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Understanding Peace Holistically

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Scherto Gill & Garrett Thomson

Understanding Peace Holistically

From the Spiritual to the Political



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PREFACE

The aim of this book is to rethink peacefulness from individual inner experience to global political systems. For this reason, it covers a wide range of different kinds of peacefulness: the spiritual, the relational and the structural. It focuses on the idea that these myriad themes can be explained in a unified manner that sheds new light on some old questions.

In many ways, this book has been long in the making. As part of a think-tank working for peace, we have for some time been perplexed by the field's lack of a common understanding of what constitutes peacefulness. It has become a perennial topic amongst our colleagues at the Guerrand-Hermès Foundation for Peace (GHFP). With our trustees, including Patrice Brodeur, Astuti Horthy, Sharif Horthy and Mohammad Ridwan, we have discussed holistic positive conceptions of peace. From conversations with Alexandra Asseily, another trustee of the GHFP, who generously shares her insights from many years' experiences working for peace in the Middle East, we have begun to see how some of these themes might be integrated in specific contexts of building peace.

To broaden our understanding of peacefulness, in the last few years, we have brought together thinkers, researchers and practitioners for in-depth dialogues and sustained conversations around these relevant questions. Hence

this book owes a tremendous amount to many friends and colleagues. Here we shall mention just some of them.

We have learned a huge amount from our conversations with Bob Boisture, Eileen Boris, David Cadman, Scilla Elsworthy, Deborah Higgins, Bhai Sahib Mohinder Singh, Kurian Thomas, William Vendley, whose work has provided rich ideas about the importance of articulating spiritual peacefulness.

We have gained invaluable insights from talking to Lord John Alderdice, Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, Francisco Galan, Katherine Marshall, Leonel Narváez, Jean-Paul Samputu, Vamik Volkan and Nigel Young whose writings and experiences in diverse peacebuilding situations affirmed the critical need to examine the relational dynamics between antagonistic groups fueled by historical violence.

In our exchanges with Jean-Christophe Bas, Marc Gopin, Mike Hardy, Steve Killelea and Mario Novelli, we have been encouraged to investigate into the connection between the structural peace and international relations.

In collaboration with Jo Berry, Marina Cantacuzino, Ivor Goodson, Imad Karam, Pat McGee and colleagues from the Centre for Lebanese Studies, we have become determined to look more deeply into the complex relationship between narrative, memories and dialogue and peace.

As with all our previous works, this book is a collaborative initiative and our own conversations have made it a pleasure for us to write this work. The order of the authors is purely alphabetical and does not reflect any priority in authorship. This means that we are both equally responsible for the errors and shortcomings! Some of materials, especially the ideas on ecological ethics, economics and international politics, have been developed over time and presented by Garrett on various occasions, and have hence been re-worked and further expanded.

Finally, we dedicate this book to the chairman of the GHFP, Mr. Xavier Guerrand-Hermès whose forward thinking and wisdom has made this work possible.

INTRODUCTION

Peace studies should be the study of peace! Let us explore some of the contentious implications of this tautology. The field ought to be the study of peace, and not merely of the study of war and violence, and their prevention. However, this has been obscured because the contemporary field of peace studies tends to get absorbed into security studies, and war and conflict studies. The concepts that define these fields are distinct from those of peace studies. Primarily, this disparity lies in the conceptions of peace—between positive and negative conceptions of peace, both of which we examine in this book. This is a significant difference. Consider intuitively how living in a peaceful family differs from living in one that simply doesn't fight.

'Peace' is a normative or evaluative concept and, because of this, peace studies involves some commitments to values. However, for understandable reasons, positivist approaches in the social sciences investigate only empirical questions, and more often, those that yield quantifiable answers. This implies that the systematic study of peace as a value will tend to be side-lined in data-driven approaches that are limited to what is measurable and to a specific discipline. In fact, the study of peace should involve a transdisciplinary investigation that requires more than a strict scientific approach precisely because of its implicit commitments.

We study peace to help bring peace to the world. The study of peace is motivated by a deep commitment to peace, and because of this, the field of study, like the commitment, has certain defeasible presuppositions. These assumptions need to be articulated, defended and refined. In general, peace studies cannot be value-neutral and politically agnostic. The commitment to seeking peace requires the idea that some states of affairs are better than others, and that some political systems are better than others. The commitment suggests that we must research peace empirically, but be guided by normative assumptions.

This commitment won't function as an excuse for the expression of undefended moral opinions or for political prejudices. The commitment is rather the expression of an intention to find peaceful ways of being in a violent world, and to reject modes of thinking that are antithetical to these ways. This is a process of seeking, but to count as a discovery of relevant truths, it must be epistemologically judicious, imaginatively explored and self-critical. The investigation should be careful and open, but also it needs to challenge itself, including its assumptions. Any assumption is *defeasible*. This means that if a presumption is reasonably shown to be erroneous then it should be given up. The field of peace studies will include the reflexive study of its own normative and conceptual assumptions within the general commitment.

Peace studies needn't be committed to the idea that peace is an absolute value. An absolute commitment isn't the same as a commitment to an absolute. Peacefulness as a value might be overridden in extreme conditions. Nevertheless, as well as being an instrumental value of great importance, for instance, by enabling harmonious relationships between communities and nations, it is also a non-instrumental value fundamental to human well-being, which as such ought to pervade our lives and societies. *Purely as a value-term*, 'peaceful' isn't descriptive of the actual (or it doesn't describe what is actual) but rather it indicates which possibilities are good or what we have reason to pursue or embody. For example, the fact that humans are often violent doesn't negate the goodness and importance of peacefulness. In fact, it underscores it.

The idea that a field of study has a set of normative and conceptual presuppositions isn't unusual. It is perfectly normal. For instance, in the natural sciences, researchers or scientists make assumptions about what counts as good evidence and a well-designed experiment, and they presume that theories supported by such evidence should be believed over those that aren't. We are accustomed to thinking that the natural sciences are value-free; but they

are not.¹ Their area or subject matter of study might be value-free; but the sciences as epistemologies and methodologies are not.

Within each area of study, researchers need to make defeasible presuppositions that are appropriate for the domain or subject-matter they investigate. In this regard, the field of peace studies is rather unusual: it is not only normative, but also sometimes counterfactual. We need to define what would count as a better world insofar it is more peaceful; this makes it normative. Additionally, the field sometimes involves claims about ‘What would have happened if...’, and ‘What would happen if...’. This renders it counterfactual.² For instance, in peace studies, we might need to assert claims about what would have happened if the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had been less harsh, or what would have happened if the UN Security Council were differently constituted, or what would have happened if one were to have organized such and such kind of dialogue between two antagonistic groups.

Peace studies would usually require affirmations that are normative and propositions that are counterfactual. For both kinds of assertions, it is notoriously difficult to provide clear evidence either for or against such claims. Nevertheless, in peace studies, we cannot afford the luxury of thinking that such propositions cannot be investigated because they are unscientific. To discover the real possibilities for positively conceived peace requires understanding the empirical and normative bases of claims about better, more peaceful futures. Peace studies cannot relinquish studying the realm of normative possibilities, nor can the field escape the need to provide evidence and reasons, despite the fact that these reasons usually don’t fit into the standard scientific paradigm of controlled experiments with value-free quantifiable results. This means that a new epistemology is urgently required to develop the appropriate understandings of evidence.

Four Tendencies

There are four general tendencies of thought that are inimical to the field of peace studies.

The first tendency is value subjectivism. This is the claim that there are no truths and falsities concerning what is good and bad, better and worse; according to such a view, any such claim is merely a matter of opinion. An introductory book like this one cannot chart the confusions that might tempt one to embrace some form of value subjectivism. Nevertheless, one can see

that such a position is flawed by reflecting on the following propositions: 'Fewer deaths is better than more deaths, all other things being equal'; 'Less suffering is better than more, all other things being equal'; 'Peace is defeasibly better than war, all other things being equal'. Such propositions are true; they aren't merely a matter of opinion. At root, value subjectivism is a danger to the investigation of peace because it refuses the thought that peace really is better than violence. It rejects the idea that such judgements can be true or false. If such claims were merely matters of opinion, then there would be no need for serious investigations to discover which options and actions were more peaceful and why. There would be no need for evidence.

The second tendency is political realism.³ Political realism has various versions, but its central idea is that nation-states seek only their self-interest, which includes gaining more power.⁴ Realism investigates international relations, war, conflict and security under this narrow assumption, and thereby eschews any normative questions about what nation-states ought to do (beyond 'might is right' and rational self-interest). Realism thus avoids evaluative analyses about how the international political-economic system *should* be set-up and transformed. It tends to assume that such evaluative analyses contradict the scientific nature of the social sciences.

The narrowness of political realism can put the study of peace in a dangerously erroneous position. It is dangerous because it tends to preclude or limit systematic thinking about where we ought to be heading when we aim for a more peaceful world-order. It excludes ideas of political systems that allow nation-states to be not purely self-interested. It disallows the possibility that nation-states can be organized in ways that are systematically synergetic, in coordination and collaboration with each other. It prohibits the very thought that the international political structure might not be best organized as a system of sovereign nation-states. These exclusions are dangerous because they lock us into a very constricted set of alternative peaceful solutions: as if the only solutions that count are those that assume a predatory world.

The position is dangerous also because, sadly, the idea that each nation-state only pursues its own self-interest is to some degree a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more each nation sees the others and expects the others to behave in this self-centered manner, the more reason it has to do so itself. Realism tends to make reality in its own image. We become convinced that things are naturally this way: we mistake a contingent social order for a natural state of affairs.

Political realism's avoidance of normative questions, or at least those that go beyond assertions regarding what is in the national self-interest, is dangerously erroneous because of two distinct points:

One is the general skepticism about normative discourse, which renders realism a close relative of value subjectivism that we have just rejected. While political science *as a science* aims simply to make true descriptive political statements and avoids normative claims, this doesn't mean that such normative claims cannot be true or false. Such claims can be investigated and cannot be ignored. We need to understand what 'better' means in the context of peacefulness and international relations.

The other part concerns self-interest. The idea that nation states only act out of self-interest is false. However, even if it were true then it would still be insufficient to show that nation-states *should* not help people from other countries, even if they have special obligations to their own citizens. Therefore, the assertion that nation-states are egoistic agents that frame their foreign policies solely in terms of national self-interest is not sufficient to show that they *should* behave like this. More important still, we need to make normative assertions about humanity in general, or the global community, or the community of living beings on Earth. The perspective of national self-interest that is enshrined in political realism denies the possibility of ascension to a broader view. This wider spiritual, global and ecological perspective is necessary, we shall argue, for peacefulness.

The third inimical tendency is instrumentalism i.e. the claim that all rationality is purely instrumental, only concerned with the most efficient means to achieve a given set of goals. Such a view implies that goals or ends cannot be rationally or evaluatively assessed; only means can. For example, the basic foreign policy goals of a country would be taken as a given, and the only dispute would concern the most efficient means to attain those policy goals. This perspective would not allow us to morally, or even rationally, assess ends or goals as such. In this way, instrumentalism contradicts peace studies.

It does so in another deeper way. The study of peace relies on a positive conception of the non-instrumentalization of persons: persons aren't merely valuable as instruments for attaining goals or ends.⁵ Such a conception is necessary because instrumentalization is central to the nature of violence: when applied to people, instrumentalization is a form of dehumanization, and thus, its opposite, humanization, is central to peacefulness. Such concepts require repudiating a purely instrumental view of rationality. The ability to transcend

instrumental conceptions of rationality is central to understanding peacefulness in economic systems, as we shall see in Chapter 10.

The last tendency is positivism; that is, the traditions that operationalize concepts and reject knowledge that cannot be stated in scientifically verifiable or quantifiable terms. In the study of peace, such approaches constitute a grave intellectual mistake on two counts.

Operational definitions are semantically vacuous. For example, if IQ were defined operationally then it would be no more than the ability to answer the questions in an IQ test. This is circular: the IQ test measures IQ, which is the capacity to do well on the IQ test! Thus, the idea that the test is trying to measure something interesting and important requires the claim that IQ cannot be defined operationally (in terms of answering the IQ test questions). Thus, IQ must be more than a person's ability to pass the tests. Therefore, IQ quotients function as a measure of something else, namely intelligence, which cannot be defined in terms of the quotient. In a similar vein, peace indices must be a measure of something independent of the operations by which the indices are constructed. Peacefulness cannot be defined in terms of the indices that are supposed to be a measure of it. Peacefulness requires an independent definition, which is non-operational. We cannot define the concept of peacefulness in terms of how we measure it, without circularity.⁶

Second, the positivist approaches that make measurement a requirement of meaning underplay the important role of interpretation in the social sciences: the study of peacefulness (and violence) involves interpretative judgments that are contextually situated. To understand social behavior, one needs to defeasibly assume a set of concepts that make sense of the behavior. The idea that such interpretations are contextually situated means that the defeasible assumptions might be appropriate in some conditions, and not in others. These points limit useful application of measurement. We can see this from the following reflection. A measurement can have many dimensions, and we might try to reduce those to a single index to construct a two-dimensional ranking. But the point is: the more we compact or condense an index or measurement in this manner, the more important it is to ask what the figures mean. Although we rightly seek standardized figures to ensure that we are comparing like with like, the more we do so, the more we require interpretation to understand what the numbers refer to. We cannot hide the need for interpretation behind a set of figures.

These four tendencies, value subjectivism, political realism, instrumentalism and positivism should be and can be avoided in the study of peace. We

shall illustrate ways of overcoming these adverse tendencies in Chapter 1 and throughout the book.

Three Fields of Content

To develop a holistic understanding of peace, it is necessary that we draw arguments from three fields of content:

Ethical Content: Peacefulness is better than violence. What does 'better' mean here? What are the relevant criteria? Along what ethical dimensions can we assess peacefulness as better than violence? The relevant criteria fall into three broad groupings.

First, the ethical assessment can be in terms of the effects on and significance for people's well-being. On the surface, this may sound like a utilitarian approach, according to which a violent action can be identified as such with its harmful effects, and a peaceful one with its benefits. Like utilitarianism, this approach is pledged to evaluating actions and policies with respect to their impartially considered consequences alone, both direct and indirect, as an impartial cost-benefit analysis of different alternatives. However, as we shall argue in this book, the idea that peacefulness should be explained in terms of well-being doesn't have to be wedded to a superficial utilitarian identification of well-being with happiness. Instead, we shall pursue a more holistic and non-instrumental conception of well-being as articulated later in this book.

Second, the assessment can be in terms of the respect for persons. In other words, we can describe how a violent policy or set of actions dehumanizes people: it treats persons as having only instrumental value or as one group of persons being less valuable than other groups. A policy will be peaceful insofar as it treats persons equally as persons, that is as beings who have equal non-instrumental value. This is a broadly Kantian approach to ethics, but in this book, we argue that this approach doesn't need to be married to the Kantian notions of duty, autonomy and reason.

Third, the evaluation can be made on the grounds of Aristotelian virtues and vices as instantiated or expressed by relevant actions, attitudes or policies. For example, a peaceful policy might express virtues such as compassion, solidarity, while in contrast a violent one might express vices such as callousness and lack of care. Spinoza argued that 'peace is not an absence of war; it is a virtue which comes from strength of mind'.⁷ For this third Aristotelian option to count as distinctive from the previous two, the goodness of the relevant

virtues mustn't be derivative. (It would be derivative if it were explicable in terms of benefits and harms or in terms of respect for persons.) A similar point would apply to the vices. Arguably it is the case that virtuous actions have an expressive value that is independent of Utilitarian and Kantian considerations: such actions express a state of being, the value of which cannot be captured adequately in terms of causal benefits or respect for others. This third Aristotelian approach needn't be espoused to Aristotle's richly teleological conception of human nature.

The interplay between these three theories in peace studies is fascinating. To catch a quick glimpse of this, consider a preliminary conception of violence. The first theory would tell us that acts of violence are wrong insofar as they cause harm or they damage people's well-being, both directly and indirectly. War destroys, maims and kills; it scares and traumatizes; it perpetuates fear, anger and enmity. These consequences define violence and its badness. The second kind of theory emphasizes that acts of violence involve treating persons as mere means: they require degrading, demonizing, dehumanizing and instrumentalizing people. From this quasi-Kantian perspective, an act of violence is a violation of dignity. It is an act whose content contradicts the status of persons as bearers of non-instrumental value. In contrast, the third kind of theory would define violent action in terms of the vices or attitudes that it expresses and instantiates. Violence can express arrogance, contempt, hatred, callousness and maliciousness. These are vices that can be instantiated in institutions and political-economic systems, as well as by the actions of individual people.

Throughout the book, we will apply these three ethical lenses in the evaluation of peacefulness at the interpersonal level, in the community, and within wider systems.

Cultural Content: An institution or community will have a culture that embodies peacefulness when it instantiates the values of respect and compassion, and when its practices are humanizing and forgiving. Such a culture need not arise explicitly from ethical deliberation, but it will be rooted in a community's history, the narratives underlying its way of being, as well as its moral compass, such as religious teaching.

An example might be traditional Javanese culture. It seems to be characterized by peacefulness amongst persons, and by harmony with nature and the cosmic order. The relevant practices include personal modesty (refraining from promoting individual self-interest) and conscientious conflict transformation. How do we understand the origins of peacefulness within such cul-

tural contexts and histories? The study of peace seeks to identify a culture of peacefulness and investigate how such a culture can be nurtured in communities, societies and globally.

Political Content: This book is dedicated to a positive conception of peace, including the idea that peace is a concept central to all areas of human life that involve conflict. This requires rethinking the nature of conflict and the relationship between conflict and peace. Furthermore, it is relatively easy to understand peace as a positive practical concept when it is applied to the inner state of the individual or even to the micro-interactions of the daily lives of people and communities. It is more complicated when it comes to understanding it at the level of international relations and global political-economic systems. How can a positive conception of peace transform our idea of the structures that partly define international relations? How can we apply the lessons about peace at the micro-level to structural peace at the macro level? The study of peacefulness involves such a project: positive peace cannot be restricted to an inner state of peacefulness or peaceful qualities in the individual; peacefulness must also be a complex characteristic that international systems can have and express.

Within these three fields of content, this book sets out to articulate a holistic vision of peace, and makes tentative proposals concerning how peacefulness can be nurtured in the individuals, amongst groups and communities and within social institutions and international structures.

The Structure of This Book

One of the main threads running through the book is the need to understand peace positively and as a non-instrumental value in diverse contexts. To this end, in Chapter 1, we develop an integrated understanding of peacefulness that applies to the psychology of individuals, relationships, communities, and global political and economic structures. We establish that peacefulness is an attribute or characteristic such that it mutes or transforms the violent potential in conflicts.

With these preliminary statements in hand, in Chapter 2, we define psychological peacefulness in terms of the way that a person self-identifies. This is important because these ways of self-identifying mean that one will be directly connected to the valuable nature of being a person or conscious being. One will feel oneself to be intrinsically valuable rather than merely instrumentally

so. Psychological or inner peacefulness is integral to one's well-being. Having characterized positive psychological peacefulness, we offer a definition of a spiritual state, and employ this definition to argue that various forms of psychological peacefulness can be described as spiritual peace.

In Chapter 3, we characterize non-peacefulness in relationships as the tendency to instrumentalize and dehumanize others. In contrast, peacefulness accords with the principle that all persons are equally intrinsically valuable. To align oneself with peacefulness so defined in personal relationships, one will not succumb to a deep epistemological asymmetry: the tendency to attribute bad intentions to others. On the contrary, understanding others is only possible when one interprets their intentions and actions in ways that conform with the principle that everyone aims fundamentally for some perceived good. Moreover, we point out that, in impersonal relationships, these asymmetries are accentuated by power dynamics between groups, and become crystalized as antagonistic social dichotomies between us-and-them. To transcend such dichotomies requires the practice of dialogue.

Chapter 4 outlines how dialogue is different from negotiation, problem-solving and conflict resolution processes. It develops an informal characterization of deep dialogue, which aims at more than simply understanding others better. Deep dialogue has humanization at its core, a process which shifts how a person non-derivatively self-identifies, and similarly how she identifies others, both toward positive peacefulness. We answer various objections to the effect that such dialogue cannot overcome radical disagreements and antagonistic politics. In the remainder of the book, we shall illustrate how deep dialogue can serve as one of the main proposed pathways to peace.

Chapter 5 examines the role that the memory of past traumas and suffering can play in perpetuating violence. Following Chapters 2 and 3, we illustrate how such memories can exacerbate the dynamics of self-identification and of imputing bad intentions to others, and how both provoke a destructive trajectory of conflict because they involve dehumanization. In the light of this, we show the interconnections between large-group identities and past violence, and how self-identification with wounds may lead to dehumanization. We also show how reconciliation, healing and forgiveness can reverse such dehumanization and help to make peace with the past. We argue that such processes are compatible with justice, but only when this concept is properly understood.

Chapter 6 extends the analysis to positive peacefulness in communities. To accomplish this, we contest two assumptions. The first is that al-

most all violence consists in clashes between different group identities, for instance, based on race, nationality and religion. We argue that such a view misunderstands the nature of these identities. The second assumption is that tolerance and multiculturalism are sufficient answers to resolving these so-called 'identity-based conflicts'. We suggest that they aren't because they take identities at face value, and they fail to confront violent social structures. To overcome the impersonal nature of these ideas, we examine different conceptions of community, and show how they are rooted in human well-being. We propose that a peaceful community is a way of being together such that each person embodies the qualities of positive peacefulness.

What is a peaceful relationship with nature? In Chapter 7, we answer this question in four ways. First, we point out that the relationship between humans and nature is violent so long as humans instrumentalize the natural world, or treat it purely as a resource to be exploited. Second, typically, people don't self-identify as part of the natural world. However, we propose that, in this regard, peacefulness requires that one self-identify as part of the natural world. Third, we suggest that communal relations with the rest of nature are a *constituent* element of well-being. Finally, we argue that treating nature non-instrumentally doesn't require anthropomorphizing it.

In Chapter 8, we challenge the *inevitability* of war. We examine just war theory and argue that it rests on four questionable assumptions. By repudiating those assumptions, we show how rejecting just war theory doesn't commit one to absolute pacifism. After answering objections to our main claim, we show how rejecting just war theory requires that one characterize the structural violence of the current international political system, which the theory takes for granted.

What would constitute structural peace? The final chapters attempt to answer this question. Chapter 9 explores structural peace in international politics, first, by showing that the notion of a sovereign nation-state has inherent unpeaceful tendencies. As an institution, it cannot satisfy the aims of providing its citizens with both self-esteem and security. These problems arise because the nation-state is a failed compromise between communitarian and cosmopolitan concerns or forces. Furthermore, this conception of the national state implies that the international political arena is one of war, in which negative peace is necessarily unstable because it cannot be enforced. For this reason, we need a positive conception of such peacefulness defined in terms of four principles. Based on these principles, we propose three transnational

institutions, which would partly constitute a global structure that embodies positive peacefulness.

In Chapter 10, we investigate structural peacefulness in an economy. Insofar as an economy systematically harms and instrumentalizes people, and damages the natural environment, it embodies structural violence. To characterize positive economic peacefulness at the structural level, we describe five principles that instantiate such peacefulness. We examine these principles in relation to a reconceptualization of work and consumption, and we show how these principles would transform three key economic institutions: the corporation, investment and markets.

Chapter 11 defines the idea of structural peacefulness in an education system. We examine various peace education programs and their philosophical underpinnings, and argue that such programs suffer from inherent limitations and deficiencies. Part of this is that the educational system in general is an integral part of an instrumentalized economic system. For this reason, even peace education is conceived indirectly in purely economic terms. In contrast, a positively peaceful education system would respect the intrinsic value of persons. It would also embody the idea that educational activities are *constitutive* of the students' well-being. Such an education would cultivate peacefulness in persons, and this would apply to the design of school, the curriculum and learning processes generally. From these conclusions, we show what a humanizing education would consist in.

Notes

1. Lacey, H. (2004). *Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Understanding*, London: Routledge.
2. Goertz, G. and Levy, J. (eds.) (2007). *Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals*, London: Routledge.
3. Please note that realism in politics is quite different from realism in metaphysics. The latter is about what exists; a realist about numbers would affirm that numbers exist as entities.
4. Morgenthau, H. (1948). *Politics Among Nations: the struggle for power and peace*, New York: A. A. Knopf
5. What this means and entails will become clearer in Chapter 1.
6. Indeed such independence is required in order to even think that some measures or indices are better than others.
7. *Tractatus Politicus*, p. 699 in Morgan, M. (ed.) (2002). *Spinoza: Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

UNDERSTANDING PEACE

What is peace? This is an important theoretical question that deserves a systematic and thoughtful answer. It clearly isn't the absence of conflict because conflicts are unavoidable. Peace isn't even merely the absence of war and violence. Because peace also has positive attributes. Furthermore, the term 'peace' applies to a wide range of situations. For instance, there is inner peace, and peace in international relations, in countries, local neighborhoods, in a family; there are peaceful processes, and peaceful relations, and peaceful states. We need to navigate through such complexities.

On the one hand, we should avoid a fractured account in which the term 'peace' has one meaning when used in international relations, another when it is employed in the context of interpersonal relationships, another when referring to processes that two parties embark on to reach common understanding, yet one more when it is applied to psychological states of individuals, and so on. In short, we want to eschew the postmodern call for many 'peaces'.¹ The word 'peace' should not be ambiguous in these different contexts; it is not like the two meanings of 'bank' or 'bat'. Furthermore, a fragmented account of the concept 'peace' indicates a failure to get to the common core. On the other hand, we shouldn't veer in the opposite extreme and assume that peace is a Platonic absolute entity or single ideal, the same in all circumstances and con-

texts. We need a unified answer—an understanding that connects the idea of peacefulness as a psychological state, as a relationship between persons, as a feature of communities, as a culture of an institution, and as a characteristic of political economic structures. However, at the same time, the unified answer will make sense of the differences between peace in these different contexts and conditions, without denying such variations.

The kind of answer that we are searching for requires various conceptual steps that are not often taken in peace studies. A major theme of this chapter is to take some of these steps. Here is a quick preview. First, we distinguish peace as an instrumental value and as a non-instrumental value. Second, we separate peace itself from the preconditions and means to peace, and from the symptoms, expressions and measures of peace. Third, we characterize the differences between negative and positive conceptions of peace. Fourth, we separate ‘peace’ as a noun and as a verb, and ‘peaceful’ as an adjective and ‘peacefully’ as an adverb.

The overall objective of these steps is to distinguish what is derivative from what is more basic in defining ‘peace’. The more we can isolate the non-derivative, the better our understanding will be. Without it, we would end up with a mere list of what ‘peace’ means in different contexts, without an underlying rationale. Such definition would be superficial and fractured.

In this enterprise of developing a unifying conception of peace, we can find inspiration from Aristotle. With regard to ‘health’, Aristotle points out that medicines, athletics, complexions and diets can be described as ‘healthy’ but in different ways. The qualities that a thing needs to be healthy vary in each of these cases; the term is applied to each of these things in virtue of those different qualities. However, this doesn’t mean that the word ‘healthy’ is ambiguous; it has semantic unity. To show how this variety of applications is based on a unitary meaning, Aristotle distinguishes between primary and secondary uses of the word ‘healthy’. He argues that the primary sense of ‘healthy’ concerns having a body in excellent functioning shape; other uses are derivative.² Aristotle’s almost commonplace points about ‘healthy’ become a very powerful insight when applied to other areas of thought. For instance, Aristotle himself applied this point to the words ‘is’ and ‘exists’ to illuminate the relationship between the metaphysics of Plato and the early Greek philosophers. In a similar vein, we need this kind of approach to understand the concept of peace because it can yield an account that provides unity to the diversity by separating derivative and primary uses of the term.

In the first section, we shall argue that the fundamental conception of peace is that of peacefulness as a non-instrumentally valuable, positive state defined adjectively in terms of qualities. In the second section, we maintain that this combination needs to be viewed as an aspect of human well-being and flourishing. Finally, we show how this conception of peacefulness forms a unified account of peace in interpersonal relationships, communities, relations to nature, political structures and processes, economic systems and education.

Positive Conception of Peace

To explain a holistic and positive conception of peace requires several preliminary clarifications:

Peace as an Instrumental and as an Intrinsic Value

Peace is good. This doesn't necessarily mean that it is conclusively, all things considered, good in all circumstances. It needn't be conclusively good in all contexts and at all costs, which is a critically important point to return to later.

The goodness of peace is both instrumental and non-instrumental. Let's briefly clarify the distinction: something is instrumentally good or valuable insofar as it leads to something good or prevents something bad; and something is non-instrumentally good or valuable insofar as it is good for what it is (rather than only because of what it leads to). For instance, a car has only the first kind of value because it is only good or valuable for taking us from A to B; and happiness has the second because it is good or valuable in itself. Health is valuable in both ways. We shall sometimes use the term 'intrinsic valuable' to stand for non-instrumentally valuable.³

This distinction is vital for our project because instrumental value is entirely derivative: things that have merely instrumental value are valuable only because something else has non-instrumental value. Another example is money which only has value insofar as it enables us to purchase items that in some way contribute to our well-being. Well-being has non-instrumental value. We can apply this distinction to peace. It is clear that peace has an immensely important instrumental value. For example, a peace accord that stops a war is instrumentally good because it saves lives and diminishes

harm and pain. Similarly, a peaceful community or neighborhood is good for people to live in; peaceful international relations are good for global trade; peaceful families are a good environment for a flourishing childhood. These claims describe ways in which peace is instrumentally good. Such claims, though important, are derivative because they presuppose that something has non-instrumental value. This implies that, to get to the bottom of what peace is and what makes it good, we need to specify the relevant non-instrumental values.

Doing this might appear to be a redundant exercise. A simple objection along these lines might be: If war kills, maims and harms people, what more do we need to know about why peace is good? In reply, there is a lot more to understand, even with respect to war itself. War bequeaths a long-lasting scar of trauma; it usually leaves whole regions unstable and vulnerable; it makes whole communities feel humiliated and maltreated; it poisons international relations. Furthermore, there are forms of violence quite apart from war, including those that are not so overt, such as daily micro-violence. Likewise, things are peaceful and peace is good in a variety of ways. For example, negotiations are peaceful because of what they lead to. Other things are peaceful because of how they are intrinsically valuable, such as a person's peaceful state of consciousness. Things can be peaceful in both ways: a political demonstration might be peaceful in itself and because it attempts to lead to peace. In short, 'peaceful' can indicate both a non-instrumental value, or an instrumental value, or a combination of both.

Peace as Conditions and Symptoms

Aristotle suggested that the word 'healthy' can be employed in derivative ways, and also in a basic manner. We are following this recommendation, applying it to 'peace' and this indicates that we need to characterize peace as an intrinsic value. Quite apart from this, the Aristotelian recommendation also calls for another set of distinctions.

Some things are peaceful because they *are conditions for and means to peace*. For example, we might think that being more democratic is a condition of peacefulness in a society. In a similar way, having more open diplomatic channels might be a means to peace when war between two nations threatens. Likewise, grave injustice can lead to violence, and greater justice is conducive to peace. Such conditions and means may not be peaceful in and of them-

selves; they are peaceful because they are either requirements of or factors conducive to peace.

Some things are peaceful because they *are indications or signs of peacefulness*. Returning to Aristotle, consider how complexions are part of being healthy. They don't cause or constitute good health, but they are an expression of it. Likewise, we might think that close trade cooperation between two neighboring countries isn't a cause or a constituent of peacefulness but rather an indication or sign or expression of that peacefulness.

In the health example, exercise leads to health, but it doesn't constitute it. Having a healthy complexion expresses health, but it doesn't comprise it. In the same vein, negotiation processes are conducive to peace, but they don't constitute it. Likewise, close trading relationships might express a peaceful relationship between two neighboring countries without constituting it. This line of thinking prompts the question: 'What constitutes peace, quite independently of what causes, facilitates or is conducive to it?'

What Constitutes Peace?

Some things are peaceful because they *constitute* peacefulness. Means and symptoms are not constitutive of peace; they facilitate peace or express it. Hence, we arrive at the third and central part of the distinction: peace itself as a state. Certain states are peaceful in themselves, and not because they are conducive to or expressions of peace. Instead, they *are* peace.

The three-fold distinction can be illustrated diagrammatically as follows:

CONDITIONS	STATE	RESULTS
Means for peace	Peacefulness itself	Expressions of peacefulness
Causes of peace		Effects of Peace
Processes toward Peacefulness		Signs of peace

The threefold distinction is important for ensuring that when we list peaceful qualities, we compare apples with apples. For instance, to explicate his conception of positive peace as relationships, Galtung lists ten ingredients that he considers essential to such relations⁴: (1) Presence of cooperation; (2) Freedom from fear; (3) Freedom from want; (4) Economic growth and development; (5) Absence of exploitation; (6) Equality; (7) Justice; (8) Freedom of action; (9) Pluralism; (10) Dynamism. Some items on this list are akin to comparing apples and pears. To compare likes with likes, we

need to step back to ensure that we respect the threefold distinction. We cannot compare the state of peace both with its causes and with the expressions of peacefulness.

The threefold distinction is also very important for understanding why measures of peace aren't necessarily definitional of peace. For instance, when we construct a peace index, one might use causes and symptoms to numerically track peacefulness itself, to measure it.⁵ The threefold distinction means that this measure won't amount to a definition of peace. To define peace, we need to specify what constitutes it. To measure it, we need to identify symptoms and causes that track it reliably, and that are readily amenable to quantification. Definition and measure are quite different. Peace indexes don't typically make this distinction and, for this reason, tend to end up with a misleading definition.

We don't want to confuse the signs with the real thing. For instance, a person or a community might display some of the signs of being peaceful, but this doesn't mean that they are peaceful. The signs do not necessarily constitute being peaceful. Likewise, the presence of violence may be a sign of the lack of peacefulness. For example, quarrelling may be a sign that a relationship is not peaceful; it is a result of the lack of peace, but needn't constitute it. Likewise, a high percentage of incarcerated people might indicate that a society lacks peace without being constitutive of that lack. (Of course, it might be both). In a similar vein, a lack of overt violence might be a sign of peacefulness. However, it doesn't constitute it; the fact that people in a neighborhood aren't fighting doesn't automatically mean that their relationship is peaceful. They might be exercising constraint and holding violent reactions in check; in which case, their relationship is not peaceful. The same points can be applied to community, national and international relations.

This distinction between conditions, signs and constituents is important to bear in mind concerning measurements of peacefulness. For example, if one is interested in quantitative comparative measures of the peacefulness in different countries then one needs to establish symptoms of peacefulness that are cross-cultural. The important point, however, is that these symptoms are not necessarily definitional of peaceful as an intrinsic value. To ignore this distinction is to fall into the error of giving only operational definitions of a concept, as positivism tends to do. It is one thing to define 'peaceful' and another to measure it. The latter requires the former; otherwise we do not know what we are attempting to measure and cannot evaluate our approach to measurement as better or worse.

Negative and Positive Peace

Many writers distinguish two conceptions of peace: the negative and the positive. The former is the idea that peace is merely the absence of violence. One can see that the negative conception of peace is more viable when violence is defined broadly, as in this example: 'peace is the absence of violence in all its forms—physical, social, psychological and structural.'⁶ Nevertheless, defining peace as an absence of violence or war is negative because, in this approach, 'the definition of war is used *prima facie* as the semantic basis or point of departure to define the concept of peace'.⁷ Negatively, peace is defined as the absence of war as well as the absence of violence.⁸

A negative conception of peace implicitly assumes that the default *de facto* natural state is one of war and violence, implying that peace is nothing more than the diminishing or removal of this violent state. Consider, for example, the political philosophy of Hobbes in the *Leviathan*, which serves as a paradigm in many theories of international relations. Hobbes portrays the state of nature as one in which all self-interested individuals are in perpetual potential violent conflict with each other for limited natural resources, and for limited positional goods, such as honor or glory. According to Hobbes's use of the term, the natural state is one of war (and we need an artificial and absolute power and institutional structure, i.e. government, to avoid this state of affairs). For the moment, we can ignore the individualist assumptions of Hobbes's portrayal of the human predicament. Placing this aside, a remaining point is that a negative conception of peace sets a Hobbesian characterization of the egoistical features of human nature as the default position. Without special remedies, we are naturally at war.

Hobbes's view of society has a psychological individualistic parallel, namely the claim that humans are naturally or innately aggressive and violent, a claim which was supported by Konrad Lorenz. Lorenz assumes that individuals are naturally aggressive; peacefulness can therefore only consist in ways to diminish or mute that natural aggression.⁹ As empirical evidence for this claim, some writers compare us to chimpanzees who are thought to be naturally aggressive or violent.¹⁰ However, this comparison is uncertain in several ways. In general, it is not clear what it means to say that a trait is innate or natural. For instance, it might be true that, in some environmental conditions, some chimps are violent, but in other conditions, they are not. Indeed, there is evidence that when chimpanzees sense that their group territory is under threat, they tend to behave aggressively.¹¹ Other possible evidence that humans are

innately aggressive comes from the historical record. Have we always been at war? Or did warfare start only under certain socio-economic conditions?¹²

In any case, peace as negative concept tends to assume that war and violence are the *de facto* natural condition. In contrast, those who reject this will affirm that we are fundamentally beings who care for each other, who feel sympathy and solidarity for others when given the chance.¹³ To underline this kind of view, some writers and research compare us to bonobos rather than chimpanzees. Bonobos are allegedly more peaceful and compassionate than chimps,¹⁴ though this evidence is disputed too.

We mention this debate about human nature and innateness mainly because it is not decisive, and because it serves as a distraction. The reason for this has two aspects. On the one side, genes do not program complex behaviors and tendencies in a simple manner. Their effect is always conditional on environmental situations. Human nature is only a field of possibilities.¹⁵ On the other side, the question we are trying to answer is normative; it isn't simply genetic or factual. The question isn't 'What kind of beings are we?'; the question is rather 'What kind of beings should we become?' Peace is better than violence and war. Given that we have the capacity to arrange our social institutions and economic system in ways that embody peace, given that we have the capacity to cultivate the peaceful aspects of our psychology, the question is: 'How should we act and structure society to be peaceful?' The answer to this question doesn't depend directly on the genetic issue.

The second feature of this negative conception of peace is that it tends not to be pacifist. A negative understanding of peace would condone limited violence in order to prevent greater violence. This is because less of an instrumentally bad thing is better than more, all other things being equal. If peace is simply less violence or war, then actions that lessen violence and war will be good, even if they themselves are violent.¹⁶ As Reardon points out, 'this concept requires "law and order"' which may include 'means of force and the threat of force'.¹⁷ The current violent conflicts in the Middle East and the West's military response to them illustrate this negative conception of peace.

Third, as Galtung says, the negative conception of peace implies that the focus of any peace-related endeavors will be on removing or suppressing violence and any other processes that are enemy-producing, such as the abuse of human rights, imbalance in political power, systemic discriminating, an unfair economic distribution, and social injustice in general.¹⁸ According to the negative conception, as long as there is no (overt) violence, there is peace.¹⁹

If peace were only a lack of something, then it would be necessary to be very clear about what it is an absence of. Is it overt war? Is a state of war more than actual fighting? Is violence more than overt fighting?

In general, we shouldn't be content with a purely negative conception of peace. It has similar limitations to the attempt to define health as merely the absence of illness. Notice how the term 'ill' has narrow and broad meanings, and the latter includes tendencies or possibilities. For instance, according to a broader meaning, if I lack resilience, I might be in ill-health even if I am not sick. Likewise, in a negative definition of peace, the nature of the concept depends entirely on how we define 'war' or 'violence'. For example, insofar as one focuses simply on overt acts of violence and explicit acts of war, one thereby ignores violence as a psychological state and war as a socio-economic systemic condition. This indicates that a negative conception of peace requires a broad conception of violence.²⁰

The problem for the negative conception is that, insofar as one includes those psychological states and socio-economic conditions in one's definition of violence, in effect, one is trying to articulate a positive conception of peace by widening the negation. To appreciate the point, consider that we turned the tables around with the following definition: illness is the absence of good health. In a similar manner, we could reverse the positions and define violence and war as the absence of peace. If we defined 'violence' in this way, how would we need to conceive peace? The difficulty of answering this question indicates the need for a positive conception of peace. We cannot put *all* the definitional weight on the contrasts with violence and war; one might as well look at a positive notion of peace for what it is!

Let us now examine a 'positive conception of peace'. Consider that of Thich Nhat Hanh, the Nobel Peace Laureate, who regards peace as an inner state. His most quoted phrase 'peace within, peace without' suggests that we make peace in the world only when we are at peace within ourselves, or when we embody peacefulness.²¹ In his view, peace is defined as a special kind of inner tranquility or calmness that is found in one's feelings, mind and body. To qualify as peace, such feelings must arise from some spiritual state, such as when one is authentically oneself or free from false self-perceptions.²²

We can contrast this view with the negative one through the three features mentioned earlier. First, the conception is positive: peace is no longer conceived merely as an absence of violence. On the contrary, it is a complex quality that has an intrinsic value. In other words, as a positive quality, it has

good or valuable features. For instance, in the mentioned example of Thich Nhat Hanh, peace requires the positive valuing of truth. Being at peace is more than feeling peaceful. The tranquility that arises from being reconciled with truths about oneself is quite different from one that arises from suppressing such truths. This is why a person who is self-deceived cannot be at peace, even if they have feelings of tranquility. In brief, there is here a positive value, namely acceptance of truth, rather than just the absence of a negative value (i.e. violence). This means that peace as a positive quality requires a careful explication.

Second, the positive conception of peace *tends* toward an absolute pacifist position. This is because insofar as peace is a positive state with an intrinsic value, it cannot be treated merely instrumentally. On the negative conception, peace is merely the absence of a certain kind of harm, which can be rationally sacrificed for the sake of greater benefit. On the positive conception, it is more than that, and the *more* cannot be compromised by violence without being diminished. In short, one cannot claim, on the one hand, that peace is a positive non-instrumental value, and, on the other, that it should be treated merely instrumentally such that it can be sacrificed for the sake of a greater good. If peace is a positive concept that itself has intrinsic value, then it is not just one more instrumental factor that hangs in the balance of a cost-benefit analysis. Without some special explanation to the contrary, instrumental factors should not override it (or would tend not to). This implies that, according to pacifist conceptions, instrumentally valuable means to peace must themselves be peaceful. Peace as an intrinsic value cannot require non-peaceful means. A positive conception of peace would tend to accept this idea.

Third, following this definition of peace as an inner quality, the peace-building actions will be oriented toward the practices of mindful living and self-transcendence. Thus, it is not surprising that Thich Nhat Hanh's Plum Village is entirely dedicated to teaching people how to use meditation to reach peace. This involves dealing with anger, fear and other negative emotions, through which to bring peacefulness into one's body, mind and feelings, and from there, to extend peaceful relationships with others as a disinterested love for people, animals, plants and the natural environment.

However, there is an important limitation in this kind of conception of positive peacefulness: it is restricted to inner peacefulness. In other words, the concern is not focused on the socio-political economic conditions necessary for the emergence of peace, such as democratic governments, the rule

of just laws, a fair system of economic distribution, an inclusive institutional culture, among others. Instead, under this conception of peace, the focus lies solely with cultivating the inner peacefulness of individuals who can serve as agents bringing peace to the world. According to this view, the pillars for peace in a society are simply peaceful people, who show loving kindness toward others.

Why do we say this is a limited view? Without notions of institutional and structural peace that go beyond the negative conception, positive peace would only be psychological and individualistic. This implies that systemic peace would be conceived purely in negative terms. In other words, the limitation is that this psychological conception doesn't provide space for positive peace conceived in a non-individualistic sense.

So far, we have contrasted two common approaches to the concept of peace: a negative socio-political one and a positive inner and individualistic one. The purpose of the contrast is to reveal it as a false dichotomy. Neither view is entirely satisfactory. But there are other options. It is important that there are positive socio-political conceptions of peace. Of course, we could simply combine the two: positive peace is inner peacefulness and all non-individualistic forms of peace are negative. However, this precludes the idea that positive peacefulness extends to relationships, communities, and systems. This is the idea that needs space to develop.

Gandhi's theory of peace can be conceived as an intermediary between the negative and positive conceptions of peace. According to Gandhi, peace is a spiritual value which is important for the nature of worldly peace processes. Gandhi conceives non-violence as a peace-making strategy; it is an active struggle toward justice and human rights that denounces any forms of violence and enemy-making.²³ Peace is a positive concept that contains compassion and truth as self-criticism. Nevertheless, it has social implications because the idea of active struggle sees peace as a continuous process in which the ends cannot be separated from their means.

Another example of a conception of peace that attempts to define an intermediary space between a negative social conception of peace and a positive spiritual conception might be that of Galtung himself, who later coined the phrases *positive peace* and *negative peace*. He thinks of peace as more than an absence of violence and affirms that 'the search for peace is concerned with the relations between groups', which focuses on human relationships and the 'integration of human society'.²⁴ As we have seen, this conception has been supported by many.²⁵

Ontological Categories

Our current task is to search for an understanding of peace that unifies its different forms without denying their variety. This search requires that we specify the relevant ontological category: is peace primarily an entity, a relation, a process, an action, a property?

Why do these ontological categories matter for our enterprise? One can see the point by considering other examples. ‘Freedom’ sounds absolute, whereas, in contrast, phrases such as ‘free to...’ and ‘free from ...’ can reveal the conditional nature of the concept. Likewise, whilst ‘democracy’ sounds monolithic, the adjective ‘more democratic’ is pluralistic and open-ended. In a similar vein, the noun ‘peace’ suggests that there is a substance or Platonic object, a single idea, peace. However, this suggestion isn’t reasonable because what counts as peace in one context might not in another. For this reason, we propose that the adjectival (peaceful) and adverbial (peacefully) forms are primary in describing and defining peace. What do we get if we think of ‘peace’ not primarily as a noun or even as a verb, but rather as an adjective or adverb? Here we shall be able to see peace not as an abstract object; rather it is a set of qualities. In other words, ‘peaceful’ qualifies something else such as a state of being, a set of relations or a set of social conditions or actions and processes.

Peacefulness and Human Well-Being

If peacefulness is valuable in itself, as well as instrumentally, then this indicates that it is a feature of human well-being. What this means will become clearer as we develop our argument in this section. For now, we simply point out that well-being is a paradigmatic example of a non-instrumental value. If conscious beings and their well-being don’t have non-instrumental value, then nothing else can. If peacefulness is valuable in itself, then this might be because it is a constituent of well-being.

Our proposal is to explain the valuable nature of peacefulness in terms of well-being. This isn’t so complicated when peacefulness is considered as merely instrumentally valuable. In relationships or in a community, or in a political-economic structure, in each case, peacefulness will have instrumental value because it facilitates or leads to well-being or prevents ill-being or harm. Once the terms have been clarified, the relevant causal connections can be described, measured and correlated. While these are not easy tasks,

they are relatively clear. What is much less clear is the relation between peacefulness as a non-instrumental value and well-being, and this is the topic of the next section.

The Nature of Well-Being

What does it mean for a person to be well or to live a flourishing life? To address this question, we need to begin by clearing up some preliminary concerns. For instance, although we want to understand the good life for *any* human person, this does not assume that human flourishing will be the same for all individuals, at all times, in all social contexts. On the contrary, any account of flourishing and well-being must acknowledge that there are vast differences between individuals. The theoretical framework should take these differences into account by describing the general contour of well-being and a flourishing life. Such a description is sensitive to and encompasses individual and cultural differences insofar as they are relevant.

Another concern is that the standard Aristotelian conception of flourishing demands a teleological idea of human nature, which we shall reject. We cannot make sense of human nature except as a field of potentialities. Therefore, we cannot tie the notion of flourishing or well-being to an Aristotelian conception of human nature.

If human nature is not a given except as a set of possibilities, then we should be wary of any universal claims about it, especially those that are unconditional. Such claims will tend to simply reflect the existing social conditions, and insofar as they do so, they become reassertions of the status-quo.

Broadly, there are five dimensions to human living and hence to being well:²⁶

- (1) *Activities*: Flourishing indicates that a person's life must consist of processes, activities and experiences (physical and psychological) that are non-instrumentally valuable for the person who is living such a life. These will count as part of the person's living a good life.
- (2) *Awareness*: For these valuable activities to be part of a person's well-being, she will appreciate them in appropriate ways, that is for their non-instrumentally desirable features (*inter alia*).

- (3) *Relations*: Well-being requires that that a person's life contain appropriate connections with other people. Other people can become part of one's life through (i) our perceptions, feelings and emotions concerning them, (ii) our own goals including those of others, and iii) a shared sense of we-ness. Similar points apply to our relation to the natural world, as we shall see in Chapter 7.
- (4) *Self-consciousness*: Well-being requires appropriate kinds of evaluative self-perception. This pertains to time. Concerning the present, a person must have a sense that the activities and experiences constituting her life are valuable and worthwhile. Similarly regarding the past, a person needs to have a sense of her previous activities and experiences constituting her life up to now as valuable. Likewise, regarding the future, one needs to have the sense of one's future life as something worthwhile. In general, well-being requires that a person perceives her life as having a primary value. This is a fundamental form of self-respect, which does not depend on what one does or has done. It is independent of achievement.
- (5) *Non-Instrumentalization*: A flourishing life has intrinsic value and is not being instrumentalized. The claim isn't that instrumentalization causes harm or ill-being or diminishes well-being. Rather the assertion is that it is a component of ill-being, and that its contrary is part of well-being.

Both 'well-being' and 'flourishing' refer to the good life, and both terms imply the value of living for living's sake. 'Well-being' indicates a way of being and hence suggests the holism that we want. 'Flourishing' is more dynamic, and carries the idea that when a person's life is going well, the various parts work together in a mutually supportive way, or symbiotically, like a plant that is flowering. Thus, parts and whole, and means and ends come together synergistically constituting a living whole (see Kant in the *Critique of Judgment*).²⁷ More precisely, it indicates that the kinds of activities and relations that are non-instrumentally valuable for the person are also instrumentally valuable, and vice versa. The term 'flourishing' entails the idea of growth in accordance with one's nature and appropriate for the social contexts in which one lives. It evokes the claim that a good life is better when it is full or complete. This means that a person's life does not omit any important general kind of valuable activity, experience or connection that contributes to the wholeness and dignity of being human.

The Relationship Between Well-Being and Peacefulness

Returning now to the inquiry about the nature of peace from the perspective of well-being, we can now see that this normative framework might help define peace. Our task is three-fold: we want to characterize peace as a qualification of something (as an adjective or adverb rather than as a noun or verb), but to do so, we need to identify primary as opposed to secondary instances of what it qualifies (in a similar way that Aristotle did with 'health' as we illustrated earlier). Second, let's also recall that we need to identify peacefulness as an intrinsic value and not only instrumentally, and not as a sign or marker or symptom. Finally, we need this discussion to take us beyond the typical contrast between negative and positive definitions of peace.

From these reflections, we can derive a general proposal: namely, 'peaceful' qualifies primarily the way that a person lives, some aspects of the different dimensions of her well-being as outlined earlier. This is a substantive claim because it means that when we describe social systems as peaceful or not, or that when we characterize modes of production as more or less peaceful, this should be thought of as secondary to the way that people live. This means that the value of social structures or systems is the way that people live. This first proposal might seem perniciously individualistic, but we will argue that it is not.

From these reflections, we can derive a second proposal: namely, 'peaceful' qualifies the well-being or flourishing aspect in the way a person lives her life including her relationships. Accordingly, 'peaceful' denotes three broad features of flourishing or well-being.

First, it indicates a state of awareness, which might be characterized as the spiritual state of inner peace. This, as we will argue later and in Chapter 2, requires connecting well either with the Divine, the Sacred, the Spirit or with the essence of the I.

Second, 'peaceful' qualifies a positive self-consciousness, including one's intra-personal relations, such as being aware of one's past, present and future as valuable and worthwhile.

Third, this inner state will be expressed in one's relationships with one's self, other people and other beings in the world. In this way, peacefulness denotes the capacity to connect well with other people and other beings, and form peaceful relationships with all. This will include living harmoniously with others within the community, society and globally. Because we are al-

ways connecting to things and, the account of peacefulness from the perspective of flourishing implies that ‘peaceful’ characterizes relationships.

The Nature of Violence

If peace isn’t merely the absence of violence, then violence isn’t merely the absence of peace! A broad conception of the concept indicates that violence is simultaneously physical, psychological, social and structural. But this doesn’t tell us what violence actually is; it merely suggests that its domain is wide.

Like peacefulness itself, violence has an instrumental and an intrinsic side. Violence is instrumentally bad because of what it causes. Fundamentally, at root, this means that violence is bad because it has detrimental or damaging effects on well-being. Wars kill, injure and traumatize people. They also damage property and interrupt production, and this is bad insofar as it causes harm to people’s lives. Thus, damage to property is an indirect instrumental harm; hurting and killing people is a direct instrumental harm.

Furthermore, an important effect of war is that it precludes peaceful relations. In a violent conflict, two peoples forgo and ruin the joy of living together in peace. The instrumental badness of violence isn’t merely the harm that it causes, but also the good that it prevents or spoils.

The instrumental harms of violence are well documented. Less well understood is the intrinsic badness of violence, even though this is clearly essential to an understanding of the concept. In what ways is violence non-instrumentally bad? This means roughly: how can a violent act be bad quite apart from its negative effects? Furthermore, if structural features of a society can be violent, then we would also need to extend this question beyond actions to the structural and the systemic.

The relevant non-instrumental aspect of violence is that it treats persons as less than persons. It dehumanizes people. An example is modern slavery and human trafficking, a form of organized violence that treats human beings merely as a means to an end, or as objects. The intrinsic badness of such violence is reflected in this dehumanizing attitude toward humans. Another example, a subtler one, might be high-stakes testing in education. High-stakes testing is violent insofar as it treats children and young people as exam-machines and schools as factories. It does not respect students as persons of value in their own right. In conclusion, the badness of violence does not just lie in the harms and traumas it causes, but it also lies in its the non-instrumental disvalue, its inherent dehumanizing nature.

A Holistic Conception of Peace

We have advocated the need for transcending the simple opposition between negative and positive conceptions of peace. In this we have set for ourselves and the reader a journey towards a new positive conception of peacefulness that relates it to well-being, but which extends the concept beyond the individual to encompass relations, communities and structures. The book is dedicated mainly to showing how this approach is fruitful. We need an understanding that can capture individual, relational, collective and systemic peace, in each case isolating the non-instrumental valuable nature of peacefulness, distinguishing it from causes and symptoms.

To complete the first step, let us unfold some of the important implications of treating peacefulness as an aspect of well-being or flourishing. There are four salient points:

First, the perspective of flourishing permits us to comprehend more deeply what peacefulness means in the context of being human, and living well with others and with the world.²⁸ Later, we shall characterize the peaceful state of being, and show how it expresses itself in harmonious human relations.

Second, a key idea is that, through the perspective of well-being, we can see that the ways in which a person appreciates the contents of her life matters hugely for peacefulness. In this sense, peacefulness is a quality of the awareness that one has of one's own life. Such awareness can enable one to appreciate or realize the non-instrumental value of the processes, activities and experiences of one's living. It allows one to connect to those values, and in this way, it is a constituent of flourishing (*inter alia*).

As we have insisted in this chapter, peacefulness must be defined in terms of both its intrinsic and instrumental values. Or rather, different kinds of peace need to be characterized in terms of their respective intrinsically valuable natures. Otherwise it wouldn't be insufficient to define the value of peace only in terms of its good effects. We need to identify the special kinds of intrinsic value that mark peacefulness.

The combination of these first two points is especially important when applied to self-awareness. Peacefulness requires that one should not treat nor be aware of one's life as a merely instrumentally valuable means to some end. However grand and honorable the ends are, however, important the goals might seem, those who violate this condition could not be genuinely at peace because they have instrumentalized themselves. One might say that, by allowing oneself to be instrumentalized, one has done violence to oneself. We shall

argue for this claim in Chapter 2. However, if it is correct then the point is crucial in two ways. On the one hand, it shows how peacefulness is an aspect of our well-being in a manner that includes some spiritual understandings of the human condition. On the other hand, it is part of the bridge that connects the spiritual to the relational, collective and systemic, without abandoning the core idea that peacefulness must be primarily of intrinsic value.

This last point is worth elaborating. As we saw earlier, conceptions of peacefulness that illuminate the spiritual aspects of the concept tend to treat social and systemic peace purely as a means to or only as a result of individual peacefulness. Such conceptions tend to be politically naïve because they presume forms of individualism that treat the properties of social systems as merely the aggregate of the qualities of individuals and, because of this, they overlook the fact that social systems shape the qualities of persons. A violent system is quite different from a violent individual and, while the former tends to produce the latter, the violence of the system can't be understood simply as an aggregation of that of the individuals who compose it.

For these reasons, individualistic conceptions of peacefulness that illuminate the spiritual aspects of the concept tend to be reductive about the collective and systemic. For example, consider the claim that systemic peace is reduced to the flourishing of individuals. This individualistic claim violates the idea that systemic peace can have irreducible properties, and likewise, it ignores the idea that the peaceful culture of a community can transcend the peaceful qualities of its members. System and culture cannot be reduced to individual qualities.

Given all this, we need a conception of peacefulness rooted in human flourishing that does not commit the individualist fallacy perpetrated in different ways by both Thich Nhat Hanh and Galtung, neither of who distinguish sharply enough the instrumental and intrinsic value of peacefulness.²⁹ This is not an easy demand; it requires a conceptual bridge that connects the individual to the systemic; and thanks to our reflection on well-being, we have one element at hand, namely, non-instrumentalization.

It is central to flourishing that we have a non-instrumental conception of ourselves: I am an *I* and not an *it*. This point is also an integral requirement of peacefulness as a state of being: to treat oneself as an *it* or as an object is to do violence to oneself as an *I*. This conceptual overlap shows that flourishing cannot be divorced from peacefulness, and that peacefulness cannot be separated from flourishing. This principle embraces the intimacy of our self-awareness and it also defines a value relevant to systemic peace.

Thirdly, flourishing provides a context for the hermeneutics or interpretation of human relationships, and how people might express peacefulness in interpersonal and intergroup relationships. As we shall see in Chapter 3, having a personal relationship means that the reality of another person impinges and enters the living of one's own life. That person becomes part of one's life. However, for this to happen, there are implicit norms that define what constitutes a better understanding of the other person, which in turn are necessary for relationships that embody peacefulness. A quick taste of these themes: humans are systematically prone to interpret ourselves more favorably than others, and deeper relationships overcome this built-in bias. The principles of sharing that this embodies are fundamental to peaceful relationships. In this way, flourishing is not only enriched by others, but also it can be constituted by others.

Finally, employing flourishing as a perspective to understand the nature of peace will establish that peace does not exclude conflict. Instead, conflicts can be drivers for creativity and desirable social changes; they are essential for progress. In any case, conflicts are ineradicable.³⁰ We will explore this idea of conflict more fully in Chapter 6.

For now, we can establish that peace is constructed and maintained through personal, interpersonal, socio-political processes. To bring out the constructive force in conflict, dialogue is a prerequisite, and we will say more about dialogue Chapter 4 and throughout the book.

Conclusion

The concept of peace is best conceived in terms of the peaceful quality of something, such as persons and relationships, social communities and structures. To understand the adjective 'peaceful', and its opposition with the term 'violent', we need to characterize peacefulness as non-instrumentally valuable: valuable for what it is rather than simply because of what it causes. This requires that we characterize it as a complex feature of well-being. Peacefulness is partly constitutive of flourishing. In this way, peacefulness is intrinsic to a human way being in the world; it is defined by what it means to be human in a value-guided way. In this sense, we can propose that peacefulness is a multi-dimensional aspect of humanity's journey towards greater collective flourishing. Advancing this proposal requires characterizing individual, relational, collective and systemic peacefulness.

Notes

1. See for example, Dietrich, W. (2018). *Many Peaces*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
2. Thomson, G. (2015), *Thales to Sextus: An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
3. The term 'intrinsically valuable' may suggest that the value in question is non-relational. However, we do not assume that if something is valuable non-instrumentally then it is so absolutely or non-relationally. In other words, 'intrinsic' doesn't mean 'non-relational'. For more on this, see Thomson, G. and Gill, S. (forthcoming 2019). *Happiness, Flourishing and the Good Life: A Transformative Vision of Human Well-Being*, London: Routledge.
4. p. 14, in Galtung, J. (1967). *Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking*, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
5. An example of this is the Global Peace Index produced by Institute for Economy and Peace, through compiling and analyzing data from wide sources.
6. p. 16, Reardon, B. (1988). *Comprehensive Peace Education: Educating for Global Responsibility*, New York, NY: Teachers College Press.
7. p. 45, Martin, F. (2005). "Critical Analysis of the Concept of Peace in International Relations", *Peace Research*, 37:2, 45–59.
8. In fact, Galtung (1996) distinguished different forms of violence, including: direct violence, e.g. children are killed, structural violence, e.g. children die as a result of poverty and malnutrition, and cultural violence, or whatever blinds people to direct and structural violence or makes them think that these are acceptable. Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, London: Sage.
9. Lorenz, K. (1983). *On Aggression*, London/New York, NY: Routledge.
10. For instance, Wilson, M. (2013). "Chimpanzees, Warfare, and the Invention of Peace", In D. Fry (ed.) *War, Peace, and Human Nature*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Boehm, C. (1992). Segmentary 'warfare' and the management of conflict: comparison of East African chimpanzees and patrilineal-patrilocal humans. In A. Harcourt & F. de Waal (eds.), *Coalitions and alliances in humans and other animals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Wrangham, R. W., & Peterson, D. (1996). *Demonic males: Apes and the origins of human violence*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
11. Schubert, G. and Masters, R. (eds.) (1991). *Primate Politics*, Carbondale, IL and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
12. See Pinker, S. (2011). *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*, New York, NY: Viking.
13. For example, Maturana and colleagues have argued that humans are innately peaceful, loving and caring. Humberto Maturana Romesin and Gerda Verden-Zöller (2008). *The Origin of Humanness in the Biology of Love*, edited by Pille Bunnell, Upton Pyne, Exeter: Imprint Academic.
14. See, for instance, Zachos, E. (2017). "Another Heart-Warming Way Apes Beat Us at Being Human", *National Geographic*, 10th November 2017.
15. See Chapter 2 of Thomson, G. (1987). *Needs*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
16. An example of this is just war theory, which we will challenge later in Chapter 8.
17. Reardon (1988, p. 12).

18. Galtung, J. (1969). "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, 6:3, 167–191
19. However, in 1996, Galtung wrote a book entitled "Peace by Peaceful Means", in which he stressed non-violent approach to resolving conflict.
20. In fact, in 1971, Galtung introduced the notion of structural violence to further broaden the definition of violence in J Galtung, (1971). "A structural theory of imperialism", *Journal of peace research* 8:2, 81–117
21. Hanh, T. N. (1987). *Being Peace*, Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press.
22. In Chapter Two, we will expand on this point.
23. See for instance, Gandhi, M. (2007). *Peace: the words and inspiration of Mahatma Gandhi*, Sydney, NSW: Hachette
24. p. 2 in Galtung, J. (1964). "An Editorial", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1:1, 1–4.
25. For instance, Lederach has been a strong proponent for this relational view of peace.
26. We will draw on insights from Thomson, G. (1987); Thomson, G. (2005). "Fundamental Needs", in S. Reader (ed.) *The philosophy of need* (175–186) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Gill, S. and Thomson, G. (2012). *Rethinking Secondary Education: A Human-Centred Approach*, London: Pearson Education; Thomson and Gill (forthcoming, 2019).
27. Thomson, G. (2003). *On Kant*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
28. See Freire, P. (1972). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
29. As we have seen, Thich Nhat Hanh simply assumes that the intrinsic value of peacefulness must be individualistic thereby relegating the social to the instrumental, and Galtung doesn't distinguish the requisites of peace from the nature of peace.
30. Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge, UK: Polity.

PEACEFULNESS AS A SPIRITUAL STATE

In some traditions, psychological peace is construed as a spiritual state. In this chapter, we shall try to make sense of this claim, and show how it might be important even for religious sceptics. We shall indicate how this understanding helps to rethink peacefulness.

In Chapter 1, we proposed that we need to separate the causes and the expressions of peace from what constitutes peace. We have also argued that peace shouldn't be understood merely as an absence of violence, regardless of how broadly one conceives violence. Peacefulness is a positive concept, not the absence of something else. Furthermore, we have also contended that the value of peacefulness is not solely instrumental, but also intrinsic. These conclusions set an assignment: to understand peacefulness as a positive concept and as an intrinsic value. This mission doesn't negate peace as the absence of violence and as an instrumental value, which are *very* important. However, the conclusions mean that there is more to peace than these negative conceptions suggest, and we need to find out what that *more* consists in.

Psychological Peace

Psychological peace isn't simply a feeling of peace, calmness or tranquility. Although one might be tempted to identify it as such, nevertheless, to count as peacefulness, such feelings must have a certain type of cause. The source of such feelings cannot be just anything. For example, calm feelings could come from the exhaustion after a storm of violence. Tacitus said of the Romans: 'They created a desert and call it "peace".'¹ A man who has violently killed may have a feeling of tranquility after such an act of, say, vengeance, but this wouldn't amount to his being in an inner state of peacefulness.

To characterize inner peace requires that we describe the nature of the state itself rather than simply identifying the calm feelings it generates. Indeed, we may say that psychological peace is a state of being such that it silences the violent tendencies in conflicts. Insofar as a person is in such a state, she cannot reap violence from her intra-personal conflicts. To affirm that a person is psychologically peaceful is to qualify the relationship that the person has with herself: psychological conflicts lose their potentially violent meanings. Psychological peacefulness is the state that has this kind of muting effect. For instance, a person in a state of inner peace cannot be easily aroused to annoyance and anger. Here is another example: reportedly, when a visitor was angry with the Buddha, the latter declined to receive his anger, asking 'if you refuse to receive a gift to whom does the gift belong?'² In a similar vein, the Stoics taught that the genesis of anger as a violent emotion is in the accepting of certain sense impressions as having a meaning such as unfairness.³ Seneca advises that we can train ourselves to refuse to consent to the impression that one has been wronged.⁴ Thereby, if we can reject straightaway the initial pricking of anger,⁵ then we never give it entry.⁶

From these preliminary reflections, we may suggest that, as an inner state, peacefulness can be characterized provisionally as a psychological state of being that spontaneously gives rise to feelings of tranquility and calm. This psychological state is essentially non-violent, and is not easily dissolved or destroyed by conflicts, such as conflicts of interest and clashes of emotion. Furthermore, this psychological state is characterized by one's relationships with oneself that hinges on a specific kind of self-identification.

Self-Identification

The relationships one has with oneself depends intimately on how one identifies oneself. For example, insofar as I identify myself with my nationality, then my relationship with myself and my psychological state revolves around this identity: my coming to terms with it, performing actions pertaining to it, relating to the world in terms of it, and forming relations with others and society through it. Self-identification will color one's thoughts, feelings and perceptions in relevant contexts. Likewise, insofar as a person identifies herself with a bundle of identify labels, personality traits or with a set of personal and political narratives then her relationship with herself will revolve around the content of these themes. This requires us to take a closer look at self-identification, and what it means for a person to identify herself peacefully.

First, self-identification falls between two extremes. On the one hand, strictly speaking, the noun 'identity' refers to the conditions that make a thing what it is. It denotes narrow so-called 'numerical identity', which a thing cannot lose without ceasing to be. It is its essence. For example, a piece of gold cannot lose its atomic number 79 without ceasing to be gold. If it loses this property, it no longer exists. For persons, the term 'identity' doesn't usually refer to this strict identity. Thus, when a person claims that her gender is part of her identity, a gender changing operation wouldn't make her cease to be. Consequently, when we refer to a person's identity, the term must mean something else. The idea is that to treat something as part of one's identity is for one to identify with it. In this manner, the verb form 'to identify' is clearer than the noun form 'identity': it specifies an act, something that we do, and it avoids reifying identity as if it were a thing.

On the other hand, the act of identifying oneself with something is stronger than simply believing that one has certain features. Describing oneself as being born in London is one thing; identifying oneself as a Londoner is another. That one's profession is teaching is one thing; identifying oneself with the role of teacher is another. That a description is true of oneself doesn't mean that one identifies oneself only with it. We need to distinguish the 'is' of predication from the 'is' of identity. The 'is' of predication is simply when one claims that an entity has a characteristic, such as 'the chair is brown.' The 'is' of identity is when the property in question defines what that thing is, such as 'The chair is a piece of furniture.'

It seems we need a notion that is weaker than strict numerical identity and stronger than mere predication. Stoic thought provides such a concept. Roughly, *oikeiôsis* is the act whereby one identifies something as belonging to oneself in an especially valuable way.⁷ I identify a house as mine, and I identify certain parts of that house as more intimately mine. Analogously, one can think of identification as specifying certain aspects of oneself as more closely or more intimately *me*. This Stoic conception avoids conflating one's so-called 'identity' with strict numerical identity (or essence), and yet it allows for the difference between thinking that something is simply true of oneself and regarding it as belonging to or being a part of me. Let's illustrate the nuanced difference with an example. When I say that I am a teacher, I acknowledge that the predicate 'is a teacher' describes me, but I am not *ipso facto* identifying myself as a teacher. In contrast, when I identify myself with my profession as a teacher, I think of that as *me* or as an essential aspect of me. Insofar as I identify with a certain feature of myself then I treat this feature as *if* it were an aspect of my identity. In identifying, it is *as if* one were regarding that feature of oneself as part of one's numerical or strict identity. Clearly the Stoic conception also indicates that the opposite of identifying oneself is to separate oneself from those features: something may be true of me, but it is not me. This is an important Buddhist idea.

Second, a person can identify herself under many descriptions, and these usually vary from context to context. For example, I might identify with my profession as a teacher in some situations and not in others. I might identify with my nationality in some circumstances, but not others. With my skin color in some, and not in others. Likewise, with my gender and sexual orientation. In this sense, one can have multiple identities.

Third, up to now we have discussed only macro-level identifications. I identify with my nationality, profession, gender, ethnicity and so forth. However, our daily lives are full of micro-level identifications. For example, suppose I am trying to complete an important task by a deadline. In such a case, I might identify with the goal that I am trying to achieve. Or suppose that I lose a letter from my mother. As I am desperate to find it, I might identify with the letter temporarily (in a fully self-absorbed way).

Fourth, identification doesn't need to be self-conscious. For example, we can suppose that, insofar as a person is overtaken with anger, to that extent, she identifies herself with that feeling, albeit for a short time-period. This identification may be true of her, even though she might not recognize it and even if she explicitly disavows it. Her identity for that period is her anger in

the sense that the feeling absorbs her self-conscious attention. In this way, she cannot separate herself from the feelings of anger. Implicitly, she has identified with her anger. It is as if it has become part of her essence, albeit temporarily. The point of saying *implicitly* is that the person might not assent to the proposition 'I was my anger during those moments of rage.'

Fifth, different self-identifications can be more or less derivative. For example, a person might self-identify primarily in terms of her nationality A, and only derivatively as a person. In such a case, she would self-identify as a person only derivatively because this would depend on the premise 'Everyone from country A is a person.' (with the implication that someone not from A might not be a person). In contrast, a non-derivative self-identification is when she self-identifies as a person in a way that doesn't depend on such a premise. We will return to this point later.

Finally, self-identification or the forming of one's identity is a complex psychological and social process that changes over a person's life.⁸ It is also a political process, as we shall see in later chapters. In all cases, it is a process that one can only indirectly influence and shape. One learns to identify with one's nationality, with a certain gender role, with a set of grievances. Likewise, one can also learn to change one's self-identifications through the experiences of life, and through processes of dialogue and self-transformation.

Inner Peacefulness

A defining criterion for psychological peacefulness is how one self-identifies. We shall argue for this in two steps. First, let us return to the semantics of the word 'peace'. Up to now we have directly opposed peacefulness with violence. However, this opposition is too restricted. 'Peacefulness' has several close cognates, such as 'tranquility', 'serenity', 'calmness' and 'stillness'. Furthermore, it also has several closely related antonyms, such as 'disturbance', 'turmoil', 'trouble' and 'turbulence'. It is not enough to limit the contrast to peacefulness vs violence. The contrast-set can be widened to include other members of the semantic family.^{9, 10, 11}

This widening allows us to broaden the idea that peacefulness mutes the *violent tendencies* of conflicts. The contrast can be enlarged; we can now characterize inner peace as dampening the turbulence and turmoil of intrapersonal conflict. Peacefulness quietens the unsettling or troublesome nature of such conflicts. A person who is in a state of inner peace can still have psychological conflicts, but, for such a person, these conflicts won't cause her turmoil.

The conflicts won't be felt as problems. For example, consider a person who strongly wants A and B, but cannot have both. Inner peacefulness removes the troublesome meaning that such a conflict might otherwise have. The person who is in a state of inner peace doesn't identify with her wants and, in this sense, she isn't caught in the conflict. She is able to treat those desires as if something other than herself.

Being more peaceful requires that a person identifies the 'I' with something that is not turbulent. For instance, if I identified with my thoughts, then this would constitute a state that is not inwardly peaceful because those thoughts are ever-changing, and because they are not *me*. During a time-period when I lose myself in those thoughts, I can find myself without coherence and stability concerning what enters my consciousness: it is one thing and then another, as the mind flits from topic to topic. Identifying with one's thoughts is *ipso facto* non-peaceful because such identifications confuse the 'is' of predication with the 'is' of identity as mentioned earlier. I am not my thoughts, and indeed, inner peace consists in *not* identifying myself with such thoughts. The same would apply to emotions and desires. For this reason, some spiritual traditions advocate practices and methods that emphasize the separation of thought, desire and emotion from the I. That is to say, for psychological peace to have the violence-muting effect that we have described, what the person identifies with must be beyond or transcend the conflicts in some sense. How is this possible? The reply leads us to the second step.

In contemporary discussions in the social sciences, identity is often conceived in terms of the social categories that a person identifies with, and these typically include gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, social class and so forth. In answer to the question 'Who am I?', people will have recourse to such identifications. To be clear, we need to distinguish third person and first person identifications: how others identify one (third person identification) and how one identifies oneself (first person identification).¹² Here, we only focus on the first person or self-identification. Oftentimes, people self-identify through these social categories. Sometimes, identity is taken to be more deeply personal. For example, a person may identify herself with a set of narratives about her life. Of course, these narratives may be interwoven with the social identities mentioned earlier; but they needn't be. A person might also identify with certain character traits that she has, such as being optimistic or being considerate, believing that: 'These features are more intimately true to me than my position in life, more defining of me than even my nationality or gender.'

However, to understand peacefulness and how it can transcend conflicts, we need to shift to a new perspective with the question: What is the nature of the I that is doing the self-identification? This is a crucial question because the I that does the identifying is more fundamental than what it identifies with. In the formula 'I identify with X', we need to ask about the nature of the I that identifies itself with a specific set of contingencies (such as one's nationality or narrative). Because this is what the I is, at least we should identify with that. If we don't so identify, then we aren't identifying with ourselves! For instance, if the answer to the question 'What is the I that identifies?' is simply 'a person' then we are committed *ipso facto* to identifying ourselves as persons.

On the one hand, insofar as a person identifies with specific sets of contingencies, which generate conflicts, the person will be unable to transcend those conflicts, and her psychological state will be unable to mute the violence, turbulence and perturbations typically associated with those conflicts. On the other hand, if the person's self-identifications transcend those conflicts, then her psychological state will *ipso facto* dampen those unpeaceful effects, and the person will be in a state of inner peace. A necessary condition of being in such a peaceful state is that *one identifies oneself directly with the I that does the identifying*. The more we so identify, the more we will be in a state of peacefulness. This is because peacefulness requires us to align ourselves with what we are rather than with contingent sources of conflict. We can regard this as a basic condition of inner harmony and integrity.

We can now tie together the two threads as follows: (a) A person has inner peacefulness insofar as she self-identifies herself non-derivatively with the I that does the identifying; (b) This state of peacefulness involves imperturbable feelings of tranquility that render violent and troubled reactions to any inner conflict psychologically impossible, because the person's self-identifications have transcended her inner conflicts.

Of course, the so-called 'true nature of the I' is a contested concept. It is disputed in several ways. Different humanistic and religious traditions categorize it in various ways. Nevertheless, such traditions will share some ideas about what they are disputing, because they are contesting the nature of the same thing. To have disagreements, they must be referring to the same thing (in some way); otherwise, they wouldn't be disagreeing.¹³

We shall begin with three secular alternatives about self-identification, given the idea that one identifies with the nature of the self who identifies.

First, the pure 'I': in the immediacy of the present moment, I can be aware of my awareness or I can be conscious of my consciousness. We may call this

phenomenon ‘reflexive self-consciousness’ to distinguish it from other forms of self-consciousness or awareness of oneself. One can perceive oneself under many kinds of descriptions. For example, one can be aware of oneself as a mother or as a citizen of a specific country or as the person caught wolfing a midnight snack. In contrast, a person can be aware of herself under no specific description (or predicate), but simply as ‘I’, an awareness of consciousness. This is reflexive self-consciousness. It is an idea that has its origins in the Stoics and Kant.¹⁴ This is the simplest form of self-consciousness, and it is a prerequisite for other forms of self-awareness and for being a person.¹⁵ Because of this, it is an essential part of our way of being: being an I. Being an I includes the idea that one is capable of reflexive self-consciousness. Inner peacefulness as a state of being can be constituted by our identifying with the ‘I’ or reflective self-consciousness in a way that generates feelings of blissful tranquility that can defuse the potentially violent nature of psychological conflict.

Second, one might think that the most relevant feature of the self is that one is a person. The standard definition goes as follows: a person is a being of any species who has self-awareness and who can act from reasons.¹⁶ If inner peacefulness is primarily about aligning one’s self-identifications with what one really is, then given that one is most fundamentally a person, peacefulness requires identification with oneself as such. Put simply, to attain inner peace, it is necessary to identify with oneself as a person.

Third, alternatively, one might consider that the most relevant feature of oneself, the self that does the identifying, is that one is a human. Given this and given that inner peace is about harmonious alignment, then one should identify with oneself as a human. That is also to say, to be in a state of inner peacefulness, one must identify with oneself as a human.

The relationships amongst these three ways of identifying with the ‘I’ are rich and complex. To begin, being an I is a necessary aspect of being a person, and being a person is perhaps a necessary aspect (or prospect) of being human in some stages of human life. Likewise, being human qualifies the way in which one is a person: there are human qualities to one’s personhood. For these reasons, we cannot treat these three criteria or forms as independent or separate.

Through this, a central point emerges. The relevant principle is that the primary bearers of non-derivative prudential value are persons and other conscious beings, such as non-human animals.¹⁷ The life of a person has primary value. The support for this claim consists in two reflections. One is the idea from Kant that if persons don’t have value then nothing else does. This is be-

cause value is for the guidance of choice, and persons are the ones who make choices. Thus, if choosers don't have value then their goals and the means to those goals won't either.¹⁸ The other reflection is that we can best explain the value of other things in terms of the value of persons and other conscious beings. As touched upon in Chapter 1, instrumental means, such as cars, running machines and vacuum cleaners, have value only because the relevant goals have value (e.g. getting to a place, being healthy and cleaning), and the goals have value only because persons do. Persons have primary non-instrumental value and, because of this, their lives are intrinsically valuable.¹⁹ This implies that the experiences, activities and processes that constitute their lives also have such value, because the person has value. This reverses the thesis that persons and their activities have value because their ends or goals do. It places persons (and other conscious beings) first and, in so doing, it negates the instrumentalism inherent in goal-based conceptions of value.²⁰ This implies the important conclusion that all the objects, tools and institutions that are valuable insofar as they serve interests have only derivative value compared to the life of a person (and other conscious beings).

Following the discussion regarding well-being and peace in Chapter 1, for a person's life to be peaceful, she must appreciate this value in an appropriate way: one feels and perceives oneself directly as valuable. Psychological peacefulness involves self-identification (and hence self-perception) that connects more fully to this intrinsic value. Such perception is a fundamental form of self-respect or self-love. A person will be peaceful when she self-identifies with the nature of the self, i.e. being an I or a person or human, rather than with contingent predications.

The idea that peacefulness requires that we align our basic self-identifications with the nature of the self contains a fruitful seed: namely, whatever we self-identify with basically shouldn't be incompatible with what the I is. If the I is to identify appropriately, it must at least identify with itself. We shouldn't identify with anything that is incompatible with this baseline, the primary identification. However, when people make more local identifications, such as discussed earlier, such as nationality, ethnicity, race, gender or religious affiliations, they count as psychologically or intra-personally violent. Because psychological peacefulness requires us to identify at least with our personhood or common humanity, then more localized identifications are incompatible with those identifications that constitute inner peacefulness. For instance, if I identify myself primarily as a member of community C then I identify myself only derivatively as a person, based on the premise that all

members of C are persons. In such a case, I don't identify myself as a person directly, but only indirectly or derivatively. In short, there is a world of difference between 'I am a person.' and 'I am a member of group C, and therefore I am a person.' Insofar as the person self-identifies in the second way, she has not self-identified fundamentally with the nature of the self as a person or as a human. This can be an important source of violence.²¹

Clearly, whatever I identify with, it ought to be consistent with the nature of the I that does the identifying. Peacefulness requires that we self-identify in ways that are compatible with what we are. This suggests that a basic self-identification that sets us up in identity-antagonism with other persons won't be peaceful. If, in our innermost heart, we think of ourselves as persons of type F in ways that separate us from persons who are not of type-F, then our self-identification is not peaceful because it won't be aligned with the reality of being a person. It creates an 'us-vs-them' separation that is unpeaceful because it misidentifies the 'us'.

When we create an 'us-versus-them', as we inevitably do, this is potentially violent or unpeaceful on both sides of the divide. As well as othering the 'them', it also misidentifies the 'us'. Consider the following. If persons A and B both self-identify basically or non-derivatively with F (for instance, being a person) then they have a common identity. If, on the contrary, person A identifies basically with F and person B with G, then there is the possibility of F and G being antagonistic groups. These group identifications are necessarily contrastive and exclusionary. Insofar as I identify with one group, *ipso facto*, I don't identify with another group. This constitutes an 'us-versus-them'. Such contrastive relations are conflictual and potentially violent precisely due to the antagonism in the exclusivity of grouping. Furthermore, insofar as A and B are in antagonistic groups F and G, and self-identify basically and fundamentally as such, then they will tend to view each other instrumentally. Likewise, insofar as person A self-identifies principally with a group that B self-identifies with, that is, insofar as they share a basic identity, then they will tend not to instrumentalize each other. They are kin. As kin, they will tend to show solidarity to each other.

In sum, psychological peacefulness consists in self-identification that is consistent with one's status as a being of intrinsic or non-instrumental value. Insofar as one perceives and appreciates oneself in this way, then one will not identify oneself in ways that instrumentalize oneself or bring psychological violence to one's conflicts. In such a condition, one is at peace with one's internal conflicts because one does not self-identify with the sources of those

conflicts, such as desires or self-interest. One is at peace with oneself insofar as one appreciates oneself as a being of non-derivative value.

So far, we draw the following conclusions concerning psychological peacefulness: (1) Psychological peacefulness is a state of being in which a person experiences tranquility because her psychological conflicts are not violent, disturbing or problematized. (2) Such a state requires that the person's basic self-identifications transcend the lived psychological conflicts that she experiences. (3) The transcendence of inner conflicts requires that the person self-identify non-derivatively with the self or the I, and not with descriptions of the person that are incompatible with such self-identification. (4) This self-identification must consist in an appreciative awareness of the non-derivative value of the self.

In brief, psychological peacefulness implies that we self-identify in ways that transcend the psychological conflicts and mute their potential violent nature, and in ways that align with the nature of the self as a being of primary value. Insofar as we do the second, we will embody the first.

Spiritual State

Writers from many traditions equate psychological peacefulness with a spiritual state. However, although the term 'spiritual' has many connotations and is strongly suggestive, it doesn't seem to have clear meaning. For this reason, in this section, we shall establish a general framework for understanding 'the spiritual'. If this scaffolding works, then it will help us in understanding inner peacefulness conceived by different spiritual traditions.²²

First, the concept of the spiritual has a structure. The recognition that a concept has a structure enables us to avoid defining it through an unconnected or jumbled list (as we highlighted regarding 'peace' in Chapter 1). Similarly, in this case, we need to distinguish the core spiritual state from its causes and effects. In simple terms, putatively, the spiritual state itself is intrinsically valuable, and the results of being in the spiritual state will be beneficial to the person herself, those around her and the world at large. However, while an explanation of what is desirable about being in a spiritual state will include the causal benefits of living spiritually, this doesn't get to what the state is nor to what is non-instrumentally valuable about it. The state is good for what it is, and not merely for its personal and social benefits, such as emotional health and intergroup harmony. In a similar vein, we can also distinguish the

state itself from its necessary conditions and preparations. For example, many traditions see acting morally as a necessary preparation for, or part of the path towards, a more spiritual state. Being moral doesn't constitute such a state, but it is a necessary prelude. Likewise, feelings of tranquility are often understood as an essential grounding, but without being a component of the state. Likewise, some things will be valuable as expressions of the spiritual. For example, the enlightened person is supposed to exude a certain aura. This isn't a part of the state itself, nor is it a cause; it isn't even a benefit. It is simply a sign or expression of the person being in a spiritual state. Another sign of being in a good spiritual state is that one has big-hearted feelings, such as being generous and being free from the need to blame others. A further expression of being in a good spiritual state is that one is joyful. Some of these can also be considered as benefits.

This structure brings some order to our understanding of different religious and spiritual traditions. We should expect that different traditions will have varying understandings of the preludes for a spiritual state, of its consequences and most importantly, of the spiritual state itself.

Secondly, there are thinner and richer conceptions of a spiritual state of being. The thinnest conceptions involve psychological ideas, such as creativity, openness and self-understanding as part of a process of self-development. Richer conceptions will include ethical concepts, such as one's relationship to other people. Richer still are those that involve postulating a right relationship with nature or with the universe as a whole. The richest notions involve a relationship with God, or with the divine or the sacred or some transcendent reality. In short, thicker or richer accounts embrace more metaphysical and religious concepts, which the thinner accounts eschew. The thicker conceptions of the spiritual will include the thinner ones. For example, a person who regards union with God as the core spiritual state will usually have views about the psychological, ethical and ecological qualities that express such a union and which are needed to attain it.

In making this distinction, we are not saying that richer descriptions are better. A purely psychological account might have great depth in the way that it is structured around a unifying core. For example, some psychotherapeutic theories have very detailed and profound accounts of human development. Equally, each religious tradition has many accounts of spiritual growth and its stages. Thin and rich accounts have quite different advantages and drawbacks. For instance, thinner accounts are more readily acceptable by people of varying backgrounds. Also, the thinner ones are more easily operational-

ized. However, thinner conceptions might omit the distinctive features of the spiritual tradition in question. If being spiritual consists in being close to the transcendent, then a purely psychological or moral definition of the spiritual will omit the heart of the idea. Suppose a person can live in a way that is creative, emotionally full, morally oriented and ecologically aware, but without being close to God. Suppose also that being close to God is part of what defines being in a spiritual state, then it follows that a person can have all those qualities without being spiritual. Such thin qualities might be necessary for spirituality without being sufficient.

Thirdly, the nature of a spiritual state is such that it will have internal or conceptual connections to a person's being more ethical. What this means in practice will be contested. For instance, it might be disputed whether, or in what ways, the relevant notion of ethical coincides with our everyday conceptions of morality. Nevertheless, necessarily, if a person is living a more spiritual life then she will be more ethical in her thinking, attitudes, and behavior—a spontaneous expression of one's spirituality.

Now let's bring together these three abstract features of our framework for conceptualizing the spiritual. We can contrast two extreme approaches to these features: the subjectivist and the absolutist. The subjectivist claims that there are no better or worse answers to any of these points: each person or each religious tradition can take one's own subjective opinion on these issues, and there is no question of better or worse. In contrast, the absolutist maintains that there is a single correct answer or true definition of 'the spiritual'. In the face of these two extreme approaches, we might remind ourselves that there are other positions besides them. For instance, the question of the nature of spirituality might be neither subjective nor absolute. This would mean that there are better or worse answers, without it being the case that there is a single correct one. What counts as better or worse might depend on the context, and some definitions will be better in one way, and others in another way.

With all this in mind, we can offer the following broad account of the spiritual, that is, the content of the concept. The idea of the spiritual requires being connected appropriately to something sacred, divine or transcendent. This leaves two points to be explained. First, what do these terms 'sacred', 'divine' and 'transcendent' indicate? They don't necessarily designate the same thing. Let's leave this point aside for now. Second, what does the phrase 'connected appropriately' mean? Despite its being vague, nevertheless, we can specify it, *inter alia*, by noting that the connection must constitute the devel-

opment of the person as such, and must have some ethical fruit or results. In other words, whatever constitutes appropriate connection to the divine must involve the development of the person in the sense of it being an ethical improvement. A person is in a more spiritual state insofar as she is connected appropriately to the sacred, divine, or transcendent.

Toward Inner Peace as Spirituality

Our earlier discussions have already prepared an answer to the question ‘What is a peaceful spiritual state?’ As we have seen, the best way to understand different religious traditions that treat psychological peace as a spiritual state is through the idea of self-identification. Inner peacefulness as a spiritual state is partly constituted by what one self-identifies with. This is a common thread of spiritual traditions which claim that, in a spiritual state, one will not identify oneself in ways that disturb the mind and agitate the feelings, but rather one will identify oneself only with the true nature of the self. Thus, according to such traditions, inner peacefulness consists in the person identifying with something divine, sacred or transcendent. For example, we find this in traditions of the soul, the real self, *atman*, *anatta*, and no-self. To rehearse earlier points, inner peace isn’t just a feeling of calmness; it is a state of being that generates a feeling of joyful tranquility which can mute or silence the potentially violent nature of all intra-personal conflict. To claim that this is a spiritual state means that it is a state in which one is appropriately connected to the divine, sacred or transcendent reality in a way that has moral fruits and constitutes part of one’s human development.

Given these two premises, we argue that the relevant spiritual state should be defined in terms of how a person self-identifies. This fits this bill of appropriate connection. To be appropriately connected to the divine or sacred requires that one must self-identify with the true nature of the self, defined in such terms. Obviously, different religious, spiritual and philosophical traditions specify what the nature of the I or the self very differently. For example, some Buddhist traditions claim that the real I is a state of complete emptiness, and that this is tantamount to claiming that there is no I. The self as ego is an illusion and inner peace is constituted by being in the state of realizing this. In standards interpretations of the Abrahamic faiths, the self is an immortal soul. Other religious traditions claim that one is not separate from God: the I

is nothing but the divine. Other pantheistic traditions claim that the I is the universe as a whole.

In many religious and faith traditions, the definition of spiritual progress is fundamentally one of realizing what one is, or of becoming closer to the true nature of the self. In some traditions, this occurs through a sudden illumination; others stress a slower process of realization. The idea is roughly this: 'I saw myself as a person in a society; I now realize that I am something quite different: a divine soul,' or 'I saw myself as an entity; I now realize that I am pure emptiness,' or 'I saw myself as separate; I now realize that I am one with all.' This is experienced both as a transformation of the self and as a coming closer to the true nature of reality as the divine, sacred or transcendent. It may be experienced as: I am part of God; I am an aspect or manifestation of the divine; I am an expression of the transcendent; I am Other.

It is not our aim to classify and describe the nature of the spiritual state in different religious traditions. It is certainly not to adjudicate between them; nor try to specify what counts as identifying in the appropriate ways. However, while the state of inner peace is known through its effects or expressions, such as the feelings and resilience that it brings, such symptomatic descriptions don't pin-point the nature of the state itself. To specify that state, one must move beyond symptoms to the cause, namely the underlying self-identification. We can postulate that this underlying inner state or self-identification constitutes being spiritual without being committed to the particularities of any specific religious tradition regarding the nature of that state.

In summary, first, psychological/inner peace is when a person identifies herself with the I that identifies, and this occurs in such a way that intrapersonal conflicts become non-violent and non-disturbing. In other words, peacefulness requires that self-identification has hit the mark: I am identifying myself with the I or the self. The idea is that the more we so identify, *ipso facto* the more we will be in a state of peacefulness and the less we identify with the I or the self, the less we will be in a state of peacefulness. Peacefulness requires that we align ourselves with what we are. It also requires that this alignment will render violent conflict and disturbing emotion increasingly psychologically impossible.

Second, spiritual traditions can be understood as giving specific accounts of what the real nature of the self is. As we defined it, to be in a spiritual state is to be appropriately connected to the sacred, divine or transcendent

in a way that constitutes a development of the person that is (at least in part) ethical. Thus, psychological/inner peacefulness as a spiritual state is constituted by what a person identifies with: the person will identify herself with the I, where this I is characterized in terms of the sacred, divine or transcendent.

We have given a broad definition of a spiritual state and shown how inner peacefulness can be defined as such a state. 'An appropriate connection' to spiritual reality (i.e. the sacred, divine or transcendent) requires that one identifies oneself in relation to that reality. In other words, to be in a spiritual state is be connected appropriately to the spiritual, and this consists in how a person identifies herself in relation to it.

So far in this section, we have tried to make sense of the idea of psychological and inner peace as a spiritual state. We have employed a framework that encompasses different religious and non-religious traditions without committing ourselves to any single one. Such a framework would help make sympathetic sense of different traditions without being wedded to any one of them. We haven't endorsed the presuppositions of such an idea. We have simply tried to make them clearer.

Likewise, we have not assumed that something sacred, divine, or transcendent exists. We have left that open and placed to one side such ontological issues. Most conceptions of the spiritual include feelings, such as awe, love and worship, and normally assume those to be experiences of or sensitivity to something real (that is of something that exists independently of one's experiences). The claim that spiritual experiences are sensibilities to some aspect of reality is not restricted to religious traditions. For example, suppose one defines the spiritual in terms of a search for meaning; such a definition might be given with or without the presupposition that there are some such meanings to be discovered. In contrast to such religious and spiritual traditions, psychologists of religion and religious scientists typically will shelve or suspend such an assumption. They will investigate the variety of religious experience, without presuming that they are directed to something real. Without such an assumption, the conception can be called 'bracketed.' Generally, bracketed conceptions of the spiritual are more widely acceptable. Furthermore, by bracketing a conception of the spiritual life, one may avoid metaphysical and epistemological problems. On the other hand, a bracketed conception of the spiritual life might not make sense. For example, suppose that love of God is central to the spiritual life. Such a conception would not make sense if God did not exist in some way.

Relation to Well-Being

Psychological peacefulness has instrumental value because it immunizes oneself from inner or intra-personal violence and turbulence. It also has instrumental value insofar as it has positive effects on one's relationships with others, one's participation in a community and one's contribution to a society. As a spiritual state of being, it also has non-instrumental value. It is a good state to be in, and it is partly constitutive of well-being. Psychological peacefulness constitutes several aspects of well-being, and as such, it is intrinsically valuable.

First, an inescapable and fundamental aspect of our way of being is being an I. Living as a human person is a non-instrumentally valuable state, and as part of that, being an I is non-instrumentally valuable. Appreciation of this value is an indispensable aspect of well-being. In plain language, an essential ingredient of well-being is to take pleasure in one's consciousness. To take pleasure in one's consciousness is to have appreciative reflexive self-consciousness. It is to feel happy in being an I in its simplest and most immediate form. We can call this 'joyful inner peace'.

We say 'simplest form' because taking pleasure in one's consciousness is different from for example, taking pleasure or appreciating that one is an engineer. To appreciate the value of being an I is to take direct pleasure in one's own consciousness as such. This is different from taking pleasure in seeing oneself under various descriptions, such as being a scholar, being a mother, being clever. These are more complex forms of self-appreciation. The kind of simple appreciative self-reflexive consciousness that we have in mind is similar to what the Epicureans call 'passive pleasure'. Their idea is that there is a kind of pleasure that doesn't come from having one's desires and ego satisfied, but which, instead, consists in a state of serenity or tranquility. They characterized this as absence of pain.²³ We are characterizing it as the simple pleasure of being aware of one's awareness. Despite some differences, the two accounts are similar in that, as the Epicureans recognized, pain and other disturbances can distract one from feeling passive pleasure.

Second, well-being requires appreciation of the valuable nature of one's life, and this constitutes another dimension of inner peacefulness. It is a necessary condition of well-being that one's awareness is an appreciation of the value of the activities that comprise one's life. As we have seen, a person (and other conscious beings) have non-derivative value. Because of this, their lives have non-instrumental value, and likewise, the parts and threads of their lives also have intrinsic value (such as their experiences, activities and processes).

One's awareness can be appreciative (or not) of the valuable nature of these aspects of one's life.

Third, without inner peace, we can engage in self-inflicted psychological violence, sometimes without even knowing it. Self-identifying in ways that don't track what one is can ruin a person's life. It can become an insidious source of self-disrespect and self-belittlement. For instance, a person who self-identifies with how others perceive him will tend to be plagued by insecurity, and may feel he needs to be extra self-assertive to compensate. Such a person will tend to take insult quickly. This feeling will drown out her ability to feel the joy of the present moment. The negative self-perception will make it harder for her to appreciate the value of her activities. Likewise, if a person is aware of herself most of the time under self-deprecating predicates related to her past and future, then she will have fewer opportunities to be aware of herself as a person of value.

Bringing the ideas in this section together, we can summarize that peacefulness is a valuable state of being in at least three ways. There is immediate direct reflexive self-awareness in the present moment: how the person sees herself in the now. Such a state can be defined as tranquil and joyfully serene awareness of the lived present moment. Second, there are also the kinds of non-derivative self-identifications that a person makes, which define the predicates under which one sees oneself, and which may constitute an appreciation of the value of oneself and one's life and its parts. Such self-identifications can be characterized as one of self-respect or self-love. Third, inner peacefulness mutes the self-directed violence that would otherwise tend to result from inner conflicts.

A peaceful state of being will manifest itself in a person's relationships, including her relationships with herself in the past and future. For instance, a person may have peaceful relations with her own past insofar as she is willing to forgive the grievances toward others that disturb him or her from living the present moment in peace. We shall discuss this point in more detail in Chapter 5.

Conclusions

The positive conception of peacefulness cannot be limited to inner peace. Religious believers and practitioners of spiritual paths tend to assume that if a sufficient number of people in a community were inwardly peaceful, then this will be enough to ensure that the community itself would be a peaceful one. If enough people were in a spiritual or a psychologically harmonic state, social peacefulness would automatically result.

We challenge this assumption on the grounds that structural relations can't be reduced to the psychological. Peaceful people might live in unpeaceful social structures. As we shall see in Chapter 9, the peacefulness of systems and institutions is not simply an aggregate of individual peacefulness. This implies that a positive conception of peace as intrinsically valuable needs to be extended beyond the psychological, toward the relational, social and structural. These points widen the mission to be accomplished. As an initial step in this journey, we have reached some preliminary insights. First, violence consists in causing serious harm to a person that dehumanizes or instrumentalizes her. This conclusion implies that any attempt to define violence without the element of dehumanization and instrumentalization would be incomplete. Second, peace silences the violent potential of conflicts. Conflicts can exist in peacefulness, but they are muted of their violent consequences. This means that peacefulness doesn't require the absence of conflicts. Third, positive peacefulness must be understood as various features of human well-being. This would explain how peacefulness can have non-instrumental value. Insofar as peacefulness is valuable because of what it *causes* and allows, it has instrumental value. Insofar as it has value because of what *it is*, it has non-instrumental value. This distinction sets up a predicament. On the one hand, how can peace be valuable apart from what it causes? The very idea seems difficult to understand. On the other hand, the idea seems non-eliminable: peacefulness has positive features that render it valuable for what it is because, otherwise, it would be merely the absence of violence. The dilemma is solved if peacefulness is a feature of human well-being. Because well-being has non-instrumental value, peacefulness would do too insofar as it is a component or aspect of this complex state, well-being.

Notes

1. See for instance, Tacitus (2010). *Agricola and Germania*, edited by J. Rivers and H. Mattingly, London: Penguin Classics.
2. Verse 223, Acharya Buddhārakkhita (trans.) (1985). *The Dhammapada: The Buddha's Path of Wisdom*, Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society.
3. Lucius Annaeus Seneca (1928). "On Anger", *Moral Essays*. Vol. 1, trans. J. W. Basore, London: W. Heinemann.
4. Seneca, (1917). *Epistles*. Translated by Richard M. Gummere. The Loeb Classical Library 75. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, II, 1, 3.
5. Seneca (1917), I, 8, 1.
6. Seneca (1917), II, 14, 1.
7. For a brief description of Stoic thought see Thomson (2015).

8. Erikson, E. (1959). *Identity and the Life Cycle*, New York, NY: International Universities Press.
9. Kittay, E. (1990). *Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
10. See also Thomson, G. and Missner, M. (2000). *On Aristotle*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Press; Thomson, G. (2015). "Meaning in Life", *Philosophical Papers*, 44:3, 439–444; Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
11. However, these family resemblances shouldn't tempt us to deny that there is a central (core-dependent) homonymy. In other words, this isn't an instance of a Wittgenstein-like mishmash but rather a complex Aristotle-like homonymy or a semantic field. We still need to explain the core dependence of the homonymy: there are central uses of the terms 'peace' and 'peacefulness'. We can widen the contrast set while retaining the idea of a core dependence.
12. p. 93. Gooding-Williams, R. (2006). *Look, a Negro!: Philosophical Essays on Race, Culture and Politics*, London: Routledge.
13. More recent philosophical theories do contest the very idea of 'true nature of the I': the dispute is about nothing.
14. See for instance, Long, A. (1991). "Representation and the self in Stoicism", in S. Everson (ed.), *Companions to Ancient Thought 2: Psychology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Kant, I. (1781/1787) (1997). *Critique of Pure Reason*, edited by P. Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. This doesn't mean that other forms of self-awareness are not also prerequisites for it.
16. Locke, J. (1689/1975). *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon.
17. Since we are investigating living the good life for humans, we concentrate on persons. See Chapter 6 for a treatment that includes our relations with the natural world.
18. Thomson (2003).
19. From now on, we shall use the word 'intrinsic value' to indicate 'non-instrumental value' or more broadly 'non-derivative value'. However, this doesn't mean that things being valuable is not a relational state. 'Intrinsic' in this context doesn't mean 'non-relational'.
20. For a thorough treatment of this point, please refer to Chapter 2 in Thomson and Gill (forthcoming 2019).
21. It is important to note here that one's primary self-identification with a person doesn't mean that peaceful life becomes an abstract or lonesome life with regard to one's belonging, or relationships. On the contrary, primary self-identification as a person can enable one to be part of a community or communities and to have friendships with many different people precisely because of such peaceful and non-antagonistic self-identification.
22. See Thomson, G. (2012). "A Framework for a Religious Life", in S. Gill and G. Thomson (eds.), *Redefining Religious Education: Spirituality for Human Flourishing*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
23. Thomson, G. (2016). "Compassionate Governance in Corporations", in S. Gill and D. Cadman (eds.), *Why Love Matters: Values in Governance*, New York: Peter Lang

PEACEFULNESS IN RELATIONSHIPS

Peacefulness is a feature of conflict. All relationships between individuals, groups, institutions and social systems are conflictive. People have different interests, emotions and understandings; ineluctably this means conflict. Thus, peace cannot be defined as a lack of conflict. Indeed, peacefulness as a value only becomes operative when there *is* conflict. In part, peacefulness means that conflictual relations won't make destructive waves. It is the quality that allows conflictual relations to exist without displacing other intrinsic goods that constitute human flourishing. For instance, peacefulness in the family is when a specific conflict doesn't affect negatively the other good features of family life. Or, for example, when one squabbles with a friend, it doesn't affect the friendship. As already established, peacefulness mutes the violent potential of conflicts.

What does it mean to live in peaceful relations with other people? The core of the previous chapter was that inner peacefulness consists in self-identification that is consistent with one's status as a being of intrinsic or non-instrumental value. Insofar as one perceives and appreciates oneself as such, then one will not identify oneself in ways that instrumentalize oneself and bring psychological violence to one's internal conflicts. Our concern in this chapter is that peacefulness also applies to one's relationships with other

people. Just as one is a being of non-instrumental value, so too equally are other people. Insofar as we have peacefulness in interpersonal relationships, both parties will appreciate and treat the other as a being of non-instrumental or primary value, and equally so. A relationship is more peaceful inasmuch as conflicts between the two people won't disturb their mutual perception and treatment as persons of equal worth.

The overall argument for this conclusion comes in several steps throughout this chapter. First, we shall argue that unpeaceful relationships are partly constituted by instrumentalizing or dehumanizing. Thus, peaceful relationships are constituted by each party appreciating the other fully as a person. In the second section, we highlight the importance of relationships for human well-being, and argue that for a relationship to be constitutive of well-being, it must be peaceful. Thirdly, we argue that there is an inherent epistemological asymmetry which underlies our incapacity to appreciate others as beings of equal value, and to see things from their perspective. In the next step, given such an asymmetry, we explore how conflicts might escalate into violence and the prerequisite for peaceful relationships. Finally, we apply the asymmetry to impersonal social relations, such as group dynamics, and how it might fuel unpeacefulness.

Peaceful Relationships and Non-Instrumentalization

Peacefulness in relationships is founded on the basis that people must regard each other as beings of primary value. The main argument for this view would be that all kinds of unpeacefulness in relationships consist in various forms of instrumentalization or dehumanization or underappreciation, because these are all ways of treating the other person as less valuable. Some support for this conception comes from the nature of violence: overt physical violence isn't bad only because it harms another person, but also because it does so in a way that dehumanizes the person. This is equally part of what is (defeasibly) bad about certain kinds of anger: in a state of rage, one feels as if the other person doesn't matter. Much the same could be said about contempt and fear. Another piece of evidence is that relationships become overtly unpeaceful when one person feels disregarded, taken for granted, unfairly treated, patronized, belittled, or demeaned by another. All such feelings amount to ways of being treated as less than fully human. Likewise,

friendships become diluted and destroyed when one or both persons treats the other as purely instrumental.

To support the claim, we would need to find and reply to counter-examples that apparently don't fit the above thesis. An apparently good example might be blame. The objection goes as follows: 'A relationship is essentially inter-personal. This means that one cannot reduce the relationship to the way any one person behaves in relation to the other. One must move beyond an atomistic or individualistic conception of persons. This point transforms the nature of responsibility and blame. Consider when a relationship turns sour or violent. It shouldn't be a simple question of whose fault it is; this is an individualistic analysis of a relationship. Furthermore, contextual factors may be relevant to the deterioration of the relationship. This is important because blame is a significant destroyer of relationships, and a partial constituent of unpeacefulness in relationships. This understanding threatens the idea that peacefulness in relationships consists in appreciating and treating the person as having primary value, and equally so. If I blame someone then I am not treating that person as less than a person. On the contrary, I regard a person as such by holding her responsible. It seems that the problem with blaming is that it individualizes, not that it instrumentalizes.'

The reply to this objection is that blame is destructive in a relationship when a person who is blamed feels that it is unfair. Typically, this means that the person feels underappreciated, unheard, misunderstood, slighted or made a scapegoat, demonized and marginalized. Thus, the person feels that they have been subject to a hermeneutical injustice that consists in being undervalued. Furthermore, the person who blames may be doing so because she herself feels violated, undervalued and treated as a lesser being. We will investigate the dynamics of such injustices in the next two sections.

Another objection might be that a simple source of interpersonal violent conflict is that other people are often annoying. Everyone gets annoyed by others at some point. This seems to be an important source of unpeacefulness in relationships that doesn't fit the thesis that such unpeacefulness consists in various forms of instrumentalization or dehumanization or underappreciation. The reply to this point is that finding persons annoying doesn't *constitute* violence in a conflict, even though it might frequently be a contributing *cause*. The thesis under scrutiny is that a relationship is more peaceful insofar as conflicts between the two won't disturb their mutual appreciation, perception and treatment as persons of equal worth. The objection misses the point.

The main thesis also explains why and when power relations are unpeaceful: they are so when they instrumentalize or dehumanize or underappreciate, that is, when they involve treating those with less power as less valuable because they have less power. (We shall return to this point in Chapter 6 when discussing the relational dynamics between groups.) This point will be key to explaining how political economic structures can be inherently violent or peaceful. At root, the ideal of peacefulness in relationships consists in all persons involved treating each other as fully human, and equally so. However, as an aside, this doesn't mean that, in such relationships, we humanize others. Since we are already persons, or beings of primary non-instrumental value, the issue is that of fully recognize that value, and feeling and acting in accordance with it. We can't humanize the human; but we can recognize ourselves and each other as such.

Relationships in Well-Being

While relationships can cause us intense joy and acute suffering, one doesn't want to assume that their importance is simply that they cause positive and negative hedonic states. Friends are not simply means to feeling good, and to avoiding feeling bad. We don't even want to assume that the importance of relationships is that they *cause* well-being and ill-being (as opposed to simply pleasure and pain). My friends may help me flourish and my enemies may cause me to ail, (or *vice versa*!), but such instrumental considerations don't exhaust the importance of friendship for well-being and the reasons for avoiding enmity. These hedonic and eudemonistic analyses tend to instrumentalize relationships and, for this reason, they don't characterize well the core nature of intimacy.

A better alternative is to postulate that in a close relationship with another, the other person becomes a part of one's life, and hence, a part of one's well-being.¹ Characterizing relationships in this way is quite different from describing them instrumentally. On the one hand, instrumental means are like disposable napkins: their value is only in their purpose, and once used, they are thereafter throwaways. They have no value in themselves. In sharp contrast, on the other hand, to characterize a relationship by affirming that the other person is a part of one's life is to assert that her value as a person has become part of one's own life, and hence part of oneself. She is part of me. We would argue that this is the only way to conceive of relationships that

doesn't instrumentalize them. In Chapters 1 and 2 we introduced the idea that one constituent aspect of well-being is being appropriately connected to something of value beyond oneself. We can extend this idea to human relationships: insofar as a person is connected in relevant ways to the value of other people, that person becomes a part of one's life. Thinking in this way allows one to posit closeness and intimacy as non-accidental features of relationships.

Consider a new-born baby. Quite suddenly this new person becomes an immensely important part of the parents' lives. The best explanation of why this is such an important transformation is that the value of the baby's life has been imported into their own lives.² The baby is a bearer of primary value: this means that the baby is worthy of being loved, and that a host of other things matter only because the baby matters, such as: Has she enough to drink? Is room too hot for her? The baby has become part of the parents' lives and each parent is no longer living as a single person. In a similar fashion, when someone we love dearly dies, their life is abruptly removed from our life.

Even impersonal relationships can be conceived *partly* in these terms. The shopkeeper or cashier that one sees on an intermittent basis is more than a machine, more than a role and more than the typifications that are normally used to characterize them. The stranger on the street is more than a nuisance and a potential threat. However, although, by definition, such impersonal relationships are not intimate, nevertheless, to qualify as *human* relationships at all, they must be considered as a relationship between persons. To qualify as a relationship between persons, *as such*, the relationship cannot be merely or purely instrumental. (Thus, if two persons are in a *purely* instrumental or functional relationship, such as buying and selling a bunch of flowers, then the buying and selling won't be a relationship between two persons *as such*; it might as well be carried out by a vending machine).

In previous chapters, we outlined how peacefulness can have intrinsic value by virtue of being a constitutive aspect of well-being. The same applies to peacefulness in human relations. As we claimed earlier, the ideal of peacefulness in relationships consists in that we treat each other as fully human, and equally so. In order for a person to become a part of one's life in ways that constitute partly one's well-being, interpersonal relationship must be peaceful in this way. Peace is a condition for a person to be able to live outside of herself.

Equality of Persons and Epistemological Asymmetry

Let us turn to the claim that all people have equal non-instrumental value. This principle needs some explanation and qualification. In terms of explanation, we saw in the previous chapters that persons and other conscious beings have primary or non-instrumental value. Other things have value through their differing dependence on that primary value: they matter derivatively. To this concept of primary value, we are now adding the idea of equality: all persons are *equally* valuable in this manner. The life of all people matters equally: no individual human life is non-instrumentally more valuable than any other. Does it apply only to humans? Does it imply that when we are faced with saving the life of a child and that of a very old person, we must treat them equally? Does it imply that all people should be treated equally by the state? 'No' is the answer to these three questions! However, the specific implications of the principle are not the subject for this chapter. The idea is that the principle acts as a minimal corrective to the asymmetry or partiality described later in this chapter. For example, for most people in North America and Europe, the many deaths in the war in South Sudan or in Syria would seem to be something distant and faint. The principle of equal value reminds us of the impersonal standpoint from which these distant deaths matter as much as those in our own neighborhoods and families. In affirming the principle, we are not claiming that one shouldn't care more about local lives and deaths. Rather we are asserting that, impersonally, they are equal.

In this sense, the principle implies the claim that all people are equally *real*. The latter claim arises in contradistinction to a feature of our lived experience, namely that others can feel and be perceived as more or less real. We sometimes struggle to come to terms with the reality of another person, even those close to us. Friends who are far away often feel less real than ones who are close. Distant strangers, even less so. In one's self-absorption, even people nearby may seem less real. Fundamentally, this means, among other things, that we have an incapacity, and sometimes an unwillingness, to see things from the point of view of others, and even to accept and appreciate that others have a point of view at all. The claim that all people are equally real serves as a reminder that our experience is partial in these ways. It is a corrective to this kind of partiality.

In all violent conflicts, the prelude to physical violence is a cultural and psychological violence that portrays the other as an enemy. This is character-

ized by a set of violent subjectivities and a political culture of violence, even when people aren't physically hurting each other. Some groups are implicitly portrayed as less important or less worthy than others (or depicted as less real). Likewise, some groups are portrayed implicitly as better and more important than others. These portrayals can become increasingly explicit. Later, some groups are painted as not having good intentions, with the implicit suggestion that they are evil. In short, we pass from a process of dehumanizing to one of demonizing.³ The idea of the deconstruction of the enemy is that these popular portrayals are non-peaceful constructions that can, and need to be, reversed. They can be reversed because they were constructed.

These ideas mean that we have ethical obligations, pertaining to peacefulness, concerning how we construct our understanding of other people, especially those with whom we are in conflict. The construction of an understanding that is more peaceful can be a long psychological and therapeutic process. However, there are ways or methods to bring those who are willing closer toward a deconstruction of antagonistic understandings of others. As we shall see, epistemologically, this deconstruction will be guided by the idea that others aim for the good too. We shall argue that we humans are subject to some deep epistemological asymmetries in understanding other people. Understanding these asymmetries point to some fundamental conditions pertaining to peaceful relations.

First, humans are essentially social beings; we live in groups and we have affiliations and allegiances. This implies that we tend to identify with some group. This has profound implications for one's sense of identity. Insofar as we identify with some group (non-derivatively), this means that we tend to not identify with some other groups. Identity necessarily tends to be exclusionary. It is a question of 'us and them' and the 'them' tends to get excluded.

Second, there is an epistemological asymmetry that necessarily plagues human existence. This is the tendency, in our own case, to only see our own good intentions, and in the case of others, to only see the results of their actions (which are often bad). This means that we are fundamentally prone to apply a double standard: we judge ourselves morally by the good intentions we have, but, when it comes to others, we judge them by the results of their actions. I am disposed to see my own actions as always good, and those of others as bad or, at best, as less than perfect.

Third, whenever a person wants something, she necessarily wants it under some description of the thing that reveals it as desirable. This doesn't mean that the thing wanted is always desirable, but it does mean that the thing

wanted is *perceived* as desirable under some description by the person who wants. This implies that a person's intentions always make sense to the person herself. However, to translate this first-person point into a possible understanding of a third person, it requires that there is some description of the person's intention that can make sense to other people who can see it from her point of view. This means that there is necessarily a way of making sense of others' intentions. That is, there is a way of seeing what others want as good.⁴

These three points form a dynamic. The combination of the first two points means that we tend to understand the good that *we*, as a group, intend, but not the good that *they*, in the other group, intend. In this way, a personal epistemological asymmetry becomes socialized as an antagonism between groups; the epistemological asymmetry solidifies socially as a set of major differences between us and them. This is part of what it means when people say: 'We identify with such and such a group.' The declaration 'This is my identity.' can function like an affirmation of allegiance to perceive a set of situations in a collective way, which necessarily excludes perceiving the relevant situations in the way of the defined opposition groups. In short, we tacitly declare: 'We intended to do good, but *they* did something bad.'

This conjunction of the first two points stands in tension with our recognition that all intentions must be for a perceived good. The conjunction can make it culturally and psychologically very difficult for people to appreciate that others intend some good, that there is always some description of any persons' intentions that make sense of their actions as directed to some good. Difficult though it may be, having peaceful relations implies employing this third idea, and this requires overcoming the epistemological asymmetry described earlier.

However, the last point provides a seedling insight. In any conflict, there is a reason for me to think that there is some description of the situation that my enemy thinks of as good, which I too could recognize as good. This suggests that I should acknowledge that, but without necessarily committing to agree with the person's (or my enemy's) judgments. In short, one should acknowledge that, in principle, one could step into the shoes of even one's worst enemy by recognizing that their point view must sense.

Returning to the principle of equality of persons, as we already said, it is a corrective to this kind of epistemological asymmetry. Point 3 above stands in a close relationship with the principle of equal reality of persons. It instantiates the principle: one way to implicitly deny the equal reality of all persons in action is to deny that others have intentions aimed at some good. One way

to affirm the principle in one's actions is to respect that others' intentions are aimed at some good. When we fall prey to the asymmetry, we violate the principle of equal reality. Insofar as we do so, we succumb to the childish illusion that I am more real and more important than others. This illusion amounts to the incapacity to appreciate and to come to terms with reality that transcends the egocentric perspective of experience. This includes the incapacity to see a situation from the point of view of the other, including to understand and appreciate the good that the other wills or desires. We shall discuss this kind of ignorance later in this chapter.

Understanding Others

We will now build on or amplify the asymmetry described earlier, and briefly characterize its importance for understanding close human relations, such as family relationships and friendships. The aim is to reveal the deep dynamics of the conflicts that lead to violence in such relations.⁵ How does a conflict between friends spiral into violence? In answer to this question, consider the following: (a) We tend to judge ourselves by our good intentions and others by the results of their actions; (b) We tend to assume that we understand others better than they understand us; (c) We tend to underestimate the differences between ourselves and others; (d) We tend to be ignorant of our ignorance of others. We contend that (a) implies (b) implies (c) implies (d). Cumulatively (a)-(d) specify a set of predispositions that indicate how one necessarily tends to fail the condition outlined in (e) People's intentions are always primarily directed toward some perceived good.

Concerning the first tendency, if someone close to me hurts me then the tendency is for me to attend to the effect of her action, such as the pain caused. Given this, I will attribute to her the action of causing me pain and, from this, the intention to act in this manner. From this basis, it is easy for me to blame her, and build up a grievance. This tendency is amplified because I do not see the broader past context that led to my friend causing me pain. Specifically, there is a tendency for me to see my own past actions as directed at some good, as a lily-white background. It may not even occur to me that they might be seen quite differently by my friend. My grievance is increased.

The second tendency augments this effect. The egocentrism present in the first principle yields the claim that I can understand others better than they can understand me. In effect, the idea is that they can't have access to

my mental states, but I can understand theirs through their behavior. I don't see that they may be in precisely the same epistemological situation. In short, the same double standard that express itself in (a) leads to (b). This reinforces my attribution of bad intentions to the other person: 'I understand you well, but you haven't understood me: you didn't see my good intentions.' The felt failure of the other person to perceive or appreciate my good intentions becomes potentially a new source of grievance. Indeed, I may feel this failure as a quasi-intended act on the part of my now *former*-friend: 'She didn't appreciate my good intentions because she didn't care enough: she was hostile.' The inherent epistemological tendencies, the expanded asymmetries, lead to a new round of imputing negative intentions to the other. Furthermore, we can imagine that my former friend is doing the same concerning me. If I perceive this in her mannerisms, facial expressions, tone of voice and word choices, then this will further increase the antagonism. Likewise, she may perceive the same of me. The mutual grievances are escalating. Enmity is brewing.

The third adds a new dimension to this whole process. I see the quarrel between us in a certain way, and because I underestimate the differences between us, I tend to assume that she ought to be seeing it in the same way too. The fact that she doesn't see it the same way reinforces my idea that she has ill-will. Another way to articulate the same point: I take my perspective on the situation as the natural one. I assume that she would have the same view if it weren't for her ill-will. Therefore, her failure to agree with me is further evidence of her ill-will. This adds fuel to my grievance. Meanwhile, she is undergoing through the same process of attributing ill-will to me. We are on a collision course.

The fourth tendency adds insult to injury. As we shall see later, the very nature of ignorance is such that the person who is ignorant tends to not know that she is so: the person who doesn't know that P will tend to not know that he doesn't know P. This is a very important idea in inter-personal relationships: our ignorance of our ignorance. Indeed, it is a peculiarly Socratic virtue to be aware of one's ignorance, and it is a virtue that requires a humility and self-consciousness that unfortunately few of us have.

In my squabble with my former friend, I have imputed to her several layers of bad intentions: she hurt me intentionally; she failed to understand my good intentions because of her ill-will; she didn't see things in the right way because of those bad intentions. In this process of blame, I am deepening my grievances and brewing my rancor. Meanwhile, she has been through a similar process with regard to me. The violent nature of the conflict is reinforced by

the fact that we are both ignorant of the viewpoint of the other. The injury is sealed or capped with an insult: I don't even recognize my own ignorance of her point of view. It hasn't even occurred to me that I have missed out something of relevance and importance, namely how she sees the squabble and the events that led up to it. Given this second-order ignorance, I tend to portray my view of the situation as the natural default position: 'This is how any reasonable person would see things. My ex-friend doesn't see it that way. This must be because she has ill-will.' My hypothesis of her ill-will is thereby substantiated yet again! I am ignorant of the idea that this is a failed hermeneutic, an important dialogue that remains in the realm of the counterfactual. What persists is in the realm of the actual only: hurt and grievances.

The first four tendencies are antagonistic with the fifth, i.e. (e), which claims that all intentions must be for some good. This means that there is some description of my friend's earlier intentions that make sense of her actions in terms of some good. To understand those intentions in this manner requires a willingness on my part to see the whole process that led up to the squabble from his point of view; and likewise, a willingness on my part to see my own actions from her point of view, however unpleasant that may be. This doesn't mean that I must agree with the other person's judgments, only that I recognize emotionally there is some description of the situation as seen by her that portrays her intentions as aimed at some good and which I could see as good myself. This condition is a requisite for understanding others.

Inter-Group Relations

Now, we can turn to how impersonal group relations differ from more personal face-to-face relationships. In practice, the difference between impersonal group relations and personal face-to-face relationships will be one of degree, and any relationship may involve both kinds of element. Nevertheless, despite these points, there are differences of principle. One of these is captured well by Alfred Schutz: face-to-face relations involve reciprocal mirroring of direct experiences between the persons; impersonal social relations between contemporaries involve an ideal type or role, or a typification (such as a ticket collector).⁶ Such typifications will include what we later refer to as identity-markers (Chapter 6). Another difference, which we have already mentioned, is that, because humans live in groups, we have affiliations and allegiances, which implies that insofar as we identify non-derivatively with some group,

we tend not to identify with some other groups. Social identities tend to be exclusionary. This exclusion defines the scope of solidarity. In short, insofar as we identify with one group X to the exclusion of another group Y, we will feel solidarity with members of X and not with those of group Y. The third difference is that impersonal social relations are power-relations, which means that they are political. This implies that one group will likely to exercise power over the other, and this aspect of the relationship will have a history typically perceived very differently by the two or more sides.

These three differences transform the basic principles outlined above. In other words, the dynamics of impersonal social relations will follow the same tendencies as face-to-face relations, but will do so very differently because of typifications and identity allegiances. This modulation is especially significant because the impersonal involves historically rooted power relations (which isn't to say that such power relations are absent from personal relationships). Let's examine how the dynamics of impersonal social relations modulate the tendencies of face to face relations.

First, part of what it means to identify with a group is that one has the tendency to take for granted the good that *we* as a group intend, and to ignore the good that *they* in the other group intend. We will tend to judge the other groups by the results of their actions. However, in the case of groups, this tendency is intensified because it becomes a socially accepted norm. On the one side, it becomes an allegiance to the group identity to perceive relevant situations in a collective way: to affirm the good *we* as a group intend. On the other side, it becomes a typification to ignore the good that *they* may intend and to read *their* actions as typically directed toward something bad. This typification can become part of the allegiance. The tacit declaration: 'We intended to do good but *they* did something bad.' becomes a social norm that members of the group are expected to follow. In short, the personal epistemological asymmetry described earlier tends to become more forceful when it is socialized between groups. Furthermore, insofar as it becomes solidified in a culture, it acquires the momentum of being a history. It becomes ingrained in group's collective memory.

This dynamic turns conflict into intergroup and intercommunal violence. The intensified epistemological asymmetry becomes a constant source of grievance. Insofar as it is written into local history, the asymmetry transforms a set of grievances into a hateful prejudice. What starts off as exclusion becomes a tendency to think of us as the good guys and they as the bad guys.

In conclusion, in an impersonal or inter-group context, the first tendency, i.e. (a) above, becomes much more pernicious.

Second, the asymmetry gets extended: we tend to assume that other groups do not understand us (or, at least, not as well as we understand them). This can become a ground for attributing bad intentions to the other group: 'They don't understand us because they don't want to.' This can develop over time into a fully-fledged grievance, which the other group in turn perceives as a hostility, and which fuels a vicious cycle of imputing negative intentions between the groups. Schutz himself elaborates this same point when he claims that the in-group takes its interpretations of the world for granted, as a given, as if it were a part of nature. In contrast, the out-group does not hold these interpretations as self-evident. As a result, the in-group will feel that the out-group's failure to understand its way of life 'is rooted in hostile prejudice and bad faith' because the in-group assumes that its own interpretations are self-evident. The out-group will sense that the in-group perceives them with hostility, and a cycle of misinterpretation is established.⁷

Third, the whole dynamic is also enhanced by the fact that the in-group tends to underestimate the differences between it and the other groups. In short, both the second and third tendencies, i.e. (b) and (c), magnify the effects of the first tendency.

Fourth, we may be utterly unaware that this is happening, and quite ignorant of our own misinterpretations of and ignorance of the other group. Given this second-order ignorance, we tend to portray the situation as a natural condition, rather than as the result of a failed hermeneutic. This whole cycle occurs as series of painful emotional misinterpretations. It is felt as hurt, grievance, anger, hatred and fear. It consists in feeling alienated, attacked, belittled and blamed. The emotional nature of the cycle signifies that people have their hearts and their self-perceptions invested in these emotional interpretations.

In sum, as epistemological asymmetry tends to underlie our interpersonal and inter-group relations, there always exists the possibility of antagonism in all relationships, even relationships among larger groups, such as ethnic and religious communities. We can even take such tendencies internationally to relationships between countries. Given such possibility of antagonism and violent tendency in our relationships at all levels, how do we develop structures and processes that are peaceful and that can help defuse antagonism and calm violence? We will address these questions specifically in Chapter 6, and Chapter 10, and also in the remainder of the book.

Conclusion

In a peaceful relationship, both parties appreciate and treat the other person or persons in the other group as a being of non-instrumental or primary value, and equally so. In such a relationship, any conflicts between the two people or two groups won't disturb their mutual perception and treatment as persons of equal worth. Unpeacefulness in relationships consists in instrumentalization or dehumanization or underappreciation, because these are ways of treating the other person or persons in another group as less valuable. This is important for well-being because well-being requires that others can become a part of one's life, and this requires that the relationships must be peaceful in this manner.

In this chapter, we argued for the principle that the life of all people matters equally: no individual human life is non-instrumentally more valuable than any other. This principle serves as a corrective to a deeply rooted epistemological asymmetry, which tends toward antagonism and violence if unchecked. The upshot of the asymmetry is that we tend to attribute good intentions to ourselves and bad intentions to others. We examined how this asymmetry constitutes a form of hostile breakdown in face-to-face relationships, and how it tends to be self-reinforcing. We also examined the dynamics of this asymmetry is enhanced in impersonal relationships, such as those involving groups and power relations.

The antidote to this escalating antagonism is to remember that other people's intentions are primarily aimed at some good. This is implied by the fact that their actions make sense in a public language. This means that we can also recognize the good that others *primarily* aim at, although this doesn't mean that we must endorse or condone their actions. If we are peaceful in our relations, then this idea will guide our interpretation of the intentions of others. This antidote stands in a close relationship with the principle of equal value of persons. This is because when we interpret others in terms of the idea that they primarily aim at something bad, we *ipso facto* demonize them. One way to implicitly deny the equal value and reality of all persons in action is to deny that others have intentions primarily aimed at the good. As we shall argue in Chapter 4, in deep dialogue, individuals and groups participate in a process that can enhance mutual recognition and allow each to enter the other's reality.

Notes

1. See also Thomson and Gill (forthcoming, 2019).
2. The best explanation of a certain kind.
3. We shall elaborate more on this in Chapter 4.
4. This doesn't imply that all virtue is knowledge as Plato claimed.
5. Thomson, G. (2017). "Towards a Theory of Peaceful Relations", in D. Cadman and S. Gill (eds.). *Peacefulness: Being Peace, Making Peace*, Reykjavik: Spirit of Humanity Forum Press.
6. Schutz, A. (1970). *Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology and Social Relations*, edited by Helmut R. Wagner, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
7. pp. 53–56 and pp. 243–248, Schutz, A. (1976). *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

TOWARD DEEP DIALOGUE

In Chapter 3, we established that all basic intentions must be for some good. This applies to the intentions of all persons and groups, including one's worst enemy and the seemingly most evil groups. Even those persons' intentions can be described in ways that make sense of their actions in terms of something good. Thus, one can reasonably recognize such good in those other's intentions. This doesn't mean that one must agree with or endorse those people's judgments! But it does imply that it is possible to step into the shoes of one's most hated enemy and recognize their good intentions. This is implied by the claim that their point of view makes sense to them in a public language. This condition is a requisite for understanding others. In other words, this requires a hermeneutical attitude of openness: 'The other could be right!'. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, there are four tendencies that work against one attaining this condition. These tendencies reinforce one's personal bias, eventually converting it from mistaken judgement about others into blind ignorance, and from prejudice into a culture of discrimination. This indicates that we need hermeneutical processes that enable us to overcome these tendencies to be able to understand others.

Such hermeneutical processes need to meet another fundamental condition. In Chapter 2, we described inner peacefulness in terms of the self-

identifications that we make and examined spiritual and humanistic characterizations of the nature of the I to depict inner peacefulness as a central aspect of individual well-being. This suggests an important conclusion, namely that these more spiritual self-identifications are more socially inclusive, and because of this, they are more peaceful interpersonally (as well as intra-personally). In this way, the relevant 'us-versus-them' needn't be a violent contrast. For example, if we self-identify as human, the excluded class is the non-human; if we self-identify as temporary waves in the ocean of the divine energy, then the contrast class is the divine energy without waves. In this sense, spiritual self-identifications are more universalist or cosmopolitan.¹ Because they are more inclusive, they indicate the willingness to feel kindred-ness irrespective of social affiliations and allegiances. They constitute the ground of wider solidarity.

In sharp contrast, when the afore-mentioned tendencies are embedded in social group identities, they become antagonistic and violent. Differences become the basis for divisions. For example, with respect to social and economic power, the more those who are powerful live in a narrow sense of 'we', the less they will show solidarity towards the 'they' who are less powerful. In short, we need hermeneutical processes that shift the basic self-identifications of the participants toward more spiritual or human basic self-identifications, which help remove the antagonism tendency in the 'us-versus-them'. We propose that such hermeneutical processes are best captured in deep dialogue.

A Clarification of Terms

By 'dialogue', we mean those interchanges aimed at better human understanding, mutual trust and more congenial interpersonal and intergroup relationships. Clearly dialogue can serve multiple purposes, but dialogue itself is also more than merely a means to an end because it is also a way of being with each other. For now, let's focus on the clarification of terms that tend to be placed within the contexts of dialogue.

What we call 'deep dialogue' must be distinguished from other processes of resolving conflicts.² Indeed, so-called 'conflict resolution' typically contains a range of activities with conflict settlement at one end, and conflict transformation at the other. Conflict settlement is peace-making between conflictive parties to avoid direct violence.³ Conflict transformation is the project of overcoming structural and cultural violence through the transformation of

the problematic of the conflict.⁴ Violent conflicts often seem intractable: they continue for decades or more, and the parties may show little willingness to negotiate, let alone dialogue. However, dialogue has integrated some of the processes aimed at reducing and resolving violent conflicts, some implicit and others explicit. We shall briefly review five broad approaches for dealing with apparently intractable conflicts:⁵

- a. *Negotiation and mediation*: Negotiation is a discussion between the parties with the goal of reaching an agreement. Although many negotiations are between two parties, there is no limit to the number of disputants who can take part in negotiation. Mediation is a negotiation in which one or more outsiders, or third parties assist the disputants in reaching the goal. Arbitration or adjudication is when a third party makes a binding decision about the conflict.⁶ There are many styles of negotiation and mediation.⁷ In some cases, facilitated dialogue is considered as a tool during processes of negotiation and mediation.⁸ In other cases, dialogue consists only in informal communications between the parties involved in a negotiation and mediation.⁹
- b. *Interactive problem-solving*: Interactive problem solving is regarded as an unofficial, third-party approach to resolving intercommunal and international conflicts.¹⁰ According to this approach, which draws heavily on social psychology principles, the core of conflict resolution is problem-solving and, in particular, how to reframe adversarial win-lose competition into a shared problem that can be solved through cooperation.¹¹ This approach usually combines so-called 'objective' and 'subjective' factors. Dialogue does not feature significantly in interactive problem-solving.
- c. *Dialogic conflict resolution*: This approach differs from problem-solving and negotiation primarily because it is directed toward increasing understanding and trust between the parties. Dialogues are not necessarily aimed directly at providing a solution to a conflict, but rather at understanding and recognizing the cultures and misapprehensions that breed it. Additionally, dialogues are usually informal and involve non-governmental organizations and members of the public as opposed to formal representatives of the parties involved.¹² The dialogical approach aimed at conflict resolution is based on different approaches to encounter and understanding, such as philosophical hermeneutics,¹³ social psychology,¹⁴ relational theories,¹⁵ as well as communication theories.

- d. *Conflict transformation*: Recently, many peace writers have moved away from mainstream negotiation, problem-solving and dialogic conflict resolution approaches towards conflict transformation. Typically, a conflict seems to have an ‘either...or’ structure: either A or B. For example, either Jerusalem is part of Israel, or it is part of Palestine. In this vein, John-Paul Lederach criticizes ‘either–or’ frameworks, and argues for seeing conflicts as complex webs of interactions that can only be transformed by ‘the moral imagination’.¹⁶ The transformational model looks toward alternative structures, such as ‘neither–nor’ or ‘and–and’.¹⁷ The two parties work towards ‘finding how their contradictions could be transcended and their perspectives combined in a higher unity’.¹⁸
- e. *Argumentative discourse*: This idea has its roots in the theories of Habermas. Argumentative discourse is the attempt to convince someone of one’s position or view through argumentation. It is adversarial without necessarily being antagonistic. As we shall see, Ramsbotham defines a special layered kind of argumentative discourse.

Clearly all these approaches focus on transcending hostile and unpeaceful relationships between peoples and groups. As already argued, truly transformative approaches will be rooted in a recognition of inner peacefulness through a spiritual self-identification and enabling peoples to harmonize secondary self-identifications. We propose that this requires deep dialogue.

Features of Deep Dialogue

The discussion from Chapter 3 sets out two fundamental principles of good dialogue which indicate that one can ‘step into’ the shoes of others (even if it is one’s own feet in the shoes of the other) and that understanding others requires that one does so.¹⁹ However, the epistemological asymmetries can make this very difficult, and group identities accentuate those difficulties, and can turn them into culturally crystalized violent antagonisms. In short, group identities often act as an accelerator of antagonistic conflict. The emotional implication of this is violence. As already discussed, these group identifications are inherently unpeaceful in two ways. First, they tend to take us away from (and are inconsistent with) more spiritually grounded self-identifications, which are inwardly more peaceful. In other words, they are anti-spiritual. Second, they establish the ‘what-is-not-me’ (or the differentiation) as relationally antagonistic. The ‘they’ becomes less valua-

ble than the 'us'. This contradicts the principle that all persons have equal intrinsic value.

The term 'deep dialogue' indicates a kind of dialogue that involves sharing and listening to each other non-judgmentally and openly, with the aim of transcending these non-derivative identifications and their underlying dynamics. The term 'deep dialogue' indicates a willingness to enter the subjectivity of someone who one would previously consider as an enemy. We include forgiveness and reconciliation processes as instances of deep dialogue as we shall illustrate in Chapter 5. We shall now bring the ideas from the previous chapters together to elucidate the nature of deep dialogue.

First, deep dialogue is valuable in itself. In post-war situations, peace NGOs working in the field sometimes offer experiential workshops in which people share their narratives, perceptions and pain, mostly as a means towards social healing and reconstruction. It is *therapy*, and despite the fact that it involves listening, empathy and transformation, it is not deep dialogue. In the build-up to war, dialogue is employed mainly to help avoid violence. It is *prevention*. In these cases, the different groups may be talking to each other merely as a means to some other end pertaining to violence.

However, the idea of deep dialogue goes beyond this instrumentalization. Given the asymmetries described in Chapter 3, such dialogue is *a part* of having peaceful relations. It isn't simply a means. It is intrinsically valuable because it is a constitutive aspect of peaceful relations. Families that don't talk to each other aren't peaceful, even when they don't fight. In short, we should embed dialogue in our day-to-day life in our families, workplaces and communities, for its own sake. It is more like healthy living, and less like taking pills before and after a medical operation. This means that deep dialogue shouldn't be instrumentalized. As soon as it becomes merely a means to serve a political purpose, it is no longer a deep dialogue. Its content cannot be imposed from outside the community, but must emerge from a transformative process within a community.

Second, deep dialogue contains an implicit commitment to the equal value (and reality) of all persons. This expresses a democratic ideal, namely the quality and equality of listening. The traditional definitions of democracy tend to focus on the right to voice one's views. However, voice means nothing unless there is relevant and appropriate listening. If democracy requires an equality of voice, then it also requires an openness of *ears* that respects such equality, especially from those with political and economic power. This suggests that *violence is the failure of dialogue*. Violent are those who feel that their

voices have not been heard. Violence is either the last resort of those who feel that they have not been listened to or it is the first resort of those who feel that they know that they will not be listened to. In both these ways, violence is the failure of dialogue.

If people persistently do not understand each other then, they do not perceive the descriptions of the good that the other accepts as good. However, abstractly speaking, there is some description of what one's 'greatest' enemy intends that renders it good and intelligible. Deep dialogue requires being willing to enter this space of the other, i.e. their point of view that renders them apparently evil intentions as containing some good that makes these intentions intelligible. This may require much contextualization, especially in terms of the historical processes that made such intentions seem good. From a phenomenological perspective, it means that, to accept that we are equals, we must be willing to enter the point of view of the other.²⁰ If we are not so willing, then this means that we have abandoned the ethical principle that all people are equally real, and that we are treating the epistemological asymmetry of egoism as a given.

Third, as we saw earlier, deep dialogical processes are aimed at transforming the basic self-identifications that would otherwise permit the formation of antagonistic social identities. Such dialogues function by enabling the person to self-identify non-derivatively with themselves in more spiritual ways: for example, as a human or a person or an I rather than primarily as a member of a specific social group. (Note that the suggestion isn't that people shouldn't identify with the relevant social groupings; rather it is that they shouldn't identify *non-derivatively* with such categories.) Deep dialogue requires encounters that treat the other as a being of equal value. This means that the more I perceive my former enemy as a person, the more I identify myself primarily as a person (and less as the member of the antagonistic group). By humanizing my perception of the other, I similarly transform my identification of myself, so that it aligns more closely with what I am. Insofar as this happens, my identity as a member of a group becomes derivative. Good dialogues weaken antagonistic group identities. They shift self-identification toward the spiritual or the human, and in so doing, they undermine violent forms of 'us-versus-them'.

This has two profound implications. First, peaceful relations require that we transcend the dichotomy between victim and aggressor. Following from the epistemological asymmetry, people and groups will always be prone or tend to perceive themselves as victims, and see their relevant others (the en-

emy) as aggressors. It is difficult to perceive oneself (and the groups that one identifies with) as aggressors. Likewise, it is difficult to see the others with whom we don't identify, as victims. We tend to see them as perpetrators. This tendency isn't something contingent. It is built into a combination of two factors: the subjectivity of our experience and our general tendencies to self-identify. As soon as we identify ourselves in a group as victims, this automatically implies that we have grievances against others whom we see as aggressors. We hold on to how *we* have been hurt or humiliated by the others. We focus on how *we* have been denigrated and badly treated in the past. We tend to conclude that the other is an aggressor who has bad intentions. These kinds of subjectivities, both individual and collective, render conflictual relations non-peaceful. Consequently, peacefulness requires transcending subjectivities defined in terms of victim and aggressor.

Transcending such subjectivities doesn't mean that the victim of violence should negate the injustice that has been done to them. It doesn't mean that those who have been transgressed should deny that they have. In fact, it may involve a process of more fully accepting that one was victimized. Likewise, it may require accepting that one is a perpetrator. It doesn't require ignoring or accepting or condoning existing power relations and the violent exercise of power. It doesn't mean that the powerless must resign themselves to their position as less powerful. Rather it means that peaceful relations require not self-identifying oneself non-derivatively as a victim.

The idea of such dialogue may *seem* to place onus on the people who are less powerful and on those who have been wronged. This appearance often presents itself as another injustice: 'We were victimized; we suffered violence; and now we are expected to forgive. Why should the weak forgive the strong?' In reply, deep dialogue cannot have forgiveness as an expected outcome. It consists in transformative sharing, which is the essence of deep dialogue. The aim of such listening and sharing is that people can transcend the victim and aggressor dichotomy as part of a healing process. If it is successful, this may express itself as some form of forgiveness, but it need not. Entering a deep dialogue doesn't require the powerless to deny these injustices nor to forgive them. Furthermore, such dialogues will also place onus on those who have wronged, and on those who are in positions of greater power. For example, for a combatant to share, in deep dialogue, with the families of those whom he killed places him under the expectation that he will recognize the wrongdoing, feel remorse, apologize, and even ask for forgiveness. Likewise, with those in positions of power.

The second implication is that deep dialogue nourishes an awareness of a spiritual 'we'—oneself and others are equally real and non-derivatively valuable as persons or as conscious beings. The more deeply one understands why a person thinks, feels and acts as they do, the more one enters their phenomenological and hermeneutical space, and the more one perceives the other as a person like oneself. In this sense, dialogue humanizes. In so doing, dialogue dissolves identity politics and transcends the antagonisms of a non-derivative 'us' versus 'them'. Spiritual 'we'-ness implies that groups and communities are no longer separated like individual units, each existing apart within a separate identification reference. Deep dialogue makes spiritual 'we'-ness possible through open listening, sharing and experiencing emotions, which can engender a deep connection with one's own and the others' common humanity. At this level, the experience of humanity can be called 'spiritual'. This spiritual 'we'-ness in dialogue does not require ignoring differences between people's interests and needs, nor their worldviews and cultural understandings. On the contrary, it is precisely due to this 'we'-ness that people can become more acutely appreciative of these differences, which are essential for dialogue and encounter to be meaningful and transformative.²¹ The rich differences in people's perspectives, worldviews and practices remain abundant rather than being replaced by facile consensualism and relativism. Indeed, by encountering differences, including prejudgments and misunderstandings, people can become more open to the lived realities and perspectives of others, and can engage with one another's horizons.²²

Fourth, dialogue processes can enable people to explore together the roots of violence at micro and macro levels. Dialogue can encourage people who were formerly in antagonistic relations to explore violence as symptoms of deeper systemic causes, and imagine institutional, cultural and even structural shifts toward positive peacefulness. We will return to this point in Chapter 9.

These four features can help us define deep dialogue. At the heart of deep dialogue lies human or spiritual encounter of one another in the form of sharing. Such encounter or sharing provides the opportunity for persons to transcend one's own subjectivities, for instance, as a victim (and the other as aggressor). It allows us to understand how others perceive the relevant situations such that they see themselves as willing the good. It permits us to enter the phenomenological reality of their point of view. In this sense, it consists in the possibility of listening with openness and with the willingness to question and correct one's own presuppositions.²³ It is defined by the qualities of listening.

While these points help to define ‘deep dialogue’, in this section we also introduced an important idea, namely that deep dialogue is a necessary aspect of peaceful social relations. Any dialogue that leads to transformation will have implications for shifting one’s attitudes, ways of being and actions. The personally meaningful exploration of a violent conflict will have implications for the mode of being, and thus for the actions of the participants, including future interactions. Here is an example. Robi Damelin, an Israeli mother, and Basswam Aramin, a Palestinian father, are two parents who each lost a child in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. They lessened their suffering from these losses by engaging in a dialogical process of mutual understanding. Through their attempts to understand each other, they arrived at a shared sense of the need to end violence between their communities through dialogue. By listening to each other, Robi and Basswam recognized that, during nearly 50 years of Palestinians and Israelis killing each other, grievances and feelings of revenge have served to continue this bloodshed, which has resulted in more victims, more pain. Such grievances and feelings perpetuate the cycles of violence. By becoming members of a Parents’ Circle, Robi and Basswam came to see that, to reduce the killing, it is necessary to engage in dialogue, and to involve politicians in such processes. Dialogue is the anchor of any reconciliation framework.²⁴

Instilling a culture of dialogue helps cut across antagonistic ‘identity’ divisions, and it opens-up spaces for engaging in relationships. Because they invite listening and sharing, deep dialogues involve compassion and often a ‘change of heart’. Such dialogues may help people better understand where their group’s interests and values are located within a given society and how the economic political system has shaped their lives.

Replies to Some Objections

The idea that we can design dialogic processes that take us toward positive peacefulness faces some theoretical objections. First is the idea that some people are inherently ill-willed or aggressive or egoistical and that, because of this, they cannot participate in deep dialogue in the required ways. The second adds the idea that the powerful have nothing to gain from such processes except the continuation of the status-quo. From this, it follows that oppressed or marginalized people have nothing to gain from such processes either. Understanding the oppressor won’t change the fact of oppression. By trying to

transcend political divides, peace dialogues are inadvertently politically supportive of the status quo. Third is the claim that war or violent conflict is sometimes unavoidable: some peace processes are bound to fail because the two parties would not be able to see eye to eye. The best that we can hope for is to limit physical violence through the forceful interventions of the appropriate institutions, such as the police and the army. Sometimes, violent involvement is required to prevent an even greater injustice. Fourth is the claim that, in general, we live in social institutions and systems that cannot be deeply improved. The idea isn't so much that we couldn't imagine better arrangements, but rather that we are stuck with what we have got. We might hope for small but important reforms (say to the tax system) but not systemic transformation. Finally, there is the more general suggestion that normative thinking is better when it is more realistic. It is better not to be too idealistic.

There may well be other objections. For now, we will try to answer these one by one throughout this book. Let us start in this chapter with the first and second.²⁵

None of the five broad approaches to conflict resolution mentioned earlier are guaranteed to succeed. However, the important question is whether in principle they *might*. Some writers contend that the faith in that they might is misplaced. In this section, we will examine two major objections along these lines. If reaching understanding through dialogue isn't possible then there may not be no need to engage in dialogue at all. The same applies to negotiation, mediation, problem-solving, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. If there are instances in which none of these peaceful processes work, then violent conflict is inevitable. In which case, the issue at hand is no longer how to attain peacefulness, but rather how to contain violence.

Radical Disagreement

Ramsbotham argues that the first four conflict resolution methodologies systematically underestimate the possibility of radical disagreement.²⁶ As a result, he suggests that parties to a persistent radical disagreement shouldn't engage in dialogue. If what the other says is patently absurd, morally repugnant or murderous then one should *not* engage in a dialogue even to 'expand' one's sympathy and enrich one's comprehension of the other's position. In such a case, one's aim should be show that the other is either factually mistaken, morally wrong or insincere.²⁷ Furthermore, he claims that the rules of

dialogue, such as that each should listen to the other with mutual respect, are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of radical disagreement.

According to Ramsbotham, the misunderstanding consists in trying to assimilate disagreement to difference. He points out that the phrase 'subjective factors' lumps together cognitive believing and non-cognitive feeling, obscuring the differences between them. When two people or groups have contradictory beliefs, they disagree. The disagreement is a contradiction: *p* and not-*p*. To describe this as 'one side asserts "*p*" and the other "*not-p*"' misses the contradiction.²⁸ *Disagreement* is fundamentally different from a non-cognitive *difference* of attitude, which doesn't involve contradiction: if you have one attitude and I have the opposite, there is no disagreement between us, only difference. There is only disagreement once we add in a cognitive element, such as the claim that only this or my attitude is correct. These differences between believing and feeling are critical for understanding radical disagreement and intractable conflicts. Ramsbotham argues that dialogues preclude radical disagreement; they require that conflicts of belief are treated as differences rather than as real disagreement. For this reason, there is always the possibility that 'more interchange will deepen mistrust, or that more understanding will make it even clearer to participants why they hate each other.'²⁹

Ramsbotham also contends that conflict transformation fares no better. He notes that Lederach advocates 'constructive engagement with those people and things we least understand and most fear', i.e. dialogue with 'political and ideological enemies'.³⁰ However, he argues that, because conflict transformation requires transcending either/or approaches, it cannot take radical disagreement seriously. Radical disagreement assumes an either/or: either *p* or not *p*.

According to Ramsbotham, to understand radical disagreement, we need to stop underestimating and hiding it. In radical disagreement, two enemies disagree concerning what the conflict is about, and what the relevant concepts and distinctions are. To regard this as a coexistence of two discourses or subjectivities is to misidentify what is in fact 'a fight to the death to impose the one discourse.'³¹ The disagreement is about how to name or identify some object, such as a territory or city. This means that third-party descriptions of radical disagreement are bound to be inadequate because they don't get to the contradiction. At best, they juxtapose the different narratives.

For Ramsbotham, the apparent intractability of radical disagreement and the inadequacy of third-party descriptions is a prelude to a new kind of argumentative discourse, which he calls 'the strategic engagement of discourses' (SED). The general idea is to acknowledge the force of the existing conflict

dynamic and to work with it, rather than against it.³² SED functions at three levels. First, there is the intra-party: each party works to strengthen its own positions and internal unity. Second, the inter-party SED: in this strategic engagement, each party's main aim is, once again, not to understand the other, but to win. The third is third-party SED: the discourses of those third parties, who may claim to be disinterested peacemakers but who are now recognized as another discourse struggling to occupy the discursive space.³³ Ramsbotham says that these three levels form a natural dynamic for managing linguistic intractability when conflict settlement and conflict transformation avenues are blocked.³⁴

Note that Ramsbotham isn't arguing that there are conflicts that can't be resolved. He is arguing that the first four types of resolution misunderstand an important facet of any conflict, and hence systematically under-evaluate the intractability of conflicts. In fact, he adds to a new variant to the fifth category, argumentative discourse.

Although Ramsbotham is not objecting directly to our earlier claims, nevertheless, we still need to reply to this line of thought. There are two important points. The first is Ramsbotham's assertion that dialogues are *primarily* aimed at increasing understanding and trust between two parties to a conflict (rather than seeking a resolution). There are many types of dialogue, but his characterization under-describes some of them. Deep dialogues seek a psychological transformation in those involved. The very fact that one is willing or committed to listen is already to suggest that one respects the other; being open in a conversation is itself an ethical act.³⁵ When properly facilitated, the process of listening to people from the other side who recount deeply personal stories can be very moving. As people become closer in their feelings, the social dehumanizing of the other, which constitutes part of the violence of the conflict, will be reversed. The dehumanization unravels. This kind of experience may constitute a shift in the person's basic self-identifications. Insofar as that identification required an unpeaceful 'us-versus-them', when reversing the dehumanizing comprises a shift in the person's basic self-identifications, turning the 'us-versus-them' into a 'us together' or 'we'. This can be felt as a release and as healing. Returning to the themes of Chapter 2, sometimes, it is felt almost as a spiritual experience of transformation. In effect, the identity shift removes some violent tendencies from the conflict.

However, Ramsbotham might well ask: does this eradicate the contradiction between what the parties believe is true? He will insist that if it doesn't, then the radical disagreement persists. In reply, even if the two parties remain

in a contradiction expressed as ‘p and not p’, nevertheless, they may still undergo very significant shifts in their beliefs. The meaning of any belief is both indeterminate and holistic. It is indeterminate because the content of any belief is not infinitely precise. Also, the meaning and importance of the belief is defined in part by its relationship with other beliefs that the person holds, and these may change. If we focus on disagreement about single atomistic propositions, the conflict may appear intractable. As the result of a dialogue, the epistemological contexts within which this disagreement is embedded may change, and this may shift the meanings that the disagreement has to the two parties. In short, even if the contradiction persists, it may matter in very different ways than before, after a deep dialogue that has changed the basic self-identifications of the participants.

From Antagonistic to Agonistic

Chantal Mouffe argues that the political is inherently antagonistic, and that instead of designing institutions intended to reconcile enemies and eliminate antagonisms, we should look for a vibrant public sphere of contestation which is agonistic.³⁶ This claim contrasts antagonism with agonism.³⁷ While the former is violent, the latter isn’t. When antagonism is domesticated and tamed within a democratic *agon* (contestation), ‘enemies’ become ‘adversaries’ and antagonism becomes agonism. In agonistic space, adversaries have a respect for each other and for the democratic ‘rules of the game’ that define ‘democratic politics’.³⁸

Mouffe challenges the rationalist assumption that competing interests can be reconciled in a liberal rational consensus. She also questions the idea that conflictual and partisan us-versus-them identifications can be rationally eliminated because such a view ignores the affective dimension of the political.

These aspects of Mouffe’s critique are directed to the ideal rational consensus that seems to be implicit in the discourse ethics of the German philosopher, Habermas. Habermas argues that the practice of argumentative discourse contains various normative presuppositions, which he described originally in terms of an ideal speech situation.³⁹ These presuppositions are that (1) no-one of relevance has been excluded; (2) all participants have equal voice, (3) participants are free to articulate their opinion without deception or self-deception, and (4) there are no sources of coercion built into the process of the discourse. Habermas thinks that these presuppositions, which are implicit in our discourse practices, have an ethical content relevant for democratic

institutions. He articulates the idea that a moral norm is valid if and only if (roughly speaking) it is acceptable to all concerned without coercion.⁴⁰ While this is a very rushed precis of Habermas' rich thought, nevertheless, it enables us to characterize Mouffe's discontents. First, she argues that power-free discourse spaces are impossible. Second, she argues that Habermas' rational consensus is a false ideal because it implicitly portrays antagonistic conflict as irrational. Third, being rational, Habermas' theory tends to ignore the non-rational and affective aspects of politics.

Do Mouffe's criticisms of Habermas apply to the conclusions that we have drawn about peacefulness and deep dialogue in this book? By defining peacefulness as a potential feature of conflict and by underscoring the fact that conflict is ineliminable, our view of peacefulness is in line with Mouffe's characterization of the political as conflictual. Nevertheless, Mouffe emphasizes two points that seem to contradict the tenor of this book. First, like Ramsbotham, she indicates that reconciliation may be impossible, and that persons can only hope that antagonistic conflicts become agonistic (i.e. respectful). This suggests that she thinks that the kinds of mutual understanding sought by deep dialogue, and the practical outcomes sought by conflict transformation, may be impossible. It indicates that she thinks that politics requires living in non-peaceful conflicts. Second, she argues that it is impossible to transcend the adversarial 'us-versus-them' identifications, whereas we have argued that spiritual practices and successful dialogue-processes can transcend such self-identifications by enlarging our sense of oneself. Third, she suggests that liberal thought ignores the affective by stressing rational consensus. Let us take these three points in reverse order.

This book advocates peacefulness as spiritual and structural transformation. This implies that there are good reasons to work toward peace, but *this* doesn't mean that peacefulness can be depicted as a rational state or as a state of Reason. Not all reasons belong to Reason! On the contrary, peacefulness as we have proposed, should be characterized in terms of non-derivative self-identification, which is a holistic state of being. Thus, this view of peacefulness doesn't ignore the power of the affective. Second, Mouffe rightly indicates that identity ineluctably involves a dichotomy between us and them. However, this doesn't mean that all self-identifications are antagonistic. As we argued in Chapter 2, a more spiritual self-identification increasingly leaves the opposing 'them' class empty. It is progressively less parochial. It is one thing to non-derivatively self-identify with a specific grouping, which places many as antagonistic others; it is quite another to non-derivatively self-identify with human beings as such; it is yet another to non-derivatively self-identify with all life forms, and pantheistically

with the universe. In each case, the antagonistic contrast lessens. Although Mouffe is right to insist that an 'us' requires a 'them', the more spiritual and inclusive the relevant 'us' is, the less antagonistic will be the contrast with the 'them'. Third, Mouffe *seems* to suggest that the pursuit of justice in an unjust world must be perpetually unpeaceful. In fact, she suggests no such thing as peaceful. Indeed, in effect, she advocates the idea that it is better that antagonistic violent conflicts become agonistic and peaceful. However, the main difference is perhaps that we advocate the ethical necessity of dialogue for mutual spiritual identification and hence better understanding of each other based on the principles articulated in Chapter 3. Mouffe seems to reject such a suggestion.

Some Insights

The conclusion we draw from these two discussions is as follows. There is a fundamental distinction between the means to peace and the constituents of peacefulness (see Chapter 1). Regarding the means, there are significant differences between Habermas's discourse ethics, Mouffe's agonism and Ramsbotham's SED. However, these differences amount to judgments about what is causally most effective in a specific context: sometimes we need SED; sometimes agonism; and sometimes dialogue. Perhaps, sometimes, the best form of conflict transformation is none of the above.

Regarding the *constituents* of peace, the two discussions show the need for clarity concerning the lack of political will. Ramsbotham and Mouffe articulate a 'realistic' approach to the idea that many people, including those in power, lack the political will to engage in deep dialogue and other forms of 'conflict transformation'. In sharp contrast, we shall now argue that this so-called 'realistic approach' is itself based on a shortcoming or failure. We need to go beyond attributions of ill-will. The first premise to this effect is that the appeal to the lack of political will usually functions as a formula to prematurely halt further discussion: there is no good will and so we must stop here; nothing else can be done. The second premise is the idea that, because each person primarily wills some perceived good, we shouldn't assume that the lack of political will and the failure to care are fundamental in the failure to understand others. We shouldn't stop there. In short, the principle that everyone wills some perceived good should be applied at the meta-level. We should apply it to the lack of political will itself: to understanding the phenomenon of not understanding others. We don't want to say that those who lack the will to participate in dialogues are 'assholes' and leave it at that.⁴¹ (So called

‘assholes’ are those who lack good-will). The principle about the will indicates that we should avoid attributing basic ill-intentions to those who attribute ill intentions to others. A person who won’t come to the dialogue table might be ignorant, but this needn’t constitute a failure of will.

The failure to care isn’t necessarily willful. In other words, insofar as people are closed off, this isn’t their primary intention: they are seeking some good, such as some form of self-protection. In face-to-face encounters, one such primary motivation might be to avoid seeing how the other person interprets oneself. It is easier to simply blame her for what happened than it is to consider how she sees my actions and how she might blame me. In such cases, self-deception is often a form of self-protection. In impersonal relations, it might be difficult to explore the perceptions of another group because this would require admitting that assumptions that one sees as natural are not natural at all, but rather social, and possibly mistaken. Furthermore, in any case, it is difficult to recognize, admit and appreciate the sufferings of other people. It can be painful. In short, such ignorance isn’t merely a question of not caring. It has a positive intentional side, such as self-protection.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we propose deep dialogue as a pathway toward peacefulness in interpersonal and intergroup relationships. We have argued that human self-identification is the basis of engendering the good will necessary for understanding others. In deep dialogue, people can begin to see each other increasingly as human, which shifts the (non-derivative) self-identifications of both sides. In such dialogues, this possibility of transforming self-identifications, and thereby entering the other’s reality, is realized through open and caring sharing and listening. In Chapter 5, we apply this conception of dialogue to healing and forgiveness processes pertaining to healing a traumatic past, and in Chapter 6, we apply it to communal conflicts.

Notes

1. This doesn’t apply to person and human which exclude non-persons and non-humans.
2. This term has been used by Swidler, Leonard (2014). *Dialogue for Interreligious Understanding*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan US.
3. E.g. Burton, J. and Dukes, F. (1990). *Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement & Resolution*, New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.

4. Lederach, J. (2003). *Little Book of Conflict Transformation: Clear Articulation of the Guiding Principles by a Pioneer in the Field*, New York, NY: Good Books.
5. This section draws on Ramsbotham, O. (2010). *Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical Disagreement, Dialogue and Survival*, Abingdon: Routledge; Also see <https://www.beyondintractability.org/moos/challenge-complexity>.
6. Carnevale, P. (1992). "Negotiation and Mediation", *Annual Review Psychology*, 43:5, 31–82.
7. Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Rieker, P. and Thune, H. (eds.) (2016). *Dialogue and Conflict Resolution: Potential and Limits*, Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge
10. Kelman H. (1990). "Interactive Problem-Solving: a Social-psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution", In J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds.). *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution. The Conflict Series*. pp. 199–215, Palgrave Macmillan, London
11. See for example, Deutsch, M. (1973). *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*, New York, NY: Yale University Press; Fisher, R. (1997). *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
12. See http://www.ywamkb.net/kb/Mapping_Dialogue_Introduction.
13. e.g. Gadamer, H.-G. (1969). *Truth and Method*, London: Bloomsbury.
14. Burton, J. (1990). *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, London: Macmillan
15. Gergen, K. (2009). *Relational being: Beyond self and community*. New York: Oxford University Press
16. pp. 172–173 in Lederach, J. (2005). *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*. Oxford, MA: Oxford University Press.
17. *Ibid.* p. 13.
18. *Ibid.* p. 57.
19. Gadamer, H.-G. (1969).
20. As always mentioned, Gadamer shows a limitation of the metaphor of stepping in the other's shoes. Even if one is able to step into another's shoes, it is after all one's own feet in those other's shoes. In other words, Gadamer reminds us we cannot posit ourselves in the other's perspective in some absolute way and experience the other's reality as perceived by the other. Nevertheless, with willingness and commitment, we are able to enter the other's space by engaging our own pre-judgement, with the openness to transform it.
21. Gadamer, H.-G. (1976). *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, London: Bloomsbury.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. Interviews with Bassam Aramin and Robi Damelin from the Parents Circle—Families Forum on Impact, BBC World News, November 7th, 2013.
25. The third we will look at in Chapter 7; the fourth in Chapter 8 and the fifth in Chapter 9.
26. Ramsbotham (2010).
27. *Ibid.* pp. 78–81.
28. *Ibid.* p. 129.
29. *Ibid.* p. 80.

30. Lederach (2005, p. 177), quoted in Ramsbotham (2010, p. 83).
31. Ramsbotham (2010, p. 120).
32. *Ibid.* pp. 166–168.
33. *Ibid.* pp. 168–199.
34. *Ibid.* p. 202.
35. Gill, S. (2015). “Holding oneself open in a conversation” – Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and the ethics of dialogue’, *Journal of Dialogue Studies*, Spring
36. p. 3, Mouffe, C. (2005). *On the Political*, London: Routledge.
37. *Ibid.* p. 94 compares his view of agonism and Mouffe’s.
38. p. 755, Mouffe, C. (1999). “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism”, *Prospects for Democracy*, 66:3, 745–758.
39. Habermas, J. (2001). *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. by B. Fultner, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
40. p. 42 in Cronin, C. and DeGreiff, P. (eds.) (1998). *Inclusion of the Other Studies in Political Theory*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
41. James, A. (2012). *Assholes: A Theory*, London/Boston: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.

PEACE WITH THE PAST

Violence and acrimonies of the past form a serious challenge to interpersonal peace: groups often remain enemies because of past hurts. Unhealed historical traumas become embedded in a group's memories, and this perpetuates violence. Bitterness and resentment may frame our self-identifications, and initiate antagonistic dynamics in the experience of the other, as outlined in Chapter 3 (Section V). These crystalize as antipathies that are integrated as part of a culture and an identity. In these ways, the past can define present relationships as ones of friend or of foe.

In this chapter, we discuss the importance of making peace with the past. To begin, we investigate what conflict is and advance an analysis of broad trajectories in conflict to reveal the development of violence. This analysis will inform our understanding of conflict and its place in human relationships, and the potentially enriching effect it has on creating constructive and desirable change within the wider social processes. This also suggests that the lenses through which we observe and understand conflict have implications for how we transform conflict. Following that, we discuss the interconnections between large-group identity and past violence. Situating relationships at the heart of well-being, we want to highlight the role that collective pain, loss and shame can play in the construction of large-group identity. Additionally,

we take a brief look at the notion of justice, which always has a significant place in making peace with the past. Lack of justice is a major cause of violence, and appears to legitimate it. A deeper understanding of justice can indicate how a society might create the relevant social and political institutions that lay a foundation for structural peace.

Once we have anchored our understanding of conflict, interpersonal relations and justice, we will introduce some well-established approaches to healing. These include reconciliation, healing the wounds of history, and forgiveness, as pathways to peace with the past and the enemy.

Conflict

The way we engage with conflictual relationships depends on our understanding of conflict itself. Typically, people see conflict as something external to the flow of social life; it is regarded as problematic, undesirable, and as something to be prevented, resolved and managed. This view equates conflict with the causes of violence. However, a contrasting view would be to conceive conflict to be a part of the normal ebb and flow of human life, and integral to human relationships. In this alternative conception, conflict is a driver for creativity, imagination, social innovation, and a constructive force for deepening interpersonal relationships.¹ For this reason, we have argued in Chapter 1 that peace mustn't be contrasted with conflict but rather viewed as potential feature of it. It is this latter view that we will expand here.

Human relationships are constantly challenged by the diversity of our needs, interests, beliefs and practices.² In the previous chapter, we described epistemological and emotional asymmetries that underlie violent relationships. These asymmetries apply to the understanding of needs, interests and goals.³ Although humans broadly share many fundamental needs, in diverse social contexts, these express themselves as varying derivative social needs. Whilst fundamental needs are normative relative to human well-being, derivative needs are subject to social conditions.⁴ Furthermore, peoples' interests are shaped directly by cultural traditions, histories and community norms, as well as by needs. In part, this is because there is an inevitable negotiation and compromise between a person's self-interest and the good of the group or community, which differ between cultures and socio-economic conditions.

Our needs and interests determine our goals. Likewise, so do beliefs and understanding, which result in judgements about what one ought to do. Oc-

asionally, the goals of different groups are compatible, even when they have dissimilar interests and beliefs, and hence, the goals can be pursued together, harmoniously. However, more often, the goals of two groups are incompatible and, in such cases, there will inevitably be conflicts. So long as there is human diversity, there will be conflict.

Although it is a normal aspect of human relationships, conflict is a driver of hostility and can catalyze unending cycles of violence. Conflict is made violent by the epistemological asymmetries outlined in Chapter 3: we tend to attribute good-will to people in our own group and ill-will to those in the other group. Violent conflict arises when one group perceives their sufferings to be the result of the bad intentions or malevolence of another group. In such a scenario, the second group tend to deny any wrongdoing, and the resulting polarization will separate the groups into an antagonistic ‘us-versus-them’ from both sides. This is an escalating process that may permit an in-group to feel its own goals and understandings as legitimate, and to reject those of an outlying group and eventually to dehumanize them. When conflict involves dehumanization, it becomes inherently violent.⁵

These conflicts are magnified by acts of aggression, which traumatize individuals and communities. Such traumas foster an attitude of resentment and even hatred between peoples who see the other as the ‘oppressor’ or ‘enemy’, and oneself as the ‘victim’. This further dehumanizes, both oneself and the other. Feelings of humiliation and victimhood will be translated as a tendency for revenge and retaliation in the name of fairness and justice. Ironically, this turns a victim into an aggressor, thereby further perpetuating a cycle of violence. When traumas, victimhood, and their associated pain and humiliation are deposited within people’s psyches and unconscious cultural values, they propagate the seeds of violence across generations. As a result, when it remains ignored and unacknowledged, conflict embarks on a *destructive trajectory* of its own. This destructive trajectory does not equate conflict with violence. However, it does indicate that, unless we engage constructively and proactively with conflict, it can spiral into violence, causing permanent damage to human relationships and peace.

Awareness of conflict’s violent potentials and destructive trajectories doesn’t mean that peacebuilding should be focused solely on conflict. Traditional peacebuilding approaches include conflict prevention, resolution and management because they tend to assume that conflict is a problem that must be minimized or eliminated. Our conception of conflict suggests that these efforts do not necessarily serve to strengthen or deepen human relations nor to

transform conflicts.⁶ For conflict to be a constructive force, we must see it as an invitation to dialogue, especially deep dialogue. By engaging in dialogue, individuals can tap into the creative and positive force of conflict, and by dialogically transforming conflict, groups can reframe their interests, as well as their understandings of each other. In this way, although conflict is a normal dynamic with violent tendencies, it can be transformed through dialogue and encounter.

We must remind ourselves that there are intractable conflicts in which the creative energies of conflict have succumbed to destructive trajectories. In some such cases, intergroup relationships are shaped by past violence, even when not everyone within each group is consciously aware of such a past. The traumas and wounds left by past violence are like a time-bomb that can explode when triggered by the perception of injustice and power imbalance. Within this kind of violent conflictual relationship, the 'enemy' is already defined by the group's experiences of past violence, dehumanization and humiliation. In the next section, we will attempt to understand conflict between large groups composed of thousands or millions of people who have become enemies due to past aggression and hostility, and due to unhealed historical traumas that continue to provoke violent reactions against perceived injustices and oppression.

Large Group Identity

One suggestion is that wars and mass atrocities are possible because of collective psychosis whereby one group views the other as an enemy, regardless who the individual persons within that group are, and irrespective of their personal attributes.⁷ In such cases, even a child becomes an enemy, so long as she is born into the other group. Such identity is termed 'large group identity'.⁸

Large group identity is characterized by a collective marker, such as ethnicity, religion and nationality.⁹ Even though they share the relevant identity features, the thousands or millions of individuals do not know each other, and have not met.¹⁰ In everyday situations, people usually go about their daily lives attending to more personal relations, such as those with family, friends, neighbors and colleagues. Hence, there may be little conscious awareness of their large group identities, especially among dominant groups who have not suffered systematic oppression. However, at a sub-conscious level, there may be a recognition of shared belongings, such as physical traits, language, nursery rhythms and representations of history.¹¹

Large group identity often plays a central role in interpersonal relations. When people in one group are threatened by those in another, they can become suddenly and acutely aware of their large group identity. There are two reasons for this. First, this happens when the threat is impersonal, such as when individuals are threatened only because they are members of a group, such as, for instance, with Israelis and Palestinians. Second, this occurs when the threat is greater than the individuals' capacity to defend themselves, such as the mass killing of Tutsis during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. When the threat is beyond the capacity of the individual, thousands of people retreat within their large group identity to seek strength and solidarity, and to defend themselves against their common enemy. The threat may concern people's livelihood, access to resources, and the continuity of their way of life, but it is also perceived as a menace to the identity of the large group, such as their ethnicity, religion or nationality.

When the identity of a large group is under threat, individual differences become secondary and the large group identity comes to the fore. The more each group dwells in their large group identity, the stronger becomes the unity of the group. Each person will perceive herself less as an individual, and more as a part of the collective. In such a case, the person will self-identify as a person only derivatively, i.e. she identifies primarily with her ethnicity, religion or nationality, and only secondarily as a human or person. When a group marker becomes the individuals' non-derivative self-identification, it is antithetical to inner peacefulness. Such identities create an antagonistic 'us-versus-them', which is the basis of enemy-making, and they are strengthened when the commonalities between the two groups are disowned, and the differences, however minor, are given greater importance to maintain the separation.¹² Or more accurately, using our analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, non-derivative self-identification locks onto the differences, and the commonalities become subsidiary forms of self-identification.

Wars are often partly the result of threats to a group's way of life. This is often perceived as a threat to the identity of the group, which leads to subsequent separation and dehumanization: separation when people self-identify exclusively with their own group and dissociate from people in the other group, and dehumanization when members in the other group are not treated as persons. For example, the Tutsis were portrayed as cockroaches during the period leading up to Rwandan genocide. In this sense, dehumanization is similar to instrumentalization: it occurs when one treats a person merely as a member of a large group that is regarded as less than human.

Dehumanization negates the possibility of a human relationship with the other and, without such relationships, it becomes easier to be aggressive toward someone in the dehumanized group. Because the other group is treated as having less intrinsic value, dehumanization apparently justifies violence and aggression.

There is an additional dimension to the large group identity, which Volkan characterizes as 'regression'. This means a return to an earlier stage of 'psychic development' as a way to defend oneself against the anxiety of being threatened.¹³ Using the example of a group mythologizing its history and its origin, Volkan shows how people employ a significant historical event, a 'chosen glory' or 'chosen trauma', in order to protect their large group identity. Amongst the things that represent such 'psychic development' processes, he lists: war memorials, statues of heroes, national ritualistic ceremonies, history books and myths. In these psychic processes, the large group identity is equated with a psychological 'marker' stemming from the past, and the identity can be revived through present day enactment of the past glory or humiliation, triumph or trauma. Such markers are typically passed on from one generation to another through cultural transmission, such as stories, nursery rhymes, history education and communal rituals. Individuals adopt pride and victory, or grievance and victimhood as a marker of their large group identity. Likewise, the group would react strongly to threats as defined by these markers and by any psychological tasks inherited from the past, such as conquest or revenge.¹⁴ When under threat, the transgenerationally transmitted traumas can be re-activated (often through political manipulation), and individuals from one group might take part in violent aggression against the other group, as in mass killings committed with fervor and rage.¹⁵

There are many ways in which transgenerational traumas can be transmitted. It might be via the descendants of people who have suffered from marginalization and victimization, or those who were hurt by armed conflict. These would include the descendants of the victims of genocide; indigenous groups who have inherited a catalogue of abuses; the victims of slave trade; soldiers who fought in wars; refugees and forced migrants, as well as the descendants of the perpetrators and victors of mass violence. This list could go on.¹⁶ This suggests that making peace with an enemy should be an important focus of any society seeking to instill a culture of enduring peace. Indeed, the roles that large group identity and unhealed and un-mourned historical traumas can play in furthering mass violence indicates the need for reconciliation and for healing the wounds of history.

Justice

Perceived injustice is another reason that motivates enemy-making and violence between groups. Therefore, the way we understand justice matters hugely for the way we build peace. Justice is about treating people fairly. It is typically understood as having both a distributive and retributive aspect. Distributive justice is the idea that the distribution of goods and resources should be fair, where usually ‘fair’ is taken to indicate that if a distribution is unequal then this should be for some good reason. An example would be the idea that extra compensation should be due to persons who have worked harder or have produced more than others. However, the concept of distributive justice is contested. Some writers claim that a distribution will be unjust if it does not allow some people to satisfy their fundamental needs.¹⁷ In contrast, other thinkers argue that property rights override such need-based distributive justice claims, given certain conditions.¹⁸ According to this idea, an unequal distribution of resources may be fair if the past economic transactions or processes that led to it were appropriately fair provenance. We will return to distributive justice in Chapter 10.

‘Retributive’ or ‘corrective justice’ usually refers to what is due to a person as a form of punishment for criminal actions that harm another person or violate her liberty. The idea of retributive justice is that a harm caused deserves a retribution, and that the severity of the punishment ought to reflect the seriousness of the offence. It is assumed that such retribution should only be carried out by the appropriate authorities after due process.

The idea of retributive justice is challenged by alternative restorative conceptions. Retributive conceptions maintain that wrong actions intrinsically deserve retribution: justice demands punishment. In sharp contrast, a restorative conception of justice denies the allegedly intrinsically valuable nature of retribution.¹⁹ It claims that a wrongdoer has an obligation to try to restore the relationships and well-being damaged by her action, but that this doesn’t mean that she intrinsically deserves punishment.²⁰ This view advocates that punishment is good only as a means to prevent and deter further wrongdoing; it isn’t intrinsically deserved.

Justice is not a purely legal concept; it is first and foremost a moral ideal. According to Kant, as an inescapable part of one’s personhood, each individual has the capacities that ground the notion of justice: a respect for the intrinsic value of persons or for each other’s humanity.²¹ These capacities require us to will what is morally right, which includes justice. In this manner, the

notion of justice has its conceptual roots in both well-being and needs and in Kant's notion of the intrinsic value of persons.

It is also regarded as an important virtue concerning the interactions and relationships between people. In this way, it is a personal virtue, which has its roots in caring. In this respect, it is not only other-regarding but also self-regarding.²² Its self-regarding nature has two aspects. First, as we argued in Chapter 3, being in caring relationships with others is partly constitutive of one's well-being. Second, a just person is necessarily fair to herself, which ensures that caring for others doesn't constitute a form of self-negation. Being just requires being fair to one's self, as well as to others. Equally, justice can be a characteristic of political and economic systems.

Seeing justice in this broader context will help us escape from thinking that justice is only about punishment. There are positive moral reasons for us to be just and to seek justice: the equal intrinsic value of persons. Conceived in this way, justice is directly relevant to peace. The social transformation needed for peacefulness consists in movements toward justice. Justice requires an interrogation of the ways that social institutions and political structures are designed so that they reflect this value of justice peacefully. When it comes to making peace with the past and with one's enemies, justice necessitates transcending the epistemological and emotional asymmetries described in the previous chapter. This means feeling, thinking and acting in accordance with the equal intrinsic value of all persons. In this sense, Cornel West is right to suggest that justice is what love looks like in public.

Making Peace With the Past

All conflict has a constructive potential and a destructive trajectory. For this reason, it is important for human endeavors to include making peace with our past enemies. In part, we can do this by halting the transgenerational transmission of unhealed traumas that form antagonistic large group identity. Peacebuilding starts with the prevention of enemy-making. This implies reversing the dynamics of antagonistic 'us-versus-them' formation described in Chapter 3. It requires active processes of reconciliation and relationship development. Following outbreaks of violence, post-conflict peacebuilding tends to focus on reconciliation between former enemies. However, making peace with the enemy ought to also include healing the wounds left by past

traumas. So, making peace with former enemies is equivalent to making peace with the past. This healing serves two purposes: it helps clean the suffering of the past and it prevents further future violence. We shall examine both approaches, i.e. healing and reconciliation.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation practices are well-developed at the grassroots level, and recently have been applied at intergroup and international levels. The term 'reconciliation' is used to refer to both the processes and their fruit or intended outcome.²³ Reconciliation processes aim at re-establishing constructive human relationships which sustain an enduring peace. In societies that have suffered protracted violent conflicts in the past, such as South Africa and Rwanda, reconciliation has brought communities together toward more trust and increased peacefulness. For reconciliation processes to be meaningful requires political will and individual commitment.

Approaches to reconciliation are diverse.²⁴ For instance, national reconciliation processes are structured in quite different ways from those in local communities. At the local level, they are likely to focus on interpersonal relationships and communal work projects; whereas at national level, they might aim at the dynamics of ethnic and other large group identities. Reconciliation processes also differ methodologically. Some, such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, are rooted in indigenous practices. Likewise, in East Timor, local indigenous justice practices ('adat') were included in the national Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation process. Some are influenced by religious teachings, such as transitional justice and its relations to Islamic laws. Some are based on human rights as prescribed by national and international laws. Others draw from approaches based on the ethics of compassion, as exemplified in restorative justice practices.

The understanding of conflict outlined in this chapter points toward deeper forms of reconciliation, which involve processes that transcend the boundaries of what it means to be a part of a group and that transform conflicts towards their more generative energies. As we saw in Chapter 4, deep dialogical processes can transform the self-identifications that permit the formation of antagonistic large group identities. Such dialogues can enable the person to self-identify non-derivatively as a human or as a person, through humanizing encounters with others equally as persons. The more I perceive my former enemy as a person like me, the more I identify myself

primarily as a person. Insofar as I do that, my identification of myself as a member of a large group will become derivative. Following the arguments in the previous chapters, such dialogical encounters weaken large group identity. In this sense, they function by shifting self-identification toward the spiritual. In so doing, they undermine antagonistic forms of 'us-versus-them'. In short, this deeper understanding goes beyond merely trying to shift attitudes toward former enemy groups, and it goes far beyond the minimal hope that former enemies can coexist without violence. It embraces the idea that reconciliation processes should aim to radically transform our fundamental self-identifications towards the more spiritual and universal. In so doing, such dialogues will empower social relations that are based on the equal value of all persons, and they will enable enduring intergroup friendships.

Such deeper processes of reconciliation point to the need for a conception of justice that could serve to guide people to confront past injustices but in ways that transcend more limited identities. Cries for punitive justice based on such identities don't embody the principle of equal value of persons. However, as we have seen, the concept of justice is disputed. Retributive conceptions seem to annul the compassion inherent in restorative views and, because of this, reconciliation processes tend to favor a restorative rather than a retributive approach to post-conflict justice. The retributive conception requires that punishment is desirable even when it serves no public benefit, simply because it is intrinsically just. In contrast, the restorative conception rejects this assumption and argues that the criminal justice system should serve the wider needs of society, which will require more mercy and compassion during peacebuilding after past violence. In periods of reconciliation, the social benefits of punishing criminals for the sake of deterrence can be overridden by the more urgent needs of a broken society trying to repair itself.²⁵ Justice demands compassion. However, this doesn't imply that reconciliation approaches aimed at rebuilding trust and peace can ignore past violence.²⁶ Reconciliation requires honesty, even if it doesn't entail retribution.

For this reason, reconciliation processes tend to involve 'truth-telling', as exemplified in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) initiatives from around the globe. TRC is a whole-society process involving all parties to the past violence, including the victimized, the perpetrators and bystanders (even though the boundaries between these different groups are not always clear-cut). TRC seeks the shared acknowledgement of past vio-

lence and suffering through compassionate listening. For example, in South Africa, the TRC processes have ensured that politically motivated killings, kidnappings, torture, and other forms of dehumanization that occurred during the apartheid were condemned, and that the memory of such atrocities and agonies were acknowledged in public. Listening counts towards deep dialogue, and the TRC processes in South Africa have been significant in enabling the country to make a peaceful transition from apartheid.²⁷ Similarly, following the peace accord with the FARC guerrilla group, Colombia established a Truth Commission in 2017 that is charged with ‘clarifying and making known the truth about what happened in the conflict.’²⁸

Another critical step in a reconciliation process is developing a shared vision of the future that can unite the society. Developing such a vision will necessarily involve generating and renewing human relationships at the core of the peace processes. To develop a shared vision requires a cultural shift to embrace a recognition of a new ‘we’, despite differences and past grievances. For example, the Rwandan Government advanced a shared vision of a unifying national identity (albeit that this is yet another large group identity).

Another step in the process of building generative relationships typically involves projects that engage people from previously separated groups. Such collaborative projects might include: restoring a school, rebuilding a damaged bridge, or recreating a market, i.e. work that would bring people into a common space for mutual benefit. Such projects may help create an attitudinal change, a shift from divisive traumatic memories toward shared hope for a better common future.

In general, reconciliation processes tend to fare better when they are supported by political and socio-economic change. This may require political discourses, negotiations and dialogues between leaders of previously antagonistic groups. Above all, it involves reimagining and installing peaceful political-economic systems.

Healing the Wounds of the Past

Historic violence often shapes relationships of enmity, and even the distant past can continue to mold our beliefs and attitudes, and how we act toward an ‘enemy’ group. Past traumatic experiences tend to leave cultural ‘markers’ in our emotional memory, which are passed from one generation to another. Traumatic experiences may even be partly transmitted epigenetically.²⁹ As stated earlier, these cultural markers arise from the emotional experiences as-

sociated with trauma, and when they are left unattended as if dormant, they can be reactivated, thereby perpetuating a cycle of violence.

This means that making peace requires addressing these inherited identity 'markers' to defuse the emotional charges against the 'enemy' which make the cycles of violence possible.³⁰ It requires *healing past wounds*. In this sense, healing is a process that involves the spiritual, emotional and political aspects of recovery and renewal, and the recuperation of human relationships in the full range of their psychological dimensions.³¹ While reconciliation aims to bring formerly antagonistic groups into contact, to develop relationships, build trust and resume hope, 'healing the wounds of history' works to 'clear' the psychological pathways that would enable people to become emotionally and relationally open to the former enemy, and to understand their lived realities. In this next section, we focus on both healing and forgiveness as approaches to making peace with the past.

Healing

Processes of healing past wounds have been long recognized as a key element of post-violence peacebuilding. At grassroots level, many NGOs have developed experiential processes based on psycho-social approaches to healing. In general, healing programs tend to have several common features:

First, ideally, the participants should be from the groups who were formerly in violent conflict with one another. *Meeting the enemy* face-to-face is an important step, and it requires the individual to have courage and openness to make this move. Many NGOs dedicated to healing recognize the importance of such direct contact, and make it a prerequisite for a healing process.³²

Secondly, healing involves two mutually constitutive processes: one that re-humanize members of the enemy group and the other that re-humanize oneself. As we have seen, violence and aggression can shift a person's self-identification and the way she identifies the other. Due to grievances and pain, and associated emotions such as depression or anger, a person may self-identify non-derivatively as a victim, or even as an aggressor. This is a form of dehumanization insofar as the person is unable to properly self-identify as a person or human being. Such self-identification may also cause self-aggression or violence to oneself. To break the cycle of violence, healing consists in a process that enables each person to return to her human 'I', and to continue identifying herself as human when relating to people from the enemy group. Put simply, it enables the 'I' of me to perceive and relate directly to the 'I' of

another (see Chapters 3 and 4). Such processes often occur when deep dialogue and healing workshops take place. These are typically characterized by respect and hospitality and by beautiful surroundings (which symbolize goodness and dignity). They may involve rituals such as meditation, prayer, visualization, reflection and so forth, all inviting the spiritual 'I' into presence.³³

Thirdly, healing involves processes that help individuals and groups to untangle themselves from the pain and traumas of the past. Discourses of pain and anger tend to remain private or hidden and, as such, they are susceptible of being manipulated in the politics of revenge.³⁴ To avoid this, healing workshops can help externalize the 'private' experiences of the past through the sharing of them in a safe environment. In this manner, when the private nature of these experiences dissipates, it is easier to release the pain. This helps alleviate the burdens of those hurts and their debilitating effects, and removes the internal conflicts associated with rage and revenge. This may also afford an opportunity to share experiences of structural violence.³⁵

These processes constitute healing insofar as they transform a person's relationship with historical traumas and pains, and with their past more generally. From this point, individuals and groups can agree new shared narratives concerning their history that are future-forming.³⁶ This requires moving away from the tendency to structure interpretations of the past around simplified antagonistic discourses of 'the other', which aggravate the divisions. Often during workshops, sharing stories results in expressions of compassion and empathy which are mutually humanizing.³⁷

Finally, healing processes are emancipatory because they are collaborative. In developing relationships and even friendship with people from the former enemy group, and in liberating each other from the grip of pain and suffering, the processes offer experiences of reciprocal healing. In contrast to conventional therapies which require an expert, this dialogic approach to healing regards each participant as having important qualities to contribute to the common process. This explains the emancipatory potential of collaborative deep dialogue.³⁸ When such a dialogue is facilitated well, the participants feel that they have been listened to and heard, that their feelings and emotions have been acknowledged, and that their suffering and grievances are understood.³⁹

In these ways, healing programs and workshops can serve to mend some of the broken relationships between peoples and groups. Therefore, they may catalyze wider social and political processes of making peace with the enemy and with the past.

Forgiveness

Past wounds are also healed through therapeutic processes that may lead to forgiveness.⁴⁰ The concept of forgiveness is found in all cultures, despite nuanced cultural differences due to the diverse backgrounds within which the concept has evolved. There is a shared idea that forgiveness can restore relationships and help make peace with the past.

Forgiveness is generally conceived as a conscious, deliberate act of releasing feelings of resentment and/or vengeance toward a person or a group, who has harmed oneself or one's community, regardless of whether they deserve or merit forgiveness or not. Forgiveness cannot be formulaic, and it cannot be forced or demanded of anyone.⁴¹ In general, there are several kinds of forgiveness.

Spiritual forgiveness: There are two major perspectives on spiritual forgiveness. The first adopts an Abrahamic religious view that regards the paradigm of forgiveness as God's action of forgiving human infractions, which we can emulate.^{42,43} The second takes a more secular spiritual view in which forgiveness is necessary for attaining spiritual inner peacefulness (see Chapter 2).⁴⁴ In many indigenous traditions, forgiveness is enacted in rituals, such as *ho 'oponopono*, an ancient South Pacific practice.⁴⁵ It consists in a mental cleansing through which relationships are set right by prayer, confession, mutual restitution and forgiveness. *Ho 'oponopono* restores good relationships among people, but also with the Divine. Any moral wrong violates what is most sacred in humans and, therefore, we must appeal to the sanctity of God to make forgiveness and its power of healing possible.

Moral forgiveness: This occurs when a person who has been transgressed forgives because she comes to see an enemy as a human being of equal intrinsic value. This suggests that we have a reason to forgive others simply because they are moral agents.⁴⁶ Such forgiveness is considered a moral virtue, based on respect for persons, notwithstanding their deeds or dispositions and, as such, it is an ethical response to past transgressions.⁴⁷

Therapeutic forgiveness: This type of forgiveness occurs when individuals relinquish their anger and resentment to permit personal renewal. Such forgiveness is cathartic and liberating, and people seek it to release resentment and corrosive emotions. Therapeutic forgiveness is often unilateral rather than reciprocal.⁴⁸ As such, it places the main responsibility for forgiving on the offended, and does not rely on the offender to meet conditions for forgiveness, such as apology, although such conditions commonly ease the process.⁴⁹

Reconciliatory forgiveness: The aim of this kind of forgiveness is specifically to restore relationships. Unlike the therapeutic kind, reconciliatory forgiveness always involves both parties and, because of this, it can have a wider impact on a society. In such forgiving, both parties shift their conceptions defined by the past offence: they move beyond the duality of victim/aggressor. This requires a genuine willingness to relinquish resentment.⁵⁰ However, reconciliatory forgiveness is not unconditional. It may require acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the offender, for example, in the forms of remorse and reparation. Additionally, reconciliatory forgiveness will not exclude legal processes, such as criminal prosecutions. It is one thing for the state to prosecute an alleged murderer for his acts; it is another for the families of his victims to seek a process of reconciliatory forgiveness. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, the spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness processes will tend to favor a restorative rather than a retributive conception of justice.⁵¹ Post-conflict reconciliatory forgiveness is especially necessary in nations where many people were perpetrators during the period of violence, such as Rwanda. When such processes go hand in hand with restorative justice and truth and reconciliation commissions, grassroots initiatives and public events can be a powerful means towards a reconciled nation.

Political forgiveness: Political forgiveness aims at reparation through public apology and repentance, leading to a political reorientation and, ultimately, reconciliation.⁵² A public statement of solidarity may enable healing processes, and can be a powerful element in post-conflict reconstruction, especially when it combines seeking accountability for past wrongs with the future-oriented reconciliation. The power of political forgiveness derives from its public nature. Once a public acknowledgement of the wrong is agreed, the forgiver may renounce revenge and become open to the repair of the fractured relationships. Some scholars argue that political forgiveness is performative because it often involves an authoritative public figure offering apologies.⁵³ Examples of this include the Japanese Prime Minister apologizing to the Korean and Chinese people for Japan's violence during the World Wars, and the Pope asking for forgiveness from abused victims of sexual violence committed by the Catholic clergy. Even if the asking for political forgiveness is performative, the granting of it does not need to be. However, if the perpetrator group publicly asks for forgiveness and gives an authoritative public condemnation of its past wrongdoings, this creates a defeasible presumption that there ought to be some lessening of resentment.

Making peace with the enemy, and healing collective trauma left by past violence requires all of the above forms of forgiveness.⁵⁴ Restoring the mutual respect between two groups of people reflects an acceptance of human moral frailty, which may nurture the potential of both groups for moral betterment. In this way, building peace amongst former enemies requires a compassionate paradigm that enables both groups to embark on processes that help rehumanize each other. The nature of forgiveness lies in its moral force to liberate people from dehumanizing dynamics. Forgiveness, including self-forgiveness, allows us to unlock or release the feelings that chain us to past events. This applies to both the one who forgives and to the one who is forgiven.⁵⁵

However, it is important to remember two crucial points. First, forgiveness cannot be demanded, as already seen. This is especially important because the person or group who gives forgiveness is the one who has suffered, who has been victimized and treated inhumanely. This typically means that this person or group has less power. The powerful cannot demand forgiveness from the powerless! This puts the responsibility on the wrong foot. The onus should be on the powerful perpetrators to acknowledge the harm they have caused.

Second, healing processes usually don't address the underlying structural issues that often fuel violent conflict. This means that they don't address power imbalances and the resulting injustices. Reconciliation and healing processes typically function within the existing framework of socio-economic institutions. They work at the level of individual and group actions and relationships, and not at the social structural level. In this sense, their transformational power is limited.

Conclusion

To overcome its violent tendencies, people need to cease to be defined by a continuation of their violent past. They need to interrupt the destructive conflict trajectory. Reconciliation and healing processes can provide such a change. They can help individuals and groups to restore the recognition of their humanity, destroyed by past violence, and they can help restore generative relationships at both personal and collective levels. Through healing the wounds of history, individuals and groups are given the opportunity to reengage with the past with a view to change the future. Healing and forgiveness are also the basis for liberating oneself and others from the pain of past traumas, which allows a shift in individual and collective destinies.

These steps toward making peace with the enemy have deep dialogue and encounter at their core, which facilitate the development and repair of intra and inter-personal relationships. In this way, conflict ultimately presents an opportunity and a space for people to come together to transcend their differences and peace invites more desirable structures in which being human as humans-in-relations becomes possible. In later chapters, we will explore ways to support peaceful relations at structural, systemic and institutional levels.

Notes

1. See, for instance, Lederach, J. (2003). *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, Intercourse, PA: Good Books; Collier, M. (2003). "Negotiating Intercultural Alliance Relationships: Toward Transformation", in M. J. Collier (ed.). *Intercultural Alliances: Critical Transformation* (pp. 1–16). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
2. Including our needs for belonging, e.g. community, and hence our identification with a certain 'identity' marker, such as gender, race, ideology, belief.
3. Galtung, J. (2007). "Introduction: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation—The TRANSCEND Approach", in C. Webel & J. Galtung (eds.). *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, London & New York, NY: Routledge.
4. Thomson (1987) (especially Chapter 1).
5. Galtung (2007).
6. Lederach (2003).
7. Volkan, V. (2001). "Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity", *Group Analysis*, 34:1, 79–97; Volkan, V. (2009). "Large-Group Identity, International Relations and Psychoanalysis", *International Forum of Psychoanalysis*, 18:4, 206–213.
8. In Volkan (2001), 'large group identity' was developed based on Erikson's description of individual identity. It refers to religion, nationality or ethnicity, 'as the subjective experience of thousands or millions of people who are linked by a persistent sense of sameness while also sharing numerous characteristics with others in foreign groups' (p. 79). In this book, we follow Volkan's definition of large group identity to refer any such person who perceives him or herself as belonging to a specific large group in terms of religion, nationality or ethnicity.
9. Volkan (2001) was very specific in terms of what counts as such markers and he mentioned these three only in his article.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Volkan, V. (2005). "Large Group Identity and Chosen Trauma", *Psychoanalysis Downunder, The Online Journal of the Australian Psychoanalytic Society*, 6. Volkan (2009).
12. Volkan (2009).
13. *Ibid.*
14. Volkan (2005, 2009) suggests that the 'chosen trauma' is often much stronger an amplifier for the large group identity. When members of a traumatised group are unable to mourn

their losses and reverse the humiliation, they pass on to the future generations the images of their injured selves and the psychological tasks to be completed, such as reversing humiliation and revenging the losses, and completing the work of mourning. This process is known as the transgenerational transmission of trauma.

15. Volkan offers an example of Milošević using the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, Serbian chosen trauma, to mobilise the mass to enter into war. See Volkan, V. (1996). "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ancient Fuel of a Modern Inferno", *Mind and Human Interaction*, 7, 110–127; Volkan, V. (1997). *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*, New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
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PEACE IN COMMUNITIES

How might we live peacefully with others in interpersonal groupings or in communities, such as a village, a city, a country, and even as the whole world? In these contexts, how we understand the notion of community is central to peacefulness. However, as we shall see, there is a general lack of clarity in defining ‘community’, despite an overall assumption that communities are desirable, if not an imperative for the human way of being together. So, we will investigate the following questions: How do communities relate to human well-being? What counts as peace in communities? What are the necessary processes for building peace in communities? The answers to these questions are important because all human beings belong to, and are embedded in, some form of community.¹ Likewise, harmonious relationships in and between communities constitute a major expression of peacefulness.

Given its significance for human’s togetherness, the idea of a community needs unpacking,² and this requires us to challenge two assumptions, both of which are major obstacles for intergroup harmony and peacefulness. The first concerns the conventional view that tends to presume a connection between identity conflict and intercommunal violence. Typically, it is claimed that almost all violent conflicts consist in clashes between different group identities based on, for instance, nationality, ethnicity or religious affiliation.³ Some

writers have even suggested that, since the end of the Cold War, most violent conflicts have been identity-based, such as the Balkan wars and the civil wars in Lebanon.⁴ The second assumption poses to be answer to the first one and it maintains that pluralism is one of the best approaches to resolving these identity-based conflicts.⁵ Such a view tends to recognize all identities, and associated values and practices as valid, and it considers tolerance and multiculturalism as the most appropriate solution. According to this view, tolerance is a subtle way to reject the imposition of a western worldview that usually takes the disguised form of a universal ethic.⁶ Multiculturalism challenges the idea that we each have only a single or a solitary identity.⁷ It advances a recognition that we all have multiple identities, and this recognition will help enable people to become more tolerant toward others.⁸

To contest these two assumptions, we shall return to the conclusions of Chapters 2 and 3, in particular, that identifying oneself and each other as human constitutes an emergent 'we-ness'. This is central to peacefulness in communities and to the possibility of a global community. Equally, this mutual identification as human underpins the *right* relationships which are essential in a culture of peace and peacefulness.⁹ This idea of right relationships will be amplified in Chapter 7 to include peaceful relationships with nature.

In challenging the assumption that violence breaks out of identity-based conflict, we also revisit the point already made in early chapters that peace does not exclude conflict; and in disputing tolerance, we also examine what human closeness may entail. This leads to us to propose that there are a set of key ingredients that constitute a community, and which also the notion of community to the well-being and flourishing of all (all humans and other beings). We will conclude this chapter by showing how the engagement with differences and the transformation of conflicts is an important pathway for peace in communities.

Beyond Identity-Based Conflict

Despite the common assumption that identity conflict is one of the major causes of violence, there has been much confusion concerning how to define the term 'identity'. In Chapter 2, we showed how the verb-form of a word is often clearer than its noun-form. In this case, 'to identify' is clearer than 'identity'. Identity isn't a thing; in this sense, the term shouldn't be reified and it needs deconstructing. In contrast, identifying is something that we

do, albeit not always consciously and consistently. The verb form reveals the complexities of self-identifying, as discussed in Chapter 2. We also argued that the idea most directly relevant for peacefulness is how one identifies oneself rather than how other people identify oneself. We distinguished between derivative and basic self-identifications, and argued that some essential or non-derivative self-identifications are violent, such as the way people self-identify fundamentally with one's large group marker as seen in the previous chapter.

We shouldn't be surprised that large group identities have been used to serve violent ends.¹⁰ This is because when people self-identify non-derivatively with a group, they feel that any threats to the group are a danger to themselves. In Chapter 5, we showed how historical trauma and memories of violence and suffering can define in part such large group identities. In this chapter, we will show how such self-identification is itself violent. This much is already implied by the *very idea* of non-derivative self-identification with a group! When a person self-identifies non-derivatively with a group, *ipso facto*, they only derivatively self-identify themselves as persons. In other words, they see their nationality, or ethnicity, or religion, or social affiliation as their primary identity, and regard being a person or a human only secondary. For this reason, people are prepared to take part in violence in the name of their so-called 'large group identity'. As we saw in Chapter 2, this is psychologically unpeaceful.

If one only derivatively self-identifies as a person, this means that she will only derivatively identify others as persons. In short, such a person will identify others primarily in terms of the group they belong to, and only secondarily as persons. As we saw in Chapter 3, this process is a basis of inter-group unpeacefulness: it separates an in-group from an out-group, and this separation is inherently violent. Throughout human history, such separations have allowed large numbers of people to fight in wars broadly branded as 'ethnic', 'religious', 'tribal' and 'sectarian'. Similarly, the fault-lines of nationality, ethnicity, religion have been blamed for intra-state wars. In Chapter 5, we illustrated how historically large group identities have not only trapped groups in perpetual intractable conflicts with each other, but also become an important rhetorical resource to try to justify violence.

However, this doesn't mean that identity itself is what turns conflict into violence and what makes one group of people wage war against other groups. We object to the conventional view that blames identity as the main cause of violence, and we shall argue that analyses and diagnoses of antagonistic relationships framed in these terms are misleading.

First, as already implied, it is too simplistic to treat identity as a thing. It is better to think of self-identifying as a complex set of acts. Identities themselves do not cause violence; the whole idea needs to be dissolved. What counts as a form of violence is some of the ways in which we self-identify. Insofar as one non-derivatively self-identifies with a group, then this is inherently unpeaceful in two ways: first, one has failed to non-derivatively self-identify as a person, and second, one will identify others non-derivatively in terms of their groups rather than as persons. In contrast, if one non-derivatively self-identifies as a person, then one's group affiliations will be secondary, and one will not non-derivatively identify others in terms of their group (but rather as persons). This analysis is not the same as the conventional claim that identity causes wars. It leads to different diagnoses of violence and different approaches to remedies.

Secondly, so-called 'identity-driven violence' *per se* isn't caused *merely* by differences in people's self-identifications. In Chapter 3, we argued that unpeaceful relations are rooted fundamentally in an epistemological asymmetry that gives rise to hermeneutical errors. Peacefulness requires overcoming that asymmetry. Various features of impersonal relationships accentuate the psychological and social dynamics associated with the asymmetry. One of these accentuating factors is how people self-identify: if people non-derivatively self-identify with groups then the social dynamics associated with the asymmetry will be overtly violent. When one group attributes ill-will and bad intentions to the other, this quickly degenerates into a dehumanization and demonization with ensuing violence. Another of these accentuating factors is differences in power. Groups with power tend to dehumanize those without; this will result in both groups attributing ill-will to the other. The in-group tends to take its interpretations of the world for granted, and will think that the out-group's disposition to see things differently is due to their bad faith. This accentuates the perception of the out-group that the in-group perceives them with hostility. From there, it escalates. Furthermore, the idea of conflict trajectory developed in Chapter 5 explains how large group identities can be exploited to exacerbate dehumanization and violence. In short, this is another way in which the claim that identities cause violence is over simplistic.

Thirdly, insisting on violence as identity-driven hides its structural causes. Typically, much violence has its roots in economic and political power structures that systematically dehumanize and marginalize certain groups of people. These structural features shape the epistemological asymmetry and the hermeneutical errors referred to earlier. The fact that these structures of-

ten marginalize along the fault lines marked by social identifiers shouldn't mislead us into thinking that it is the identifiers that are causing the violence. What is termed 'identity-driven violence' is merely the tip of an iceberg, a symptom of a greater dysfunctional structure underneath. Such symptoms reflect the ways in which the system tends to distribute political and economic power, and the ways that it instrumentalizes people (see Chapter 10). In turn, this defines how individuals and groups experience their lives within the system, and how they are engaged in decision-making and whether they have the access of power to improve their life's conditions. Thus, even when identity lines track systemic divisions, the two aren't the same.

Fourthly, it is politically salient that people self-identify with groups in part because such self-identifications provide people with a framework that helps them to make sense of their experiences, problems, and goals within the terms of the so-called 'group identity'.¹¹ Such frameworks often enable people to find a political voice, which may allow them to express their discontents concerning the socio-political economic system. Such self-identifications matter politically because people can be dominated and disadvantaged along these group-identity lines.¹² The more people are oppressed or threatened, the more they tend to self-identify (non-derivatively) with a group categorization. The more this occurs, the more they utilize this grouping to try to legitimate their collective needs, and to demand justice and entitlements, such as to good education, clean water, safe neighborhoods, opportunity to work and democratic participation.

However, when this awareness of group categorization is non-derivative, it tends to become a form of expediency. This can be seen by comparing it with the political claim 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. It leads to similar fickle and purely instrumental alliances. As such, this can easily become a political football. When it is used to attempt to justify violent political discourse and actions, it constitutes an instrumentalization of identity.¹³ If one claims that a specific self-identification ought to be made in a non-derivative manner because this would be beneficial for a group, then one is instrumentalizing one's identity. In such a case, individuals are encouraged to self-identify in a certain way because it serves political goals, and such instrumentalization will have severely detrimental effects on peace in communities.

Furthermore, when these so-called 'group identities' are blamed for violence, peacebuilding efforts tend to be directed primarily at bridging identity differences, and this approach inevitably posits peacefulness as merely the absence of violence, as we shall see in the discussion of tolerance. How a society

should cope with different identities doesn't confront the issues in fundamental terms. It tends to treat symptoms, because it misses the underlying causes. Furthermore, it may instrumentalize people: insofar as it uses their sense of themselves merely as a means to resolve violent conflict, ironically, it is itself violent.

To move beyond the ideo of identity-driven violence requires peaceful structures in which people are respected for their non-derivative value. As we argued in Chapters 1 and 5, in and of itself, conflict between groups is not necessarily violent. In fact, peacefulness is a feature of conflict; it is what can mute the violent potential of conflict. As we have maintained, the presence of tensions between people from different groups can invite deep dialogue and transformative encounters, which should be occurring anyway.

The fifth and last objection to the conventional view of identity as the driver of violence is that it confuses 'self-identification with a group' with belonging to a community. Belonging may be a fundamental human need; but this doesn't mean that the group-defined self-identification is. Self-identifying with a group can help develop unity amongst group members for the sake of political activism and collective social action but, so defined, the group unity is merely a means to an end. As such, the fundamental idea has been perverted: unity shouldn't be a question of means to an end. As we shall see, this constitutes an important distinction between groups and communities.

Conflict is always already inherent in human relationships and has constructive potential but also destructive and violent tendencies. Differences in the way people identify themselves and each other socially and personally, disparate cultural values, and diverse understandings and interpretation of history and socio-economic dynamics, are amongst sources of conflict, and as such, fonts of enrichment, but only so long as there are spaces for deep dialogue with respect, care and openness to learning.

Beyond Tolerance

Contrary to the politicalized and unitary identity which can be instrumentalized for violence, pluralism appears to provide an answer to the problem as it encourages tolerance. Indeed, it has been increasingly recognized that, in the contemporary world, each individual person can have multiple identities.¹⁴ One can simultaneously have numerous memberships in diverse

cultures and groupings. Hence, one can hold myriad values and moral principles, even if they are mutually contradictory. This multicultural and cosmopolitan phenomenon is in sharp contrast to more traditional societies in which people's values tend to be attached to the specific form of life of the community, or to a particular religious teaching and cultural tradition. Instead of living out their community values in an unquestioning way, individuals are suddenly confronted with a host of different values and ways of thinking and acting.

Indeed, in multicultural societies, on a daily basis, people see different things being valued. For instance, in the workplace, meritocracy and competitiveness are cherished alongside fairness and equal opportunity; in education, the value of every-child-matters is privileged at the politicians' insistence on testing the children from a young age to ensure no child is left behind. This is alongside the value of uninterrupted childhood featuring free play, discovery, friendship and exploration. Clearly, the 'survival the fittest' contradicts 'an equal opportunity for all'. In this globalized era, people are increasingly exposed to a confusing multiplicity of moral claims.¹⁵ This multiplicity challenges traditional values; it engenders skepticism of the validity of some of the alternatives. Therefore, any value claim becomes unstable, and the individual can become uncertain how to pursue an ethical life.

In the face of such multiplicity, as already mentioned, one popular response is 'tolerance'. In fact, the politics of tolerance is increasingly promoted in societies that embrace cultural and ethical pluralism. It is also encouraged in societies where some ethnic or religious minority groups are striving to have their views and practices recognized amidst suspicion and distrust. Tolerance comprises the primary virtue of pluralism and, as a political gesture, it is equated with openness and generosity. It is the presumed pathway to peacefulness in communities of diversity.

We shall argue that tolerance does not constitute peacefulness in the communities. First, it risks moral relativism or subjectivism. Moral subjectivism is the claim that things can be good or bad only relative to what a society accepts—hence *everything goes*. Subjectivism in turn can lead to nihilism—the belief that nothing really matters—hence *nothing goes*. The logical consequence of moral subjectivism is that moral claims are merely a matter of opinion; there are no ethical truths and falsehoods. Authoritarian values are accepted by an authoritarian regime, and democratic values are accepted in a democratic regime; according to subjectivism, there can be no truth as to which is better.

The second problem with defining community peacefulness in terms of tolerance is that it risks moral inaction. Multiplicity introduces many possibilities, and when confronted with controversies, one might simply shrug and think ‘Oh, what can I do?’ There appear to be too many moral horizons that one can feel that it is impossible to take a moral stand or make a moral choice. Gradually, more and more people begin to get used to walking past the homeless without noticing, ignore abused women as a purely domestic affair, accept the differences of social hierarchy, allow economic growth to override all else, and regard democracy as mere aggregation of individual preferences.

Furthermore, tolerance implies a distance between oneself and people from other cultures and groups. To tolerate X suggests that one finds X objectionable or disagreeable, and at the same time, one recognizes some reasons that seem to override one’s own negative judgement of it.¹⁶ Tolerance requires keeping one’s animosity in check through the degree of one’s forbearance. For this reason, tolerance indicates relational distance rather than relational closeness. This keeping at a distance contains both a minimalist view of ethical obligation and a negative view of peacefulness. Tolerance is minimalist because it does not include any reasons for caring for others. It expresses a *laissez-faire* attitude that is compatible with unconcern for the plight of others and, in this fashion, it potentially colludes with dehumanizing and instrumentalizing social relations. It also implies a negative view of community peacefulness, which defines peace as the absence of violent interference. This negative conception ignores the prospect of positive peacefulness in a community. Necessarily, the positive would consist in more than tolerance because to be merely tolerant is to keep other people at arms’ length, and dismiss the possibility of a relationship. In terms of positive community peacefulness, much better than tolerance is the absence of the need for it. Positive community peacefulness would include caring for the well-being of others and recognizing them as persons of equal intrinsic value as oneself.

As we have seen, multiculturalism faces several problems. In its diagnostic, it takes identities at face value; it overlooks the birth of violence in hermeneutical dynamics and hides violent social structures. In its proposed solution, it advocates a cold and impersonal conception of living together, more suitable for a city bus station than a community. The way to overcome the challenge the ambiguity of multiplicity and clashes of values lies in dialogue. We shall proceed to discuss ways to engage in dialogue after the next section on understanding community.

Community, Well-Being, and Peace

To address our questions about peacefulness in communities, it is necessary to start with an understanding of the notion of community, and how it related to human well-being and hence peace. Typically, community is conceived as a place, a geographical location, such as a village or hamlet in a rural setting or a neighborhood or church in a large city. In this conception, ‘community’ indicates people’s identification with a locale, some affinity or important connection with a place. Such affinity can enable a person to feel a sense of belonging to the place, and its associated culture. Such a community will exclude others simply by being defined in terms of a place.

Another conventional way is to define community as a collection of people who share something in common, such as interests, attitudes, beliefs, social ties and activities. Here the commonality is essential as it is the feature that unifies the group. Although the ‘something-in-common’ allows the people to be bound together as a community, these individuals do not need to be together in the same place or in a face-to-face manner. For instance, those who are part of the LGBTQ community feel a strong sense of unity, but they are not attached to a specific place or form of contact. As mentioned above, this kind of community can be instrumental—the unity becomes a center of power in the fight for justice.

Another typical way to define community is in terms of a group of people who are brought together through face-to-face personal interactions. This face-to-face togetherness can inspire sentiments such as mutual trust, care, co-operation and altruism. Such community is often made more real by people participating in communal activities, the ends of which are beyond those of the individual. People can experience beautiful closeness in a church, a book club, a boy-scout troop, or in a school. Interpersonal relationships are strengthened by engaging in common meaningful activities, such as learning in a school, and in many cultures, there is the imperative to cultivate in young children a deep desire to be part of and to participate in face-to-face communities. However, these face-to-face communities are limited, and often appear to be exclusive: those who aren’t included in the face-to-face contacts become outsiders, creating a situation in which basic us-versus-them identifications are encouraged.

Communities can be tied together through acknowledging and sharing a collective memory of a significant history, which might go back several generations. Here, the notion of community is more than a tie or an attachment.

A community of memory can form a political unity that constitutes a temporal continuity of human responsibility, accountable for the past and responsible for the future.¹⁷ Such community may be geographically scattered, but nevertheless, it is a source of meaning and collective action. The *raison d'être* of such a community is to keep alive a memory that can serve an ongoing engagement in political struggle. Such communities are comprised of the people who hold the memories of genocides, an apartheid regime, the displacement of indigenous groups, and a history of slavery. This isn't simply a question of learning lessons from history: it is not static or dead remembrance, but rather living remembering of the subjective experiences and complexities of these events.

However, in the 21st century, these standard ways of defining 'community' are confronted by some challenges. Fixed membership based on place and sameness in cultural and ethnic identifications are no longer sufficient to characterize people's need to belong and to be together. Furthermore, global mobility has made stable membership and exclusive belonging an illusion. Communities of memory threaten to become forms of victimhood; as we argued in Chapter 3, peaceful relations require transcending the dichotomy between victim and aggressor. Moreover, competing claims to victimhood can fuel frictions between different communities of memory, and risk perpetuating cycles of violence.¹⁸

When community is conceived in terms of inclusive and exclusive factors, such as location, common conviction, shared interests and collective memories, this draws hard boundaries between insiders and outsiders. Sooner or later, these boundaries become the defining aspects of community, and this tends to limit human relations. Once the circle is drawn, some will be kept in and others are cast out. Likewise, a community cannot be defined in terms of same and overlapping interests, because this would suggest that the one group of people have entitlements, rights or privileges not shared with those who are not part of the community.

Even common interests and goals does not capture the essence of a community. A goal-oriented group is frequently brought together to serve a specific purpose, such as a protest, and each person within the group may play a designated role in achieving the common end. However, such a group does not constitute a community. Such a grouping might become a functional organization, but this is quite different from a community. When communities are regarded merely as functional organizations, this violates the idea that a community is primordially a mode of living together. This violation can be seen in the ways we describe the growth of the community. The use of verbs such as 'design', 'build', 'construct'

to describe the way people come together as a community suggests wrongly that a community is like an artefact, an instrument and a separate entity rather than a way of being that is integral to people's lives. This discourse threatens to turn a community into a product. When processes of community 'building' are framed in such instrumental and commodifying terms, it introduces the threat of clashes of egos, self-interest and competition for domination. It also suggests that the growth of the community has become primary, while the interests of the persons and their well-being are secondary. This kind of discourse implies that the community is an entity with its own goals, and that the bigger the membership, the more effective the community will be in achieving its goals. This way of thinking despoils the idea of a community as a close living connection between its members and their coordinated activities, central to their well-being.

From the perspective of peace in communities, the above conceptions are problematic because exclusionary boundaries tend to brew strife, separation and alienation. The more a community is regarded in such terms, it is more likely that there will be unwelcome tensions and disputes between it and the excluded groups. Even within the in-group, intimacy and closeness based on sameness is limited and exclusionary, and in this context, the focus on intimacy seems to rule out connectedness and relationship with 'the strange and the stranger'.¹⁹

This is also to say that, when defining community, it is necessary to remember that commonalities are always situated within differences. The question is how a community can contain the various conflictual dynamics and tensions between its diverse members without this spiraling into violence. How might we understand community so that the peaceful relationships can mute the violent potential embedded in a community as a collection of people. This is an important dimension of peace.

With this in mind, let us examine the idea of a *community of intention*. 'A community of intention' refers to the collective intention of coming together to engage in coordinated actions for the sake of and as part of the well-being of oneself and of others, and for the sake of something beyond oneself (such as collective goal). Such communities might include: spiritual communities, environment groups and arts societies, such as the Royal Society of Arts in the UK. In each of these cases, the defining intention is to work for one's own well-being and towards something beyond oneself, in collaboration with or together with other members of the community.

In some ways, this indicates a characteristic of all communities. The key is how each community member identifies herself and the other members, and

how they understand the collective intention. As we discussed in Chapter 2, a peaceful person identifies herself primarily and non-derivatively as a person. This would be a prerequisite for belonging to a peaceful community. With this kind of self-identification, members of the community can also embrace various derivative identifications, such as race, gender, sexual orientation and profession. Following Chapter 3, the focus on common intention enables the members to see one another's intention as good. By defining 'community' from the perspective of spiritual identity and collective intention, we can transcend the exclusionary and potentially antagonistic nature of the us-vs-them contrast. This definition embodies the ethical principle that other people are equally real, and equally valuable as oneself.

In summary, drawing from what we have developed in the earlier chapters in this book, there are four criteria that render a community peaceful. The first is that each person identify herself non-derivatively as a person who has intrinsic value in being a conscious being. Secondly, each person in the community appreciates the actions of the others from the perspective of a collective intention. When one relates to oneself and to others from a peaceful self-identification, and when one appreciates the common intention, community relationships can germinate, grow and blossom, with mutual care and loving connections. The third criterion is that these communal activities, experiences, and relationships constitute part of one's well-being and that of the collective. Finally, the community's processes must be underpinned and sustained by ongoing deep dialogues.

We can now see why the idea of a community shouldn't be defined only in terms of what binds people together. It is also a question of how people self-identify, perceive one another's identity, appreciate each other's intentions, and make choices about how to live and what ends matter. In other words, a community is not an identity-holder, although an identification with what the community represents might be what initially draws people together into the community. It is, in effect, people's self and mutual identification as human that makes peace enduring in communities.

Therefore, up to this point, the conclusion is that, although there is no one single straightforward way to understand community, there are better ways to conceptualize communities. A better understanding explains why belonging to communities has been one of the most pleasing ways for humans to be together.²⁰ Such an understanding can simultaneously maintain both the non-instrumental and instrumental value of communities. It is non-instrumental insofar belonging to a community is part of human well-being and is constituted

in a shared flourishing life. It is also non-instrumentally valuable insofar as such a community embodies the qualities of positive peacefulness. A community is instrumentally valuable insofar as it achieves goals that contribute to a wider collective, and it is also instrumentally valuable insofar it contributes to peace.

Engaging Proactively With Conflict

Belonging to a community does not negate conflict; no community is conflict-free. As we saw in previous chapters, a community will be peaceful when it practices deep dialogue and offers spaces for such transformative encounters at the heart of its processes. When organizations actively nurture peaceful qualities and engage in deep dialogue, these processes can silence or calm the violent tendencies inherent in conflicts. Such transformative approaches draw on the creative tensions in conflict, and steer them away from a destructive trajectory. For a community to fully appreciate the potential that a conflict has for innovation, there are several prerequisites:

First, it is necessary that individuals develop an understanding that conflict is always already present in human relationships. This understanding allows people to accept conflict, and to move forward by engaging proactively with the differences and tensions that constitute the conflict. The acceptance that conflict is a fact of life can help people to resist the urge to act aggressively towards other people or groups in the face of such differences. Therefore, in day-to-day life, organisations can play a significant role in promoting the life-affirming opportunities afforded by the presence of differences.

The second prerequisite is to be attentive to the kinds of conflict encountered in any situation. Some conflicts are intrapersonal; some are relational between groups; some are cultural. Others are structural, such as those reflected in economic systems and the systemic institutional practices that privilege one group over others. Attentiveness to these different kinds of conflict can guide people to be sensitive to the relevant features of a conflictive situation.

The third condition, discussed in Chapter 4, consists in regular deep dialogues between people from different groups. Such dialogues increase mutual identification as persons, and reduce separation and dehumanization. Direct contact increases the opportunities for sharing personal experiences, and for better interpreting the understanding and intentions of others. However, meaningful dialogues cannot be left to chance; they must be carefully facilitated so that they will be underpinned by a culture of listening, openness and good will.

As shown in previous chapters, such face-to-face contacts can help people tap in the creative energy latent in a conflict. Deep dialogue directs our attention to the growth of peaceful and enduring relationships, instead of merely resolving conflicts. It is only with such a basis that dialogue can touch upon topics concerning structural peace.

Also embedded in face-to-face contact is the possibility of developing a common language of peace, rather than a language of confrontation and divisiveness. The development of a common language is an important factor in peacefulness because, through it, people may forge recognizable narratives. Although each group and community believes that their histories and stories are unique, precious, and even inalterable, the development of a common language can allow the narratives to be shared and transformed.

The last prerequisite for engaging with and transforming conflict in a community is that the members are proactive. When individuals actively engage with the differences in their community, they will open-up spaces for ongoing deep dialogue and elicit the creative energies inherent in a conflict. Communities need to see that they can trust these processes, and this requires that someone takes responsibility. Otherwise, relationships will breakdown and conflict will assume a destructive trajectory.

The transformation of conflicts contributes to peace in communities not only by resolving disputes, but also by bringing people together such that they can surf the creative energies in a conflict. The former constitutes negative peace, and the latter, positive peace. Such processes of positive community peacefulness focus on 'a continuously evolving and developing quality of relationship.'²¹ As Dewey envisioned, conflict invites reflection and ingenuity.²² Conflict is a request for dialogue. The backdrop to this request is that disputes tend to be more visible and pronounced, and good relationships tend to be less apparent. However, it is precisely within relationships that resourcefulness resides, which enables people to create constructive change together. In turn, constructive changes feedback into the relationships, thereby empowering a virtuous cycle.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have attempted to understand peacefulness in communities. A community is a human way of being in the world that is a gift that people can offer to each other and receive reciprocally.²³ To live out this way

of being and instill a culture of peace through community requires at least three interlocking ways of nurturing.

The first is a personal endeavor of putting in the deep psychological work necessary to nurture a state of inner peacefulness. The second consists in individuals actively living out inner peacefulness in their relational lives. This will include an ongoing formation of the peaceful self in and through relationships. The third involves a political commitment to create the necessary conditions in which the kinds of human relatedness required for communal life can flourish. No doubt, the most fundamental way of fostering human capacities for relatedness is through the relevant kinds of educational processes. We will address these themes in the remaining chapters of the book.

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PEACE WITH NATURE

What is a peaceful relationship with nature? In this chapter, we will answer by identifying four strands concerning this relationship. First, there is the conflict between humans and nature insofar it divides us in an antagonistic or violent ‘us and them’. This would be violent insofar as humans instrumentalize the natural world, or treat it purely as a resource to be exploited. Second, typically, we don’t self-identify as part of the natural world. We tend to identify ourselves in terms that are non-natural or that negate or hide the fact that we are part of the natural world. For example, we tend to contrast ourselves *non-derivatively* with animals, as if we weren’t animals! Third, we ignore the importance that communal relations with the rest of nature have as a *constituent* part of well-being. At best, we think of our aesthetic experiences of communing with nature as an external *cause* of well-being rather than as a *constituent part* of it. This reinforces the instrumentalization. Finally, we humans tend to fall victim of a philosophical trap, a deep false dichotomy that may well lie at the root of the previous three points.

Instrumentalizing Nature as Violence

Earlier we defined violence as causing harm in a dehumanizing or instrumentalizing manner. We now need to consider how this definition can be amplified to include other natural beings including the environment and the natural world in general.

As a first step, we might clarify the distinction between human and person. Humans are members of a species *homo sapiens*. Persons are beings that are self-conscious and are rational in the sense of being able to respond to reasons. Given these definitions, it is clear that not all humans are persons, and not all persons are humans. Candidates for non-human persons would include chimpanzees, whales, gorillas, dolphins, elephants, crows, pigs and dogs.¹ Perhaps a more striking point is that the distinction between persons and non-persons is one of degree, and not one of kind. This means that it is not a question of an animal either being a person or not: there are shades of grey, and this is because self-awareness is a complex set of capacities that different animals can have in different degrees.² We marvel at the intelligence of crows and octopi, who show signs of personhood.

A second step is to point out that many non-human animals are conscious beings, who feel pain, have close relationships with their kin, feel emotions, have desires and beliefs regarding their environment. Insofar as an animal has these psychological states, it can be harmed, and it can be treated with disrespect. Beings of different species are conscious in different degrees.

These two points indicate that conscious non-human animals have primary value. Dog biscuits, kennels and dog hospitals have a secondary or derivative value compared to the life of dogs. This suggests that, just as we can dehumanize a human person, we can 'dedogize' a canine by treating him as less than a dog, by not permitting him to live a dog's life, and by treating him merely as an object to be used. Similar points could be made about other animals. And it is in these terms that we can understand violence to animals.

However, our thinking about what it is to live in peaceful relations with the natural world in general requires a still deeper treatment. To dig a little deeper, let us consider utilitarianism. An ecological catastrophe would be a disaster for the human race. Additionally, it would harm and kill other animals, and damage their sustaining environment. According to utilitarianism, these are the sole problems with all environmental damage: it would harm sentient beings.

On this basis, utilitarianism may *seem* like a relative solid foundation for environmental ethics, and hence for defining peacefulness in our relations with

the natural world. It asserts that the right action in any circumstance is the one that maximizes overall happiness more than the alternatives, and, as such, it has three features especially relevant to defining environmental destruction. First, it is clear concerning the nature of the good; only happiness is intrinsically valuable, and this concept applies only to conscious beings. Second, the theory requires impartiality over time, and does not privilege the present generation. Therefore, it condemns causing significant damage to future generations for the sake of present luxurious living because this exchanges a small benefit to present generations for serious harm for future generations. Thirdly, because it is impartial, the theory extends to *all* conscious life. It denounces killing whales as much as killing humans. The species of a being *as such* does not constitute a morally relevant distinction, even though there are morally relevant differences between species, such as the differing capacities to feel pain and different degrees of consciousness. Ethically, we cannot favor humans just because of our species.

Furthermore, utilitarianism can be combined with an understanding of the principles of ecological biology, such as the claim that all parts of nature, including humans, are interdependent. Everything lives in delicate and complex webs of interrelations with its environment, including other species. Nothing lives alone. Given this interdependence, the utilitarian can argue that contemporary mass-consumer society is violently undermining the ecological balance and harmony of the biosphere and, therefore, we need to change drastically our way of living in order not to harm the global environment, for the sake of future generations and other animals. In short, a utilitarian will maintain that utilitarianism forms a solid basis for understanding peacefulness with nature.

Nevertheless, even a utilitarian might agree that to be a viable ethic of the environment, we might need to modify the theory. As it is traditionally stated, the theory is about individual actions.³ We might amend it to include the nature of collective responsibility and structural violence. For example, one person using air-conditioning doesn't cause significant damage to the atmosphere; however, everyone using their AC systems does. One plastic bottle doesn't damage the environment; 480 billion p.a. of them does.⁴ How can the theory be adapted to explain that a billion harmless acts together can make one violent, destructive act? Likewise, how can the theory be revised to include structural violence to the environment? More on this in Chapter 10. However, let us provisionally assume that a notion of collective responsibility and structural violence can be accommodated within a broadly utilitarian framework.

There is a deeper problem stated as follows. 'Utilitarianism implies that all values apart from happiness and well-being are merely instrumental. This

means that the aesthetic value of a beautiful landscape can be reduced to its effects on the happiness of sentient beings. It also means that all non-sentient natural things, such as trees and flowers, mountains and swamps, are valuable only in so far as they contribute to that happiness. They only have instrumental value.' In other words, utilitarianism requires us to treat everything in nature that is not conscious purely as an instrumental means. This seems to be a poor basis for understanding environmental peacefulness. Thus, one argument against utilitarianism is that humans need to treat nature with more respect and that to regard non-sentient nature merely instrumentally, or as a set of economic resources to be exploited, violates that respect. It is non-peaceful. Indeed, it is precisely treating nature merely instrumentally that has led us to the brink of an environmental disaster. Looked at in this way, utilitarianism exemplifies a way of thinking that is a core part of the problem: we think of ecological disaster solely from a human point of view. This is the mentality that instrumentalizes the natural world and constitutes a non-peaceful relationship.

In this regard, it might be argued that utilitarianism is similar to its sibling, traditional neo-classical economics. It is a form of expediency because it conceives environmental peacefulness in terms of calculating our interests with more care and accuracy when we exploit nature. It urges us not to greatly damage our long-term interests for small short-term gain in our use of natural resources. Thus, it treats the natural world merely as a resource, and it does not value nature as something non-instrumentally valuable. Thus, it seems to constitute the very attitudes that have led the world to the precipice. Of course, this doesn't mean that it wouldn't be better if humanity managed the 'natural resources' of the Earth more intelligently, with a longer-term vision. However, it does mean that, while better environmental management is an approach for understanding negative environmental peace, it isn't a route for understanding positive ecological peacefulness in our relations to the Earth.

Some Radical Alternatives

The core argument against a utilitarian-based approach to ecological peacefulness is that the theory cannot recognize the value of natural things that are not sentient. The remedy, it seems, is to argue that biological systems can have non-instrumental value akin to the way that conscious beings do. We shall briefly consider three such approaches.

Biocentrism

Paul Taylor argues for an environmental ethic that attempts to recognize the value of non-conscious life, and which is based on three major ideas.⁵

First, Taylor argues for a bio-centric moral attitude, which is a character-state that involves seeing the good of other living beings as a reason for action, and which requires the following beliefs. Humans are part of nature in the same sense that all other living things are, and they are not inherently superior to other living things. All living things are part of an interdependent natural system and pursue their own good. Taylor argues that the bio-centric outlook is rational, because it is based on scientific evidence, and that it requires the attitude of respect for nature.

Second, he argues that all living things are teleological centers of life and, thus, have a good of their own, which means that, even if they do not have desires, nevertheless, it still makes sense to speak of harming and benefiting them. For example, even a fly has a good of its own because it has ends, such as development, sustenance and propagation. To claim that a plant is a teleological center of life is to assert that its internal and external functions are goal-oriented.

Third, as a consequence of the bio-centric moral attitude, we have a moral duty not to harm and interfere with other living things, as well as to treat them fairly. To explain these duties, Taylor appeals to the four general kinds of moral obligations that are commonly cited in applied ethical theories: non-maleficence, non-interference, fidelity and restitutive justice. Non-maleficence means that one should not intentionally harm another; non-interference requires us to not interfere with the freedom of other beings. Fidelity involves respecting other forms of life by not deceiving them, and restitution requires recompensing other beings for the harm we cause them, for example, by restoring damaged habitats.

To deal with conflicts of interests between humans and other living organisms, Taylor appeals to some of the procedural rules of liberal political philosophy. These are: self-defense, proportionality, minimum wrong, distributive justice and restitutive justice. The principle of self-defense permits killing organisms that threaten human life and health. However, proportionality requires that we do not harm the basic interests of other beings for the sake of our non-basic interests, and minimum wrong requires us to satisfy our non-basic interests in a way that causes minimum wrong to other beings. The principle of distributive justice requires an impartial fairness in the distribution of harms and benefits, and that of restitutive justice requires recompense for harms caused.⁶

Ecological Ethics

A radical objection to biocentrism is that, like utilitarianism, it does not recognize the value of ecological wholes. It implies that only individual living things have value. Against this view, some thinkers have claimed that ecosystems, species, and even the whole biosphere have a non-instrumental value in much the same way that individuals do.

According to this idea, just as we can refer to the good for any living organism as Taylor claims, we also can do the same for ecological systems *per se*. One can harm and benefit an ecological system. In this sense, such systems must be regarded in the same ways as individual organisms. An ecological community is like a higher-level organism because it is a unified whole in which the parts play a functional role and have a purpose in relation to the whole. It is a self-organizing system.

Some ecological theories make the further and more radical claim that ecological systems are primary compared to any individual organism. This claim is suggested by the finely tuned interdependence of the parts of a whole ecosystem. In this vein, Baird Callicott writes: 'Ecological relationships determine the nature of organisms rather than the other way around... The system as whole produces the individuals that it needs to survive.'⁷

James Lovelock has famously argued for a similar view regarding the whole biosphere, which he names 'Gaia'.⁸ In collaboration with microbiologist Lynn Margulis, Lovelock claims that the biosphere is a huge self-regulating system in which the biota, or the total of all living organisms, controls certain properties of the Earth, such as its temperature and the composition of the lower atmosphere. Since the formation of life on the Earth, the surface temperature of the sun has increased 25%, even though the earth's temperature has remained relatively constant, prior to global warming. For example, oxygen levels are also controlled by the growth of plants, bacteria and algae. On the basis of this and other evidence, Lovelock argues that the Earth as a whole is a self-regulating system to which we have ethical duties. However, he does not claim that this system is teleological.

Deep Ecology

In the 1940s, the American ecologist Aldo Leopold (1887–1948) employed similar ideas to pioneer what was at the time a new approach to ecological ethics. In his essay 'The Land Ethic,' contained in his classic book *A Sand*

Country Almanac, Leopold develops the first eco-centric ethics, the idea that ecosystems as wholes have intrinsic moral worth and as such should be respected. He widens the ecological community to include the land and other sources of energy that an ecological system needs. Leopold writes that 'a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.'⁹ Leopold's view was developed and defended by Baird Callicott in the late 1980s.

The more spiritual aspects of Leopold's views inspired another non-anthropocentric approach, which is called 'deep ecology,' and which was developed by Arne Naess in the 1970s.¹⁰ The deep ecological movement opposes shallow approaches that characterize our environmental problems merely as the prevalence of pollution and the depletion of resources. Such views are superficial because they fail to identify our ecological predicament as constituted by an unhealthy way of life and unsustainable modes of thinking. Our culture fosters lack of ecological consciousness by failing to see humans as an integral part of nature. The environmental crisis is but a manifestation of this deeper condition. Because of this, members of the deep ecological movement call for a political, philosophical and spiritual transformation.¹¹

Insofar as deep ecology explains why ecosystems have value in terms of the fact that they can be harmed, the position is similar to ecological ethics, i.e. b) above. However, deep ecologists often appeal also to a different kind of consideration, namely a metaphysical holism, to show that an ecosystem has intrinsic value.¹² They reject the reductionism and individualism inherent in the so-called traditional western worldview that tries to separate humans from the rest of nature. For example, they oppose the idea that we humans have souls that distinguish us from other organisms. Their idea is that ecosystems are genuine wholes because understanding the life of any animal or plant requires knowledge of how it interacts with other parts of the system. Furthermore, ecosystems are wholes because they are biologically primary in the sense of generating the organisms they need.

More fundamentally, many deep ecologists argue that the conception of an individual as an entity separate from its environment is a mistaken metaphysical notion that reflects our lack of ecological consciousness. For example, some claim that the whole biosphere is a system of energy flow within which individual organisms are temporary concentrations of energy rather like a wave or vortex in a current of water. As such, the distinction between the individual and its surroundings is an artificial one. The universe consists of parts nested within wholes, and the only genuine whole is the universe itself.

This kind of claim is reminiscent of the metaphysics of Spinoza (1632–1677), who argued that the only real individual is the whole universe.¹³ It is also similar to some forms of Buddhism. Like Spinoza, some deep ecologists see the process of acquiring ecological awareness as a process of spiritual transformation through which one transcends the limited individualistic conception of the self.¹⁴ The main ethical conclusions of deep ecology are that the Earth's ecosystem is a valuable whole, which we have a moral duty to preserve and maintain as healthy, and that humans are essentially only part of this whole. Ethically, the whole ecological system has value in-itself, quite apart from its usefulness for human purposes, and humans have no right to damage its diversity and health except to satisfy vital needs.

A False Dichotomy

A central problem of environmental ethics is that there does not appear to be an alternative to, on the one hand, what seems to be expediency and, on the other, what appears to be mysticism. On the one hand, moral theories such as utilitarianism don't avoid an instrumental approach to nature. On the other hand, theories that impute to nature an intrinsic value often refer to ecosystems and the biosphere *as if* they were conscious organisms in an almost mystical way. We shall argue that, even if this latter kind of position cannot be upheld, this does not force us back into the expediency of a utilitarian view. This is an important false dichotomy: on the one side, we have a cold business-like approach to natural resources and, on the other, a reverence for nature that approaches the religious. Arguably, we need a new alternative to explain adequately what ecological peacefulness is, and how it takes us beyond negative environmental peace.

In this section, it is *not* our aim to argue that humans don't have ethical relations with ecosystems and plants. It is rather to present some standard challenges to the three explanations, considered in Section II, of why we do. The main challenge facing such theories is the assertion that only conscious beings have non-instrumental worth; this challenge implies that non-conscious plants and ecosystems don't have intrinsic value. All three positions of Section II can be considered as ethical expressions of a reaction against a mechanical approach to biology. These reactions affirm that biological systems are more than mechanical because they are alive, and they are so because they are self-organizing, goal-directed and genuine wholes. The rele-

vant question is ‘Do the biological features support the ethical position?’ Why is it unpeaceful to instrumentalize nature? We will examine critically each of these three answers in turn.

Self-Organizing

Does the fact that biological systems are self-organizing have the relevant ethical significance? The answer seems to be ‘no’. Even if all ecosystems are self-organizing, this doesn’t mean that they have intentional mental states or that they are conscious. First, the mere fact that a system is self-organizing does not imply that it is intentional. The Russian chemist Ilya Prigogine claims that some dissipative chemical systems display self-organization, and the German physicist Hermann Haken describes laser beams as self-organizing systems.¹⁵ In other words, non-living systems can be self-organizing. Furthermore, the fact that a self-organizing system such as a plant can be described in terms of purposes does not mean that it has intentional mental states. Second, even if ecological systems and plants show signs of having intentional mental states, they do not meet the criteria for awareness. For instance, they do not suffer pain and enjoy conscious experience in the way that animals do. This is because conscious experience requires a central nervous system or something functionally equivalent.

Goal-Directed

The idea that non-conscious goal-directed organisms, such as plants and ecosystems, have intrinsic value requires that the claim ‘something can be harmed if and only if it lives consciously’ be false. The issue is not whether we can *damage* an ecosystem but rather whether this damage can amount to *harm* to the ecosystem itself. I can damage a car, but this does not harm it. *Harm* should be defined in terms of the valuable processes of experiencing and living, for instance, the inability to appreciate the valuable aspects of one’s life. If this is right, then strictly speaking, plants and ecosystems cannot be harmed.

As we have seen, Paul Taylor argues that all living things are goal-directed and have a good of their own and, therefore, that it makes sense to speak of harming them, even if they do not have desires and are not conscious. The ecological ethics approach extends this core idea to whole ecosystems. There are two problems with this claim. The first is based on what it means to say

that a plant is goal-directed. It does not mean that plants desire. Desires can be attributed only to entities that can have beliefs and that can perform actions. This much Taylor admits. Given this, what does it mean to say that plants are goal-directed? Given that it does *not* mean that they have goals and ends, the best alternative seems to be that it means that their reactions can be described with the intensional language of ends.¹⁶ Because such descriptions are not literally true, they should be understood instrumentally. Put crudely, they are useful simplifying fictions. If so, then this is not sufficient to support claims of harm and intrinsic value. Second, in the light of this, we might consider the application of the intensional language of ends to other non-conscious systems such as corporations and computers. Computers are like plants, and corporations are akin to ecological systems. All four are goal-directed systems that can be described instrumentally with the language of goals. But should we claim that computers and corporations have a life that is intrinsically valuable and that, in this sense, they can be harmed? If we deny that computers and corporations have intrinsic value, then we should also do so for biological goal-oriented systems. If it is counter-argued that plants and ecosystems are different because they are alive unlike computers and corporations, then we need some non-circular criteria for being alive that does not appeal only to self-organization and goal-directed behavior.

Holism

The deep ecological point is that the traditional western conception of the individual organism is radically mistaken. It fails to sufficiently take into account the interdependence of the natural world. Reality consists not of individuals, but of nested wholes. Therefore, it is these wholes that have primary intrinsic value, and not individual organisms, such as humans. As a first reply to this contention, let us note that denying full-blown holism does not commit one to a reductive individualism. This is an important conclusion because some versions of holism assert the priority of the whole over the individual in all respects, and such a view appears attractive when the only alternative is reductive individualism that denies interdependence. The whole doesn't necessarily matter more than the part. For instance, the whole assembly 'me and my kitchen' doesn't matter more than me. It would be worse to destroy me than the assemblage. Second, is the so-called western conception of individual organisms erroneous? Are we temporary blips within the total energy flow, metaphorically like waves on the ocean? Suppose that the answer is 'yes.'

Would that imply that particular entities, such as Garrett Thomson, do not exist? And, would it entail that non-conscious aspects of nature have intrinsic value? Arguably, the answer to both questions should be 'no.' Even if I am a wave on an ocean of energy, nevertheless, I am one that hopefully will last for 80 or more years, and that is stable and complex enough during that time to be self-conscious and to want, feel, think and act. Furthermore, my being such a wave does not show that other waves, such as plants, that are not complex enough for consciousness are intrinsically valuable.

In conclusion, the three radical approaches considered here do not establish that non-conscious life and ecosystems have non-instrumental value. Of course, absence of proof is not proof of absence. Even if the three radical approaches fail, this doesn't demonstrate that non-conscious life and ecosystems don't have non-instrumental value. However, for the sake of moving the argument along, let us assume that non-conscious life and ecosystems don't have non-instrumental value. Even granting this assumption does not mean that we should revert to the utilitarian position that treats non-conscious aspects of nature purely instrumentally. Rather, it shows the need for an alternative understanding of our ethical relations to nature.

Beyond the Dichotomy

There was a man who owned a beautiful walled garden, which had been tended for generations. The man hated the garden. Every day, he would walk around it, spitting on the flowers and cursing them.¹⁷ The feeling that these actions are somehow wrong cannot be based directly on any utilitarian moral considerations: they do not hurt any conscious beings and, additionally, the man is not depriving anyone of their freedom or rights. Yet, surely, there is something wrong with what this man was doing: we need an alternative explanation that does not appeal to utilitarian considerations or to more radical ecological ideas.

One such alternative line of reasoning is the claim that one ought to be the kind of person who respects nature, and that actions such as spitting on the flowers express a disrespect for the natural world. With this line of reasoning, we can explain the feeling that it can be wrong to destroy parts of the environment on the basis of the expressive value of the action, even when those parts of nature are not conscious. For example, because swamps and salt deserts are not conscious, it would be difficult to explain why their destruction

might be defeasibly wrong on the basis that they are intrinsically valuable. Nevertheless, the destruction of the desert might be unpeaceful because the action expresses an uncaring state of being. In a better state of being, we might be more careful not to degrade the environment, pollute the desert and treat fragile eco-systems as mere instruments for our economic benefit.

This line of reasoning requires the idea that an action can be good or bad purely because of the character-state that it expresses. The thesis that something can be valuable for what it expresses is not a novel idea. For example, an old gift that has become useless, nevertheless, can be cherished for what it means. In a similar manner, actions can express virtues or vices. For instance, if I defile the memory of a dead relative, I do not harm anyone; yet my action may express a spiteful state of mind. Suppose I tear up the letters of my dead grandfather in hatred: I am not violating a moral obligation toward a living being. Yet, the action expresses a hatred that we may suppose that I should not have. Thus, if I hurt a living relative, such an action may also express a hateful state of being, just like the letter tearing, even though, in addition, it also harms a living person. In conclusion, in addition to the normal categories 'intrinsically good,' 'instrumentally good,' and 'good as a part of a whole,' actions can also be expressively good or bad.

This alternative explanation requires we have reason to become a person who loves nature, and this assumption needs to be explained and defended. What are the relevant psychological features of loving nature which imply that we have a reason to do so? Thomas Hill answers this question as follows: a proper appreciation of nature is an aesthetic experience that involves a humility, which is incompatible with feelings of self-importance. It also involves a sense of self-acceptance, which requires understanding that we are part of nature.¹⁸ In other words, according to Hill, indifference to non-sentient nature 'is likely to reflect either ignorance, a self-importance, or a lack of self-acceptance, which we must overcome to have proper humility'.¹⁹

We would argue that Hill's answer doesn't go far enough. To it, we *must* add the following. We humans are part of the natural world; this is an inescapable and deep aspect of our identity, which arguably, we have not fully come to terms with yet. It means that we belong to the natural world. It is more intimately our home than the houses we construct; it is our dwelling place. Concerning other people, such as friends and family, our human struggle is to recognize emotionally how they are part of our lives. Our struggle is to let them in, to live and act in ways such that our relationships are peaceful with this fact. In contrast, with regard to nature, the struggle is to recognize

emotionally how we are a part of it, to come to terms with and to live in accordance with that.

Someone might object that the position we have carved out is a merely an indirect form of utilitarianism.²⁰ According to indirect utilitarianism, virtues are good only because virtuous persons tend to act in ways that increase happiness. In short, the value of virtues is to be explained *solely* in terms of their consequences, namely their effects on future actions, the value of which, in turn, is to be explained consequentially. Such virtues, for instance generosity and considerateness, will spill over into one's attitudes toward nature: such virtues will tend to express themselves in our relationship with the natural world. Furthermore, the love of nature essentially involves and cultivates character traits, such as humility, that are important in our lives for utilitarian reasons.

Although such indirect considerations are crucial for understanding negative peaceful relations to the environment and although having negative peaceful relations would be very important in the intensifying environmental crisis, there is more. Indirect utilitarianism is not the approach we are advocating for understanding positive ecological peacefulness. On contrary, such a view embodies two common misapprehensions that severely limit its capacity in this regard. We need a wholly different approach.

First, indirect utilitarianism argues reductively that virtues are valuable solely for the actions they typically cause. For instance, courage is important only because it disposes us to act bravely, and prudence is valuable solely because it prevents us from acting foolishly. However, such a view is an error. For example, there is more to being courageous than being disposed to act bravely. A courageous person lives in wide or more open phenomenological life-world, containing more perceived opportunities. Likewise, a generous person tends to perceive other people as more real, that is she sees them more often *as persons* and less as nuisances. In short, the value of a virtue is not *merely* the actions that it typically causes. Rather it is constituted by a holistic state of being, which includes how the person experiences, perceives, thinks, feels, attends to what is around her. This broader conception of virtue is required to articulate how nature can become part of one's life, or can enter one's 'life-world.'

Second, we must also reject the assumption that the sole purpose of ethical judgments is to improve society or for the public good. We can see ethics as also playing a deeply personal role: the improvement or transformation of oneself for its own sake. In brief, we can draw a distinction here between

morality and ethics; while social morality pertains to one's moral obligations toward others, personal ethics concerns one's care of oneself. The two are different because, whereas social morality has a public enforcement problem, personal ethics does not. For this reason, only the former has close relations to the law and to public practices of praise and blame. There is another difference between the two: personal ethics will also involve care for others, but the relevant motivation will be quite different from that of social morality. Following Nozick, personal ethics involves push, and social morality, pull.²¹ Here is the difference. If I ought to act morally toward you because of *your* value as a person, then this indicates moral pull. There is moral pull when your value as a person fixes what action should flow from me. Ethical push occurs when my value as a person fixes what behavior should issue from me. Push is when I act ethically because I am a certain kind of person. The point is that personal ethics concerns the care for others insofar as this is motivated by push rather than pull.

These two points reply to the objection. We were trying to carve out an understanding of ecological peacefulness that evaded capture in a false dichotomy: either the natural world has merely instrumental value or else it has intrinsic value. Roughly, the first corresponds to the expediency of utilitarianism, and the second to the mysticism of radical ecology. In etching out an alternative, we encountered the objection that the new approach was really a sophisticated form of indirect utilitarianism. And now, we have rejected that objection.

The two replies contain a common core, namely that an external view of our relationship to the natural world is inadequate; it is not merely a question of external actions and the public good. One needs to be inside the idea that we are part of the natural world to see that a caring attitude toward and appreciative attention to nature is an integral part of our being-well. This is a question of ethical push rather than pull. In other words, given that we should have a caring attitude toward non-conscious nature then this is not because we owe it to plants and ecosystems due to their intrinsically valuable nature, but rather because we owe it to ourselves to be the kinds of persons who are respectful to and appreciative of the natural world of which we are a part. Additionally, this non-external view requires a non-reductive view of virtue. The value of being the kind of person who respects nature cannot be explained adequately solely in terms of the effects of one's actions on other people and the public good. The explanation requires the idea that there are reasons to acquire the relevant virtues because the way we perceive the natural world should be in tune with the fact that we are part of it.

Part of the Natural World

One way to articulate what is wrong with instrumentalizing the natural world is to return to the issue of self-identification. In Chapter 2 we saw that psychological peacefulness can be defined in terms of how we (non-derivatively) self-identify. It requires that we do so in ways that transcend the psychological violence of conflicts and that align with the nature of the self as a being of primary value. This is a key idea because any human being is a part of the natural world. This is an essential part of our nature; we are animals who engage in the kinds of activities typical of animals such as breathing, drinking, eating, sleeping, reproducing, moving around, pursuing goals, being with others, and growing and ageing. While it may be true that we engage in some kinds of activities that other animals don't participate in, such as reading, painting, praying, gossiping and telling jokes, this doesn't distract from our animal natures and from the fact that we are part of the natural world.

Furthermore, in Chapter 2, we also argued that a state of peacefulness requires that the person self-identify non-derivatively in ways that aren't incompatible with the real nature of the self as self-identifier. Peacefulness requires that we self-identify in ways that are compatible with what we are. This implies that a basic self-identification that sets us up in identity-antagonism with the rest of the nature world won't be peaceful (given that we are part of the natural world). If, in the heart of our hearts, we think of ourselves as persons in ways that separate us from the rest of the natural world, then our self-identification is not peaceful. This is because it won't be aligned with the reality of being human. It creates an 'us vs them' (or in the case of the instrumentalized natural world, an 'us vs it') that is unpeaceful. This result is one of the interesting complaints of radical ecologists regarding contemporary society: it sets up a dichotomy between humans and the rest of nature.

Conclusion: Relations to Well-Being

To characterize peacefulness in our relations to nature, we need to go beyond the negative ideas that we act violently when we exploit nature and treat it merely as an economic resource. We want to say more than 'such violence involves creating a nonsensical divide between ourselves and the rest of the natural world'. We might try to say more about what such ideas mean in practice, how to harmonize our needs with those of the planet as an interwoven

set of ecosystems. This is a vast topic, increasingly well explored in other literature.²² However, such analyses don't take the step of thinking deeply about what a positive peaceful relationship to nature might look like. Understandably, it sticks to the urgent negatives.

Our relationships with the natural world suffer from being systematically ill-described. As we saw in Chapter 3, there is a tendency to think of relationships along the following lines: a good relationship brings us well-being in important ways, just as a bad one does the same with ill-being. This is a mischaracterization. It under-describes the role that our friends and family play in our lives because it places them outside our lives. To assert 'friends and family cause well-being' locates them as external sources. In contrast, to affirm that they are part of our being or living well locates them inside our lives. A good account of well-being will recognize this difference as central and it will rectify the deficiency.²³

When thinking of our relationship to the natural world, we tend to frame nature as an external source of well-being: the park causes us enjoyment; the landscape causes us to feel awe; the trees make us feel calm. This is a disservice in two related and hugely important ways.

(1) It reinforces the misleading scientific tendency to think of nature as neutral and mechanical. In everyday parlance, a forest can be enchanting; a glade, delightful; a landscape, grand. But, under the influence of scientism, we are apt to contradict this way of thinking by affirming that nature doesn't really have such aesthetic qualities at all; they are in the mind, subjective: objectively, nature is neutral.²⁴ According to this idea, there are no aesthetic properties, only aesthetic feelings. We would argue that this way of thinking is irredeemably mistaken.²⁵ The alternative is to regard aesthetic judgments as directed to the relational properties of trees and landscapes: sometimes, trees really are enchanting. There are three considerations that favor this way of thinking. The first consideration is that the original subjectivist conception cannot make good sense of human relationships. For example, a loved one has loveable qualities. She really is considerate and kind, and my admiration and love are in part an appreciation of her loveable qualities. This implies that she has those qualities, and they aren't merely an invention. Second, the subjectivist position that portrays the natural world as neutral makes the natural sciences king or an absolute monarch in ways that contradict everyday human experience. It assumes that *only* the natural sciences can describe reality as it is. It gives the natural sciences descriptive monopoly. This contradicts any description of a human relationship or society as such. It contradicts the claim that we can make true assertions

about the banking system, for instance. The third is that the alternative non-subjectivist approach allows for the possibility of mistakes and ignorance. If I judge that a landscape is threatening, I might be mistaken. More importantly, a person who is cut off from nature can be ignorant of its aesthetic qualities. In this regard compare our relationship with other people to that with the natural world. As we saw in Chapter 3, I can be mistaken in my judgments about other people and I can be ignorant about their character. In a similar vein, if judgements about the aesthetic characteristics of nature aren't purely subjective then a person can be deaf and blind to those properties.²⁶

(2) The framing of the natural world merely as a cause of well-being renders the valuable qualities of nature as no more than external sources of our own feelings and well-being. The alternative is to think that nature can really be beautiful, enchanting, awesome, and that we can enter into a relationship with it such that it becomes a part of a person's life in much the same way that friends do. Friends aren't useful tools for augmenting well-being; a friend is a part of one's life and a potential constituent of one's well-being. Likewise, there is a world of difference between 'this tree makes me feel beauty and hence it contributes to my well-being' and 'this tree is beautiful and when I appreciate it properly it becomes part of my life'. Thus, the insipid discourse of the form 'the forest causes me pleasure' and even 'I like being in the forest' expresses and reinforces a mode of being in which we are separate from the natural world. It does so by *not* expressing the intimacy of our relation to the rest of the natural world: we are part of it. It isn't like a fairground or a spectacle.

Notes

1. Singer, P. (2011). *Practical Ethics*, 3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Bermudez, J. (2000). *The Paradox of Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3. Mill, J.S. (2002). *Utilitarianism*, edited by G. Sher, Hackett Publishing.
4. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/28/a-million-a-minute-worlds-plastic-bottle-binge-as-dangerous-as-climate-change>
5. See Taylor, P. (1981). "The Ethics of Respect for Nature", *Environmental Ethics*, 3, 197–218; Taylor, P. (1986). *Respect for Nature*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
6. *Ibid.*
7. p. 87, Callicot, J. (1989). In *Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, New York, NY: SUNY.
8. Lovelock, J. (1979). *Gaia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. p. 262, Leopold, A. (1991). *Sand Country Almanac*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

10. See Naess, A. (1989). *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Also see Naess, A. (1986). "The Deep Ecology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects", *Philosophical Inquiry*, 8, 10–31; and Naess, A. (2005). "Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement", in H. Glasser (ed.). *The Selected Works of Arne Naess*, Dordrecht: Springer Verlag.
12. E.g. Callicott, B. (1986). "Asian Traditions as a Conceptual Resource for Environmental Ethics", *Environmental Ethics*, 8:4, 301–316.
13. Spinoza, B. (1677/1996). *Ethics*, trans. Edwin Curley, London: Penguin Classics.
14. Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985). *Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered*, Salt Lake City, UT: Peregrine Smith.
15. pp. 86–91, Capra, F. (1996). *The Web of Life*, New York, NY: Doubleday.
16. Intensional linguistic contexts include 'Person A believes that P' and Person A desires that P'. They are intensional because one cannot substitute co-referential expressions for 'P' without possibly changing the truth-value of the sentence as a whole. This means that they are referentially opaque or non-extensional. This feature reflects that they are about mental states that have content.
17. p. 104, Hill, T. (1991). *Autonomy and Self Respect*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18. *Ibid.* pp. 108–115.
19. *Ibid.* p. 115.
20. This objection might apply to Hill's formulation.
21. Nozick, R. (1981). *Philosophical Explanations*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
22. Such as Callicott, B. and da Rocha, R. (eds.) (1996). *Earth Summit Ethics: Toward a Reconstructive Postmodern Philosophy of Environmental Education*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
23. See Thomson, Gill and Goodson (forthcoming).
24. "Scientism is the broad-based belief that the assumptions and methods of research of the physical and natural sciences are equally appropriate (or even essential) to all other disciplines, including philosophy, the humanities and the social sciences." https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_scientism.html, accessed in Feb. 2018.
25. See McDowell, J. (1998). *Mind, Knowledge and Reality*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; McNaughton, D. (1988). *Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics*, Oxford: Blackwell and Chapter 9, Thomson, G. (2004). *On Modern Philosophy*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
26. See Chapters 7, 8 and 9, in Thomson, G. (2002). *On the Meaning of Life*, South Melbourne: Wadsworth.

PEACE AND WAR

In the next three chapters, we invite the reader to reject the assumption that a spiritual or an ethical understanding of what it is to be a peaceful person implies indifference to the question of what political-economic systems we humans should live in. Spiritually and ethically orientated understandings of peacefulness have political implications and aren't neutral with regards to the structural features of society. Furthermore, the structural cannot be reduced to the psychological and relational. Relationships, communities and institutions function within a structural framework, and evaluative questions about the former will inevitably make assumptions about the framework.

This is a time in which the global human family needs socio-political structural translations of spiritually and ethically attuned understandings of what it means to be human. Spirituality needs a structural expression to flourish. In general, what implications does a spiritual understanding of peacefulness have for questions concerning international organizations, political systems and economic structures? More positively, what kinds of systemic changes are necessary for us to realize more fully our human natures as peaceful beings? Peace cannot fully be a condition of the soul unless it is also a condition of the society in which we live. In the next two chapters, we explore the question concerning peacefulness in international relations. We will start by showing

how theories, that justify wars, such as just war theory, ignore critically important structural assumptions.

Just War Theory

Just war theory stands roughly in a position between realism and pacifism.¹ It states that some wars are morally justified and others not, and it attempts to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the distinction between the two (*jus ad bellum* or the right to war). It also specifies the conditions for waging a war justly or in a moral manner, or '*jus in bello*'. Such standards are broadly enshrined in some international law, such as the Geneva and Hague conventions.

The standard components of *jus ad bellum* are as follows: (1) The war must be declared by a legitimate authority: this is usually taken to be an established government of a nation-state. (2) The war must be waged for a 'just cause', such as self-defense against an aggressor, or to prevent or rectify an injustice. (3) The war must be waged with a right intention: one must aim at what is morally good or acceptable. (4) War must be the last resort, with all other peaceful alternatives having failed. (5) There must be a reasonable prospect of winning the war and achieving the goal. (6) The amount of good to be achieved should outweigh the harm that is done in waging the war. (7) The war must be fought according to *jus in bello* principles.²

The two main principles concerning *jus in bello* are: (a) the principle of discrimination: in warfare, soldiers and weapons should only be aimed at enemy soldiers and weapons, and not at civilians and civilian installations, such as public utility systems; likewise, prisoners of war should not be attacked or mistreated. The principle of discrimination places restrictions on what kinds of weapons may be employed. (b) The principle of proportionality: any military operation must be likely to bring more benefits than harms (including the unintended but predictable effects on civilians).³

Often, discussions of just war theory adopt the strategy of examining each of the conditions in turn, partly because each condition carries a set of contentious complexities.⁴ However, in contrast, in this chapter, we will advance an extended argument concerning just war theory in general. Before this, however, there are two preliminaries.

The first concerns the tricky question: What counts as a war? For instance, the Vietnam and Korean Wars were never officially declared as wars. Another example is the Cold War (1945–1991). This global tension sparked many

proxy wars around the world, but was the Cold War itself a war? Many of these proxy wars were 'civil wars' in which either insurgents or the national government of a country were backed financially and/or militarily by the USA or the USSR. Do these actions amount to a war between the West and the Eastern Bloc? What counts as a war is itself a political question. The Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army) saw itself as fighting a war against Britain for the liberation or withdrawal of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom. The British government considered the Provisional IRA as a terrorist paramilitary organization, denying that it was at war. Would the fighting between the drug cartels of Medellín and Cali in Colombia in the 1980s count as a war? Carl von Clausewitz's famous 19th century treatise *On War* defines war as an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfil our will.⁵ This definition is perhaps too wide because it seems to include any act of violence by anyone. At the same time, the definition is perhaps too narrow because it seems restricted to acts of overt violence.

The second preliminary relates to the ways in which war is bad. Following the suggestion from the introduction of this book, one might postulate three different kinds of factors that define war as bad. First, there are the many harmful consequences on individual well-being, both direct and indirect. The primary result is the people killed and maimed, their suffering, and the permanent loss and prolonged agony for their family and friends. This creates a nation of people in trauma, which is passed from generation to generation. War has horrific indirect effects that often surpass the direct ones. For instance, the breakdown of a society and its services and infrastructure can cause deaths from malnutrition and disease, both immediate and long-term. During the Crimean war (1853–6) eight times as many French soldiers died from cholera as from battle, and in the Thirty Years' War, during the siege of Nuremberg 1632, 18,000 soldiers from both sides died from typhus and scurvy, before the fighting even began.⁶ Wars cause large-scale displacement both between nations and within nations. There were an estimated 14.4 million refugees and 32 million internally displaced persons, according to the UNHCR in 2014. A war can destroy the economy, agriculture and the natural environment of a country. For example, the USA dropped almost twice as many bombs (14 million tons) on Vietnam during that war (1955–1973) as it did during the whole of WW II, and it sprayed 18 million gallons of herbicides, leaving Vietnam devastated.⁷

Another direct consequence of war comprises the damaging and traumatic psychological effects on the soldiers who have killed others during the war,

and on those who are in close relationships with them. There are also the effects on the culture of the two warring groups or countries: a culture of peacefulness is replaced by a culture of violence, which implicitly sanctions the idea that violence is an acceptable means to resolve conflicts or achieve ends. Given this, we are more likely to see violence in homes and on the streets. There are also the effects on the relationships between the countries involved, and on those that are nearby, in the region. A war will tend to make all countries retreat into a culture of individualistic security rather than one of common synergetic flourishing.

Secondly, war is bad in that it ineluctably involves the treatment of persons as objects or tools, or more generally as having less worth. It ruthlessly instrumentalizes people fighting on both sides, i.e. the combatants or soldiers. Napoleon is said to have boasted to Metternich that he could afford to lose 30,000 men a month.⁸ In so bragging, Napoleon articulates part of the tragedy of war: people become treated as military device, pawns on a battlefield. This instrumentalization is apparent in the great classic *The Art of War* by the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu in the 5th Century BC., who said: 'All warfare is based on deception' and 'Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.'⁹

One might think that the dehumanizing aspect of war can be avoided if both sides only use volunteers or professional soldiers, as opposed to conscripts, and if there are no civilian casualties, as if 'War is hell whenever men are forced to fight, whenever the limit of consent is breached.'¹⁰ According to such an idea, a war is not bad in this second manner as long as the people who kill and killed are voluntary combatants: consent is necessary and sufficient to eliminate this bad-making feature of war. However, in reply to this claim, such an assertion misunderstands the principle of the equal value of persons, which affirms that all people are of equal non-derivative value. This implies that a person cannot change this fact by consenting to be treated as something less than a person. A person who sells herself into slavery *ipso facto* allows herself to be treated as less than a person; the fact of the consent doesn't alter the dehumanizing nature of the relationship. Likewise, the fact that a person consents to be used as a human shield or a pawn in combat doesn't change the fact that she has been dehumanized by being used in this way. The consent may perhaps lessen the dehumanizing, but it doesn't eradicate it.

When we think about the dehumanizing aspects of war, how the lives of many people count for less during and because of war, it is tempting to reduce

this factor to the first. One yields to this temptation when one thinks that dehumanization is bad because it *causes* people trauma and suffering. While it is true that it does, the point at hand is that dehumanization is bad in itself. We have argued for this in earlier chapters. Dehumanization is a lived emotional category mistake. It will manifest itself in bad consequences, but such negative expressions are not the same as the act of dehumanizing itself.

Thirdly, war is bad because of the vices and bad qualities that it expresses. For example, it shows lack of solidarity and lack of feeling for lives of other people who are supposed to be the enemy. It shows our unwillingness or inability to bridge emotional and epistemological distances.

Beyond Just War Theory

We shall argue that just war theory involves mistaken ways to conceptualize the issue of what peacefulness is. In any effort to understand international and societal peacefulness, we need the idea of a political culture of peace, i.e. the culture that peaceful political institutions (i.e. governments, national and international organizations) would embody. Just war theory makes some assumptions that are antithetical to this project. This is primarily because just war theory is an attempt to answer the wrong kind of question. Any theory is an attempt to answer an array of questions, but every question has a built-in set of assumptions that can be challenged. The assumptions behind the questions of just war theory constitute a fundamental impediment to a political culture of peace. Overcoming those questions will help formulate a deeper understanding of a political culture of peace.¹¹

What do we assume when we ask the question ‘Is a war just?’ in the way that just war theory asks it? The main question is, roughly, ‘Are *we* (a group or nation state) justified in waging war?’ Or ‘Do we have the moral right to fight and to kill?’ We will examine four erroneous assumptions latent in this question.

Ignoring the Structural

The first assumption that underlies this question ignores the distinction between, on the one hand, issues concerning the morality and wisdom of individual choices and actions, and on the other hand, questions about the morality and wisdom of political structures and systems and their resultant cultures.

This distinction is vitally important. In other words, for example, we need to distinguish two questions:

- (a) Given framework F or socio-political structure S, what is the morally right action in these circumstances?
- (b) Is framework F or socio-political structure S morally justifiable?

Let's look at a simple parallel. Questions about how a teacher should teach a class are different from those that challenge the nature of the school as an institution, and from those that interrogate the educational system as a whole. The questions about how an individual should behave within a given framework cannot provide answers to questions that critique the framework itself. For instance, 'What is a good lesson plan for this part of the curriculum?' is an individual choice question that doesn't address issues concerning the structure, such as the design of the curriculum, its overall purposes and their place within a society. It doesn't address the structural question 'How should we transform the institution "school" and the organizational network that mutually supports it?'

Likewise, the political culture of peace needn't be committed to answering questions from within or that assume a framework that fundamentally needs revision. The conception of peacefulness may need to address the framework itself. 'When the framework is wrong, what should we do?' is an entirely different question from 'Is the framework good?'. This is an important distinction because people who see war as justifiable tend to think of the issues solely in terms of the individual atomistic choices of nations rather than as a systemic or structural concern. For example, consider an argument based on a hypothetical example in which a family member will be violated by an intruder unless one retaliates with violence. In such a situation, do I have the right to use violent means to protect my family? Of course, yes; therefore, war can be justifiable, and pacifism is mistaken, QED. However, this argument relies on an analogy that frames the issue as only a matter of individual choice, without addressing political structural issues.

This point is central because many aspects of the political culture of war depend essentially on the fundamental assumption that violence can be justifiable. As an advocate for peace, one might want to critically analyze aspects of our violent political culture such as: war monuments, the language of the press, the transactions of the armaments industry, foreign policy rhetoric, militant patriotism, the very concept of an army and a police, and the conception of retribution. This list could go on. Even the narratives of national history

are 'weapons of mass instruction.' Sometimes, it seems that the whole edifice is constructed to make large scale killing appear morally acceptable. However, in the final analysis, this huge tower of industries (the institutions, economic transactions, ideology, language and ideas) is based on a faulty assumption, namely that war can be justifiable because the decision to wage a war can be justifiable. The relevant conception of 'justifiable' is erroneous because it assumes that all moral questions can be reduced to the atomistic decisions of individuals. We need to widen the remit of the question to include the international political framework that casts nation-states as antagonistic individuals. Once we remove the foundation that the edifice is based on, we are freed to imagine an international political culture of positive peace. We can ask the systemic questions that permit such a culture.

Limited Perspective

Just war theory adopts the perspective of a country or group, and asks: 'Are *we* justified in retaliation?' or 'Are *we*, as a country or group in these conditions and circumstances, justified in going to war or in acting violently?' Such questions are asked from the perspective of a specific nation or group. But questions such as 'Is it just for *us* to go to war?' aren't the same as 'Is this war just?'. The latter question adopts an impersonal point of view, and *not* that of a specific aggressor or defender. Just war theory tries to answer a question that *isn't* being asked from the impersonal perspective; whereas the question 'Is this war justified?' is a question from an impersonal perspective. As an analogy: the bullied victim asks: 'Would I be justified in punching you?'; the impersonal question is: 'Is this bully-victim set of events justifiable?' By failing to make the distinction, the question buys into a view of international relations that casts such relations as an inevitable antagonism between purely self-interested countries or nation-states. Effectively, this Hobbesian theory denies the possibility of a more impartial viewpoint, such as that of the community of nations or of persons irrespective of nationality.

When we ask from an impartial perspective whether a war is justifiable, we arrive at a negative reply. 'Was World War II a good idea?' is quite a different question from, for instance, 'Was Britain justified in going to war against the Axis in September 1939?' Even if the reply to the latter question is positive, the answer to the first looks ineluctably negative. From an impersonal viewpoint, we can judge that war is a horrible form of insanity that is entirely unjustifiable. From this impersonal view, given the tremendous suffering and

trauma that results from a war, given the way that war inescapably treats people as disposable objects, it looks like a truism to claim that a war is a bad idea.

This simple point can be illustrated using an analogy from the infamous prisoner's dilemma in game theory. Consider three options. Option 1: If A and B betray each other, they will each serve 5 years in prison. Option 2: If neither A or B betray each other, then they will both serve only 1 year. Option 3: If A betrays B and B doesn't betray A, then A will go free and B will serve 10 years in prison. (Note that in the set-up of the dilemma of game theory, it is assumed that the prisoners cannot communicate with each other, and that there are only these 3 options). Given these options, and no communication between the prisoners, the individual rational decision of any self-interested agent would be to betray, and the resulting rational choice is option 1. However, pointing this out doesn't detract from the fact that, impersonally considered, option 2 is the best solution of the three. In short, what looks, and even is, rational from the individual's point of view isn't necessarily the best from an impersonal point of view. This has two implications. First, as a pointer for later, the problem becomes how to construct a system so that the second option becomes the best alternative for both agents.¹² How can we make it so that the best for each of the two agents overlaps with the best impartially considered? Second, for immediate consideration, we have illustrated the fact that the idea that war might appear as the only rational option to at least one of the combatants doesn't mean that it is just having been impersonally considered. Impersonally considered, it is a form of madness that results in hell.

A just war theorist might object to this line of argumentation in two ways. First, a war is justified when a country is attacked and has no option but to wage war to defend itself. For example, France was justified in waging war against Germany in 1939. Second, a war can be justifiable even from an impersonal point of view if the consequences of not going to war would be even worse, such as a genocide, or to remove a dictator who would otherwise tyrannize his people for decades to come. The claim is that war can be justified in terms of such impersonal utilitarian calculations i.e. the greater likelihood of more lives being saved. Consider, for example, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, which overthrew the brutal Khmer Rouge regime that, from 1975, terrorized Cambodia and exterminated over 2,000,000 persons. We might wish that Vietnam had intervened earlier. Consider Michael Waltzer's comment: 'Imagine that there had been, as there surely should have been, an African or a European or a United Nations intervention in Rwanda in 1994.'¹³ A carefully executed military in-

tervention might well have curtailed, and even prevented the genocide. However, the point is that Rwanda went through a long historical build-up process that finally resulted in the genocide. This process included the kinds of interaction we described in Chapters 3 and 5: there was a build-up of Hutu resentment of the Tutsis especially during the colonial period. For some Hutus, independence in 1961 meant freedom not only from the oppression of Belgium but also from the Tutsis.¹⁴ In short, there was plenty of time for peaceful interventions prior to 1994 genocide.

So, the problem with the objection is that it turns on a single point: namely, that the beneficial results couldn't be achieved without war. It assumes that the detrimental consequences of not going to war must be both worse *and* otherwise unavoidable. Given that war is potentially so catastrophic, its potential justifiability hinges on its unavoidability. Given this, let us return to the apparent truism that, from an impersonal point of view, war is a bad idea. The only pause for thought, the only plausible caveat to the truism, is whether the war could be avoided or not. In short, the claim 'if two countries have a conflict of interest then it would be always better, impartially considered, that they resolve this conflict peacefully rather than with war' would be a truism except that such a claim assumes that war is preventable or avoidable (in the sense that the good results can be attained without it). So, this is a point that we need to clarify (see the fourth point below).

Insanity is doing the same thing, over and over again, expecting different results.¹⁵ Violence always tends to breed violence, and trauma procreates resentment and hatred, which propagates more violence. War recycles violence. It is insanity to expect to solve problems violently, to expect to find peace through violent means. However, one can see war as a form of madness only from an impartial wider perspective. From the narrower perspective of the warring parties, who believe that they have no other option given their circumstances and history, it may look sane and rational. Invariably, when two parties go to war, both sides feel entirely justified in their actions. They ineluctably fall into an epistemological downward spiral in which they increasingly become deaf to any self-criticism and demonize the enemy. Diplomatic possibilities for ending the war are systematically ignored.

For this reason, understanding what peacefulness requires will include the perspectives of the combatants. It can't simply assume an impartial view that excludes those perspectives. To take the wider perspective of the culture of peacefulness is not only to see how war is madness but also to see how it might look sadly *sane* from point of view of the conflicted parties. In short, just war

theory is flawed in the questions it asks because it doesn't ask from the point of view of the wider impartial perspective that includes those of the combatants.

Framed as Negative Rights

Just war theory usually frames the issue in terms of the right of a country or of a group to go to war. In other words, it assumes a negative rights-based conception of ethics or morality. Such a conception usually presumes that the role of ethics is limited to answer questions of the form: 'Do I have the right to do this?' Morality is taken simply to be a set of external constraints, which are imposed on us, or which forbid us, from undertaking self-interested actions that we would otherwise perform. In other words, just war theory is an answer to a question of the form: 'Am I allowed to do this?'

Such a view typically makes two erroneous assumptions. It assumes that we are agents motivated solely by self-interest, except for the willingness to curb self-interest when morality or the law demands. Therefore, it buys into a Hobbesian view of international relations. Second, it also assumes that ethics has only a negative or constraining role. Therefore, it omits the idea that nations should better understand and help each other; it overlooks the idea that nation-states have obligations to collaborate with each other and to form multi-national organizations for the benefit of all peoples.

Temporal Scope

When people ask the questions that just war theory is supposed to answer, they usually ignore the temporal framework. Normally, the question assumes a temporal scope that would make an act of war look inevitable. Neville Chamberlain sought 'peace in our time' one minute before midnight, almost as a last-ditch effort. The captain of the Titanic ignored all the warning signs; the ship entered an area of icebergs at full speed; by 23.39, when the iceberg was spotted, collision was almost inevitable; to avoid head-on impact, the liner was forced to hit the iceberg sideways. Likewise, I may have carelessly placed myself into the situation from which it looks inevitable that I must crash my car into a wall, to avoid something even worse. But something is unavoidable only with respect to a set of givens. I didn't need to drive myself into those circumstances of tragic inevitability. From a wider temporal perspective, I didn't need to treat these conditions as a given. Likewise, even if war looks inevitable from a short-term perspective, this is so only given a set of assumptions

about the given circumstances that weren't inevitable. For instance, from the viewpoint of political dynamics of 1914, the First World War might look inevitable, and, given Versailles, World War II seems hard to avoid. Take a broader temporal view: suddenly, the processes that erupted in war look very contingent. Europe could have avoided both wars. That a war is unavoidable doesn't mean that it was always so. Showing that a war couldn't be prevented at the 11th hour doesn't mean that it was inevitable, and hence justifiable. In this manner, just war theory thrives on a short-term perspective. In contrast, violent conflict draws its sustenance from long-term grievances, as we have seen in Chapter 5. Just war theory looks plausible only by taking a short-term perspective on long-term problems or antagonisms. Short-term thinking emphasizes inevitability; long-term thinking emphasizes contingency.

This problem is accentuated by a misplaced ontology. Peaceful international relations need a type of wisdom, defined by Jonas Salk as the capacity of having hindsight about the future. This isn't simply a question of taking a long-term historical view of non-peaceful relations and their associated subjectivities. Although a long-term view is necessary for such understanding, it isn't enough. It isn't just that events such as the battle of Karbala in 680 mark the differences between Shia and Sunni. It isn't simply that events in the distance past such as the battle of Kosovo in 1389 may have shaped the recent Balkans crisis. All violent national conflicts seem to have roots in events in the distant past (also see Chapter 5), but the issue is more than that. It is about the ontology.

The judgment that we are justified in waging war assumes a short-term perspective that tends to see history as a series of discreet events. The longer-term perspective sees history as a coalescence of processes. For instance, as we saw in Chapter 5, there is a long-term set of processes that define the identity of group A in part in terms of a set of grievances against group B. Similarly, there is a long term set of processes that mark event E has having a significance that defines these antagonistic identities. There are historical processes that allow specific events to be perceived as a humiliation for a specific group, and that stoke the flames of group resentment towards another. There is also a long-term process acculturating those identities as antagonistic: generations of children are brought up to sub-consciously think of their neighbors as inferior, threatening and hateful.

In sum, we introduced the idea of a just war because there is a popular negative conception of peace that identifies it with the lack of war, and which thereby misunderstands what peacefulness is. This is exemplified by

just war theory. Such a theory attempts to answer questions that are limited or flawed in the assumptions they make. Because of this, there are some positive instructive conclusions to be drawn by rejecting the theory. These are: first, that peacefulness requires that we cannot understand violent conflict just from the perspective of a specific individual group. It requires a system-wide perspective. Second, peaceful relations cannot be understood from an atomistic ontology of individual events and choices. Thirdly, to understand what constitutes peaceful relations requires a long-term historical perspective that is process rather than event oriented.

Beyond these three abstract lessons, there is a broader meaning. This is that violent conflict and war ought to be regarded as something morally unacceptable. It is a form of madness. A political culture of peacefulness would (among other things) make it culturally impossible to regard violent action as a solution to problems that could in principle be settled through peaceful practices. The fact that our national and international institutions might be inadequate to settle disputes and transform conflicts peacefully does not excuse humanity from designing peaceful structures and building peaceful institutions.

Reply to Objections

So far the main argument of this chapter has been that the question 'Is the war justified?' is an incomplete and faulty question. It takes the perspective of potential combatants; it assumes a short-term temporal standpoint, and it ignores the positive moral obligation to build peaceful political structures. Because of this, just war theory is antithetical to the idea that political institutions should embody a culture of peacefulness.

An objection to our argument affirms that wars can be justifiable. For a war to be potentially justifiable, the good results that it seeks must be (as a necessary but not sufficient condition) unattainable without the war. In this sense, the war must be unavoidable. The objection insists that wars can be unavoidable in this sense.

To this objection, as the previous section suggests, we reply that judgments about whether something is avoidable or not are true or false depending on the relevant conditions, including temporal and structural conditions. For instance, given certain conditions and given a specific temporal frame, a train accident might be unavoidable. Given other conditions and a broader time-

frame, it certainly would be avoidable. It is in this broader sense that we have argued that war is always avoidable, and hence is never justifiable.

Just war theory only *apparently* addresses this point with its fourth condition stated above, namely that a just war should be a last resort. This formulation, however, misses the key point. It addresses the issue as a short-term decision from the perspective of a country: 'Now, can we go to war?' It states that if a country has already tried all reasonable peaceful routes to the good results that it seeks, then the war is a last resort. And then, given that the other conditions apply, the war is justifiable. In September 1938, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Germany with the Munich Agreement, declaring 'peace in our time'. Less than a year later, in September 1939, following the German invasion of Poland, Britain and France declared war on Germany. From this perspective, the war *appeared* to be a justifiable last resort in accordance with the fourth condition of just war theory. However, this doesn't address the issue at hand. The idea that we are advocating is that 'unavoidability' should be understood from a wider set of conditions. Chamberlain's perspective is like that of the captain of the Titanic at 11.39 pm, when the iceberg was sighted in the fog. From a broader perspective, the war and the collision were entirely avoidable. The conditions that led to World War II were already brewing by 1923 and had been set on the stove on the 28th June 1919, with the Treaty of Versailles.

The objector will insist that, just war theory aside, nevertheless, the objection remains: a war might be unavoidable, even from this impartial and broader perspective. It would be so if there is no reasonable manner for the conflicting parties to come to some settlement, compromise or agreement, even after deep dialogues. Such a conflict would be ineluctably violent.

Are there conflicts that are intractably violent? Ramsbotham provide grounds for thinking that there are because of radical disagreements. His complaint against traditional reconciliation methods is that they ignore or underplay radical disagreement, as we saw in Chapter 4. The core of his argument is that most types of dialogue misunderstand the nature of belief and hence disagreement in two ways. First, consider the difference between 'I believe that P' and 'I want that P'. They aren't on a par because beliefs are claims to truth, while desires aren't. The person who believes that 'P' *ipso facto* asserts 'P'. The theist says 'God exists' and the atheist affirms 'God doesn't exist'. To represent them as asserting respectively 'I believe that P' and 'I believe that Q' masks this point; it makes appear as if their dispute was about their subjective beliefs rather than objective truth. If we make it appear that they

merely have different subjective beliefs, then we miss out this core point. We slide from facts to beliefs to opinions to likes. Belief becomes like, and disagreement becomes masked as difference. Second, dialogue typically involves stating opposing beliefs from a third-person perspective, which disguises the depth of the antagonism.

To this objection, we can respond as follows. The existence of radical disagreements doesn't demonstrate that there are unavoidable wars. At best, it might show the limited nature of existing conflict resolution methodologies. But, drawing on the discussion in Chapter 4, actually it shows less than that because it underestimates the transformative power of dialogue on what people believe. A humanizing deep dialogue can change a person's understanding, *even if* it leaves the radical disagreement between the two parties in place.

Another objection is that wars are sometimes unavoidable when key people have inherently evil or malevolent intentions: one cannot enter negotiations, dialogue, conflict transformation and argumentative discourse with an evil tyrant who is beyond the pale. In such cases, war can be unavoidable. In reply to this argument, the idea that some people are fundamentally evil contradicts the principles of interpretation outlined in Chapter 3. People necessarily aim fundamentally at some good; otherwise their desire would not make sense. Obviously, this doesn't mean that people can't desire things that are bad or wrong! It implies that such descriptions of the desire are derivative or secondary. Again, this doesn't mean that such persons shouldn't be resisted. But rather it implies that the argument fails to show that wars are sometimes unavoidable.

Conclusion: Structural Pacifism

In this chapter, we have shown that the question 'Is this war justifiable?' is incomplete and flawed at least in four ways. This suggests that the nature of pacifism needs to be reframed. Fortunately, there is a rich literature on the point.¹⁶ Absolute pacifism is the view that war is never justified. This pacifist view accepts the faulty question 'Is this war justifiable?' at face value, and replies to it with a definitive 'no'. In effect, it tries to answer an erroneous question. For this reason, absolute pacifism is open to being falsified by a single counter-example of one situation in which war is justified in any circumstances. It is also vulnerable to the allied objection that it requires moral absolutes.

There are alternative non-absolute understandings of pacifism.¹⁷ Such views espouse a commitment to peace, but they don't accept that necessarily all wars are unjustifiable. Typically, these views are called *contingent* or *conditional* pacifism. For example, just war pacifism argues that no contemporary war, fought with today's weapons, could comply with the requirements of just war theory, especially the *jus in bello* principle of discrimination, which forbids harming civilians.

However, once again, such views attempt to answer a defective question. We argue that pacifism shouldn't require accepting the flawed question 'Is this war justifiable?' for various reasons. We will quickly rehearse these points to show that such a view of pacifism is significantly different from both absolute and contingent pacifism.

The first issue is simple: from an impersonal point of view, war cannot be justified when it is avoidable. Insofar as it can be avoided, a war can't be justified. From the eleventh-hour perspective, it may look as if a war is justifiable. From that last gasp perspective, it appears as if the only means to a good is violent force, but the claim that going to war is justifiable *at some point in time* doesn't warrant the claim that it is justifiable full-stop. What is unfortunately unavoidable now wasn't so before. Given this, the spirit of pacifism can be captured with three assertions: (a) At some point in time, any war is avoidable, (b) War should be avoided, and (c) If we don't know how to avoid it, we should find out. Given these three propositions, we can claim that all wars are due to the inability to have dealt well with the preludes to and the conditions of war. War is the failure of dialogue or a failure of the international system.

The second issue is that pacifism cannot be reduced to the rejection of war. Pacifism cannot be reduced to a 'Yes' or 'No' to war. The search for positive peace is more than rejecting war: it is the quest for the disarming of the preludes to and conditions of war. If the conditions are not present for a peaceful future, then these conditions should be constructed. If, in the present circumstances, those conditions cannot be constructed, then those present circumstances must be altered, so that the conditions can be built. In this way, peacefulness requires changing the system so that no violence is required. We might call this 'structural pacifism'.

Third, this doesn't mean that violence might not be required sometimes within a violent system. Structural pacifism isn't absolute, but it doesn't give in to the faulty idea that sometimes war is justified. It rejects the question 'Is this war justifiable?' as too simplistic, as based on erroneous assumptions. It supports our earlier proposal of regarding peace spontaneously as a verb, an

adjective and adverb. That is structural pacifism defines the systemic processes of enabling positive peace.

Notes

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12. p. 55, Ramsbotham (2010).
13. p. x, Waltzer (2006).
14. See for example, the Hutu manifesto of 1957, described in p. 58, Gourevitch, P. (1998). *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, New York: Picador.
15. In her 1983 book 'Sudden Death,' Rita Mae Brown, the mystery novelist writes: 'Unfortunately, Susan didn't remember what Jane Fulton once said. "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting different results."'
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PEACEFULNESS IN GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS

In this chapter and the next, we will show how political-economic structures can be inherently violent or peaceful. We shall assume that such structures refer to the ways relevant institutions are systematically organized in relation to each other, as defined by a set of principles. This means that assigning peacefulness (or the lack of it) to a social structure isn't the same as describing the human relationships that occur within that structure.¹ Structure isn't reducible to relationships between individual persons, and so peacefulness requires a new characterization when applied to political-economic structures. It requires identifying the relevant principles and how they shape the institutions, such as the nation state or the corporation.

The critique of just war theory indicates the need for peaceful international structures. Even if war is justifiable from the limited perspective of a country, that still doesn't make it good. When a country decides to go to war, its decision is taken within the existing international political framework or system. But if that framework is itself unpeaceful, then we can't conclude that some decisions to go to war are best for peace. Decisions taken within an unreasonable structure may appear reasonable without being so. Given such deliberations, the key question is: 'Is the political-economic framework within which the current decision to wage war is taken a peaceful one?' In other words, 'Is the structure peaceful?' We will turn to economic structures in the next chapter.

A Federation of Nation-States

Kant painted international peace as the moral outcome of an association of independent nation-states or republics that abide by the relevant kind of treaty. He tried to formulate the articles of the treaty that would define such peaceful relations.² Kant's portrait inspires much of contemporary liberal international political theory.³ For instance, John Rawls' *The Law of Peoples* can be regarded as a contemporary redrawing of Kant's original idea, which in turn has some features in common with Hobbes.⁴

Kant's theory is based on four theoretical assumptions that we will challenge in this chapter, while trying to outline a political structure that is positively peaceful. The first of Kant's assumptions is the assertion that the international system consists of sovereign nation states, which have certain rights. The second is the claim that the natural state of nations is one of war. The third is that the morality of international relations consists in a set of articles that define an association or federation. The fourth is that cosmopolitanism is an issue of the right to hospitality. These four assumptions have their origins in Hobbes (and once made explicit as such, they might lead us to question the extent to which Kant can be regarded as a political cosmopolitan).⁵

Let us examine Kant's first two assumptions. He claims that the natural state between sovereign nation-states is one of war. This idea is a heritage of Hobbes, and it presents a negative conception of peace that we rejected in Chapter 1. Here we briefly revisit Hobbes' argument. In the *Leviathan* (1651), Hobbes argues that, prior to the formation of the state, in their natural condition, people were at war. Because human nature is egoistic, war is inevitable, given certain truths about human life: namely, that goods are scarce and that no one person has sufficient natural advantage to dominate other people. For a person to gain and maintain advantage requires constantly increasing power; when everyone does that, we have a war. War doesn't require overt violence. Given that the natural state is one of war, according to Hobbes, it is in the interests of all to agree to a covenant, a social contract according to which individuals transfer certain natural rights to a sovereign or government, in exchange for peace and security.

Sadly, Hobbes' bleak portrayal seems to *in fact* accurately characterize the arena of international politics. Indeed, the idea of national sovereignty seems to imply it: each national political unit is like an individual, both self-interested and autonomous. Given that none can dominate, every nation-state is in perpetual conflict with every other, like the individuals in Hobbes'

domestic theory. As Kant says: 'Peoples, as states, can be judged to harm one another merely by their coexistence in the state of nature (i.e. while independent of external laws), just as individuals can.'⁶ Therefore, peace requires a voluntary treaty between these independent units. Because each nation-state is sovereign, there can be no overarching world government, and no country should interfere with any other. To protect their autonomy, and to regulate relations between states, global peace requires a set of voluntary treaties and international associations, rather as envisaged by Kant, rather like the charter of the UN.

This understanding of international politics, which is reflected in today's realities, has a serious shortcoming, which is also mirrored in today's realities. Purely self-interested nation-states would have no reason to abide by contracts, treaties and other forms of promise except insofar as doing so would serve their interest. Therefore, the idea that self-interested countries need to abide by international treaties (that define a federation of equals) to escape from a global natural state of war won't work. The state of war would persist. If the agents are self-interested then it will be in their self-interest to make it appear that they abide by the treaty, even when they don't. The point is that, under these theoretical assumptions, one cannot appeal to the moral idea: 'You promised; you agreed to the treaty; therefore, you can't break the treaty.' One can only appeal to self-interest. This reflects a problem faced by any social contract theory of morality: one needs to assume morality to explain the kinds of reason that the agents have for abiding by the contract, but one cannot make that assumption under the condition that the agents are self-interested. This means that such a treaty would need to be enforced. However, it can't be, and this impossibility plays out in two ways. On the one hand, one cannot appeal to a world government for enforcement. If the ideal is a federation, then there would be no overarching organization that can enforce the treaty and prevent violations through the threat of punishment. Such a force would constitute a world government, and would thus contradict the very idea of a federation.⁷ Kant explicitly rules out this option. On the other hand, we cannot appeal to a dominant military power to enforce the treaty. If one country has sufficient military power to dominate other nations, then this would also violate the idea of a federation of equals. Insofar as one country does dominate, the international order would tend to be an empire rather than a federation.

According to Chomsky, we see such tendencies in practice when the USA tries to 'establish credibility' by rejecting claims that it should solve the

crisis through international law, for example after the 9/11 attacks.⁸ In other words, it is in the interests of a dominant country to employ such occasions to overtly assert its power. For example, the so-called ‘Hague Invasion Act’, passed in 2002, gives the US president the right to employ ‘all means necessary and appropriate’ to secure the release of US citizens detained by the International Criminal Court. Apparently, this means that the US president would have the legal right to invade the Netherlands if a US citizen were detained by the International Court. Defeasibly, this expresses the intention that the US would use its military power to override the decisions of the International Court. In a similar vein, following the US support in the early 1980s of the Contras in their fight against the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, in 1986, the International Court ruled that the USA had acted illegally. Although the details of the case are complex, in effect, the US ignored this ruling. This illustrates the simple point that a federation of equal countries cannot have a dominant national power as a military guarantor to enforce the treaty. Pax Romana, Pax Britannica and Pax Americana don’t count as instances of a federation of positive peacefulness.

In summary, the assumption of a natural state of war among nations requires the postulation of a treaty, but such a solution is not sufficient to overcome the postulated natural state because it requires a condition that can’t be met: enforcement. Theoretically, the state of nature has been established in such a way that only a treaty can help alleviate war, but it has also been set-up so that no treaty could end the natural state of war. As Kant says: ‘A peace-treaty may bring to an end this particular war, but it doesn’t end the state of war, i.e. the state in which new “reasons” for hostilities can always be found.’^{9 10} This implies that, given our initial Kantian assumptions, internationally, there is no positive peacefulness, only negative peace. If we want to discover the nature of positive structural peacefulness at the international level, we must re-examine the initial assumptions.

The Nation-State

In this section, we will examine two preliminary challenges to the claim that the nation-state is an inherently peaceful institution. The first challenge emerges from the contrast between the two concepts ‘state’ and ‘nation’. The nation is a cultural community that is often largely based on a majority common ethnicity and language. Many countries are defined culturally by a

majority population, but still contain ethnic and linguistic minorities; for example, Japan is often considered an ethnically homogeneous nation, but it has minorities such as the indigenous Ainu people. In contrast to the nation, the state is a political institution that has certain legal powers, such as jurisdiction over a territory, and it typically operates through a centralized government. Its sovereignty or jurisdiction over a territory fundamentally consists in three kinds of rights: (a) rights over subjects; (b) rights over the territory; (c) rights against aliens.¹¹ Combining the two elements, we can claim that the nation-state is an institution that has jurisdiction over a territory for a community of persons defined as such by their belonging to a common nation.

Clearly, however, there are peoples who consider themselves as nations, but for whom, there is no corresponding state; for example, the Kurds and the Basque people. Are there states for which there is no corresponding nation? Yes! Typically, because most countries contain persons of diverse ethnic origins, of various religious backgrounds and of assorted other allegiances, the nation tends to be defined in terms of the state that these people belong to (i.e. their nationality). In short, there isn't a unified nation that creates and maintains a state; historically, it is the reverse.¹² Typically, the state needs to create a nation: it is in the interests of the state that persons identify primarily with the state, despite regional, religious and ethnic divergences.¹³ The state creates a nation based on its territorial rights. Consider the importance to Lebanon that its citizens identify themselves as Lebanese rather than as Sunni, Shia, Orthodox, Druze and other ethnicities. Consider the importance for Rwanda that its citizens identify themselves primarily as Rwandans rather than as Tutsi or Hutu or Twa. In such cases, internal ethnic or religious divisions have fueled civil wars and violence that emphasize a divided history and divisive perceptions of that history. Without national unity, states are vulnerable to imploding from within, and consequently, every state tries to make a nation of its citizens. It does so by training people to absorb a shared national identity, which will usually weaken or transcend the antagonisms inherent in local identities. The state will typically reinforce the national identity through a common history, a national mythology, shared narrative and cultural icons such as sports teams, national foods, and the army.

The trouble is, of course, that this transfers the problems of intra-state divisions to the inter-state. It establishes rivalries between nation-states. Apparently, there is nothing as 'good' for national unity as a common enemy. However, even seemingly harmless historical national myths are usually constructed by denying the reality of or ignoring the experiences and histo-

ries of other groups. We carve out our national identities by systematically undervaluing other people. The icons and myths that form the cement of national allegiance *ipso facto* form repulsive forces between nations. This is already unpeaceful, even when it is not overtly violent. It is unpeaceful because it contradicts the principles of peacefulness in relations established in Chapter 3. Even when it is not overtly violent, nevertheless, it constitutes a readily inflammable social mode of being. Chris Hedges describes how the myths of war create a new artificial reality.¹⁴ He captures the sudden igniting of nationalist fires in several countries including civil war in Spain and Serbia.¹⁵ Likewise, Hitler's popularity was at its zenith at the height of his foreign-policy successes in 1938, and immediately after the victory in France in 1940.¹⁶ The myths of war create lived experiential realities that help make war more possible.

The second challenge deepens the first. The standard conception of a nation-state suffers from a practical contradiction because it has central among its aims both national self-esteem and national security. National self-esteem pushes countries to revenge their humiliations, to seek national glory, and to stoke national pride. It drives them to foster national ideologies, myths and icons that encourage people to identify with the nation-state. Thus, it incites people to esteem themselves above other nation-states. It also facilitates vulnerability to feelings of inferiority and humiliation, or else arrogant defiance, when other nations judge them as lesser. If country or group B judges us as less, then as country or group A, we will tend to feel either humiliated or defiant or both.

The idea that a nation-state provides persons with a sense of self-esteem ultimately contradicts the idea that the nation-state supplies them with security. One cannot have both cakes. If each nation-state is pursuing honor, it is doing so at the expense of other nations, and this implies a zero-sum game. National self-esteem is competitive—we cannot all be the best. Thus, national self-esteem provides a reason for a country to threaten others, and to feel, and to be, threatened by them. Consequently, the idea that the nation-state provides self-esteem stands in inherent tension with the claim that it also provides security. It cannot do both in a stable way. This tension is reinforced when we define security in terms of having military strength, which is another zero-sum game. Given such a definition of security, insofar as one nation has greater military strength, its competitors also need to acquire more military strength to gain security. In short, such a definition, and the policies that flow from it, are not viable because they adopt the viewpoint of only one country.

The escalating dynamics that we have just outlined acquires a more forceful significance given two relatively plausible ideas. First, it gains importance if we understand material motivations as evaluatively derivative (though not necessarily derivative as motivations). Wars are often about the control of resources and the opening-up of markets. This idea makes sense of the many imperialist conquests, wars and violent interventions. It helps make sense of wars and interventions in the oil rich areas of the world. Such a materialist view is often contrasted with the idea that violent conflicts are primarily about group psychological factors, such as humility and revenge. Wars are apparently often about group oppression and humiliation (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). If a group has been hurt and treated unjustly, then we might expect it to seek retaliation. Germany was humiliated at Versailles in 1918; most of the Middle Eastern Muslim world has been subject to past injustices at the hands of the USA; Jewish people were degraded and persecuted systematically in Europe for centuries before the Holocaust. Russia was subject to atrocities at the hands of other countries for centuries, and in this historical context, the break-up of the USSR is a humiliation. In brief, such factors also help to make sense of many violent conflicts.

These points illustrate a duality between objective and subjective causal factors in explaining wars. (This doesn't exclude other types of factors, such as relational ones.) The point at hand is that the so-called objective factors are evaluatively subsidiary because purely economic considerations are always derivative. Even if every war has economic motivations, and even when such economic factors predominate motivationally or causally, they are still evaluatively derivative. This is because economic factors are purely instrumental: they are good in virtue of something else. Economic factors aren't basic as a value, and this means that any explanation couched solely in terms of economic motivations is incomplete because it assumes a background of ends (or rather of things that are non-instrumentally valuable). This implies that it is *required* to ask: 'Why does this country or group want control over more land and more resources?' and 'Why does it seek more power?'

The answers may not be obvious. This isn't only because each case will be different, but it is also because nation-states don't have motivations in the same way as individuals. Why does Saudi Arabia or Iran want more regional power? A good answer requires historical and cultural understanding, as well as empirical investigation of economic interests. Nevertheless, the question illustrates the point that, even when economic factors predominate motivationally, national self-esteem and ideological factors might be more basic in

terms of explanation. For this reason, the question ‘Why does a nation-state want more power or greater wealth?’ is always pertinent because power and wealth are only a means to *something else*. For instance, a country might want power and wealth as means to greater national self-esteem or to see an ideology prevail. Why is this important? Nation-states might be motivated by economic motivations to go to war (even when they are not sincere in their deliberations and communications about this) but, nevertheless, the underlying value perceptions might pertain in part to national self-esteem or to ideology. If such claims are correct, then they accentuate the contradiction between national self-esteem and security. The contradiction acquires a more forceful significance.

Secondly, the contradictory dynamics between self-esteem and security also gain more importance if nation-states don’t have interests in the way persons do. According to this idea, nation-states don’t have self-interest in a robust non-derivative sense. Nagel says: ‘institutions, unlike individuals, don’t have their own lives to lead.’¹⁷ In Chapter 7, we canvassed the idea that one can *damage*, for instance, a car but without *harming* it. Ultimately, what is wrong with damaging a car is that it harms someone, such as the owner, where ‘someone’ refers to a conscious being. One can only *harm* beings that are conscious, and that are capable of being in states of well-being or ill-being. Like cars, organizations aren’t conscious; therefore, one cannot harm them, although one can damage them. This view would apply to corporations. More pertinently, it applies to nation-states.¹⁸

This last claim contradicts a strong totalitarian view of national self-interest. A totalitarian conception would affirm that the state has its own interests that transcend those of individuals. Roughly speaking, the general idea of totalitarianism is that the state should wield total authority over the lives of individuals. In its strong form, totalitarianism implies that the state is a super-entity with emergent interests of its own, separate from those of its citizens.¹⁹ Such a view includes the idea that rulers should aim to promote the interests of the state over and above the well-being of its citizens. So, for example, if the rulers promote the prestige, power and ideology of the state at the expense of the well-being of its citizens, then this would be totalitarian in the strong sense.²⁰

If one denies this strong totalitarian view, then nation-states don’t have well-being related interests to protect or advance beyond those of their citizens. This would mean that concepts such as ‘the good of the country’ don’t have a sense beyond the reductive idea of the well-being of individual peo-

ple.²¹ 'The good of the nation' doesn't refer to something beyond that. Consider the implications of this for territorial disputes. Suppose that territory T were to be transferred from country A to B and suppose that this would not reduce the income of country A and would not lessen the well-being of persons in either country. Further, suppose that the residents of T consent to the transfer. Under these conditions, would the transfer matter? Of course, the citizens of country A (outside of area T) might feel humiliated, and those of B aggrandized by such a transfer. But, apart from this, has country A lost anything? Given the previous conditions, the answer should be 'no'. Of course, if country B were to invade territory T and grab it from country A, then this would be an entirely different matter because the actions of B have violated A. But, aside from this case, has country A lost anything? The totalitarian answer would be 'yes'. The non-totalitarian answer would be 'no'. If nation states are only units for administrative convenience and loci of synergetic action, then the transfer of territory between such units is merely a question of the appropriate conditions of cost-benefit analysis and consent. If nations don't have interests to be harmed beyond those of their citizens, then (under the specified conditions) there is no harm caused by such a transfer.

Nevertheless, it remains true that, insofar as people of group A identify with their nationality, they will feel that their country A has been damaged by the transfer of territory T to country B, and they will feel that this constitutes a harm to A. In other words, insofar as they so identify, they will confuse damage with harm. Indeed, such nationalistic identifications will *ipso facto* confuse damage and harm. However, this confusion is an error based on the reifying of social institutions. Even if a nation is *damaged*, this doesn't *ipso facto* constitute a harm to persons. Under exceptional conditions, it might even be a benefit. Only a strong totalitarian view would deny this claim. This analysis means that, insofar as a war is fought for the *mere* sake of the territorial interests or the control of resources for the sake of nation-state, then the war is prosecuted for illusions that have totalitarian roots.

In conclusion, there are good reasons for thinking that the nation-state is not an inherently peaceful institution. To help alleviate internal divisions, to help the citizens of the state to become more of a nation, the state needs to promote primary self-identification with the state. Such an identification constitutes a culture of national self-esteem which has the inevitable tendency to establish antagonistic relations with rival countries. Such rivalries constitute an international insecurity which tends to lead to increased military strength. When all parties engage in this process, it is an ever-escalating zero-sum game.

However, obviously, we cannot jump from such an analysis to advocating abandoning the nation-state! The state has not been called ‘historically the most successful institution’ without good reason. According to Henrik Spruyt, the nation-state evolved historically from the feudal system as a stronger institutional form than the alternatives at the time, namely urban leagues, independent communes, city states, and sovereign monarchies.²² The analysis given here indicates that the institution ‘the nation-state’ has inherently unpeaceful tendencies built into it. We need to understand more deeply what more peaceful alternatives might look like. We shall do this by examining two opposing challenges to the idea of the nation-state as a political unit. Kant claims that a peaceful world-order would consist in autonomous nation-states complying with the relevant kind of treaty. This assumes that independent states are like political atoms. We shall question whether international peacefulness can be understood within this limiting framework. As we shall now see, there are two opposite political challenges. From below, there is a communitarian challenge, and from above, there is a cosmopolitan challenge.

Communitarian Challenges

The third of Kant’s assumptions was that peaceful international relations would consist in a treaty or an alliance between nations. In this regard, one deep alternative to Kant’s Hobbesian portrait is a communitarian view that has its roots in Aristotle. According to such views, it is a mistake to regard the political solely as a contract, undertaken for the sake of self-interest, between individuals as self-contained units. Such a contract-based view misses out on the idea that we live, and need to live, in communities (see Chapter 6). Following from this, the communitarian view would challenge the idea that the relevant political entity is the nation-state as a given indivisible unit. There are also smaller and more local foci of power such as regional and municipal bodies. For example, in recent years, the UK has devolved legislative powers to regional parliaments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Indonesia, since 2001, much political power has been devolved to the municipalities or districts.²³ In terms of peacefulness, such devolutions, and the political thinking behind them, make sense insofar as they appeal to people’s need for belonging and offer a real possibility of participation. They can form real communities as described in Chapter 6.

In Book I Chapter 2 of the *Politics*, Aristotle charts the natural development of the *polis* or city-state. People naturally form families or households (*oikia*), which is the simplest political unit. The village is formed from a community of several households, and the natural extension of village is the *polis*. Individually, people lack self-sufficiency, and so they combine to form increasingly complex associations, from household to village, until the only self-sufficient community is reached, namely the *polis*. Aristotle says that it exists for the sake of the good life of its citizens. The *polis* is a natural entity because humans are by nature political: by nature, we live in groups and we work together for common goals. We aren't simply gregarious, as other animals are: our sense of community goes deeper due to our capacity for speech. Because of this capacity, we can perceive the good, and hence, common goods such as justice.²⁴ In claiming that the *polis* is a *natural* entity, Aristotle denies Hobbes' view that it is purely conventional or artificial, like a contract. Hobbes claims that, in a state of nature, individuals live solitary lives, and that, for the sake of survival and peace, they club together by agreeing to a social contract through which they are governed by a government.

There are several important points of divergence between the two approaches. The first concerns the state of nature. For Hobbes, in a state of nature prior to the social contract, people lived as individuals, and not in social groups. In contrast, Aristotle stresses our communitarian make-up: humans live naturally in groups or communities. The second difference concerns the nature of the state. For Hobbes, the state is an artificial contract of the form 'I will scratch your back if you scratch mine'. Such contracts are merely means to our individual security and happiness. They are marriages of convenience. In sharp contrast, for Aristotle, political associations aren't merely instrumental contracts. They are an extension of our natural mode of being: we live together as social animals in communities. Thirdly, for Aristotle political activity is an integral part of the flourishing or *eudaimonia* of its citizens. Such a life will include participating in public reasoning with other persons, and this is part of what it means to belong to a political community: we join with others to make decisions regarding the future of the community. The decisions may be difficult and conflictual, but they are peaceful insofar as they don't harm our shared sense of community and well-being.

This brings us to a fourth point, which doesn't come from Aristotle. It is an ingredient that is highly significant for indigenous communities: belonging to the land. Such communities usually have non-instrumental and non-commodified relationships with the land on which their ancestors have grown

and on which they live. This land is their history and present-belonging. Typically, indigenous communities characterize their relation to the land in terms of being part of: we are part and parcel of the natural world; this is where we belong (see Chapter 7).

In conclusion, local communities and city-states are the kind of political institution that satisfy belonging in terms of community-participation and non-commodity-based relations with the land. Furthermore, local community organizations also allow for direct democratic participation, and they don't require long-distant representation and non-dialogical involvement such as voting. The strengths of local and direct political participation can be extended beyond the local sphere through delegates to councils, as we shall see later.²⁵ In short, communitarianism provides two distinct challenges to nation-state thinking: in terms of belonging and political process. These two challenges combined will oppose directly those of cosmopolitanism, to which we turn next.

Cosmopolitan Challenges

Kant claims that a peaceful international order would consist in republics or democratic nation-states behaving in accord with the relevant treaty, which makes them into a federation. This assumes that the nation-state is the basic political unit. One can also challenge this assumption from a cosmopolitan perspective, bearing in mind that the Kantian theory has cosmopolitan elements. Cosmopolitanism is the claim that all persons are equally citizens of the world. The term 'citizen' suggests that cosmopolitanism is committed to the desirability of some form of world government, but this implication is contested because the root Stoic idea is that all people are citizens of the cosmos.²⁶ The core idea is that goodness requires that we should help others without prejudice in favor of one's own *polis* or city-state. This contradicts the communitarian Aristotelian view that one has obligations primarily to other members of one's local community, and not to strangers from other states. The central idea of cosmopolitanism is the principle that all people are of equal primary value, and this doesn't necessitate that there should be a world government. It is one thing to refer to our common humanity and equality as a moral property that all persons ideally should respect, and it is another to argue that this implies that there should be a single worldwide state.

We have already planted two seeds that motivate cosmopolitan questioning of the nation-state as an institution. We advanced the idea in Chapter 2 that inner peacefulness requires that we self-identify non-derivatively in ways that are consistent with the nature of the self. This implies that we should self-identify primarily as persons, as a minimum requirement of inner peacefulness. Self-identifying non-derivatively with a specific group, such as a national grouping, contradicts this requirement, and it is not peaceful. This suggests that self-identification is a spiritual matter that shouldn't be manipulated for the sake of the ends of political organizations. The state ought not treat our self-identifications as instrumental to its political ends. People need to work out who or what they are most fundamentally without this being a football in the international political arena. Second, in Chapter 3, we also seeded the principle that all people have equal intrinsic worth, and we tried to define an epistemology of relationships that is consistent with this principle. The idea that the people of our nationality are worth more than those of another nationality contradicts peacefulness in relationships. Thus, any attempt to inculcate the idea that people of *our* nation are special or better is unpeaceful. It implies that others are less worthy.

From these two seeds, we can examine the cosmopolitan challenge to the idea that the nation-state should be the fundamental political unit. The idea of this challenge is that international political peacefulness requires more international governance, and thus, more comprehensive international law and more powerful world-wide political institutions. The various global organizations such as the UN (and its agencies including the World Bank and the international court of criminal justice) and the IMF need to have more political power for there to be a peaceful world. They need to be restructured along such lines. One suggestion is the Clark-Sohn Plan which proposes deep reforms to the UN and a plan for world disarmament.²⁷ Because nation-states are at war, we require something like an international peace agency. The global community is under serious threat from environmental dangers; this requires an international environmental agency (not a program like the UNEP). Humanity faces many global problems that require something akin to world government or global governance. In other words, the walls of national sovereignty need to be opened to international and multinational political institutions, especially concerning problems that require transnational actions.

Let us now step back and draw some interim conclusions. We are being tugged away from the assumption of the nation-state as an indivisible unit, but in two opposing directions by two different kinds of force:

- (1) Psychologically, we are towed in two opposite directions. Belonging takes us toward communitarianism, toward more local forms of civic life: we belong to local communities insofar as we participate in them, and insofar as they are rooted in communal and non-commodified relations to land. In contrast, ethical equality draws us toward cosmopolitan forms of identity: peace requires that we identify with humanity. Non-derivative exclusive group identities are racist.²⁸ These reflections leave us with a question: how can local-belonging be combined with global identity? How can we coalesce the push toward local communitarianism with the pull toward a universal cosmopolitanism?
- (2) Politically, we are wrenched in the same two opposite directions. On the one hand, democratic participation requires local politics. Such participation is most readily amenable to the self-governance of municipalities and cities in which people can be heard by their neighbors, and in which they can learn from them. It suggests governance in which political dialogical processes cannot be reduced to a vote nor to the votes or commentaries of a distant representative who stands for the packet-policies of a political party. It is only in the context of long-term local dialogues that a person can articulate her concerns about X and Y in ways that transcend the slogans and memes of party politics. On the other hand, it is evident that local politics constitutes an insufficient vision. The material conditions of the political economy mean that no local community can regard its problems as self-contained. Indeed, the larger, more serious problems of humanity are global, and this indicates the urgent need for institutions and policies that are cosmopolitan. We need political institutions with global responsibilities. This need reflects the idea that we are humanity: we are all in it together, despite everything. Such reflections leave us with a question: how can local political participation be combined with the need for global policies? How can we coalesce the push toward local communitarianism with the pull toward a universal cosmopolitanism, when the first is supposed to answer the second?

It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the notion of the sovereign nation-state as an indivisible unit is a failed compromise concerning each of the two types of opposing forces. Psychologically, it isn't a real community of belonging based on grass-roots participation and indigenous non-instrumental relations to the land. It is an imagined community. Yet on the other hand, it

is comprised of systematic violations of the equality of persons: it consists in separating us from them in demeaning and dehumanizing, antagonistic forms. Politically, it doesn't permit self-governance; it relies on long-range representative democracy, which inherently tends to be alienating. At the same time, it fails to address the pressing needs for global governance. Hobbesian sovereign individuals competing for advantage cannot assume responsibility for solving global problems.

Arguing that it is a compromise of this type suggests the kinds of reforms or transformations that peacefulness would require. Although it indicates both the strengths and weaknesses of the institution, nevertheless, it also intimates some elements of the required reforms. First, it indicates the importance of devolving more legislative power to local political institutions in ways that would allow for more local participation and more sense of belonging based on such participation. It suggests that these local forms of governance shouldn't be disconnected from the regional and the national. In other words, it indicates the need for the nesting of decision-making power relations from the local outward. We need a participatory system based on expanding circles of councils: delegates from neighborhoods attend the relevant municipal council; from there to the regional, to the national, zonal and international. It suggests a nesting of direct democracy rather than a distant representative democracy. Second, it also suggests the importance that this nesting continue outward beyond what we now consider to be the boundaries of the nation-state. Some legislative powers need to be vested in transnational organizations, especially when these are concerned with global challenges that transcend national boundaries.

Peaceful International Politics: Four Principles

When one conceives international political peace negatively, as the absence of war, then the idea of peaceful relations between countries becomes reduced to an agreement, to a contract, treaty or charter that sets limits to what countries can do in the pursuit of their national self-interest. It only bans overt violence. Essentially, this is what much of the UN charter does. We also saw this negative conception at work with just war theory. Just war theory tends to assume a negative conception of morals, which forbids countries from certain kinds of self-interested actions. It only places caps. For this reason, just war theory is constructed within a framework of ques-

tions inimical to positive peacefulness. It is framed in a way that ignores the structural and that adopts a limited, negative and short-term perspective. The point also applies to an international framework of institutions built on the same principles. Such a framework conceives of the international as an arena in which countries compete for advantage, and which requires self-imposed regulations. However, this negative view overlooks the idea that nation-states have positive obligations to do more than just collaborating with each other, but rather to ascend to a new level, and form transnational (democratically accountable) organizations for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of their nationality.

As well as being limited, a negative conception of international peace implodes. As we have seen, it faces an irresolvable dilemma: the contract or treaty needs to be enforced, but the national sovereignty conditions that lead to the need for it disallow such enforcement. Simply put, there can't be a boss, and enforcement requires one. This implies that institutions built on a negative conception of peace face an inescapable problem. A system based on such principles will have an inherent tendency to be drawn into war. Constructing institutions on the assumption that the international is an arena in which nations compete for advantage is inherently unpeaceful. The fact that this conception faces such an irresolvable dilemma constitutes an argument against it.

For these reasons, we need to go back to the drawing-board. Institutions within a system based on a positive conception of peacefulness might fare better. As we have emphasized throughout this book, much better than rules against violence is the absence of the need for them. We can always work toward being in such a state of positive peacefulness (or being closer to one). This is why we need the concept of positive peacefulness pertaining to one's psychological state, one's relationships, the community one lives in, and the political economic structures of society.

Let us quickly sketch an alternative picture of international relations based on the idea of positive peacefulness. What does it take for an international political system to be positively peaceful? We shall outline some of the principles necessary to make the transition from individual and community relations to the structural. With the principles in place, we can then discuss the kinds of practices and institutions that are needed to embody them. This part of our book is tentative and exploratory because it is relatively novel.

The Principle of Equal Worth of All Persons

In Chapter 2, we established that all people are intrinsically and non-derivatively valuable, and equally so. The first part of this sentence implies that any political institution or system that fails to treat people as such, for instance by instrumentalizing, marginalizing or oppressing them, will *ipso facto* not be peaceful. The second part of the sentence indicates that any political system that fails to treat people as of equal value will fail to be peaceful. It would do so, for example, if it treated some people as inferior or of lesser value.

The Principle of Reducible National Self-Interest

The second principle is that national self-interest is derivative and reducible. Because they are organizations and not living beings, nation-states don't have non-derivative interests. As we argued earlier, their interests are reducible to those of the people who live in the country (at least). Saying this doesn't constitute a ringing endorsement for individualism in the social sciences. However, it does constitute a rejection of the totalitarian idea that nation-states are like individuals who can pursue their self-interest at the expense of the interests of people. Like any other organization, nation-states are meant to serve people.

The Principle of Democratic Listening

Positive peacefulness requires the principle that friendly neighbors want to listen to each other and don't talk simply to stop fighting. Consider violent conflicts within a nation-state. When people throw stones or petrol bombs in the street, when they risk their safety to protest, this is clearly a form of communication. They want to be heard. If the parties in power don't heed this message, then *ipso facto*, they are discounting their interests and points of view. They are taking the first steps toward disenfranchising and alienating a group, and creating an enemy. The failure to listen constitutes a failure of democracy. If groups feel that they must shout to be heard, this indicates a lack of democratic culture. But such failures don't necessarily mean that the government in power is being undemocratic. They might indicate a systemic failure, the lack of institutions for dialogues, and also a cultural failure, the lack of a good listening habits.

The same point can be applied to the international. To act in accord with the first two principles, we need institutions that enable us to overcome

the epistemological asymmetry that plagues our limited identities (see Chapter 3). This requires deep dialogues that consists in listening as part of positive relationship-building, as guided by the principle of the equal worth of all persons. Such dialogues would be part and parcel of the socio-political structure of a global peaceful society.

Negative peacefulness permits the situation that, although my neighbor nations *should* be my friends, they will tend to be my implicit enemies. If we are lucky, we will not be in an overtly violent relationship, but this may be due to the fear of the devastations of war. As a country, our relation to our neighbor nations is likely to be quietly violent. We will have unresolved issues regarding our relationship in the past; these might consist in serious historical grievances and misunderstandings. We are likely to be in a competitive relationship concerning national pride and self-esteem. Each side is likely to think of the other: 'We are better than them.' Or else, one side feels humiliated and demeaned by the other: 'They think that we are inferior and treat us like dirt.' As neighbors, we may be involved in territorial disputes, especially about resources that lie close to our borders. More importantly, we may consider ourselves at economic war with each other, in silent but violent ways, for market domination. Such soft wars are typically directed toward the control of natural resources, especially land, and increasingly toward the capture of global markets.

Given these points, we cannot characterize structural international peacefulness as merely the absence of war. We require the idea that positive peacefulness will be embodied by relations of trust and friendship that require deep dialogues. Such dialogues might touch upon all the points of conflict mentioned above. However, if such dialogues are regarded simply as an instrument to avoiding violence and war, they won't constitute positive peacefulness. They need to be understood as a part of what friendly or peaceful international relations means: being good neighbors. We won't merely be seeking mutually agreed moral constraints on individualistic self-interested actions, but rather exhibiting positive peacefulness. The relevant institutional spaces won't have purely instrumental value, i.e. to prevent war. They will be regarded as being valuable in themselves, as part of what it means to be globally peaceful.

The Principle of Non-Zero-Sum Games

Positive peacefulness cannot be grasped from the perspective of a specific individual group or country; it requires a system-wide perspective that is synergetic concerning apparently competing national self-interests. For example, from

a system-wide perspective, national self-interest cannot involve demonizing other nations; if everyone does it, we are all worse off (quite irrespective of the fact that it contradicts the equality of persons). Such demonization makes deeper forms of dialogue culturally impossible.

The institutions that embody positive peacefulness need to be based on a perspective that is higher than that of zero-sum games in which if I win, you lose, and *vice versa*. It is necessary to ascend from the perspectives of A versus B or B versus A, to a new common ground, A and B. This ascension needs to be built. In the past, some writers have expressed the hope that trading democratic nations would not go to war because of their intertwined economic interests. However, this constitutes a half-hearted attempt to define the ascension. It tries to define a self-interest common to two nations. But it is only half-hearted because it doesn't transcend national self-interest; it merely seeks overlaps. If two nations are trying to build peaceful relations, then they need to identify opportunities for synergetic interests. In short, we need to move from the perspective of the international and multinational toward the transnational.

As we saw in Chapter 6, a community requires the idea of common or 'we' intentions. When people do things together for mutual benefit and for a common purpose with the required 'we' awareness of their action, this constitutes a necessary condition for their being a community. This point applies to the family of nation-states. One way to fail this condition is to engage in dialogue only when violence threatens and to make the avoidance of war the sole topic of conversation. The definition of the role of the UN Security Council arguably fails this condition (Article 24). To build toward the transnational as a positively peaceful community requires that nation-states seek and engage in coordinated actions that aim at some common good that conforms with the previously cited principles.

This transnational common good may well include discussions about needed structural changes. In the context of politics, deep dialogues based on a 'we'-awareness may lead to attempts to redesign broader socio-economic and political systems. It may lead to group evaluations of the cultural practices within which good relationships can sustain peaceful structures. In short, institutions within a peaceful transnational structure will need to be self-reflexive. Obviously, discussions aimed at shifting structural design and transforming cultural practices require a common intention to prioritize peaceful relationships between groups and communities.

In summary, a peaceful international political system is a transnational structure that would make it culturally impossible for a country to regard violence as a solution to problematic conflicts that could be settled through dialogical practices. In a family, it is culturally impossible, quite unthinkable, that the parents would charge their children for every meal and keep an account to this effect. It just isn't that kind of relationship. Likewise, if the set of nation-states is to be akin to a family, or like a global community, then there are many current practices of political advantage-seeking that would be unthinkable. The realization of principles 1 and 2 would render such nationalistic practices impossible. The fulfillment of 3 and 4 would render them unthinkable. Positive structural peacefulness would require the transnational institutions that enshrines the culture of these principles.

Let us assume that positive peacefulness includes at least the above principles. Perhaps there are others that we haven't identified. Regardless, we can outline some institutions and institutional practices that embody these four principles. Positive peacefulness requires institutional transformation and construction; it will not assume the inviolability of the nation-state. On the contrary, as we saw earlier, the sovereignty of the nation-state should be eroded from both above and below: from below, by regional institutions; from above, by transnational organizations. In this chapter, we are concerned solely with the latter.

Conclusion: Positive Peacefulness Through Global Governance

Rather than thinking about reforms to existing multinational institutions, the narrative of our argument has taken us toward the construction of new transnational institutions that instantiate the four principles. We conclude this chapter with three proposals that point to the possibility of peaceful global governance.

Transnational Listening Spaces

If the relevant institutions don't exist, deep dialogical processes won't take place. How can peoples live in peace if they don't listen to each other? But how can peoples listen to each other if there aren't suitably structured institutional spaces for listening? Likewise, how can nation-states engage in deep dialogue unless the relevant listening spaces have been established?

The principles outlined above help define the kinds of transnational institutions that we need to house peaceful international deep dialogues. In this regard, we already have some interesting results. First, we have offered some suggestions in this tone regarding the nesting of participatory democratic institutions (see Chapters 3 and 4). These thoughts suggest that democratic bodies need to be nested participatory institutions: municipal bodies need to listen to people; regional institutions need to listen to their municipal constituents; the national listens to the regional and so on, past the national boundaries toward the global. Second, we have outlined some of the defining features of deep dialogue (Chapter 4): it is intrinsically valuable, democratic, and transformative. Third, we have also argued that such dialogue cannot be restricted in content to the avoidance of war and violent conflict (see condition 4). Such discussions of security are ineluctably framed in terms of negative peace, which can't be achieved without violating its own conditions.²⁹ Beyond security, there lies a whole universe of potential transnational projects that require coordinated actions aimed at some common good that conforms with the first principle cited above. Such common intentions are a condition of the international being a transnational community.

However, lamentably, we are a long, long way from this ideal. Current track two diplomacy may fall short of the envisaged deep dialogical processes discussed in earlier chapters. Deep personal sharing can't be readily introduced into current political reconciliation processes. Practically and psychologically, it might not function with principal political leaders who might be 'impervious to the humanizing process,'³⁰ partly because it might be difficult for them to suspend their demanding roles. For this reason, Volkan has suggested that such processes be introduced at level two: among influential diplomats, legislators and government officials.³¹ However, the few instances in which deep dialogical encounters have touched high political processes has showed their transformative power.³² Peace NGOs around the world already practice various kinds of deep dialogue, but their efforts tend to suffer from the fact that governments and societies at large typically don't learn from their endeavors. Suppose that, in a dialogue, a small group of people representing two nations in an antagonistic relationship come to a new understanding of each other. We can suppose that this understanding would constitute fertile soil for new political accords regarding the points of antagonism. The problem is that the new friendship is confined to the few participants. In part, it is because the dialogue needs to be set-up well, so that both parties are acting as delegates of others, such as a government.

Transnational Peace Observatories

As we saw in the previous chapter, just war theory adopts a last-minute event-focused perspective which makes the war that is about happen appear inevitable. It doesn't adopt a process-view that identifies brewing antagonisms that need diffusing whether they erupt or not. Just as the process of constructing a bitter enmity requires the lengthy processes outlined in Chapter 3, so too do the processes of deconstructing an enemy-relationship, and building resilient good neighborly relations. They take time. The relevant peace building institutions require a long-term process-oriented approach to historical understanding. Clearly, the press tends to advocate a short-term event-based ontology. This popular view tends to emphasize events as atoms as opposed to historical processes. We need to counteract this tendency. As we have seen, peaceful relations require a long-term historical perspective that is process rather than event oriented.

As we said in Chapter 8, the required perspective almost asks us to view the future retrospectively. Given the long-term build-up of hateful discourse dehumanizing the Tutsi people in Rwanda, some atrocity like the genocide was predictable. Therefore, the pertinent question isn't only 'Why didn't the UN send a force earlier in 1994 to prevent the genocide?' but also 'Why weren't preventative alarm bells ringing, say, in 1973, when President Habyarimana banned Tutsis from political participation?' The answer is that there was no international political institution with a mandate of sounding such alarms. Such bells should have been ringing even with the conflicts surrounding independence in 1962. After 1994, the Rwandan conflict spilled into mineral-rich Eastern Congo, where various militia and paramilitary groups have been fighting ever since, resulting in over 5 million deaths. Given the historical and economic conditions, this prolonged set of conflicts was predictable and preventable. Indeed, the UN did establish a mission, MONUSCO, in the area, in 1999: progress! However, the peacekeeping efforts didn't succeed perhaps primarily because of a lack of dialogues regarding local conflicts.³³ This suggests that the UN mission was not empowered to seek how locals understood the conflict, and to look for non-political dialogical solutions to the various conflicts in the region. It had the wrong kind of telescope.

Transnational Diplomacy

There is more. MONUSCO wasn't conceived as a transnational diplomatic mission with the aim of facilitating the construction of positive peacefulness in the region. Instead, it was conceived as a peace-keeping force meant to

monitor compliance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 and the UN Security Council resolutions 1258 and 1234. In other words, it was conceived under the banner of negative peace and not the umbrella of positive peacefulness.

Existing actions toward constructing positive peacefulness tend to be conceptualized as track-two or multi-track diplomacy. Typically, track-one diplomacy is bilateral: it consists in negotiations between two antagonistic countries officially represented by government employees, such as state appointed diplomats.³⁴ The idea of track-two diplomacy was developed by Joseph Montville in 1981 to refer to unofficial dialogues aimed at helping to resolve antagonistic conflicts. These dialogues would typically involve peace NGOs from both sides. Such track-two initiatives might be extended in a couple of ways. They might become semi-official by involving official diplomats but in a private capacity. Susan Nan refers to this as 'track-one and a half', and they might involve third parties such as consultants and facilitators. The point is that track-two remains unofficial and bilateral.³⁵

The idea of a transnational diplomatic organization breaks with these traditional forms. It advocates the facilitation of deep dialogues, as practiced in track-two, by a purpose-built transnational organization that isn't a private entity such as a consultant or an NGO. In short, it contends that the world needs a transnational organization sponsored by countries that is mandated to initiate track-two type dialogues at the highest levels possible among the officials of countries in conflicts that threaten to become antagonistic.³⁶ The Peace Observatory identifies countries in special need of such dialogical processes.

The sharp distinction between track-one and two is based on the idea that state officials should not participate in humanizing deep dialogical processes; state officials can only engage in negotiations. This 'should' is based on a sharp distinction between the role and the person. The underlying assumption is that, as a private person, the individual could participate in a humanizing dialogue, but as an official role holder, she can't. Our proposal rejects this assumption, arguing that it is based on a profound misunderstanding. The main point of humanizing dialogues is that they touch someone as a person rather than as a member of a group or in their function as a role-holder. But state officials are human persons first and foremost. To divorce their function from their being human is implicitly totalitarian. In other words, the claim that officials of a nation-state shouldn't participate in such humanizing processes is equivalent to the proposition that nation-states have sovereign interests

that cannot be reduced to those of persons. It is so equivalent because it is the same as asserting that the role is intrinsically more important than the person who occupies it.

By rejecting this assumption, we are free to advocate that state officials can and should participate as such in track-two type dialogues. We are free to advocate that the sharp distinction between track-one and two dissolves. Because of this, we are free to argue for a transnational governmental or official organization that facilitates track-two type dialogical processes between countries. Track-two doesn't need to be bilateral or unofficial.

Wars are typically motivated at least in part by economic factors, such as resources and markets, because this is a form of power. Often this power control isn't direct or overt. Economic factors are a predominant factor in national self-interest and, for this reason, we shall now examine structural economic peacefulness.

Notes

1. Thomson, G. (2018). "Reificar o Reducir: una poderosa y persistente falsa dicotomía", in J. Ramos and C. Ramírez (eds.). *Ontología Social*, Bogota: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
2. Kant, E. (1795/2010). *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, New York, NY: Cosimo Classics.
3. Franke, M. (2001). *Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations and the Critique of World Politics*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
4. Rawls, J. (1999). *The Law of Peoples*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
5. "Kant's 'Towards Perpetual Peace' is a profound defense of cosmopolitan values," p. 28, Nussbaum, M. (2010). 'Kant and Cosmopolitanism', in G. Brown and D. Held (eds.). *The Cosmopolitanism Reader*, pp. 27–45, Cambridge: Polity Press.
6. Kant (1795/2010), Second Article.
7. p. 32, Franke (2001).
8. Chomsky, N. (2011). *9/11 and Was There an Alternative?* New York: Seven Stories Press.
9. Kant (1795/2010), Second Article.
10. For this reason, Kant tries to define a league of peace, as a kind of super-peace treaty that forms a federation of nation-states. However, we have just seen that postulating such a federation of self-interested sovereign states doesn't solve the problem either.
11. p. 2, Simmons, J. (2016). *Boundaries of Authority*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Roeder, P. (2007). *Where Nation-states Come From*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
13. Guibernau, M. (1996). *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity.

14. p. 35, Hedges, C. (2002). *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning*, New York, NY: Anchor Books.
15. *Ibid.* pp. 43–60.
16. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-fuehrer-myth-how-hitler-won-over-the-german-people-a-531909.html>, accessed in Feb. 2018.
17. Nagel, T. (1991). *Equality and Partiality*, New York, NY/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
18. Notice that the mere fact that a being or entity N has a goal G isn't sufficient for G to be in N's self-interest. Goals don't define interest.
19. There are two variants of the idea. In its milder form, 'totalitarianism' can mean that the main function of the state is to look after the welfare of its citizens. This first kind of totalitarianism is paternalistic, but unlike the second, it does *not* treat the state as a super-entity that has interests of its own, separate from those of its citizens.
20. In the weaker sense of the term, totalitarianism means that the main function of the state is to look after the welfare of its citizens. This weaker kind of totalitarianism is paternalistic, but unlike the stronger version, it does *not* treat the state as a super-entity that has interests of its own, separate from those of its citizens.
21. See Thomson (2017). *Ontologia Social*. The problem is to explain why this claim doesn't mean that a reductive social ontology is correct. Talk of nation states cannot be reduced to talk of persons but nation states don't have well-being defined interests beyond those of the people involved.
22. Spruyt, H. (1996). *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
23. Aspinall, E. and Fealy, G. (2003). *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia*, Canberra: Australian National University Press.
24. Aristotle. *Politics*, I, 1. 1252a15-20
25. Knapp, M., Flach, A. and Ayboga, E. (2016). *Revolution in Rojava*, Chicago: Pluto Press.
26. Cicero, Fin III 62.
27. Clark, G. and Sohn, L.B. (1958). *World Peace Through World Law*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
28. Or, more accurately, what renders such exclusive group identities non-peaceful is the same as what makes racism wrong.
29. Negative peace needs to be enforced but its conditions make it unenforceable.
30. Montville, J.V. (1987). 'The Arrow and the Olive Branch: the Case for Track Two Diplomacy', in J. McDonald and D. Bendahmane *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, Washington: Foreign Service Institute, US Department. of State.
31. Volkan, V. (2014). *Psychoanalysis, International Relations, and Diplomacy*, London: Karnac Books, p. 126 and Volkan, V. (1999). "The Tree Model: A Comprehensive Psychopolitical Approach to Unofficial Diplomacy and the Reduction of Ethnic Tension", *Mind and Human Interaction*, 10, 142–206.
32. Such examples can be found, for instance, in Volkan, 2014, and Volkan, V. (2013). *Enemies on the Couch: A Psychopolitical Journey Through War and Peace*, Durham, NC: Pitchstone Publishing.
33. Autesserre, S. (2010). *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

34. Jones, P. (2015). *Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice*, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
35. Op cit. p. 15.
36. It is important to note that the phrase 'track-two diplomacy' usually doesn't distinguish the five kinds of 'conflict resolution' identified in Chapter 3. Our discussion is focused on dialogue, and not on interactive problem solving and conflict transformation.

PEACEFULNESS IN AN ECONOMY

What is peacefulness in an economy? An essential ingredient of economic violence is that it causes harm in ways that dehumanize and instrumentalize people and nature. That is, an economic system is violent insofar as it harms and, in so doing, it both fails to treat persons as having non-derivative value, and it treats nature merely instrumentally, as a resource. Put positively, an essential ingredient of peacefulness in an economy is that it is consistent with respecting the intrinsic value of persons and appreciating the natural environment as constitutive of our being-well. In the case of economics, this ingredient pertains to *good work* and *meaningful consumption*, which are both integral to well-being. In effect, an economy is a manner of coordinating good work with meaningful consumption. A peaceful economy is one in which the intrinsic value of persons and of the activities of working and consuming are respected in the coordination, which brings synergetic benefits justly.

A main theme of this chapter is that economic peacefulness is a characteristic of the structural features of a society. Assigning peacefulness (or the lack of it) to a social structure isn't the same as characterizing the peacefulness of the human relationships that occur within that structure.¹ In short, structure isn't reducible to relationships between individuals. Because of this, peacefulness involves a new characterization when applied to political-economic

structures.² For this reason, we shall answer two types of questions. The first and most familiar is: what kinds of economy are most conducive to peace and least to violence? Such questions pertain to the instrumental value of a peaceful economy. What benefits and losses does such an economy bring? The second more obscure question is: What constitutes an inherently and positively peaceful economy? What kinds of non-instrumental values would such an economy have or express? The two questions are different. The first suggests the need for something like cost-benefit analysis: a weighing of benefits and harms. This is a question of balance. The second requires an alignment of our socio-economic practices with a set of principles, which can't be reduced to a question of balance.

Violence in Economies

We begin with some descriptions of how an economy can be violent in its effects. In what ways does an economic structure have violent harmful effects? To answer this question, we return briefly to the nature of violence. An action is violent insofar as it harms people in ways that are also instrumentalizing or dehumanizing, and insofar as these effects are either intentional or known.³

Violent Effects: War

We shall first consider briefly different forms of economic violence concerning war. A substantial part of the world economy is engaged with or absorbed by war and its means. This has significant opportunity costs. The point divides into two parts: the opportunity cost of investing in and producing weapons and other means to war, and the economic costs of waging wars.

Regarding investment, conservatively, the world invests 100 billion dollars per year directly in the weapons industry. To glimpse part of the opportunity cost of this, the Watson Institute has estimated that the USA's investing on average USD 230 billion p.a. in war creates 1.3 million jobs.⁴ If the same amount invested in healthcare would have created 3.2 million jobs.

Concerning the economic costs of violence, the Institute for Economics and Peace has quantified the economic loss due to violence and war as 14.3 trillion dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity, for the year 2016.⁵ To make such an estimate is no mean feat, and the result is highly significant given that the gross world product for 2016 with purchasing power parity (PPP)

is estimated to be 119 trillion dollars.⁶ In short, the world would be roughly 12% wealthier without such violence. Of the 14.3 trillion dollars, 1.04 trillion is directly attributable to the costs of war p.a.. The Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs estimates that, from September 2001 to November 2017, the USA spent USD 5.6 trillion on its wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have directly killed 370,000, and through which another 800,000 people have died indirectly, with 10.1 million refugees.

These alarming figures may provide a material incentive for governments to come to international accords that help prevent and stop wars. However, the overarching main aim isn't to save money! Saving money isn't intrinsically valuable; it is derivative on human well-being. For this reason, it is questionable whether the directly harmful effects of a war can be adequately measured in purely monetary and other numerical terms.⁷ The problem is threefold. In part, it is how to quantify or monetize the value of human life and the harm done to persons. Typically, such cost-benefit approaches require quantifying the monetary value of a person's life in terms of the lost income that would have been generated had she lived. This method may violate the principle that all human lives have equal non-instrumental value, and it certainly involves instrumentalizing the lives of persons: our monetized value in cost-benefit analysis is *only* the income we would generate. Secondly, the problem is also how to quantify the immensely important indirect and long-term consequences of a war such as large-scale trauma and the effects on national cultures and international relations. Thirdly, and more importantly, the idea that government policies should be sensitive mainly or only to financial or quantifiable considerations seems to miss the point that persons have non-instrumental value. Such an approach is *part of the problem* because it makes the life of persons convertible into money. The idea that governments should carry out cost-benefit analyses of potential wars to decide foreign policy is part of a culture of violence that makes wars more likely and appear less undesirable, by misunderstanding the value of human life.

Additionally, if some economic systems have an inherent tendency to encourage war, then even huge financial incentives may not be enough to prevent wars. Some writers have claimed that a capitalist system has an inherent tendency toward war because it relies on war production (Karl Kautsky), and because war is required to open global markets as a form of imperialism (Lenin and Bukharin). According to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism itself generates war.⁸ Its axioms create a tendency toward war. In this vein, one might regard

capitalism as an axiomatic system that requires that the nation-state functions complicitly to serve capitalist interests even when this means war.

Many writers liken the global economy to a battleground. For instance, Michael Hudson compares the financial sector to the military in that they share the goal of conquest, by seeking control of land and basic infrastructure, and by collecting taxes.⁹ Hudson claims that the current global economy is an instance of warfare: it involves the appropriation of surplus value and the accumulation of capital i.e. the control over assets, especially land.¹⁰ Karl Marx frequently employs military analogies to describe industrial production.¹¹ Such analogies dominate descriptions of competitive markets. For example, consider the terms ‘corporate raiding’ ‘making a kill in the market’ ... Even the phrase ‘caveat emptor’ suggests that sellers are predators. Are such analogies fair? It is important to be clear about the nature of the claims we are affirming. We are describing one way in which an economy might be violent: insofar as it is characterized by ‘growth for the sake of growth’, an economy will be *ipso facto* violent. How accurately such terms describe the actual economy is an empirical question that requires evidence.

Violent Effects: General

A global economy is violent insofar as it causes serious harm to persons in dehumanizing ways, intentionally or knowingly. For example, consider the terrible conditions under which some people work in high-tech factories in parts of China or in clothing workshops in Bangladesh or in mines in RD Congo. People paid the barest minimum wages have little hope of rising out of miserable and vulnerable poverty. About 10.7% of the world’s population live in absolute poverty, which is defined as less than USD 1.90 per day; that is 740 million people live on less than USD 700 p.a.¹² Official figures say that, around the world, there about 201 million people unemployed.¹³

Who is responsible for this dreadful situation? ‘*Who*’ might be the wrong question! To the idea that it is individual people, such as politicians and corporation directors, who are responsible, we contest that the political economic system is the root cause. Individual persons fulfil their roles in institutions such as companies, and these institutions are following the logic of the system. For instance, economic rationality dictates (roughly) that one should try to obtain maximum return on one’s investment within the law, and that workers are merely instruments to that goal. Insofar as a company doesn’t follow that logic, it is outside of the system. If a company behaves morally for the sake

of increased sales or for its long-term interests, then it is merely applying the logic of maximal returns in more enlightened way and with a longer view.¹⁴ In short, company managers and directors typically exploit because this is inherent in the economic system.

It is important to note that none of these points are contradicted by the fact that many people have benefited from economic development since 1981, including many of the poor. Since that time, overall absolute poverty has been reduced globally by about 1 billion persons, even though the world population has increased by roughly 4 billion.^{15 16} Nevertheless, the points we make are not contradicted by this progress. In other words, despite these reductions, it remains true that the global economy is violent insofar as it causes serious harm to persons in dehumanizing ways. Progress made doesn't contradict progress that could have been made and that wasn't, and *vice versa*.

Second, there are other structural features of an economy that harm people by violating their dignity. Globally, as currently structured, the economy tends to systematically favor wealthier urban people over the rural poor, to favor certain continents over others, and to prefer efficient technology that employs fewer people. In short, it tends to keep the poor, poor. It keeps the poor in a situation with limited access to education, safe living conditions, health services, sufficient nutrition, good work and political influence. All this is part of the logic of the system, which fails to comply with the principle that all people are equally valuable (even if that principle is compatible with some inequalities).

Third, it is harmful to dignity in yet another way: it tends to instrumentalize and marginalize. It treats groups of people as less than fully human: the poor are treated as merely instrumentally valuable, as no more than part of productive processes. This degradation counts as harm. Furthermore, the system is violent through the vices that it embodies and manifests: because it systematically treats groups of people as if they mattered less than others, it expresses callousness and cruelty. This kind of violence tends to be self-perpetuating: when groups feel treated as less important or valuable, this structural violence may become part of the national or local culture.

Another (fourth) argument advanced by many writers is that the world economic structure is violent because it is socially unjust: it inevitably produces huge and grievous inequalities that amount to a structural injustice. In a 2018 revision to its report, *An Economy for the 99%*, Oxfam states that, in 2017, 61 of the world's richest people own as much wealth as half of the world (as of January 2019, the number is 46).¹⁷ Because the degree of inequality is

worsening, we can reasonably claim that the production of such inequalities is an inherent tendency of the system. It is not as if Peter is robbing Paul. It is rather that individual actors behave in accordance with the rules that (partially) define the system, and that such collective behavior has the ineluctable tendency to cause such horrendous inequality. The economist Thomas Piketty has shown that, in the USA, over the last 30 years, the growth in the incomes of the bottom 50% has been zero while that of the top 1% has been 300%.¹⁸ This increasing disparity is a global phenomenon: between 1988 and 2011, the income of the poorest 10% increased by less than \$3/p.a., while that of the richest 1% increased by 182 times more than that.¹⁹

Is this fourth point something distinct from the first three? Perhaps not if one thinks that such inequality is wrong solely because it causes terrible poverty, and hence suffering and ill-being in dehumanizing ways. In such a case, inequality is bad because of its damaging effects on human well-being (both direct and indirect). But, against this, one might argue that there is more to it because such inequality *itself* amounts to a form of social injustice that is not merely instrumentally bad, but also intrinsically so. For example, it constitutes a deep lack of solidarity and caring; a system that produces such inequality, that permits such incongruities, is heartless and cruel.

In this regard, it is interesting to note the discussion between one of the pioneer founders of peace studies, Johan Galtung, and the economist, Kenneth Boulding. Boulding criticizes Galtung for linking social inequality to violence, maintaining that because they have different sources, reductions in the former don't necessarily decrease the latter. To this critique, Galtung should have replied that structural inequality itself *constitutes* a form of unpeacefulness, whether it directly causes acts of violence or not. The issue isn't what *causes* violent acts but rather also what *constitutes* violence.²⁰ Galtung might have argued that the economic system is inherently violent because it ineluctably dehumanizes the poor.

Additionally, as a fifth point, the economy may also be described as structurally violent because of its detrimental psychological effects. Consider the effects on our lives as producers. Growth requires the acceleration of the economy, and this causes increased stress and anxiety. The threat of unemployment and the promise of promotion can cause employees to compete with one another, causing psychological insecurity and the tendency toward self-commodification. Moreover, in an accelerated economy, people will tend to have pressing goals to attain, and this will tend to skew their relationships to the value of their own activities and processes. Goals become felt as more im-

portant than the lived processes of achieving them, despite that such processes constitute part of one's life. In other words, there is a tendency to instrumentalize our own actions and lives, and hence ourselves. Similarly, a culture of commodification facilitates treating relationships instrumentally: if almost everyone is treated as a commodity at work, then the cultural conditions are rife for treating acquaintances, friends and family members more often merely as means.²¹ These are hidden forms of violence, albeit implicit and gradual, perhaps more insidious than the overt.

Consider also the psychological effects in our lives as consumers. Growth necessitates increased consumption. The growth of the economy requires us to consume more, which not only means that we have increased purchasing power (we can afford it) but also that we want to buy more. Thus, it is in the interests of growth and increased sales that people have greater and more intensive desires. The system creates new and more desires that are needed to fuel sales and growth. This can have profoundly detrimental psychological effects. For instance, there is an increased propensity to be more rapidly dissatisfied with what one already has because of the felt lack of something new or better. This implies less appreciation of what one already has, and hence less well-being: people tend to be more dissatisfied with what they have. There is also a tendency toward an inflation of expectations, which leads to more feelings of dissatisfaction and less appreciation. These illustrations of how 'the system needs to stimulate desire' imply that it requires dissatisfaction, a reduced capacity to appreciate and diminished levels of psychological well-being.²² Desire tends to oust appreciation. Such devastating psychological and cultural effects can be called 'violent' because they erode the appreciative awareness that lies at the heart of well-being (see Chapter 1). Such desires tend to disturb inner peace.

There is one more point that strikes a dreadful blow to our lives as both producers and consumers. Growth for the sake of growth requires demand for goods that exceed even generous specifications of need. Growth requires desires that outstrip our (well-being-defined) needs.²³ Thus, *per se*, satisfying such desires doesn't contribute to our well-being. Thus, huge numbers of people spend their working lives drearily producing things that people don't need in their consuming lives. Collectively, we damage our well-being doubly with one strike, two blows with one stone: dreary work apparently for the sake of meaningless consumption. It is a massive double-bind, made worse by the fact that we instrumentalize ourselves from both sides in the process. In short, we instrumentalize both use-value and work for the sake of growth.

Lastly, an economy can be violent regarding its relationships with the natural world. An important way to think about this materially is in terms of throughput.²⁴ This is the quantity of flow of raw materials and energy from the Earth into the economy, and back out from the economy into the Earth's ecosystems as waste. This flow involves an entropic degradation: the input-resources have low entropy and the output-waste has high entropy, where entropy is roughly the degree of disorder of the system. The main cause of environmental damage is economic activity. As we shall see, much of this activity is wasteful: it doesn't augment our well-being significantly, and it serves a pointless purpose: growth for the sake of growth.

Violence as a Quality

We have been examining the ways in which an economy is violent with respect to its consequences. In short, it is a necessary condition of an economy being violent that it has severely harmful effects on peoples' lives or on the natural environment in which we live, when the causing of these harms constitutes a form of dehumanization or instrumentalization. However, this isn't a complete account. Continuing the search for a comprehensive understanding of positive peace, we need to describe the ways in which an economy can be *inherently* violent.

How can an economic system be inherently violent? It means that it is so because of its qualities rather only because of its consequences. An economic system is more than the actions of production and consumption, more than the raw materials and the produced articles. It is defined by the relationships between the relevant kinds of institutions, their aims, and how they mutually support each other, such as the symbiosis between public companies and stock markets. Such institutions aren't entities in the way that organisms are; they are social arrangements, or forms of organization, in which people achieve institutional goals collectively through a division and configuration of roles. Institutions necessarily define roles. In this way, they shape the lives of people, as role-holders. Some roles are common to almost everyone in contemporary society, such as those of being a worker or producer, an owner and a consumer. In this manner, an economy is a collective way of life and a mode of social being. As such, it can have qualities that are inherently violent or peaceful (or neither).

The main way in which an economy can have violent qualities is if it is dedicated to growth for the sake of growth. Such an economy is unpeaceful because it systematically places the production and accumulation of things of purely instrumental value, and money, above the intrinsic value of persons

and their well-being. By its very nature, a growth-centered economy treats human beings, human lives, and the natural environment as objects to be exploited without limit, and this constitutes a violent quality. This is a pathological social mode of being in several ways. First, what is purely of instrumental value has *no* value except insofar as it is or will be employed for well-being. Because of this, *no one* needs more than enough. However, the very idea of enough cannot even be articulated in a system defined by maximization of the merely instrumental (or increasing growth). If being rational is defined as always having more of something instrumentally good, then we cannot even formulate the idea that no one needs more than enough. Rationality as maximization makes even costly superfluous accumulation a required good. That is pathological. Second, such a mode of being (defined by an economic system of growth for the sake of growth) is violent in its tendency toward mutual destruction. It implies that it is always rational for me to try to obtain more money even when I don't need it, and even when my doing so will cause you to receive less money even when you need more. Trivial desires override serious needs.²⁵ When such a claim is true of each person, the resulting social mode of being is war-like. It prioritizes self-contained egoism over shared commonality. Third, thus, inherent in this tendency is increasingly severe inequality. Such inequality is an injustice not only insofar as it causes poverty, but also intrinsically because it embodies and expresses a callous lack of solidarity.

Given all this, the nature of the violence in question is systemic; it isn't constituted primarily by individual human actions but rather by the system itself. Furthermore, it is inherent because such a system is essentially characterized as having fundamental value questions back-to-front in the ways just outlined. As we have argued, 'growth for the sake of growth' places instrumental value prior to intrinsic value. In contrast, an economy of peacefulness would transcend these problems by revealing how an economy can serve humans rather than the other way around.

Basic Principles of Peaceful Economy

To move away from an 'economy of violence', we sketch what an 'economy of peace' might look like and how it might redeploy human creativity to redefine the nature of work and consumption in more human-centered terms. In this section, we will outline five abstract principles that an economy of peacefulness will embody.

The Human Principle

A peaceful economy will serve human beings rather than the other way around. Economic factors only matter insofar as they contribute to well-being, where well-being is understood in terms of being well fully, which includes the kinds of psychological, relational and social peacefulness described in earlier chapters. What matters ultimately is only that our lives go well. While what 'well' means in these contexts is contested, the main point that other things have value only derivatively remains unscathed.

This first principle follows from a more abstract one that asserts: a peaceful economy will only treat as valuable what is really valuable. All things that are purely instrumentally valuable have no value except in relation to what has intrinsic value. A peaceful economy will not treat the purely instrumental as intrinsic. Thus, it will respect persons as such, it will not dehumanize, and it will not regard the maximization of profit or the accumulation of capital or the efficiency of production as if they were intrinsically valuable.²⁶ This has two aspects.

One, because a peaceful economy will serve human well-being rather than growth, it will divert energy and work toward the reduction of poverty and suffering.

Two, a peaceful economy would consist only in activities that contribute positively to our being well. For example, it wouldn't include the production of things the demand for which is artificially stimulated for the sake of sales.²⁷ It won't be based on activities that harm our well-being. For example, things that heighten people's insecurity about themselves or that are conducive to life patterns that tend to make people more alienated. It won't steer people toward having a sense of themselves that is only instrumentally valuable. If a non-peaceful economy distorts human psychology toward ways of living that are harmful to well-being then, positively, a peaceful economy will be based on the production of things that people need as part of their well-being rather than what they merely desire.

In summary, as a vast set of transactions, the economy appears to be a continuous loop of instrumentally valuable activities searching *in vain* for a resting place in intrinsic value. Production is an instrumental means to consumption; but boosting consumption is necessary to keep production up. The first is a means to the second, and the second is a means to the first. Both increased consumption and production are good for the economy, but, in orthodox thinking, this means that they serve profit-making and capital accumula-

tion, which are not intrinsically valuable either. They only widen the loop of the merely instrumental serving only the instrumental. To escape the cycle, we require the notion that what has primary intrinsic value is the living of life for conscious beings. The minimal fundamental of any economy is organized work directed toward well-being in just and ecologically peaceful ways. As we have just seen, standard economic thinking tends to mischaracterize deeply both sides of the equation: work and consumption. We need to reframe them so that they accord with the fundamental principles of peacefulness.

Good Work In neo-classical economic theory, work is conceived in purely instrumental terms in two ways: from the demand side, as a factor of production, and from the supply side, as a means for gaining personal income. From the point of view of the supply of labor, in working, the laborer exchanges her leisure time for income. This implies that working must stand in a dichotomy with playing and leisure time activities. Leisure is good, working is bad; therefore, we need a financial incentive for giving up the former. The idea that one might want to work for the sake of the activity itself is an anathema to the theory: the idea of good work that is intrinsically valuable just doesn't fit. From the point of view of its demand, labor is simply one factor of production, which can be exchanged with the other factors when efficiency demands it. This means that labor is never conceived as a human relation or a partnership or a mode of communal life. It is only a replaceable resource. In both cases of supply and demand, the person working is treated or treats herself as an object.

In sharp contrast to this instrumentalized view, work is a highly significant aspect of our being well and flourishing.²⁸ Although it is also a means, nevertheless, work has intrinsic value; it is valuable for itself. It has such value in several ways, including:

- (a) Work is an integral aspect of our lives or our being;
- (b) It is an expression of our talents and constitutes the medium through which a person develops as a person;
- (c) It is an opportunity to be with others in synergetic relationships.
- (d) It is the opportunity to do things for others.²⁹

These four facets of work combine in a peaceful economy: the being; the learning, the relationships and the service to society. Each of these is integral to the conception of work in a peaceful economy.

Meaningful Consumption Traditional economics regards consumption merely as making a purchase. (This is in part due to failing to distinguish the

measurement from the value: the price one is prepared to pay for X is only a measure of the value of X). According to this conception, it doesn't matter *why* a person purchases something, and it doesn't matter what she does with the purchased article afterward. In neo-classical economic thinking, what matters is simply the purchase (and these other points matter only instrumentally, that is insofar as they might serve to increase purchasing).

See how identifying consumption with purchasing takes the perspective of the seller? It is only from the point of the seller that these are the same. From this point of view, acts of consumption are only contributions to the revenue of a corporation: consumption is instrumentalized as an income-source for companies. What matters is the money: company revenues. From this perspective, all economic activity is conceived in purely monetary, and hence instrumental terms. In this light, all activities of producing and spending appear utterly meaningless. They constitute an endless cycle of means chasing means. That is, instrumental value for the sake of instrumental value is meaningless because such value is entirely derivative. To be meaningful requires relation to life activities and experiences of non-instrumental value. In conclusion, to be meaningful, consumption must be more than spending; it has to pertain to the non-instrumental valuable nature of living. Thus, the neo-classical conception of consumption as spending contradicts the idea that an economy functions ultimately for the well-being of persons. The assumption that consumption is only the act of making a purchase constitutes a fundamental barrier to understanding economic activity in terms of well-being. Thus, it is an obstacle to an economics of peacefulness. An economy of peacefulness cannot ignore that goods and services only matter insofar as they serve our well-being in some way. It matters directly how they are used and why they are desired.

Traditional demand theory makes the implicit assumption that things are valuable only because they are preferred or desired by an economic agent. It is welded to a desire or preference theory of intrinsic value and well-being. This point is important in several ways. First, given such a theory, and given that desires expand (because our expectations always increase) then we would be committed to the claim that the economy must grow because well-being is dependent on satisfying increasing desires. A desire theory binds us to economic growth for the bad reason that our expectations increase. It requires us to yield to our expectations rather than manage them. Second, a desire theory of well-being misunderstands the importance of appreciative awareness for well-being and flourishing. One

cannot fully appreciate what one has when one is under the influence of a desire for something else that one doesn't have. Desire as lack drives out appreciation. Thus, defining well-being in terms of desire-satisfaction denies the role of appreciation in well-being. Well-being requires that one appreciates what one has; desiring requires the opposite.³⁰ Third, a desire theory of well-being doesn't characterize well what well-being consists in because it doesn't treat desires and preferences as subject to critique. It regards them as a given. This point is especially important when our desires are partly generated by consumer society. When we claim that we should consume more because that is good for the economy, then our value relationships are back-to-front.³¹

We tend to pretend that consumer-value is king, but, in fact, societies tend to act as if it were a servant of the economy: consumption is good for economic growth. For this reason, consumer desire cannot be the real basis of the value of economic activities. Traditional economics is not efficient on its own terms because it dedicates valuable human work time to the production of things that don't matter for well-being (and which, in the long-run, probably harm us psychologically).

The Principle of Enough

In a peaceful economy, rationality wouldn't be identified with efficient maximization of a good, or even with the optimization of many goods. Traditional economic conceptions of rationality claim that the rational course of action necessarily brings *more* of something good. For instance, if value is defined in terms of desire then we can define what is rational in terms of maximizing desire-satisfaction. If value is defined in terms of happiness, the rational is to maximize happiness. If value is defined in monetary terms, then the rational is to maximize financial returns.

In contrast, in a peaceful economy, the rational would be identified with enough or with sufficiency or in terms of satisficing. According to this idea, more of a good is not always better or rational. More of a good can be superfluous. What is rational is to have enough or what satisfies.³²

This is important because if we defined humans as self-interested beings who seek to maximize value, then it follows that if resources are scarce then we are at war for them. 'Resources are scarce' isn't considered true solely in virtue of the fact that we live in a finite world; it appears true because we mistakenly define rationality as requiring maximizing.

The Principle of Simulation

The use value of a product is how much it would typically increase the well-being of the person who uses it. Use-value so understood can be measured in terms of equivalent exchanges and thus, monetarily, in terms of prices. However, we need to separate the value of a product from the monetary measurement of its value, and more generally, distinguish what is valuable from the measurement of that value. We are so accustomed to thinking of value in monetary terms that we often forget that money is a measure of value; it doesn't constitute the value. An article is worth £50, means roughly that one can exchange it with an indeterminate specified bundle of equivalent goods. Those goods are valuable only in relation to well-being.

Why is this principle important for economic peacefulness? It is so because a peaceful economy cannot be based on an illusion that confuses value, defined in terms of well-being, with its monetary measurement. Money isn't value; it measures value. Insofar as economic practices fail this distinction, the economy cannot be peaceful because it will pursue the monetary symptoms of wealth rather than real wealth, as defined in terms of well-being. It will systematically chase the measurement rather than the real thing. In short, we will identify our well-being with our purse.

Imagine that we could measure well-being with WB (well-being) units. Then we could pursue the strategy of augmenting well-being by increasing these WB units. This strategy appears to be logical. After all, a higher WB score is better than a lower one, and we can achieve higher scores by managing our lives scientifically according to this index. Indeed, the strategy only *appears* to be logical because it is based on confusing measurement with value. So, it isn't logical after all. In effect, the strategy makes the measurement the goal: I no longer pursue my well-being directly, but rather a higher WB score. This is an error in two ways. First, I have made my activities way of increasing a score; this means that I no longer regard them as intrinsically valuable, to be performed for their own sake. Second, the aimed result is only a measurement; it isn't the real thing. A better barometer score isn't better weather. A higher WB score isn't a better life! In short, I am chasing signs. We can intuit the absurdity of this by reflecting on the practice of teaching to the test. Such practice fails twice: it instrumentalizes learning, and it makes the aimed result a mere grade or score. The net effect of these two errors combined is that educational activities become drained of value. Learning

for its own sake has been replaced by getting the numbers right. In a similar vein, in making a measurement of well-being our goal and target, we are no longer responsive and connected to the original value. Instead we connect to the appearance of value.

The Principle of Freedom/Fairness

An economy of peacefulness will allow people to enter into economic transactions freely so long as they are fair. In other words, it will respect the freedom of persons to follow their own initiatives. However, this freedom will be set within the context that the transactions will be respectful of the equal value of persons. 'Equality' in this context means that our lives of equal non-instrumental value. This means that we should respect all persons as such equally, and that people should not have the freedom to exploit others. The fairness of a transaction would need to be defined partly in terms of its synergetic nature, and also the social culture of solidarity that it embodies. A fair transaction will be synergetic, and it will express solidarity.

The Principle of Progress

An economy of peacefulness will be directed to material progress, defined in terms of the previous principles. Material progress is not intrinsically valuable; it is only good insofar as it serves human well-being, which includes the need for striving and endeavor. For this reason, a peaceful economy will tend to encourage and reward suitably directed innovation and entrepreneurial initiatives. The peaceful economy will have material progress and technological innovation. Key institutions will be directed towards the creation of new wealth (rather than simply the redistribution of existing wealth, given that the economy isn't unjust).

However, we wouldn't identify such progress with economic growth. 'Growth' as an increase in adjusted GDP is a form of measurement, which tracks the increased volume of consumption and production. The growth figures expressed in monetary terms represent something other than peaceful progress, such as people working harder or more hours or the introduction of more efficient machinery. Growth might represent changes in the economy that are peaceful, but it needn't. Consequently, the peaceful economy *might* be a no-growth economy. It all depends on the nature or content of the growth. For instance, growth may come with severe ecological and psycho-

logical costs, and therefore, it will not serve well-being. In contrast, growth might be providing work to young people, or it might consist in lifting persons out of poverty.³³

Peaceful Economic Institutions

An economy of peacefulness would be based on principles fundamentally different from those of neo-classical economics, thereby requiring a transformation in the two fundamental concepts of work and consumption, which neo-classical economics instrumentalizes. In contrast, a peaceful approach seeks to articulate how these activities embody intrinsic values central to the well-being of persons. To imagine an economy of peacefulness, we need to envision how key economic institutions might be built around such principles. We take this blue-sky envisaging as an urgency because the narratives of the neo-classical tradition have become so dominant that it is not easy to imagine alternatives. We are stuck in one socio-economic mode of being, like fish in water. It is difficult to recognize that the neo-classical paradigm is only one economic model, and it is harder to conceive how key institutions would be defined in other kinds of economic modes of being. The following is only a quick sketch of some suggestions. We have picked three pressure points of change.

Company

A company or corporation is fundamentally an institution for people to work together in good ways to make material goods and provide services, in cost-effective and ecological manners, that people need as opposed to merely desire. This definition encapsulates the first four principles outlined earlier including the conceptions of work and consumption. Given this, a company is a not-for-profit-*maximization* organization. It doesn't exist merely for the sake of profit: in this sense, asserting that a company is not *for* profit doesn't mean that it shouldn't *yield* profit. It needs to make profit to provide a fair return to external investors (distributed profit), and to retain funds for internal reinvestment (retained profit). However, in this sense, profit serves various functions that allow a company to work in accord with its mission, as defined above: to permit organized good work that serves meaningful consumption, cost effectively and ecologically. Thus, profit is an economic means to a set of

non-economic ends.³⁴ This begins to capture the meaning of the fifth condition outlined earlier. In this sense, the company is a potential agent for radical change. It is a site where traditional upside-down thinking can be turned around. Companies ought not to exist for the sake of making profit. Profit ought to be regarded as a cost. Companies exist for the sake of people working together in synergetic ways to provide meaningful goods and services. Any company's mission that isn't framed in these fundamental terms instrumentalizes and gets values upside-down by putting means before ends.

Investment

Investment is the intelligence of an economy. At root, it is how a society uses its surpluses for further productive processes that enhance the future well-being of persons. Seen in this way, we need to make two crucial distinctions. First, investment must be distinguished from the purchase of its representations in paper and electronic form, such as shares. When I buy shares, I am not investing; I am purchasing a paper representation of an investment that comprises a legal claim on the future income of a company.³⁵ When a company floats or issues new shares, the organizations or people who purchase them are said 'to be investing', but the purchase of these right-claims doesn't necessarily constitute a real investment in training or education, in new productive capacities or in technological innovations or in environmental recuperation.³⁶ The cash from a share issue needn't be employed in these ways. Typically, large corporations finance their investments through operational revenues (or retained profits). Smaller firms may need to raise capital through the markets, but often, smaller fledgling companies need to borrow money or raise capital to fund their operational deficits during their start-up years.³⁷ For these reasons, we cannot confuse the sale and purchase of investment paper products with the investment in productive capacity. For the same reasons, we also need to distinguish investing from trading in such financial papers. The failure to make this first distinction corresponds to an increased financialization of the economy. Theoretically, it corresponds to the failure to separate the measurement of value from the value itself. When we buy and swap financial paper, such as stocks, that represent the means of production, this doesn't constitute the creation of wealth. When we think otherwise, we confuse the assets that increase production or productive efficiency with their paper representations. We confuse wealth with its representation.

There is a second failure, which is to neglect to distinguish the physical investment from the improved well-being of persons (as if the first automatically meant the second). This second failure amounts to the illusion that the means of production have value independently of how they can be used to improve the living of peoples' lives. 'More means' doesn't automatically mean 'better'. We can't define the *value* of physical investment solely in terms of productive returns. Increasing efficiency and increasing productive capacity don't necessarily further human well-being; such returns would need to contribute to human well-being. This second failure consists in the assumption that the central political-economic issue is: 'who controls and owns the surplus?' This assumption predetermines that the aim of an economy is to maximize surplus, and the political issue is simply who gets it. In some ways, this is the essence of the debate between private and state capitalism: 'Who controls and gets the surplus?' Private investors or the State? When Lenin adopted Fordism for the USSR, it was as if he assumed that the aim of the economy is to maximize surplus value or create growth. However, this assumption amounts to a willingness to instrumentalize work. It assumes that the value of work is simply its end-product and that the value of work should be conceived in only instrumental terms. Stalin said: 'We must finally understand that of all the precious capital in the world, the most precious capital, the most decisive capital, is human beings...' ³⁸ We have already rejected such conceptions.

Freed of these two failures, investment requires practical wisdom (in Aristotle's sense of the term, *phronesis*). For instance, such wisdom would have advised economies to invest in low carbon energy technologies more than 30 years ago. Judicial investment in educational institutions and infrastructure in newly independent African countries some 50 years ago would have created the conditions for later direct investment in productive capacity. Tragically, the investment sector tends to be blind to everything but short-term individualized gains because managers have (and are given by market conditions) short-term performance horizons. This precludes longer-term investment *phronesis*. This suggests that the sector needs to be rethought; the institutions could be redesigned in accordance with the principles of peacefulness mentioned above.

The concept of 'investment' is fundamentally flawed unless it is based on the principle of real wealth creation, where 'wealth' is defined in terms of well-being rather than either in purely material terms, such as the volume of production, or in purely financial terms, such as stock exchange indexes. From this, we can redesign the principles and institutions of investment so

that they align with the peaceful principles mentioned earlier. What does this mean? Investment can be directed toward the design and production of goods and services that people need, and which contribute to their well-being. Likewise, for good work. This implies that investment must have content. It has content when it is directed to a specific aspect of human well-being, such as some facet of health, education, communication or transport. Let's take finding cures for cancer as an example and suppose that a group of investors is interested in this facet of human life and how they can improve lives in this regard. They agree on an investment strategy. Let us say that they agree that changing the brain functions of a person who suffers from cancer is more likely to be an effective route to a cure than trying to directly alter the mutation processes of cancerous cells. (Specialist knowledge will be required for investment strategies in new technologies that meet such needs.) This point puts the content of investment first and foremost. It places returns on investment as secondary. It precludes the idea that investors are *only* seeking to *maximize* returns, but without excluding the idea that they are, at the same time, seeking a satisfactory return. So, on the one hand, content-defined investment rejects the idea that extracting maximum financial return as quickly as possible is the main end. However, on the other hand, when people put their money into a venture and take a risk, they need to have a reasonable chance of a sufficient return within a reasonable time (See Principle 5 above). These points indicate that we need to design investment institutions that track or are sensitive to the strategic issues that define progress in an industry or field, where 'progress' is characterized in terms of enhancing well-being or increasing flourishing. We need to avoid institutions that are only sensitive to movements in the market.

These kinds of issues are quite different from how they are usually portrayed. Often, political economics is characterized in terms of self-interest vs. altruism: whereas capitalism appeals to self-interest as the prime motivation (for instance, in the writings of Adam Smith), socialism and charity appeal to altruism. This is a false dichotomy in several ways. First, human motivation needs to be characterized by a combination of both self-interest and altruism. It isn't an either/or. I earn money by helping others. To be meaningful and rewarding, work will include both. Second, the dichotomy isn't comprehensive: much human motivation falls between the large cracks of these apparently exhaustive categories, self-interest and altruism. John cherishes the birds that live around his home. In her work, Deborah is deeply involved with the new approach to A.I. Kayleigh cares deeply about her baby. Are these cases of

self-interest or altruism? This kind of question is wrongly framed. As mutually exclusive categories, self-interest is simply the gaining of more means, and altruism is the sacrifice of such self-interest. The activities of John, Deborah and Kayleigh don't fit into either. As we saw in Chapter 3, through such activities, persons connect to things of value beyond themselves. This enlarges and forms part of the meaningfulness of their life. This isn't self-interest (I am working for something beyond myself) but it isn't altruism (it is part of my life and well-being to work in this way). Often, work fits into this huge third category. In terms of a peaceful economy, we need investment institutions that do likewise.

Competition and Markets

'Competition' is generally taken to refer to the way entities compete for limited or scarce resources. With regard to markets, 'competition' denotes the struggle between companies for boosted sales and larger market share, all for the sake of increased revenue. Popular discourse often likens such competitive markets to Neo-Darwinian jungles and to war. For instance, a new fledgling company needs to beat off the competition. The metaphor of war isn't inappropriate to describe aspects of the current economic system.

A study of Hobbes would show us that the claim that people are at war with each other in a state of nature tends to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Insofar as we view ourselves as individuals competing with others, we will view the others as competitors, and this mutual view will tend to reinforce the idea that our social way of being is one in which self-interested autonomous individuals necessarily fight each other. And insofar as we view ourselves this way, we will always necessarily see ourselves as being in conditions of scarcity of resources rather than a sufficiency. If everyone wants more than enough, then most will not have enough. This highlights the impression that we live ineluctably in war. However, if we abandon the assumption that rationality is maximization then, even if each person feels as if she lives in conditions of scarcity, this doesn't imply that there is scarcity from the point of view of the whole system. In short, if one conceives of the economic system as a war then this fortifies individualism and scarcity, which fosters the conception of markets as competitive and essentially non-peaceful.

Another analogous piece of fallacious reasoning is roughly as follows: we want efficiency in markets because of the resulting improved goods and reduced prices, and this requires competition. Therefore, we should have com-

petitive markets. This is fallacious reasoning because it assumes that a Hobbesian non-peaceful social mode of being (individuals at war with each other for scarce resources) is required for the sake of efficiency. As we shall see, it equivocates the term 'competition'.

There are alternatives to the current model. The ideal is that people enjoy good work to produce goods and services that serve human well-being, including the well-being of others and of ourselves. We need organizational forms that allow this without making us at war with each other, and that permit us to live in better social modes of being. In this regard, the term 'market competition' covers three distinct forms, which need to be separated.

First, the least peaceful: each company will engage in warrior practices explicitly aimed at capturing an increased market share to kill off the competition. Under this first model, companies will try to manipulate consumer preferences better than their competitors, and will use this and other means to try to eliminate their competitors. For example, concerning consumers, a company will seek brand loyalty so that they can later reduce the quality and cost of the product; they will seek built-in obsolescence, and so on. Concerning their competitors, companies will try to reduce competition, by, for instance, fixing prices, seeking tax advantages and legislation that passes costs on to the taxpayer. Reducing costs in these ways increases net revenue. Each of these practices seeks advantage for a company by reducing competition. In this sense, all other things being equal, markets that are freer of governmental control will tend to be less competitive and more monopolistic.

Second, there is the idea that different suppliers will offer similar goods to customers under similar competitive conditions, and that by competing, there will be improvements, such as more efficient production and investment in new technology. In this way, the market system provides us with a weeding-out process, whereby efficient companies flourish and the less efficient ones fail. In this second kind of competition, it is a question of separating the chaff and the wheat. Notice that under this second kind of market competition, companies don't will the destruction of each other.

Third, there is the idea that the market is a mechanism that provides complex information about consumer wants at different prices concerning different products. According to this third idea, it is not the essence of the market to be competitive in the first two senses, but rather to provide the information that allows efficient resource allocation. Market coordination is an information feedback mechanism. Viewed in this manner, it might be possible to make such information feedback more efficient through means that

would be non-competitive in the second sense, such as market data-bases. In other words, the information feedback and efficiency needn't require that businesses fail and that people go bankrupt, if with better information it would have been clear that those businesses should not have been started in the first place. *Less* market competition in the second sense of the term can be more efficient, less wasteful.

These quickly sketched distinctions show that the term 'competition' has different senses that we need to disentangle. Without this disentanglement, we cannot think clearly about when and why cooperation is a better way to organize markets, and when it is not. The three levels indicate three decreasingly violent kinds of competition and ways of understanding what a market is.

Some Concluding Remarks

By now, it should be clear that things of merely instrumental value are only derivative in value. They do not pertain directly to the meanings in our lives as such. Having the money for the train ticket enables me to visit my mother, but it is not a substitute for my seeing my mother. There is not equivalence of value here. It is a difference of kind.

Because of this, a society of peacefulness requires transcending economics. Insofar as economics is to do with efficiency, and benefits and costs, it is concerned with instrumental value: how to get more out of less. And insofar as political economy deals with justice, it is concerned with the distribution of things of instrumental value: who should get more and less. These are very important issues, but they do not transcend the instrumental. They are about the train ticket and not my being with my mother. Of course, my visit depends on my having the ticket. Nevertheless, there is not equivalence of value here; there is difference of kind. According to Marx, money is the universal equivalent form, but it might be well described as the non-equivalent form: one cannot eat dollars.³⁹

Peacefulness is a social mode of being that transcends economic descriptions. In such a social mode, people would engage in activities *as* intrinsically valuable insofar as possible. If our material needs were fully met, we wouldn't have to struggle and fight, and pretend that fair is foul and foul is fair.⁴⁰ What would we do? As we have seen, to answer this requires reconceptualizing what work and consumption are about.

The point of this brief reflection is to dismiss three assumptions:

The first is that a society must have as its main project the acquisition of material goods. The assumption that material progress requires this project is false. We can envisage a society that isn't dedicated to the acquisition of material goods, and which, at the same time, values material progress.

The second assumption is that material production is a means to the accumulation of financial wealth. This idea illicitly projects the view of the struggling individual within the system onto the system itself. At the systemic level, the idea that we produce material goods to gain money is entirely back-to-front. At this level, the idea of 'monetary wealth' is a contradiction. Wealth cannot be financial because money is a representation. Wealth is the capacity to engage in activities of intrinsic value. Money is the social representation of and a social means to acquiring such capacity. It itself isn't that capacity: one cannot eat money.

The third is the background assumption of scarcity. We can replace this presupposition with that of sufficiency or abundance. We do not feel as if there is sufficiency because insofar as everyone is acting as self-interested maximizers of 'financial wealth', we will live in a society at war for scarce resources. Without these background assumptions, we are at last free to feel that our social way of being needn't be chained to a project that is defined in purely materialistic and financial terms and which is unpeaceful.

Notes

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20. Rubenstein (2017).
21. We should say here 'more often instrumentally'.
22. James, O. (2017). *Affluenza*, London: Vermillion.
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24. Sheeran, K. (2006). "Ecological Economics: A Progressive Paradigm?", *Berkeley La Raza Law Journal*, 17, 26–28.
25. Thomson (1987).
26. This implies that we need to distinguish means vs. ends from instrumental vs. intrinsic value. We don't want to claim that means such as human work have only instrumental value as such, and we don't want to affirm that all intrinsic values must be goals as such. Otherwise we will be committed to the idea that all goal-directed activities are only valuable instrumentally because they are means. Thus, we need to separate the two distinctions. See Chapter 2 of Thomson, Gill and Goodson (forthcoming).
27. See Thomson (1987); Thomson, G. (2003). *On the Meaning of Life*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Press, and Thomson, Gill and Goodson (forthcoming).
28. Schumacher, E. (1979). *Good Work*, London: HarperCollins; Elster, J. (1993). "Self-Realization in Work and Politics", in J. Elster and K. O. Moene (eds.). *Alternatives to Capitalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29. See Thomson and Gill (Forthcoming 2019).
30. This doesn't mean that desiring isn't important instrumentally for well-being; striving for the better might well bring one more well-being. The point is that it can't be defined in such terms.
31. Thomson (1987); Thomson (2003).
32. Byron, M. (ed.) (2004). *Satisficing and Maximizing*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
33. Jackson, T. (2009). *Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet*, London: Earthscan.

34. Thomson, G. (2016).
35. Marx, Karl. (1981). *Capital: Volume III*, London: Penguin Classics.
36. Kay, J. (2015). *Other People's Money*, New York, NY: Public Affairs.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Stalin's Address to the Graduates from the Red Army Academies on 4th May 1935 in Stalin, J. (1978). *Works, Vol. 14: 1934–1940*, London: Red Star Press Ltd.
39. Or money is the non-equivalent form that tries to make equivalents of non-equivalents.
40. pp. 358–373, Keynes, M. (1963). "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren", in *Essays in Persuasion*, New York: Norton & Co.

EDUCATION AS PEACE

In this book, we have sketched a positive and holistic conception of peace. Here is a very brief summary: Peace has positive attributes, and it is not merely an absence of violence and war. Peace is a constituent of human well-being and a flourishing life, as well as being instrumentally beneficial. Inner peacefulness is when one perceives oneself as having intrinsic value as a person. Inner peacefulness can also be spiritual when it consists in identifying oneself (non-derivatively) as the 'I' that does such identification, and when it contains self-transcendence as an important ingredient. Inner peace has profound implications for one's relationships with others because it does not permit antagonistic non-derivative contrasts between us and them. Peace is a potential feature of all aspects of human life that involve conflict. In other words, peacefulness can be a feature of conflicts, tensions, differences and contradictions. It calms the violent potential in them. Hence, conflicts are not the opposite of peace, and peace doesn't require eliminating conflict. Instead, conflict is a source of ingenuity, innovation and transformation and its presence invites us to dialogue.¹ In our intrapersonal relations, peacefulness requires positive self-consciousness, such as being aware of one's past, present and future as valuable and worthwhile. It is also reflected in a primary self-identification as a person (where all other self-identifications, for

example with social groups, would be secondary or derivative). In interpersonal relations, peacefulness consists in regarding all people as equally and non-derivatively valuable. Hence war is not justifiable, not only because of it harms well-being, but also because it dehumanizes. Likewise, in socio-economic and political systems, peaceful structures reflect a respect for the non-derivative value of persons. Such structures would be designed around principles that embody this respect, and contribute to well-being, as we saw in Chapters 9 and 10.

In this chapter, we will argue that the educational system is also a structure that can instantiate peacefulness, and which can fail to do so. As discussed before, the issues pertaining to this structure do not reduce to questions about the peacefulness of individual teachers and students, and their relationships in the community. There can be a peaceful school in an unpeaceful educational system. If the structure or framework is unpeaceful, then this will limit the capacity of educational institutions and communities to be peaceful. We argue that, as a system, education ought to provide children, young people and learners of all ages with the kinds of processes and experiences that are constitutive of and conducive to their well-being. The cultivation of peaceful qualities and relationships is central to such processes. We propose that education be part and parcel of our answer to a question posed in Chapter 1: 'What kind of being should one want to be?' We will do this in several steps:

First, we link peacefulness in the world to the cultivation of peaceful qualities in persons. Second, given this link, we review and critique the explicit aims of many conventional peace educational programs which attempt to combat violence and resolve conflicts. In the light of this book's positive and holistic conception of peace, and constructive understanding of conflict, we point out that both goals are based on erroneous assumptions. Furthermore, these goals contradict the idea that a primary focus of education should be the cultivation of peacefulness or peaceful qualities in persons. Third, we challenge the existing education system especially for its instrumentalizing of persons and its violent effects on children and young people. We conclude that, for education to truly cultivate peacefulness in persons, it must be human-centered with a focus on nurturing human qualities and virtues. In this sense, peace education shouldn't be *about* peace, or even *for* peace, instead, as a structure and process, it should embody the qualities of peacefulness.

The Cultivation of Peacefulness in Persons

A holistic understanding of peace integrates diverse layers and multiple dimensions of peacefulness from an undivided vantage point. In this holistic conception, ‘peace’ has an integrated meaning: from one’s state of being, to the ways one perceives and treats other persons and nature; to community relations and socio-economic and political systems. This cohesive understanding suggests that, although the psychology of persons is shaped by the social structures they live in, nevertheless, humans can make our own history, even if the conditions of such choices are not decided by us.² The very idea of education is based on the assumption that it has the power to transform given social structures.

Transformation entails a conscious and enduring striving of humanity toward peacefulness. The striving is comprised of endeavors at different levels. Individually, it consists in persons trying to actively strengthen their qualities as part of their self-transcendence. Relationally, it indicates good-will toward other people, through friendships and sharing. Outwardly, it consists in the willingness to listen well in the context of dialogues and collaborative ventures. Structurally, it requires that we design institutions around principles such as the equal worth of all persons. For education to transform in these ways, it itself needs to be transformed in these regards.

An important quality of a peaceful person is her awareness of the spiritual ‘I’, as discussed in Chapter 2. Usually, such awareness doesn’t come naturally, and people can have erroneous views or misconceptions of themselves. For instance, people are instrumentalizing themselves when they treat themselves merely as a means to an end or a goal.³ Likewise, as we described in this book, people may mis-self-identify when they non-derivatively identify themselves as being members of a specific group. When a person self-identifies basically as a person, group self-identifications become secondary. This means that the basic self-identification will define ‘us’ in solidarity with all other persons, making antagonistic us-versus-them impossible. For a peaceful person, a human’s way of being is always already being-*with*, in a non-instrumental way. The word ‘with’ captures the essence of peacefulness—a genuine *co-esse*, or co-being. However, a person is not always aware of other people *as persons*. We are all witnesses to many forms of dehumanization in our society, from slavery to racism, from wars to economic exploitation, from corporal punishment in schools to authoritarian educational systems. Awareness of persons as beings of intrinsic value needs to be consciously cultivated, developed and

enriched. When there is such an awareness, a person can strive to live a good life *with* other people. Similarly, with such an awareness, a person can seek self-transcendence *for* oneself. These reciprocal relationships can only be realized through care and respect, which need to be intentionally fostered. In this way, peace is a fruit of human endeavor.

Seen from these perspectives, peace involves the cultivation of persons as engaged agents in creating and sustaining peacefulness in human life. This will include, for example, self-conscious reflexivity to identify oneself as a person; an openness to mutual engagement in ethical relationships; capacities for listening, dialogue and collaboration. Lastly, a holistic conception of peace also suggests that the cultivation of persons must be oriented toward the development of the person as a whole, including the physical, spiritual, social, emotional, intellectual, moral and motivational aspects of being a person. Cultivating peaceful persons is no doubt one of the primary tasks of education. Let's examine what constitutes peacefulness in education, and what contributes to peace in education.

Peace Education

Despite its name, 'peace education' in effect applies to diverse contexts where there is a need for addressing violence, transforming conflicts between antagonistic groups, reconciling ruptured relationships and reconstructing a society broken by violence. Indeed, as we shall see, peace education has long been subject to debate, especially in terms of its underlying theories, aims, content and pedagogy. There is little agreement on what peace education is and how it ought to be practiced. To begin, the philosophical underpinnings of peace education are varied, and its definitions lack coherence.⁴ This results in disparate educational practices for peace. Here is an overview of both.

Some Philosophical Perspectives

Peace education is generally grounded in a number of philosophical foundations.⁵ Here we examine five of these, which seem to have the most influence.

One of the significant voices in the field is that of Betty Reardon. Her thinking integrates both positive and negative conceptions of peace. It proposes 'authentic peace', a cosmopolitan philosophy consisting in the abolition of structural violence, the development of a global justice system, and the

establishment of a global civic community.⁶ For Reardon, peace education is concerned with cultivating students' 'political efficacy', citizenship, and awareness of universal moral equality and human dignity.⁷ Although Reardon's contribution to peace education is reflected in her writing on justice and her promoting a capabilities-approach to peace and justice,⁸ in practice, however, peace education programs inspired by Reardon's philosophy tends to focus on citizenship, equality and human rights.⁹ Moreover, one can see that this cosmopolitan view locates peace within moral and ethical domains, which is helpful in integrating peace in the heart of a community. However, the political emphasis of peace education seems to underplay the role of other forms of peacefulness, especially inner and spiritual peace.

Another key source of influence is from Harris and Morison who claim that education can play an important part in encouraging a pacifist attitude and that, in the spiritual domain, it can help people find deeper connections among each other and with the natural world. Given this recognition of the spiritual, Harris and Morison regard education as part of a set of strategies for peace, which include military strength, justice, sustainability, transformation and politics.¹⁰ They also propose building up armaments as a deterrence and as a form of security. These views on peace strategies seem to contradict their own pacifism and their ideas about non-violent relationships. Furthermore, when applying these perspectives in education, Harris and Morison's emphasis on training rational minds does not sit comfortably with their postulation of a deep spiritual connection between people.

Smith Page's ethics-oriented philosophy of peace education has been equally influential. It maintains that peace is a virtue,¹¹ and education can encourage the student to reflect on who she is as a person, which can in turn shape her (ethical) actions. Rather than pursuing rights and justice, Page proposes that peace education can empower the student to develop dispositions to be more other-regarding, kind and caring. However, the translation of this vision into character education in schools often misses out the real heart of his proposal, namely the cultivation of peaceful qualities.

Ilan Gur-Zéev's postmodern view of peace rejects the idea of peace as the absence of violence, and contests the false dichotomy between peace and conflict.¹² In what he calls 'counter-education', he suggests that peace education is about learning to live with conflict in a constructive manner. By encouraging a critical attitude, counter-education aims to develop students' capacities to interrogate Western hegemony and the dominant discourse.¹³ The reason why Gur-Zéev calls his approach 'counter-education' is that it rejects the idea that

there are moral universals, such as justice. Instead, it advocates commitment to negative imperatives, such as those that confront specific injustices. Gur-Zéev's explicit challenge to the negative conception of peace, and his critique of western-centric views of peace and education are insightful. Nevertheless, we maintain that peace education requires that some evaluative claims are true and others are false, as we saw in the introduction and Chapter 1. In other words, peace education necessitates that there are true evaluative claims, even if in order to critique western-centric views of peace education.

Many spiritual movements in peace education are underpinned by visions of peace such as the one put forward by Daisaku Ikeda.¹⁴ This vision postulates that peace is reflected in the interdependence of people, nature, spirit and community, and that inner transformation and dialogue are the basis for peace.¹⁵ Ikeda's is a spiritual and positive vision, and it is close to our view of peace in many ways, especially in its focus on respect for each person's dignity and well-being, and on interpersonal relationships. However, it misses any recognition of the connection between inner transformation and structural peace. This latter aspect is critically important because, as we will show later, the conventional conception of education and the way that socio-economic structure shapes the educational system make it almost impossible for this vision of spiritual/humanistic peace to be a focus of peace education within the existing system. Peacefulness involves a transformation of the system itself.

Some Definitions

It is not surprising that, as a result of these different philosophical influences, there are disparate definitions of peace education. Here are some examples.

For UNESCO, peace education should aim at developing human personality and strengthening respect for human rights, promoting mutual understanding, tolerance and friendship amongst nations and religious groups.¹⁶

For UNICEF, peace education is the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behavior change that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, and to resolve conflict peacefully.¹⁷

For others, peace education helps develop an appreciation for the global connection of all humanity and the interdependence between humans and nature.¹⁸ It promotes the critical self-examination and transformation of students' worldviews.¹⁹ From a postmodern perspective, peace education is conceived as a way to problematize core concepts, such as knowledge, representa-

tion, communication, consensus, intersubjectivity, as well as to interrogate the social and historical contexts of education itself.²⁰

These various interpretations of peace education philosophies are further translated into peace education practice, to which we now turn.

Practices

Peace education programs are also wide-ranging and do not share a common focus, like the diversity in their philosophical underpinnings and definitions. Such programs generally serve to combat the negative impacts of violent conflicts, as well as to prevent further outbreaks of violence. Typically, there are three distinct peacebuilding contexts within which peace education tends to have an important role to play.²¹ The first is *protecting* children and young from the negative impacts of violent conflicts; the second is *preventing* children and young people from engaging or participating in violence; and the third is *preparing* children and young people to challenge and critique structural violence in the socio-economic and political systems with a view to changing it. We now take a quick look at peace education aims and practices in each of these contexts and roles.

In order to protect children and young people from violence during wars and emergency situations, peace education programs can provide students (and families) with access to health, social and medical care. Having the normalcy of coming to school and staying in the safe site of a school can also shelter children and young people from the traumas of violence. This protection is crucial for vulnerable children to survive the atrocities of armed conflict and war. In this sense, peace education in the context of violence is akin to humanitarian efforts and social work. This is often categorized under 'education in emergencies'.²²

When a country or region is in a fragile state, peace education can offer 'conflict-sensitive' programs to prevent children and young people from taking part in violence.²³ These programs are conflict-sensitive because they aim to reduce inequalities which could fuel further violence, as well as mediating conflicts between people and communities. Suitable guidelines can help schools to develop educational policies and design environments that avoid stereotypes, prevent discrimination, and ensure equal access to education. For instance, conflict sensitive programs usually offer training to teachers so that they are equipped with classroom strategies that help avoid bias and discrimination against ethnic minorities in the classrooms.

In post-conflict situations, peace education helps children and young people to become more critically aware of the root causes of violence and war. Likewise, as part of post-conflict reconciliation, peace education aims to strengthen intercommunal relationships within the school environment, especially amongst the children. There is a long list of programs that peace education may adopt, including education in: conflict resolution, development (poverty reduction), human rights, history, multiculturalism, democratic practices and sustainability.²⁴ These are broadly labelled 'peace education' because they help bring an awareness of the painful effects of violence, and because they prepare children and young people with critical capacities to identify the symptoms of violence and the causes of war. Although there are exceptions, these peace education programs are typically knowledge-based programs.

As we have seen, although these practical approaches to peace education may differ considerably regarding their underlying conceptions of peace, education and pedagogy, they are all helpful in suppressing violence and reducing the risks to young people, and thereby, they undoubtedly do contribute to 'peace'.²⁵

However, in the light of the holistic conception of peace developed in this book, there are a few problems and limitations associated with these peace education programs.²⁶ The first is that the programs set up a dichotomy between 'normal' education and 'peace' education. In so doing, peace education appears to be added-on rather than being integral to education in a general sense. There are few exceptions such as the Soka Education Movement in Japan that do view education as integral to peace.²⁷ This separation hides a pernicious effect of conceptualizing 'normal' education as intended for 'something else' other than peace and human development. It suggests that only specially designed programs, over and above 'normal' educational processes, can help toward peace. We will discuss this 'something else' later in this chapter. For now, we simply want to draw attention to this separation because it suggests that education and peace are two distinct things, an idea that contradicts the core of the idea that peace consists in education as the cultivation of persons, developed above.

The second is that these peace programs suggest an instrumentalized conception of education. As briefly illustrated, the underlying assumption of these programs and practices is that peace education serves merely as a means to an end: to protect children and young people from violence, prevent them from taking part in violence, and to remove the threats of violence. This indicates a tendency to think of all educational activities only in terms of their instrumental value, and not as learning and development activities that are valuable in themselves.

The third problem is closely linked to the second, which is the exclusive focus on violence. This focus situates peace education practices within a negative conception of peace. It means that these programs share a common aim of eradicating violence rather than promoting positive peace. Furthermore, some of these programs merely aim at removing the external expressions or symptoms of unpeacefulness, rather than addressing its root causes. Education aimed merely at eradicating violent conflict ignores a holistic conception that peace is constituted in peaceful qualities and ways of living in the world. This ignoring of people's aspiration indicates that peace education will always be directed toward the symptoms of non-peace.

Connected is a mistaken view of conflict. When peace education overly emphasizes a negative conception of peace, it can equate conflict with violence. Seeing peace and conflict as opposites places further stress on the dichotomies between in-group and out-group, victims and victimizers, good and evil, thereby placing peoples and communities in opposition. At the same time, the emphasis on peace as the removal of violent conflict can give the impression that all conflicts are bad and must be eliminated. Such a view rejects the constructive potential of conflict, especially when it can invite dialogue, listening, care, and other transformational activities. This dynamic of conflict is important for deepening relations and for social innovation.

Peace education can also provide foundational normalcies for children and young people and help strengthen their skills, attitudes and capabilities to ultimately resist the pull of violence. However, conceiving education purely in this instrumental light would inadvertently drain educational processes of their intrinsic value. The only way to escape the instrumental trap is to conceive education as consisting of learning experiences, activities and processes that are in part constitutive of living well.

Before we examine such a vision of education in practice, we must overcome three existing conceptual obstacles.

Conceptual Obstacles

Conventional conceptualizations of education pose three obstacles to the proposal that education involves the cultivation of peacefulness in persons. The first is the narrow aim of education; the second is the place of education regarding structural violence; and the third is education's relationship to human well-being, or rather the lack of it. As we discuss, it will soon become clear that these three conceptual foundations of education are mutually shaped for it to be transformative.

Narrow Aims

Typically, the aims of education are stuck in a tug-of-war between numerous ideas. The most orthodox view is centered around the acquisition of knowledge and skills to make positive contributions to the economy and improvements to society. This conception seems to have the greatest buy-in across the educational systems in the world, and has become the mainstream conception of education.

However, there are alternative views. These are alternative either because they are integrated in schooling as secondary aims, or because they serve to underpin progressive (or alternative) educational movements.²⁸ Alternative conceptions include, for instance, an emancipatory view of education focusing the development of critical capacities for engaging with oppressive structures, initiated by educators such as Paulo Freire;²⁹ a social and democratic view of education as a form of participatory citizenship toward social efficiency, articulated by writers such as John Dewey;³⁰ a self-actualizing view that sees the aims of education as the unfolding of the individual's potential, supported by educators including Carl Rogers;³¹ a social psychological view of education as the pursuit of happiness, put forward by, among others, Nel Noddings;³² and a spiritual view of education as inner transformation, advanced by Jiddu Krishnamurti and Parker Palmer.³³ Despite this rich diversity in conceptualizing the aims of education, the mainstream conception remains dominant.

Across the continents, educational systems have been dictated by the aims of transmitting knowledge-contents to children and young people, and of providing them with training in useful skills-sets. The results of such education can be examined and measured through standardized testing, within each country, such as GCSEs and A-Levels exams in the UK, Baccalauréat in France, and internationally, such as the Programme for International Students Assessment at the OECD. This transmission view of education is the 'something else' we mentioned earlier. It is a narrow view of the aims of education, and it ignores the idea that education should cultivate human qualities essential for a peaceful and flourishing life. As we argued elsewhere, in practice, this limited view of the aims of education can only yield something superficial.³⁴

Instrumentalization

As shown in Chapter 10, globally, human societies are dominated by an instrumentalized economic system, which is a violent structure. Education is usually conceptualized as an integral part of such a system and hence, it

instrumentalizes learning activities, teachers and students. The underlying main goal is for the educational system to produce well-trained laborers (and consumers) who can effectively oil the economic engine. In this way, education becomes part of a structural violence that instrumentalizes learning and dehumanizes children and young people, as well as brutalizing childhood and adolescence.³⁵ This also leads to an obsessive pursuit of standardization, which has been practiced in the mainstream education across the planet with a specific emphasis on high-stakes national standardized testing. It is high-stakes because it serves as a reward-and-punishment system, which does not respect students and teachers as persons.³⁶ What is supposed to be merely a way to measure progress has become the principal goal and the main incentive of education.

Associating such education with violence shouldn't be surprising. It is part of the culture of most schools, quite apart from the systemic instrumentalization inherent in high-stakes testing. Within a violent structure, there are other more explicit forms of violence which include for instance, corporal punishment, educational inequality; repression and alienation, such as discriminative curriculum content, the exclusion of mother tongues, and the suppression of teaching certain subjects, and more.³⁷ Furthermore, educational policies tend to reinforce unequal access to education, unfair distribution of educational resources, racial and ethnic segregation, and cultural and political oppression and repression.³⁸ These forms of violence embody the dehumanizing of individuals or groups, which includes racism, discrimination, oppression, alienation and injustice. These are so prevalent that UNICEF's Innocenti report coins the term: *peace-destroying* education.³⁹

Even the antidotes to peace-destroying education can instrumentalize, such as conflict-sensitive education and the other forms of peace education practice already mentioned. They instrumentalize education, and treat intrinsically valuable activities such as engaging in learning, dialogue, human relationships and critical awareness merely as means to ends.

III-Being

Insofar as educational processes, activities and experiences are conceived in purely instrumental terms, they cannot be constituents of student or teacher well-being. On the contrary, typically, they will lead to students' ill-being. Let's return to high-stakes testing as an example. As reported, it is not uncommon for the pressures of exams to have serious effects on student stress,

depression and even suicide attempts.⁴⁰ Indeed, evidence-driven educational policies put standardization at the center of schooling, but give little relevance to the holistic development of the person, to the thriving of the inner life and the relational qualities of the person.⁴¹ Equally, such education does not encourage student self-determination, initiative and responsibility, be it with respect to their own learning, their capacity to challenge social norms or to live life more fully. When there is a concern for well-being, it is typically instrumentalized: student well-being becomes a way to attain better testing results and grades. This critique even applies to positive psychology, happiness classes and the introduction of mindfulness in schools.⁴²

Students' ill-being also results from another aspect of this conceptual error. Educational practices do not nurture basic self-identification of oneself as a person, i.e. as a being of intrinsic value. They tend to inculcate self-identification in terms of roles, social positions, and achievement. They promote an instrumentalized understanding of oneself and of one's relationships.⁴³ Simple self-appreciative awareness is driven out of the child and young person's psychology. It is obvious that unless these conceptual obstacles are overcome, education will continue to dehumanize.

Education, Cultivation of Persons, Well-Being, and Peace

So far, we have established that education entails the cultivation of peacefulness in persons. This idea can be regarded as a basic foundation of human society. Drawing on our discussions on well-being throughout the book, one can see that a peaceful education will aim at holistically cultivating humane qualities in three interrelated directions:

- (a) Reflexively: toward a greater self-awareness and understanding, including most importantly an appropriate identification of the 'I';
- (b) Relationally: toward openness, curiosity, and a willingness to dialogue and engage with others, which will include an appreciation of the other as equally real and valuable as oneself;
- (c) Outwardly: toward caring for other people, for nature and other beings on the planet, as well as caring for valuable causes and things beyond oneself, including taking responsibility for developing goodness in the world.

By working in these three intertwined directions, through the cultivation of peaceful qualities in persons, education also enables a transformed view of structural peace, which is indirectly a fourth track. We will discuss these three kinds of cultivation separately below, bearing in mind that they are interlinked:

Self

The cultivation of the self is different from the egoistic process of self-actualization. Although self-actualization involves a strong commitment to the development of oneself, it is more directed toward strengthening a person's self-esteem and efficacy, which is more individualistic and egoistic.⁴⁴ In self-actualization, the individual can easily become *an isolated soul* who engages with people and the world as *a self*, whereby everyone else is defined as *an other*. Self-actualization has an accompanying vision of well-being exclusively in terms of the individual's personal fulfilment.⁴⁵

In contrast, the cultivation of the self is connected to the development of peaceful qualities, which will include recognizing one's own intrinsic value, resulting in an emotional awareness of one's dignity. Such qualities are crucial in overcoming one's insecurity, fears and prejudices, as well as in balancing the tensions between one's interests and desires.⁴⁶ This cultivation is also in part a self-transcendence by connecting appreciatively with the intrinsic value of others, as we shall see. It suggests that education must respect students as equally intrinsically valuable, and offer an environment that is safe and open in which students can have the space and freedom to explore and discover who they are, and their interests and joys.

Relations

The cultivation of a person's relational qualities is a key aspect of peace. As already mentioned, relational qualities include a person's capacity to appreciate others as persons of equal intrinsic value as oneself, and to connect to others from this appreciation. Such qualities also include the capacity to relate to one's self in a peaceful way, and therefore include a person's self-compassion and self-respect, which is constituted in self-transcendence, as discussed above.

To cultivate such qualities requires that education be structured in such a way that its processes and institutional ethos and culture embody respect, solidarity and friendliness. Education is itself a form of caring and nurturing,

and should be situated within relationships. This means that schools should not be established only as institutions, but rather also as learning communities. Good curriculum content and pedagogical practices should offer children and young people a continuous experience of human interconnectedness. We shall return to this topic later when we discuss humanizing education.

Care, Proactivity, and Responsibility

Peace involves the cultivation of qualities, such as care, initiative and creativity, that are fundamental for the transformation of the human condition toward peacefulness. Such personal qualities are fostered through an educational system that consciously develops young people's capabilities to listen, dialogue, and initiate action. This means that the cultivation of care, proactivity and responsibility is achieved within an environment in which creativity, imagination, a spirit of initiative and an attitude of service are nurtured.

Moreover, the cultivation of a person's caring qualities can be directed at two key ethical sensibilities. One is 'I must' which is included in one's awareness of the requirement to respond with care and compassion to the needs of persons. The other sensibility is 'I can't' which is grounded in one's internal reflection and self-awareness in ways that disengage with one's own anger, and tendencies for self-violence. Both kinds of sensibilities can be fostered in education.

We have briefly illustrated that, for education to be the cultivation of peacefulness in persons, three intertwined aspects must be at the core of education. In the discussion so far, we have mentioned some human qualities, such as: self-awareness, the capacity to think and to act purposefully; emotional and moral sensitivities; aesthetic sensibilities; spiritual consciousness and the capacity to care and to connect with other people. Education that aims at cultivating peaceful persons will encompass these holistic qualities. Despite cultural and individual variations, education as the cultivation of persons will be consistent in requiring humanization in all contexts. Humanization requires the recognition of the non-instrumental value of persons, and the humanization of social structures enables the flourishing of persons. In turn, peaceful individuals can contribute to a more humane and peaceful world. No wonder Galtung writes: 'ultimately, peace ... is an effort to put Man together again, an effort to transcend all these borders and divisions ... in order to arrive at something more truthful to the miracle that is Man.'⁴⁷

Humanizing Education⁴⁸

Humanizing education would be consistent with respecting the intrinsic value of persons, and with the idea that appreciating educational activities is constitutive (*inter alia*) of the students' being-well. The proposal that education should cultivate peacefulness in persons will apply to the *ethos* of the school, the design of its curriculum and to the nature of its relationships in learning processes.

As a start, humanizing education radically rethinks the aims of education and aligns it with the cultivation of peaceful qualities in persons, those that make each person more fully human. Although it does not reject other ends, it conceives the fundamental aim of *developing the person as a human being*, understood in terms of her well-being and flourishing, as paramount.⁴⁹ As already discussed, the development of the person should point in three directions simultaneously: reflexive inner transformation; relational enrichment; and greater engagement with others and with the world. These dimensions apply directly to the time that young people spend at school, and not solely to their future development. For instance, echoing Dewey, for students, time at school is a lived experience, an important part of their current life and, as such, it is intrinsically valuable. Experiences in education and lives in school are partly constituted in the students' current well-being, which, in a peaceful system, is recognized as the heart of education.

In this spirit, educational institutions will be humanizing places in which a *learning community* can thrive. In such a community, young people, teachers, administrators, parents and others are equal as persons. Within such humanizing spaces, each member of the community acknowledges that the community exists for this kind of educational reason, and is aware that everybody shares this understanding. Because of this mutuality, a learning community is permeated by a culture of care, mutual concern and respect. Such a culture expresses itself as openness, joyfulness, friendliness and warmth.

Furthermore, a learning community enables those involved to transcend relationships and interactions defined solely by the roles that people occupy, such as principal, teacher, counsellor, teaching assistant, student and cleaner. Such transcending consists in recognizing that we are more than the functions we perform and the roles we play. This transcending does not imply that one abandons one's responsibilities, but instead, it means that all role-defined responsibilities are understood as operating in a broader human-centered context.

Humanizing education is not only structured around the nurturing of qualities, but also around the way teaching and learning take place. There are several points worthy of highlighting here. One is that the recognition that human qualities are holistic means that education doesn't need to design programs to address individual qualities. This would make curricular content piecemeal: an exercise to develop kindness, one for creativity, and a third for perseverance.

Another point is that for education to be caring, it will necessarily provide learning processes that are appropriately challenging for each student. To challenge the student, the curriculum needs to be personally tailored. This shows how a 'one-size-fits-all' style of education is typically shallow. Tailored education will offer students choices in terms of how they need to develop, and what they would like to learn and how. The making of such choices requires that one understand the relevant criteria, and students need guidance in this respect. The more challenging educational activities are, the more guidance the student would need. This indicates the reason why the relationship between the teacher and the student would be personal rather than merely functional. Lastly, it points out that educative experiences must offer varied spaces for young people to develop their personal qualities, which would include engaging with other young people through collaborative learning projects.

The principles of humanizing education are not new. What is new is connecting them to peace. In this book, this is achieved by articulating the interconnections between the cultivation of persons and peacefulness. With this in mind, let's see how these principles can be applied to the three kinds of contexts of peacebuilding examined in the previous sections: (a) during intractable violent conflicts; (b) during inter-ethnic tension; (c) during sustained non-violence.⁵⁰

During intractable violent conflicts. In such contexts, there are many urgent humanitarian needs. However, humanizing education needn't be limited to material humanitarian support. On the contrary, the more dehumanized the situations are, the more need for humanization. For instance, education can continue to nurture well-being by cultivating empathy and questioning. Equally, in times when humanity is reduced to minimum living conditions due to violence, education can offer warmth, care and a human touch to children and young people which, in turn, reaffirms their worthiness and encourages their peaceful qualities.

During inter-ethnic tensions. When a country or a region is in a fragile state, vulnerable to violence, children and young people are especially at risk, for

example, of being recruited as soldiers, or of feeling alienated and displaced. In this context, the cultivation of human qualities should be at the core of efforts to rekindle imagination, creativity and hope. Good micro-interactions in the classrooms, such as eye contact and a kind word, are typically very important. In one's attitudes, language, and deeds, we can embody the idea that children and young people are persons. The more young people are integrated in the learning community, the stronger their human qualities, and the less vulnerable they are to the pull to violence. However, it is easy to misconceive such efforts as part of the *fight* or *battle* against violence. This misconceives the nature of such efforts: because violence is a symptom or expression of dehumanization, it can only be overcome through humanization. In this sense, one can't fight violence.

In relatively non-violent societies. In such contexts, violence is often implicit, especially given Reardon's point about the multitude forms of violence. Hence, the need for an emphasis on humanization will be more pronounced. Humanization requires transforming the aims of education, and this in turn requires a transformation in the processes of learning, in pedagogical approaches, in the methodology of evaluation, and in the learning environment itself. Humanization ensures that education is not being instrumentalized for the sake of economic growth and competitiveness. In effect, humanizing education should help transform a violent economic system.

We have illustrated how, within all three kinds of context, humanizing education remains central to peace. Let us now take the current need to support refugee children and young people in Europe as a case-in-point. Humanizing education starts with understanding and meeting their needs, such as medical care, counselling and psychological healing. It emphasizes making the educational environment safe for children and young people who have been traumatized by the violence in their home countries and by their journeys to relative safety. Equally important is the development of caring and trusting relationships with the adults around them and with other students. Such relationships will help young refugees to reclaim their self-worth, and contribute to cultivating a self-awareness of the 'I' as a spiritual condition. Likewise, the everyday practice of teaching must embody caring relationships, even when caring requires that the student is challenged.

In summary, we must distinguish between education *about* peace, which is a knowledge-based approach, and education *for* peace, which focuses on education for the sake of capacity building concerning conflict transformation and non-violence.⁵¹ Both are limited: the first is superficial because it is purely

knowledge-based, and the second is limited because it is still instrumental in its approach. In contrast, we have offered an integration of education and peace through the concept of well-being: education is the cultivation of peacefulness in persons. In this sense, education is peace. It is so when education instantiates the humanization of individuals, relationships and communities. In this way, education can help transform both the structures of consciousness and the structures of society.⁵²

Conclusion

This book has advocated a holistic understanding of peacefulness, the core of which hinges on an appreciation of the non-instrumental value of being a person (or of being conscious) and the intrinsic value of well-being. In anchoring education within this understanding, we have come to see that it must be centered on the cultivation of peaceful persons. What has become clear in this chapter is that the aims of education cannot be simply imparting knowledge and training skills, not even those about peace, citizenship, international systems and global issues. Instead, education must aim at nurturing those qualities that make our well-being more complete and enable us to live life more fully. When we learn to live out those human qualities, including spiritual peacefulness, we are more likely to extend love and compassion to those around us, and embody solidarity with those who think differently from ourselves. Furthermore, in nurturing such qualities, education can help cultivate children and young people who are motivated to take responsibility for their own learning, and who have the willingness to embody peace in their lives.

Structurally, the education system will be a humanizing space in which the principles of the equal worth of all persons, and of the intrinsic value of the activities, processes, experiences and relationships that constitute well-being. Hence the design of schools, their educational ethos, curriculum, pedagogical features, and evaluation systems, must be aligned with a humanizing intention to be peaceful.

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