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Executive Summary

On June 14, 2023, a terrible accident took place at the "Time Stomp" music event in Leeds. The legal problems that came up after the event are looked at in this study report. There were more than 1000 people at the event, which was planned by Barry Bottleman. There was a problem with the fireworks show and they went off in the crowd. People were scared, which caused a rush in which many were hurt.

One of the people who was hurt the most was Sarah Peterson. She got hurt by flames and people stepping on her. As a result of her injuries Sarah's left arm was amputated and she was paralysed from the waist down. Her boyfriend Jack Smith was also caught in the crowd and later developed post-traumatic stress disorder. Someone else who helped Sarah was Bob, who carried her to safety. But Bob afterwards became alcoholic. Since Barry planned the event, let us look whether he is legally responsible for what took place. Event organisers owe a duty of care to protect attendees from foreseeable harm, as established in *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman* (1990).

Introduction

People want to feel safe when they go to big public events like concerts, street fairs, and sports games. When event managers do not do their job properly and something goes wrong, the law should protect what is there. A lot of people were hurt physically and mentally at the Time Stomp festival, and the law needs to decide who, if anyone, is legally responsible.

The flames were pointed at the people in the crowd instead of away from them. People ran away because they were scared. When there was a rush, Sarah Peterson got hurt very badly. Bob was one of the people who helped Sarah, but he later had mental health issues. The question is whether Barry Bottleman, who planned the event, should be charged with a crime. This report uses the IRAC method to look at this case through the lens of English tort law. It checks for both negligence and occupiers' liability and checks to see if people can file claims for both physical and mental hurt. Using the "but for" test from *Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital* (1969), it is evident that had Barry taken reasonable steps to ensure crowd safety, the injuries would not have occurred.

In the case of *Caparo v. Dickman* (1990), the three-step rule for carelessness is: Foreseeability, proximity and fairness. Was it likely that the harm would happen? Were there close ties between the groups? Would you agree that it is fair to blame someone?

Sarah and Jack really do pass these tests. Barry should have known that having a lot of people around and fires could be dangerous. Sarah was hurt, and Jack was close enough to the chaos to understand why he is traumatised.

But things are not so clear for people like Janice and Mary who suffer second hand. According to Alcock (1991) and McLoughlin (1983), they must follow strict rules of the law to file a claim. They have to prove that they knew about the hurt person, saw what happened and were close to them. Even though they were there right away and are the moms of the victims, the judges might not think that is enough.

For Bob, the rule is even stricter. In *Chadwick v. British Railways Board* (1967), a saviour could sue for mental health harm. The court said in *White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1999) that rescuers cannot get money for damages unless they are in danger. As things stand, Bob's claim might not be true since he was not in immediate danger.

There is a bigger problem with tort law that this case shows. It is not always as clear that mental harm is just as bad as physical harm, even though doctors and government statistics show how bad it can be (NICE, 2021; NHS England, 2022; Office for National Statistics, 2023).

This report will use important cases and laws, as well as legal books like *Clerk & Lindsell on Torts* (Jones and Dugdale, 2022), to look at the current state of the law. After extensive legal analysis, Barry is likely to be found liable for Sarah and Jack's injuries under the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 and the common law of negligence. Despite serious psychological harm, Janice, Mary, and Bob may struggle to win a claim under current legal standards. This report outlines the legal position and highlights gaps in the law. It proposes realistic reforms to ensure trauma victims' fairness and recognition, especially at large public events. At the end, the report should show what parts of the law work well and what parts do not.

Research Plan

This part describes how the report was carried out. The June 2023 Time Stomp party will be investigated to see if Barry Bottleman, who put on the event, could be held legally responsible for the injuries people got. A lot of people were hurt, some physically and some mentally. The application of causation in tort law requires a clear link between Barry's negligence and the injuries suffered by each claimant. This is what the IRAC method is used for in the report: Comparative: comparing and looking at how different law rules are used in UK cases. The study of how the law affects real people and how that affects how people think about mental health today.

This report is mostly about how English tort law deals with cases like these. I studied negligence, occupiers' duty, and how the law handles mental injuries in detail. This part talks about why I did the study, what questions I tried to answer, and how I did it. The main purpose of this study is to find out if Barry, who planned the event, can be held legally responsible for the harm that was done. These are some of them: harm to the body (like what Sarah went through) harm to the emotions, like the pain Jack, Janice, Mary, and Bob felt. This report also tries to show if the law is good or needs to be changed.

Questions to Ask for Research: The main things I wanted to answer in this report were the following: Barry, was it his job to make sure everyone at the event was

safe? Did he break that role, if so? Can people like Jack, Janice, Mary, and Bob who have been hurt mentally get money for it? What does the law not allow now? How could we make the rules fairer?

Under English tort law, this paper will take a close look at whether Barry Bottleman, as the festival organiser, can be held legally responsible for the physical and mental harm that festival goers suffered. The study's goal is to find out if the current legal framework protects victims of psychological harm well enough and if changes need to be made to bring the law up to date with how we think about trauma now.

The goals:

To find out if Barry had a duty of care to the participants under the theories of occupiers' liability and negligence. To find out if Barry's bad event management caused him to forget about that duty. To investigate the legal situation of people who are both primary and secondary victims of psychological harm. To look at the legal protection that Bob who helped save a life have. To highlight disparities and inconsistencies in the legal treatment of psychiatric injuries. To suggest sensible changes that would make tort law fairer and cover more situations.

Are victims like Jack, Janice, Mary, and Bob able to successfully seek compensation for psychological injuries under the current legal framework?

What are the differences between primary victims, secondary victims, and rescuers in the eyes of the law? What major flaws and unfair situations exist in the current legal system? What changes to the law could better protect people who have been hurt in major disasters

Doctrinal approach:

You need to read and think about the real rules for this method. There are many rules such as the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957. *Caparo v. Dickman* (1990), *Page v. Smith* (1996), *Alcock* (1991), *McLoughlin v. O'Brian* (1983), *White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire* (1999), and *Wheat v. Lacon* (1966) are some examples. Books like *Tort Law* (Giliker, 2020), *Clerk & Lindsell on Torts* (Jones and Dugdale, 2022), and *Tort Law: Text and Materials* (Lunney et al., 2017).

It helped me understand what the law says now and how it has been used in real life. *Chadwick v British Railways Board* (1967) said that a rescuer could sue for mental hurt. In *White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* ((1999), heroes did not have that right, though. This kind of change to the law might not make sense or be fair. With the help of these cases, I was able to find the flaws and make the law work better.

Research and findings

Time Stomp legislative issues are examined using IRAC in this section. Each claim is examined using tort law to determine if festival organiser Barry Bottleman is liable for festivalgoers mental and physical harm. Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 advises event planners on legal compliance. Barry safeguarded the festival as the "occupier." in *Wheat v. Lacon* (1966). He failed to protect the crowd or fireworks (Health and Safety Executive, 2023; *The Purple Guide*, 2023). *Napier v Hunter* (1993) suggests the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 could fairly share liability. *Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police* (2018) held that a duty of care should not be denied because the incident was public or may result in multiple claims. The claimant must prove that the defendant's actions caused the harm, as per *Hughes v. Lord Advocate* (1963). Random events shouldn't break chains. *Knightley v Johns* (1982) case. Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 requires event organisers to protect attendees' health, safety, and welfare. Health and Safety Executive publications *Managing Crowds Safely* (2023) and *The Purple Guide* (2023) offer crowd management, emergency planning, and firework safety advice. Health and safety violations are persuasive but not proof of negligence.

A duty of care arises when one individual must take reasonable steps to avoid causing harm to others. *Paris v Stepney Borough Council* (1951), *Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust* (2002). This duty is established when harm is foreseeable, there is sufficient proximity between the parties, and it is fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty, as confirmed in *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman* (1990).

1. Duty of Care and Breach by Barry Bottleman

Issue:

This case concerns whether Barry Bottleman, who organised and ran the Time Stomp festival, breached his legal duty of care by failing to keep festivalgoers safe. *Caparo Industries plc vs. Dickman* (1990) states that someone has a duty of care when harm is likely, they are close, and their responsibility is fair, just, and reasonable. The Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 (*Wheat v. Lacon* (1966)) requires building occupants to reasonably protect legal visitors. Barry's festival planning and management meet these legal requirements. His crowd management, fireworks safety, and emergency plans may have hurt people physically and mentally. Barry should protect the attendees? Did he break that role?

Rule: Due to *Caparo v. Dickman* (1990), we must be careful. A guilty person would likely be hurt. Making someone do something is fair and reasonable because it was nearby. Since Barry was already at the festival, the 1957 and 1984 Occupiers' Liability Acts required him to ensure everyone's safety.

Analysis:

Barry hired the musicians and fireworks crew and ensured party safety. Many people know that rushing crowds at events are dangerous. Barry lacked smart planning in *Knightley v. Johns* (1982)

Conclusion:

Barry broke a promise. The court will find him negligent in breaking his lease.

2. Sarah Peterson (main victim)

Issue:

The first legal issue is whether Time Stomp festival organiser Barry Bottleman breached his duty of care to Sarah Peterson. *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman* (1990) states that a duty of care exists when harm is foreseeable, the parties are close, and it is fair, just, and reasonable. Contains all three elements. Sarah funded Barry's public event. Her presence at the site, the fireworks display and crowd behaviour risks, and Barry's complete control over the event's layout and safety meet proximity and foreseeability tests. A large event organiser should ensure attendees' safety. Barry violated The Purple Guide and HSE event safety guidelines as an organiser. Barry's negligence caused Sarah's stampede injuries alone. Thus, Barry breached his duty of care to Sarah by negligent planning and oversight.

Rule:

Someone who broke the law had to show care and a breach of duty to claim tort negligence.

Establishing negligence requires proving a duty of care. If the defendant's actions create a foreseeable risk of harm to sufficiently proximate people and legal responsibility is fair, just, and reasonable, a duty arises. Lord Atkin's 'neighbour principle' expanded liability beyond contractual relationships in *Donoghue v Stevenson* (1932), establishing this principle. To refine the modern structured approach, *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman* (1990) required foreseeability of harm, proximity between claimant and defendant, and fairness and justice policy considerations. Breaking a duty requires comparing the defendant's actions to a reasonable person. The Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 requires occupiers to take reasonable care for lawful visitors' safety, as explained in *Wheat v Lacon* (1966). Common law and statutory frameworks protect people from preventable harm.

Analysis:

Barry oversaw event setup, safety rules, and fireworks. It makes him the "occupier" of the land. A rush was likely to injure people (*Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.*, 1856; *Bolton v. Stone*, 1951).

Sarah was allowed to be near the flames and in danger. Her injuries included a face burn, arm loss, and paralysis from the waist down. She also lost her PE teaching job. In 1980, *Pickett v. British Rail Engineering Ltd.* awarded lost earnings capacity damages. This allows her to claim future income.

Conclusion:

Sarah may win. Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 and common law of carelessness say Barry broke duty.

3. Psychiatric harm done to Jack Smith (main victim)

Issue:

Barry organised Time Stomp. The question is whether Barry owed Jack Smith, who attended, a legal duty of care. *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman* (1990) requires us to consider whether Barry's actions put Jack at reasonable risk of injury. How close Barry and Jack were and whether putting Barry under a duty was fair, just, and reasonable. Can Jack sue for mental harm despite not being hurt? Jack suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a direct participant. He need not prove psychiatric injury was separately foreseeable as a primary victim *Page v Smith* (1996). Barry harmed Jack's psyche.

Rule:

Any negligence claim begins with *Donoghue v Stevenson* (1932), which requires people to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions that could foreseeably harm their "neighbours," or those directly affected by their actions.

In *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman* (1990), the structured duty of care approach was developed. To impose a duty of care, the harm must be foreseeable, the defendant and claimant must be close, and it must be fair, just, and reasonable. *Page v Smith* (1996) states that a primary victim, someone directly involved in the traumatic event, need not prove that psychiatric harm was separately foreseeable. Any foreseeable personal injury, physical or psychiatric is enough. Thus, the law recognises a duty of

care owed to Jack as a primary victim because he was present, involved in the immediate danger, and later suffered psychiatric harm. According to Page v. Smith (1996), a person in physical danger who knew they would be hurt can sue for mental harm after a traumatic event.

Analysis:

Jack and Sarah stood stage side. He was in the crowd when the fireworks failed, scaring everyone. He froze and was pushed. He was found with minor wounds. He just needs to show that he was at risk. Page v. Smith (1996) to be the focus. Jack was in "zone of danger." He doesn't have to prove that his mind would harm itself. He has real post-traumatic stress disorder (NICE, 2021; NHS England, 2022).

Conclusion:

Page v. Smith (1996) states that he is the main victim and can sue for psychiatric harm.

4. Psychiatric harm done to Janice Peterson (secondary victim)

Issue:

Barry, the Time Stomp festival's organiser, may have owed Janice Peterson a duty of care after witnessing her daughter's injuries. The strict criteria in *Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1991) for secondary victims must be met, and Barry's actions must be assessed for foreseeable harm to Janice. Janice's daughter Sarah was hurt. Can she sue for mental harm? Witnessing the aftermath damaged her psyche. Secondary victims must meet strict legal requirements under *Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1991). Their suffering is real, but current law may reject their claims.

Rule:

Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1991) requires the following for a secondary victim to make a psychiatric damage claim. Strong love and care, close to the event or afterward. *McLoughlin v. O'Brian* (1983) recognised this mental illness.

Analysis:

Sarah's mother Janice attended. She ran back after the rush to find Sarah bleeding and out. She needed therapy after that because she was depressed. Her doctors know what is wrong, so she passed the final test. She also meets the first two conditions, being nearby and having a close friend. Unfortunately, time is limited. In the Alcock case, courts prohibited claims from non-witnesses. Janice arrived just as more people arrived. Even though McLoughlin (1983) showed courts could be broad, her case may not work under Alcock (1991).

Conclusion:

Janice may not get her claim accepted despite being hurt. The judges may say she was not aware or present.

5. Damage to Mary Smith's mental health (secondary victim)

Issue:

Barry, the festival's organiser, may have owed Mary Smith a duty of care since she was upset after the incident. Mary must meet Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1991) standards as a secondary victim. These include knowing the victim, being close to the event, and experiencing the trauma. Can Mary claim self-harm? Witnessing the stampede's aftermath harmed Mary's psyche. She was close to Jack and arrived quickly, but she did not witness the trauma. Secondary victims must demonstrate immediate harm perception under Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1991). Mary only saw the aftermath, so her claim is unlikely to succeed despite her psychiatric injury.

Rule:

Mary must follow Alcock (1991) rules. She must demonstrate that they are close, can see each other, and are serious. Secondary victims have stricter duty of care. The general duty principle from Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) applies, but courts have limited claims by those who suffer psychiatric harm by witnessing injury. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1991) established the rules. The psychiatric harm must also be medical and caused by a sudden shock. Secondary

victims like Mary find it harder to establish a duty of care under current law due to these stricter conditions.

Analysis:

Jack's mother Mary, from the stands saw the crowd go crazy. When she could not see her son, she ran to help Sarah and prevent further damage. She developed panic attacks.

Mary scores well on friendship. She arrived at the crime scene shortly after. Her mental illness is treated by doctors. Even though McLoughlin (1983) showed courts could be broad, her case may not work under Alcock (1991).

Conclusion:

Mary experienced this. Her mental health is damaged, but the law may prevent payment.

6. Harm to Bob's mental health (Civilian Rescuer)

Issue:

Barry may have owed Bob, a rescuer who suffered psychiatric harm, a duty of care. Bob's claim hinges on whether rescuers who were not in physical danger can recover psychiatric injury damages under *White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1999). Can Bob sue for helping Sarah but becoming alcoholic? After saving Sarah, civilian rescuer Bob was psychiatrically harmed. After *White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1999), rescuers not in physical danger are unlikely to win claims. Bob's case shows civilian rescuers receive little legal protection.

Rule:

The duty of care for rescuers in negligence claims begins with *Donoghue v Stevenson* (1932), requiring them to avoid foreseeable harm. The law treats rescuers in psychiatric injury claims differently. *Chadwick v British Railways Board* (1967) held that a rescuer who risked physical injury could recover psychiatric harm at a disaster scene. Rescuers acting out of moral or social duty deserve legal protection. After *White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1999), the House of Lords ruled that rescuers who were not in physical danger could not claim psychiatric harm. Police officers who helped at Hillsborough in *White* could not

recover because they were not at risk. Bob would need to prove that he was a primary victim in physical danger or that civilian rescuers should be exempt. Without an imminent physical threat, current laws make this difficult.

Analysis:

In an emergency, Bob's choice to take Sarah to safety was the right thing to do *Scott v. Shepherd* (1773). He put her in his car and took her to the hospital. He chose to help even though other people told him not to. He got hooked on drinking afterwards. On the other hand, *White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1999) says that rescuers who are not pros or who are not in trouble are not to blame for mental harm. Bob may not have done anything brave.

Conclusion:

Bob wanted to help, but moving Sarah could hurt her more. When this happens, the law considers whether someone acted reasonably in the same situation. Rescuers are usually understood by courts, especially in emergencies. If Bob ignored warnings or acted carelessly, the courts may disagree. Even if he meant well, the main question is whether his actions were right at the time. Whether his actions made things worse and whether they could have been avoided by being more careful would determine his responsibility. Bob cannot be a primary victim under current law unless he was at risk of physical injury.

No close love or witnessing a loved one in danger means he doesn't meet *Alcock* (1991)'s secondary victim criteria. Despite his morality, Bob would likely not be owed a duty of care, and his claim would fail under tort law. This shows that the law does not fully protect rescuers.

Reform Suggestions

The English tort law does some things well, like when it comes to mental harm. But in the case of the Time Stomp event, it does not work so well. Lawyers look out for people who are hurt physically like Sarah. But Bob, Mary, and Janice are not. There are ways to make the law better so that it is fairer for everyone in this part of the study.

It should be easier for second-hand victims to make claims for psychiatric harm. At this time, people who see a loved one get hurt can only file a claim for mental harm if they follow a lot of strict rules. These rules were created in the cases of *Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1991) and *McLoughlin v. O'Brian* (1983). This is what they say: Learn a lot about the subject. Show up on time or soon after. You can see or hear the event for yourself. Most people do not follow the rules, even if their pain is real and a doctor has confirmed it.

Because Janice and Mary saw their kids get hurt in the Time Stomp case, they are now very mentally ill. As things stand, they might not be able to make a claim since they got there a little after everyone else. It does not seem right. Courts often do not want to allow too many claims. But experts like Witting, C. (2021) say this fear is overblown. Judges can still be careful without being unfair.

The law should care more about whether the harm could have been seen coming and whether the person was hurt, not just when or how they saw it. Make a new test for the law that gives judges more freedom and lets people get the right kind of pay when they were really hurt and can show it. The law should be changed to reflect what we now know about how trauma works, according to mental health experts (NICE, 2021; British Psychological Society, 2021). This change would help people like Mary and Janice and make it look like the law is more open and fairer.

It is the law to protect people who are helping. Bob helped Sarah when she was hurt and on the ground. Some people told him not to take her, but he did it anyway. The things he saw have hurt him a lot, even though they did not put him in danger. It looks like Bob cannot make any claims right now. There is no way that helpers can be in danger of getting hurt. This was made clear in *White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1999). It is not fair. People who do the right thing get in trouble for it.

The law should be changed so that people who help people in need and are then traumatised by it can file a claim for mental injuries. Things that went wrong at the Time Stomp show might not happen again if this is done.

New events should be added to the Occupiers' Liability Act. The Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 is an old law. Laws say that people who own land or property must make sure that guests are safe. It does not talk about current events, like concerts, sports games, or protests. We saw in *Wheat v. Lacon* (1966) that it can be hard to figure out who the "occupier" is when a lot of people are involved. Someone could rent a park, put on a fireworks show, and pay for their own security. If something goes bad, who oversees the law?

A new part of the Occupiers' Liability Act should be added to cover public events that only last a short time. How does liability work when more than one person is in charge, like the organiser, the place owner, the security company, and so on? Under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, each person or group should take responsibility for their fair share of the damage. This would help judges, event planners, and victims figure out who is to blame when bad things happen at big events.

Who has suggested reforms? Witting (2021) argues that the floodgates concern is overstated, and that judges are capable of assessing psychiatric harm claims on their merits without relying on inflexible rules. Similarly, Giliker (2020) highlights the growing gap between modern psychiatric knowledge and legal doctrine, advocating for a fact-sensitive approach that focuses on foreseeability and actual harm, rather than physical presence or visual perception.

Judicial concerns have also surfaced. In *McLoughlin v O'Brian* (1983), Lord Wilberforce supported a broader approach suggesting that the law should not be strictly confined to artificial boundaries. Even within *Alcock* (1991) itself, Lord Ackner acknowledged that the restrictions might lead to unjust results in cases of real suffering.

What do the reforms look like?

Relaxing or removing the *Alcock* Criteria. The strict tests of proximity and perception could be replaced with a more flexible approach based on medical evidence and foreseeability. The law should focus on whether the claimant suffered a medically recognised psychiatric illness due to a traumatic event involving a loved one, rather than relying on rigid and often arbitrary criteria.

Parliament should codify the rules relating to psychiatric harm in the same way that occupiers' liability has been addressed. A clear statutory framework would provide both consistency and fairness and could better accommodate developments in psychiatric care and trauma studies.

The restrictive outcome in *White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police* (1999), which denied compensation to police officers who helped victims at Hillsborough, has been widely criticised. Reform could extend protection to civilian rescuers who suffer trauma after assisting in emergencies, provided their actions were reasonable and the resulting harm foreseeable. This would correct the inconsistency between *White* and earlier cases such as *Chadwick v British Railways Board* (1967), where a civilian rescuer was allowed to recover.

Greater Emphasis on Medical Evidence :

Courts should rely more heavily on psychiatric assessments and medical diagnoses, rather than outdated concepts such as "sudden shock." If a claimant can

demonstrate that their condition is a direct result of a traumatic experience, and is recognised as such by qualified professionals, this should be the primary basis for determining liability.

Changes to be made to the law: The current legal treatment of secondary victims is too narrow and does not align with either the realities of modern trauma or advances in medical science. Reforms are necessary to ensure that justice is available to all who suffer real, medically recognised harm because of another's negligence. The suggested changes removing rigid proximity rules, extending protection to rescuers, and adopting a more medically grounded approach would allow the law to function more fairly and responsively in the context of contemporary mental health understanding.

1. Negligence and duty of care

Duty of care is required for negligence. *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman* (1990) required the harm to be foreseeable, the parties to be sufficiently proximate, and the duty to be fair, just and reasonable.

Barry should have protected attendees as event organiser.

Claimant must prove negligence, care was due, and a duty was broken.

That the breach caused legal and factual harm.

Damage was imminent, *Hughes v Lord Advocate* (1963)

2. Occupier Liability Reform

The Occupiers' Liability Act of 1957 requires that lawful visitors be taken care of. Key elements are obligation to provide visitors with reasonable protection. This responsibility includes facilities and operations. Type of visitor (adult, child, or expert) and carrying out the warning obligation.

Wheat v Lacon (1966) say premises control allows multiple occupants. The Act made Barry Bottleman site and activity manager. His failure to implement crowd safety or firework barriers violates his statutory duty to attendees.

To cover future temporary public events, amend the 1957 and 1984 Occupiers' Liability Acts. These rules should outline organiser, landowner, and subcontractor responsibilities and crowd movement and pyrotechnics safety.

3. Public Event Health and Safety Enforcement

Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 requires employers and organisers to protect workers, but not public festivals.

After the Time Stomp incident, where crowd panic caused serious injuries, these guidelines should be raised. Lack of firework handling is a major issue.

Idea for Reform:

Local and HSE authorities must license events with safety plans and third-party inspections.

Firework safety, medical response teams, and crowd movement laws should be introduced.

4. Application to the Time Stomp Scenario:

Barry would work under the 1957 Act and common law. Failure to plan for firework safety, hire enough security and establish emergency procedures violates statutory and common law duties.

These frameworks could heal Jack's mental trauma and Sarah's serious injuries. Janice, Mary, and Bob secondary victims and civilian rescuers face legal challenges despite psychological harm.

Psychiatric injury reform is needed. Relaxing Alcock (1991) criteria and protecting civilian rescuers would modernise law and medicine.

Conclusion

Barry Bottleman is legally liable for the harm he inflicted during the Time Stomp performance, as is clear from a review of the facts and the application of relevant legal concepts. As the owner, he was legally required to take reasonable measures to protect attendees from knowing risks. His failure to effectively manage the crowd and prepare for emergencies constituted a breach of that duty. It was to be expected that such failures would result in injuries, particularly to individuals like Sarah and Jack.

Those who suffer direct physical or psychological harm are obviously protected by the law but those who suffer indirect harm are not as well protected. Under the existing system, victims like Janice, Mary, and Bob may not have legal redress despite their extreme suffering.

Secondary victim claims must be treated more leniently, and protections for citizen rescuers who act in good faith during crises should be increased. These adjustments would help ensure that the legal system treats physical and psychological damage equally and that those injured by negligence are not unfairly excluded from access to justice.

Tort law is meant to help people who got hurt because someone else did not do what they should have. For that to really work though, the law needs to change to reflect modern life, progress in medicine, and general sense. We need to make that change

right away because of the Time Stomp case (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1991).
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