



Postgraduate/Distance Learning Assignment Coversheet & Feedback Form

[Please insert this coversheet as the first page of the assignment you are submitting]

For completion by the student: Student Name: Laura Stuart Obenauf		
Module code: HPPH7009	Student University Number: 2008365	Educational support needs: Yes/No
Module title: Environmental Philosophy		
Module tutor: Rebekah Humphries		
Assignment title: Annotated Bibliography		
Assignment due date: August 27, 2021		
I confirm that this is my original work and that I have adhered to the University policy on plagiarism.		
Name ... Laura Stuart Obenauf.....		

Assignment Mark	
1 st Marker's Provisional mark	64
2 nd Marker's/Moderator's provisional mark	
External Examiner mark (if relevant)	
Final Mark	

NB. All marks are provisional until confirmed by the Final Examination Board

You present the content of the texts in an incredibly clear & detailed manner, showing an accurate knowledge of relevant facts, ideas & arguments. The main weakness of the work is that you present very little by way of an assessment of the arguments. Your presentation shows that you've given them a lot of thought, considering how best they can be explained. Try to go beyond that & offer a critique, drawing on further texts to help you to do this.

For completion by Marker 1:

Comments:

Marker 1 signature: *[Signature]* Date: 13/9/21

For completion by Marker 2 / Moderator:

Comments: Overall though, this piece of work has much strength, & explains complex arguments & ideas in a very clear & well structured manner.

Marker 2 / Moderator signature: Date:

External Examiner's comments (if relevant):

External Examiner signature:	Date:

GOODPASTER, KENNETH E.,

'On being Morally Considerable',

The Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1978), 308-325, in
CrossRef <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025709>>

Introduction - pp. 308-309

Through a six-part progressive exploration, Kenneth Goodpaster's 1978 paper 'On Being Morally Considerable' invites the reader to analyze what it means to deserve moral consideration or standing. Before beginning, Goodpaster draws the reader's focus to Aldo Leopold's statement: *'a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community, It is wrong when it tends otherwise,'* and G.J. Warnock's approach to consider morality from the perspective of the patient (or recipient of the action), as opposed to the agent (or perpetrator of the action). Through this perspective, one can better analyze whether current criteria for moral considerability or standing is sufficient, or if it should be expanded in accordance with Leopold's vision, Warnock's advice and the inclination of one's own intuition.

Section I: Human-centered disturbance – pp. 309-310

In this section, Goodpaster acknowledges rising moral disturbance about people's relationship with nature. However, Goodpaster indicates the human-centered, self-interested attitudes and behaviors held by the majority as the main impediment toward environmental harmony. He references the work of philosophers David Hume and Immanuel Kant which attempted to deepen understanding of one's individual morality. However, Goodpaster assessed that the human-centered, self-focused nature of the work neglected to adequately connect the human individual to larger ecologies and therefore could not gain traction for a new appreciation of morality toward the environment over the long term. Even so, Goodpaster confirms this deepening and expanding one's morality as crucial to harmonious environmental relations with a certain caution: overly focusing on morality as it applies to one's interests, or human-understood categories such as pleasure and pain is a missed opportunity to consider morality at a richer level. Revisiting Warnock's notion, one should endeavor to focus on how another might be impacted by one's actions to determine the morality of an action. Goodpaster argues that when individual morality is empathically expanded to focus on potential interests of those impacted by one's actions, one finds that any possessors of life likely also possess interests which deserve to be considered.

Section 2: Morality analyzed – pp. 310-313

Here, Goodpaster offers an analysis of morality in different categories – consideration, relevance, significance, and rights – by examining the work of five different philosophers: G.J. Warnock, John Passmore, Willam Frankena, Peter Singer and Joel Feinberg.

First, Goodpaster addresses the difference between moral rights and moral considerability and asks the reader to consider whether it is necessary for beings to possess legal rights simply to be treated considerately. Illustrating this debate, Goodpaster quotes Passmore in this passage: *'it is one thing to say it is wrong to treat animals cruelly, it is another thing to say that animals have rights.'* Aligning with Warnock's notion of moral relevance, Goodpaster attests it is not necessary for a being to prove its worthiness of 'rights' – as humans define them – in order to be treated considerately. ✓

Second, Goodpaster outlines the difference between moral considerability and moral significance and cautions that the conversations between the two must be kept separate. Considerability, as examined before, determines whether a being's wellbeing should be taken into account before one acts. Significance, however, determines the priority of consideration. Some beings – based on context of time or place, known capacities (of suffering, for example), or threshold of the one considering – may necessitate more consideration than others. Goodpaster attests that hyper dependence on qualifications of rights can actually thwart mindful action and behavior. ✓

Third, Goodpaster introduces the realm of meta-ethics and meta-morality by exploring questions of intelligibility and normative substance (establishing value based off of certain qualifications). Referencing Feinberg's attempt to condense this complicated conversation, Goodpaster offers the following binary analysis: *Which beings deserve consideration from a logical or intuitive perspective, and which must be treated with consideration as a matter of ethical fact?* In so doing, he illuminates a crucial point that assigning moral relevance based on normative substance has been invalidated historically. Shameful examples include the meta-moral disenfranchisement of women, people of color, even children. Thus, it is unclear whether humans will ever be capable of unbiased moral analysis due to historical context and conditioning.

Fourth, Goodpaster analyzes what ethics are realistic and even legally enforceable considering one's thresholds and limitations. For instance, one may consider all life forms morally considerable, but one still must harm in order to eat. At the end of this section, Goodpaster restates his argument from section one: that the condition of being alive is sufficient reason for consideration regardless of 'rights' that are acknowledged.

Section III: Criteria and Consideration – pp. 314-317

Goodpaster further dissects the notion and necessity of applying criteria to gain moral consideration in Section III. Beginning with the Kantian proposal of reserving moral consideration for rational - or potentially rational - beings, Goodpaster references Warnock in refuting this principle stating that this would exempt infants, for instance, from moral consideration. Next Goodpaster considers other criteria proposed by Warnock and backed by philosophers Frankena and Singer such as sentience, capacity to suffer, or the ability to receive beneficent action. Goodpaster also refutes these criteria as arbitrary and morally insufficient. Sentience, for instance, seems to be an evolved trait. As such, if any being could potentially be sentient, it may be morally imperative to behave beneficently toward any living creature enabling it to reach its full evolutionary potential. Furthermore, requiring proof – with our limited human capabilities of perception – that a being can suffer, or is thankful for being treated with consideration hardly seems adequate. As Goodpaster notes: just because a leaf cannot vocally object or try out in pain – is that any reason to pull it from a tree? Overall, Goodpaster finds the demand to determine and define criteria in order to elicit appropriate, respectful action unnecessary and potentially dangerous. If a being does not fit given criteria, it may excuse wanton treatment toward that being.

Section IV: Interest Principle and Life Principle – pp. 317-320

Here, Goodpaster considers Feinberg's 'interest principle' which Feinberg deems as a prerequisite for moral consideration. According to Feinberg, beings who satisfy the 'interest principle' can be represented, are capable of being harmed and benefited and have a good of their own. Contending that they do not have interests or a good of their own, Feinberg uses plants as living creatures which do not fit the interest principle. Feinberg does acknowledge that plants might be considered – particularly from a human-centered view – that their flourishing or destruction may correspond with similar human experiences who depend on plants to live. However, Goodpaster notes Feinberg's contradicting statements on plants, that they are 'mindless creatures' and 'not mere things.' Also, Feinberg does note the capacity for plants to thrive as well as wither and die. As such, it seems clear that Feinberg recognizes plant's natural tendency to grow, and the potential for plant and human interests to conflict in the case of a human cutting down a tree to pave a lot, or an 'undesirable' weed flourishing to seed. With that considered, Goodpaster calls for different criteria to establish the interest principle or to distinguish beings who have interests from those who do not. Better yet, an expansion of the 'interest principle' to a 'life principle' which acknowledges that to live is to have interests would be ideal.

Section V: Hedonism – pp. 320-322

Goodpaster discusses the concept of hedonism, or the pursuit of pleasure, and how it connects to cultural perceptions of sentience and capabilities for moral consideration. If a culture believes experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain is the ultimate motivation, then beings with similar capacity to demonstrate pleasure and intolerance of discomfort will be most readily considered. Moreover, cultures which highly value pleasure will prioritize and rationalize hedonistic pursuits and technologies which maximize pleasure, and leisure while minimizing discomfort and inconvenience regardless of the cost. Insensitivity or outright hostility will be directed towards any entity that obstructs hedonistic pursuits.

Section VI: Objections and Responses – pp. 322-325

Here, Goodpaster notes certain objections like dismissing the 'life principle' as romantic; extreme offense that considerability for plant life could ever be equated to animal life; and legally enforcing interest satisfaction of seemingly non-sentient beings. In response, Goodpaster reinforces his previous arguments. He advocates for releasing the preoccupation with enforceable criteria and depending upon a life principle instead: if a being is alive, its wellbeing should be considered regardless of legal consequences, or non-adherence to philosophical categories. Returning to the example of pulling leaves off a tree – just because there are not legal repercussions, or a being does not perceptibly object, does not license a person to behave mindlessly. In other words, it should not depend on the ruling of an attorney general to enforce a person watering a dry lawn. Finally, certain thresholds – such as the need to eat which necessitates harm – does not excuse wanton behavior. Given the reality of one's circumstances, one can endeavor to do as little harm as possible and be conscious and respectful of any suffering brought by one's needs.

In closing, Goodpaster reinforces his pervasive intention: to rely on one's ability to recognize life in another being and consider that life regardless of how it fits within any arbitrary criteria. It is possible to behave mindfully within the scope of one's circumstances and to avoid interference and harm to the best of one's ability. . . ✓

GRUBB, MICHAEL,

'The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets',

International Affairs (London), 66 (1990), 67-89, in CrossRef
<<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2622190>>

✓
↑
V. well
presented -
accurate, &
in-depth.
But a critique
is needed.

Abstract and Introduction – pg. 67

Grubb begins with the startling fact that global temperatures are on target to be hotter than any time in 120,000 years. He questions how our population is to limit the energy use causing this crisis when the developing world is pressured to industrialize faster than ever. Through his paper, Grubb intends to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of certain solutions – such as limiting emissions based on per-nation targets – while advocating for tradable carbon emission permits as the only viable solution. Finally, he intends to show alternative courses of action if no agreement can be reached.

Grubb's paper came at a time of increasing alarm over the environment and rising heat. The 1980s contained 7 years of the warmest weather on record and in response to this concern Intergovernmental Panels on Climate Change were established in 1988 – the first and largest initiative of its kind.

The first step in addressing a complex problem... - pp. 68-71

Grubb states the facts and projections of carbon dioxide emissions and the corresponding environmental impacts to showcase 'the greenhouse problem.' In the 1980s emissions were 20-25% above pre-industrial levels and were projected to rise another 40-70% in the middle of our current century causing dangerous and erratic weather and species loss. Strongly rejecting apathy or inaction, Grubb acknowledges the extreme difficulty of inspiring cooperation and beneficial action due to presumed costs politically and economically. Fueling this problem are scientific complexities – such as the type of gasses. Warming is created by a combination of gasses which both accelerate warming and impede the ability to find appropriate solutions. As such, Grubb recommends a general framework convention to initiate addressing the enormity of the problem prior to beginning negotiations. Grubb shows this approach is preceded by reviewing similar conventions like the United Nations Environment Programme (1985), the Vienna Convention of the Protection of the Ozone layer, and CFC Emissions Control Protocol determined in Montreal. In addition to outlining the warming problem, the initial conference should also address current political and economic challenges, inequity and responsibility between developed and developing nations, and inconsistent scientific data with widely varying projections of emissions. An understanding of the enormity and complexity of the problem is imperative before any protocols can be negotiated.

Approaches for limiting emissions

Country-specific target reductions – pp. 71-76

First, Grubb explores the possibility of setting targets based on each nation's prior usage following the approach of conferences in Toronto, Hamburg, Montreal and Helsinki to limit the use of CFCs. However, the successful outcome from the CFC-limiting negotiations differs from limiting fossil fuel emissions in three important ways: if involved a much smaller group of nations within the same economic group, the cost was relatively small and finally, many industries would benefit. In the case of fossil-fuel emissions, every nation is involved, the cost and inequity is immense, and many nations may stand to feel harmed or punished rather than benefited through appropriate action.

Even in the relatively favorable setting of the CFC conference negotiations, it still took five years of twice-weekly negotiations for solutions to be reached. One can expect much longer, more intense and challenging negotiations to address the complexities of fossil fuel reduction. At the root of these complexities is supporting basic needs for an ever-expanding population while simultaneously meeting and competing with the ever-increasing standard of living normalized by Western industrialized nations. As such, there are two measurements which could be used for fossil-fuel emissions targets – per capita (or per person) and per unit GNP (or Gross National Product) – with wildly different outcomes. For instance, if China and India matched their per capita usage to that of the United States, emissions would skyrocket catastrophically; however, if nations matched per GNP emissions of Japan, world-wide emissions would be reduced three-fold. Given this, it may sound logical to base targets off of GNP, however this measurement does not account for the reality of economic disparity. In order to import and use energy-efficient resources and technology, purchasing power is required. As such, many developing nations feel pressured to use environmentally catastrophic methods – like China's plan to increase carbon emissions 50% by 2020 at the time of this paper – to acquire purchasing power which would enable other investments – including energy-efficient technology.

Further complicating per-nation targets are other factors both known and unknown such as: native energy reserves (some nations have little to no native energy source requiring import), changing populations, technologies, shifting political situations, and ability to enforce – which might negate any agreements reached. All things considered, per-nation targets are unlikely to be an equitable or useful solution according to Grubb.

Inequity – pp. 77-79

As briefly reviewed, historic inequities have greatly exacerbated the warming problem by shifting the perception of appropriate, or desired, standards of living in some

nations resulting in inequitable use of the global common's resources – such as the atmosphere, and oceans. If a neutral entitlement system were adopted to enforce equitable use of the shared global commons, it would require wealthy nations – who have grown wealthy from overconsumption – to relinquish control, privileges and conveniences to global evaluation and determination. As many of these privileges and conveniences are now conflated with basic need, this relinquishment has been extremely unpopular. Instead, wealthy nations rely on purchasing power built through past exploitative use to buy control and advantage from and over developing nations in order to maintain and advance the same standard of living. To push back against this colonial power dynamic, developing countries rely on older, cheaper, more damaging methods of energy production to amass their own purchasing power both advancing the living standards for their own citizens while competing with industrialized nations who used the same methods in generations past.

Grubb predicts there is more to be gained through cooperation than through current dynamics of control and competition. Technical transfer, in which wealthy nations use their purchasing power to help developing nations invest in the latest emissions-reducing technologies would help these nations 'leapfrog' over outdated, emissions-heavy methods which are catastrophic for all. Beyond the relief from damaging emissions, industrialized nations would benefit from such a transfer through fuller employment due to stronger export markets bolstered by the resulting technical monopoly.

Solution Two: A Carbon Tax – pp. 79-81

A carbon tax would add prohibitive costs of varying degrees to emission-producing fuels to reduce purchase and consumption. A small tax was proposed in 1989 by the European Commission raising the price of coal by one percent. Profit margins would remain intact, however the resulting 0.2% difference between coal and oil was too small to prohibit coal purchase. Another type of carbon tax could be implemented at the national level – bypassing global agreements – and potentially replacing other taxes such as income tax. However, a minimum increase of 50% would be required to make it substantially prohibitive. Such a drastic increase and the certain political pushback would require incremental implementation over a long timeframe. A third alternative would be an international carbon tax accruing the resulting revenues in a global fund. However, the massive amount collected – estimated to be \$100 billion (100 times the budget of the UN) – would instigate political controversy over its management and dispersal. Although global fundraising to combat a global problem is logical and beneficial, the current political reality of pursuing such a measure is unlikely.

Unfortunately, the conundrum stands that what is practical is insignificant, and what is significant is not practical.

The best solution: tradable carbon emission permits – pp. 81-86

Here, Grubb advocates for leased permits which might be traded globally between nations based on a nation's population and needs. Grubb outlines the vulnerabilities in this plan, but ultimately concludes this system would allow for a balance between global equity and national empowerment; it also allows for investment in energy-efficient technologies which are needed in developing nations. As the atmosphere is a global commons – meaning each human should have equitable access to this resource, it makes sense that one should pay specifically for what one uses. So, Grubb suggests permits per-capita, as opposed to per-GNP, as the only equitable solution.

Among the vulnerabilities noted would be the hoarding of permits by wealthy nations, and an unfettered economic and power transfer to less developed nations. If this occurred, there would be little to no incentive for industrial nations to cut emissions, and unrestricted cash could be used for arms or consumer imports that both exacerbate political instability and exacerbate the warming problem. There is additional concern that permits issued per-capita would incentivize population growth as having additional children would garner families additional permits.

Grubb mitigates the final concern by suggesting that the minimum qualifying age for entitlements be set for the age of 21. As such, families would not benefit by having more children under their roofs. The vulnerabilities stemming from inequity could be tackled via international oversight: an international fund established to collect fines for infractions, ensuring that permits are only leased but never sold, and mandating permits can only be exchanged for energy efficient technology and infrastructure assistance – but never as unrestricted cash. However, this mitigation comes with another kind of vulnerability as international enforcements have rarely been upheld in the past. Even so, there must be an incentive to garner co-operation to discourage nations benefiting from the actions of many while doing nothing themselves. Thus, Grubb proposes a carbon tax ring for non-compliant nations. This would place an import tax on the product equaling the cost of emissions for its creation. To implement this kind of global cooperative effort would require a return to the visionary and internationalist outlook of the postwar era, although Grubb predicts this to be unlikely. Even so, Grubb still confirms that leasing carbon permits per capita in exchange for technology and development assistance is not only significant but equitable in that the polluter pays the direct cost of exploiting the atmospheric resource.

What happens if there is no global agreement? – pp. 86-88

Grubb advocates that collective regional action between nations of similar economic and cultural perspective should be pursued as it could be quite impactful and negotiations more feasible. Even if regional action is not possible, a nation acting individually is strongly advisable. Often, nations perceive that singular action means overwhelming cost that they will unjustly bear alone; however, Grubb contests this by stating that action is not necessarily prohibitively costly and could even stand to benefit a nation's overall economy.

Difficulties may be faced when individual or regional representatives attempt to integrate agreements at a global level; however, regional impactful action cannot be underestimated. Action at an individual or region level could set the precedent for other nations to follow and a small number of nations could make a huge difference. For instance, action by just three nations: China, the US and (at the time of this paper) the Soviet Union would mitigate over half of global emissions. If similar regional action occurred within the European Commission and Eastern Europe, 70% of emissions could be reduced. Framing the environmental issues are of utmost importance to inspire regional action. If environmental problems were labeled, quite rightly, as security problems by the UN Security Council – of which all mentioned nations are involved – it would collectively and politically acknowledge that environmental problems are everybody's business. International action is eventually necessary – however – delaying individual or regional action until there is international consensus is not an option.

Grubb's Closing Remarks – pp. 88-89

Grubb again acknowledges the rising environmental problems, public concern and the need for action that set the intention for this paper. Of the explored solutions, he advocates for a system of leasable carbon permits as the most impactful, feasible and equitable to implement. Although many may find such a situation to be 'utopian' or unrealistic, Grubb argues that the crisis in which we find ourselves demands a transformed attitude. Inaction is catastrophic; as such, it is imperative for nations to act regionally – or even individually – while progressively looking for avenues to act collectively at a global level. Although there is no time to waste, Grubb cautions that jumping straight to negotiations without thorough education will only amount to practical, yet meaningless action as explored earlier. Instead, immediate action must be directed at maximizing understanding, researching cost-effective methods to reduce emissions, and creatively analyzing how impactful agreements might manifest. Grubb predicts this first phase of education and collaborative creative problem solving might enable subsequent collective negotiations.

ROUTLEY, RICHARD,

'Is there A Need for A New, an Environmental Ethic?'

*in Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy Vol. 1,
(Varna, Bulgaria: Sofia Press, 1973), pp. 205-210*

Introduction – pg. 205

At the beginning of his 1973 paper 'Is there a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?' Richard Routley states that many are calling for a new ethic to address how humankind engages with the natural world. This action is meant to evolve human's existing permissiveness and careless behaviors toward the natural world. Illustrating this, Routley offers an example of a farmer who severely degrades his land polluting the surrounding ecosystem. Under current ethical standards, the farmer would still be respected and the harm he does never admonished nor reconciled. Under a new environmental ethic, this kind of harm would be unacceptable.

Ethical systems and the freedom principle – pp. 205-207

Routley states it might be possible to build upon elements of existing ethics to create an appropriate environmental ethic but that it would prove difficult. Western ethical systems tend to be undefined, conflicting or utterly contrary to an environmental ethic. Referencing philosopher John Passmore, Routley defines the 3 main types of western ethics: **Despotic** – the dominant ethic – with man as tyrant over nature; **Stewardship** – with humans as custodians of nature; and **Co-operative** – humans as perfectors of nature. Primitivism, romanticism and mysticism have also influenced Western value system, but to a lesser extent according to Routley. Routley considers the liberal and human chauvinistic attitudes inspired by despotism to be indicative of a 'freedom principle' meaning humans may do whatever they like as long as another – specifically human other – is not irrevocably harmed. Returning to the example of the farmer polluting his ecosystem: the farmer's actions would only be found immoral under the freedom principle if other humans are directly harmed by the pollution but not by the act of pollution itself.

A thought experiment – pp. 207-208

Routley introduces a thought experiment – *The Last Man* – with several variations. The premise of the thought experiment is to determine whether the last man on earth does wrong (or harm) if he wantonly destroys all other life on the planet. This challenges the reader to critically analyze if life inherently has value when there are no humans to value it. Routley does not comment on the state of mind, sanity or deontology of the last man in the original example – but does state that the last man conducts the

extermination in conditions similar to operations at the best of abattoirs. Expanding the experiment, he modifies the original scenario accordingly: a last – or alien – people exterminate Earth's natural systems to create artificially 'perfected' ones; a 'great entrepreneur' who exterminates in the short term to advance gross domestic product and create technologies intended to enhance quality of life in the long term; a vanishing species – such as the blue whale – which is intentionally sacrificed to enable and encourage commerce and profits rendered from its saleable parts. Routley comments that such actions under a human chauvinistic ethic would be permissible – even lauded in the case of the entrepreneur or whalers who take action for economic gain – but would be abhorrent under an environmental ethic.

The importance of thought experiments – pp. 208-210

As analogies to real-life practices of industrialized nations – such as pushing indigenous peoples off their land to extract the resources – these thought experiments push the readers to conclude that if the circumstances outlined in the examples are unacceptable, then so are real-life industrial practices. As such, Routley advocates that environmental ethics goes beyond the study of pollution or conservation, but to a broader, deeper exploration of ideals, values, and rights. He draws a historical parallel by suggesting that this reckoning and recalibration of values will match the reckoning that took place when slavery was abolished. Routley contends that if appropriate obligations and prohibitions are enacted that individual morality will relate and correspond.

