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Turks in Germany: Muslim Identity "Between" States

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JAMES HELICKE



Introduction

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON'S CONCEPT OF A "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS"¹ has had a profound influence on the thought of numerous policy makers, intellectuals, and members of the media, as well as private citizens. In the German context, Huntington's arguments have seemed to confirm what has been suspected: that conflict between Muslims and Christians is inevitable, as is evident in the difficult relations between German citizens and *Ausländer* (a word that often connotes Turkish workers) resident in Germany. For example, *Der Spiegel*, among the most widely read of German newsmagazines, featured a series of articles in its April 1997 issue that portrayed a growing sentiment of confrontation between Germans and *Ausländer*. One article, in citing Huntington's work, expressed the fear that Germany itself might become the venue for such a conflict in the presence of German social "disintegration" and the "ethnicization of social problems." This chapter attempts to explore the links between culture and politics, challenging the proposition that a cultural clash between "foreigners" and Germans is inevitable.

In recent scholarship about Turks in Germany, two primary approaches have prevailed. The first, a social-scientific approach, has generally attempted to understand the debate in terms of large-scale social, economic, and political forces, and has tended to reduce the impact of culture to rational human interaction. The second has utilized cultural methodology, which, as Yasemin Soysal points out, often obfuscates the more complex role of the host society in the process of integration by referring instead to contrasts based in a Turkish or Islamic model of organization.² I hope to avoid the pitfalls of both methods by stressing instead the interrelatedness of culture and politics, while not reducing the one to the other.³ I will argue that political considerations, such as differing conceptualizations of citizenship of the Turkish and German states, have a profound effect on the culture of "Turks" within German society. Whereas the Turkish understanding of the nation is based on territoriality and the state, the German understanding of the nation has been defined in genealogical and exclusionary terms. Turks in Germany have been profoundly influenced by the cultural understandings of both states, but they have not been entirely connected to either.

The marginality of Turks living in Germany to both Turkish and German societies, as Ruth Mandel indicates, has provided the context for a newly defined Muslim identity.⁴ I would extend her observation to include not only immediate social surroundings but also the connection of Turks in diaspora to the Turkish and German states. Turks in Germany have found themselves caught between the influence of these two differing political entities. Their concepts of national inclusion thus have provided for a space in which Turks living in Germany have been able to develop new understandings of what it means to be Turkish and Muslim in that context. Because neither the Turkish nor the German identity asserts absolute cultural hegemony over Turks in diaspora, they have developed a cultural identity that is rooted both within and apart from the two states.⁵

The Relation between State and National Identity in Turkey

The development of an independent Turkey necessitated the simultaneous development of a national culture to support the sovereign state. For Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the modern Turkish nation-state, the process of establishing a national consciousness involved nothing less than a cultural revolution. In essence, Kemal attempted to create a Turkish national identity, both as a vessel of his envisioned state and as the basis of state legitimacy. Ultimately, Turkish national identity can be understood as state-centered and territorial, with religion playing a significant (albeit extremely complex) role in the formation of national identity.

Mustafa Kemal's vision of a Turkish national consciousness was closely related to a strong, centralized state. His early Turkish republic imposed the notion of Turkishness on residents of Anatolia, rather than relying on existing civil-societal identities that were mainly rooted in religious communal and local affiliation. The Ottoman Empire had divided its population into distinct religious communities (*millets*) that functioned as the loci of identity until the Tanzimat reforms (1839–1856), which promoted modern notions of egalitarianism among citizens before the law.⁶

Nonetheless, religious identity continued to shape politics in Anatolia. During its final years, the Ottoman Empire became increasingly rooted in Anatolia with the loss of its European and Middle Eastern territories. In essence, Anatolian Muslims formed the final remnants of the Ottoman Muslim *millet*. In this context, it is unsurprising that Muslim identity played a prominent role in defining Turkish identity.⁷ Anatolia, moreover, became increasingly Muslim in population as a result of the massive influx of Muslims from lands under former Ottoman domination and the disappearance of a significant Christian population.⁸ Thus, in the absence of a single language and a popular national consciousness (the term “Turk” often implied “peasant”), Islam provided the most cohesive form of communal identity in Anatolia.

However, Mustafa Kemal did not regard Islam as the new state's ultimate source of legitimacy. Instead, he promoted a unitary state structure by turning to a territorially specific definition of the Turkish nation, rooted in Anatolia. Pan-Turkism, which sought to unite the Turkic speaking world, was also clearly refuted by Mustafa Kemal. Indeed, he rejected Pan-Turkism as an “ideological bind,” instead turning to “natural” and “legitimate

limitations" of a clearly defined Anatolian land mass.⁹ In doing so, cultural understandings of the Turkish nation moved away from ethnic and religious identity to the political consolidation of an existing territorial entity.

The state began a series of reforms in order to create a Turkish society that would be separate from Islam and ultimately serve as a compliment to state ambitions.¹⁰ This was accomplished by eliminating the caliphate, closing all *seriat* (Shari'a) courts, and eliminating *medreses* (Islamic schools). Sufi brotherhoods, which had served as the most important link between the ruling Islamic elite and the countryside, were banned.¹¹ The Kemalist state also implemented national forms of education to replace the educational hegemony of the Muslim clerics, changed the alphabet, and mandated a more "European" style of dress.

The significance of the state and the territorial features of Turkish national identity have continued throughout the life of the Turkish republic. The current constitution affirms that the Turkish nation is determined by the boundaries of the geographic nation-state, rather than by religious and other ethnic allegiances. Indeed, the constitution firmly rejects "the creation of minorities" in religious, cultural, or ethnic terms.¹²

However, Turkish political thought has been marked by a continuous tension with regard to religion. On the one hand, religiously oriented political movements (such as the Democratic Party of the 1950s, the National Salvation party of the 1970s, and the Welfare-Virtue party of the 1990s) and a variety of Turkish nationalist parties have attempted to establish a closer official connection between Turkish national identity and Islam. Popular support for these movements and the virtual absence of religious minorities in Turkey support the hypothesis that being Turkish inherently means being Muslim.¹³ On the other hand, a secularist notion of Turkishness has generally prevailed at the level of the state and among military officers, who perceive themselves as guardians of the Kemalist state legacy. The latter have vehemently opposed the introduction of Islamic symbols in public life. Interestingly, however, even General Kenan Evren, who directed the 1980 military coup, used Quranic verses in order to support military intervention and the modern and secular Turkish state. Moreover, there is really no separation of state and religion in Turkey, as the state, in fact, has incorporated religious institutions into its Ministry of Religious Affairs.¹⁴ Thus, while the Turkish state does not derive its legitimacy through Islamic reference, neither can it be characterized as strictly *laic*. Accordingly, Alevites, as well as more "fundamentalist" Sunni Muslims, have criticized the Turkish state for imposing a republican form of Sunni Islam on Muslim constituents that fundamentalists claim to be diluted, and Alevites claim is overtly Sunni in character.

The Relationship between State and National Identity in Germany

German conceptualizations of the relationship between state and national identity contrast starkly with the Turkish. Whereas the Turkish understanding of the nation is related to a particular territory and intimately connected to the Turkish state, the German is based on the nation as *wolk*-centered and prepolitical. Rogers Brubaker, who explored the relationship between the notion of citizenship and state in the German context, argues that the German notion of citizenship extends beyond a particular geographic domain because

of the political fragmentation of Germans. According to the German understanding, citizenry is a community of descent (*jus sanguinis*). Accordingly, *Deutschtum* (the abstract notion of all Germans) transcends the particular German state, insofar as some Germans live outside territorial Germany. In other words, the German notion of national identity is genealogically, not geographically, determined. By its nature, "German nationhood engendered an interest in civic exclusion"¹⁵ by attempting to exclude Poles and other ethnic groups in the creation of a more ethnically defined "German" state (as is evident in the Kleindeutsch decision to exclude the Habsburg domain with its considerable Slavic presence). The Kleindeutsch decision, however, also implied that the Prussian-German state did not contain all ethnic Germans.

Religion has also played a complex role in the German notion of nation. Michael Minkenberg indicates that German nation building developed as religion and dynasty slowly lost authority in political communities. Nonetheless, the Prussian state, mainly Protestant in composition, still required religious support. The idea began to develop among Protestants that they had a special covenant with God following victory in the Franco-Prussian war in 1871.¹⁶ Because Protestantism could not enjoy the status of state religion without alienating Catholics, the two religions were incorporated into the state's self-definition as a means of assuring religious legitimacy. Jews, many of whom perceived themselves as Germans, occupied a difficult position in this state structure. Although toleration sometimes prevailed, persecution was the general rule. It is clear, then, that the Third Reich marked a pivotal point in national consciousness by essentially removing any correlation of Germanness and Jewishness.

Despite the various attempts of the Federal Republic of Germany to distinguish itself from acute manifestations of German nationalism following the history of the Third Reich, an ethnically determined understanding of citizenship has continued to be strong throughout the history of the Federal Republic as well. The definition of citizenship given in the Basic Law indicates that "everyone is a German citizen in the eyes of the Constitution who holds German citizenship or who, as a refugee of German descent or spouse or children thereof, has fled to the Federal Republic of Germany from areas included in the Third Reich as existing on December 31, 1937."¹⁷ Despite claims that Germany is not a land of migration, Brubaker indicates that the relationship between German identity and the German state provides for the immigration of "ethnic Germans" from Central and Eastern Europe at the same time that it promotes repatriation of Turks born in Germany. Moreover, the relation of religion to state has continued. The Federal Republic of Germany does not claim to be *laic* in nature, but rather is "*religionsneutral*," guaranteeing freedom of religion by acknowledging the status of Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism as "publicly recognized corporations (*Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts*)."¹⁸ Thus, church and state operate closely together, in that church schools and other agencies receive public funds, and the state even administers taxation on behalf of the church.

Motivations for Migration

In 1962 an agreement was reached between Germany and Turkey in which the latter would provide *gastarbeiter* (guestworkers) to Germany. This was the first step in the immigration

of hundreds of thousands of Turks to Germany in response to German labor shortages and Turkish labor surpluses. The agreement is based on the understanding that the Turkish and German states should attempt to maintain their respective political tropes on national inclusion/exclusion. Foremost, both states appropriated the boundaries defined by German national identity, i.e., Turks would not become Germans. Permanent residence in Germany was never considered in the 1962 agreement, and the implicit understanding was that while Turks would "temporarily" reside in Germany, they would ultimately return to Turkey.

It is significant to recognize that the 1962 agreement was reached mainly through interstate relations. The German state established labor recruiting offices in order to get needed manpower. The Turkish state, moreover, posted available positions in Germany¹⁹ and had final say in which of its citizens would be sent to fill them.²⁰ Germany required labor in order to promote a high level of growth. According to Nielsen, it is not coincidental that the bilateral agreement for recruitment was reached in 1962, shortly after the construction of the Berlin wall, ending the influx of East German labor.²¹

Turkey's interests were also fostered by its program of state-led development. In the words of an official report on a five-year plan issued during this period, Turkey aimed for "population planning" and "the export of surplus manpower" in order to pursue its economic improvement.²² In the first place, the export of labor aimed to lower domestic unemployment. The Turkish state also saw an opportunity to improve the supply of foreign exchange reserves in the form of remittances paid by Turkish workers in Germany to their families in Turkey.²³ Finally, as Terry Monson indicates, Turkey saw a potential means of expediting the development of an industrial labor force from a dominantly rural and minimally educated population through training in Germany.²⁴

The Status of *Gastarbeiter*

Germans understood that the Turks in the first generation of immigrant workers were only temporary laborers. Although they did receive social benefits and all of the employment rights of German workers (largely because of the fear of German unions that cheap Turkish labor might begin stripping Germans of jobs), the involvement of Turks in German society was not understood to go beyond the workplace. Workers were accommodated mainly in factory dormitories, and their lives were largely focused on their place of work. Most important, because these Turkish workers were almost all men, they lacked the social rootedness of family life.

Differences among "Turks" were apparent in the first generation of *gastarbeiter*. They represented the general demographic composition of Turkey. Accordingly, ethnic, linguistic, and religious distinctions between Turks and Kurds, Sunnis and Alevites revealed themselves most fully in their limited networks of acquaintances outside the workplace. Nonetheless, those in the first generation of *gastarbeiter* clearly also had a good deal in common. Their living arrangements, their lack of family life and institutional support, and their status as undifferentiated "Turks" among Germans initially created a more homogenous effect. They believed that they would soon be repatriated to their Anatolian homeland; thus, they lived on the fringes of the country where they temporarily found themselves working.

Nonetheless, change did occur in the German state conception of the foreigners within its boundaries that allowed for a change in the status of Turkish *gastarbeiter*. German companies began to prefer holding on to existing Turkish workers in order to avoid the inefficiencies and costs associated with retraining new workers. Meanwhile, the German state recognized that the presence of a large foreign minority could pose a challenge to German conceptions of exclusionary, genealogically based citizenship. In 1965 a new Foreigner Law was passed. Although not attempting to improve the rights of foreigners, but rather confirming existing notions of civic exclusion, the ambiguous wording of the law inadvertently created results that differed significantly from the intentions of its drafters. Section 2 indicated that a residency permit of a foreigner can be extended if this "does not injure the interests" of the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁵ Although the scope of the law applied to the whole Federal Republic, the actual enactment of the law was left to the discretion of local bureaucrats. Therefore, although the intention of the law was to confirm the Federal Republic's exclusionary understanding of society and its right to expel foreigners, the result was that it became necessary to prove that the presence of foreigners "injured" the German state. Moreover, the state's power vis-à-vis foreigners was relegated to local interpretation, thereby lessening to a certain extent the state's grip on the presence of a significant Turkish population in Germany.

Many Germans were becoming increasingly aware of a potential anomaly between the simultaneous profession of liberal notions of democracy and inclusion and German notions of citizenship as exclusionary. Willy Brandt's famous statement "to dare more democracy" with regard to the foreigners in Germany attempted to address this issue. Nonetheless, the year 1973 marked a dramatic change in policies regulating the presence of foreigners in Europe as a whole.

This was the year of the oil embargo, in which Europe suffered severe economic recession as its dependency on oil was revealed. As a result, unemployment grew and, with it, antagonism toward Turkish guestworkers increased. Accordingly, Brandt issued the *Bewerbestopp* to end the import of foreign labor. However, in contrast to other ethnic groups, such as Spaniards and Italians, who, as a result, left en masse, the number of Turks remained virtually unchanged.²⁶ The Turkish state suffered economically because of a reduction in foreign loans, thus reducing its ability to create jobs to meet the demand of a rapidly increasing population.²⁷ Fewer Turks in Germany were willing to return home, and even more families of Turkish workers wanted to migrate to Germany. Ironically, the oil embargo had a stabilizing effect on the Turkish presence in Germany by changing the composition of the resident Turkish population from primarily single men to a reconstituted family as the wives and children of the resident workers arrived.

Mitburger versus Living Here/Living There

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, both the Turkish and German states held to the notion that the presence of Turks in Germany would remain temporary, despite demographic evidence to the contrary. This perception by the two states was to have a profound impact on the culture of the Turks in Germany.

The position of the German state has been expressed as follows: "The Federal Government is of the opinion that there is no necessity of providing special regulations for

foreign workers with regard to naturalization. Naturalization presupposes a process of assimilation and therefore demands a time of residence which cannot be too short."²⁸ This statement is interesting for several reasons. First, the German state would not change its understanding of civic inclusion and citizenship to accommodate the large Turkish presence within its borders. Instead, they would remain "foreign workers." Second, citizenship would not be granted in the foreseeable future. Third, the definition of what it meant to be German was understood in static terms. Any possibility of acquiring German citizenship would entail "assimilation" into this given definition because the German state was not willing to accommodate.

These essential distinctions between "German-ness" and "Turkish-ness" are apparent in a 1977 statement by the Christian Democratic Union: "Integration does not mean an assimilation which works toward making foreign workers and their families into Germans." Instead, it means "the opportunity for foreign workers to live under the same conditions as German without having to abandon their national identity."²⁹ Despite support of the right of foreigners "to live under the same conditions," it was apparent that foreigners would remain excluded from German society because of an essentialized understanding of national identity. As Elcin Kursat-Ahlers points out, even though German integration rhetoric advocated preserving the homeland culture of a minority so as to assist in the process of reintegration, it was also expected that non-German minorities should adapt to German culture.³⁰ An essentialized and exclusive definition of German citizenship means that Turks living in Germany are prohibited from acquiring German citizenship unless they renounce Turkish citizenship—in effect, that they cease being Turkish.

It is interesting to recognize the ways in which the German state's trope of intrinsic difference between Turks and Germans manifests itself in the culture of the Turkish residents in Germany. Turks are excluded from German society in various ways. Only German citizens can participate fully in the German political process. Foreigners cannot vote, nor are they permitted to join German political parties. The most significant form of political participation for Turks in Germany occurs at a local level. Local advisory boards have acted, in a sense, as a foreign parliament in giving suggestions to local government agencies and institutions. However, these recommendations are in no way binding on governmental policy.

Economic as well as political marginalization has been the general rule for Turks in Germany. Unemployment has affected non-Germans much more starkly than Germans. Despite the fact that Germany has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, Turks have generally been excluded from the affluence of German society as a whole. Indeed, there is hardly any Turkish middle class.³¹

In social terms, the rights of Turks to live within German society are also limited. Most have a Residency Permit rather than a Right of Residency. Whereas the former acknowledges one's right to reside in Germany, the latter can be revoked by the German state. Although such revocation has been rare in recent times, recanting permission remains at least a theoretical possibility. Furthermore, housing ordinances have functioned as a further means of excluding Turks from German society. According to a German law, any area with over 6 percent foreign population can be designated as an "overburdened settlement area"; with 12 percent a city can assert this designation without any need for

higher authority.³² This legal provision provides an attempt by the German state to disallow the development of Turkish "ghettos" and areas that might fall away from German cultural domination. In the words of Ray C. Rist, a large number of foreigners seems to "constitute an implicit assumption that the concentration of foreign workers is detrimental to German society." Rist, however, shows that Turkish space may assume a much smaller form, in that individual apartment buildings are generally distinguished between those in which Germans live and those inhabited by foreigners.³³

However, Turks have been able to acquire "places of their own" within Germany as a whole. Berlin Kreuzberg, the most famous and largest Turkish neighborhood in Germany (now zoned as an overburdened settlement area), is commonly designated as "Small Istanbul." While the concentrated settlement of Turks in Berlin Kreuzberg has occurred partially because of German concepts of civic exclusion, it is also a result of Turkish interest in finding support and continuity with their homeland. Although Kreuzberg is located in the center of Berlin, it maintains a strong continuity of identity with Turkish society. Turkish-owned shops and coffee and tea houses provide ways to maintain ties with other Turks. Turks' residence in Kreuzberg is not accidental. Kreuzberg has been traditionally a peripheral area of Berlin. Formerly surrounded on three sides by the Berlin Wall, Kreuzberg is one of the most economically depressed areas in Germany.³⁴ In this sense, Kreuzberg represents one of the few areas that Turks are able to afford in Berlin.

Mandel provides an interesting cultural example of the attempt of Turks to "live" in Turkey, while residing in Germany, by making annual visits to Turkey. She writes that while migrants live and work in Europe for eleven months each year, they are waiting for the twelfth month in which they can "really live" by going home.³⁵ According to Mandel, "For many, if not most, migrants, Kleine Istanbul is not home. They dream of their final return to Turkey, plan for it, save for it, talk of it."³⁶ There is also a great deal of confusion when Turks living in Germany return to their homeland. Often they are no longer accepted as strictly "Turkish"—the identity that they have attempted to retain in Germany—and Turkish friends and family in Anatolia often refer to them as *Almanci* (someone from Germany). Many have indeed adopted aspects of German culture. This dynamic is particularly acute among later generations of Turks resident in Germany, who, similarly, are sometimes called "*deutsche Ausländer*" (German foreigners) or "*ausländische Einheimische*" (foreign natives) in German media.

Education and the State(s)

Education provides an important means of socialization for later generations of Turks who, unlike their parents, grow up in German society. To a significant extent, however, education reinforces the German notions of exclusion. At a national level, the widespread presence of Turkish students at the lowest streams of German education has pushed German students into higher streams of education.³⁷

In accord with the notion of being *religionsneutral*, the German state requires schools to provide religious education for adherents of the officially sanctioned religions. However, the state leaves Islamic religious instruction to the discretion of the individual *Länder*. In so doing, the state confirms the idea that it is not its responsibility to attempt to assimilate

late and accommodate the particular needs of Turkish students. While religious education might serve as a means of socialization, developing a Muslim identity within German society and bringing ethnic Turks closer to the German state, according to prominent understandings of German identity, Turkish ethnic background and Muslim religious identity persist as signs of difference.³⁸ Moreover, very few states (notable exceptions include North Rhine-Westphalia and, recently, Berlin) have actually chosen to provide separate funding for Turkish language and Islamic religious education. Instead, most states have opted to provide educational programs provided by the Turkish state. Because this instruction is in Turkish, not German, Yasemin Karakasoglu points out that "Muslim children never acquire concepts enabling them to discuss religious concepts with Germans."³⁹ Islamic religion, rather than becoming a means of integration into German society, becomes a means of separation by distancing Islam from German institutions and connecting it to Turkish ones.

Muslim Identity among Turks in Germany: Here and There

To some extent, Muslim identity is conditioned in response to the dominant and exclusive German, and Christian, culture. Turks understand themselves to be Muslim specifically as a way to locate themselves in relation and in contrast to Christian Germans. It is important to recognize that German society has contributed to this dynamic in several ways. Since the Second World War, West German society has attempted to pursue a close relationship between religion and state in an attempt to distance Germans from the atrocities of atheistic National Socialism (and perhaps equally important, from the "atheistic" East German state). Religion, therefore, has been understood by the West German state as a resource against totalitarianism.⁴⁰ However, the close partnership and legal recognition given to the Catholic and Protestant Churches has fostered the perception that being German is intimately connected to being Christian. Although Judaism is granted a similar status to the two Christian denominations, it is possible to argue that this status is closely related to West German attempts at reconciliation with Jews following the Second World War. Moreover, Judaism does not enjoy the numerical strength of Catholicism and Protestantism that allow for a parallel comparison.

As already indicated, the German state has been unwilling to grant Islam the same legal status as Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism in terms of state tax privileges, education, and cultural recognition.⁴¹ It is possible to argue that purposeful exclusion of Islam from state cultural recognition is not surprising in a historical context. Numerous studies have attempted to relate German and Western perceptions of Islam (and Turks—oftentimes perceived as the same) as of the antagonistic "other."⁴² Indeed, numerous German media suggest that Muslims and Turks should be understood as an undifferentiated civilizational whole that confirms Samuel Huntington's notion of a clash of civilizations. Turks, as Muslims, are often associated with fanaticism, backwardness, and terrorism. *Der Spiegel* in its series of articles in the April 1997 issue portrayed a growing sentiment of confrontation between Germans and *Ausländer*. The cover of the issue featured the juxtaposition of a Muslim girls' school, a girl protesting, and a series of apparently Turkish teenagers showing off their weapons, with the accompanying title, "Outsiders and Germans, DANGEROUSLY FOREIGN: The Failure

of the Multicultural Society."⁴³ The article, moreover, mentions sociologist Heitmeyer's finding that 57 percent of the Turkish youth polled responded affirmatively to the (both ambiguous and misleading) statement that "the Turkish nation is our body, our spirit is Islam. A spiritless body is a corpse."—a statement which, according to the article, "sounds quite astonishing to German ears." Jutta A. Helm points out that Turks have assumed the form of "other" in another important means of social discourse: as the subject of jokes. For example,

Question: What is the difference between Turks and Jews?

Answer: The Jews already have it behind them.

Helm points out that this identification of Turks as the "new Jews" not only reveals racist attitudes, but that the Turkish presence in Germany has become "an emotionally perceived threat."⁴⁴

Muslim identity, in this context of exclusion of the Turkish "other," serves as a means of defining Turkish identity by contrasting Turks with those who they are not. Dursun Tan and Hans-Peter Waldhoff describe this type of cultural and religious position as "culturally defensive," in which isolation from the decadence of German society acts as a means of Muslim-Turkish group cohesion.⁴⁵ In this sense Germans appear as the "other" in the consciousness of many Turks in Germany. Indeed, they often refer to Germany as "*Gavuristan*" (the land of the infidel). External symbols worn by Turks, such as the headscarf, act in this context as a means of resistance against the impiety (and perceived sexual promiscuity) of German society by isolating Turkish Muslim women from it. A recent Turkish film juxtaposes promiscuity, crucifixes, and German society with the tragic lives of Turks in Germany,⁴⁶ revealing the partially reactive significance of Muslim-Turkish identity in a German context.

At the same time, increasingly intensified Muslim identity and Islamism provide a way of connecting between here (Germany) and there (Turkey). Whereas the Turkish state has linked Turkishness to territoriality and the Turkish state (with mythic historiography that also serves to legitimize the state), a significant number of Turks in Germany have developed a new notion of Turkishness in terms of religious identity. For example, the organization Milli Görüş, which is outlawed in Turkey, is tied to movements within Turkey promoting the development of an intense Turko-Islamic identity. Somewhat ironically, Turko-Islamist movements operating in Germany such as Milli Görüş can best be understood as intimately connected with Germany, both as a reaction to German state and society and as a dependence on space within Germany away from the hegemony of the Turkish state.

However, Muslim identity as a source of Turkishness contrasts with Turkish state definitions of identity. There are numerous explanations for this discrepancy. First, the Turkish state has never been able to assert absolute control over identity, even within the confines of its own territory. The 1970s in Turkey marked a time of severe social division with the politicization of Islamist ambitions.⁴⁷ Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party, which favored an increased role of Islam in politics, enjoyed a large degree of support throughout the 1970s, especially in the least developed parts of Turkey.⁴⁸ Many Turks in Germany, mirroring this demographic composition, have also been attracted to this move-

ment. When the Turkish military engineered a coup in the early 1980s, the state was unable to extend its hegemony to the Turks living in Germany. Shortly after the coup, however, Turkey reached an agreement with Germany that increased the role of the Turkish Department of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) among mosques and in providing education for Turks in Germany.⁴⁹ This agreement has also provided a context for the Turkish community to perceive the close state cooperation as indicative of a "co-conspiracy" between Germany and secular Turkey. The diminishing capacity of the Turkish state to pursue statist policies is growing increasingly apparent during a period of downsizing, liberalization, and privatization. These processes, in turn, allow for the development of a partially autonomous civil society within Turkey, a significant portion of which increasingly identifies itself in Islamic terms.⁵⁰ Ultimately, the inability of the Turkish state to monopolize the identity of Turkish workers and their families in Germany, and the German state's detachment from the affairs of the community, have provided a space for Turks in Germany to discover an identity "between" states, particularly in Islamic terms.

Alevite Muslims, the Anatolian adherents of a version of Shi'ite Islam, have attempted to develop an understanding of their identity not only as differing from German society, but also as distinct from Sunni Islam. Alevites in Turkey, fearing possible oppression from the Sunni majority, have remained the strongest supporters of a secular Turkey and are vehemently opposed to Sunni Islamist movements. In Germany, Alevites have often attempted to use integration in German society as a means of distinguishing themselves from Turkish Sunni Muslims. For example, Alevite women avoid the veil as a means of showing their willingness to integrate into German society. Alevites tend to see themselves as modern, progressive, secular and anti-fundamentalist, as a result of which they are viewed more positively by German society than Sunni Turks. Whereas both Sunnis and Alevites often hang Turkish flags as signs of their Turkishness, Alevites are more likely to put pictures of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Berlin shop windows as signs of their dedication to a secular Turkish republic. Exclusionary definitions of citizenship still apply to Alevites, however, especially because many Germans do not recognize the distinction between them and Sunni Muslims. Alevites themselves, less prone to center their activities in the mosque and often framing their identity in contrast to Sunni fundamentalism, seem to confirm the idea that the only possible means of integration occurs at an individual level by accepting German social institutions and ideas.

Islamic Institutions: Us or (Part of) Them?

Despite the fact that many Turks in Germany have used Islam as a means of framing identity in contrast to the German state, Turkish Islam in Germany has developed within a particularly German context. Because Turks have to survive within a German institutional framework, the institutional manifestations of Islam may actually provide a potential means of integration into German state and society.

From their earliest arrival in Germany, Turks have gathered together as Muslims. The German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) guarantees that "Every person [including foreigners] has the right to express his opinion in words, written material, and in pictures and also to publish and distribute these materials."⁵¹ Nonetheless, the unwillingness of the German state

to extend the formal religious recognition given to the Catholic and Protestant Churches to include Islamic institutions has provided a hindrance to the integration of Muslim Turks. Mosques, which have generally been local and low-scale in organizational terms, have not easily adapted to the hierarchical structure of German churches. Increasingly, however, many mosques have recognized the need to work together in larger organizational terms in order to achieve political recognition by German authorities. The Islamic Federation of Berlin, established in 1980, sought to bring together all Muslims, not just Turks, in the hopes of receiving recognition by German authorities. However, this organization was relatively short-lived.

Both Turkey and Germany have been interested in bringing Muslims under a greater degree of state control. The German state is interested in developing a single voice for Muslims for reason of more effective policy. Both states would like to bring the rather divided Turkish Muslim community under a greater degree of centralized control, as a way of moderating the contrasting, and occasionally radical, Muslim voices in Germany (which sound alarming to German ears and which rebuke the secular legitimacy of the Turkish state). The two states reached an agreement in 1981 that only imams and religious teachers approved by Turkey's Department of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) would be permitted to work with Turkish Muslims in Germany.⁵² This has proved somewhat effective in moderating Islamic extremism among Turks.⁵³ Many Islamists, however, have instead gone through official channels, effectively "infiltrating" Turkish state control.⁵⁴ Although a large number of mosques (some 740) are under direct *Diyanet* control, other organizations also have significant membership. The Association for a New World View in Europe, which is Islamist in orientation, has 262 member mosques. The Grey Wolves, regarded by both Germany and Turkey as the most extremist in orientation, have 180 member mosques.⁵⁵ Although German acceptance of *Diyanet* serves to reinforce the ties of domestic Turks with the Turkish state, the connection also provides a greater means of consolidation for Turkish Muslims, with the potentially greater opportunity for integration into the German system.

Muslims in Germany belonging to different organizations, Turks and non-Turks alike, have sought to achieve legal recognition, similar to the Christian churches, by forming a central authority. In 1994, the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany was formed on the model of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. This organization aspires to represent the needs of the Muslim community as a whole by operating within a German legalistic framework, while attempting to avoid competition with any Islamic organization. The Council has adopted German religious, social, and political discourse. Discussions are framed in terms of human rights, modern individual needs, religious freedom, and human dignity, concepts which the German state and court system can understand.⁵⁶

Mosques in Germany respond to the needs of Turks in German society. Unlike in Turkey, where mosques function primarily as places of prayer, German mosques assume functions more like those of German churches, providing welfare services and serving as the locus of funerals, weddings, and social gatherings. In addition, mosques take on roles not generally associated with either mosque or church in providing needed services for a community between states. *Halal* (Islamically acceptable) meat is often provided by butch-

ers at a local mosque. Mosques offer courses responding to the needs of the local community, such as German language and computer courses and translation services. As a community center, the mosque responds not only to the spiritual concerns of Turks in Germany but acts as a gathering place for maintaining connections to Turkish culture as well as responding to more "secular" needs.

Although the German state at a national level has generally attempted to maintain the links of Turkish Islamic institutions to the Turkish state, some local communities have recognized the integrative potential of Islam. For example, the city of Mannheim, home of Germany's largest mosque, has co-financed integration programs for Turks in the mosque.⁵⁷ However, Mannheim's mosque has recently become the center of local controversy because of the decision to replace the mosque's liberal, pro-integration leader with a member of the ultranationalist Grey Wolves organization, who opposes the integration of Turks into German society. Interestingly, this move was supported by the Turkish state "as pressure against Germans critical of Turkey and as a bulwark against Islamists."⁵⁸

Reunification and Contemporary Issues

Following German reunification in 1989, several new issues have emerged that affect the status of the Turkish minority in Germany. Politically, reunification has meant less the establishment of a new German state than the integration of the former East German republics into West German institutions. Whereas most Turks who have lived in Germany for decades still do not have German citizenship, former East Germans have acquired citizenship instantly. Unlike Germany's treatment of its Turkish population, unified Germany has made considerable efforts at integrating the new citizens and their institutions. "On the one hand the Turks are more 'foreign' than the Germans of the eastern 'new states,' yet in many cases the Turks are much better integrated into the western German social and economic structures."⁵⁹ More important, the collapse of the Soviet bloc has led to thousands of "ethnic Germans" seeking refuge in the German state. Although the latter have come only very recently to Germany and occasionally lack complete competence in the German language, they, too, have automatically qualified for citizenship. The rapid attempt at East German integration, and the willingness both to accept and accommodate ethnic "Germans" from the former Soviet bloc, has led to a more profound sense of being foreign in contrast to being German among Turks in Germany. The increase in xenophobic attacks against Turks following the reunification, particularly among former East Germans, has further added to the sense of isolation among Turks in German society.

Currently, more than two million Turks live in Germany, the majority of whom continue to be without German citizenship.⁶⁰ Moreover, only one-fourth of Turks actually have the right of residency; the rest still possess a permit that can at least theoretically be removed upon expiration. Nonetheless, some progress has been made toward the fuller incorporation of Turks into the German state apparatus. For example, the 1990 Foreigner Law recognized the right (not privilege) of many Turks who have grown up in German society to German citizenship at the age of eighteen. However, many have not taken advantage of this because it would require renouncing Turkish citizenship, and with it a sense of cultural and familial connection. An important citizenship law passed in 1999 further expanded foreigners' citizenship

rights by reducing the required time of residence in Germany from fifteen to eight years, granting automatic citizenship to children born in Germany of foreign parents (who have resided in Germany for more than eight years), and even permitting dual citizenship until the age of eighteen. Although this law has significantly amended existing citizenship legislation by introducing citizenship rights based on residence in Germany, genealogically defined understandings of citizenship have also been maintained and will continue to affect popular notions of who is and who is not a "German." Moreover, Turkish youth are confronted with the difficult choice between German and Turkish citizenship at the age of eighteen. Although a growing minority of Turks has chosen to become German citizens,⁶¹ an overwhelming majority (1.6 million of 2.1 million Turks) prefers dual citizenship and would apply for it if the possibility existed.⁶² Regardless of citizenship, there is little evidence to suggest that large numbers of Turks living in Germany will return to Turkey. This is especially true of second- and third-generation Turks who have grown up in Germany and lack a formal memory of the "home" country.

Although services and businesses that orient themselves to the needs of Turks living in Germany have slowly developed, most Turks have remained employed by German businesses (especially industry). Despite a relatively constant level of Turks in the country, the number of Turkish-owned businesses has increased from 33,000 in 1990 to some 47,000, employing over 200,000 workers (a large portion of whom are Turks). According to a study conducted by the Center for Turkish Studies at the University of Essen, job security and independence are the most frequently mentioned reasons for the trend toward self-employment among Turks in Germany. It is possible to argue that this trend seems to indicate that Turks, in "setting up shop," are confirming the permanent nature of their lives in Germany.

Turkish-owned businesses generally try to remain independent from German state control as a way of affirming their sense of separation from German society. However, business also represents a possible means of integration. As Turks become more economically rooted in German society, their need to operate according to rules more clearly defined by the German state increase as well. A recent survey indicates that 81.2 percent of the Turkish-owned businesses in Germany fulfill the formal requirements dictated by the German state for the training of apprentices.⁶³ It is also becoming more difficult to discern Turkish from German consumption. Many German consumers find Turkish produce of much higher quality than that offered by German grocers, and therefore patronize "Turkish" markets.⁶⁴

Conclusion

I have illustrated the complex relation between culture and politics in the lives of Turks residing in Germany. The understanding of German nationality in static and essential terms has entailed an understanding of the presence of Turks as external to the German nation. Germany has, instead, largely turned over Turkish religious institutions, education, and other means of transmitting identity to Turkey in an attempt both to distance Turks from the German state and to maintain cultural and political allegiance with Turkey. However, this attempt has not proven entirely successful. The presence of Turks in Germany appears

to have become permanent, calling into question the German understanding of the nation that has excluded them. Moreover, Turkish understandings of nation, intimately connected to the territorial Turkish state, have not been able fully to survive "extraterritorially." Instead, Turks living in Germany have attempted to discover identities of their own, that, while influenced by both states, are not entirely connected to either. Many Turks in Germany have redefined the notion of "Turk" in religious terms, which runs counter to the secular understanding of the Turkish state. In this sense, Turks in Germany have discovered identity "between" states.

Notes

1. Samuel Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

2. Yasemin Soysal, "Workers in Europe: Interactions with the Host Society," in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, ed. Metin Heper et al. (London: Tauris, 1993), 236.

3. As Rogers Brubaker points out, particular "cultural idioms" manifest themselves in political conceptualizations of citizenship. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 16.

4. Ruth Mandel, "Shifting Centres and Emergent Identities: Turkey and Germany in the Lives of Turkish Gastarbeiter," in *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination*, ed. Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (London: Routledge, 1990), 153-71.

5. I am not suggesting that Muslim identity has been the Turks' only response, but wish to illustrate the ways in which Islam has served as a form of "Turkish" identity in German society. Ethnic Kurds, who comprise approximately one-fourth of Turkish workers, have also been influenced by a similar space "between" states encouraging "Kurdishness" (as well as Muslim identity).

6. Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables" in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 103-4.

7. Consider the fact that the Turkish National Pact, which stated the goals for the Turkish Nationalists during the Turkish War of Independence, never made reference to "Turks" or a "Turkish Nation," but rather to the "Ottoman Muslim majority." See also Erik Zuercher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 1993), 154, 158-9.

8. According to Erik Zuercher, the population of Anatolia climbed from being approximately 80 percent Muslim in 1918 to more than 98 percent after the Turkish War of Independence. *Ibid.*, 171-73; It is also worth noting that this trend would continue in the following years as a result of property taxes that were disproportionately applied to non-Muslims. According to official statistics, Turkey is currently 99.8 percent Muslim.

9. Patricia M. Carley, "Turkey and Central Asia: Reality Comes Calling," in *Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran*, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and M. Smolansky (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 177-79.

10. Serif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," in *The Modern Middle East*, ed. Albert Hourani et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 369.

11. Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, ed. Albert Hourani et al., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 75.

12. Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, *Perspectives on Democratisation in Turkey* (Istanbul: Tüsiad, 1997), 45.

13. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 15.
14. Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey" in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 627.
15. Brubaker, *Citizenship*, 15.
16. Michael Minkenberg, "Civil Religion and German Unification," *German Studies Review* (February, 1997): 66.
17. Ray C. Rist, *Guestworkers in Germany* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 136.
18. Jorgen S. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 26.
19. Rist, *Guestworkers*, 61.
20. *Ibid.*, 91.
21. Peter O'Brien expands on this notion, noting that "the strong emphasis on rapidly developing the West German economy became inextricably linked to the yearning for the unification of all Germans. With familiar irony, though, the maturing German economy soon fell dependent on foreign labor." "Continuity and Change in Germany's Treatment of Non-Germans," *International Migration Review* (Fall 1988): 115.
22. Rist, *Guestworkers*, 90.
23. Tufan Kolan, "International Labor Migration and Turkish Economic Development" in *Manpower Mobility Across Cultural Boundaries: Social, Economic, and Legal Aspects, The Case of Turkey and West Germany*, ed. R. E. Krane (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 138-60.
24. Terry D. Monson, "Differences in Industrial Learning Behavior of Turkish Workers at Home and Abroad: Causes and Consequences" in *Manpower Mobility Across Cultural Boundaries: Social, Economic, and Legal Aspects, The Case of Turkey and West Germany*, ed. R. E. Krane, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 95-123.
25. O'Brien, "Continuity and Change," 116.
26. Rist, *Guestworkers*, 65.
27. Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State Class, and Economic Development* (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 247-48.
28. In Rist, *Guestworkers*, 76.
29. In O'Brien, "Continuity and Change," 123.
30. Elcin Kursat-Ahlers, "The Turkish Minority in German Society" in *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, ed. David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky. (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn, 1996), 113-14.
31. Eva Kolinsky, "Non-German Minorities in Contemporary German Society" in *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, ed. David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn, 1996), 98-99.
32. Rist, *Guestworkers*, 81.
33. *Ibid.*, 80.
34. Ruth Mandel, "A Place of Their Own: Contesting Spaces and Defining Places in Berlin's Migrant Community" in *Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe*, ed. Barbara Daly Metcalf (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 147-66.
35. Mandel, "Shifting Centres," 156.
36. Mandel, "Place of Their Own," 163.
37. David P. Baker, et al., "Effects of Immigrant Workers on Educational Stratification in Germany," *Sociology of Education* 58 (October 1985), 213-27.
38. Eva Kolinsky, "Conclusion" in *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, ed. David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn, 1996), 183.
39. Yasemin Karakasoglu, "Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany and the Role of Islam" in *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, ed. David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn), 1996, 164-5.

40. Minkenberg, "Civil Religion," 67.

41. A variety of other religious groups have also been denied such recognition. On the one hand, Germany's treatment of Islam is much better than that of some other religious groups, such as Scientologists and Jehovah's Witnesses, whose status as religions have been challenged. On the other hand, no other religion of comparable numerical strength has been denied public recognition.

42. See M. E. Yapp, "Europe in the Turkish Mirror," *Past and Present* (November 1992): 134-55.

43. *Der Spiegel* (April 14, 1997).

44. Jutta A. Helm, "No Laughing Matter: Joking about Turks," *German Politics and Society* (Spring 1994): 51.

45. Dursun Tan and Hans-Peter Waldhoff, "Turkish Everyday Culture in Germany and its Prospects" in *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, ed. David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky. (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn, 1996), 141.

46. Mandel, "Place of Their Own," 154.

47. Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey" in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton. (Leiden: E. J. Brill), 36-37.

48. Toprak, "Civil Society," 637.

49. Jorgen S. Nielsen, "Muslims in Europe in the Late Twentieth Century" in *Christian Muslim Encounters*, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Wadi Zaidan Haddad (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), 319.

50. Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society," 101, 106-12.

51. Rist, *Guestworkers*, 145.

52. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 30.

53. Karakasoglu, "Turkish Cultural Orientations," 169.

54. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 31.

55. Karakasoglu, "Turkish Cultural Orientations," 169.

56. Soysal, "Workers in Europe," 236.

57. "Mit den Wolfen heulen" *Der Spiegel* (April 27, 1998), 58.

58. *Ibid.*, 61.

59. Mandel, "Fortress Within," 115.

60. For recent employment and residence statistics, see Institute for Turkish Studies, University of Essen <<http://www.uni-essen.de/zft>>.

61. In 1997, approximately 220,000 out of 2,049,000 opted for German citizenship. These figures do not indicate if the latter are Sunni, Alevite, or even possibly Kurdish in background. The Turkish state has accommodated those who have chosen to become German by issuing them so-called Pink Cards, allowing former Turkish citizens to keep many of their former citizenship privileges (including inheritance privileges, but excluding voting rights).

62. Faruk Sen, "Turkish Communities in Western Europe" in *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, ed. Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 252.

63. Institute for Turkish Studies, University of Essen <<http://www.uni-essen.de/zft>>.

64. Mandel, "Place of Their Own," 152.