

CHAPTER 18

Orthodox Judaism

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Orthodoxy (Greek: "true opinion") is a Jewish religious movement that advocates the full observance of Jewish religious law (the halakhah), interpreted in traditional ways, and is critical of modernity and its values. In its adherence to the laws, customs, and beliefs of the ancestors, Orthodoxy portrays itself as the faithful continuation of traditional Jewish society. In many ways, though, Orthodoxy should be regarded as a movement of the modern era, whose birth occurred toward the end of the eighteenth century, in reaction to the challenges posed by Reform, secularization, and assimilation in western and central Europe. In this setting, one sector of the Jewish population struggled to maintain the supremacy of halakhah in Jewish life. As the endeavor to preserve the society as a whole was doomed to fail, the efforts were focused on the protection of their own sector, yielding what now is called Orthodoxy.

Orthodox theology accepts the literal interpretation of traditional doctrines, such as the election of Israel, divine providence, reward and punishment in the world-to-come, and the future coming of the messiah. However, more than any specific dogma, it is the commitment to the full observance of the halakhah that has guided the creation of a separate Orthodox identity.

Orthodoxy asserts the divine source of the Torah and the eternal, unchanging nature of its laws. Seeing the law as a direct expression of God's will, Orthodox Judaism refuses to reduce the halakhah to historical, sociological, or psychological grounds. Unlike Conservative Judaism, Orthodoxy does not accept halakhic rulings based on such considerations. Orthodox theologians understand changes and developments in the halakhah not as new norms but rather as elaboration and realization of the existing ones. Accordingly, halakhic ruling is authoritative only when based on specific texts (i.e., the Talmud and traditional halakhic codes and commentaries) and issued by a recognized rabbinical authority. The qualities required of the latter are thorough learning of the traditional texts, a deep conviction in the divine source of the Torah, and a sincere attempt

to reach a true understanding of the law. His recognition comes from the already accepted rabbinical authorities of his day.

The Term "Orthodox"

The title "Orthodox" first appears in a Jewish context in the first half of the nineteenth century, in western Europe. It was coined by opponents of Orthodoxy who compared Jewish traditionalism to a parallel phenomenon in the Christian world. Only later did Orthodox Jews themselves adopt the term. Later in the nineteenth century, the term Neo-Orthodoxy was created to denote the moderate wing of Orthodoxy, which by then had emerged in Germany. In Hebrew texts up to the second half of the twentieth century the Orthodox refer to themselves as *Haredim* ("Men of Awe"), *Yereim* ("God-fearers"), or *Shlomei Emunei Israel* ("Israelites of Wholehearted Faith"). By the second half of the twentieth century, the latter two titles no longer denote a specific social group, while the term Haredim refers to the more extreme trend of Orthodoxy, sometimes titled Ultra-Orthodoxy. In the State of Israel, the designation *Datiyim* ("religious") denotes the Orthodox but recently is often used in reference to a specific trend of Orthodoxy, the Zionist-Religious (or: Modern-Orthodox), which is the contemporary moderate wing of the movement. Although some of the non-Orthodox, such as Reform and Conservative Jews, identify themselves as "religious," in colloquial Israeli speech the term *Datiyim* is almost synonymous with Orthodox.

History

Roughly speaking, Orthodoxy has experienced three main stages of development since the late eighteenth century. These reflect Orthodoxy's changing attitude toward competing forces in the larger Jewish society as well as the dynamic relations within its own wings.

The first stage: From the end of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century Orthodoxy is formed, first in Hungary and Germany and later in eastern Europe, each region responding differently to the challenges of modernity.

The second stage: From the late nineteenth century until the Holocaust, Orthodoxy moves toward uniformity in some religious practices but splits on the political question of Zionism.

The third stage: Following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the attitude to Zionism becomes more than a political issue and engenders a deep social and religious schism, which splits Orthodoxy, especially in Israel, to two main trends: the Zionist-Religious (or Modern Orthodox) and the Haredi.

The First Stage

The end of the eighteenth century marks the beginning of a new age in the history of the Jewish people: the age of emancipation in western and central Europe. If in the preceding decades Jewish traditional society had begun to show signs of a forthcoming crisis, now, as the gates of the ghetto opened and Jews turned to take advantage of new professional, social, and intellectual opportunities, it seemed that traditional Jewish society had come to an end. Many Jews in western Europe converted to Christianity, others assimilated without any formal religious ceremony, while others sought a reformed Judaism that would adapt to contemporary values. These processes were often so rapid and sweeping that Rabbinic authorities found it almost hopeless to cope with those viewed as already lost to the community. Feeling that the preservation of Jewish traditional society as a whole was out of their reach, they focused on building a protective wall around the core of traditional Judaism – observance of the halakhah. In Hungary, they adopted a strategy of militant stringency to achieve this goal, in Germany – a strategy of openness.

While in western and central Europe the process of modernization took rapid and radical forms, in Russia, where anti-Jewish laws prevailed until the Russian Revolution of February 1917, it emerged later and was more gradual and less oriented toward non-Jewish culture. The Orthodox reaction varied accordingly. Their common purpose notwithstanding, the religious leaders of each geographical region adopted their own strategy in the fight to preserve the halakhah. We must, therefore, distinguish no fewer than three major Orthodox patterns of response to modernity: the Hungarian, the German, and, later, the eastern European.

Hungarian Jewry's most prominent rabbinical leader in the age of the crisis, Moshe Sofer, better known as the Hatam Sofer (1762–1839), led the first clear-cut Orthodox response to the challenges of modernity. Using the phrase a few times in his letters and responsa, he coined the motto that later became the banner of radical Orthodoxy: "*Haddash Asur min ha-Torah*" ("The new is forbidden by the Torah"). A paraphrase of M. Orlah 3:9, the statement expresses the conviction that the halakhah's protection demands more than mere observance of the law's positive norms. Rather, additional "fences" and stringencies are required, coupled with a prohibition against anything with a modern flavor. The Hatam Sofer rigorously opposed any change or reform and rejected involvement in western society and culture. He stressed the religious value of the Hebrew language and land of Israel, themes Reform circles pushed aside.

In comparison with Hungarian extremism, German Orthodoxy's response to modernity is conspicuously moderate. Already in the first third of the nineteenth century, German rabbis were prepared to accept the challenges of emancipation and welcome general culture, so long as observance of the halakhah was not disrupted. Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808–88), leader of the Frankfurt Orthodox congregation, and Rabbi Esriel Hildesheimer (1820–99), leader of the Berlin Orthodox congregation, best represent this response to

modernity. Their religious trend, known as Neo-Orthodoxy, adopted the motto "*Torah im Derekh-Eretz*" (approximately: "Torah and civilization," from M. Abot 2:2) and sought an ideal integration of religious and secular achievements. Hirsch's writings in particular advocate the belief that observant Judaism is entirely consistent with humanist values (see below).

This openness to modernity notwithstanding, Hirsch shared Hungarian Orthodoxy's unhesitating and uncompromising fight against the Reform movement. Orthodox leadership in both Hungary and Germany viewed Reform as undermining traditional Judaism and as a short and easy bridge to full assimilation. When German Reform Jews won power over important communal institutions, Orthodox leaders created a "separate community" (*Austrittsgemeinde*). Prominent leaders of Orthodoxy called their followers to break off with the general community and establish an independent community, based on a commitment to halakhah. Appropriate legislation on the part of the secular authorities, which had been achieved both in Hungary (1871) and in Germany (1876), facilitated this move. The policy of separation achieved a greater measure of success in Hungary, as many German Orthodox Jews continued to belong to the general community.

Modernity reached eastern Europe later than it did the West. Since the late eighteenth century and still in the first half of the nineteenth century, the primary conflict within eastern European Jewry was not between Orthodoxy and modernity but between the Hasidim and Mitnagdim. Both groups shared the values of traditional Judaism but differed over how to attain them. Beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, Hasidism called for greater emphasis on spiritual and mystical experience among even common Jews, placing the mystical and charismatic master – the *Tzaddik* or *Rebbe* – in a central leadership position. The Mitnagdic reaction insisted that mysticism be pursued in an esoteric framework alone and maintained the traditional hierarchy of values, in which the study and observance of the halakhic texts are paramount. To promote Torah study, the Mitnagdim established the Volozhin Yeshiva (1802–92), the first yeshiva of the Lithuanian type, which soon became a stronghold of Mitnagdic scholarship and a model for later similar institutions. The conflict between Hasidim and Mitnagdim had significant social aspects: early Hasidism attracted many of the lower social and economic strata, while the Mitnagdim enjoyed the support of the elite segments of Jewish society.

Even before the appearance of modernity, the gaps between Hasidim and Mitnagdim had begun to diminish. In a rapid but thorough process, beginning in the early nineteenth century, Hasidism was gradually institutionalized, mystical experience was removed from its practical program, and mystical terminology was invested with more traditional significance. Hasidic leadership, originally attained through mystical and charismatic qualities, now passed on dynastically. By the end of the nineteenth century, the first Hasidic yeshivot were founded, largely following the model of Volozhin. Conversely, the Mitnagdim – called *Litvaks* (Lithuanians) – began to encourage a greater and richer expression of emotion and experience in religious life.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Rabbi Israel Salanter (Lipkin) (1810–83) initiated a new movement within *Mitnagdic Lithuanian society*: the Musar movement, which championed the moral emendation of man's personality in addition to the traditional ideals of Torah study and the observance of the halakhah. Although it evoked some opposition, Musar affected the majority of Lithuanian yeshivot, and the debate over its ideas remained, in most cases, at a low level of intensity.

The struggle between Hasidim and Mitnagdim dominated eastern European Jewry for decades. Yet, as modernity advanced, the parties found themselves working together in the battle against the common adversary. Both parties developed a unique Orthodox response to modernity. Its uniqueness was not in what it was but rather in what it was not: The rabbis and rebbes of eastern Europe did not phrase a clear-cut policy toward religious deviance, but rather adopted a strategy of rigidity and flexibility alternately, thus sharing neither the open Judaism of "Torah and civilization" nor the policy of "The new is forbidden by the Torah." They rejected even the concept of "separate community" common to both German and Hungarian Orthodox Jewries. Several prominent eastern European Orthodox leaders, such as the Head of the Volozhin Yeshiva, Rabbi Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin (1817–93), expressed their explicit opposition to the policy of separation, and a few Hasidic rebbes took a similar stand. However, the Hasidim, previously marked with an anti-establishment spirit and revolutionary ardor, now adopted the more conservative approach, sticking to the warm communities of *Anshei Shlomenu* (approximately: "Our men").

At the end of the nineteenth century, Orthodox Judaism was far from being religiously uniform. Only in the last decade of that century did the challenge of Zionism succeed in unifying Orthodox forces in several important matters, even as it set the stage for the great split of the next stage in the history of Orthodoxy.

The Second Stage

From the last decades of the nineteenth century until the Holocaust, Orthodox Judaism in both eastern and western Europe suffered a deepening crisis. Increasing numbers of Jewish youth abandoned religion for a secular way of life, many of them also joining secular political movements, the presence of which quickly dominated Jewish society. Many of them perceived Orthodoxy as an archaic remnant of the past and scorned adherence to an anachronistic way of life. The rapid deterioration caused a trauma that influenced the Orthodox experience for generations.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Orthodoxy developed increasingly uniform religious patterns and sought social and political structures that would unite its various groups. With time, this tendency toward relative internal conformity and unification increased its hold in Orthodox life. In eastern Europe, Rabbi Israel Meir Ha-Cohen, known as the Hafetz Hayyim (1839[?]–1933), was

recognized by almost all Orthodox groups as a paragon religious figure. He, in return, viewed the different Orthodox groups with favor: Himself a Litvak, the Hafetz Hayyim appreciated Hasidism; not a member of the Musar movement, he sympathized with the latter's goals, but also was respectful of some of its opponents. No less than his scholarship, it was possibly the Hafetz Hayyim's personality that made his book, the *Mishnah Brurah*, on the laws of everyday life, the major halakhic source for most Orthodox Jews.

While Orthodox Judaism moved only gradually toward uniformity, the fact that a single text gained such wide acceptance reflects the search for greater uniformity and unity among the various groups. On a political level as well, Orthodox Jewry sought a single framework that would unite it. Some of these attempts (such as the *Mahzikei Ha-Dat* party, founded in 1878) achieved partial success. A more complete success, however, was achieved only later, in the face of the challenge of Zionism.

Zionism, the most influential and significant of Jewish nationalist movements in modern times, officially focused on the fight for a Jewish national home. Behind the political idea, however, no few Jews (both partisans and opponents of the movement) discerned in Zionism a new basis for Jewish identity, an identity based on national – i.e., secular – components like land, language, and culture. In this respect, Zionism, though claiming indifference to religion, was conceived as a threat to Judaism. Indeed, it facilitated some Jews' break with Judaism even as it was a path that kept others within the community.

Two important Orthodox political frameworks were created in response to Zionism, one partisan, the other in opposition, and both presumed to cross the boundaries of group distinctions within Orthodoxy. In 1902, Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines (1840–1915) founded the Mizrahi movement, a Zionist-religious party that was integrated into the greater Zionist organization and participated in its activity. Except for its early stages, the Mizrahi movement failed to gain the support of influential rabbis and spiritual leaders, most of whom remained suspicious of Zionism. In 1912, Agudat Israel, another all-Orthodox political framework, was founded, this time in order to counter Zionism.

Although German-Jewish laymen (the most active of whom was Jacob Rosenheim [1870–1965] of Frankfurt), and not rabbis, established Agudat Israel, the movement drew to its ranks some of the foremost east European religious personalities. The Hafetz Hayyim and rabbi Avraham Mordechai Alter (1866–1948), the third rebbe of Gur, the largest Hasidic group, both expressed their support for Agudat Israel. The bulk of the Hungarian Orthodox leaders, though, remained suspicious of this “new” phenomenon.

Several important Hungarian Hasidic rebbes argued that Agudat Israel was both too moderate and too innovative. The extremists' criticism could be harsh. One of them, Rabbi Hayyim Elazar Shapiro (1872–1937), the rebbe of Munkacs, for example, saw Agudat Israel as one with secular Zionism and Mizrahi, both of which he detested. But despite the resistance it faced, Agudat Israel offered an Orthodox common denominator that contributed to the consolidation of Orthodoxy. In need of a supervising spiritual body, Agudat Israel established

Moetzet Gedolei ha-Torah ("The Council of Great Torah Masters"), recognizing the authority of leading rabbis even on issues that were not explicitly halakhic. This was explained by the doctrine that the rabbis of the Council were credited with great personal virtues and an ability to internalize not only the words of the Torah but also its spirit (*Da'at Torah*). In addition to the political struggle, Agudat Israel took several significant initiatives in Orthodox literature, and press. Despite these achievements, it was unable to suggest a concrete, definite solution for the problems at stake (growing anti-Semitism etc.), thus failing to present a real alternative to the Zionist program.

Agudat Israel viewed the Zionist program as a danger: Its leaders saw the proposed Jewish state as merely an instrument of the Zionists' aspiration to secularize Jewish identity. This shift in the foundation of identity meant – as some Haredi leaders asserted – the creation of a "new Jew," whose Jewishness was detached from religion. Indeed, the intention to create such a "new Jew" arose from the writings of several Zionist ideologists. The fact that the Zionist leadership was secular lent great weight to this argument. Some rabbis added another justification for the anti-Zionistic stance, the notion that Judaism forbids the establishment of a Jewish sovereign state before the coming of the messiah. This latter argument reached its full intensity only later, after the Holocaust, in the teachings of Satmar Hasidism (see below).

Because of these reasons, Haredi leaders did not encourage their adherents to move to the land of Israel, and some even firmly objected to emigration. No less did they discourage emigration to the United States, a country in which the full observance of the halakhah was rare and difficult. However, the objection was not too harsh, and practically Orthodox Jews' immigration to these countries continued nonetheless, thus preparing the infrastructure for their becoming future religious centers.

In fact, Orthodox Jews immigrated to the United States already in the nineteenth century, many of them from Eastern Europe. Though most of the immigrants were not highly occupied with religious affairs but rather with the difficulties of everyday life, Orthodox Jews have established new communities in the New World, and expressed themselves through press and literature of their own. In the beginning, talmudic scholarship was rare and the Orthodox culture was oriented mainly to sermons and preaching; but soon enough, it turned to more intellectual directions, too: Already in 1897 the first American yeshiva, the Rabbi Isaac Elhanan Theological Seminary, was founded in New York. Soon after its establishment, the yeshiva added secular studies to its curriculum, as a result of students' pressure. Indeed, American Jewish Orthodoxy could not follow the Eastern European pattern in this issue, and adopted a lenient line. Only later, in the late 1920s, another yeshiva, Torah va-Daas, was established, where secular studies were put down to minimum.

In the same decade the first Hasidic rebbes immigrated to the United States, but they gained only little support and their "courts" were by all means unimpressive, similar to what only "small rebbes" attained in Eastern Europe. Only in the 1940s, when the rebbes of Lubavitch and Satmar fled to the United

States, American Jewish Orthodoxy could have "real" Hasidic courts of its own. The rebbes, together with some fleeing talmudic and halakhic masters, later reversed the tendency of decline, that characterized Orthodoxy until then, and led it into a period of unprecedented thriving.

The early twentieth century also witnessed the evolution of the Zionist-religious movement. In the land of Israel, the chief rabbinate was founded in 1921, under the auspices of the British Mandate, and contemporary Zionist-religious leaders expected the new body to play an important role in the anticipated Jewish state. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865–1935), appointed the first chief rabbi, believed that the Zionist enterprise of settling and rebuilding the Holy Land constituted *At'halta di-Geula* ("The Commencement of Redemption"). He perceived the secular Zionist pioneers' rebellious atheism as part of a complex dialectical process of history, destined to purge traditional Judaism of defects it acquired during the exile and to prepare it for its ultimate messianic purpose (more on this below). These views of Rabbi Kook were considered very eccentric at the time. Extremist Haredim, members of the Old Yishuv (the Jewish population that preceded the Zionist immigrations), accused him of subverting their struggle against the Zionist secularization of the Holy Land and opposed him bitterly.

The Old Yishuv was now the main pillar of Haredi anti-Zionism. During the 1920s, its members collaborated with Agudat Israel. By 1927, however, they organized the Jerusalem *Eidat Haredit*, "the Haredi Community," an independent social and political framework inspired by the separate communities in Hungary. During the 1930s, relations between the *Eidat Haredit* and Agudat Israel deteriorated and precipitated a crisis within the Haredi ranks. Following the death of the Hafetz Hayyim (1933), Agudat Israel was characterized by a growing ambivalence. On the one hand, party functionaries were increasingly bound to take a pragmatic line towards Zionism, and their policy was spiritually backed by Rabbi Hayyim Ozer Grodzhensky (1863–1940), the head of *Moetzet Gedolei ha-Torah*. On the other hand, the influential Rabbi Elhanan B. Wassermann (1875–1941) wrathfully preached for a dogmatic hard line.

Considering themselves the spearhead of the anti-Zionist struggle and feeling betrayed by Agudat Israel, the *Eidat Haredit* increasingly relied on its alliance with extremist Hungarian rabbis. In about 1936, several young militant members of the Jerusalem *Eidat Haredit* founded a group of *Kanna'im* ("Zealots") with a particularly radical line, including use of moderate violence in the fight against the Zionist political establishment. This group was later named *Neturei Karta* ("Guardians of the City"). In spite of its meager membership, it attracted considerable public attention. Through demonstrations against the violation of the Sabbath in Jerusalem and other acts of protest, it exercised influence on other Haredi circles, who were now emboldened in their opposition to the secular state.

Orthodoxy of this period, then, was marked by two parallel, opposing trends. As religious differences between its various groups were put aside (though preserved), mainly in order to maintain a unified front against the Zionist enter-

prise, the *political* question of Zionism increasingly divided the Orthodox ranks. It is important to emphasize that at this stage, the controversy within Orthodoxy over Zionism was chiefly political and had not yet developed into a deeper split with religious and social implications, as occurs in the next period.

The Third Stage

World War II and the Holocaust devastated Orthodox Judaism along with the rest of European Jewry. Along with the physical destruction, the Nazi occupation of eastern Europe eradicated the great Orthodox centers, yeshivas, and Hasidic rebbe-courts, and, with few exceptions, Orthodoxy's spiritual leadership perished. The Holocaust also presented Orthodox theology with especially painful and difficult questions.

The anti-Zionist Orthodox, the Haredim, additionally had to face their own unique ideological crisis. Zionists reminded Haredim of their prewar objection to emigration to Palestine, and some even accused Haredi leaders of responsibility for the deaths of their followers. Haredi leaders who had fled Europe in time were condemned for abandoning their followers. Zionist politicians, religious and secular alike, further claimed repeatedly that the destruction of European Jewry provided hard proof that the diaspora had never been a viable option for the Jews. The fact that the Nazis did not conquer the land of Israel was seen as evidence that Zionism had the right diagnosis. The propaganda was effective, even as it ignored the facts that Nazi troops had been very close to conquering Palestine and that their failure to do so had nothing to do with Zionism.

Accusations were made in both directions, however, and following the Holocaust some Haredi leaders – such as Rabbi Jacob Israel Kanievsky (1899–1985) and Rabbi Yekutiel Yehuda Halberstamm, the rebbe of Zans-Klausenburg (1904–94), attributed indirect responsibility for the Holocaust to the “lawless,” that is, assimilated, Reform and secular Jews. The drive to imitate the gentiles, they claimed, only increased anti-Semitism. Germany, the birthplace of Jewish enlightenment and Reform, they pointed out, served also as the home of Nazism, and not coincidentally.

Still, Haredi anti-Zionist doctrine suffered a further blow in 1947, when the United Nations accepted the resolution on the Partition of Palestine, recognizing Jews' right to establish their independent state in the land of Israel. Half a year later, the state of Israel was declared, and Zionism appeared to have won the battle against all its opponents. Following these developments, Orthodoxy divided into two opposing camps. A new Zionist Orthodoxy interpreted the birth of the State as a realization of a divine promise. The great immigrations to the new State and the surprising military victories in the War of Independence (1948–9) strengthened this messianic view of the period. One prominent political leader of this camp, Rabbi Yehuda Leib Maimon (Fischmann) (1875–1962), even called for a renewal of the Sanhedrin, and many Orthodox Zionists

believed that the dawn of redemption had arrived. Thus Zionist Orthodoxy joined secular authorities in building the fledgling state. A military draft, efforts to settle the land, and the promotion of the new *Sabra* identity took on a religious significance and were incorporated into a Zionist Orthodox theology, which took shape in a new religious group, known as "Zionist-Religious" (*Dati-Tzioni*) or "National-Religious" (*Dati-Le'umi*).

In the United States, too, a new "Modern Orthodoxy," in many ways similar to its Israeli counterpart, emerged after the Holocaust. Beginning in the early fifties, Modern Orthodoxy accepted the guidance of Rabbi Joseph Baer Soloveitchik (1903–93). Following the Holocaust, Rabbi Soloveitchik, previously a member of the Agudat Israel spiritual leadership, crossed the lines to Modern Orthodoxy. Introducing existentialist motifs into his theology (see below), he portrayed a new ideal of Jewish believer. Rabbi Soloveitchik attributed the foundation of the state of Israel, right after the Holocaust, to providence and interpreted it as God's call to the people to reaffirm the covenant. Even several moderate non-Zionists in Agudat Israel circles spoke about the events of the time in messianic terms, but their voices were quite sparse.

In Israel, non-Zionist Orthodox Jews, now called Haredim, followed the leadership of Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, known as the Hazon Ish (1878–1953). The Hazon Ish found dialogue with the secular society useless. "How can we ever talk to them" – he is alleged to have said – "if we don't even have a common language? – what they call 'love' we call *Karet* (approximately: 'That soul shall be cut off from God's people')." Objecting to the new State's image as the defender of Jewish existence, the Hazon Ish was skeptical of Israel's chances at survival and feared that Zionism aimed to root out Jewish religion. According to him and his doctrinal partners, the Torah alone had preserved the Jewish people during two thousand years in exile, and the Torah alone could guarantee survival in the future. Putting one's confidence in a fragile and perilous human experiment was a terrible mistake. Some of his co-believers, among them Rabbi Wasserman (who perished in the Holocaust) and Rabbi Elazar Menachem M. Shach, (1898?–2002), the Head of the Ponivezh Yeshiva in Bnei Brak, even labeled Zionism a modern form of idolatry (see below).

The Hazon Ish held that the destruction of East European Jewry required that Haredi Judaism devote all its efforts and resources to a single goal, rebuilding the world of Torah in the land of Israel. "We have no other remnant but this Torah," Haredi leaders quoted from the penitential liturgy. In order to realize the Hazon Ish's vision, Agudat Israel in Israel worked tirelessly to secure State support for their educational projects, especially for new yeshivot, and secured an arrangement that exempted yeshiva students from military service. Haredi society adopted study in a *kolel*, a Torah institution for married men, as the single preferred occupation for adult males, and the institutions proliferated. Haredi educators encouraged women to prefer marriage to a full-time Torah scholar over a man who worked for a living. In addition to accepting the traditional responsibilities of a Jewish wife, Haredi women now were expected to enter the workforce to enable their husbands to continue learning.

Unlike the Ashkenazim, Sepharadic Jews had lived in traditional Jewish societies until the 1940s. The modernization in the Moslem countries was moderate and unideological, so no Orthodox reaction was needed. The encounter with secular Zionism in Palestine of the British Mandate caused the first Sepharadic Orthodox reactions, both of the Zionist-Religious type, represented by figures like Rabbi Ben-Zion M.H. Uziel (1880–1953), and of the Haredi type, represented by the Jerusalem Yeshiva Porat Yosef (founded in 1923), and some less prominent Sepharadi rabbis. However, only in the sovereign State of Israel were Sepharadic Jews abruptly exposed to anti-religious sentiment and rapid secularization, as young Sepharadic immigrants were sent to Kibbutzim and secular public schools. In response, in the early 1950s, Israeli Lithuanian yeshivot began to open their doors – though in allotted numbers – to sons of Sepharadic immigrants. Coming from such a different cultural and religious background, Sepharadic youth did not always adapt well to these institutions and often were not treated equally. Despite this difficulty, these young men would decades later provide rabbinical and political leadership of the Sepharadic Haredi Judaism, which now forms a distinct and significant group within Israeli Orthodoxy.

While mainstream Haredi Orthodoxy, politically represented by Agudat Israel, made the pragmatic decision to work with the state, extremist Haredi groups still refused even to accept the State's existence. Beginning in the 1950s, the Satmar Hasidim, who have since grown into one of the largest Hasidic community in the world, provided the leadership for extreme anti-Zionism. Satmar's rebbe, Joel Teitelbaum (1886–1979), preached that the very foundation of the Jewish state – regardless of the state's nature – constituted a revolt against the kingdom of God (see below). His community in the United States, large and wealthy, provided both economical and moral-ideological support for the Jerusalem *Eidah Haredit*. These anti-Zionist groups refused to participate in any of the State's institutions.

By the early 1950s, the Haredi Orthodoxy and the Zionist-Religious Orthodoxy had evolved into two separate movements. At this stage they not only differed on political issues but followed different, often contradictory, religious worldviews and ways of life. Haredim and religious Zionists differed in almost every facet of life: in the choice of clothing, language, place of residence, educational institutions, attitude toward secular culture, depth and scope of Torah learning, readiness to obtain secular learning and university education, approach to military service, age of marriage, size of the family, woman's status in family and society, vocation and sources of living, identity of rabbinical leaders and their status in society, degree of preserving interior distinctions based in traditional Jewish society, political parties, and a long list of other factors. In all of these, Zionist-Religious Orthodoxy adopted elements of modern culture and expressed a strong desire to integrate into Israeli society, while the Haredim harbored a growing hostility toward western culture and its ideas.

But the most outstanding difference between the Religious Zionists and the Haredim lay in the diverging attitudes towards halakhic observance: While many

of the former adopted a lenient, sometimes heedless, approach to the precepts, especially to ritual ones, the latter followed them punctiliously, and their rabbis produced increasingly stringent halakhic decisions. The difference is manifested in the two groups' dress codes. Haredim have preserved the traditional dress of their European ancestors, while Zionist-Religious Jews wear more or less the same clothes as secular Israelis. Haredi men generally wear a white shirt, long black trousers, black upper-coat (a long garment for most of the Hasidim; a short jacket for most of the Lithuanians), black hat, and bearded face. Conversely, the crocheted skullcap for men has become a symbol of Zionist-Religious Judaism, and relatively few Modern Orthodox Jews grow beards. Haredi women refrain from trousers, wear modest dresses, and, after marriage, cover their head with a tightly fitting cloth or wig. Zionist-Religious women observe a more lenient standard of modesty.

Additionally, Zionist-Religious Judaism has suffered fewer internal divisions than the Haredim. While the vast array of Haredi splinter groups mirrors the diversities of pre-Holocaust diaspora Jewry, the Modern Orthodox differ primarily on how best to apply the Zionist-Religious ideology to the particular problems of the present.

In the United States, as in Israel, Orthodoxy defied those who predicted its decline and grew to become a significant (though minority) force in postwar American Jewry. The divisions between the Modern and Haredi Orthodox in America were more elusive and less bitter than those in Israel. American Orthodoxy, too, established yeshivot. The largest of these, the Lakewood Yeshiva, was established by Rabbi Aharon Kotler (1892–1962) and became the world's largest Torah institution. But relatively few young men pursued full-time yeshiva-studies after marriage. This is probably one of the reasons American Haredi Judaism remained relatively open to the surrounding society. Moderate American halakhic scholars, such as Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (1895–1986), moved their followers away from the stringencies of their Israeli colleagues. Besides, in America, the ideological debate over Zionism and the State was less divisive and more theoretical. Only in the eighties did the American Orthodox community polarize along Israeli lines.

The generation following the Six-Day War (1967) witnessed the development of three new forces in Orthodox Jewry: the worldwide Habad (Lubavitch) Hasidism, the Israeli Gush Emunim party, and the Israeli Shas movement, which represents Sephardic Haredi Judaism.

Habad Hasidism was established in the late eighteenth century but remained relatively small until the twentieth century, when, under the leadership of Rebbe Menahem Mendl Schneersohn (1902–94), it took on a new form. Schneersohn developed a strategy of relative openness towards the modern secular world and dedicated great resources to the dissemination of the Hasidic message. Habad recruited to its ranks large numbers of Ba'alei Teshuvah ("repentant Jews"), and, unlike other Hasidic groups, exerted an influence on Jewish consciousness far beyond its own membership. The messianic tension that had characterized this movement since the Holocaust, exploded in the late 1980s with the claim