CONCLUSION

The history of China's proletarian patrols is the tale of an institution transformed. Worker militias, from their inception in strikes and armed uprisings to their incorporation as an instrument of state domination, exemplify a growing separation between origins and outcomes over the course of a revolution and its aftermath. The precipitants of this institutional inversion were various: conflicting motives between partisan leaders and their rank and file followers, imitation and infiltration of enemy organizations by rival political entrepreneurs, adaptation and absorption of revolutionary initiatives by state authorities, and competition among government agents and agencies. But the transformation was also anticipated in foundational debates and decisions about the relationship between revolutionary citizenship and state-building. Marx and Lenin, in advancing the idea of proletarian dictatorship, prepared the way for worker militias to serve not only as a means of state-breaking, but also as agents of state-making. And Mao and his comrades furthered this process by encouraging worker militias to wage class struggle against counterrevolutionaries long after a Communist regime had been installed.

The definition of the revolutionary citizen was never unproblematic, either during the revolutionary conflict or after. From the beginning, cadres disagreed over whether to extend the boundaries of a proletariat beyond gainfully employed members of the industrial labor force in order to include marginal elements. With rank and file workers often reluctant to enlist in militia activity, especially at times when militia service was a high-risk proposition, the question of how

wide to cast the net of proletarian membership was at key historical turning points a vital concern to revolutionary leaders. When the socialization of industry destroyed the property basis for distinguishing between proletariat and capitalist, alternative means of delimiting class—such as caste or creed—were devised to fill the breach. Defining the proletariat was not simply an exercise in organizational pragmatism, however; it also had profound political and personal implications. Mao's calls for continuing the class struggle meant that one's class designation could be tantamount to a life or death sentence.

At least as controversial as the composition of the proletarian patrols were the purposes to which this revolutionary institution would be put. China's first Leninist party-state, the KMT, effected a dramatic role reversal in turning its worker militias, previously developed under Comintern guidance, into a medium of state control. An institution whose beginnings lay in a (misinterpreted) Paris Commune model of proletarian insurrection was now deployed as a means of *preventing* just such an eventuality. Although underground CCP labor organizers from the late 1920s through the 1940s dreamed of reclaiming the revolutionary potential of the worker militias by staging urban uprisings, Communist Party Central decreed a more restrained approach. Having relied upon rural militias, under military command, to consolidate their control of base areas in the countryside, the Chinese Communists—like their KMT rivals—appreciated the value of such institutions to the state-building project. Proletarian patrols would be used to protect factory property, allowing the PRC to inherit the economic infrastructure of its predecessor. Under the new socialist regime, worker militias continued—first under union and then under PLA control—to serve as an appendage of state power. Not until the CR, when rebels resuscitated a radical conception of urban militias as vehicles for smashing the state machinery, did the inverted pattern devised by the KMT face a serious challenge. In the post-Mao era, the Chinese leadership has again taken measures to see that militia activities work to undergird, rather than to undermine, the Leninist party-state. How enduring their effort will prove remains uncertain, especially in the face of protests by aggrieved social elements who draw upon the revolutionary tradition to question state authority.

Institutional inversion is not peculiar to China, of course. Joyce Lee Malcolm, in her study of the origins of the Anglo-American right to keep and bear arms, shows how the English Civil War transformed the militia such that the new postwar institution "was not limited to the role of its predecessor . . . Rather, it was used as a police force whose primary function was the prevention of subversion . . . an instrument for surveillance and disarmament of its political enemies."[1] Not all institutional adaptation accrues to the advantage of the state, however. The history of militias in the United States illustrates the continuing challenges that private groups of citizens have mounted against government control. In the 1970s, for example, an influential right-wing militia known as the Posse Comitatus was founded by Bill Gale in California. A scholar of the movement remarks on the irony of this development, "While the historic role of a *posse comitatus* had been to *aid* civil authorities in suppressing violence and vigilantism, Bill Gale's revision stood this ancient practice on its head—his posse was devoted to promoting armed insurrection."[2] Gale cited constitutional sanction for his posse of armed citizens, a recourse that is unavailable to would-be insurgents in contemporary China—whose constitution stipulates no universal right to bear arms. Chinese have, however, periodically staked class-based claims to political power—as the Shanghai Militia did with considerable effect during the CR and as maverick worker pickets have done throughout the history of the PRC.

Militias have been an important element in revolutionary mobilization and state-building, and a significant site of state-society struggles, from eighteenth-century America and France to twentieth-century Russia, China, and Iran. When it comes to reshaping institutions, states enjoy obvious advantages vis-á-vis potential challengers among the citizenry. But the state (like society) is not a unitary actor. At each turning point in a revolution, some of those in authority cooperate with some elements of society to present opportunities for change. The ups and downs of militias reflect the pull of competing interpretations and agendas, as contenders tussle over the question of who will patrol the revolution—and for whose benefit. Moreover, militias themselves are often influential players in this process. At two critical junctures in modern Chinese history,

Chiang Kai-shek's coup of April 12, 1927, and Hua Guofeng's coup of October 6, 1976, fear of armed worker militias in Shanghai helped to trigger dramatic political reversals.

REVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORIES

Some analysts predict that the twenty-first century, thanks to a recent wave of democratization across much of the formerly colonized world, will witness a declining role for revolutions.[3] Others, highlighting growing inequalities between the haves and the have-nots, argue that revolutions are as, and perhaps even more, likely to erupt than before.[4] Whatever the future may hold, there is no doubt that revolutionary pasts continue to exert a profound influence on state-society relations in the many modern polities that grew out of such struggles.

Revolutions are protracted processes whose meanings are subject to frequent reinterpretation, and whose endpoints and outcomes are difficult to gauge. When asked by André Malraux to comment on the significance of the French Revolution, Zhou Enlai is said to have replied, "It's too soon to tell."[5] If nearly two centuries afforded insufficient hindsight for the Chinese Premier to pass judgment on the French Revolution, a definitive evaluation of his own revolution is surely premature. Yet, although revolutions are by their very nature works-in-progress, we can detect some important differences in how they develop.

Such variations in historical trajectory have prompted social scientists to propose a number of schema for distinguishing among types of revolutions, based upon differences in the prerevolutionary context.[6] Preexisting structures and cultures obviously do place enormous constraints on the prospects and patterns of radical political change. Yet a close reading of the unfolding of revolutionary events cannot help but impress an observer with the wide range of possibilities inherent in any particular revolutionary moment. It is not without reason that social scientists have proven so inept at forecasting revolutionary change.[7] For seasoned China hands in the spring of 1989 to have anticipated imminent regime collapse was no

less plausible than for their colleagues in the East European field to have assumed continued stability. Much depended upon heat-of-the-moment actions and reactions that might well have developed differently. Even so, the fact that events transpired as they did, and that participants (and observers) went on to assign a certain inevitability to these once uncertain junctures, imbues them with lasting influence.

This book has revisited turning points in the Chinese revolution, with the hope of resurrecting some sense of the unpredictability that once surrounded them. At the same time, in tracing the trajectory of an institution that (d)evolved from a tactic of popular protest into a tool of government repression, one is faced with an inescapable image of growing state power. Without question, the Chinese Revolution has over time proven kinder to the imperatives of the state than to the improvisations of society. The form of state-building that occurred was, however, hardly predictable from the constitution of the ancien regime. Thus the spotlight in this study has been trained less upon enduring structures than upon the making of the revolution itself. The claim is that the deliberations and declarations of revolutionary actors—particularly on the question of citizenship—exert enormous influence on subsequent developments. While all successful revolutions contribute ipso facto to state-building of one sort or another, they do so in distinctive ways that reflect alternative understandings of political participation and prerogative. Moreover, different designations of revolutionary citizenship open up (and close off) different avenues of opposition for those who would challenge the state's authority.

To assign revolutionary membership on the basis of class, community, creed, or any other criterion (regardless of how artificial, ambiguous, and arbitrary such categorizations may be) is at the same time to lay a foundation for state-society relations in the postrevolutionary era. The fateful choice of young Chinese radicals in the 1920s to adopt a Bolshevik model privileging the proletariat had implications that long outlived the 1949 divide. Like the Russians whose revolution they so admired, the Chinese Communists have grappled with the legacy of class struggle for generations. Yet they have done so in ways that depart significantly from their Soviet instructors. The differences between these two Communist societies, as

well as the even greater differences that separate them from the postrevolutionary democracies of France and the United States, or for that matter the undemocratic Islamic Republic of Iran, are closely connected to earlier determinations of revolutionary citizenship.

In each of these cases, moreover, militias provide an illuminating point of comparison. As an institution charged with patrolling the revolutionary ranks, citizen militias embody the particular principles of inclusion and exclusion upon which alternative revolutionary edifices are constructed. After the new state is established, these forces are usually assigned special responsibility for defending the purity of the revolution. But militias are seldom docile tools of the regime. Composed of people for whom soldiering is not a full-time occupation, such groups are subject to the pull of competing agendas. By putting weapons in the hands of ordinary citizens, militias create a powerful source of potential opposition to state control. To compare the histories of these various institutions, therefore, is to explore the dynamics of state-society relations in different national settings. Although not all revolutionary militias endure, their fate—whether long or short—tells us much about the larger political processes of which they are an integral part.[8]

Community-Based Citizenship

The American and French revolutions generated the modern understanding of citizenship as a reciprocal relationship between state and compatriot, marked by rights as well as obligations. More specifically, these two revolutions—drawing explicitly upon classical Greco-Roman political theory—considered a citizen to be anyone who resided within the community over which the state claimed jurisdiction. When citizenship is delimited this way, in theory all inhabitants are equally subject to its duties and benefits. In actuality, of course, community-based citizenship has often been severely narrowed by requirements of property, ethnicity, sex, age, or education.[9] Yet the official declaration of universal membership does afford everyone living within a polity's territorial borders a legitimate claim to full inclusion.[10] Less clear in this variety of citizenship is the *level* of community at which the rights and obligations of citizenship should take effect; the boundaries between neighborhood and nation

become as contentious as they are contiguous. Tocqueville's keen observations about the contrasting polities (populist versus statist) that were taking shape in postrevolutionary America and France[11] point to basic differences in the institutionalization of community-based citizenship in the two countries. The histories of their militias exemplify these differences.

American Militias

The celebration of the citizen-soldier and a suspicion of military professionalism were strong currents in the political thought of colonial America.[12] Whereas standing armies were typically depicted as agents of tyranny, local militias were praised as guarantors of political freedom.[13] America's colonial militias drew upon traditional English practice, which had limited militiamen's service to short stints (usually three months) in their home districts.[14] The American transplants were composed of able-bodied freemen all residing within a county, each of whom was expected to arm himself, to train regularly under a local officer, and to respond at any time to a call for action in defense of his own community.[15] Early triggers of militia operations were Indian raids and slave rebellions, but by 1775 the colonial militias had redirected their energies against the British.[16]

Although the eighteenth-century colonial militias were often decried (especially by advocates of the Continental Army) as untrained, undisciplined, and unreliable, their operations were critical to the course of the American Revolution.[17] Indeed, the mobilization of the Massachusetts Minutemen and other local militias initially *was* the revolution:

> Put another way, the decision to mobilize the militia in 1774 and 1775 was predicated on the reason for mobilization itself. The call to arms was not intended to win political independence. It was designed to reestablish the constitutional balance that had historically guaranteed political and civil liberties in a free society. Informed by perceptions of constitutional order and stability passed down to the colonists by popularizers of radical Whig theory, Americans turned to the one institution that had historically been linked with the preservation of civil liberties and constitutional balance: the militia.[18]

The contribution of militias to the American Revolution imbued a lasting respect for volunteer military service, recruited from and answerable to local communities. While the adoption of the Constitution and George Washington's assumption of the presidency ensured that the new country would have a permanent national military force, the Federalists failed to gain control over the militias.[19] The passage of the Second Amendment in 1791 represented an anti-Federalist move to provide constitutional protection for a state-based militia system. The following year, the Uniform Militia Act—despite its name—repudiated the formation of a national militia in favor of continued state control.[20]

A key ingredient in Thomas Jefferson's presidential victory of 1800 was a widespread preference among the electorate for a republican concept of defense—the citizen militia—over the military professionalism advocated by the Federalists.[21] Jefferson's stirring call to arms resonated among a people who valued their militias as a check on tyranny: "No free man shall ever be debarred the use of arms. The strongest reason for the people to retain the right to keep and bear arms is, as a last resort, to protect themselves against tyranny in government."[22] For Jefferson, periodic armed rebellion was essential in sustaining democratic freedoms: "What country can preserve its liberties if the rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take up arms . . . The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure."[23] In his inaugural address, Jefferson praised the militia as one of the "essential principles of our government."[24]

The American Civil War, in which volunteers provided the bulk of military recruits, further ennobled the image of the citizen soldier.[25] Following the Civil War, nearly all states encouraged the formation of volunteer uniformed local companies—which came to be known collectively as the National Guard.[26] Although the decision of state governments to provide permanent financing marked a significant departure from past militia practices, the establishment of the guard also reflected a continuation of certain longstanding traditions:

> [T]he National Guard represented an evolutionary development rather than a new state institution created to meet the circumstances of late-nineteenth-century America. The post–Civil War Guard retained the antebellum volunteer, uniformed militia's predilection for local control, especially the election of its officers and its enthusiasm for nonmilitary activities. Deeply enmeshed in local communities, National Guard units long resisted outside efforts to regulate them, as had their forebears.[27]

Presenting itself as the institutional embodiment of the citizen soldier, the National Guard acquired a permanency never before seen in the American militia.

The states, which now made a substantial financial and administrative commitment to the National Guard, assigned it a wide range of domestic responsibilities. As William Riker has shown, the rise of the National Guard paralleled a growing wave of civil disorder in late-nineteenth-century America.[28] Throughout this period, guardsmen were deployed repeatedly as strikebreakers in numerous industrial conflicts. Although the twentieth century saw a gradual decline in labor dispute interventions, the guard was frequently called upon to quell urban riots and antiwar protests. One of the most notorious of such confrontations occurred at Kent State University on May 4, 1970, when four student protesters were killed by poorly disciplined guardsmen.[29] At the same time that these changes in its operations were taking place, the National Guard became increasingly subject to federal, rather than state, direction. The Spanish-American War of 1898 marked the last time that the states exercised control over the mobilization of the U.S. National Guard. Five years later, the Militia Act traded state autonomy in exchange for federal funding.[30]

The federal government's incorporation of the National Guard did not settle the militia question for many Americans, however. The Second Amendment, which guarantees a citizen's right to keep and bear arms on grounds that "a well regulated militia" is "necessary to the security of a free state," continued to inspire a wide range of private militia operations. Over the years, many a maverick militia outfit has cited this constitutional provision as justification for its existence. In the nineteenth century, volunteer armed posses were formed to control unruly workers, intimidate abolitionists—or, conversely, to thwart enforcement of the fugitive slave law.[31] And the late twentieth century saw a major resurgence of independent militia organizing that continues to this day.[32]

Contemporary militias in the United States insist that their existence conforms with the principles of the American Revolution.[33] As one observer puts it, militia members see themselves as "a modern-day replica of the Revolutionary Era minutemen."[34] A member of the North Carolina Citizens Militia announces proudly, "The men who fought the American Revolution are *our* forefathers and *we* are their children."[35] The right to bear arms in defense of one's freedom is seen by these groups as the central cause and lasting legacy of the American Revolution: "the primary trigger for the revolution was the same as it is today: you don't mess with a free man's right to keep and bear arms."[36] In the eyes of their constituents, militias stand as guardians of local community against an oppressive federal government. The literature produced by these groups makes frequent reference to an eighteenth-century republican ideology that saw the armed citizenry as a people's best protection against despotism. Thomas Jefferson's call to arms is quoted with particular favor.[37]

The contemporary militia movement got underway in 1961 when Robert DePugh, a member of the right-wing John Birch Society, founded a new "Minutemen" organization in California. Aided by the anxious atmosphere of the cold war, DePugh's initiative spread rapidly to many other states. The Minutemen popularized the idea that the Second Amendment permitted local groups of Americans to take up arms against a global Communist conspiracy. Fear of Chinese and Russian incursions runs through the history of the contemporary American militia movement. DePugh's rationale for founding the Minutemen was to provide community protection against what he claimed was a massive gathering of Chinese Communists just south of the Mexican border, poised for attack![38] More recently, the Idaho-based United States Militia Association, established in 1994, issued a brochure warning that American gun owners would soon be disarmed by Chinese police.[39] In 1995, four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Michigan Militia plotted to bomb the Camp Grayling National Guard base, claiming that Soviet tanks had gathered there for an attack on American citizens.[40] Believing that the federal government was unwilling to protect local communities against a growing international threat (in some versions because U.S. authorities were actually in cahoots with the enemy), militia members moved in to fill the breach. The end of the cold war brought no slowdown to this trend.

A leader of the Missouri 51st Militia—named for the fifty-one-day siege of the Branch Davidians at Waco, Texas, in 1993—when asked by a British researcher to define a militia, answered this way: "It's an armed citizen who's willing to stand up for his community . . . Now if we named our organization anything other than a militia then we probably wouldn't be legal. And that goes back to what our forefathers did in the early making of this country—they did it with a militia group." He went on to say, "We hear things all the time and it's pretty amazing. We hear that 'Chinese militia were accused of killing people in Tiananmen Square.' But there's *no* militia in China. There couldn't be because a militia is an armed citizen."[41]

While the answer of the Missouri militiaman betrays a parochial understanding of the meanings of citizenship, it also highlights the continuing connection between founding revolutionary myths and contemporary political discourse. The question of what constitutes the relevant community to which the armed citizen owes utmost allegiance—neighborhood, state, or nation—remains a live issue for many Americans. A leader of the Texas Constitutional Militia explains, "The militia, like citizenship, is fundamentally local . . . We are first and foremost citizens of our local community."[42] A spokesman for the Missouri 51st Militia elaborates, "Your county government should have far more influence on your daily life than your state. Your state should have more than the federal [government]. I mean it's tiered like that, and that way you can decide if you want to live under [particular] laws."[43] The fact that Americans enjoy easy access to firearms, thanks to their Second Amendment right to a "well regulated militia," renders this debate over the parameters of citizenship of far more than academic concern.[44]

The French National Guard

In France, like America, revolutionary militias were rooted in the ideal of local community. A recent generation of scholarship on the French Revolution, rejecting the analysis presented in Marx's *Civil War in France*, has largely retreated from previous class-based explanations.[45] The popular uprisings of 1789, 1848, and

1871, scholars have established, were admixtures of various social elements whose political orientations did not reflect clear or consistent class interests.[46] The example of the American revolution, and in particular its revival of classical republican ideals of citizenship, exerted considerable influence upon the French a decade later. Notions of community, more than of class, inspired popular participation in the revolutionary militias that emerged from these struggles. And yet the outcome of battles over the meaning of community-based citizenship would bequeath to the French a configuration of state-society relations very different from that of their American counterparts.

The *sans-culottes*, an ad hoc militia of master craftsmen, shopkeepers, small merchants, domestic servants, and other Parisian petty-urbanites, were arguably the most important popular force at the beginning of the French Revolution. As their heterogeneous social composition suggests, the *sans-culottes* reflected neither a purely bourgeois nor a purely proletarian point of view. Nevertheless, they did espouse a radically democratic political position that championed autonomous local assemblies (which came to be known as "revolutionary committees") as the means of popular representation. Marching through the streets of Paris, wearing their trademark red caps and carrying pikes for weapons, the *sans-culottes* saw armed insurrection as a legitimate expression of popular sovereignty. Important as they were in the early years of the revolution, however, they faded with the collapse of the Terror in 1794—a mere five years after mounting the historical stage.[47]

A more enduring volunteer citizens' militia, known as the National Guard, grew out of the taking of the Bastille in 1789 and lasted until the demise of the Paris Commune in 1871. The history of France's National Guard is thus coterminous with a century of revolutionary conflict in that country. Historian Francois Furet describes the dramatic genesis of this important institution:

> A new power emerged from the shadows, which had been prepared by the notables of the electoral districts in the spring: this "permanent Committee," whose first measure was to organize a volunteer militia, wanted both to encourage and to control the insurrection. During the night of 13–14 July all Paris—illuminated by the order of the Committee—could hear the first patrols of the new social order on the move. The National Guard was born.[48]

To simultaneously "encourage and control" an insurrection would prove to be a tall order, whether in 1789 or at subsequent revolutionary moments. Nearly a century later, Karl Marx celebrated the National Guard as an "institution of working men" that empowered the Paris Commune. But the Parisian National Guard was far from a faithful steward of the working class in either composition or commitment. From the beginning, in fact, the National Guard was a decidedly bourgeois operation. As J. G. A. Pocock has noted, in eighteenth-century France the term *bourgeois* denoted "membership in a municipal—rather than an imperial or political—community . . . and the words 'bourgeois' and 'citizen' were used interchangeably."[49]

The first commander of the Paris National Guard—that aristocratic young veteran of the American Revolution, the Marquis de Lafayette—selected his troops on the basis of residential and property qualifications, and charged them with a dual mission: to promote political liberty and to prevent mob rule. Despite the fame of its commander, the guard immediately revealed a mind of its own. Less than three months after the taking of the Bastille, fifteen thousand members of the National Guard marched on Versailles to demand that the king be forcibly brought back to Paris to capitulate. Lafayette, who had rushed to protect the royal family, had no choice but to bow to the will of his guardsmen in order to avoid assassination at their hands. Despite an oath of loyalty that Lafayette had imposed upon his men, obedience was impossible to enforce.

In the months and years that followed, the National Guard—which soon had enrolled hundreds of thousands of members in the provinces to augment its thirty thousand members in Paris—played a pivotal part in a series of critical events.[50] Their challenge in sustaining the spirit of 1789 remained twofold, defending the revolution against the dangers of either monarchical restoration or mob rule. Their political sympathies proved fickle, reflecting the contradictions that surrounded their origins. On the one hand, the guard had been forged in the heat of the revolutionary moment and saw itself as a popular militia that embodied the general will. On the other hand,

members of the guard were economically and socially removed from the urban masses they purported to represent.[51] Required to pay for their own uniforms, arms, and ammunition, guardsmen were drawn from propertied families. Not surprisingly, they were susceptible to divided loyalties in performing the difficult task of maintaining public order in a revolutionary situation.

When a crowd gathered in the streets of Paris on July 17, 1791, to demand immediate punishment for the king, the National Guard—this time obeying orders from Lafayette—fired into the gathering of fifty thousand unarmed demonstrators. This shocking incident was the initial indication of an uneven process of institutional inversion whereby former state-breakers were becoming future (albeit fitful) state-makers: "For the first time, the authorities who had emerged from the Revolution did what they had not dared to do against the peasants in August 1789, or against Paris in October; they turned against the 'people', on the side of the king. They had booked their places on the morrow's scaffold."[52]

The National Guard's act of mass repression opened the door for Robespierre and the Jacobins to seize control and launch the Terror. Lafayette, relieved of his commission by the new authorities in Paris, spent the next five years in an Austrian prison. His once proud National Guard was now "confused, divided, and uncertainly led, concerned more with protecting its neighborhood of Paris from violence against property and persons than with the outcome of a political struggle."[53]

Under the Terror, the nascent French state attempted to sideline the National Guard. The ascendancy of the radical Montagnards and Jacobins led, ironically enough, to a restoration and regeneration of the prerevolutionary standing army. Through the *levée en masse*, which proclaimed all Frenchmen in permanent requisition for military service, the bourgeois National Guard was overshadowed by a growing peasant army rooted in prerevolutionary precedents. Theda Skocpol describes the process by which the radicals established the military arm of their new regime:

> The Montagnards did not start from scratch. Nor did they scrap the regular armies and simply replace them with armed volunteers, organized into self-governing units as the early revolutionary militias had been . . . During 1793–4, the Montagnards amalgamated volunteer units and newly mobilized citizen soldiers with the existing line units of the standing armies . . . To be sure, the armies were vastly expanded and infused with new patriotic élan . . . But these troops were—for all their political awareness and involvement—incorporated into the framework of line armies that had not completely dissolved in 1789–92. Despite transformations, they had survived to serve as the basis for revolutionary state-building."[54]

The Terror was a gruesome expression of state-building that reflected life-and-death struggles over the boundaries of citizenship. Under the Jacobins, obsessive fear of a conspiracy that would reverse the course of the revolution spread through the political elite.[55] The result was state-sponsored violence intended to purge the body politic of its enemies: "The Terror was a regime where men in power designated those who were to be excluded in order to purify the body of the nation . . . But the political culture which could lead to the Terror was present in the French Revolution right from the summer of 1789."[56] The Terror ended only with the round-up of Jacobins in July 1794. That task was accomplished by a hastily reassembled National Guard, recruited from the richer quarters of Paris, under the command of a former terrorist. Montagnard rule evaporated when Robespierre himself met the guillotine in 1794, but the reinvigorated standing army remained in place, providing the springboard for the rise to power of Napoleon Bonaparte. Under Napoleon, of course, the French National Army would expand exponentially in both size and strength.

Although eclipsed by the standing army, the National Guard continued to play an intermittent yet influential political role. In July 1830, a now elderly Lafayette resumed command of the National Guard to manage a revolutionary crowd. His reenactment of historical scenes had the air of a familiar stage play:

> It was because he had been commander of the National Guard in 1789 that the nervous leaders of the opposition thought his resumption of the office would be a prudent move. Lafayette duly donned his old uniform and with disingenuous modesty announced

in public that "a veteran may be of some service in our present grave crisis." When he arrived at the Hotel de Ville amidst a riotous crowd as commander of the National Guard, a well-meaning officer attempted to show him the route. "I know my way," he replied with heavy emphasis, "I have been here before."[57]

The 1830 Revolution was as dramatic as it was short-lived. In "Three Glorious Days" the Bourbons were driven out of France in a display of popular unity that evoked the storming of the Bastille forty years before. Another monarchy was soon installed, but it was nonetheless a much weakened one. Among the many institutions over which the July Monarchy was unable to exercise control was the National Guard; still confined to property holders, the guard suffered from lack of training and leadership, particularly after Lafayette's resignation that December. The throne's lack of support for the National Guard was soon repaid in kind. When the people of Paris took to the streets once again in February 1848, the National Guard (which at the time numbered fifty thousand in Paris alone) sided with the crowd against the crown. The defection of the guard sealed the fate of the Orleanist regime.

One of the first acts of the successor provisional government was a democratization of the National Guard that opened guard membership to all able-bodied males between the ages of twenty and fifty-five, regardless of property, and established elections for guard officers. The reforms were highly contentious, fueling a conservative backlash among older guard units.[58] In the insurrection that erupted in June of 1848, the National Guard—augmented by a new Mobile Guard (which, unlike the volunteer militia, was paid for its services)—"marched as one man against the uprising, whereas in February they had joined it."[59]

In the months leading up to the establishment of the 1871 Commune, the National Guard acted as a brake on revolution: "in Paris, the populace was far from unanimously following the activists in the clubs and committees; armed and formed into National Guards, the majority remained loyal to the government."[60] Only when threatened with forcible disarmament by Thiers and his troops at Versailles did the Parisian National Guard march on the Hotel de Ville once again—in the name of municipal autonomy. The result, in Furet's words, was "the last armed confrontation in French civil war; the last

scene in the Revolution."[61] Even at the moment of the National Guard's crowning glory (in the annals of Marxist historiography at least), "its general indiscipline and continued susceptibility to ideological rifts compromised its ability to defend the city against the Versailles forces and, in Bloody Week of May 1871, the National Guard was slaughtered and definitively removed from the historical stage."[62]

The demise of the National Guard was closely intertwined with the larger conflict of which it was a product. The French Revolution was marked from the outset by a clash between competing conceptions of community-based citizenship: small neighborhoods of free citizens (and their National Guard) versus a powerful and highly centralized nation-state (and its standing army). Simon Schama writes, "The fiction of the Revolution was to imagine that each might be served without damaging the other and its history amounts to the realization of that impossibility . . . Revolutionary France could not be, at the same time, a rejuvenated great European power and a confederation of forty thousand elected communes."[63] The bloody defeat of the Paris Commune shattered the republican dream of an unfettered citizenry, in charge of its own political affairs. Instead, the victory would go to overweening state institutions, ruling in the name of the people.

There is thus a double irony in Marx and Lenin's influential interpretation of the Commune. Not only was the Paris Commune essentially a community, rather than a class, struggle; instead of "breaking the bourgeois state machinery," its defiance of central authority actually facilitated the consolidation of an unprecedentedly powerful national state.

COMMUNITY VERSUS CLASS

Community-based citizenship, as both the American and French revolutions demonstrate, is no barrier to state-building. Nor is it any guarantee that state-sponsored militias will refrain from turning on their own people, as the histories of national guards from 1791 Paris to 1970 Kent State make painfully clear. Nevertheless, by defining citizenship in terms of community, a state acknowledges that all residents

within its territorial jurisdiction enjoy a right to political participation. This puts a potentially powerful weapon in the hands of the entire populace. If, by contrast, citizenship is defined in terms of class status, then only some classes are granted a legitimate claim to participate. And so long as class conflict is said to persist, the use of revolutionary violence by oppressed against oppressor classes remains justified. In this view, officially-sponsored militias are quite properly deployed as instruments of class struggle.

The privileging of community or class as the cornerstone of citizenship implies a fundamental difference in political philosophy and practice. Yet within each camp there are also important distinctions, as the divergent histories of the French and American militias make clear. More than two hundred years after their revolutionary beginnings, France and America differ notably in the degree to which the nation-state has overshadowed other bases of community participation and prerogative. A comparative study of labor relations in the two countries attributes France's far greater level of political centralization to the searing lesson of 1871: "Remembering the Paris Commune . . . French republicans abandoned their ideological commitment to local self-rule."[64]

If the army's suppression of the Commune in Bloody Week of May 1871 buried the libertarian-localist strain of the French Revolution, in the United States the debate was never so definitively resolved. And just as France and the United States demonstrate significant divergence within the general framework of community-based citizenship, so China and the USSR—despite a common allegiance to proletarian dictatorship based upon Marx and Lenin's (mis)representation of the Paris Commune—reflect substantial variation on the extent to which the working classes have played an active role in postrevolution political life.

CLASS-BASED CITIZENSHIP: THE SOVIET *MILITSIIA*

All revolutionary ideas and institutions are subject to transformation, but those in the Marxist tradition shoulder a particular burden. In attempting to impose a consistent doctrine of class conflict on the confusion of complex societies, Marx and Lenin—and their followers in Russia and China—stretched the meaning of the Paris Commune beyond easy recognition. While both the Chinese and Russian revolutions, especially in their beginning stages, grappled seriously with community-based conceptions of citizenship, they elected in the end to embrace class as the defining criterion for inclusion and exclusion. The issue was no longer one of neighborhood versus nation, but of proletarian versus capitalist, of oppressed versus oppressor. The Leninist notion of a conspiratorial party, moreover, permitted worker militias operating under Communist sponsorship to conduct their class struggles beneath a cloak of secrecy. And when such parties consolidated their revolutionary gains, the clandestine mechanisms of class struggle became crushing motors of state-building.

Even so, the processes by which revolutionary militias were melded into means of state power diverged markedly in the PRC and USSR. Whereas wartime militias in China were drawn into the military system (beginning with the rural soviets and reaching a crescendo in the Everyone a Soldier Campaign of the late 1950s), in the Soviet Union they were amalgamated not into the Red Army but into the police.[65] This difference bespoke a major distinction in the role of the military in the postrevolutionary politics of the two countries—stemming, in turn, from their very dissimilar revolutionary experiences.[66] Yet, despite the considerable political prestige of China's PLA, it was never able to exercise unquestioned command over the militias. Although military control was an important legacy of the rural wing of the Chinese revolution, in the cities—especially Shanghai—the revolution had also bequeathed another, earlier tradition: union-sponsored pickets. Worker militias operating in this urban tradition invoked the powerful symbol of the Paris Commune, fighting to the death against the advance of a standing army, to claim moral authority in their challenge to military hegemony. The CR marked the apogee of militia defiance of military supervision, but the history of the PRC is replete with efforts by trade unions and by workers themselves to create and control proletarian patrols.

While the origins of the Russian Red Guards lay in factory militias formed during the revolutionary struggle to promote workplace autonomy, these units were rapidly turned to state-building

ends. Under the Soviet Union, a full-time, centrally controlled police organization was put in place less than a year after the revolution, incorporating the Red Guards and other worker militias.[67] Although the new regime dispatched some militias to the front during the Russian Civil War, by the start of the New Economic Plan in 1921 these combat units were also converted into *militsiia* (police forces) under the command of the NKVD (or Commissariat of Internal Affairs). The *militsiia* of the New Economic Plan era were saddled with a wide array of responsibilities: criminal investigations, street patrols, ideological propaganda, and local enforcement of government regulations.

The heavy administrative burden of the *militsiia* sapped its ability to maintain public order and led to the formation of an industrial (*vedomstvennaia*) *militsiia* specifically directed to the task of ensuring security on factory premises. Over the course of the 1920s, the size of the industrial *militsiia* overtook that of the regular police, which numbered 95,000 and 60,000 respectively by 1931. Useful as the industrial *militsiia* were to factory managers and local officials, their decentralized character eventually came to be seen as a threat by the Soviet political police, the OGPU, which moved to abolish them. In an effort to retain control, the NKVD advocated a radical return to the utopianism of the revolutionary era, dubbed the "*militsiia* system." As Paul Hagenloh explains,

> The *militsiia* system attempted to revive the idea of popular participation in policing by encouraging factory workers to assume policing duties. Major factories released a certain number of workers, with full pay, to the police for one week per month. These workers formed detachments and patrolled under the guidance of local police. Beloborodov [Commissar of the NKVD] believed that the *militsiia* system would eventually lead to a "withering away" of the professional police force and its replacement by volunteer workers' detachments.[68]

The short-lived *militsiia* experiment bore a close similarity to the deployment of worker patrols in the PRC—in the 1950s, the CR, and again during the post-Mao period. However, in the Soviet Union the practice lasted only very briefly and ended with the abolition of the

NKVD and the wholesale transfer of *militsiia* control to the OGPU. Hagenloh characterizes this takeover by the political police as "the crucial turning point in the modernization of the Russian police force . . . that, for the first time in the history of the Russian Empire, would produce an effective, if repressive, modern police system."[69] The OGPU takeover resulted in a gradual erasure of the distinction between regular and political police and a blurring of ordinary and political crimes. As Louise Shelley explains, "The massive police apparatus associated with Stalin was created by the consolidation and expansion of the security police and the militia in one massive organization."[70] Under the direction of the OGPU, *militsiia* were deployed to liquidate kulaks and quell opposition from other rebellious peasants during the collectivization of agriculture. And when the collectivization drive led to a mass exodus out of the countryside, the *militsiia* were assigned responsibility for enforcing a rigid internal passport and registration system to deprive the peasantry of geographical mobility.

Important as the *militsiia* were to the strengthening of the Soviet state, they were apparently no less immune to disciplinary infractions than their militia counterparts elsewhere in the world. A 1932 report from Moscow recited a laundry list of complaints; the *militsiia*, it was charged, were "infiltrated to a significant degree by class-alien and unfit elements" who "fired indiscriminately on workers, raped arrested women, and murdered drunks in local jails."[71] The indictment was similar to charges leveled against Chinese militias during the early years of the PRC (see chapter 4), but with at least one difference: the Russians' prodigious consumption of alcohol. This tendency was particularly pronounced among the industrial *militsiia*, who routinely deserted their patrols, fell asleep on the job, or failed to show up for work at all. As a result, "statistically every industrial policeman violated work-related ordinances at least once per year."[72]

During the 1930s the Soviet Union undertook a variety of initiatives—Societies and Brigades for Assistance to the *Militsiia*, Night Patrols, and so forth—intended to increase popular, especially working-class, participation in policing. In marked contrast to China, however, such efforts to involve the ordinary Russian populace in police work "failed completely."[73] This failure led to an even more

repressive and centralized pattern of control characterized by massive police sweeps of urban areas combined with permanent expulsion of those seized to distant reaches of the country. The Great Terror of 1937–1938 was the culmination of precisely this top-down style of policing.[74]

Despite the many important similarities between Stalin and Mao—and between the Great Terror and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution—these leaders and the movements they launched differed substantially in the role they afforded to ordinary citizens. In the PRC popular participation has been a cardinal element of Communist rule, whereas in the USSR, experiments with mass involvement in state-sponsored campaigns were fleeting and unsuccessful. Writing in 1936, Leon Trotsky bemoaned the Soviet Union's loss of revolutionary spirit, castigating Stalin for having excluded the Russian working class from state power. As Trotsky framed his famous criticism in *Revolution Betrayed*, "Will the bureaucrat devour the workers' state, or will the working class clean up the bureaucrat? Thus stands the question upon whose decision hangs the fate of the Soviet Union." Among the charges that Trotsky leveled at Stalin was his disregard for the militia, which no longer served as an "army of the proletarian dictatorship."[75]

Unlike the Soviet Union, where former Red Guards became full-time employees of the political police, in China militias continued to function as part-time occupations for otherwise employed workers and peasants. At times of military confrontation (e.g., the Korean War, the Taiwan Straits Crisis, or the attack on Vietnam), the PLA was in a position to push for a centralized people's militia under firm military command. But the demands of other interested parties—trade unions, radical officials, and indeed the workers themselves—were never silenced. The contemporary history of China's militias reveals continuing contention by competing claimants to the mantle of revolutionary citizenship. As in the United States (more than in France or the former Soviet Union), frequent institutional changes in the constitution and composition of the Chinese militia point to still unresolved conflicts over the proper relationship between state and citizen in a postrevolutionary context.

CREED-BASED CITIZENSHIP: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD

Class and community do not exhaust the possibilities for revolutionary citizenship. Creed—or adherence to a religious or quasi-religious faith—has also served as a criterion for inclusion or exclusion from revolutionary movements. As we have seen, revolutions based upon class and community are quite capable of devolving into state-sponsored terrorism. This tendency may be even more pronounced in creed-based movements. Here the fundamental divide is neither between neighborhood and nation, nor between exploited and exploiter, but between elect and infidel. Militias formed in the course of religious revolutions, claiming divine sanction for their crusades, are highly prone to draconian methods of patrolling revolutionary purity. Even revolutions declared in the name of secular principles often go through periods of creed-based citizenship, in which pronouncements by the charismatic leader assume a quasi-religious authority to which all purportedly true revolutionaries must demonstrate devotion (or face the wrath of the iron-fisted faithful).

In the case of Iran, the postrevolutionary authorities moved swiftly to consolidate their new regime. When preexisting institutions could not be fully trusted to adhere to religious strictures, parallel institutions were created.[76] The Iranian Revolutionary Guard (*Pasdaran*) was established in May 1979 under a decree of the Ayatollah Khomeini for the purpose of assisting clerics in enforcing Islamic morality. The constitution of Iran charges the regular military with responsibility for the country's national defense, but entrusts to the *Pasdaran* the special mission of protecting the revolution itself.[77] Although the guard grew out of a diverse assortment of independent groups of radical religious elements—urban guerrillas, clerical militias, army defectors, and other pro-Khomeini militants, it developed a command structure modeled along the lines of a conventional military force and quickly acquired ground, naval, and air capabilities to rival those of the regular military.[78]

As Kenneth Katzman observes, the brief history of the *Pasdaran* reveals impressive institutionalization: "the Revolutionary Guard has successfully completed a transition from an ad hoc, disorganized

patchwork of revolutionary militias to one of Iran's most powerful and durable revolutionary institutions."[79] Consolidation has not meant a dilution of religious fervor, however. Nor has it brought military professionalization. Recruitment continues to be based upon religious, rather than martial, qualifications. Although it began with a membership of 10,000, within only a few years of its founding the Revolutionary Guard boasted more than 350,000 zealots organized into battalions that operated either independently or in tandem with units of the regular military. Additionally, the guard oversees three million volunteer militiamen (*Basij*) who monitor the everyday activities of their fellow Iranians, arresting those whose dress or demeanor is considered indecent or in violation of Islamic strictures.[80]

At its inception, the Revolutionary Guard was charged with a single function: to identify and eliminate suspected enemies of the revolution. But in time its portfolio was substantially enlarged. During the early years of the revolutionary regime, the *Pasdaran* assisted Iranian peasants and workers in seizing land and businesses owned by the former elite. Subsequently the guard became active in socializing Iran's youth into the ideology of the revolution, and in policing public morality. It also served as an instrument for suppressing protest movements:

> Guard units . . . policed the major cities in white Toyota trucks looking for transgressors, such as women who refused to strictly conform to Islamic dress, youths playing Western music, and those eating during the daylight hours of the holy month of Ramadan. These units, which also searched homes for violations of Islamic custom, contributed greatly to the unpopularity of the Guard among the educated, Westernized upper and upper middle classes in Tehran . . . The Guard appears to have assumed the authority to suppress demonstrations when they occur . . . believing that any opposition to the regime constitutes treason against Islam and against the Guard's father figure (even more so in death) Ayatollah Khomeini.[81]

The actions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are reminiscent of the Chinese CR, when militias conducted house searches and suppressed demonstrations (e.g., the April Fifth Incident) in the name of Chairman Mao. Although participation in the Great *Proletarian* Cultural Revolution was in theory based upon class, in practice proletarian status was at that time often equated with creed—or allegiance to Mao Zedong Thought. The similarities between contemporary Iran and CR China are thus more than coincidental.

The Iranian Guard not only suppresses demonstrations, it also stages them. As the *New York Times* recently reported:

> Some 3,000 members of an Iranian hardline militia demonstrated on Tuesday against pro-reform students who have staged strikes and sit-ins for more than a week for freedom of speech in the Islamic Republic. The protest by the bearded men and black chador-clad women of the Basij militia [a volunteer security unit of the Revolutionary Guard] at Tehran University came as police tried to lock out thousands of reformist students from another campus in the capital and prevent them from holding a rally. "We are ready, we don't have tolerance any more," said one Basij leader addressing the Tehran University meeting.[82]

Many of the Revolutionary Guard's actions mirror those of postrevolutionary militias in other times and places. But the *Pasdaran* has gone a step further, endeavoring to export the Iranian revolution abroad through terrorist means.[83] The *Qods* (Jerusalem Force) of the Revolutionary Guard, which is specifically responsible for foreign operations, has reportedly inducted thousands of Islamic fundamentalists from a number of Arab countries for military training at terrorist camps across the Middle East. While the full scope of these international activities is unclear, and may well include anti-American ventures, the primary objective has been to foment fundamentalist Islamic revolutions in other Arab nations.

REVOLUTIONARY CITIZENSHIP COMPARED

Revolutionary citizenship—regardless of whether it is defined primarily by community, class, or creed—favors some members of society at the expense of others. Similarly, the militias charged with enforcing these political distinctions—whether operating in the name

of the people, the proletariat, or the pious—exhibit common tendencies toward indiscipline and terrorism in combating counterrevolution.[84] The militias themselves—as the institutional embodiment of revolutionary citizenship—also become important objects of political contention; competing forces within state and society battle to control these powerful symbols of legitimacy. The comparative history of revolutionary militias attests to the different ways in which shared dilemmas have been resolved in the construction of postrevolutionary political systems.

In the case of France, the standing army's victory over the National Guard—after a century of violent struggle—exemplified the growth of a strong, centralized state that afforded scant space for local initiative and autonomy. Even so, the yearning for revolutionary citizenship did not disappear entirely. For the first time since the Commune in 1871, Parisians in 1968 constructed barricades in the center of their city as part of a massive political protest. Inspired by China's CR as well as by their own history, students and workers in Paris attempted to set up neighborhood revolutionary committees as a local alternative to central control. The challenge was short-lived and ultimately ineffective, however.[85]

In the United States, by contrast, the militia tradition remains a powerful yet highly contested force. The dual command of the U.S. National Guard, which can be activated by state governors for local emergencies as well as by the president for national and international assignments, indicates the ambiguities of political control inherent in a federal system. The controversial recent deployment of National Guard units for long-term service in Iraq highlights the continuing tension between local and national loyalties. Moreover, extremist challenges from private militias, claiming revolutionary sanction for their opposition to federal (and sometimes even state) authority, provide compelling evidence of festering debates over *community* that pose deeply troubling problems for contemporary American society.

Class-based revolutions present a similar range of variation. In the former Soviet Union, the wholesale absorption of the militia tradition by the secret police shortly after the establishment of the new regime prepared the ground for Stalin's top-down reign of terror—conducted in the name of the proletariat. In China, by contrast, continuing struggles over the character and command of the militia bespeak unresolved conflicts between urban and rural revolutionary legacies as well as between state and society.[86] Such tensions have periodically afforded opportunities for the resurgence of proletarian patrols—sometimes under official sponsorship and sometimes in opposition to state authority. The relative militancy of the Chinese working class under the PRC, when compared to that of the former Soviet Union or contemporary Russia, underscores the rather different understanding of class-based citizenship that developed in these two societies.[87]

In Iran, it is still too early to say whether the rise of reformists will loosen the grip of the Revolutionary Guard in enforcing religious strictures. For now the frightening power wielded by this institution illustrates the hold that a narrowly construed creed-based citizenship can retain several decades after political victory. But exclusion from political membership can breed popular resistance, even from those who once embraced the revolutionary project. A student of the Iranian Revolution observes, "It appears that the revolution has almost come full circle . . . Many ordinary Iranians who were initially in favour of the Islamic Republic and who vehemently opposed the regime of the Shah, now find themselves persecuted again . . . for their views in favour of greater political participation."[88]

In any postrevolutionary polity, the contours of citizenship expand and contract in response to shifting pressures issuing from state and society alike.[89] But although citizenship is an inherently fractious issue, it is not infinitely flexible. Founders make determinative decisions about the contours of revolutionary citizenship, setting the boundaries of contention for generations to come. In China, class categories retain political salience to this day, as the continued deployment of worker militias (by protesters as well as by state agencies) graphically illustrates.

As concerned Chinese contemplate their political future, they may wish to reflect further upon their revolutionary past. A history whose twists and turns have now assumed a canonical aura of inevitability was not always so assured. At many points in the process—1927, 1949, 1967, 1976, and 1989, to enumerate but five pivotal moments that have framed this study—critical junctures were marked by a realignment of

state-society relations in which familiar institutions were captured and converted to new uses.

State-building, like stone masonry, is a layered process.[90] The original foundation sets certain limits on the shape and stability of the subsequent structure, yet common cornerstones can support a variety of different edifices. And those who patrol the construction sites may periodically be confronted or captivated by visionaries bold enough to imagine an alternative architecture. Institutional inversion is after all an uncertain and ironic process, ever open to surprising reversals. In Yugoslavia, for example, the persistence of territorially based militias has been cited as an explanation for the unusual level of violence that accompanied the dismemberment of the socialist system there.[91] Organizations incorporated by the Leninist party-state to fortify its rule do not always remain faithful stewards of central directives. Valerie Bunce has written of formerly Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, "Over time and certainly by accident, the institutional framework of socialism functioned to deregulate the party's monopoly . . . This set the stage for crisis and reform—and, ultimately, for the collapse of all of these regimes."[92] If the history of China's proletarian patrols demonstrates the danger that purported means of liberation may devolve into powerful mechanisms of repression, other outcomes remain within the reach of possibility.

China is not the only postrevolutionary society where basic issues of citizenship remain unsettled. More than forty years ago, Hannah Arendt decried America's political complacency and loss of "revolutionary spirit" under the "enormous weight of the Constitution."[93] Today, when renewal of the USA Patriot Act threatens to dilute constitutional protections against state interference in the lives of ordinary citizens, Americans can ill afford to take their own revolutionary institutions for granted. Extended tours of overseas duty for U.S. National Guardsmen raise troubling questions about the proper mission of official militias. And the terrorist tendencies of some unofficial militias, empowered and emboldened by Americans' constitutional right to bear arms, present even more disquieting considerations. Arendt reminds us that the revolutionary spirit "is the eagerness to liberate *and* to build a new house where freedom can dwell."[94] To revisit a country's revolutionary trajectory, then, is not an excuse to surrender to the inevitable oppression of the modern state, but rather an invitation to rethink, rework, and perhaps even reclaim the promises of revolutionary citizenship.

NOTES

1. Joyce Lee Malcolm, *To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 24–26.

2. Daniel Levitas, *The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002), 2.

3. Jeff Goodwin, "Is the Age of Revolutions Over?" in *Revolution: International Dimensions*, ed. Mark N. Katz (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), 276ff.

4. Eric Selbin, "Same as It Ever Was: The Future of Revolution at the End of the Century," in Katz, *Revolution: International Dimensions*, 285–86.

5. Quoted in Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1989), xiii.

6. Useful summaries of the theoretical literature on revolutions include A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction* (London: Nelson, 1975); Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics* 32 (1980): 425–53; John Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation," *Sociological Theory* 11 (1993): 1–20; Jeff Goodwin, "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions," *Theory and Society* 23 (1994): 731–66; and Nikki R. Keddie, ed., *Debating Revolutions* (New York: New York University Press, 1995).

7. Nikki R. Keddie, "Can Revolutions Be Predicted; Can Their Causes Be Understood?" *Contention: Debates in Society, Culture and Science* 1, no. 2 (1992): 159–82.

8. In Indonesia, for example, underworld militias provided nationalist revolutionaries with a much needed popular constituency and armed force. But once the republican state was established, it eliminated the militia that had helped bring it to power. See Robert Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945–1949* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991). Even so, the pro-Jakarta militias that were responsible for so much bloodshed after the 1999 referendum in East Timor have been explained as part of a subculture of violence dating back to the militia activities of the revolutionary era. See Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad, eds., *Roots of Violence in Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 227–76.

9. J. G. A. Pocock, "The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times," in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 29–52.

10. Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," in Beiner, *Theorizing Citizenship*, 175–208.

11. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), and *Democracy in America* (London: Penguin, 2003).

12. Lawrence Delbert Cress, *Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), chap. 1.

13. Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802* (New York: Free Press, 1975), 2–9.

14. John K. Mahon, *The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789–1800* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), 1.

15. Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Americans: The Colonial Experience* (New York: Random House, 1958), 355.

16. Richard Bush, "The Militia of Northumberland County," *Bulletin of the Northumberland Country Historical Society* 31 (1994): 21–48.

17. Don Higginbotham, "The American Militia: A Traditional Institution with Revolutionary Responsibilities," in *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War*, ed. Higginbotham (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), 83–103.

18. Cress, *Citizens in Arms*, 50.

19. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword.*

20. Mahon, *The American Militia: Decade of Decision*, 66.

21. Cress, *Citizens in Arms*, 151.

22. Thomas Jefferson, proposed Virginia Constitution, 1776, *Jefferson Papers*, 344.

23. Thomas Jefferson, letter to William S. Smith (Paris, November 13, 1787).

24. Albert E. Bergh, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1907), 3:317–24.

25. Russell F. Weigley, *Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 128.

26. Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636–2000* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003), chaps. 3–4.

27. Jerry Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865–1920* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), xiii–xiv.

28. William H. Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy* (New York: Arno Press, 1979).

29. Joseph Kelner and James Munves, *The Kent State Coverup* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).

30. Jerry Cooper, *The Militia and the National Guard in America Since Colonial Times* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 109–111.

31. Cooper, *The Militia and the National Guard*, 70.

32. *The Quiet Retooling of the Militia Movement* (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2004). This source notes that unauthorized militia outfits exist in at least thirty states. Detecting a step-up in militia organizing in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the report observes that "ironically, efforts by the U.S. to fight foreign terrorism may have the side effect of spurring increased resentment and growth among domestic extremist groups" (1).

33. Neil A. Hamilton, *Militias in America* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1996), 1.

34. Robert L. Snow, *The Militia Threat: Terrorists among Us* (New York: Plenum Trade, 1999), 34.

35. Quoted in D. J. Mulloy, *American Extremism: History, Politics and the Militia Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 35.

36. Missouri 51st Militia Newsletter, quoted in Mulloy, *American Extremism*, 47.

37. Hamilton, *Militias in America*, 6.

38. Hamilton, *Militias in America*, 13–14.

39. Levitas, *The Terrorist Next Door*, 307.

40. Hamilton, *Militias in America*, 34–35.

41. D. J. Mulloy, ed., *Homegrown Revolutionaries: An American Militia Reader* (Norwich, U.K.: Arthur Miller Centre for American Studies, 1999), 51.

42. Quoted in Mulloy, *American Extremism*, 107.

43. Quoted in Mulloy, *American Extremism*, 108.

44. In the mid-1990s, individual Americans already possessed more than 216 million guns. Kenneth S. Stern, *A Force Upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate* (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1996), 108. While sales of handguns had been dropping in the late 1990s, the attacks of September 11, 2001, "led to a dramatic rise in gun sales in the United States." Lane Crothers, *Rage on the Right: The American Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Homeland Security* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 179. The most aggressive advocate for private gun ownership in the United States today is the National Rifle Association (NRA). When the NRA was founded in 1871, however, its initial leadership came from the newly constituted National Guard, and its mission was to popularize rifle marksmanship so as to prepare ordinary citizens for volunteer guard duty in the event of war. Only in the twentieth century, after the National Guard was incorporated by the federal government, did the NRA begin to promote the personal ownership of firearms. The National Guard's detachment from local communities, together with the NRA's promotion of gun ownership, has contributed to the extraordinary resurgence of private militia activity in contemporary America. Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard*, 87–88.

45. François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); François Furet, *Marx and the French Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Colin Lucas, *Rewriting the French Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

46. Albert Souboul, *The Sans-Culottes: The Popular Movement and Revolutionary Government* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); Mark Traugott, *Armies of the Poor: Determinants of Working-Class Participation in the Parisian Insurrection of June 1848* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); Roger V. Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

47. Soboul, *The Sans-Culottes.*

48. François Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1880* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 67.

49. Pocock, "The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times," 37.

50. Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, 452–61.

51. The French practice of revolutionary citizenship was certainly not without a class dimension. The fact that, for most of its history, the National Guard stipulated taxpayer status (which in turn required property ownership) as a criterion of membership ensured that its defense of local community was often tantamount to the defense of private property. The guard's bourgeois concern for the protection of property and maintenance of social order was, of course, precisely what rendered it acceptable to the central authorities. Once such qualifications were eliminated, and the guard of the 1871 Commune became the champion of all residents of the local community—workers and bourgeoisie alike—its fate was sealed.

52. Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1880*, 96.

53. Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, 613.

54. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 190. Here Skocpol is drawing upon Samuel F. Scott, "The Regeneration of the Line Army During the French Revolution," *Journal of Modern History* 42, no. 3 (September 1970): 307–30.

55. Timothy Tackett, "Conspiracy Obsession in a Time of Revolution: French Elites and the Origins of the Terror," *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 691.

56. Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1880*, 140.

57. Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, 10–11.

58. Peter H. Amann, *Revolution and Mass Democracy: The Paris Club Movement in 1848* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

59. Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1880*, 405.

60. Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1880*, 498.

61. Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1880*, 500.

62. Bruce Vandervort, "National Guard (France)," in *Encyclopedia of 1848 Revolutions*, ed. James G. Chastain (www.cats.ohiou.edu/~Chastain/ip/natguard.htm) accessed May 20, 2005.

63. Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, 15.

64. Gerald Friedman, *State-Making and Labor Movements: France and the United States, 1876–1914* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 148.

65. The following discussion of the Soviet militias draws upon Louise I. Shelley, *Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control* (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Paul Mark Hagenloh, *Police, Crime and Public Order in Stalin's Russia, 1930–1941* (PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1999).

66. Jonathan R. Adelman, *Revolutionary Armies: The Historical Development of the Soviet and Chinese People's Liberation Armies* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980).

67. In the initial year of the new Soviet regime, changing regulations on militia membership indicated an expanding conception of citizenship. The October 12, 1918, instruction "On Organizing a Soviet Worker-Peasant Militia" invited the participation of "any citizen of the RSFSR" over the age of twenty-one who "recognizes soviet power, is literate and has the right to vote under the constitution of the RSFSR." However, the constitution disenfranchised a number of categories, including "employers of hired labor; those living on unearned income; and private merchants and commercial brokers." Thus, while the militia was no longer thought of as an exclusively proletarian enterprise, as had been the case in 1917, there was still a strong class requirement for membership. And soon the militia was absorbed into other state agencies. (I am indebted to Steve Smith for information on this early period.)

68. Hagenloh, *Police, Crime and Public Order in Stalin's Russia*, 27.

69. Hagenloh, *Police, Crime and Public Order in Stalin's Russia*, 32–33.

70. Shelley, *Policing Soviet Society*, 30.

71. Hagenloh, *Police, Crime and Public Order in Stalin's Russia*, 92.

72. Hagenloh, *Police, Crime and Public Order in Stalin's Russia*, 93.

73. Hagenloh, *Police, Crime and Public Order in Stalin's Russia*, 111–113. Failed though these efforts may have been, a similar experiment—claiming a lineage that reached back to the militias of the Russian revolution—was undertaken by Khrushchev in 1954 when "people's patrols" were established to combat "capitalist residues." A propaganda brochure of the period featured a worker who described the people's patrols as "defending the gains of the Revolution." Likened to the "steel battalions of the proletariat," lauded in Lenin's *State and Revolution*, the patrols were a frightening—if ultimately ineffective—means of conducting urban surveillance. See Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 285–89.

74. Arno J. Mayer, *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 640ff.

75. Leon Trotsky, *Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going?* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1937).

76. Mark Downes, *Iran's Unresolved Revolution* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2002), 146–49.

77. Kenneth Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 1.

78. Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam*, 12; www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/pasdaran.htm (accessed December 13, 2002).

79. Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam*, 165.

80. Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 135; www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/pasdaran.htm (accessed December 13, 2002).

81. Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam*, 84. Similarly, during student demonstrations in 1999, "the *basijj* violently broke up the demonstrations on what could only have been the leaders' orders." Downes, *Iran's Unresolved Revolution*, 137.

82. *New York Times*, November 19, 2002.

83. Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam*, 11.

84. In the United States, lynchings carried out by private militias offer one baleful example of home-grown terrorism. Cooper, *The Militia and the National Guard*, 70. Another is the apparent influence of the Michigan Militia on Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. *Washington Post*, April 22, 1995; July 2, 1995.

85. Bernard E. Brown, *Protest in Paris: Anatomy of a Revolt* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1974); Daniel Singer: *Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1970); Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1969).

86. A game theoretic analysis of this basic difference between the Soviet and Chinese systems can be found in John Brehm and Emerson M. S. Niou, "Police Patrol versus Self-Policing: A Comparative Analysis of the Control Systems Used in the Former Soviet Union and Communist China," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 9, no. 1 (1997): 107–30.

87. For analyses of the passivity of Russian workers, see Sarah Ashwin, *Russian Workers: The Anatomy of Patience* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1999); Stephen Crowley, "Barriers to Collective Action: Steel Workers and Mutual Dependence in the Former Soviet Union," *World Politics*, no. 46, pp. 589–615; and Debra Javeline, *Protest and the Politics of Blame: The Russian Response to Unpaid Wages* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). On the militancy of Chinese workers, see Elizabeth J. Perry, "Labor's Love Lost: Worker Militancy in Communist China," in *International Labor and Working Class History* (Fall 1996); Marc J. Blecher, "Hegemony and Workers' Politics in China," *China Quarterly*, no. 170 (June 2002): 283–303; Yongshun Cai, "The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers in the Reform Period," *China Quarterly*, no. 170 (June 2002): 327–44; William Hurst and Kevin J. O'Brien, "China's Contentious Pensioners," *China Quarterly*, no. 170 (June 2002): 345–60; Ching Kwan Lee, "Pathways of Labour Insurgency," in *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance*, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (London: Routledge, 2003), 71–92; Wang Zheng, "Gender, Employment, and Women's Resistance," in Perry and Selden, *Chinese Society*, 158–82; and Timothy B. Weston, "The Iron Man Weeps: Joblessness and Political Legitimacy in the Chinese Rustbelt," in *State and Society in 21st-century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation*, ed. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (New York: Routledge, 2004), 67–86.

88. Downes, *Iran's Unresolved Revolution*, 141.

89. Acrimonious debates over immigration, nationality, and minority rights indicate continuing contestation over the nature of community-based citizenship. See Miriam Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, eds., *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, eds., *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Riva Kastoryano, *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Etienne Balibar, *We the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).

90. For an analysis of what he calls "institutional layering" in the evolution of the U.S. Congress, see Eric Schickler, *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

91. Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 118.

92. Bunce, *Subversive Institutions*, 26.

93. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 241–42.

94. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 28.

APPENDIX

SIZE OF SHANGHAI MILITIA

YEAR	*NAME*	*#MEMBERS*	*#CORE*	*#SHI*	*#TUAN*	*#YING*	*#LIAN*	*#PAI*
1957	*minbing*	150,000						
1958	*minbing*	740,000	44,000	15	100	156	273	
1959	*minbing*	2,573,603	500,000	57	848	2,823	12,276	
1966	*minbing*	2,664,003	1,005,822	51	826	1,549	15,562	60,975
1969	*wengong wuwei*	125,000			6	52	111	237
1970	*wengong wuwei*	210,000		7	72	151	623	
1973	*minbing*	856,000	148,000					
1976	*minbing*	3,090,000		9	602	1,207	18,700	
1977	*minbing*	3,090,464	1,320,296	9	602	1,287	18,764	60,664
1978	*minbing*	3,203,803	1,477,682	22	687	4,682	17,729	67,189
1979	*minbing*	3,289,212	1,496,753	29	758	4,775	17,846	67,371
1980	*minbing*	3,087,002	1,282,285	29	701	4,130	15,052	56,504

Sources: *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 14:1, 5, 20, 23:27; bk. 3, 16:4–5, 17:42, 49; Shanghai Party Committee Party History Research Office, ed., *Zhongguo gongchandang zai Shanghai 80nian* [80 years of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2001), 654.