

Between Narrative and Interpretation: Writing History in the Ancient World

Unit 4: The Fourth-century Historians

In this unit you shall have the choice of three assignments. Note that you may complete only one of these assignments as part of your non-assessed coursework.

Introduction

The fifth-century surviving historiography ends with Thucydides, although a number of fragments of the other fifth-century historians has survived. The following century, the fourth, was a time of great upheaval in the Greek world. Where the fifth century saw the great conflict with Persia and the rise of imperialism in the Greek world, the fourth century was marked by the continual rise and fall of imperialist powers and the rise of Macedon that brought with it the end of the world of the classical polis.

Historiographically, the fourth century was particularly influential in the development of Greek historical writing. Unfortunately, the vagaries of survival have robbed the modern student of the vast majority of fourth-century writers, in most cases leaving only fragments and testimonia in later sources. The only surviving historian from this century is Xenophon, whose magnum opus, the *Hellenika*, is a continuation of Thucydides' history to 362 BCE. The other important historians of the fourth century were Ephoros, Timaios, Theopompos and the as-yet-unidentified Oxyrhynchus Historian.

Before continuing with this unit, it is strongly suggested that you familiarise yourself with the events of the fourth century.. A good introduction is Osborne, R. Classical Greece, 500-323, OUP 2000, p.197-222 [Available from NetLibrary: <http://www.netlibrary.com/>]

Xenophon

Life

Xenophon was an Athenian and a member of an upper class family. He was born around 430 BCE and died in the late 350s BCE. Xenophon probably belonged to the elite cavalry corps in Athens, the *hippeis* (See OCD s.v. *hippeis* (2): <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e3109>). During the reign of the 30 Tyrants, Xenophon sided with the oligarchs and fought against the democratic insurgents (for the 30, see OCD s.v. The Thirty Tyrants: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e6410>). His relationship with Socrates, as well as his own social class, probably influenced him in that decision. Later Xenophon appears to be critical of the Thirty, not in terms of their political affiliation but rather their methods (see the account of the 30 in the *Hellenika* 2.3-4, available from the Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Xen.+Hell.+2.3.1>).

Although Xenophon was covered by the 403/2 amnesty (see OCD, s.v. amnesty: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e365>), he elected to leave Athens shortly afterwards to be a member of the 10,000 Greek mercenaries employed by Kyros the Younger in his revolt against his brother, the King of Persia, Artaxerxes (see OCD s.v. Cyrus (2): <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e1995>).

After the defeat of Cyrus and the assassination of the Greek generals, Xenophon became the de facto leader of the 10,000 and succeeded in leading them through Anatolia to the shores of the Aegean. Along with many of the surviving 10,000, Xenophon became a Spartan mercenary during the Spartan campaigns against Persia in Asia Minor in the first years of the fourth century. During this period, he became friendly with leading Spartans, among them King Agesilaos (see OCD, s.v. Agesilaos II: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e194>).

Xenophon followed Agesilaos in his return from Asia Minor and fought at the Spartan side in the battle of Koroneia in 394 BCE. His participation at that battle earned Xenophon a sentence of exile from the Athenians. Afterwards he was given the rank of Spartan proxenos at Olympia and was provided with land at Skillos (on proxenia, see OCD, s.v. proxenos/proxeny: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e5395>).

Xenophon was honoured by the Spartans throughout his life and was given special privileges not usually offered to outsiders, such as a Spartan education (agoge. On this see OCD, s.v. agoge: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e201>) for his sons. When Spartan power waned after the battle of Leuktra in 371 BCE (see OCD, s.v. Leuktra: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e3669>), Xenophon moved to Corinth, where he lived the remainder of his life. Probably some time after Leuktra, or possibly in the later part of the 370s, the Athenians rescinded his exile and in the later years of his life, Xenophon became involved in Athenian politics, if only from afar. Certainly by that time, he had achieved notoriety and respect among the Athenians, which contributed to the posthumous honours to his son, Gryllus, who died as an Athenian cavalry-man in the battle of Mantinea in 362 BCE (see OCD, s.v. Mantinea, battles of: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e3927>).

The most important aspect of Xenophon's life was that he was often an eye-witness to the events he described and he had access to the testimony of important Spartans at the time of the Spartan hegemony. Further, Xenophon was an accomplished general in his own right and had knowledge and experience of warfare, which is preserved in his works.

Xenophon as author

Xenophon as a historian is sharply different than Herodotos or Thucydides. Where both previous extant historians have left no other authorial testimony, Xenophon was a prolific author, whose works in their majority survive. While the *Hellenika* is the longest and most important, historically, of Xenophon's works, the remainder of his output are equally important not only in understanding Xenophon as an author and as a historian but also for the development of other Greek literary genres.

Xenophon's other historical work is the *Anabasis*: an account of the expedition of the 10,000 and their return. The *Anabasis* straddles the genres of historiography and memoir. His *Kyropaideia* is the earliest known predecessor of the historical novel, a literary genre that became particularly prominent in the 1st century CE (on this see OCD, s.v. novel, Greek:

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e4463>).

Xenophon also wrote a number of philosophical works (*Apology*, *Memorabilia*, *Symposium*, *Oikonomikos*), most of them in dialogue format, that testify to his Socratic background and education. These works provide a glimpse into Xenophon's morality and political as well as social viewpoint. More importantly, they present a different view of Socrates that is a good counter-point to the portrayal of the philosopher in Plato.

Xenophon also wrote a number of specialist treatises (*Hippikos*, *Hipparchikos*, *Kynegetikos*) that are part of the fourth-century drive toward specialisation and specialised treatises (such as Aeneas Tacticus' *Poliorketika*, see OCD s.v. Aeneas Tacticus:

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e131>).

Lastly, Xenophon wrote a number of political works. *Agésilas* is an encomium and short biography of King Agesilaos II (see OCD, s.v. Agesilaos II: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e194>).

The *Constitution of the Spartans* is an account of the Spartan constitution and government that belongs in the same genre as the Aristotelian constitutions (see OCD,

s.v. Athenaion Politeia:
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e917>).
The *Hieron*, which is in dialogue format, is a discussion of tyranny, probably influenced by the contemporary tyrannies in Sicily (see OCD, s.v. Dionysios (1) I: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e2210> and s.v. Dionysios (2) II: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e2211>). Xenophon' *Poroi* is a unique survival of a political pamphlet, which provides Xenophon's suggestions for the improvement of Athenian finances after the Social War of 355-357 BCE (see OCD, s.v. Social wars (1st): <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e5977>).

The Hellenika

The *Hellenika* is a continuation of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* down to the battle of Mantinea in 362 BCE (see OCD, s.v. Mantinea, battles of: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e3927>). The work was divided in seven books in antiquity but on linguistic grounds is divided in two distinct parts. The first part (1.1-2.3.10) goes down to 404 BCE and is the genuine continuation of Thucydides' *History*. It was probably written in the first two decades of the fourth century, possibly as late as the 380s BCE. The second part (2.3.11-end) was written considerably later (probably completed in the mid-350s BCE) and is a continuous account of events to the battle of Mantinea. The historical value of the *Hellenika* is unequivocally recognised by scholars, since it is the only surviving contemporary historical account of the fourth century. Anyone working in the period after 362 BCE knows intimately the lack of a contemporary account such as the *Hellenika*.

Xenophon's method and quality

Xenophon, unlike his predecessors and successors, starts his work without a programmatic statement of method. As we have already seen both Herodotos and Thucydides presented and defended their chosen method of selecting and recording events as well as the sources they used. Xenophon does no such thing, indeed the *Hellenika* lack even a proemion:

I. After this, not many days later, Thymochares came from Athens with a few ships; and thereupon the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians fought another naval battle, and the Lacedaemonians were victorious, under the leadership of Agesandridas. [2] Shortly after this, at the beginning of the winter, Dorieus, the son of Diagoras, sailed into the Hellespont from Rhodes with fourteen ships, arriving at daybreak. And when the Athenian day-watcher described him, he signalled to the generals, and they put out against him with twenty ships; and Dorieus, fleeing from them towards the shore, beached his triremes, as fast as he got them clear of the enemy, in the neighbourhood of Rhoeteum. [3] And when the Athenians came near, the men under Dorieus fought, from their ships and from the shore, until the Athenians sailed away to Madytus, to the rest of their fleet, without having accomplished anything. Xenophon *Hellenika* 1.1.1-2

Translation: Xenophon. *Xenophon in Seven Volumes*, 1 and 2. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. vol. 1:1985; vol. 2: 1986. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Xen.+Hell.+1.1.1>)

Xenophon in his initial period of composing this part of the *Hellenika* clearly took his unstated but clear aim of continuing Thucydides serious; so serious in fact that he did not even provide his name or his purpose. Interestingly when the second part of the *Hellenika* was written, Xenophon did not revise the first part, or at least not enough to add a proemion.

The lack of a programmatic statement along with the aim to continue Thucydides' work make a comparison between the two historians unavoidable. Comparing any two historians is a difficult, and ultimately fruitless, endeavour but in the case of Xenophon, a comparison with Thucydides is the only effective way of divining his methodology. In

this, it is of particular interest that the two parts of the *Hellenika* are different and present different standards of authorship.

The first and earliest part of the work (down to the fall of Athens in 404 BCE) is more Thucydidean in character, or at least Xenophon appears to make a conscious effort to imitate Thucydides. That is not to say that he actually succeeds. Xenophon tries to retain the impersonality of the Thucydidean account in the first book and a half of the *Hellenika* and he also does nothing to disguise his Athenian viewpoint. Yet he seems to have missed the fundamental details of Thucydides' type of history in its attention to detail and providing a wealth of information seamlessly throughout the work. Xenophon has a tendency to introduce new situations and characters without any preamble, clearly expecting the reader to know them.

Still, however, Xenophon's personal voice, which is very apparent in the latter part of the *Hellenika*, is almost completely absent from the first book. On the other hand, where Thucydides is eminently a political author, interested in the political manoeuvring and political bodies in his *History*, Xenophon is less inclined to consider political issues or consequences. Xenophon is more interested in personalities and dramatic events rather than in the hidden qualities of the mundane. A lot of the important political manoeuvring that took place in the years after 411 BCE is conspicuously absent.

There are several examples of how Xenophon appears uninterested in politics and fails to enlighten the reader as to key players and events. Probably the most interesting is Xenophon's lack of attention and detail to the demagogue Kleophon (see OCD, s.v. Cleophon (1):

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e1673>).

Kleophon was a very important figure in Athenian politics in the 410s and 400s, particularly after the ostracism of Hyperbolos (OCD, s.v. Hyperbolus: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e3197>). Especially after the restoration of the democracy in 410 BCE, Kleophon was the

leading politician of the democratic party, playing a part similar to that of Kleon in the 420s.

LIII. After the Laconian had made these and similar representations, the sentiments of the most reasonable men among the Athenians inclined toward the peace, but those who made it their practice to foment war and to turn disturbances in the state to their personal profit chose the war. [2] A supporter of this sentiment was, among others, Cleophon, who was the most influential leader of the populace at this time. He, taking the floor and arguing at length on the question in his own fashion, buoyed up the people, citing the magnitude of their military successes, as if indeed it is not the practice of Fortune to adjudge the advantages in war now to one side and now to the other. [3] Consequently the Athenians, after taking unwise counsel, repented of it when it could do them no good, and, deceived as they were by words spoken in flattery, they made a blunder so vital that never again at any time were they able truly to recover. [4] But these events, which took place at a later date, will be described in connection with the period of time to which they belong; at the time we are discussing the Athenians, being elated by their successes and entertaining many great hopes because they had Alcibiades as the leader of their armed forces, thought that they had quickly won back their supremacy. Diodoros 13.53

Translation: Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation by C. H. Oldfather. Vol. 4-8. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1989. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Diod.+13.53.1>).

[9] Moreover, I find it astonishing that Nicomachus should think fit to stir up resentment against others in this criminal way, when I mean to prove that he hatched mischief against the people. And now listen to me; for it is justifiable, gentlemen of the jury, to admit such accusations in the case of men who, having combined at that time to subvert the democracy, would represent themselves today as democrats. [10] After the loss of our ships, when the revolution was being arranged, Cleophon reviled the Council, declaring that it was in conspiracy and was not seeking the best interests of the State. Satyrus of Cephisia, one of the Council, persuaded them to arrest him and hand him over to the court. [11] Those who wished to do away with him, fearing that they would fail of a death-sentence in the law-court, persuaded Nicomachus to exhibit a law requiring the Council to partake in the trial as assessors. And this man, the worst of villains, was so open in his support of the plot that on the day of the trial he exhibited the law. [12] Now against Cleophon, gentlemen of the jury, one might have other accusations to

urge; but one thing is admitted on all sides,--that the subverters of the democracy desired to get him out of their way more than any other of the citizens, and that Satyrus and Chremon, who were members of the Thirty, accused Cleophon, not from any anger at your fate, but in order that, having put that man to death, they might injure you themselves. [13] And they achieved their end because of the law which Nicomachus exhibited. Now you may reasonably reflect, gentlemen,--even those of you who thought Cleophon to be a bad citizen,--that, although among those who perished under the oligarchy there were perhaps one or two villains, yet it was on account of even such sufferers that you were incensed against the Thirty, as having put them to death, not for their crimes, but for motives of party. [14] If, therefore, he tries to rebut this charge, you have merely to remember that he exhibited the law at that very moment when the revolution was being effected, with the aim of gratifying those who had subverted the democracy; and that he included as assessors at the trial that Council in which Satyrus and Chremon had the chief influence, and which put to death Strombichides, Calliades and a number of loyal and upright citizens. Lysias 30.9-14.

Translation: Lysias. Lysias with an English translation by W.R.M. Lamb, M.A. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1930. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Lys.+30+9>).

Chorus

Muse of the sacred dances, advance and come to enjoy my song, to see the great throng of people, where wits sit by the thousand more honorable than Cleophon, on whose babbling lips roars terribly a Thracian swallow sitting on an alien leaf. She rumbles her sorrowful nightingale's song, since he will perish even in case of a tie. Aristophanes *Frogs* 675-685

Translation: Aristophanes. *Frogs*. Matthew Dillon. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Aristoph.+Frogs+675>).

Kleophon appears to have been single-handedly responsible for the Athenians rejecting two overtures for peace in 410 BCE after the battle of Kyzikos (OCD, s.v. Cyzicus: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e1999>

) and in 406 BCE after the battle of Arginoussai (OCD s.v. Arginusae: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e714>).

He was also the main obstacle in the surrender of Athens after the defeat at Aigospotamoi (DWH s.v. Aegospotami, battle of:

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<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t48.e48>).

His execution enabled Theramenes (OCD s.v. Theramenes:

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e6382>

) to conclude the negotiations for Athens' surrender. Kleophon was clearly important in the Athenian political scene during the 400s but Xenophon manages to ignore this important character in his *Hellenika*.

Beyond omissions and mistakes, Xenophon is also considerably more dramatically inclined than Thucydides and views things from a more social perspective. The best example of this tendency is his description of the receipt of the news of Aigospotamoi in comparison to Thucydides' description of the receipt of the news of the Sicilian disaster.

I. Such were the events in Sicily. When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. When the conviction was forced upon them, they were angry with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and were enraged also with the reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all other omenmongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope that they should conquer Sicily. [2] Already distressed at all points and in all quarters, after what had now happened, they were seized by a fear and consternation quite without example. It was grievous enough for the state and for every man in his proper person to lose so many heavy infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied troops, and to see none left to replace them; but when they saw, also, that they had not sufficient ships in their docks, or money in the treasury, or crews for the ships, they began to despair of salvation. They thought that their enemies in Sicily would immediately sail with their fleet against Piraeus, inflamed by so signal a victory; while their adversaries at home, redoubling all their preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and land at once, aided by their own revolted confederates. [3] Nevertheless, with such means as they had, it was determined to resist to the last, and to provide timber and money, and to equip a fleet as they best could, to take steps to secure their confederates and above all Euboea, to reform things in the city upon a more economical footing, and to elect a board of elders to advise upon the state of affairs as occasion should arise. [4] In short, as is the way of a democracy, in the panic of the moment they were ready to be as prudent as possible. Thucydides 8.1

Translation: Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*. London, J. M. Dent; New York, E. P. Dutton. 1910. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Thuc.+8.1.1>).

[3] It was at night that the Paralus arrived at Athens with tidings of the disaster, and a sound of wailing ran from Piraeus through the long walls to the city, one man passing on the news to another; and during that night no one slept, all mourning, not for the¹ lost alone, but far more for their own selves, thinking that they would suffer such treatment as they had visited upon the Melians,² colonists of the Lacedaemonians, after reducing them by siege, and upon the Histiaeans and Scionaeans and Toronaeans and Aeginetans and many other Greek peoples. [4] On the following day they convened an Assembly, at which it was resolved to block up all the harbours except one, to repair the walls, to station guards, and in all other respects to get the city ready for a siege. They busied themselves, accordingly, with these matters. Xenophon *Hellenika* 2.2.3-4

Translation: Xenophon. *Xenophon in Seven Volumes*, 1 and 2. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. vol. 1:1985; vol. 2: 1986. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Xen.+Hell.+2.2.1>).

The differences of perspective in the two accounts are obvious. Thucydides is more concerned with the political repercussions of the defeat in Sicily and particularly in the reaction of the Athenians as a political body. He is using this instance as yet another example of how the democracy fails to work and it is an admirable introduction to the events that will eventually lead to the oligarchic revolution of the 400 (OCD, s.v. Four hundred, the:

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e2719>). Xenophon, on the other hand, is interested not in politics, which he discusses briefly and with no detail but rather on the human aspect of the defeat. The reactions of the Athenians as they mourned and feared for their own lives and the consequences of their past actions and aggressive imperialism are given from the most human of perspectives, while the political body is ignored.

The change of tone and perspective between the former and the latter part of the *Hellenika* is most obviously seen in the consistent introduction of a personal viewpoint

on the part of the author and the expression of personal opinions. From the beginning of his work after the fall of Athens, Xenophon immediately adopts a more personal voice, such in the case of his opinion of Theramenes:

[55] When Critias had spoken these words, Satyrus dragged Theramenes away from the altar, and his servants lent their aid. And Theramenes, as was natural, called upon gods and men to witness what was going on. But the senators kept quiet, seeing that the men at the rail were of the same sort as Satyrus and that the space in front of the senate-house was filled with the guardsmen, and being well aware that the former had come armed with daggers. [56] So they led the man away through the market-place, while he proclaimed in a very loud voice the wrongs he was suffering. One saying of his that is reported was this: when Satyrus told him that if he did not keep quiet, he would suffer for it, he asked: "Then if I do keep quiet, shall I not suffer?" And when, being compelled to die, he had drunk the hemlock, they said that he threw out the last drops, like a man playing kottabos, and exclaimed: "Here's to the health of my beloved Critias." Now I am not unaware of this, that these are not sayings worthy of record; still, I deem it admirable in the man that when death was close at hand, neither self-possession nor the spirit of playfulness departed from his soul. Xenophon *Hellenika* 2.3.55-6

Translation: Xenophon. *Xenophon in Seven Volumes*, 1 and 2. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. vol. 1:1985; vol. 2: 1986. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Xen.+Hell.+2.3.1>).

This passage is particularly interesting, since Xenophon appears fully conscious that such anecdotes are not quite suited to the genre he is writing. This older Xenophon, however, unlike the younger man of the continuation to Thucydides' *History* finds the incident illuminating and worth preserving for posterity.

Xenophon's focus in the *Hellenika* after the fall of Athens changes sharply from Athens to Sparta. To an extent that is acceptable, since after 404 BCE, it was Sparta rather than Athens that dominated politics in the Greek world. Still, Xenophon's Spartan-focused viewpoint is historically delinquent, since too many events, situations and build-ups are ignored or presented in the blandest terms possible. The omission of the foundation of the Second Athenian League (OCD, s.v. Second Athenian Confederacy: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e5779>

) is a glaring example of how Xenophon could omit major events and developments in the Greek world.

When Nausinicus was archon at Athens, the Romans elected four military tribunes with consular power, Marcus Cornelius Quintus Servilius, Marcus Furius, and Lucius Quinctius. During their term of office what is known as the Boeotian War broke out between the Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians for the following reasons. When the Lacedaemonians maintained a garrison unjustly in the Cadmeia and had exiled many important citizens, the exiles gathered together, secured the support of the Athenians, and returned by night to their native city. [2] Having first slain in their own houses those who favoured the Lacedaemonian cause, whom they surprised while still asleep, they next rallied the citizens to the cause of freedom and obtained the co-operation of all the Thebans. When the populace had quickly assembled under arms, at daybreak they attempted to assault the Cadmeia. [3] The Lacedaemonians who formed the garrison of the citadel, numbering with their allies not less than fifteen hundred, sent men to Sparta to announce the insurrection of the Thebans and to urge them to send help as soon as possible. Favoured by their position, they slew many of the attackers and wounded severely no small number. [4] The Thebans, anticipating the arrival of a large army from Greece to aid the Lacedaemonians, dispatched envoys to Athens to remind them that they too once aided in restoring the democracy of the Athenians at the time when the Athenians had been enslaved by the Thirty Tyrants, and to request the Athenians to come with all their forces and assist them in reducing the Cadmeia before the arrival of the Lacedaemonians. XXVI. The Athenian people heard the ambassadors through to the end and voted to dispatch immediately as large a force as possible for the liberation of Thebes, thus repaying their obligation for the former service and at the same time moved by a desire to win the Boeotians to their side and to have in them a powerful partner in the contest against the superiority of the Lacedaemonians. For the Boeotian was reputed to be inferior to none of the Greek nations in the number of its men and in military valour. [2] Finally Demophon, who had been made general, and had immediately raised a levy of five thousand hoplites and five hundred horse, on the following day at dawn led forth his troops from the city, and pressed on at full speed in an effort to outstrip the Lacedaemonians; but the Athenians none the less went on with their preparations for an expedition into Boeotia with all their forces in case of need. [3] Demophon by taking cross-country paths appeared unexpectedly before Thebes. And since many soldiers likewise came hurriedly together from the other cities of Boeotia, there was quickly assembled a great army for the support of the Thebans. [4] For not less than twelve thousand hoplites and more than two thousand horse were assembled. And since they were one and all eager for the siege, dividing their forces they

kept making their assaults in relays, maintaining a persistent attack at all times both day and night. XXVII. The garrison in the Cadmeia under the exhortations of their commanders stoutly defended themselves against their adversaries, expecting that the Lacedaemonians would come shortly with a large army. Now as long as they had sufficient food, they held out stubbornly against the attacks and slew and wounded many of their besiegers, supported by the strength of the citadel; but when the scarcity of provisions increased and the Lacedaemonians, occupied in mustering forces, were long in coming, dissension spread amongst them. [2] For the Lacedaemonians among them thought they should hold out till death, while their partners in war from the allied cities, who were many times their number, declared themselves for surrendering the Cadmeia. Under such compulsion even the men from Sparta itself, who were but few, joined in the evacuation of the citadel. These therefore capitulated on terms and returned to the Peloponnese; [3] but the Lacedaemonians advanced with a considerable force on Thebes, and, coming just too late, were unsuccessful in their attack. They put on trial the three officers of the garrison, sentenced two to death, and inflicted so heavy a fine upon the third that his estate could not pay it. [4] Subsequently the Athenians returned home, and the Thebans assailed Thespieae but were unsuccessful in their attack. While these things were taking place in Greece, the Romans dispatched five hundred colonists, who were to be exempt from taxes, to Sardinia. When Calles was archon at Athens, the Romans elected as military tribunes with consular power four men, Lucius Papirius, Marcus Publius, Titus Cornelius, and Quintus Lucius. During their term of office, following the failure of the Lacedaemonians at Thebes, the Boeotians, uniting boldly, formed an alliance and gathered a considerable army, expecting that the Lacedaemonians would arrive in Boeotia in great strength. [2] The Athenians sent their most respected citizens as ambassadors to the cities which were subject to the Lacedaemonians, urging them to adhere to the common cause of liberty. For the Lacedaemonians, relying on the size of the force at their disposal, ruled their subject peoples inconsiderately and severely, and consequently many of those who belonged to the Spartan sphere of influence fell away to the Athenians. [3] The first to respond to the plea to secede were the peoples of Chios and Byzantium; they were followed by the peoples of Rhodes and Mytilene and certain others of the islanders; and as the movement steadily gathered force throughout Greece, many cities attached themselves to the Athenians. The democracy, elated by the loyalty of the cities, established a common council of all the allies and appointed representatives of each state. [4] It was agreed by common consent that, while the council should hold its sessions in Athens, every city great and small should be on an equal basis and enjoy but one vote, and that all should continue independent, accepting the Athenians as leaders. The Lacedaemonians, aware that the movement of their cities to secede could not be checked, nevertheless strove earnestly by means of diplomatic missions, friendly words and promises of benefits to win back the peoples who had become estranged. [5] Likewise they devoted

themselves assiduously to their preparations for war, for they expected the Boeotian War to be a hard and tedious affair for them, since the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks who participated in the council were allied with the Thebans. Diodoros 15.25-28

Translation: Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation by C. H. Oldfather. Vol. 4-8. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1989. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Diod.+15.25.1>).

The Spartan viewpoint that characterises Xenophon's sources and his own pro-Spartan bias are both evident in the account of the King's Peace (OCD, s.v. King's Peace: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e3528>) in the *Hellenika*.

[25] And now Antalcidas returned with Tiribazus from the Persian capital, having effected an agreement that the King should be an ally of the Lacedaemonians if the Athenians and their allies refused to accept the peace which he himself directed them to accept. But when Antalcidas heard that Nicolochus with his ships was being blockaded at Abydus by Iphicrates and Diotimus, he went overland to Abydus. And from there he set out during the night with the fleet, after spreading a report that the Calchedonians were sending for him; then he came to anchor at Percote and remained quiet there. [26] Now the Athenian forces under Demaenetus, Dionysius, Leontichus, and Phantias, upon learning of his departure, followed after him in the direction of Proconnesus; and when they had sailed past him, Antalcidas turned about and came back to Abydus, for he had heard that Polyxenus was approaching with the ships from Syracuse and Italy, twenty in number, and he wished to join these also to his command. But soon after this Thrasybulus, of the deme Collytus, came sailing from Thrace with eight ships, desiring to unite with the other Athenian ships. [27] And Antalcidas, when his scouts signalled to him that eight triremes were approaching, embarked the sailors on twelve of his fastest ships, gave orders that if anyone was lacking men, he should fill up his crew from the ships left behind, and lay in wait with the utmost possible concealment. Then, as the enemy were sailing past him, he pursued; and they, upon seeing him, fled. Now he speedily succeeded in overhauling the slowest of the enemy's ships with his fastest; but giving orders to the leaders of his own fleet not to attack the hindmost ships, he continued the pursuit of those which were ahead. And when he had captured them, those who were behind, upon seeing that the leaders of their fleet were being taken, out of

discouragement were themselves taken even by the slower ships of Antalcidas; and the result was that all the ships were captured. [28] And after the twenty ships from Syracuse had come and joined Antalcidas, and the ships from all that part of Ionia of which Tiribazus was master had also come, and more still had been manned from the territory of Ariobarzanes -- for Antalcidas was an old friend of Ariobarzanes, and Pharnabazus had at this time gone up to the capital in response to a summons, this being the occasion when he married the King's daughter -- then Antalcidas, the whole number of his ships amounting to more than eighty, was master of the sea, so that he also prevented the ships from the Pontus from sailing to Athens, and compelled them to sail to the ports of his people's allies. [29] The Athenians, therefore, seeing that the enemy's ships were many, fearing that they might be completely subdued, as they had been before, now that the King had become an ally of the Lacedaemonians, and being beset by the raiding parties from Aegina, for these reasons were exceedingly desirous of peace. On the other hand the Lacedaemonians, what with maintaining a garrison of one regiment at Lechaeum and another at Orchomenus, keeping watch upon their allied states -- those which they trusted, to prevent their being destroyed, and those which they distrusted, to prevent their revolting -- and suffering and causing trouble around Corinth, were out of patience with the war. As for the Argives, knowing that the Lacedaemonian ban had been called out against them, and being aware that their plea of the sacred months would no longer be of any help to them, they also were eager for peace. [30] So that when Tiribazus ordered those to be present who desired to give ear to the peace which the King had sent down, all speedily presented themselves. And when they had come together, Tiribazus showed them the King's seal and then read the writing. It ran as follows: [31] "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money." [32] Upon hearing these words the ambassadors from the various states reported them to their own several states. And all the others swore that they would steadfastly observe these provisions, but the Thebans claimed the right to take the oath in the name of all the Boeotians. Agesilaus, however, refused to accept their oaths unless they swore, just as the King's writing directed, that every city, whether small or great, should be independent. But the ambassadors of the Thebans said that these were not the instructions which had been given them. "Go then," said Agesilaus, "and ask your people; and report to them this also, that if they do not so act, they will be shut out from the treaty." The Thebans ambassadors accordingly departed. [33] Agesilaus, however, on account of his hatred for the Thebans, did not delay, but after winning over the ephors proceeded at once to perform his sacrifices. And

when the offering at the frontier proved favourable, upon his arrival at Tegea he sent horsemen hither and thither among the Perioeci to hasten their coming, and likewise sent mustering officers to the various cities of the allies. But before he had set out from Tegea, the Thebans arrived with word that they would leave the cities independent. And so the Lacedaemonians returned home and the Thebans were forced to accede to the treaty, allowing the Boeotian cities to be independent. [34] But the Corinthians, on the other hand, would not dismiss the garrison maintained in their city by the Argives. Agesilaus, however, made proclamation to these peoples also, saying to the Corinthians that if they did not dismiss the Argives, and to the Argives that if they did not depart from Corinth, he would make war upon them. And when, as a result of the fear which seized both peoples, the Argives departed and the state of the Corinthians regained its self-government, the authors of the massacre and those who shared the responsibility for the deed withdrew of their own accord from Corinth, while the rest of the citizens willingly received back the former exiles. [35] When these things had been accomplished and the states had sworn that they would abide by the treaty which the King had proposed, thereupon the armies were disbanded and the naval armaments were likewise disbanded. Thus it was that this peace was established between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians and their allies, the first since the outbreak of the war which followed the destruction of the walls of Athens. [36] Now while in the war the Lacedaemonians were no more than holding their own with their antagonists, yet as a result of the so-called Peace of Antalcidas they gained a far more distinguished position. For by having become champions of the treaty proposed by the King and by establishing the independence of the cities they gained an additional ally in Corinth, made the Boeotian cities independent of the Thebans, a thing which they had long desired, and also put a stop to the doings of the Argives in appropriating Corinth as their own, by threatening to call out the ban against them if they did not depart from Corinth. Xenophon *Hellenika* 5.1.25-36

Translation: Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 1 and 2. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. vol. 1:1985; vol. 2: 1986. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Xen.+Hell.+5.1.1>).

Xenophon does not mention at all the reactions of the Greeks of Asia Minor or indeed how Sparta betrayed its own stated aim to liberate the Greeks from Persian domination.

At the conclusion of these events the year came to an end, and among the Athenians Theodotus was archon and in Rome the consular magistracy was held by six military tribunes, Quintus Caeso Sulpicius, Aenus Caeso Fabius, Quintus Servilius, and Publius Cornelius. [2] After these men had entered office, the Lacedaemonians, who were hard put to it by their double war, that

against the Greeks and that against the Persians, dispatched their admiral Antalcidas to Artaxerxes to treat for peace. [3] Antalcidas discussed as well as he could the circumstances of his mission and the King agreed to make peace on the following terms: "The Greek cities of Asia are subject to the King, but all the other Greeks shall be independent; and upon those who refuse compliance and do not accept these terms I shall make war through the aid of those who consent to them." [4] Now the Lacedaemonians consented to the terms and offered no opposition, but the Athenians and Thebans and some of the other Greeks were deeply concerned that the cities of Asia should be left in the lurch. But since they were not by themselves a match in war, they consented of necessity and accepted the peace. [5] The King, now that his difference with the Greeks was settled, made ready his armaments for the war against Cyprus. For Evagoras had got possession of almost the whole of Cyprus and gathered strong armaments, because Artaxerxes was distracted by the war against the Greeks. Diodoros 14.110

Translation: Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation by C. H. Oldfather. Vol. 4-8. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1989. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Diod.+14.110.1>).

[120] One may best comprehend how great is the reversal in our circumstances if he will read side by side the treaties which were made during our leadership and those which have been published recently; for he will find that in those days we were constantly setting limits to the empire of the King, levying tribute on some of his subjects, and barring him from the sea; now, however, it is he who controls the destinies of the Hellenes, who dictates what they must each do, and who all but sets up his viceroys in their cities. [121] For with this one exception, what else is lacking? Was it not he who decided the issue of the war, was it not he who directed the terms of peace, and is it not he who now presides over our affairs? Do we not sail off to him as to a master, when we have complaints against each other? Do we not address him as "The Great King" as though we were the captives of his spear? Do we not in our wars against each other rest our hopes of salvation on him, who would gladly destroy both Athens and Lacedaemon? [122] Reflecting on these things, we may well be indignant at the present state of affairs, and yearn for our lost supremacy: and we may well blame the Lacedaemonians because, although in the beginning they entered upon the war with the avowed intention of freeing the Hellenes, in the end they delivered so many of them into bondage, and because they induced the Ionians to revolt from Athens, the mother city from which the Ionians emigrated and by whose influence they were often preserved from destruction, and then betrayed them to the barbarians--those barbarians in despite of whom they possess their lands and against whom they have never

ceased to war. [123] At that time the Lacedaemonians were indignant because we thought it right by legitimate means to extend our dominion over certain peoples. Now, however, they feel no concern, when these peoples are reduced to such abject servitude that it is not enough that they should be forced to pay tribute and see their citadels occupied by their foes, but, in addition to these public calamities, must also in their own persons submit to greater indignities than those which are suffered in our world by purchased slaves ; for none of us is so cruel to his servants as are the barbarians in punishing free men. [124] But the crowning misery is that they are compelled to take the field with the enemy in the very cause of slavery and to fight against men who assert their right to freedom, and to submit to hazards of war on such terms that in case of defeat they will be destroyed at once, and in case of victory they will strengthen the claims of their bondage for all time to come. Isocrates 3.120-122

Translation: Isocrates. Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes, by George Norlin, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1980. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Isoc.+4+119>).

Diodoros' account of the Peace is a lot briefer than Xenophon's but clearly he takes into account the reaction of the Greeks of Asia Minor as well as the fear of the Greeks of the mainland. Isokrates' testimony as a near contemporary is particularly important, since it provides the necessary information that Xenophon conveniently omits.

On the other hand, Xenophon, in spite of his pro-Spartan bias, is not blind to Sparta's faults. The best example is his own personal and very sharp criticism of the Spartan actions in the seizure of the Kadmeia.

[25] Then Phoebidas, after he had gathered together the remaining portion of Eudamidas' troops, took them under his command and began his march. And when they arrived in the district of Thebes, they encamped outside the city, near the gymnasium. Now since the Thebans were divided by factions, it chanced that Ismenias and Leontiades, who were polemarchs, were at variance with one another, and both of them leaders of their respective political clubs. Hence Ismenias, on account of his hatred for the Lacedaemonians, did not even go near Phoebidas. Leontiades, however, not only paid court to him in various ways, but when he had become intimate with him, spoke to him as follows: [26] "Phoebidas, it is within your power this day to render the greatest service to your fatherland; for if you will follow me with your hoplites, I will lead you into the Acropolis. And this once

accomplished, be sure that Thebes will be completely under the control of the Lacedaemonians and of us who are your friends; [27] whereas now, as you see, proclamation has been made forbidding any Theban from serving with you against the Olynthians. But if you join with us and accomplish this deed, we will at once send with you many hoplites and many horsemen; so that you will go to the aid of your brother with a large force, and while he is getting ready to subdue Olynthus, you will already have subdued Thebes, a far greater state than Olynthus.” [28] When Phoebidas heard this, he was filled with bouyant hopes; for he was a man with a far greater passion for performing some brilliant achievement than for life itself, although, on the other hand, he was not regarded as one who weighed his acts or had much practical wisdom. And when he had agreed to the plan, Leontiades directed him to set out on his way, prepared as he was to depart from Thebes. “And when the proper time arrives,” said Leontiades, “I will return to you and act as your guide myself.” [29] Accordingly, while the senate was in session in the portico in the market-place, for the reason that the women were celebrating the festival of the Thesmophoria in the Cadmea, and while, inasmuch as it was summer and midday, the streets were entirely deserted, at this time Leontiades rode out on horseback to overtake Phoebidas, turned him back, and led him straight to the Acropolis. And after establishing Phoebidas there with the troops under his command, giving him the key to the gates, and telling him to let no one into the Acropolis unless he himself so ordered, he proceeded at once to the meeting of the senate. And when he had arrived there, he spoke as follows: [30] “Be not at all despondent, gentlemen, because the Lacedaemonians are in possession of the Acropolis; for they say that they have not come as enemies to anyone who is not eager for war; as for me, since the law directs that a polemarch shall have power to arrest any man who seems to be doing deeds which deserve death, I arrest Ismenias here, as an instigator of war. Therefore do you captains, and you who have been detailed with them, arise, seize this man, and lead him away to the place where you have been directed to take him.” [31] Now those who knew of the plan were of course present, obeyed the order, and seized Ismenias; but of those who did not know about it and were opponents of Leontiades and his party, some fled at once out of the city, fearing that they would be put to death; others withdrew at first to their homes; when they learned, however, that Ismenias was imprisoned in the Cadmea, then all those who held the same views as Androcleidas and Ismenias retired to Athens, to the number of about three hundred. Xenophon *Hellenika* 5.2.25-31.

Translation: Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 1 and 2. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. vol. 1:1985; vol. 2: 1986. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Xen.+Hell.+5.2.1>).

[27] And now that success had to such an extent attended the efforts of the Lacedaemonians that the Thebans and the rest of the Boeotians were completely in their power, the Corinthians had become absolutely faithful, the Argives had been humbled for the reason that their plea of the sacred months was no longer of any help to them, and the Athenians were left destitute of allies, while on the other hand those among the allies of the Lacedaemonians who had been unfriendly to them had been chastised, it seemed that they had at length established their empire most excellently and securely. IV. Now one could mention many other incidents, both among Greeks and barbarians, to prove that the gods do not fail to take heed of the wicked or of those who do unrighteous things; but at present I will speak of the case which is before me. The Lacedaemonians, namely, who had sworn that they would leave the states independent, after seizing possession of the Acropolis of Thebes were punished by the very men, unaided, who had been thus wronged, although before that time they had not been conquered by any single one of all the peoples that ever existed; while as for those among the Theban citizens who had led them into the Acropolis and had wanted the state to be in subjection to the Lacedaemonians in order that they might rule despotically themselves, just seven of the exiles were enough to destroy the government of these men. Xenophon *Hellenika* 5.3.27-5.4.1.

Translation: Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 1 and 2. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. vol. 1:1985; vol. 2: 1986. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Xen.+Hell.+5.3.1>).

Xenophon is clear in his condemnation of the Spartan actions in relation to the Kadmeia incident. Yet this is not a political condemnation but rather a moral and religious one. This tendency towards a moral rather than a political view of events is evident throughout the latter part of the *Hellenika*. Xenophon surpasses even Herodotos in his view of the influence of the gods on the actions of men and his portrayal of Sparta is both mythological and tragic. Sparta encapsulates the notion of hubris (OCD, s.v. hubris: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e3172>) in its ascension to hegemony and its brutal and abrupt fall. Interestingly in this, Xenophon is not much different in Thucydides but where Thucydides prefers to present political arrogance, Xenophon prefers the traditional Greek idea of hubris as an offence against the divine.

Suggested Reading:

1. Beck, Hans, "'The Laws of the Fathers' versus 'The Laws of the League': Xenophon on Federalism' *Classical Philology*, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 355-375. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1215512>
2. Dillery, John. *Xenophon and the History of His Times* London 1995, chaps 7&8. [Available from NetLibrary: www.netlibrary.com]
3. Gray, V. J. 'Continuous History and Xenophon, Hellenica 1-2.3.10' *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 112, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 201-228. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/294718>
4. Gray, V. J. 'Dialogue in Xenophon's Hellenica' *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1981), pp. 321-334. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/638536>
5. Lewis, Sian, 'Καὶ σαφῶς τύραννος ἦν: Xenophon's Account of Euphron of Sicyon' *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 124, (2004), pp. 65-74. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3246150>
6. MacLaren, Malcolm, 'A Supposed Lacuna at the Beginning of Xenophon's Hellenica' *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 100, No. 2 (Summer, 1979), pp. 228-238. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/293686>
7. Packman, Zola Marie, 'The Incredible and the Incredulous: The Vocabulary of Disbelief in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon' *Hermes*, Vol. 119, No. 4 (1991), pp. 399-414. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4476837>
8. Pownall, Frances Skoczylas, 'Condemnation of the Impious in Xenophon's "Hellenica"' *The Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Jul., 1998), pp. 251-277. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509984>
9. Rahn, Peter J., 'Xenophon's Developing Historiography' *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 102, (1971), pp. 497-508. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2935952>
10. Seager, Robin, 'Xenophon and Athenian Democratic Ideology' *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2001), pp. 385-397. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3556518>

Short Assignment: How much of Xenophon's bias is the result of the bias(es) of his sources?

Ephoros

Ephoros was one of the most popular historians in antiquity, far surpassing Thucydides or Xenophon. His work was used by many later authors, who provide the majority of his fragments, most importantly Diodoros of Sicily and Strabo. He was a native of the city of Kyme (OCD, s.v. Cyme: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e1975>) in Asia Minor but he spent a part of his life in Athens. He was born as the Peloponnesian War was ending, c405 BCE, and lived to see the ascension of Alexander and the beginning of his Asiatic conquest (died c330 BCE).

Ephoros wrote several works, the most important of which was his *History* in 30 books covering from the return of the Heraklidai (OCD, s.v. Heraclidae: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e3017>) to the siege of Perinthos in 340 BCE (OCD, s.v. <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e4867>). His son, Demophilos, continued Ephoros' *History* to cover the Third Sacred War, 356-346 BCE (OCD, s.v. Sacred Wars: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e5655>). His other works included a local history of his native Kyme. (Most of our knowledge regarding the tradition of local histories comes from the Atthidai, or local histories of Attika. On this see OCD, s.v. Atthis: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t180.e276>. For further information, see Harding, P. *Story of Athens: The Fragments of the Local Chronicles of Attika* London 2008, Available from NetLibrary: <http://www.netlibrary.com/>, or Jacoby, F. *Atthis* Ayer Publishing 1976, available in part from Google Books: <http://books.google.com/books?id=uYkixD6-Oh8C>).

The vast majority of our knowledge of Ephoros' method, strengths and weaknesses comes from the testimony of later authors. Thus, we are bound by what such authors thought of Ephoros for our understanding of his work.

Ephoros was considered to be the first universal historian:

I am aware, however, that a similar profession has been made by many other historians of an intention to write a universal history, and of undertaking a work on a larger scale than their predecessors. About these writers, putting out of the question Ephorus, the first and only man who has really attempted a universal history, I will not mention any name or say more about them than this,—that several of my contemporaries, while professing to write a universal history have imagined that they could tell the story of the war of Rome and Carthage in three or four pages. Yet every one knows that events more numerous or important were never accomplished in Iberia, [p. 388] Libya, Sicily, and Italy than in that war; and that the Hannibalian war was the most famous and lasting of any that has taken place except the Sicilian. So momentous was it, that all the rest of the world were compelled to watch it in terrified expectation of what would follow from its final catastrophe. Yet some of these writers, without even giving as many details of it as those who, after the manner of the vulgar, inscribe rude records of events on house walls, pretend to have embraced the whole of Greek and foreign history. The truth of the matter is, that it is a very easy matter to profess to undertake works of the greatest importance; but by no means so simple a matter in practice to attain to any excellence. The former is open to every one with the requisite audacity: the latter is rare, and is given to few. So much for those who use pompous language about themselves and their historical works. I will now return to my narrative. Polybios 5.33

Translation: Histories. Polybius. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. translator. London, New York. Macmillan. 1889. Reprint Bloomington 1962. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plb.+5.33>).

Universal history was a type of history that went beyond the author's personal experience and sought to synthesize the oral and written traditions and histories into one coherent whole. Different authors that assigned to their works the label of universal history had different definitions of it.

My History begins in the 140th Olympiad. The events from which it starts are these. In Greece, what is called the Social war: the first waged by Philip, son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in league with the Achaeans against the Aetolians. In Asia, the war for the possession of [p. 3] Coele-Syria which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator carried on against each other. In Italy, Libya, and their neighbourhood, the conflict between Rome and Carthage, generally called the Hannibalian war. My work thus begins where that of Aratus of Sicyon leaves off. Now up to this time the world's history had been, so to speak, a series of disconnected transactions, as widely separated in their origin and results as in their localities. But from this time forth History

becomes a connected whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all is to unity. This is why I have fixed upon this era as the starting-point of my work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in this war, and their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most essential step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and to cross with an army into Greece and Asia. Polybios 1.3

Translation: Histories. Polybius. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. translator. London, New York. Macmillan. 1889. Reprint Bloomington 1962. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plb.+1.3>).

Consequently we, observing that writers of history are accorded a merited approbation, were led to feel a like enthusiasm for the subject. But when we turned our attention to the historians before our time, although we approved their purpose without reservation, yet we were far from feeling that their treatises had been composed so as to contribute to human welfare as much as might have been the case. For although the profit which history affords its readers lies in its embracing a vast number and variety of circumstances, yet most writers have recorded no more than isolated wars waged by a single nation or a single state, and but few have undertaken, beginning with the earliest times and coming down to their own day, to record the events connected with all peoples and of the latter, some have not attached to the several events their own proper dates and others have passed over the deeds of barbarian peoples; and some, again, have rejected the ancient legends because of the difficulties involved in their treatment, while others have failed to complete the plan to which they had set their hand, their lives having been cut short by fate. And of those who have undertaken this account of all peoples not one has continued his history beyond the Macedonian period. For while some have closed their accounts with the deeds of Philip, other with those of Alexander and some with the diadochoi or the epigonoï, yet, despite the number and importance of the events subsequent to these and extending even to our own lifetime which have been left neglected, no historian has essayed to treat of them within the compass of a single narrative because of the magnitude of the undertaking. For this reason, since both the dates of the events and the events themselves lie scattered about in numerous treatises and in divers authors, the knowledge of them becomes difficult for the mind to encompass and for the memory to retain. Consequently, after we had examined the composition of each of these authors' works, we resolved to write a history after a plan which might yield to its readers the greatest benefit and at the same time incommode them the least. For if a man should begin with the most ancient times and record to the best of his ability the affairs of the entire world down to his own day, so far as they have been handed down to memory, as though they were the affairs of some single city, he would

obviously have to undertake an immense labour, yet he would have composed a treatise of the utmost value to those who are studiously inclined. Diodoros 1.3

Translation: Diodorus Siculus. *Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation* by C. H. Oldfather. Vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1989.

We cannot be entirely certain how Ephoros considered his own work and whether he had a conception of some type of “universality” of this subject. However, the testimonia on his work make clear that he had tried to achieve a unity of subject, at least within the individual books.

Ephorus, on the other hand, in the universal history which he composed has achieved success, not alone in the style of his composition, but also as regards the arrangement of his work; for each one of his Books is so constructed as to embrace events which fall under a single topic. Consequently we also have given our preference to this method of handling our material, and, in so far as it is possible, are adhering to this general principle. Diodoros 5.1.4

Translation: Diodorus Siculus. *Library of History (Books III - VIII)*. Translated by Oldfather, C. H. Loeb Classical Library Volumes 303 and 340. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935. (Theoi: <http://www.theoi.com/Text/DiodorusSiculus5A.html>).

Ephorus of Cyme, the historian, closed his history at this point with the siege of Perinthus, having included in his work the deeds of both the Greeks and the barbarians from the time of the return of the Heracleidae. He covered a period of almost seven hundred and fifty years, writing thirty books and prefacing each with an introduction. Diodoros 16.76.5

Translation: Diodorus Siculus. *Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation* by C. H. Oldfather. Vol. 4-8. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1989. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Diod.+16.76.1>).

Ephoros was clearly, at least in the consciousness of the later Greek historians and other intellectuals, the first to attempt a unified history of the world, even if his chronological mandate was narrower than that of Diodoros.

Ephoros' interests in his work were varied and covered a variety of issues, such as migrations and genealogies (OCD, s.v. genealogy: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e2813>).

I am quite aware that my history has an element of austerity in it, and is adapted to, and will be approved by only one class of readers, owing to the uniformity of its plan. Nearly all other historians, or at any rate most, attract a variety of readers by entering upon all the various branches of history. The curious reader is attracted by the genealogical style; the antiquarian by the discussion of colonisations, origins of cities, and ties of blood, such as is found in Ephorus; the student of politics by the story of tribes, cities, and dynasties. It is to this last branch of the subject that I have had a single eye, and have devoted my whole work; and accordingly have, as I said before, accommodated all my plans to one particular class of narrative. The result is that I have made my work by no means attractive reading to the majority. Why I thus neglected other departments of history, and deliberately resolved to confine myself to chronicling actions, I have already stated at length; however, there is no reason why I should not briefly remind my readers of it again in this place, for the sake of impressing it upon them. Polybios 9.1

Translation: Histories. Polybios. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. translator. London, New York. Macmillan. 1889. Reprint Bloomington 1962. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plb.+9.1>).

Ephoros is not considered to be a particularly knowledgeable historian in military matters. Polybios criticizes him severely for his lack of knowledge and ability to describe and account for military history, particularly in relation to landed warfare:

This will be rendered still more evident from what I have now to say, particularly from certain passages in the history of Ephorus. This writer in his history of war seems to me to have had some idea of naval tactics, but to be quite unacquainted with fighting on shore. Accordingly, if one turns one's attention to the naval battles at Cyprus and Cnidus, in which the generals of the king were engaged against Evagoras of Salamis and then against the Lacedaemonians, one will be struck with admiration of the historian, and will learn many useful lessons as to what to do in similar circumstances.

But when he tells the story of the battle of Leuctra between the Thebans and Lacedaemonians, or again that of Mantinea between the same combatants, in which Epaminondas lost his life, if in these one examines attentively and in detail the arrangements and evolutions in the line of battle, the historian will appear quite ridiculous, and betray his entire ignorance and want of personal

experience of such matters. The battle of Leuctra indeed was simple, and confined to one division of the forces engaged, and therefore does not make the writer's lack of knowledge so very glaring: but that of Mantinea was complicated and technical, and is accordingly unintelligible, and indeed completely inconceivable, to the historian. This will be rendered clear by first laying down a correct plan of the ground, and then measuring the extent of the movements as described by him. The same is the case with Theopompus, and above all with Timaeus, the subject of this book. These latter writers also can conceal their ignorance, so long as they deal with generalities; but directly they attempt minute and detailed description, they show that they are no better than Ephorus. Polybios 12.25.

Translation: Histories. Polybius. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. translator. London, New York. Macmillan. 1889. Reprint Bloomington 1962. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plb.+12.25>).

On the contrary, one would be justified to argue that Ephoros was primarily a political historian with acute and sharp observation on political matters. Ephoros had a more practical and human-oriented viewpoint than Thucydides. Probably the best example of Ephoros' viewpoint regarding history, particularly as it centres around individuals is provided by his account of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. While that part of the work has not survived, Diodoros' account of the political, and completely Athenocentric, account of the causes of the war is based upon the account given by Ephoros.

When Euthydemus was archon in Athens, the Romans elected in place of consuls three military tribunes, Manius Aemilianus Mamercus, Gaius Julius, and Lucius Quinctius. In this year there began the Peloponnesian War, as it has been called, between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, the longest of all the wars which history records; and it is necessary and appropriate to the plan of our history to set forth at the outset the causes of the war. [2] While the Athenians were still striving for the mastery of the sea, the funds which had been collected as a common undertaking and placed at Delos, amounting to some eight thousand talents, they had transferred to Athens and given over to Pericles to guard. This man stood far above his fellow citizens in birth, renown, and ability as an orator. But after some time he had spent a very considerable amount of this money for his own purposes, and when he was called upon for an accounting he fell ill, since he was unable to render the statement of the monies with which he had been entrusted. [3] While he was worried over the matter, Alcibiades, his nephew, who was an orphan and was being reared at the home of Pericles, though still a lad showed him a way out of making an explanation of the use of the money. Seeing how his uncle

was troubled he asked him the cause of his worry. And when Pericles said, "I am asked for the explanation of the use of the money and I am seeking some means whereby I may be able to render an accounting of it to the citizens," Alcibiades replied, "You should be seeking some means not how to render but how not to render an accounting." [4] Consequently Pericles, accepting the reply of the boy, kept pondering in what way he could embroil the Athenians in a great war; for that would be the best way, he thought, because of the disturbance and distractions and fears which would beset the city, for him to escape giving an exact accounting of the money. Bearing upon this expedient an incident happened to him by mere chance for the following causes. XXXIX. The statue of Athena was a work of Pheidias, and Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, had been appointed overseer of the undertaking. But some of the assistants of Pheidias, who had been prevailed upon by Pericles' enemies, took seats as suppliants at the altars of the gods; and when they were called upon to explain their surprising action, they claimed that they would show that Pheidias had possession of a large amount of the sacred funds, with the connivance and assistance of Pericles the overseer. [2] Consequently, when the Assembly convened to consider the affair, the enemies of Pericles persuaded the people to arrest Pheidias and lodged a charge against Pericles himself of stealing sacred property. Furthermore, they falsely accused the sophist Anaxagoras, who was Pericles' teacher, of impiety against the gods ; and they involved Pericles in their accusations and malicious charges, since jealousy made them eager to discredit the eminence as well as the fame of the man. [3] But Pericles, knowing that during the operations of war the populace has respect for noble men because of their urgent need of them, whereas in times of peace they keep bringing false accusations against the very same men because they have nothing to do and are envious, came to the conclusion that it would be to his own advantage to embroil the state in a great war, in order that the city, in its need of the ability and skill in generalship of Pericles, should pay no attention to the accusations being lodged against him and would have neither leisure nor time to scrutinize carefully the accounting he would render of the funds. [4] Now when the Athenians voted to exclude the Megarians from both their market and harbours, the Megarians turned to the Spartans for aid. And the Lacedaemonians, being won over by the Megarians, in the most open manner dispatched ambassadors in accordance with the decision of the Council of the League, ordering the Athenians to rescind the action against the Megarians and threatening, if they did not accede, to wage war upon them together with the forces of their allies. [5] When the Assembly convened to consider the matter, Pericles, who far excelled all his fellow citizens in skill of oratory, persuaded the Athenians not to rescind the action, saying that for them to accede to the demands of the Lacedaemonians, contrary to their own interests, would be the first step toward slavery. Accordingly he advised that they bring their possessions from the countryside into the city and fight it out with the Spartans by means of their command of the sea. Diodoros 12.38-39

Translation: Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation by C. H. Oldfather. Vol. 4-8. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1989. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Diod.+12.38.1>).

XXIII. The Median war, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian war was prolonged to an immense length, and long as it was it was short without parallel for the misfortunes that it brought upon Hellas. [2] Never had so many cities been taken and laid desolate, here by the barbarians, here by the parties contending (the old inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others); never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field of battle, now in the strife of action. [3] Old stories of occurrences handed down by tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased to be incredible; there were earthquakes of unparalleled extent and violence; eclipses of the sun occurred with a frequency unrecorded in previous history; there were great droughts in sundry places and consequent famines, and that most calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the plague. All this came upon them with the late war, [4] which was begun by the Athenians and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made after the conquest of Euboea. [5] To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. [6] The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by either side, which led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of the war. Thucydides 1.23

Translation: Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. London, J. M. Dent; New York, E. P. Dutton. 1910. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Thuc.+1.23.1>).

The differences between the two accounts are great and fundamental. For the modern student, Thucydides' explanation feels more comfortable and true because it is presented as the underlying cause of a conflict in a way that is familiar to modern historiography of conflict. Yet, one cannot escape the fact that Thucydides' *prophasis* is anti-Spartan and pro-Athenian. In a way it can even be seen as an indirect, but extremely prideful, apologia for the Athenian aggression that is described in the following chapters. It may

very well be that the Spartans in 440 BCE were growing increasingly fearful of Athenian ambition and the power that came with it. However, Thucydides manages to obscure the rather simple fact that the First Peloponnesian War and the Great Peloponnesian War (OCD, s.v. Peloponnesian War: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e4834> and s.v. Thirty Years Peace: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e6412>) had very similar beginnings.

In both cases, Athens tried to encroach upon the Peloponnesian League and the states related to it. In both cases, Athenian aggression was what led the Spartans and their allies to war. Even the most surface discussion of the events of the 430s reveals the mounting Athenian aggression and the encroachment upon the territory and interests of the Peloponnesian allies, mainly Corinth. While our modern sensibilities side unequivocally with the deeper motives presented by Thucydides, his account is obscuring the more fundamental causation of the war, since the burden of guilt is thrown upon Sparta rather than Athens.

Ephoros, on the other hand, is more biographically inclined preferring personalities as explanation of causation rather than deeper issues. However, his viewpoint is not as naïve as appears at first glance, since in the late 440s and the 430s, Athenian politics were dominated by Perikles and this is exactly the period of mounting aggression against Sparta and the Peloponnesians. While the more base motives ascribed to Perikles by Ephoros, and his follower Diodoros, may be suspected as too naïve and personality-oriented, one cannot escape the fact that Perikles, whatever his motives, must have been a major influence, if not driving force, behind the Athenian aggression.

Possibly Ephoros' view of politics was influenced by Isokrates, of whom he is reported in later sources to have been a pupil.

The largest and best of the Aeolian cities is Cyme; and this with Lesbos might be called the metropolis of the rest of the cities, about thirty in number, of which not a few have disappeared. Cyme is ridiculed for its stupidity, owing to the repute, as some say, that not until three hundred years after the

founding of the city did they sell the tolls of the harbor, and that before this time the people did not reap this revenue. They got the reputation, therefore, of being a people who learned late that they were living in a city by the sea. There is also another report of them, that, having borrowed money in the name of the state, they pledged their porticos as security, and then, failing to pay the money on the appointed day, were prohibited from walking in them; when it rained, however, their creditors, through a kind of shame, would bid them through a herald to go under the porticos; so the herald would cry out the words, "Go under the porticos," but the report went abroad that the Cymaeans did not understand that they were to go under the porticos when it rained unless they were given notice by the herald. Ephorus, a man indisputably noteworthy, a disciple of Isocrates the orator, and the author of the *History* and of the work on *Inventions*, was from this city; and so was Hesiod the poet, still earlier than Ephorus, for Hesiod himself states that his father Dius left Aeolian Cyme and migrated to Boeotia. Strabo 13.3.6

Translation: Strabo. ed. H. L. Jones, *The Geography of Strabo*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1924. (Perseus DL: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Strab.+13.3.1>).

Ephorus of Cymê, for instance, a pupil of Isocrates, when he undertook to write his universal history, passed over the tales of the old mythology and commenced his history with a narration of the events which took place after the Return of the Heracleidae. Likewise Callisthenes and Theopompus, who were contemporaries of Ephorus, held aloof from the old myths. Diodoros 4.1.3.

Translation: Diodorus Siculus. *Library of History* (Books III - VIII). Translated by Oldfather, C. H. Loeb Classical Library Volumes 303 and 340. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935. (Theoi: <http://www.theoi.com/Text/DiodorusSiculus4A.html>).

It has therefore seemed unnecessary to me, since Isocrates was superior to all of these writers in every genre, to write a separate critique of each, or indeed of any of his contemporaries who closely imitated his individual style – I refer to Theodectes, Theopompus, Naucrates, Ephoros, Philiskos, Kephisodoros and many others – for these writers do not deserve to be compared with the genius of Isocrates. Dionysios of Halikarnassos *On Isaeus* 19.

Translation: Dionysius of Halicarnassus: *The Critical Essays*. Translated by Usher S. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1974.

Ephoros of Kyme and Theopompos, son of Damasistratos, of Chios;[1] both students of Isokrates,[2] but from the start they were opposites of one another in terms both of character and of discourse. Ephoros, you see, was simple in character, and in the interpretation of history laid-back and lazy and devoid of intensity; Theopompos, meanwhile, was jaundiced and ill-tempered in character, but in expression he was rich and eloquent and full of force, a dogged pursuer of the truth in what he wrote. Isokrates, at any rate, said that Theopompos needed a rein, but Ephoros a spur.[3] Theopompos was exiled, became a suppliant of Ephesian Artemis, and wrote many letters to Alexander [sc. the Great] against the Chians,[4] and at the same time he also wrote many encomia of Alexander himself.[5] It is also said that he wrote a diatribe against him that is not preserved. Suidas s.v. Ephoros: epsilon,3953 (Suda Online: <http://www.stoa.org/sol/>).

Isokrates was one of the most important Athenian orators and political theorists of the fourth century. His main contribution to political theory was his unswerving support for the Panhellenic ideal (OCD, s.v. panhellenism: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e4700>). He was considered to have been a major influence upon Philip II of Macedon and probably influenced the pro-Macedonian party in Athens. Isokrates wrote many speeches, some of which survive, on politics, the need for unity among the Greeks, the threat of Persia, as well as the Athenian democracy. His influence on Ephoros is attested in the sources and some of the fragments. Certainly Ephoros' effort towards a unified account of the history of the Greeks and their relations with the non-Greeks, particularly the Persians, was influenced by Isokrates' teachings of a unified Greek world.

Suggested Reading:

1. Barber, G. L. *The Historian Ephorus* Chicago 2nd edition 1995. [Selected Fragments are included in the folder for this unit titled "Ephoros Fragments"]
2. Davidson, James, 'Isokrates against Imperialism: An Analysis of the *De Pace*' *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1990), pp. 20-36. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436136>
3. de Romilly, Jacqueline, 'Isokrates and Europe' *Greece & Rome*, Second Series, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Apr., 1992), pp. 2-13. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/643117>

4. Drews, Robert, 'Ephorus' κατὰ γένος History Revisited' *Hermes*, Vol. 104, No. 4 (1976), pp. 497-498. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4475986>
5. Flower, Michael A. 'Simonides, Ephorus, and Herodotus on the Battle of Thermopylae' *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1998), pp. 365-379. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/639828>
6. Molitor, M. V. 'A Possible New Fragment of Ephorus in the Scholia on Pax 363' *Hermes*, Vol. 117, No. 1 (1989), pp. 125-127. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4476671>
7. Reid, Catherine I. 'Ephoros Fragment 76 and Diodoros on the Cypriote War' *Phoenix*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Studies Presented to Mary E. White on the Occasion of Her Sixty-Fifth Birthday (Spring, 1974), pp. 123-143. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1087237>
8. Thompson, Wesley E. 'Isocrates on the Peace Treaties' *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1983), pp. 75-80. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/638648>
9. Wheeler, Everett L. 'Ephorus and the Prohibition of Missiles' *Transactions of the American Philological Association* (1974-), Vol. 117, (1987), pp. 157-182. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/283965>

Short Assignment: Do you think that Ephoros' focus on personalities makes him a poor historian?

The Oxyrhynchus Historian

The *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* is one of the most interesting texts surviving from Greek antiquity. It is comprised of a number of fragments from one of the lost historians of the fourth century. The coverage is of the years 411 BCE to 395 BCE and it is probably a continuation of Thucydides' *History*. The fragments were discovered in the Oxyrhynchus region in Egypt (one in 1906, the other in 1942), thus their name (for more information on the Oxyrhynchus papyri in general, see OCD, s.v. Oxyrhynchus <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e4639>), and, more importantly, the Oxyrhynchus papyri website at CSAD, particularly the reproduced Omnibus article by P. J. Parsons, (7 pages): <http://www.papyrology.ox.ac.uk/POxy/oxyrhynchus/parsons1.html>).

The *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* survive on a 2nd century BCE papyrus and while substantial fragments survive, parts of the papyri are too damaged to read. There are two main parts of the readable surviving text. The first part (PSI 1342 or Florentine papyrus) covers a part of the Ionian War, particularly the battle of Notion in 406 BCE. The second papyrus (P.Oxy. 842 or London papyrus) covers the events of 397/6 BCE and contains an account of the Boiotian constitution. A third fragment was found in Cairo again dealing with the events of the Ionian War.

The authorship of this lost history is disputed with various possible identification having been proposed. An initial proposal was either Ephoros or Theopompos (OCD, s.v. Theopompus (3):

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e6376>

). Other proposed identifications include the atthidographer Androtion (OCD, s.v. Androtion:

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e432>)

and Daimachos the elder, who wrote a local history of Boiotia (OCD, s.v. Daimachos:

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e2004>

). Another possible identification is Kratippos (OCD, s.v. Cratippus of Athens :

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t111.e1917>).

The game of identify the historian played since the initial discovery of the papyrus in the beginning of the 20th century, although interesting, is not particularly important. [on the debates on identification, see Walker, E. M. *The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia: Its authorship and authority* (Oxford, 1913), available online at <http://www.archive.org/details/hellenicaoxyrhyn00walkrich>, for the initial discussion, F. Jacoby and P. Maas 'The Authorship of the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus (with an Appendix Containing the Newly Published Fragments)', *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 1950), pp. 1-11, JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/637063>, for the identification of the author with Theopompos. Also the reviews of Bruce, I. A. F. *An Historical Commentary on the "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (1968) by Hamilton, C. D. in *Classical Philology*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Jul., 1969), pp. 203-204, JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/268179>, and Cawkwell, G. L. in *The Classical Review*, New Series, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Dec., 1968), pp. 288-290, JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/709288>].

The *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* are clearly the work of an able and knowledgeable historian. In terms of literary merit, they are the least of the authors surviving from the classical period, since the style is dry and at times tiresome. However, the author of the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* provides rich detail on all the subjects he covers. His main distinguishing characteristic, like Herodotos' *logoi* and Thucydides' *demegoriai*, is the use of digression. Beyond the detail of the account of events, the author of the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* went off on tangents in the middle of his description of events. While this makes his work more difficult to follow, especially in its present fragmentary form, it provides a lot of valuable information.

It is in one of his digressions, that the author of the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* provides a great service to the modern student of antiquity, since he provides a description of the Boiotian constitution and thus of the practical constitutional aspects of federalism in the classical period (on the development of the Boiotian constitution and federalism in

Boiotia, see N. G. L. Hammond 'Political Developments in Boeotia' *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2000), pp. 80-93 JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558936>).

[1] This summer the Boiotians and the Phokians went to war. Those chiefly responsible for the bad relations between them were some people in Thebes. Not many years previously there had been political conflict (stasiasmon) in Boiotia. [2] At that time the situation in Boiotia was as follows. There were four councils established at that time in each of the cities. Not all the citizens were allowed to share in these but only those with a certain level of wealth. Each of these councils in turn sat and deliberated about policy and referred it to the other three. What seemed acceptable to all of them was approved. [3] They continued to run their internal affairs in this way, but Boiotian affairs were managed in the following way. All who lived in that area were arranged in eleven divisions and each of these provided a Boiotarch as follows. Thebes contributed four (two for city, two for Plataia, Skolos, Erythrai, Skaphai, and the other placed preciously linked to them in one political entity but at that time subject to Thebes); Orchomenos and Hysiai provided two; Tanagra one; and Haliartos, Lebadeia and Koroneia provided another whom each of the cities sent in turn; and in the same way one came from Akraiphnion, Kopai and Chaironeia. [4] In this way the divisions returned their magistrates. They provided sixty councillors per Boiotarch and they paid their daily expenses. For the organisation of the army, each division had to provide about one thousand hoplites and one hundred cavalry. To put it simply, depending on the number of its magistrates, each community shared in the common treasury, paid its taxes, appointed jurymen, and shared equally in public burdens and benefits. This was the constitution of the whole people, and the council and the common assemblies of the Boiotians sat in the Kadmeia. *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* 16.

Translation: *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* by P.R. McKechnie and S. J. Kern. Aris & Phillips 1988.

Although the Oxyrhynchus historian lacks the vividness and personality of Xenophon, his account is more factual and clearly well-researched. Particularly in the case of Thebes and Boiotia, the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* to an extent fill the intentional gap of Xenophon's, who was strongly and staunchly anti-Theban. Indeed Xenophon was anti-Theban enough to carefully manage to ignore Thebes and federalism to the utmost extent throughout his *Hellenika*.

The non-survival of the Oxyrhynchus historian in manuscript form is the most eloquent testimony of the criteria of survival, especially after antiquity. Xenophon's value was measured not by the historical information he provided in his work but rather on the rhetorical and literary value of his style. It is certain that the Oxyrhynchus historian survived to the first century BCE, when Diodoros of Sicily used the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* for his account of the last stages of the Peloponnesian War and the early fourth century conflicts. It is possible that the Oxyrhynchus historian survived in manuscript form to quite late in antiquity as did other major historians of the classical period, only for them to be lost when historical writings became more studies in rhetoric and literary style than sources of information.

Suggested Reading:

1. Bruce, I. A. F. 'Theopompus and Classical Greek Historiography' *History and Theory*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1970), pp. 86-109. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504503>
2. Buckler, John, 'A Note on Diodorus 14.86.1' *Classical Philology*, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 210-214. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/270560>
3. Ehrhardt, Christopher, 'Xenophon and Diodorus on Aegospotami' *Phoenix*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Autumn, 1970), pp. 225-228. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1087242>
4. Hammond, N. G. L. 'Political Developments in Boeotia' *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2000), pp. 80-93. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558936>
5. McKechnie, P. R. & Kern, S. J. *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* London 1993 [Selected Fragments are included in the folder for this unit titled "HO Fragments"]
6. Rhodes, P. J. 'In Defence of the Greek Historians' *Greece & Rome*, Second Series, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Oct., 1994), pp. 156-171. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/643011>
7. Shrimpton, G. S. 'The Theban Supremacy in Fourth-Century Literature' *Phoenix*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter, 1971), pp. 310-318. JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1088061>

Short Assignment: Would you consider the Oxyrhynchus historian a better historian than Xenophon?