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Postgraduate/Distance Learning Assignment Coversheet & Feedback Form

62/6

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For completion by the student:

Student Name: Victoria Marie Fauve Desvaux de Marigny

Module code: HPPH7009

Student University
Number: 2009229

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support needs:
Yes/No

Module title: Environmental Philosophy

Module tutor: Dr Rebekah Humphreys

Assignment title: 'What light does Environmental Ethics throw on the extent of Moral Standing?'

Assignment due date: August 19th 2022

I confirm that this is my original work and that I have adhered to the University policy on plagiarism.

Name : Victoria Marie Fauve Desvaux de Marigny

Assignment Mark

1 st Marker's Provisional mark	62
2 nd Marker's/Moderator's provisional mark	
External Examiner mark (if relevant)	
Final Mark	

NB. All marks are provisional until confirmed by the Final Examination Board

This essay presents a relatively thorough answer to the essay question, & in doing so evinces a good grasp of the theories at stake & of underlying concepts related to value. In places,

For completion by Marker 1:

Comments:

there is a need to develop of more in-depth discussion, particularly as you mention Singer's argument by analogy & McShane's new, but then your treatment of the material here is a little rushed. I think you are trying to include an awful lot, & while this enables you to show that you have a very good grasp of the topic, it also means that sometimes

Marker 1 signature: argument are a little

Date:

For completion by Marker 2 / Moderator:

Comments:

underdeveloped. That said, this is a good piece of work. It is well-prepared & well-researched.

Marker 2 / Moderator signature:

Date:

External Examiner's comments (if relevant):

External Examiner signature:

Date:

What light does Environmental Ethics throw on the extent of moral standing?

Introduction

In his book *Environmental Ethics: an overview for the twenty-first century* Robin Attfield defines environmental ethics as the 'study of the ethics of human interactions with and impacts on [environmental] systems'.¹ In the same book, Attfield endeavors to explore how different value theories have framed humans' interactions with their environment, stating that 'these contrasting positions concern the scope of moral standing and the location of intrinsic value', adding that 'choosing between them affects not only what we recognize as right action but also what we count as a problem'.² If such is the case, the question of moral standing finds itself at the center of environmental ethics questioning. In this paper will be explored in what way environmental ethics helps unfurl the conversation on the extent of moral standing by firstly exploring the, sometimes discussed, definition of moral standing, to then look into the different positions adopted by environmental philosophers on the topic, before finally exploring the societal implications of the applications of these different stances.

✓ Good introduction

Defining the problematics at hand, and the intrinsic problematic of definitions

When Attfield shares that environmental ethic is the 'study of the ethics of human interactions with and impacts on [environmental] systems', he tries to grasp the central themes of a field that could very well be one of the most important of our time, if we believe the continuous warnings issued by scientists about the current environmental crisis, a crisis that could be said to be not of only one issue but of a real amalgamation of various environmental problems.³ When Attfield continues by stating that 'contrasting positions' that concern 'the scope of moral standing and the location of intrinsic value' would affect 'not only what we recognize as right action but also what we count as a problem', Attfield reflects on the very scope and variety of what can be considered as environmental problems.⁴ Indeed, Attfield argues that 'much variation is also found in people's understanding of environmental problems' and that 'this diversity arise because people diverge enormously in their assumptions about what constitutes a problem or about what makes problems problematic', reflecting on how while 'some people consider as important nothing but impacts on local people for the near future, others may take into account impacts on the whole of humanity, and/or the entire foreseeable future, and/or other species too' and that 'all kinds of intermediate stances are also taken'.⁵ To complicate things further, the term 'environment' itself can be understood in different ways, from 'surroundings', 'natural or otherwise' as highlighted by Attfield, to 'familiar milieu' or 'objective systems of nature'.⁶ John Benson hence comments that in such a

¹ Robin Attfield, *Environmental Ethics: An overview for the Twenty-First Century Second Edition*, (UK: Polity Press, 2014), Kindle Edition, [hereafter Attfield, *Environmental Ethics*], p.14

² Attfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.25

³ Attfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.14;

Ripple, William J et al. 'World Scientists' Warning of a Climate Emergency', *Bioscience*, 70 (2020), pp.8-12

⁴ Attfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.14

⁵ Attfield, *Environmental Ethics*, pp. 3-4

⁶ Attfield, *Environmental Ethics*, pp.1-2

way 'someone playing loud music nearby can be an environmental problem if it is heard as an unwelcome intrusion'.⁷ Already it could be remarked how, even before thinking about finding solutions to these aforementioned environmental problems, their very definition is laborious and not as straight-forward as one would wish.

well said
Besides the difficulties of defining our 'environment' and 'environmental problems', if the question of the scope of moral standing is indeed at the heart of how we perceive and act on environmental problems, as suggested by Attfeld, it might well be one of the most urgent questions of our time.⁸ Before going further, it could be noted here that in regard to the different meanings of 'environment', the various theories discussed here can be said to usually use the 'objective systems of nature' definition. Uncovering such a common understanding of 'moral standing' would also be necessary for this discussion to proceed. On this subject, Benson shares that philosophers have used different terms such as 'morally considerable', having 'moral standing' or having 'independent moral status' to define this concept, the concept of a being 'whose claim to be considered is independent of the claims of any other beings' when determining the effect of an action.⁹ Benson elaborates by sharing that

claiming
when I contemplate some action there is a whole array of other beings which it may affect. Some of these other beings matter: that is, how they are affected determines whether the action is right or wrong. Beings of some sorts matter in a way that can be explained only by reference to the way in which beings of some other sort are affected; but some matter in a way that requires no such further reference to explain why they matter: they matter in themselves.¹⁰

These beings that 'matter in themselves' are the ones that one needs 'to consider in deciding whether to go ahead' with an action.¹¹ For Attfeld as well 'moral standing belongs to things that ought to be taken into consideration when action is in prospect'.¹² While this definition of moral standing is globally agreed upon, the actual ramification of which beings ought to 'matter in themselves' is where opinions diverge, giving range to the different value theories mentioned by Attfeld.¹³

When defining 'moral standing', Attfeld continued his definition by mentioning Kenneth E. Goodpaster's notion of 'good of one's own' as he shares how 'Goodpaster's own theory is that moral standing attaches to everything that has a good of its own (independently of the good of its owners, producers or users)': in doing so, Attfeld raises one of the next issues to be explored here in regard to moral standing.¹⁴ If having moral standing attaches to a being having a 'good of its own', it then becomes crucial to define whose beings have such a 'good of their own'. A 'good of its own' seems for many to depend on a being 'having interests', the application of which is also a topic of divergence. Indeed, in his responses to W. Murray Hunt's, Kenneth E. Goodpaster shares more about the aforementioned link between a being having 'a good of its own' and 'having interest', while also showcasing some of the divergence of opinions on that subject when he shares that

J. He
argues
that...

⁷ John Benson, *Environmental Ethics: An Introduction with Readings*, (London: Routledge, 2000), [hereafter Benson, *Environmental Ethics*], p.11

⁸ Attfeld, *Environmental Ethics*, p.25

⁹ Benson, *Environmental Ethics*, p. 14

¹⁰ Benson, *Environmental Ethics*, p. 14

¹¹ Benson, *Environmental Ethics*, p. 14

¹² Attfeld, *Environmental Ethics*, p.11

¹³ Attfeld, *Environmental Ethics*, p.14

¹⁴ Attfeld, *Environmental Ethics*, p.11

Feinberg's mistake [...] was not that he embraced "having interests" as the key to moral considerability, but that he limited "having interests" to beings capable of wants, desires, pleasure, pain, etc. My point in the context was that a being does not need a fancy central nervous system or "feelings" to qualify as having interests: being alive is enough.¹⁵

Good
Indeed, while both Feinberg and Goodpaster agree that 'a being without interests is a being that is incapable of being harmed or benefited, having no good or 'sake' of its own', and hence that such a being can't be morally considerable, the exact definition of what can be considered 'having interests' is where they disagree.¹⁶ Goodpaster elaborates by sharing that 'Interests are crucial because the concept of morality is non contingently related to beneficence or nonmaleficence, notions which misfire completely in the absence of entities capable of being benefited or harmed.'¹⁷

Smashing in all cases?
Here too nuances can be found. In his essay, entitled 'The Good of Trees', Attfield defends that while he considers trees to have 'interests', stating that 'the growth and thriving of trees does not need to be regarded as a kind of wanting. nor trees as possible objects of sympathy, for us to recognise that they too have a good of their own', and even adding that these interests are not attached to humans as 'trees had needs before people existed, and cannot be supposed to have lost them', but he nonetheless does not consider them to have a 'will of their own'.¹⁸ Indeed he follows the above points by mentioning that 'it does not imply, however [...] that trees are of value in their own rights, have rights, or ought to be shown consideration', hence showcasing how he believed a distinction to exist between 'having interest' and 'having a will of one's own', as opposed to the views of other philosophers.¹⁹ These examples showcase the complicated endeavor of creating an unified understanding of the very terms and concepts that constitute the building blocks of the conversation on moral standing and environmental ethics. Nonetheless, a few different stances on the question can be distinguished.

Distinguishing different value systems and their implications

While the divergence of definition on moral standing and what it encompasses is far from being resolved, a few value theories, each with their own stance on the question, have emerged. Some (like Feinberg) will equate 'having interest to 'beings capable of wants, desires, pleasure, pain' ' as quoted by Goodpaster.²⁰ Attfield calls the adherents of this position 'sentientists' and summarize their position as follow:

the key factor that qualifies anything for moral consideration is either its capacity to suffer, or alternatively its having a perspective or point of view of its own. Most non-human animals have this capacity, albeit to different degrees, and, to the extent that they are conscious, have points of view, from which things can go better or worse for them. Because like cases should be treated alike, non-human animals should be

¹⁵ Kenneth E. Goodpaster, "On Stopping at Everything", *Environmental Ethics*, (1980), [hereafter Goodpaster, "On Stopping at Everything"], pp.281-284

¹⁶ Goodpaster, "On Stopping at Everything", P. 282

¹⁷ Goodpaster, "On Stopping at Everything", p. 281

¹⁸ Robin Attfield, 'The Good of trees', in O'Neill, J., et al., *Environmental Ethic and Philosophy*, (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2001), [hereafter Attfield, 'The Good of trees'], p. 333

¹⁹ Attfield, 'The Good of trees', p.336

²⁰ Goodpaster, "On Stopping at Everything", p.282

given consideration comparable to human beings with respect to these shared capacities²¹

Many disagree with this position, but for different reasons; for some, this definition of who can have moral standing is too broad. On the contrary, for some this definition is too narrow. Indeed, adherents of biocentrism will consider this definition too narrow and consider that all living creatures have a good of their own. Just as Goodpaster above; they will consider that it is intrinsically valuable that these beings can attain their 'own good'.²² Proponents of this stance might well argue that the capacity of feeling or sentience can't be the criteria guarding access to moral standing, using the arguments of how a human being in a coma state still has interests or sharing how plants' good is about their capacity for growth, reproduction and self-repair.²³

necessary

Although it may be sufficient.

As far as they are concerned, those adopting an ecocentrist position will argue that, as summarized by Atfield, 'ecosystems [having] a good independent of that of their component individuals, and as such [having] their own moral standing; their attaining their good has intrinsic value'.²⁴ Some ecocentrists will make parallel claims about species.²⁵ Anthropocentrists, on the other hand, will argue that these three previous positions on the scope of moral standing are too broad and that only humans have moral standing.²⁶ Katie McShane summarizes this anthropocentrist view as 'the view that the nonhuman world has value only because, and insofar as, it directly or indirectly serves human interests'.²⁷ She uses the term 'nonanthropocentrism' to describe these other stances that say otherwise, that say that 'it isn't the case that the nonhuman world has value only because, and insofar as, it directly or indirectly serves human interests'.²⁸

These positions are not always so clearcut and many intermediary positions exist, as well as areas of shared understanding, between these. For example, as shared by Atfield, while 'some ecocentrists suggest that systems (and possibly species) alone have intrinsic value [...], others hold that the intrinsic value of systems and of species coexists with that of individual creatures'.²⁹ Some theorists might also be said to share a similar stance, for example that sentient beings have moral standing, but come to that ethical stance through different point of views, or even draw different conclusions from that stance: for example Peter Singer and Tom Regan might both be regarded as sentientists and proponents of animal-welfarism, but Atfield commentary highlights how Peter Singer is a consequentialist - a theorist 'for whom the morality of actions and policies depends on foreseeable outcomes' and who, in Singer case, 'regards the interest of conscious creatures as turning on pleasure and absence of suffering', while Regan would be regarded as a rights-theorist 'who hold that having a point of views betokens having fundamental rights'.³⁰

It's

Another example of these differences within a similar stance can be seen in anthropocentrism. Bryan G. Norton hence distinguishes between theories that are strongly anthropocentric and theories that are weakly anthropocentric, contrasting these

²¹ Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.6

²² Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.10

²³ Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.10

²⁴ Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.10

²⁵ Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.10

²⁶ Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.9

²⁷ Katie McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?', *Environmental Values* 16, no.2, (2007), [hereafter McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism'], p.170

²⁸ McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism', p.170

²⁹ Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p. 10

³⁰ Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.7

by sharing that strongly anthropocentric theories place value on felt preferences - hence giving ways to possible exploitation-, while weak anthropocentric theories add to these felt preferences 'more rational ones'.³¹ Norton hence argues that while in this theory moral standing is still only linked to human beings, it can nonetheless guarantee an appropriate environmental ethic.³²

On the flip side, shared conclusions can also be found between different value theories. For example, both a sentientist and an anthropocentrist might hold that animal cruelty is wrong, while having different positions concerning moral standing. Indeed, anthropocentrist will argue that animal exploitation is 'wrong because it can indirectly affects humans, as they're the only ones having intrinsic value, while a sentientist will argue that animal exploitation is wrong not in relation to any human agents but because the animal in itself has intrinsic value and hence the right to not suffer. Joel Feinberg for example list how those defending the idea that only humans have intrinsic value will link our negative sentiment toward animal cruelty to humans by saying that this sentiment can be traced to how it would effect 'the feelings of other human beings', or how laws against animal cruelty 'were designed to protect human beings by preventing the growth of cruel habits that could later threaten human beings with harm too'.³³

As these different stances showcase the multitudes of positions that one can hold in regard to these issues, just as it was the case with the complicated endeavor of creating an unified understanding of some of the terms used here, each with their own argumentations and conviction of holding a piece of the solutions, one can wonder about the importance of this argumentation. One can indeed wonder if, being faced with the immensity and intensity of the environmental crisis mentioned at the beginning of this paper, these distinctions and differences are important, or if they're just distracting us from the real problems at hands.

From theory to application

In his paper 'The historical roots of our ecological crisis', Lynn White shares that 'what people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny "hence sharing how our worldviews - defined by Jack Hunter as 'the way in which an individual perceives the world around them and understand their places and role within it', impact our actions, including when it comes to environmental issues.³⁴ This reinforces Atfield's idea used to open this paper, that these different positions concerning 'the scope of moral standing and the location of intrinsic value' will impact our actions.³⁵ Reinforcing furthermore this idea, it can be noteworthy to mention that during their reviews of 'personal and social factors that influence pro-environmental concern and behaviour' Robert Gifford and Andreas Nilsson also indeed investigated 'values,

³¹ Bryan G Norton, 'Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism', *Environmental Ethics*, Volume 6, Issue 2 (1984), [hereafter Norton, 'Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism'], p. 165

³² Norton, 'Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism', p.167

³³ Joel Feinberg, 'The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations', in *Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980), p.161

³⁴ Lynn White, Jr, 'The historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis', *Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science)*, 155 (1967), p.1205

Jack Hunter, 'Ordinary Theology in the Classroom: Experience and Belief in Secondary Religious Education', *RE Today*, Vol.33, No.2 (2014), p.58

³⁵ Atfield, *Environmental Ethics*, p.25

political views and worldviews' as one of the areas that can influence a person's pro-environmental behaviours.³⁶

Hence, although some different value theories will suggest a similar action, as seen above, their reasons for doing so will be different. Hence why some philosophers, like McShane, warn us of not minimizing the impact these differences can create. In her paper 'anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism: why should we care?', while noting the efficiency of anthropocentric theories in the urgently-needed adoption of adapted environmental policies, McShane highlights how the adoptions of anthropocentrists' views can limit how we ought to feel about nature, hence affecting also how we interact with it.³⁷ Indeed, she highlights the importance of this dimension of feeling by sharing that

questions of how to feel are also central in thinking about how to direct our own lives. When I think about what I'm aiming for in trying to be morally good, I don't just think about which actions to perform. I also think about how to feel about the world. I want to be emotionally oriented toward things in the right way³⁸

In the same paper, McShane also elaborates about the importance of these discussions. She shares how anthropocentrists claims, notably that the nonhuman world only has value when it serves human interests, is not a claim about how to behave but about what is valuable, and that such claims then serve as the grounds for ethical norms - both norms for action and norms for feeling.³⁹ She continues by stating that 'the worry about anthropocentrism can thus be understood as the worry that since these claims serve to ground our ethical prescriptions, limiting the claims we can make might limit the kind of ethical prescriptions we can offer.'⁴⁰ She then continues by sharing how nonanthropocentrists do not necessarily think that appeals to human interests are problematic, but object to the claim 'that these are the only reasons to which one can appeal'.⁴¹ She then continues by sharing how anthropocentrism might limit the norms we have in regard to feeling, whereas how we feel actually also significantly affect how we act, stating that 'if ethics cares about how we act, then it ought to care about how we feel' and hence crystallizing the importance of these difference positions, even though they could produce the same outcomes in a given situation,⁴²

One could still wonder though about the importance of these conversations and how they then ground in the real world. In his article on Environmental Ethics, Alasdair Cochrane, gives but one of the many examples of how different scopes of moral standing will lead to different environmental policy being taken when he shares about the problem of rabbits in Australia devastating local ecosystems.⁴³ For such a situation, depending on where one ascribes moral standing, different actions will be taken. For example, ecocentrists will put more importance on the overall health of the ecosystems and might hence take measures to kill the rabbits in order to balance the ecosystems again, whereas such a solution will be unacceptable for the proponent of animal rights, a more sentientist stance who put moral standing on the individuals and not the overall

³⁶ Robert Gifford and Andreas Nilsson, 'Personal and social factors that influence pro-environmental concern and behaviour: A review', *International Journal of Psychology*, Vol.49, No.3, pp.144-145

³⁷ McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism', pp.175-179

³⁸ McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism', p.175

³⁹ McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism', pp.172-173

⁴⁰ McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism', p.173

⁴¹ McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism', p.174

⁴² McShane, 'Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism', p.174

⁴³ Alasdair Cochrane, 'Environmental Ethics', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://iep.utm.edu/envi-eth/> [accessed August 15, 2022]

Attitudes
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The impact of these differentiation in value not only takes effect on an individual level in case-to-case situations, but can have impacts on a societal level as well. Whole movements trying to bring changes in regard to the environmental, and neighboring, sphere can be said to be based on the very idea of shifting the location of intrinsic value. As an example, it could be said that both animal rights movements and animal liberation movements want to change the commonly held anthropocentrist view of animals in light of a more sentientist one that would give animals intrinsic values, even when both stance differs when it comes to the discussion of rights.⁴⁴ Such a shift in the placement of value would hence also have practical applications, and bring forward the changes that these movements hope for. On that topic Singers ~~shares~~ *claims* that

Once nonhuman animals are recognized as coming within the sphere of equal consideration of interests, it is immediately clear that we must stop treating hens as machines for turning grain into eggs, rats as living toxicology testing kits, and whales as floating reservoirs of oil and blubber. All these practices -and the list could be continued for a long time- are based on treating animals as things to be used for our advantage, without any thought being given to the interests of the animals themselves. The inclusion of animals within the sphere of equal consideration could not leave such practices intact.⁴⁵

Singer even goes as far as to compare speciesism, discrimination based on species, to be just as 'unjustifiable as racism'.⁴⁶

In some cases, these themes of environmental ethics, such as shifts in the scope of moral standing and location of intrinsic value, have become so prevalent, that they were even codified in legislation, hence actually transitioning from moral rights to actual codified legal standards. Before going further, it would be good to note here that moral rights and legal rights are not to be confused. Joel Feinberg's quotation of Raymond Frey can be used to describe moral rights, as he describes, a 'moral right' as 'a right which is not the product of community legislation or social practice, which persists even in the face of contrary legislation or practice, and which prescribes the boundary beyond which neither individuals nor the community may go in pursuit of their overall ends'.⁴⁷ Such a right could be said to be more linked to questions of ethics, and of what should be ethically, than to actual legislation that can be enforced.

what do you think about this? are our practices speciesist? as there is an analogy between racism & speciesism?

Such shifts in regard to the location of moral standing can though also indeed be seen to bring changes even on national level to such a point that they're then inscribed in pieces of legislation. Such an example can be seen in the constitution of Ecuador's, in which the chapter 7 is now dedicated to the 'rights of nature': article 71 of Ecuador's constitutions for example states that 'Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structures, functions and its processes in evolution', showcasing at a national level a very ecocentrists stance.⁴⁸ Another such example is the 'Mother Earth Law' in Bolivia where the objective of this law is to establish a vision of 'integral development in harmony and balance with Mother Earth', hence 'guaranteeing the continued capacity of

⁴⁴ Peter Singer, 'animal liberation or animal rights?', *The Monist*, Vol. 70, No. 1, (1987) [hereafter Singer, 'animal liberation or animal rights?'], pp.3-14

⁴⁵ Singer, 'animal liberation or animal rights?', pp.5

⁴⁶ Singer, 'animal liberation or animal rights?', pp.4

⁴⁷ Joel Feinberg, 'In defense of moral rights', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol.12, No.2, (1992), p.151

⁴⁸ Political database of the Americas, 'Republic of Ecuador - Constitution of 2008', Political database of the Americas, <https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html>, [accessed August 15, 2022].

Mother Earth to regenerate natural systems, recuperating and strengthening local and ancestral practices, within the framework of rights, obligations and responsibilities'.⁴⁹ In both these pieces of legislation, Nature is described as having intrinsic value in itself, not derivative from humans. Of course, even in the case of rights being encased in actual legislation, one can still wonder if such legislation will have actual impacts and about the practicalities of actually enforcing these legislation. Although all these questions are still to be answered, such a shift in value is still nonetheless interesting to note and can make one wonder about how these questions of environmental ethics will continue to shape our worldviews and how we act toward the more-than-human, in a moment when such considerations are crucial to bring to the front rows.

Conclusion:

While the definition of what exactly bestows moral standing is still a matter of discussion, the numerous debates it has created could be seen as a testament to the weight of its importance. The different value theories emerging of these conversation about moral standing, stances that frames human's interactions with their environment, while diverging on the scope of moral standing and location of intrinsic value, can be seen as trying, each in their own way, to work out the best course of actions when it comes to environmental issues. While the debate is far from being settled, the willingness of philosophers within each of these different stances to dig into these questions could be seen as a glimmer of hope in the face of the current environmental crises. Similarly could be perceived the progress of the different movements having these questions of moral standing at their heart, such as the animal rights movements or the cases where legislation worldwide recognizes intrinsic values to the more-than-human. Furthermore, if White is right and that truly 'what people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them', maybe these reflections, in and of themselves, even without reaching consensus, could be part of the solution, as an invitation to reflect more on human's relationship to the more-than-human and how it's ought to be treated.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 'The Mother Earth Law and Integral Development to Live Well, Law No 300', Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, <https://climate-laws.org/geographies/bolivia/laws/the-mother-earth-law-and-integral-development-to-live-well-law-no-300>, [Accessed August 15, 2022]

⁵⁰ Lynn White, Jr, 'The historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis, *Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science)*, 155 (1967), p.1205

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