanation of realism from a philosophical and historical perspective, and of the inevitable 'flouting of universal standards of morality'⁴⁰ (though later in his career, he was particularly critical of the behaviouralist turn that realism had taken, and of realism itself in the context of its inability to go beyond the state of nature).⁴¹ Realism aimed at the control of war rather than its proliferation.⁴² However, even those realists that favoured a historical or philosophical approach disliked the pretences of a science of realism, which many felt did not take this aim far enough.

From these assertions, a claim was developed by realists that they described an eternal reality and had constructed a pragmatic approach to explaining and managing it. This recast the Realist canon again turned to earlier thinkers in order to support this claim, in the process often misrepresenting the subtleties of their claims⁴³ because of their aspirations towards producing a science of IR. Yet, such claims clearly objectified and essentialised, not to mention reduced, the key components and claims of IR, leading to the positivist realist depiction of an endless cycle of the historical repetition of war, interest, and breakdowns in the balance of power. Realism revolved around the tendency of states to exist in their own moral universe, and therefore to compete even on a normative basis.⁴⁴ Both Morgenthau and Niebuhr thought that any kind of universal ethical concern projected at the international level – as idealists and liberals called for – may indeed be a cause for war, rather than a cause of moderation.⁴⁵

From the perspective accorded by an examination of peace, the first 'great debate' of IR, which seemed by WWII to have been settled in favour of realism, appears to have been an artificial debate in which 20th-century realists interpreted canonical texts in the new context of the inter-war period and the Cold

War. This was in order to endorse a science of realism via commentary that was biased towards the view that only realism could explain IR, and to discredit idealist and liberal thinking on peace. This raises the question of whether classical realism and the first great debate is mainly an invention of a certain epoch of modern realist IR, imposed on history to determine the present and the future according to a negative epistemology of peace.⁴⁶

Realist science

During the second half of the 20th century, realist thought moved from a historical and philosophical base towards adopting the formats offered by behaviouralism and positivism, as illustrated by Wolfer's 'billiard ball' model, which represented a 'scientific image' of realism⁴⁷ (culminating in the rational choice models which have dominated corners of realist and liberal theory). The move to place realism within the ambit of a science of international relations was part of a broader positivist movement in social science, focusing on the behaviouralist argument that observable human and social behaviour was crucial. This so-called 'second debate' in IR was effectively an attempt to legitimate the assumptions realism was already based upon. Such rational actor models focused upon utilitarian calculations of interest and power (even offering the proposition that nuclear war might have utility) and endorsed the notion that state interest could be defined as power underpinned by a basic concern with self-preservation. There was little room for any discussion of peace in these approaches, during the Cold War, where in one period between 1983 and 1988, \$3 trillion was spent on weaponry by both superpowers.⁴⁸ At the same time, issues such as famine, disease, and civil war continued, often ignored by IR. Self-preservation was defined in terms not of the construction of a broader peace but in terms of the preservation of the state as an umbrella for the nation. This endorsed the Weberian state control of violence to preserve its domestic integrity and its position in competition with other states.

Kenneth Waltz's first major work continued along these lines and provided a structure more able to represent realist interpretations of scientific order in the latter half of the 20th century. In *Man, the State, and War*, he argued that there are essentially 'three images,' all of which are representative of the fragility of IR, and its propensity for violence. The first, human nature, is the root cause of war.⁴⁹ The second, the state, dictates the clash of national interest between states. And the third, the international system, is structured in such a way that state behaviour is determined by this clash. According to Waltz, international anarchy is the cause of war and, as with his reading of Rousseau, the nature of social relations leads to war. In this system, there was little room for any peaceable alternative other than the brief absence of war at all or one of these three images of IR. Because all states operate within a balance of power, and are subject to a security dilemma vis-à-vis other states' warlike intentions and selfish national interests, peace is simply a hiatus from violence and will always be limited, brief, tragic, and illusory.

Martin Wight's intervention into IR theory pointed to the paucity and moral poverty of IR's orthodoxies, and argued that IR was a realm of the repetition of war, but he also pointed to the potential of international government, if it existed, in promoting peace.⁵⁰

So long as the absence of international government means that Powers are primarily preoccupied with their survival, so long will they seek to maintain some kind of balance between them.⁵¹

This rested upon a limited notion of peace arrived at through his reading of three thinkers – Machiavellians who equate with realists, Grotians with rationalists, and Kantians with idealists.⁵² Grotian rationalism represented a middle ground between realism and idealism, but essentially, given its focus on states, law, and a balance of power, merely represented a softer form of realism which always lay beneath IR.⁵³ Such thinking was also reflected in Hedley Bull's contribution, in which he argued that anarchy and society were central to IR. Bull developed an argument resting upon the assertion that international relations are derived from a 'domestic analogy' whereby,

'...the need of individual men to stand in awe of a common power in order to live in peace is a ground for holding that states must do the same. The conditions of an orderly social life, on this view, are the same among states as they are within them: they require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale.'⁵⁴

He argued for a move away from this in favour of an international society without a government, for the simple reason that international anarchy had 'become intolerable.'⁵⁵ Of course, such views effectively represented the experience and development of the European states-system as universal, as the sole agents of coercive power, and therefore abstracted from this very negative views of peace. Thus, the second 'great debate' about IR was not really a new debate, but simply a restructuring of the classical debate between idealism and realism on behavioural grounds.⁵⁶

In one of the most influential contributions to the realist tradition, though mainly in the North American context, which redefined realism as structural or neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz now sought to rescue classical realism from its reliance upon the state as the sole actor, to focus upon the international system as a whole and to place it upon a positivist footing – as was the order of the day.⁵⁷ In this international system of self-help, the core of realist thinking remained intact, and the problem of structure and agency was brought to the fore, as well as that of the question of which level of analysis was most influential in understanding IR. Waltz's work marked a resurgent methodological shift from IR as an 'art' (often the 'art of the possible' on the part of statesmen and diplomats) to its claims as a science, therefore carrying the possibility of immutability, prediction, and

independent facts. Waltz made explicit the privileging of structural constraints determined by a mix of anarchy and state resources within the international system over agents' – mainly sovereign states – strategies and motivations towards survival, as well as the comparison between the free market with its 'hidden hand' and the international system.⁵⁸ However, the security dilemma still drives the international system and state behaviour within a balance of power. Unsurprisingly, in the Cold War context, a bipolar balance of power was deemed more stable than a multipolar balance. Certain interpretations of the dynamics of the Cold War were influential in validating this view of IR. The approach formulated in George Kennan's identification of the inability of the Soviet Union to respond to anything other than the use of force or expression of power became a foundational assumption legitimating the new phase of realism.⁵⁹ This absolute priority for IR trivialised many other issues and approaches that were equally, if not more, significant. Yet, realist thought persisted, now couched within the framework provided by Westphalian states, though with the advent of the Cold War period, its underlying subtext related to an analysis of relations between two alliances (some would also argue that these represented two empires) marked by proxy wars, a nuclear balance of power, and the fear of 'mutually assured destruction.'

Implicitly, in the state-centrally reproduced world now inscribed upon IR, any peace that was achieved would be underpinned by a dominant or hegemonic state. Human nature and the resultant nature of states meant still indicated that a better peace could not be achieved (despite the challenge posed by liberal democratic peace theory and by neoliberalism, which was discounted by neo-realists on the grounds that democracies loosely defined had fought wars in the past and cooperation was still unlikely). Neo-realism focused upon the present situation, upon balancing multiple states' interests, and pre-empting future violence by constructing a militarised capacity that would make violence between states too costly for any one state to believe that there could be a clear winner. This rested upon a cost-benefit analysis of the utility of force as an expression of interest, and meant that the canon neo-realist thought ultimately stopped at the point where a balance was achieved, and did not delve into the further possibilities that peace might offer.

Neo-realism was not without its critics. Within the sister field of IPE, the notion of 'complex interdependence' offered a more ambitious notion of peace. A connection began to develop here with neoliberal thinking about the benefits of international trade, which could anchor international cooperation and allow states to transcend their security dilemmas.⁶⁰ Yet, states only take part in international regimes, organisations, and institutions because these conform to their national interests. Limited cooperation effectively occurred only within the parameters defined by state pursuit of national interests. This neoliberal challenge emphasised the cooperative aspects of state-centric IR. On the issue of hegemony, Keohane and Ruggie argued that cooperation between states is possible without the need for hegemony, implying that the development of an 'embedded

liberalism' modifies the basic positions of realism.⁶¹ Yet, regimes, norms, and principles were affirmed not to be significant in IR by Waltz (though Krasner and Keohane did not agree).⁶²

More critical work began to recognise the limitations of neo-realism, even during its heyday. More generally, George claims that Waltz's 1979 study was a major step backwards for IR after more critical interpretative debates had begun to emerge in the late 1960s and 1970s (coincidental with the Vietnam War).⁶³ He ridiculed realism's attempts to reclaim IR, arguing that it was simply a subjective response to a set of values rather than a scientific epistemology.⁶⁴ Critical voices such as Ashley pointed to the 'poverty of structural neorealism' aimed at its reduction of IR to interest and order, and the subsequent limitations of such a parochial view of the discipline, in order to open up a discussion of a more emancipatory approach to IR than realism offered.⁶⁵ Similarly, Cox pointed to the self-interested nature of realist theory, which he implied created theory to perpetuate a particular system and set of values, as all theorists, in his opinion, do.⁶⁶ Keohane and Nye's concept of interdependence was designed to show how regimes developed and changed, and also to point to the role of non-state and transnational actors responding to issues rather than to power.⁶⁷ This allowed for a number of new themes to be developed and the discussion of international regimes, principles, rules, and norms rapidly became a major debate.⁶⁸ This also connected with earlier idealist, liberal, and pluralist work and led to a widespread argument that realism had now become defunct in the face of the challenge of international regimes.⁶⁹ Ultimately, this Grotian-based approach offered a more sophisticated view of peace that crossed over into liberal and neoliberal debates.

In sum, neo-realist thinking continued to rest upon the assumption that there is a clear divide between subjective and objective thinking, between the domestic and the international, and that the objective world 'out there' is made up only of self-interested states that shape the international system from the top-down in a hierarchy induced by relative power. Cooperation is a chimera because states are egoistic rational actors and regimes are at best an expression of coincidental utility between states. Neo-realism eventually produced the offering of – not a sophisticated view of peace (though it moves towards accepting liberal hegemony at the end of the Cold War as a limited form of peace) – a view of civilisational conflict, of competition for hegemony between China, the EU, and the US, and a continued logic of nuclear deterrence.⁷⁰ Of course, the logic of the 'war of terror' after 2001, with attacks taking place across the world aimed at the liberal state and Western interests, fell outside of the realist paradigm of rational state actors pursuing a national interest, though the realism response that such violence can only be ended on the basis of a victor's peace, through which states reassert their hegemony and their Weberian control of the means of violence, appears to have remained relevant to the debates in IR. However, as Gaddis and Hoffman both illustrated in their critiques of realism's failures at the end of the Cold War, there were many serious oversights in such thinking and its influence on policymaking, not least the general implications for the conduct of the most powerful states during the

Cold War, such as the US.⁷¹ So far, realism has failed to offer a response to such problems, or to the broader question of the sort of peace its intellectual and policy frameworks might offer. Though the first great debate ended with WWII, with a realist assertion that survival was the best that IR could achieve, neo-realism failed to respond to end the Cold War, or the ambition that developed for a broad, albeit, liberal peace amongst many thinkers and policymakers.

A victor's peace

The underlying realist assumption that human nature, transferred to the state, is the basic constraining factor for peace in IR depends upon the equally questionable notion that human nature itself is not contingent on cultural, political, economic, social, and historical contexts. Furthermore, it depends on the long-challenged inherency argument that humans are basically violent creatures, reflected in society and the state. Yet, these very shaky assumptions form the basis upon which the main version of peace in IR for realism emerges – the victor's peace. Territorial states represent an *a priori* formulation of nations and their interests and in this immutable world of conflict, anarchy, the state of nature, and the balance of power allow for either minimal survival or a maximum of an imperial hegemony. All of this emerges from the assumption that the first task of individuals and states is security, and strategies are deployed against the inevitable threats of existential and physical challenges to their values, norms, and resources. This amorphous set of challenges highlights a mode of thinking which establishes interest as power: the unit exercises power derived from its control of these resources in order to secure itself and its interests, and to reduce or negate current and future threats. Until these threats have been negated, the narrative of peace in realist versions of IR is extremely limited, and its absolute end goal is a victor's peace in which all other actors are either subservient or are removed.

Almost exclusively, the forces that are seen to drive world politics are destructive, self-interested, and also eternal and predictable. Politicians and officials are constrained by national interests rather than laws and morality, and are ultimately obligated only to their own constituencies, eternally defined as the citizens of their territorially sovereign state. These were the factors that a 'science of international politics' should focus on: experience had shown that international institutions and law merely provided camouflage for the realities of state power and competition.⁷² This meant that preparations for war were eternally required to make it more unlikely. Pacifism and preparations for peace through international law and institutions, while normatively desirable, merely underestimate the realities of power and resulting violence in international relations.

Implicit in these approaches is the notion that realism presents the world as it is. These claims to present an objective view of world politics, war, and order imbued political realism with extraordinary claims of legitimacy and realist theorists with the ability to make vast and authoritative, but largely unsupportable claims, about IR. Ultimately, they were a form of censorship which prevented an

open discussion of a broader peace, deeming it naïve and risking association with appeasement strategies, such as those preceding WWII. This has maintained long standing and iniquitous hierarchies in IR, as if they were part of a natural order of things. Yet, this itself was dangerously simplistic and naïve; the focus on war meant little preparation for peace, lacking even the liberal or structuralist concern with building a world order marked by some form of justice – other than that of the victor. Because ‘reality’ dictates that there can, in practice, be no peace, as peace has never been extant in anything but a limited form, realism theorises a world order in which little more than a cold peace might ever exist. Yet, realism appeared to claim that it had settled all of the key methodological and epistemological debates, and indeed represented ontological stability, while yet all around in IR and other disciplines, these battles still raged. Realism, and its extension into neo-realism, was indicative of the ‘backward discipline,’ still engaged in the search for objective laws even in the context of complex and fluid, social, economic, and political dynamics and the tension between individuals and their identities and political organisation.⁷³ Realism – and mainstream IR – clung to its simplistic, reductionist, and hegemonic representation of the world, and of a victor’s peace.

An extreme form of this thinking has been offered by Mearsheimer, who sees little possibility for anything other than a realist form of peace without a sovereign power to oversee the activities of states in an anarchic international system. Nuclear weapons are therefore described as an agent of peace because of the terrible consequences of their use.⁷⁴ Increasingly, however, the sanctity of such thinking was undermined by strong challenges within liberal quarters, for example from those working on the ‘democratic peace’ project. Even so, Mearsheimer has continued to argue that liberal and liberal institutionalist visions of international order were fatally flawed because they underestimated how deep the roots of realism ran in the international system.⁷⁵

What is remarkable about this style of debate is that it assumes that the nature of peace is incontestable, even if it cannot be achieved. Peace is an uneasy truce between states or civilisations, at best moderated hegemonic states, mainly dependent upon military and economic power and interest. Within this structure, the realist tradition suggests a multiplication of types of peace in domestic settings, in an uneasy truce with each other. This suggests that a domestic peace can exist even while the international sphere is organised for war. This binary of war and peace, connected and disconnected, is, of course, an unlikely proposition. The problem here is that a domestic aspiration for peace, which one must assume would rest on an amicable arrangement and social contract between inhabitants and government, results in a general aspiration for international power and interest, which emerges above and beyond that promoted by the requirements of defensive national security. This leads to an interpretation of an offensive national interest from the perspective of other states even if security is discursively constructed as ‘defensive’ (as been a recurrent theme within the domestic debate on reforming Japan’s ‘peace constitution’ since its sovereignty was restored in 1952 after the end of US occupation). In addition, history and the contemporary

world are replete with examples of states which did and did not pursue power even in this easily misinterpreted defensive sense. Thus, the assertion that anarchy drives the actions of states and thus produces the dynamics which realism describes is only relevant for some states. For these states, realism describes a dynamic whereby in the absence of a commonwealth, a small number of aggressive states constantly destabilise the international system either in the discursive or perceptual realms, in order to survive or assert their hegemony.

In this eternal world, history preaches that peace is limited and war is inevitable while at the same time noting that if the lessons of history are ignored, perhaps by those with a more utopian outlook, the outcome will be more rather than less violent. In this view, sovereignty lies with the powerful, always within the state framework and the only way out would be through like-minded states forming a club for mutual self-defence while at the same time being wary of each other's capacity to default from this club. In this tautological world, peace might be guaranteed by a central authority, though this is unlikely because no state would allow another to exert hegemony.

Examining the realist tradition via the mechanism of peace accentuates problems with its focus on the state as the unit of analysis, as a rational actor in pursuit of power, influence, and security in an insecure geopolitical environment. This means that there is no room for normative debates, or for other actors and their issues, identities, or interests. Peace is limited and constructed according to the post-Enlightenment culture of European diplomacy. State preparedness to use force may guarantee survival but it also hints at the anarchy which limits it, and a possible attempt to create a victor's peace: this is the paradox of Bismarck's *Realpolitik*. It is a recipe for conflict rather than peace. State-centricity ignores the agency of non-state actors such as rebels, secessionists, and terrorists. It may also emphasise their concerns. Territorial sovereignty and its association with recognition and representation issues lead to the assumption that territories can be simply represented by sovereign actors, and inhabited by homogenous identity groups, without giving rise to competing claims for its control or to identity conflicts. Individual agency, culture, identity, and 'non-rational' aspects of life are automatically discounted as irrelevant. In this way, realism presents a highly simplified cartographic version of the world, and tragically establishes the conditions in which even a limited peace is unlikely. Indeed, realism's presentation of international relations and international politics as 'eternal' and, of course, tragic, effectively negates historical development, progress, and evolution: when arguing that we must learn from history to understand IR, realism focuses on history's conflicts. Indeed, it is shaped by such a negative view of human nature and human history – and of power – that it neglects much in order to prove a simple point – that domination and hegemony are the only true forces determining peace, and that where this fails, anarchy will prevail. Where peace is envisaged, it is normally a version of the victor's peace.

Despite this, many thought that at the end of the Cold War, a 'liberal moment' had arrived that would bring to an end a tragic period of realism, though underlying this liberal moment was the basic logic of political realism. For example, for

the most part, societies and individuals, as well as issues such as poverty, equality, gender, development, and human rights, remained hidden in IR. Peace was also represented as of benefiting others if it spread, delineating a crusader mentality. Perhaps one of the most visible early attempts to retain the logic of realism in the post-Cold War environment as mainstream IR shifted towards a liberal/neoliberal framework was Huntington's work on the 'clash of civilisations.' In this now almost mythical statement on post-Cold War international relations, Huntington saw 'civilisations' as the new 'state,' representing units that formed a core cartography of enmity in IR. He argued that coexistence between them is fraught with difficulty because of inalienable differences over interests, power, identity, and culture. This reprise of political realism defined civilisations as the new state-like units locked into escalating conflict over interest and power, which might culminate in a systemic clash of civilisations (which in the final pages of his book leads to an apocalyptic war).⁷⁶ Here, peace is viewed as dependent upon homogeneity within civilisations, and based simply on an uneasy truce between inevitably clashing 'others,' rates of development, interests, identities, cultures, and religions. It is in these areas that realism bridges with liberal thought. This implies that international institutions, norms, and law have potency when backed by force: liberalism may occasionally dispute the necessity of enforcement, but it concurs if force supports international institutions and law according to common norms, behaviour, consent, and consensus. This underlying 'liberal-realism' has now become a new orthodoxy of mainstream approaches to the discipline.

Yet, realism remains attractive to policymakers and officials who see their role as located in the realm of pragmatism and expediencies, and need quick solutions for the tensions caused by geopolitics, even if they are short-term, and to crises and pressing problems.⁷⁷ Because of this, Buzan sees realism as capable of overcoming the challenges presented by alternative approaches, including Marxism, liberalism, critical theory, and post-modernism, by incorporating their insights into its core, though he also acknowledges its inherent fatalism and failure to offer any hope for a sustainable peace in the longer term.⁷⁸ Here lies the failure of realism's grand narrative as a project for peace in IR.

Conclusion

Realism offers a domestic peace limited by the need to be prepared for war, and victor's peace at the international level. It eschews any kind of positive normative debate (as Thucydides is often famously argued to have upheld and despite the possibilities offered by a Hobbesian commonwealth of fear). As an agenda for peace, the realist tradition offers little, particularly in its positivist, neo-realist incarnation, that would be rhetorically acceptable to many of today's more enlightened political leaders or officials in IR beyond the limited order of the Westphalian, territorial, sovereign peace (though there are still plenty of despots and authoritarian leaders who might dispute this). As a research programme, it failed to foresee the end of the Cold War or explain multipolar frameworks for

IR, and appeared to advocate a belief in unstable balances of power and deterrence that in a nuclear context is extremely dangerous.⁷⁹ As Booth has pointed out, realism failed in the Cold War as well as at the end of the Cold War,⁸⁰ and it never inhabited an uncontested space, given the importance of idealism, liberalism, liberal internationalism, and liberal-institutionalism at various stages of the discipline's development. Indeed, it might be said that the first great debate was a debate over the epistemology of peace, with realism's negative view strongly supported by the World Wars, and the Cold War.

Realism has come to be determined mainly by North American positivism, and formulaic methodologies designed to reduce IR to key actors, geopolitical dynamics, and related issues. As a consequence of its rejection of subjectivity, it slavishly reproduces an 'objective reality' and represents a cult of anti-peace thinkers, who reject both universal and pluralist bases for peace, or that interests and peace might be linked. As Vasquez argued, realist theory led to war over peace.⁸¹ Indeed, Walker points out that political realism entails the evasion of the necessary skills to understand the 'reality' of IR.⁸² Certainly, this appears to be the case with the so-called second debate, in which realists sought to provide a scientific basis for their objectification of the dynamics of order in world politics.

Realism is little more than the story of war between groups and states, and how this eternally dominates IR. While this is an important story, it only represents one (tragic) perspective, fails to move beyond the politics of fear (despite occasional mention of a commonwealth of a world government), and does not provide an agenda for peace. It is akin to driving dangerously so that one can learn how to make oneself a safer driver. The realist tradition is tautologous, paradoxical, and rests upon a blinkered version of human political history, constructed to perpetuate the predominance of state, elite, and official discourses about the world. Because it rests on official actors and official records, it only reflects their own elite and professional interests as representatives of states, and so misses an enormous amount of information, other histories, and other representations, in its analytical framework.

Realism only explains peace as a result of hegemony or collapse. This is defined by a negative ontology and a tragic epistemology relating to realism's inherency view of human nature, the state of nature, and their tragic repetition. It offers a narrow methodology that legitimates a perspective based upon binary inside/outside structures. These effectively reify the incommensurability of different identities and sovereignties. Even during the height of realism, there were powerful discursive frameworks which illustrated another story of IR, and one which was deeply influential and had important implications for a far more sophisticated version of peace than the victor's peace realism offered. Realism has offered an important set of tools to understand security frameworks for states: these insights are an important part of any discussion of peace – but only a part. Realism's ontological and methodological assumptions, which have grown up around it, need not be accepted as they prove to be an obstacle to anything more than a negative peace even if more was possible.

Notes

- 1 Tacitus, "The Life of Gnaeus Julius Agricola", *Agricola*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, Chapter 30.
- 2 Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory", in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 33.
- 3 Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, London: Norton, 1997, p. 206.
- 4 Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 70.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 71, esp. note 8.
- 6 M. Wight, *International Theory*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994, pp. 104–114.
- 7 Chris Brown, "Tragedy, 'Tragic Choices' and Contemporary International Political Theory", *International Relations*, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2007, p. 5; Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- 8 Barry Buzan, "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism", in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 51.
- 9 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1651], Chapter 7.
- 10 Barry Buzan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 50; Thomas Hobbes, *Op. Cit.*, Chapter 7.
- 11 Thomas Hobbes, *Ibid.*, p. 186.
- 12 *Ibid.*, Chapters 7–31.
- 13 Barry Buzan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 51.
- 14 Michael Doyle, *Wars of War and Peace*, London: Norton, 1997, p. 44.
- 15 *Ibid.*, pp. 44–48. See also Rousseau's comments on the unlikelihood that prince would accept restrictions on their power.
- 16 *Ibid.*, pp. 49–160.
- 17 Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, London: Penguin, 1970, Book V, pp. 85–113.
- 18 Nicoli Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 [1532].
- 19 Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- 20 Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 193.
- 21 Michael Oakeshott, "Letter on Hobbes", *Political Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 6. 2001, pp. 835–836.
- 22 David Van Mill, "Civil Liberty in Hobbes's Commonwealth", *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2002, p. 25.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- 25 Thomas Hobbes, *Op. Cit.* Chapter 26.
- 26 S Frost, "Faking it: Hobbes's Thinking-bodies and the Ethics of Dissimulation", *Political Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2001, p. 50.
- 27 See R.N. Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- 28 G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, London: Prometheus, 1996.
- 29 *Ibid.*, pp. 330–340.
- 30 Summary of the Commonwealth of Britain. For more on this see W. H. Sherman, *John Dee: The Politics of History in the English Renaissance*, Amherst: Massachusetts University Press, 1995.
- 31 He referred to the concept of 'unlimited imperialism'. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (4th ed.), New York: McGraw Hill, 1968, pp. 52–53.
- 32 John Locke, *Two Treatises on Civil Government*, (1690) Everyman, London: J. M. Dent, 1953.
- 33 Jim George, *Op. Cit.*, p. 78.
- 34 E. H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, London: Macmillan, 1939, p. 68.

- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 97.
- 36 Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics 1919–1969", in B. Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919–1969*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 35.
- 37 Hans Morgenthau, *Op. Cit.*, p. 22.
- 38 Jim George, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 91–92. See also, H Morgenthau, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 237.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 259.
- 41 See Hans Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory", *Truth and Power*, New York: Praeger, 1970, pp. 244–245.
- 42 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 186.
- 43 See for example, Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," *Millennium*, Vol. 10 No. 2, 1981, pp. 126–155; Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and IR," *Millennium*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 162–174, 1983.
- 44 EH Carr, *Op. Cit.*, p. 21.
- 45 Hans Morgenthau, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 259–260; R. Niebuhr, *Man and Immoral Society*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932, p. 91.
- 46 J. Quirk and D. Vignaswaran, "The Construction of an Edifice: The Story of a First Great Debate", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 89–107.
- 47 Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 19.
- 48 Lawrence, "Strategy, the State and the Weberian Legacy", cited in Jim George, *Op. Cit.*, p. 103.
- 49 Kenneth Waltz, *Op. Cit.*, p. 185.
- 50 Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory", *Op. Cit.*, p. 36.
- 51 Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power", in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), *Op. Cit.*, p. 174.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- 53 Jim George, *Op. Cit.*, p. 81.
- 54 Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations", in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), *Op. Cit.*, p. 35.
- 55 *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.
- 56 John Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, esp. Chapter 2.
- 57 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, London: McGraw Hill, 1979.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p. 90.
- 59 See George Kennan, "Long Telegram of February 1946", cited in Jim George, *Op. Cit.*, p. 85.
- 60 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977, pp. 23–24.
- 61 Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order", *International Organization*, Vol. 36, (Spring), 1982.
- 62 Steven Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, p. 136.
- 63 Jim George, *Op. Cit.*, p. 118.
- 64 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 65 Rick Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", in Robert Keohane (eds.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 228.
- 66 Robert Cox and Sinclair, T, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- 67 Robert Keohane, "Power and Independence", *Neorealism and Its Critics*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 113.

- 68 Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No.2, 1982, pp. 185–205.
- 69 See, for example, Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis", in S Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 61–91.
- 70 Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1993.
- 71 John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 31; Stanley Hoffman, "Delusions of World Order", in Steven L. Spiegel and David J. Pervin (eds.), *At Issue: Politics in the World Arena*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 13–26.
- 72 EH Carr, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 10, 153.
- 73 Mervyn Frost, *Towards a Normative Theory of IR*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- 74 For more on this type of argumentation, see "Correspondence: Back to the Future Part II", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1990, pp. 191–199; "Correspondence: Back to the Future Part III", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1991, pp. 216–222.
- 75 John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", in M.E. Brown, Owen R. Coates, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Millar, *Theories of War and Peace*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
- 76 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
- 77 Barry Buzan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 56.
- 78 *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 62. For an interesting discussion of critical realism, which has taken up this challenge to move beyond realist ontology, while recognising it, towards emancipatory strategies, and as a response to the challenge of post-positivist approaches, see Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2000, pp. 213–237.
- 79 John Vasquez, *Op. Cit.*, 1998, pp. 374, 375.
- 80 Ken Booth, "75 Years on" in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 329.
- 81 *Ibid.*, p. 220.
- 82 R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 106.