

Analyse potential links between terrorism and other forms of criminality, and comment upon the potential of an insider threat within the police service. (2000 words)

Terrorism can still be characterised as the spread of fear, human casualties, and destruction on a worldwide scale even though there isn't a clear definition for it (Karimi *et al.*, 2017). Similarly, Hoffman (2017) describes terrorism as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.". Terrorism has existed in its varying forms for a period of at least 2000 years. Throughout this period, one constant remains – regardless of the varying rationale, victims, means, and actions undertaken, the intention of causing fear to the public and bring about change because of the use or threat of violence, remains. The target of that change can be varied but is primarily a change in public or societal behaviour or the altering global geopolitical power or influence for the involved parties (Garrison, 2004).

Among many other initiatives to combat terrorism in previous years, The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) was endorsed in 1999 and came into effect in April 2002. Its goal was to make it easier to prosecute people who were allegedly involved in terrorist activities, this provided the 167 participating states in the United Nations General Assembly to extradite and prosecute those responsible (Klein, 2009).

Terrorism has dominated international news and people's thoughts ever since the September 11th attacks on the US (Lutz and Lutz, 2005). It is estimated that the cost of the strikes in New York and Washington was approximately US \$500,000 (Levi, 2010). This raises the question of where the financing of the attacks comes from,

Freeman and Ruehsen (2013) suggests, the 'honey trade' industry between Yemen and the US raised concern regarding 'over-invoiced' transactions showing links to funding and supporting of the 9/11 attacks and connections to the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda. The July 7th London bombings in 2005 were equally noteworthy, they were regarded as another act of terrorism in western civilisation which left dozens dead, and hundreds injured. The cost of this attack is believed to have been approximately £8,000 according to The House of Commons (2006), despite their being no exact total cost.

Transnational organised crime and terrorism occasionally collaborate with one another and often share organisation and operational characteristics (Lebeya, 2012). For example, when state support from the Soviet Union and its allies began to decline, it prompted terrorist organisations to seek alternate sources of funding. While this deterrent first manifested in the early 1990s, the 9/11 attacks of 2001 turned the decline into an accelerant (Kupchinsky, 2002).

U.S and U.K Anti-Terrorism agencies are among the organisations entrusted with investigating and pursuing various groups to cut off their funding and prevent further criminal activity including acts of terror (Huband, 2002). To deter charities from funding terrorist groups, the United States has mostly focused its attention to pursue governments and charities who are complicit in these actions (Kupchinsky, 2002). Similarly, since 2004 more than 100 nations have collaborated in the fight against terrorism, forcing terrorist organisations to look for alternative sources of funding (Paz, 2002). Likewise, Sanderson (2004) too suggests the increase in terrorist involvement in common criminal activities is a direct result in the decline of state funding of terrorism, resulting in these groups resorting to criminal activity to finance themselves and their illegal activities.

This suggests that terrorist organisations utilise forms of criminality such as money laundering and other to finance their terrorist activities. Supportive of this, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012) notes terrorist groups to 'clearly and frequently' engage in crime for conducive goals such as, acquiring equipment, accessing information, gaining political attention and many more. According to McCarthy (2003), a terrorist group called 'Shining Path' profited from large amounts of income in Peru from providing security for drug traffickers, additionally, there are also proceeds from the Afghan drug trade which are used to fund another terrorist group in Uzbekistan.

The methods mentioned above provide links between terrorism and common forms of criminality, even indirect activities of individuals who may not necessarily support these terrorist groups are unknowingly linked to them when involved in criminal activities such as money laundering, drug smuggling, human trafficking, sex trafficking and more (Dandurand and Chin, 2004). Furthermore, Clarke (2017) notes that low-level criminality and 'petty' drug dealing can no longer be considered the sole responsibility of local policing, in fact the issue now presents a crucial counter-terrorism concern. Additionally, Levy and Yusuf (2021) note examples terrorist group al-Shabaab use to launder money via the United Arab Emirates consisting of buying vehicles for cheap, importing them into Somalia and bribing port officials to allow the importation and finally selling on for 20%-30% more.

Gonzalez (2013) concludes that not only is human trafficking one of the initial financial steps into the global and transnational criminal financial network, but it also forms the basis of these criminal organisations. In comparison to trafficking in drugs or weapons, it is considered more lucrative and profitable. For example, during the Taliban's five-year rule of Afghanistan, numerous women and girls were abducted by Taliban

soldiers to be used as mistresses while females were also sold as sex slaves to wealthy men through contracts managed by Al Qaeda, these proceeds assisting in maintaining Taliban's finances afloat (Welch, 2016).

Alternatively, it can be difficult to directly link terrorism and other forms of criminal activity when considering the individuals involved. For example, a terrorist group may recruit persons who specialise in particular crimes to assist them for a broader goal, subsequently these individuals become linked to extremist groups unknowingly and may face harsher repercussions for doing so, these 'grey areas' have produced an array of concerns in the legal definitions and offences of terrorism where liability is considered (Saul, 2010). Although criminal and terrorist organisations appear more similar in modern times, with strategic cooperation, tactics, and resources, there remains differences regarding desired outcomes. For example, a terrorist group would have religious and ideological agendas whereas a criminal group would prefer a desired goal of power and wealth (Karmon, 2005). Furthermore, Finckenaue (2005) notes an Organised Crime Group (OCG) would not wish to attract unwanted attention into their criminal networks, methods, and motives as this may provide the police or other crime preventing agencies with insight into their illegal activities. Additionally, Mullins (2009) notes a terrorist group would seek to promote their beliefs and actions on via social media, television, and other options whereas an OCG would avoid it altogether.

Organised crime groups prefer to avoid drawing attention to themselves, most criminal organisations prefer to keep things as they are, or to keep the system "rigged" (Holbrook and Horgan, 2019). Organized crime avoids public attention, whereas terrorists frequently want attention to evoke fear (Ilan and Sandberg, 2019). In addition, unlike organised crime, which rarely accepts responsibility for its activities,

terrorism frequently does. Criminal organisations typically develop and maintain networks of illegal transportation, bribe or threaten politicians, judges, police, and intelligence officials, and have frequently come to an agreement with host nations (Altier, *et al.*, 2022). Unfortunately, organised crime groups across certain regions have been said to have so much control of corrupted governments that arrests and prosecution of these individuals is often considered near impossible (Lebeya, 2012).

Similarly, there is no universal definition of an insider threat, Einwechter (2002) describes it as someone who is entrusted with allowed access but instead of carrying out assigned duties, manipulates access to a system to exploit it.

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) has warned the police are at risk of 'insider threats' of right-wing extremism due to the lack of thorough vetting of its employees (Jacques, 2022). The UK's Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) (2015) emphasises that insider cooperation may indeed be required for acts of terror, including those carried out by criminals, and other individuals seeking personal gain. According to (BaMaung, *et al.*, 2018) within the U.K the CPNI emphasises that insider assistance may be required for attacks including those that are criminal, terrorist, or motivated by financial personal gain. An insider may in fact be an employee, a contract worker, or an agency employee who has access to the organisation's facilities, who may already work at the location or who may have recently joined with the intention of exploiting their access. The (CPNI, 2015) highlights that attacks, including criminal, terror, and those seeking commercial advantage may depend on the co-operation of an insider. The CPNI emphasises that insider assistance may be required for attacks including those that are criminal,

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In 2010, Rajib Karim, a British Airways employee had been communication with terrorist group al-Awlaki and was actively exploiting his position within the company to perform a terrorist attack on behalf of AQAP was arrested (Loffi and Wallace, 2014).

Lemieux, *et al.*, 2014, notes insider attacks often have several, highly dynamic, purposeful, or unintentional motivating causes which make it challenging to identify the key drivers behind them, on many occasions, there may not even be a single contributing factor linking to certain incidents. There have been certain instances of insider behaviour, such as espionage-related spying, surveillance, illicit intelligence gathering, and many others which have been steadily increasing in recent years (Reveraert and Sauer, 2021). In fact, Heino (2022) notes, a large portion of this increase stems from cyber-espionage where nation-states or affiliated organisations such as terrorist groups use cyberattack methods for acquiring confidential intelligence to undermine police and other counter-terrorist agencies' capabilities to increase their own capabilities and compete with opposed organisations. The most frequent causes of an insider threat include espionage, vulnerable co-workers, and criminal intent, while using cyber has been an important tactic, indirect attackers have benefited by converting an existing employing into spies via financial incentives or coercion (Zaboklicka, 2020). Charney (2010) notes a crucial aspect in converting an employee has been vulnerability, such as the sense of personal failure that they experience in their personal lives or financial difficulties.

For example (Randazzo, *et al.*, 2015) examines instances in the banking and financial sectors that personal financial gain was the main contributor of most insider threats.

In 2015 the CPNI released its findings regarding improper workplace behaviours and practices, the study found seven significant organisational failures and concerns that increase the likelihood of coercing vulnerable employees. They are:

- Employees failing to remove their work passes after leaving work or not wearing them whilst on shift.
- Computers and other technology left unlocked when the user is absent from them.
- Staff discussing sensitive and confidential topics in indiscreet locations.
- Confidential information being left out for passers-by to see.
- Sensitive documents or property being unethically destroyed.
- Staff becoming complacent or ignorant to company policies and procedures.
- Unescorted visitors attending locations without a pass.

All the above directly link to concerns within the British police sector and tie into all policing Code of Ethics (2014), and the Data Protection (2018).

When considering the factors which present an insider with opportunity to exploit police organisations (Safa, *et al.*, 2018a) notes there are several factors to consider. Firstly, there is a general understanding that insiders frequently take advantage of trust as a key resource. Secondly, accessibility provides key access to locations, secured premises, sensitive data, and systems. Thirdly, the knowledge that an insider possesses provides danger when they leverage their understanding of an organisations systems or security protocols to damage others. The exploitation of vulnerabilities is also a contributing element when taking into consideration personal

relationships and levels of trust within organisations. The idea of intent is the fifth component, in many cases it is necessary for the insider to take advantage of flaws in security measures to harm others or further illegal, criminal, or terrorist goals. Insider attacks often have several, highly dynamic, purposeful, or unintentional motivating causes which make it challenging to identify the key drivers behind them (Safa, *et al.*, 2018b). On few occasions, there may not even be a single contributing factor linking to certain incidents.

In 2011 the U.S established a threat detection and prevention program known as the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) with the goals of deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the safeguarding of classified information from exploitation, compromise, and unauthorised disclosure (National Insider Threat Task Force, 2011). According to Bean (2017), the U. K's MI5 organisation identify three insider threat primary areas: security programs, counterintelligence programs, organisational culture. The CPNI with MI5's assistance utilises numerous profiling and behavioural analysis measures to detect insure threats.

Conclusion

There has been relatively little research on insider threats to organisations that are motivated by terrorist beliefs and ideologies, despite the origins and effects of terrorism are extensively studied. There is a need to better investigate these issues due to the potential magnitude of impact an insider threat may cause if they were to be found within an essential organisation. Several examples exist of people who have worked for organisations that became inspired or coerced by terrorist belief systems, and there are preventatives available to reduce the likelihood of future terror attacks. There must be efforts to deter terror attacks from becoming reality and will rely on the

proactiveness and competence of anti-corruption organisations and positive engagement with employees.

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Evaluate the use of different policing models and analyse the effectiveness of specific crime prevention initiatives (2000 words).

Policing is one of the most crucial tasks for each country. The social and cultural historical factors of any country influences how police are organised (Shannon, 2022). The United Kingdom operates as a democratic country where policing by consent is preferred under the “Peelian” Principles in 1829. Noted by Loader (2016) “Policing by consent” suggests that policing is founded on a consensus that results from transparency regarding the authority, honesty and integrity of policing powers, and their accountability for using those powers with the desired goal of preventing crime rather than catching criminals.

Defined by (Newburn, 2017) the role of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law to keep the King’s peace; to protect, help and reassure communities; and to do all with integrity and reasonable judgement.

Policing strategies within the U.K may operate differently but all have the desired goal of preventing crime. In 2019, the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales

(2019) was imposed to examine how crime, fear of crime and threats to public safety in the future are changing and assess how the police are adapting to the challenges (Hinkle, *et al.*, 2020).

An examination of several policing models and strategies including Problem-oriented Policing (POP), Predictive policing, Intelligence-led Policing (ILP), and Reactive Policing will be critically analysed throughout this task.

A model relating to these strategies is the Problem-oriented Policing (PoP) which is also known as problem-solving policing, PoP provides an approach to tackling crime and disorder within the U.K which may involve; identifying problem areas, in-depth analysis to understand the problem, creation of a suitable response, and the assessment of the resulting effects of that response (Barber, 2022). Furthermore (Weisburd, *et al.*, 2011) refers to PoP as the “most important and widely implemented police innovation of the last two decades”. PoP can be considered a strategy which can be used to address any crime and disorder issue in conjunction with other interventions for reducing crime rather than becoming a direct replacement (Bullock and Tilley, 2012). Due to the fact this model is created specifically for particular problem crime areas, it aids in offering solutions to ongoing issues.

The SARA model would be an example of a PoP model, which comprises of four areas:

- Scanning - The detection and risk evaluation of probable disorder and threats of crime.

- Analysis – The examination of prospective issues to find their root causes by gathering and insight.
- Response – The planning and execution of tailored responses to crime, to resolve the sources of the issue.
- Assessment – the evaluation of reactive measures taken to evaluate the outcome or to adjust the response if necessary.

In a review by College of Policing (2020), evidence suggests that PoP has reduced levels of offending and crime, the review went on to suggest that this police strategy led to a 33.8% reduction in crime. However, there are several implications to suggest reviews lacked detailed information regarding the processes used when providing results which weakens its reliability, effectiveness, and the ability to share its findings to other police forces to use (Eck, 2019). Further research and evaluated outcomes from results of PoP is required in order to provide accurate insight of its findings. An example of a PoP method is the Problem-analysis triangle (PAT), this method involves three components which contribute to a crime:

- Motivated offender
- Location
- Suitable target

It is suggested by Ashby and Chainey (2012), if you focus attention on at least one of these known components, a crime is less likely to be committed in the future.

Additionally, predictive policing is also another method in which policing operations make use of tactical, analytical tools to decipher data which produces predictions in the later stages of development surrounding the likelihood of individuals committing

crime. The idea is that police officers would rely on predicted computer programming to provide them with qualitative intelligence as guidance to establish where, who, and when the committing of a crime is likely to occur. If accurate, this strategy would enable police to anticipate, forecast, and prevent future crimes from being completed such as repeat offenders targeting local areas with high levels of crime.

Despite the potential advantage of artificial intelligence replacing the requirement of human interference, predictive policing does not replace conventional policing methods, instead it improves these methods with the assistance and application of models, artificial intelligence, and algorithms (National Institute of Justice, 2014). Bernasco (2008), notes an example in Netherlands where the same offender returned to a nearby location to apply a previously effective burglary method on other properties whereby intelligence-based policing proved crucial in the apprehension and prevention of further burglaries proved effective.

Additionally, when considering intel-led policing the term “modus operandi” (M.O) comes to mind. M.O refers to specific offender behaviours or ‘habits’ in which an individual which regularly commit during their crimes, they aren’t always unique to the point of clear evidence of a particular subject however, it can provide crucial evidence for serious offences in the form of DNA and fingerprints (Sundberg, 2020).

Although there are many positives of predictive policing and what they can provide, it appears at present that biased predictions and high levels of scepticism regarding the effectiveness of this method weakens its argument in how effective this strategy can be

(Sandhu and Fussey, 2021). What must be acknowledged is that predictions were dependant on input data that showed how police had classified crime in the past, judgements that could have reflected structural inconsistencies in their findings (Moses and Chan, 2018). For example, during a digital policing project a local police officer noted that using 'stop and search' data for crime predictions would portray biasness towards racial profiling in London, this element of computing biasness contradicts several 'Peelian' principles such as the notably mentioned 'policing by consent'. Ultimately the findings of this policing strategy make the case that assertions that predictive software can eliminate the objectivity of police work disregards the ongoing dispute of a police officer to impose their authority and control how much the prediction algorithms are used, and whether they are as credible as human comprehension (Andrejevic, *et al.*, 2020).

In the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and other nations across the world, intelligence-led policing (ILP) is a policing paradigm that strive to put criminal intelligence at the forefront of decision-making. This police approach swaps from being reactive to a more proactive approach (Belur and Johnson, 2016). With the implementation of ILP in the U.K in the late 90's to early 00's, it became more apparent due to the introduction of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) which also bases its main policing strategy on intelligence. NIM similarly to ILP provides guidance to police investigation in order to process information and convert it into actionable intelligence (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). According to the (National Centre for Policing Excellence, nd), Analysts using the ILP were better able to comprehend police

operational capabilities and what solutions might be realistically suggested for specific issues after police officers were introduced as intelligence managers.

According to Ratcliffe (2016), it is difficult to determine how crime analysis affects results and how this should be reported. The conducting of thorough analyses in crime reduction programs demands a high level of analytical skill which few police organisations have. Additionally, Santos and Taylor (2014) note the analysing of intelligence technologies take time to develop and fine tune but subsequently have a short “shelf life”, as a result of the constant emergence of new data challenges and issues in the field of policing. According to (Rowe and Sogaard, 2020), the intelligence cycle can often be criticized for being too static and fixed as intelligence is considerably dynamic and constantly changes through phases. A further critique is that the model often views its intelligence without context or its variable environment in which it operates, resulting in its failure to explain how the analysis is connected to decision making and risk management (Martin, 2022).

Furthermore, Huotari (2014) notes the ability to create effective crime prevention plans and dissect crime analysis into crucial actionable intelligence is hampered by the lack of interaction between analysts and police officers. A study by (James, 2014) found that, although crime analysis was prevalent and crucial to policing, it remains underused and often a ‘yes or no’ question within an intelligence document rather than effectively directing police operations and models.

Within the U.K there are several policing crime prevention initiatives that are owned by police organisations and work on behalf of the Police Service’s throughout the

country. The initiatives are aimed at reducing crime, the fear of crime, and creating safer communities and with the assistance and guidance of other agencies such as the Home Office, Ministry of Housing, Local Government, Local Authorities, and many others, the initiatives help to provide positive influence and support towards the goals of the police service.

In 1985, a project was initiated to reduce levels of residential burglaries involving a local housing estate in Rochdale, England known as the 'Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project' and involved the interviews of burglary victims, neighbours, and local offenders to establish proportionate measures reduce this targeted area (Seymour, 2001). The devising of preventative measures such as improving the physical security of dwellings and neighbourhood watch schemes were among the many efforts to reduce further attempts. After the local security measures were completed, an intelligence system was used to record, analyse, and evaluate the results which showed a dramatic reduction in the burglary rate within that area, as well as within the force area of Rochdale (Forrester, *et al.*, 1988). In addition to this, the findings were that ethnic minorities were more likely to be victims of crime, there was also a strong suggestion that crime was not often reported. Despite this, it enabled the police to introduce preventative measures that would prevent there becoming further victims of crime as often but allowed the insight into the target audience who were likely to be burgled (Tilley and Webb, 1994).

Secured by design (SBD) is one of the police security initiatives that improve the security of premises to provide safety to lives, workplaces, and property (Secured by design, 2021).

The Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS, 2022), a voluntary scheme that allows Chief Constables within the U.K to assign non police staff organisations to assist in the tackle of anti-social behaviour and low-level criminal damage such as, graffiti and litter.

The Licensing Security and Vulnerability Initiative (SAVI, 2022), a relatively new security and vulnerability initiative aimed at reducing the risk of crime and raising the standards of public houses and nightclubs to promote safety for customers, staff, management, and local residential areas.

According to (Hobson, *et al.*, 2021), the evaluation of police-led initiatives identifies numerous limiting factors, like policing models, the lack of clarity on the aims and objectives of schemes and initiatives proves difficult to record. Supportive of this, (Grant, 2015) notes the main barriers to successful inter-agency partnerships include a reluctance of other agencies to participate, the “strong headed” police agenda, an unwillingness to share information, conflicting interests, opinions, and so on. Unfortunately, without partner agency assistance, these initiatives became almost stagnant and render their implementation insignificant.

Conclusion.

Reactive policing to crime is proven to be more accurate when recording results and requires less time to initiate a plan due to the crime having already been committed. As a result, the data to record and actively evaluate has already provided, allowing for shorter periods of analysis and response.

Unfortunately, if this were the case and reactive policing were to be the only approach of policing, it would reflect poorly on the police and other crime prevention agencies

as it would appear that little efforts were being made to maintain public and community safety.

The implementation of preventative measures to address specific crime can only be viewed as positive. However, this does not prevent offenders from turning to other types of crime. Results from initiatives indicate success in reducing crime for their respective categories but this does not eradicate increases in other categories of crime, which may increase with the previous offenders resorting to different crimes.

1971 (Words).

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