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MEDICINE, MUSIC, AND MAGIC:
THE HEALING GRACE OF
PINDAR'S *FOURTH NEMEAN*

G. A. MACHEMER

Ἄριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκριμένων
ίατρός· αἱ δὲ σοφαὶ
Μοισᾶν θύγατρες αἰοιδαὶ θέλξαν νιν ἀπτόμεναι.
οὐδὲ θερμὸν ὕδωρ τόσον γε μαλθακὰ τεύχει
γυῖα, τόσσον εὐλογία φόρμιγγι συνάρορος.
ῥῆμα δ' ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει,
ὅ τι κε σὺν Χαρίτων τύχα
γλῶσσα φρενὸς ἐξέλοι βαθείας. (1–8)¹

ALTHOUGH the ancient scholiasts are not in agreement on the meaning of the first three lines of Pindar's *Fourth Nemean*, recently modern scholars seem to have reached a consensus. These lines comprise the first two terms of a priamel in which the durable songs of the poet, the second term, are opposed to and eliminate the first term, εὐφροσύνα, a word that in the scheme of things of Elroy Bundy, the father of this interpretation, stands poetically for the fleeting revels held in honor of the victory. Thus the symposium is the physician "most desirable in the immediate present"² for the pains of athletic

¹ H. Maehler after B. Snell, *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis* (Leipzig 1980). In this paper Greek citations are from the most recent OCT texts, except for the iambic and elegiac poets (M. L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci* [Oxford 1971–2]); Herodas (I. C. Cunningham, *Herodas Mimiambi* [Oxford 1971]); the Hippocratic Corpus (W. H. S. Jones, *Hippocrates*, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, Mass. 1923–1931]); and the Presocratics (Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* [Dublin/Zurich 1952]).

² Elroy L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica I: The Eleventh Olympian Ode*, University of California Publications in Classical Philology 18.1 (Berkeley 1962) 2 n. 9 = *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley 1986) 2 n. 9.

contests just concluded, yet in the long run well-crafted songs, the daughters of the Muses, seize the pains and charm them away. It is my belief that the opposition proposed by Bundy between song and the victory revel is not present here, but rather a comparison between the relative effectiveness of the healer's and the poet's art. Thus the pleasure (εὐφοροσύνα) which is the best healer of the pains endured in trials of strength is brought into being, not by the healer's purifications and potions, but by the magical power of well-crafted songs (1–3). Hot baths for tired limbs do not produce so pleasurable (and healing) a sensation as songs of praise (4–5). Furthermore, the account of deeds (praise) lives (has a lasting positive effect, maintains health, sustains pleasure) longer (than bodily cures, or other producers of pleasure, or the deeds themselves³) if profundity (the poet's understanding of the victor's deeds) is attended by the Graces.

The disagreement between me and the Bundys rests on the problem of determining the correct antecedent of the pronoun *viv* in the third line, a problem, as I have already indicated, that goes back to the very beginnings of the scholarly tradition. Aristarchus (2nd century B.C.) identifies εὐφοροσύνα as the antecedent of *viv*; Didymus, the πόντοι. There are modern followers of each interpretation⁴; and one eccentric modern proposal that *viv* refers to an unstated antecedent, the

³ The ambiguity of the genitive ἐργμάτων seems unresolvable. Most recently D. S. Carne-Ross (*Pindar* [New Haven 1985] 111–112) and Willam H. Race (*Style and Rhetoric in Pindar's Odes* [Atlanta 1990] 94 n. 25) have come down on the side of the comparative use, an interpretation possibly present in the thought of the poet, but, even so, secondary to the objective genitive with ῥῆμα, for the effectiveness of deeds is not the question being addressed by the poet, but the effectiveness of his praise.

⁴ A. B. Drachmann, *Scholía Vetera in Pindari Carmina*, vol iii (Leipzig 1927; rpt. Amsterdam 1964) 64. Among the modern disciples of Aristarchus count J. B. Bury (*The Nemean Odes of Pindar* [London 1890] 69), citing F. Mezger's commentary (*Pindars Siegeslieder* [Leipzig 1880] 392) and LSJ; C. M. Bowra (*Pindar* [Oxford 1964] 258–259); and LSJ. Those who follow Didymus include Lewis Richard Farnell (*Critical Commentary to the Works of Pindar* [London 1932; rpt. Amsterdam 1961] 264) and the majority of contemporary readers: e.g., Jacqueline Duchemin, *Pindare: Poète et prophète* (Paris 1955) 89; John H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus*, Martin Classical Lectures XIV (Cambridge, Mass. 1955) 52; Aimé Puech, *Pindare* III, Budé (Paris 1958) ad loc.; D. S. Carne-Ross (above, note 3) 111; Stanislaw Stabryla, "Some Observations on Pindar's Concept of Poetry: The Function of Poetry," *Aischylos und Pindar: Studien zu Werk und Nachwirkung*, ed. E. G. Schmidt, Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur der Antike 19 (Berlin [GDR] 1981) 36.

victor, who is present in the poet's thought.⁵ Even though this implicit antecedent conveniently smooths over the difficulties of the grammar, its adoption in place of two explicit competing antecedents is unjustified, especially at the beginning of a poem where no internal context as a basis for this kind of inference has as yet been developed.

The later scholiast to *Nemean* 4, who reports the two earlier readings, clearly prefers the antecedent *πόννοι* to the alternative *εὐφροσύνα*. Aristarchus, he says, understands *νιν* as going with *εὐφροσύνα*, with the result that the lines mean that the poems, attaching themselves to her, charm the *εὐφροσύνη* of a man, whenever he is praised. (*τὸ νίν Ἀρίσταρχος ἐπὶ τῆς εὐφροσύνης ἀκούει, ὥστε εἶναι τὸν λόγον· αἱ δὲ τῶν Μουσῶν θυγατέρες ᾤδαί, τουτέστι τὰ ποιήματα, ἀπτόμεναι αὐτήν, τὴν εὐφροσύνην, ἔθελξαν, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὅταν ἐγκωμιάζῃται.*) This is clearly incorrect, he asserts, for how is *εὐφροσύνη* charmed, the very one who charms the victors and is not charmed by another? (*πῶς γὰρ θέλγεται ἡ εὐφροσύνη, αὐτὴ θέλγουσα τοὺς νενικηκότας, οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλου θελγομένη*) It is better to follow Didymus and take *νιν* with the *πόννοι*, for the poets after Homer are not so precise in their antecedents (*οἱ γὰρ μεθ' Ὅμηρον οὐκ ἀκριβεύουσι τὴν ἀντωνυμίαν*), as Euripides attests (*τοιγὰρ νιν αὐτάς ἐκ δόμων οἷστρος' ἐγώ. Ba 32*).

Whatever we may think of the deadening literalism that lies behind the scholiast's amazement at the charming of the charming *Euphrosyna*, his is a natural response to a genuine grammatical dislocation, that is, that *εὐφροσύνα*, as personified pleasure, as a Grace of music, and as a healer, is properly a subject of *θέλγειν*, and, at least superficially, an unusual object. The peculiarity of *εὐφροσύνα* as an object of *θέλγειν* (as an antecedent of *νιν*) is shown by the difficulty that lexicographers have had in construing the meaning of the verb in this context. LSJ, accepting the Aristarchan reading and consigning this odd usage to the last of their variant meanings of *θέλγειν* translate: "produce by spells." Yet the *πόννοι*, as an alternative to *εὐφροσύνα*, are even more unlikely.

Although it is possible for the Doric *νιν* to take a plural antecedent, it is certainly not usual (poets who use it being imprecise). In the epinicians Pindar uses this pronoun with considerable frequency, but never

⁵ So August Boeckh, *Pindari Epinicionum Interpretatio Latina cum Commentario perpetuo* (Leipzig 1827; rpt. Hildesheim 1963) 380.

elsewhere than here in the plural, although in his work on pronouns, the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd century A.D.) cites rare examples from both Pindar (ὅστις δὴ τρόπος ἐξεκύλισέ νιν fr. 7) and Bacchylides.⁶ In the Doric atmosphere of Attic drama, weaker than that of Pindaric epinician, the plural use of νιν does occasionally occur, but, in the few examples available, the plurality is made explicit from the context, as in the line offered from Euripides by the scholiast where the use of αὐτάς makes the direction of the poet's thought clear.

At the opening of the Fourth *Nemean* no clear directions for plurality exist. Quite the contrary, by personifying and characterizing the nature of εὐφροσύνα with the predicate ἰατρός and then strengthening that act of predication with the superlative ἄριστος, Pindar has made εὐφροσύνα the indisputable focus of the listener's thought, not the πόνοι, which had been relegated to the weaker (unmarked), more tangential (circumstantial), and structurally vague genitival form. How then can νιν refer to the less obvious, non-personal (or inanimate), plural object when as a rule it refers to the most obvious object in its context, when that object is usually a person and not a thing, and when that object is one, not many? In trying to penetrate the meaning of an obscure ancient text, it is wise to reason from the more obvious and incontrovertible grammatical facts to the less obvious meaning, rather than from an assumed obvious (to us) meaning to a convoluted use of the grammar. Even for Pindar's audience the apprehension of the meaning of the ode would have begun with the self-evident syntax as the vehicle of sense and not with their preconceptions of what Pindar ought to be saying in preference to what he was saying. Especially in the creation of figurative language does the poet, who is doing unusual things with the meanings of words, rely on the prior rules of syntax, complex and various though they may be, as a foundation on which to build his semantic extravaganzas. Were the underlying normative structure of the language not sure, the categorical transpositions required by the creation of metaphors would not take place. The river runs because the "river" is the clear subject of "runs," even though it makes more sense for the boy on the river bank to be the one running.

It might be argued that θέλγειν requires πόνοι as its object, not on the basis of the sense of the proposition, as the scholiast has argued, not

⁶ *Apollonii Dyscoli quae supersunt*, ed. Richard Schneider and Gustav Uhlig, *Grammatici Graeci III* (Leipzig 1878) 84, line 7. See also W. J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969) s.v. νιν.

because we think it makes more sense for the *πόννοι* to be the objects of *θέλγειν*, but on the basis of semantic structure, because *θέλγειν* is more likely to take a word like *πόννοι* as its object than a word like *εὐφοροσύνη*. But this is clearly untrue, as an examination of the pre-Classical and Classical uses of *θέλγειν* quickly demonstrates.

In pre-Classical and Classical usage *θέλγειν* nowhere takes as its object the thing or state removed by the act of charming. Rather it regularly takes as its object either the person or animate being in whom a desired change or deceit is wrought (e.g., ὥς ἐμὲ κείνος ἔθελγε παρήμενος ἐν μεγάροισι. *Od.* 17.521; καὶ μ' οὔτοι μελιγλώσσοις πειθοῦς ἐπαιοδαΐσιν θέλξει. *A. Pr.* 172–3) or the organ of perception or reception through which it is wrought (e.g., a Pindaric passage similar to *N.* 4.1–3: [φόρμιγγος] κῆλα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνων θέλγει φρένας, ἀμφί τε Λατοΐδα σοφίᾳ βαθυκόλπων τε Μοισάν. *P.* 1.12; θέλγε δὲ θυμὸν/μειλιχίοις ἐπέεσσι, νόος δέ οἱ ἄλλα μενοῖα. *Od.* 18.282–3). Sometimes it takes a complementary infinitive of the effect wrought (Ἔρωσ δέ νιν μόνος θεῶν θέλξειεν αἰχμάσαι τάδε ... *S. Tr.* 354–5); occasionally, this verbal idea is expressed substantively (μίαν δὲ παίδων ἵμερος θέλξει, τὸ μὴ κτεῖναι σύνευνον ... *A. Pr.* 865–6).⁷ The rare figurative use of an abstract verbal noun in the place of the more transparent verbal formulation, as in *θέλγω ἀνηνεμίην* (*AP* 9.544.4, the second source cited by LSJ for the meaning attributed to *θέλγειν* in *Nemean* 4), is but a simple extension of this third category. What is extraordinary about Pindar's use of *εὐφοροσύνα* in *Nemean* 4.1–3 is that this noun, as presented in this context, accommodates the form of each of these three natural objects, the person affected taken as a whole, the “psychic” part of the person directly affected — ὄμματα, θυμός, νόος, etc. — and, finally, the effect wrought by the change in the *psyche*, as expressed in an abstract noun.

Pindar's personification, or more accurately, deification, of *Εὐφοροσύνα*, which the chastizing scholiast takes for granted, has not seemed so evident to those modern critics who believe that *νιν* refers to the *πόννοι*,⁸ for if one admits that *Εὐφοροσύνα* is not just an abstract idea,

⁷ Only in an Orphic invocation to Asclepius have I found *θέλγειν* taking as its object the condition (in the plural) which has been removed by charms (*θέλγων ἀνθρώπων πολυαλγέα πήματα νούσων* [*Orph. H.* 67]), a use so late (2nd/3rd century A.D. [M. L. West, *The Orphic Poems* (Oxford 1983) 28–9]) as to be inapplicable, against the weight of earlier sources, to the determination of Pindaric locutions.

⁸ Above, note 4.

but a goddess, one of Hesiod's Graces (*Th.* 909),⁹ then she becomes a natural primary object of θέλγειν. Still, what reason can be given, other than that Εὐφροσύνα is to be regarded as the antecedent of νιν, to show that this personification is not just a figure devised for a momentary stylistic effect, like the ῥῆμα in line 6 or γλῶσσα in line 8, but a real goddess, in deed as well as word, a counterpart to the deified ἁοιδαί?

The strongest proof lies in the Hesiodic nature of Pindar's theme. In these first three lines of *Nemean* 4, which exemplify the thematic compression and amplitude of imagery so characteristic of his style, Pindar, while actually enlarging upon the Hesiodic original by the introduction of a specifically therapeutic dimension, has reduced to three choral lyric lines sentiments that Hesiod expounds in the proemium to the *Theogony* in at least forty lines of epic verse (36–74, 94–103): the Muses are the source of a technically proficient poetry of praise and celebration that is capable of delighting and instructing the hearts of its audience, even those burdened by cares, sorrows, fatigue, and pain (*Th.* 55, 98–103).¹⁰ Although it would be difficult to show without question that the Boeotian Pindar here consciously alludes to Hesiod's "Hymn to the Muses," since, save for the mention of the Muses themselves and the sameness of the position and function of both passages as proemia, there are no distinctive verbal echoes or parallel narrative action which we expect as sure evidence of such allusions (e.g. *Pi. P.* 1.1–28 where both characters and events, as well as the thought, recall the *Theogony*, especially in the inclusion of the Typhoeus passage, 820–868); nevertheless, it seems probable that Pindar's Greek audience, so attuned to the contents of the great poems of the ancient paideutic canon, might be expected to recall in their imaginations the aura of Hesiod's famous proemium where the Graces (though unnamed at this point) first appear with the nine Muses of the Greek poetic pantheon.¹¹

⁹ "Pro-Aristarchan" Bury accepts this view unhesitatingly ([above, note 4] 62–63), and in dealing with Hesiod's *nachleben*, Friedrich Solmsen readily identifies Εὐφροσύνα in *N.* 4.1 with Hesiod's Grace (*Hesiod and Aeschylus* [Cornell 1949] 106 n. 12). On personification in Pindar see Bowra (above, note 4) 198–199.

¹⁰ If my analysis is correct, these three lines in substance embrace the whole of the "Hymn to the Muses," including the empowering of the poet and prince (below, pp. 136–37).

¹¹ On ancient poets, their audience, and the ancient poetic tradition see John Herington, *Poetry into Drama: Early Tragedy and the Greek Poetic Tradition* (Berkeley 1985); and

The phrase αἱ δὲ σοφαὶ Μοισᾶν θύγατρες ᾄουσαι assists this recollection in that it presents in image and thought a perception of reality not uncongenial to the Hesiodic or archaic tradition. The idea of songs as offspring of the Muses, while strictly speaking not Hesiodic, in the sense that Hesiod's songs are not engendered by the Muses, but sung by them as attributes and conferred upon the poet (*Th.* 81–83, 93; see also *Sol.* fr. 13.51), still expresses the archaic principle of genealogical cosmic organization, forever to be associated with the *Theogony*. Furthermore, from what Hesiod says of the content and effect of the Muses' songs, it is clear that to say that they are σοφαί is to say something “Hesiodically” true of them, even if the word “σοφαί” is quite “un-Hesiodic” and introduces into the ode an assessment of proficiency in poetry that Hesiod himself did not make. Like Protagoras' interlocutors in Plato's dialogue who accept his judgment of Hesiod as σοφιστής (*Prt.* 316D–317C), the Greeks of Pindar's generation, delighting perhaps in a tension between old and new, would have readily recognized the artful application of a modern conception, not used by Hesiod himself, to Hesiod and his vision of poetry.¹²

more recently Gregory Nagy, *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past* (Baltimore 1990). See also Friedrich Solmsen (above, note 9) on Hesiod's originality in defining the personalities of the Muses and the Graces (38–42) and on Pindar's debt to Hesiod (106).

¹² The newness of the epistemological conception is attested by the invention, popularity, or investment with new meanings, first witnessed in Pindar, Aeschylus, Theognis, and the Presocratics, of many other words in the same sphere of discourse, including not only derivatives, such as φιλόσοφος and σοφιστής, but also words like λόγος or κόσμος that are pregnant with philosophical implications, or words like διδασκαλία, ἀμαθία, or μάθησις/μάθη that reflect deep institutional changes. In a sentence similar to the one under consideration here, Pindar uses διδασκαλία (*P.* 4.102) to combine the mythic past (Chiron and Jason) with a new perception of it. When Pindar attaches σοφαί, an emotionally “loaded” term, bearing the excitement and frustration of contemporary debate, to the lively, yet archaic, conception of the “daughter songs,” he achieves an expression that is at once time-honored and wondrously new. The wisdom of the Muses, hoary with age, is now seen to be philosophical, a creative divine intellectual source of truth. On the changing conception of *sophia* in archaic thought and poetry, see especially Herwig Maehler, *Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im fruhen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars*, *Hypomnemata* 3 (Goettingen 1963) 66–68, 94–96, who recognizes the Hesiodic origin of Pindar's idea of the intellectual competence of the poet and, like most classicists, identifies Solon as the first poet to use σοφία as an expression of this idea; Bruno Snell, *Der Weg zum Denken und zur Wahrheit: Studien zur fruehgriechischen Sprache*, *Hypomnemata* 57 (Goettingen 1978) 30 ff., particularly his explanation of *sophia* in Pindar (31, 33 n. 37, 44–52, and 47 n. 9); Shirley Darcus Sullivan, “Τὸ Σοφόν as an Aspect of

The appropriateness of εὐφροσύνα as the object of θέλγειν does not stop at her deification, for latent in this typically transparent Greek compound and available to the poet who wishes to use it is the fundamental notion of the φρήν that is doing well, or that is in the right condition, or that is well-disposed towards others and so experiences and generates right order (psychic health), contentment, and pleasure (in itself and others). Not in the act of personification, but through the more significant act of “iatrification” Pindar chooses to open up for our aesthetic inspection the true meaning of εὐφροσύνα.¹³ In the guise of

the Divine,” *Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury*, ed. Douglas E. Gerber (Chico, CA 1984) 285–301; and Gregory Nagy (above, note 11) 59–68, 116–135, 148–149, 161–162, who offers a novel perspective on the question of the development of the idea of truth and its relation to σοφία. Bowra’s account of Pindar’s use of σοφός/σοφία ([above, note 4] 4–6, 14, 29–33) should not be ignored, nor his discussion, so germane to this argument, of Pindar as an innovator in diction and thought (194–199, 214–223). For a historical explanation of Pindar’s habitual balancing of old and new, see John Herington (above, note 11) 62.

¹³ Bundy’s assertion that εὐφροσύνη is “a poetic word for a victory revel,” ([above, note 2] 2) is not apt for the interpretation of these lines, although his view is accepted by many scholars, e.g., Nagy (above, note 11) 98.

Regarding the meaning of εὐφροσύνη, English-speaking scholars may be misled by εὐφροσύνη’s often being translated by “joy” or by some other opaque English word, whose opacity invites the illusion of similar opacity in Greek “Εὐφροσύνη” is, in truth, comparable to other transparent compounds built on the notion of the *phrên* (σωφροσύνη, ἀφροσύνη [absence of *phrên*], χαλιφροσύνη [slackness of *phrên*], etc.) or exhibiting roots that denote psychic experiences, such as εὐνοία, εὐμένεια (ἰα), and εὐθυμία. Εὐφροσύνη says what it says it says, the quality of a *phrên* (heart-mind-will-midriff), when doing well. It does not name an undifferentiated state, but rather the feeling good and thinking right, the good tone and right harmony of parts, that creates or attends such a state. Just as εὐδαιμονία describes bliss brought by the gods, and ἄλβος the gratification of wealth, so εὐφροσύνη tells of joy arising from a contented, unaffected *phrên*, a soul in agreement with circumstances (Pl. *Cra.* 419D).

In assessing the meaning of εὐφροσύνη, one must take into account its relation to synonyms like ἡδονή, τέρψις, or χαρά (cf. Pl. *Cra.* 419B–D) and the rhetorical topoi they share, but one must not equate its meaning with theirs, for εὐφροσύνη (τὸ εὐφραίνειν) differs from these nouns in that it carries with it the idea of location, instrument, or source of pleasure, being closer in meaning to such competing formulaic verb phrases as τέρπουσι ... νόον (*Th.* 37) or ἐχούσαις ἀκηδέα θυμόν (*Th.* 61), τέρπετ’ ἐνὶ φρεσίν (*Od.* 8.368), φρένα τερπόμενον (*Il.* 9.186), νόφ χαρίεντα (*H. Merc.* 484), or ὃ γε θυμόν ἔτερπεν (*Il.* 9.189). Cf. *Od.* 10.465 where Circe’s argument concerns the state of Odysseus’ θυμός.

The rich semantic potentiality of εὐφροσύνη derives from the complexity of the notion of the *phrên*, whose activities are neither purely emotional, nor purely reflective, but also purposive. Εὐφροσύνη embraces the idea of goodwill, of being well-disposed

the best healer, εὐφροσύνα becomes simultaneously the healer and the self-bearing object of the healer's art, both the organ upon which he operates, the φρήν, and the hoped for effect of his activity, τὸ εὐφρων γίγνεσθαι/εἶναι, τὸ εὖ φρονεῖν, τὸ φρένας τέρπειν, or τὸ εὐφραίνεσθαι.

Pindar first prepares us rhetorically for this transformation of εὐφροσύνα with the bold claim that εὐφροσύνα is the best healer. This use of the superlative, a popular device of rhetorical amplification in archaic Greek poetry,¹⁴ makes us respond to εὐφροσύνα, not simply as

towards someone; and of good-fellowship, the mutual response of two or more *phrenes* agreeably affected by one another and sharing common pleasures, ideas that are more easily seen, because of syntactical conditions, in applications of εὖ φρονεῖν (e.g., Homeric formulae like that at *Il.* 1.73) or εὐφρων. (On εὐφρων as goodwill see Bundy, "The 'Quarrel between Kallimachos and Apollonios' Part I: The Epilogue of Kallimachos's *Hymn to Apollo*" *CSCA* 5 [1972] 51 ff.) Often religious contexts admit the idea of the goodwill of gods towards men and of men towards gods and other men, e.g., Thgn. 773–788, 757–768; *E. Hel.* 1469, *Ba.* 376. This inner goodwill is contrasted with the outward good life (εὐζοίᾳς) in *Pi. P.* 4, 127–131. When outward striving is directed towards specific ends, it may be termed hope, expectation, or possibly even desire (the ἕμερος, perhaps, of *Hes. Th.* 64 or *H. Merc.* 420–423, *re* the production of εὐφροσύνη [449] in a singer's audience; see W. D. Smith, "Physiology in the Homeric Poems," *TAPA* 97 [1966] 555). Thus φαναῖς ... ἐν εὐφροσύναις is a variation of θαρσαλέαις ... ἐλπίσι at *A. Pr.* 536–539. So too may outwardly directed thought in a good condition be seen not as positive desire, but as resourcefulness. What else does wealth offer the powerful in *Hom. Epigr.* 15 but the ability to achieve their ends? For recent studies of the *phrên*, see Bruno Snell (above, note 12) especially 53–90; David B. Claus, *Toward the Soul: an Inquiry into the Meaning of Ψυχή before Plato*, Yale Classical Monographs 2 (1981) 16–21, 48–51, 54–56; and Friedrich Solmsen, "ΦΡΗΝ, ΚΑΡΔΙΑ, ΨΥΧΗ in Greek Tragedy," *Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury*, ed. Douglas E. Gerber (Chico, California 1984) 265–274. For another instance of the poetic dismemberment of εὐφροσύνη, see R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Euripides and Dionysus: An Interpretation of the Bacchae* (Cambridge 1948) 61 n. 3.

¹⁴ Aristotle offers the first description (*Rh.* 1.9.38–39 [1364a]. 1.7 [1363b–1365b]). Frequent examples testify to the importance of comparison in Greek thought and of competition in Greek life. Who is best among heroes is a prominent theme in epic. Who or what is best in general and in many categories (along with the defining "who or what is good?" and the comparative "which is better?") are questions with long histories in gnomic and epideictic poetry, the most famous example being Pindar's *O.* 1.1 (recognized in *Arist. Rhet.* 1364a). The *Theognidea* offers many examples of series of what is good, better, best, difficult, pleasurable, and so on, and their opposites; e.g., 15–18, 255–256, 425–428, 571–572, 672–678, 1003–1006, 1007–1012, 1027–1027, 1037–1038, 1059–1062, 1075–1078, 1104–1106, 1117–1118, 1171–1176, 1223–1224, 1225–1226, 1369–1372. In the development of Greek philosophy and science, endeavors in Pindar's day not yet generically distinct from poetry, the quest for the superlative plays a leading

a personified abstraction, but as a subject for debate, as something (someone) we must think about or become objectively aware of, whose nature is problematic. In the listener's imagination a galaxy of comparanda appear, leading him to compare the εὐφροσύνα so modified to other entities: with other traditional pain relievers or joy bringers (victory [Pi. O. 2.19–21], wine [Dionysus], love [Aphrodite/Eros], sleep, and so on), or with such healers as Apollo, Asclepius, Machaon and Podalirius (Asclepius' sons), and the Asclepiadae in general (all those who practice the healer's art), or even Musaioi or Orpheus and their like, or with the "iatric" graces, like Hygieia, that attend Asclepius (much as the Graces attend the Muses [below p. 133]), who are immediately analogous conceptually and imagistically to Euphrosyna as deifications of the desired states and means of healing, or even with Euphrosyna's companion musical Graces. In the process of drawing these comparisons, not by any systematic logical deliberations, but by means of an associative cognitive reflex that is part of the listener's aesthetic comprehension of the poet's thought, the question of the true nature and meaning of εὐφροσύνα becomes present to his imagination, and the word itself ripe for dissolution into its elements.

This dissolution is completed by the act of calling εὐφροσύνα a ἰατρός. Not only does the predicate determine the nature of the comparanda elicited by the superlative adjective, it places εὐφροσύνα directly in the context of an ancient tradition of medical thought and image still vital in Pindar's day, in which the φρήν—its health, and the health of the body it regulates and influences—is a central concern. In his discussion some years ago of the complementary notions of order and disorder in Homeric physiology, Wesley Smith pointed out the use in Homeric discourse, particularly in the *Odyssey*, of φρήν/φρένες (along with other terms) and of compound -φρων epithets to express traditional notions of health and disease, control and lack of control.¹⁵ That the archaic conception of the φρήν/φρένες continued from this earliest glimpse of medical theory and practice, even beyond Pindar's time, to play a role in Greek views of anatomy, physiology, and

part, for example, the importance of what makes the best physician or cure in the Hippocratic Corpus (e.g., *Prog.* 1, *Acut.* 1–9). Similar arguments permeate the dicta of the Presocratic philosophers, e.g., Empedocles fr. 112.9–12, Heraclitus fr. 53, 54. Indeed, arguments over "What is best?" and "What is first?" lead to the development of competing philosophical systems.

¹⁵ W. D. Smith, "Physiology in the Homeric Poems," *TAPA* 97 (1966) 547–556.

psychology cannot be disputed, for it appears in the earliest philosophic and medical discussions of human nature, which are nevertheless clearly post-Pindaric. The author of the Hippocratic *Sacred Disease*, in defending his view that the brain (ἐγκέφαλος) is the primary source of conscious psychic activity (σύνεσις), argues against traditional opinion, by asserting that the φρένες have their name as the seat of intelligence (τὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν) by chance and by custom, but not in reality or by nature.¹⁶ His testimony is proof of the Greeks' own realization that the vocabulary which evolved out of the root φρην/φρον/φρεν preserved and was a result of a conception of human physiology which by the late fifth century was no longer universally shared.

Alcmaeon seems to have been the first in the recorded philosophic tradition to have rejected the centrality of the φρένες in the organization of the higher psychic processes and to have pronounced the brain to be the place in which the senses are joined together (fr. A5). If this is so, then the debate on the nature and location of the parts of the soul, which, by Plato's account, had for a while claimed the young Socrates' attention (*Phd.* 96A–B) and which finally assigned to the φρένες a merely mechanical role as the diaphragm, was already joined by the time *Nemean* 4 was composed.¹⁷ Hence the possible association of εὐ-φρο-σύνα, not only with traditional views of physiology and medicine, but with current debate.

Further facilitating the process of dissolving εὐφροσύνα into its elements is its likeness to newly coined εὐ- and δυσ- compounds which at this time were proliferating in the technical vocabularies of medicine and the other sophistic arts. Although the practice of coining such terms is quite ancient, as εὐφροσύνα itself demonstrates, nevertheless,

¹⁶ C. 20. This work dates to the early 4th, possibly late 5th century, if genuinely Hippocratic; see Smith, *The Hippocratic Tradition* (Ithaca 1979) 44–60.

¹⁷ By the late 5th century the contest for the seat of the intelligence or focus of the senses had been lost by the φρην/φρένες to the heart (καρδία, see, e.g., Empedocles, fr. 458 and Praxagoras of Cos, fr. [11, pp. 49–53], 70, 71, 72, 75 [*The Fragments of Praxagoras of Cos and His School*, ed. Fritz Steckerl (Leiden 1958)]) and the brain (ἐγκέφαλος), where, as *Sacred Disease* bears witness (c. 20), the lines of contention were now drawn. Plato reflects the outcome of this debate in his description of the φρένες as the partition between the higher and lower parts of the mortal soul (*Ti.* 70A, 77B), a theme repeated with obvious variations in Aristotle (e.g., *PA* 672B). For a general account see John I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle* (Oxford 1906; rpt. Dubuque, Iowa, n.d.) 250 ff.

the abundance of these compounds as specifically technical terms, which first begin to appear in the earliest technical (e.g., the early treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus) or quasi-technical (e.g., the dialogues of Plato) sources,¹⁸ testifies to the vitality of this construction as a means of expressing precise new technical ideas. In the absence of earlier written sources it would be difficult to prove that the enterprise of coining such compounds was so well-established in Pindar's day, in therapeutics or other arts, that it could serve poetic ends. But one suspects that this is so, inasmuch as long before this time the new thoughts of the philosophers and other *sophistai* had created a demand for new words. If it is so, then the "iatrification" of εὐφοροσύνα creates an awareness of the technical medical form of the word, and the regular role of medicine in making a damaged or diseased (δυσ-) organ (φρήν) healthy (εὖ).

The poetical transformation by "iatrification" of εὐφοροσύνα into a technical εὖ- term is echoed in line 5 with the musical term εὐλογία. Although musical theory and application does not surface in the written record before Plato, when it does appear, εὐλογία belongs to a series of other similarly constructed technical compounds (εὐαρμοστία, εὐσχημοσύνη, εὐρυθμία, εὐηθεία; *Rep.* 400 D). In the Platonic context εὐλογία seems to refer to the contents (*logoi*) of poems when they are morally elevating and truthful (*Rep.* 377 B ff.), regardless of their rhetorical intention. Without trying to prove where the roots of Plato's theory of correctness in poetry lie, I would like to suggest that some of the ideas he expresses were circulating a century earlier, and that Pindar echoes them here, where he sees in the true and noble *logoi* of his technically proficient songs (σοφαί, line 3) a *phrên*-shaping power.

¹⁸ These pepper the εὖ- and δυσ- sections of LSJ and are widely used in the Hippocratic Corpus, e.g., εὐοργησία, εὐσαρκία, εὖσπλαγχνος, εὐτονία, εὐφυία, εὐχομία, εὐκράσια. See *Concordance des Oeuvres Hippocratiques*, ed. Gilles Maloney et Winne Frohn (Montreal 1984) vol. 2, pp. 960–963, 963–969 (δυσ-); 1763–1773, 1775–1780, 1782–1783, 1785–1794 (εὖ-). Compounds of this sort were used by systematizers in other arts, including poetics and rhetoric, e.g., εὐφωνία, possibly εὐλογία (Pi. N. 4.5). By Pindar's manipulation of its context, εὐφοροσύνα thus becomes endowed with sophistic brilliance as an apparent term of medicine and poetics. Since technical terms in ancient Greek represent an expansion of old structures of meaning within the native language, not alien intrusions from other systems, and since the separation of philosophic from fictional or poetic genres had not yet occurred, this process of "sophistication" will have been less noticeable and more natural in Pindaric epinician than might be the case in modern English.

Pindar's elliptical syntax helps his hearer respond to a broader range of meaning than would have been apparent had he expressed the predicate of εὐλογία. Presumably it is tired limbs which *eulogia* (praise) ultimately makes soft; but its immediate object is the *phrên* which it charms (softens, cf. *O.* 2.89–90) into health, and it is by means of this grace — *euphrosuna* — that the limbs themselves are restored.

The “iatrification” of εὐφροσύνα, not stopping with the description of her nature in a simple act of predication, suffuses the surrounding discourse and, in so doing, not only confirms retrospectively the dissolution of εὐφροσύνα into a healthy state of the *phrên*, but also sustains the argumentation which is at the center of Pindar's thought, namely, the superiority of the healing power of music over the powers of other healers. For the word ἱατρός, like a catalyst, actualizes the therapeutic associations to be found in the semantic structures of other vocabulary items in the context. Not the least of these are the verbs θέλγειν and ἄπτεσθαι that define the place εὐφροσύνα occupies as the antecedent of νιν.

Before examining the medical potential of θέλγειν and ἄπτεσθαι, however, let us first consider readier examples, beginning with the retroactive effect of ἱατρός upon the phrase πόνων κεκριμένων. In the context of Pindaric epinician κρίσις/κρίνω necessarily refers to judgment and success in trials of athletic prowess (e.g., *O.* 3.72, *O.* 7.80, *P.* 4.253, *N.* 10.23) and, more cosmically, to that which has been decided in the divine order of things.¹⁹ But now under the influence of “ἱατρός,” it may be reasonably assigned, and has been so assigned by others,²⁰ to a specialized and perhaps recently formulated medical vocabulary, even though it is not attested in this sense earlier than the Hippocratic Corpus and has been associated by ancients and moderns with the name of Hippocrates.²¹

¹⁹ See Slater (above, note 6) 290, s.v. κρίνω section b; and especially *N.* 6.2 for the same form of the word as found here.

²⁰ Slater (*ibid.*) adopts this view, citing Brock, *Le vocabulaire médicale* (Paris 1961) 214; as does, seemingly, Frank J. Nisetich in his recent translation (*Pindar's Victory Songs* [Baltimore 1980] 246).

²¹ The question of what is originally Hippocratic in thought or language is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that no one has reconciled what Plato says about Hippocrates (*Phr.* 270C–E) with what is set forth in the Hippocratic writings. The need for a definition of κρίσις in *Aff.* c. 8 suggests a long and varied existence of the term in medicine. Κρίσις/κρίνω is certainly a well-established term in the Corpus and does not seem to be an invention of the practitioners whose writings appear there. Medical imagery also nourished Aeschylean verse, cf. Aeschylus' use of δυσκρίτων ὀνειράτων

Within the Hippocratic Corpus remnants of the archaic art of medicine surely survive in treatises like the *Aphorisms* which have the archaic catalogue form of technical *gnomai* first found in the *Works and Days*, but also characteristic of early Greek philosophy.²² Whatever date is finally assigned to the version of the *Aphorisms* as we have it,²³ its later dissemination was so widely popular²⁴ that, if it existed in some antecedent form in Pindar's day, as is likely, it might well have circulated among the learned seekers after knowledge of whom Pindar counted himself one. Although one may debate²⁵ the meaning of κρίσις in the memorable rhyming and rhythmic pronouncement with which the *Aphorisms* begins — ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή, ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς, ἡ δὲ πείρα σφαλερὴ, ἡ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπή — the word appears later in the treatise (e.g., c. 19) clearly in the medical sense it has today. Textual citations and analyses aside, however, the metaphorical origin of the term κρίσις/κρίνω in the political and legal language of trial, conflict, and contest might easily have found a place

(Ag. 981) in the third stasimon of the *Agamemnon* (975–1034). Here, as elsewhere in the *Oresteia*, Aeschylus' language is adorned with medical concepts, images, and allusions (see J. Dumortier, *Le vocabulaire médicale d'Eschyle et les écrits hippocratiques* [Paris 1935]; Gilles Maloney, "Contributions hippocratiques à l'étude de l'*Orestie* d'Eschyle," *Formes de pensée dans la Collection hippocratique*, Acts du IVe Colloque Internationale Hippocratique [Geneva 1983] 71–76), and here (as in the opening of *Nemean* 4) the immediate general topic is the health or sickness of the soul. The heart of the singer is disturbed by fear and cannot be returned to the desired state of optimism: οὐδ' ἀποπτύσαι δίκαν / δυσκρίτων ὀνειράτων / θάρσος εὐπειθέος ἵζει φρένος φίλον θρόνον. Though the central images are political, therapeutic imagery is clearly present, not as a contrast to the political, but as a natural extension of it, and anticipates the image of Asclepius in the epode (1022–4). (See Eduard Fraenkel, *Aeschylus, Agamemnon* [Oxford 1950] ii 452–3.)

²² On the aphoristic lists in the Hippocratic Corpus see I. M. Lonie, "Literacy and the Development of Hippocratic Medicine," *Formes de pensée dans la Collection hippocratique*, Acts du IVe Colloque Internationale Hippocratique, Lausanne 1981, ed. F. Lasserre et P. Mudry (Geneva 1983) 145–161, especially 149–152. Not only do these lists represent the oldest recorded teachings of medical societies, they represent as well the oldest level of the Pythagorean tradition (Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, tr. Edwin L. Minar, Jr. [Cambridge, Mass. 1972] 166 ff.). Heraclitus' obscure book and Empedocles' *Purifications* might have had this same basic form.

²³ W. H. S. Jones, "Prognostic and the Aphoristic Books," (above, note 1) vol. ii, xx–xxix.

²⁴ Jones, "Aphorisms," (above, note 1) vol. iv, xxxiii.

²⁵ Jones (above, note 1) vol. iv, 99 n. 2.

in the language of Alcmaeon or other pre-Hippocratic physiologists²⁶ for whom political metaphors and notions of conflicting powers were the springboard to physiological theory.²⁷

A similar “iatrification” infects the meaning of *πόννοι*. In the context of Pindaric epinician, *πόννοι* surely connotes the tradition of heroic labors of which the victor’s exertions and achievements are to be taken as a present instance. But under the influence of *ἱατρὸς* this expected sphere of association is expanded to include the ideas of both the pains and illnesses usually treated by the physician and also the specific fatigues and exercises of an athlete. Although the intersection of medicine and gymnastics (in the ancient sense of the term) is not specifically attested earlier than the Hippocratic Corpus, it is clearly attested there, for example, in the treatises on *Regimen* where the nature of exercise (*πόννοι*, see *Regimen* 1.2 *et passim*), the relationship between nourishment and exercise, the contribution of exercise to health and the recovery from disease, degrees of exercise from weak to excessive, the exercise of the athlete in training and competition, and so on (e.g., paragraphs 2, 35, 61 ff.), are all topics of discussion.²⁸

²⁶ Burkert (above, note 22) 280 n. 13. Burkert draws attention to a guild of physicians in Elia whose origins are traced to Pindar’s contemporary, Parmenides. Ancient tradition names a number of Presocratic philosophers as healers or teachers of healing, e.g., Diog. Laert. *Pyth. Vita* 8.12; *Emp. Vita* 58–59 (& *Emp. fr.* 111), 61–62 (& *Emp. fr.* 112).

²⁷ Such metaphors are characteristic of the Presocratic philosophers’ search for insight and an adequate terminology, e.g., Heraclitus fr. 53, or Νεῖκος and Φιλότης of Empedocles. See, e.g., G. E. R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason, and Experience: Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science* (Cambridge 1979) pp. 246 ff.; also Jones (above, note 1) vol. i, li–liiii. Pythagorean principles of contrariety do not derive from such metaphors but can be seen to have contributed to their development, as in Alcmaeon’s concept of *ἰσονομία* (fr. 4; Arist., *Metaph.* 986A 22–986B 9).

²⁸ The association of athletics and medicine was natural for the Greeks. The discussion of the gymnastic art in Plato’s *Republic* (403C–412B) relies on his readers’ and the internal audience’s recognition of learning common to both the physician and the skilled athletic trainer, who ranks with the rest of the sophists at *Protagoras* 316D. More to the point, since closer to Pindar in time, is the casual remark at the outset of the Hippocratic *Ancient Medicine* on the discoveries in regimen by practitioners of athletic arts: ἔτι γοῦν καὶ νῦν οἱ τῶν γυμνασίων τε καὶ ἀσκησίων ἐπιμελόμενοι αἰεὶ τι προσεξευρίσκουσιν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ζητέοντες ὃ τι ἐσθίων τε καὶ πίνων ἐπικρατήσῃ τε αὐτοῦ μάλιστα καὶ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς ἐωυτοῦ ἔσται (c. 4).

While the comparison of poetry to the sophisticated art of the trainer is merely implicit in these lines and corollary to the central comparison between poetry and healing in general, it is realized later in the poem in the figure of Chiron (59–61), the rescuer of Peleus in the midst of his *πόννοι*, and at the poem’s close in the figure of Melesias, a contemporary exemplar of the trainer’s art (93–96; *O.* 8.54–66). Chiron, teacher of heroes

In *Regimen* too, interestingly, we find restoring hot baths for the abatement of fatigue (66) and the purgation of the sick (68 ff.), the very point of comparison to which the first three lines of *Nemean* 4 (as I read them) succeed in lines 4–5: “Nor does hot water so relax the limbs as praise fitted to the phorminx.” Not only is hot water in this context rendered therapeutic, but the effect of water as well. Although *μαλάσσω* is not found in *Regimen* to describe the effect of a hot bath, it is used there to describe, along with heating and moistening, the effects of a closely allied practice used regularly by athletes, that of oiling the limbs (58). *Μαλάσσω* can also refer to internal abatements or reductions as in the expression *πυρετός ἐμαλάχθη*, “the fever abated” (Hp. *Epid.* 3.6). Thus, to soften the limbs is to abate the tensions or excess heat produced by *πόνοι*. In *Regimen* 66 fatigue is explained in terms of the theory of heat and moisture. In this discussion *πυρετός* is a term employed in extreme cases, and the immediate cure is a bath not excessively hot. In general, hot baths after exercise have the effect of cooling and drying, but after eating, of warming and moistening. Hence their proper use entails the art of knowing what is desirable in every instance. The wise healer will know how to use them, but the wise poet’s remedies are even better.

Μαλθακός itself is used in the Hippocratic Corpus of things applied or administered to the body, as in soft water (*μαλθακά ὕδατα*, Hp. *Aër.* 1), or soft bandages (Hp. *Art.* 14), as well as of the effects of various emollients, and of certain bodily conditions, such as loose or soft bowels (Hp. *Aër.* 7). Although these examples are not a product of a systematic search, such a search would, I believe, yield the same con-

and the demi-god Asclepius (*P.* 3.5–7), is the perfect mythic mediator between heroic *πόνοι* and medicine, for to his pupils, even those like Achilles and Jason, whose *personae* are not essentially that of healers but of warriors, he imparts medical lore and skill (e.g., *Il.* 9.480–484 and Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. i, tr. by Gilbert Highet [New York 1945] 25–26, 217–218). For this idea in connection with Jason in *Pi.* *P.* 4, see Emmet Robbins, “Jason and Chiron: the Myth of Pindar’s Fourth Pythian,” *Phoenix* 29 (1975) 205–213; and Charles Segal, *Pindar’s Mythmaking: The Fourth Pythian Ode* (Princeton 1986) 19. To be affiliated with these allusions are the wrestling metaphors of lines 33–43 and the closing lines (93–96), as well as the myth of Peleus’ wrestling with the many shapes of Thetis (63–65). For a discussion of the wrestling metaphors in *Nemean* 4, which celebrates a victory in wrestling, see Michael Poliakoff, *Studies in the Terminology of Greek Combat Sports* (Meisenheim 1982) 137–138; and Deborah Steiner, *The Crown of Song: Metaphor in Pindar* (Oxford 1986) 24, 114, 117–120.

clusion, that like κεκριμένων in line 1, μαλθακά ... γυῖα has a potential medical dimension which becomes noticeable in this particular context. The adjective is no doubt an instance of hypallage, in that the hot bath is felt to be the soothing instrument of soothed limbs, just as the gentle hand of the healer, on the principle of “like to like,” eases pain. The archetypal hand of the divine physician Asclepius, the instrument of his cures, is a gentle hand (μαλακόχειρα νόμον [*N.* 3.55], μαλακὰν χέρα προσβάλλοντα [*P.* 4.217, as a metaphor for the art of governing]; see also a similar use of ἥπιος, *Her. Mim.* 4.18). So too are his ἐπαιδαί (*P.* 3.51). Among the graces of Asclepius his wife Epione is the embodiment of the gentleness which is the hallmark of the effective healer.²⁹ Thus we need not appeal exclusively to technical treatises to discover the therapeutic qualities of the hot bath. Indeed the image of the restoring hot bath is an heroic regimen, familiar from archetypal epic scenes as both the conclusion to heroic labors and the pleasurable prelude to the victory feast.³⁰ It is also peculiarly appropriate for an epinician hymn, whose performers and audience would not only recollect the victor’s achievement in athletic contests, but might have themselves just come from the fatigues of the gymnasium and the pleasures of bathing.³¹

Pindar’s choice of γυῖα in this context as the word for the parts of the body soothed by the hot bath (as opposed to μέλη or κωλή) is perhaps also in keeping with the therapeutic tenor of his thought. In Homer τὰ γυῖα are the seat of strength; the term is typically used of the body in a state of vigor and controlled precision (e.g., *Il.* 5.122, 13.61, 23.772), or one of weakness caused by wounds (fatal or otherwise), or by fatigue, conditions which unstring or loosen (-λυω; *Il.* 4.469 = 11.260, 6.27, 7.6, 7.12 = 16, 13.85) the limbs’ natural tension. Even their immobilization by the divine action of θέλγειν can be found (*Il.* 13.435). There too we find limbs set in balanced opposition to psychic guts (θάρσος ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε καὶ ἐκ δέος εἴλετο γυῖων [*Od.* 6.140]). By putting together these two images, μαλθακά and γυῖα, Pindar has at once enlivened our sense of the traditional extremities of

²⁹ Emma J. and Ludwig Edelstein, *Asclepius: A Collection and Interpretation of Testimonies* (Baltimore 1945) ii 86–87.

³⁰ Recall the hot bath in Odyssean narrative as a restorative after the fatigues of travel, and even after feats of athletic prowess, e.g., *Od.* 8.426 ff., 10.360–364; cf. *A. Ch.* 670.

³¹ Cf. Pindar’s use of μαλακός at the end of the ode (95) in the comparison of epinician poetry to wrestling.

pain and pleasure, and strengthened the contrast between the poet's wise words and the physician's efficient applications.

It is easy to convince a modern audience of the therapeutic value of the hot bath; but, because we believe that magic and scientific medicine are antithetical to one another, it is less easy for us to see how a word like *θέλγειν* participates in ancient notions of the healer's art. Our instinct is to oppose the two spheres of activity, not to conjoin them, and to believe that Pindar in the proem to *Nemean* 4 is doing likewise. Yet in *Pythian* 3 Pindar himself bears clear witness against this view when he summarizes Asclepius' treatment of the sick: τοὺς μὲν μαλακαῖς ἐπαιδαῖς ἀμφέπων, / τοὺς δὲ προσανέα πίνοντας, ἧ γυίοις περάπτων πάντοθεν / φάρμακα, τοὺς δὲ τομαῖς ἔστασεν ὀρθοῦς. The incantations that head Pindar's list and appear elsewhere in the poetic tradition (e.g., δῆσαν ἐπισταμένως, ἐπαιδιῇ δ' αἶμα κελαινὸν / ἔσχεθον ... [*Od.* 19.457–458]; οὐ πρὸς ἱατροῦ σοφοῦ / θρηνεῖν ἐπιδᾶς πρὸς τομῶντι πῆματι [*S. Aj.* 581–582]) no doubt reflect the practices of mortal physicians. Only consider what the author of the Hippocratic *Sacred Disease* has to say against those fellow healers who believe in the divine origin of seizures and so attempt to cure them, like magicians (c. 2), by purifications and incantations (καθαρμοῖσί τε ἰῶνται καὶ ἐπαιδιῇσιν, c. 1, see cc. 1–4), or the vision of Empedocles, the great healer magician and purifier, practicing his craft among his fellow Sicilians (fr. 111, 112 [*D.L.* 8.58–9, 61–2]). An expert in magical healing rites need be no less an expert than the physician who professes the natural causes of disease. How else do we explain Socrates' mock prescription in the *Charmides* (155E–157C) of a *pharmakon* and an incantation for the headache?

The art of healing in antiquity was never divorced from ritual. Even the ancient physicians who, like the author of the *Sacred Disease*, sought for the origin and character of disease among natural causes, did not believe that these causes were purely mechanical (Epicureans, of course, excepted). Nature itself, the world of change, was divine and animated, and the skilled (σοφός) practitioner who would understand and deal with these causes must take into account their divine nature. His quarrel with rival practitioners stemmed ultimately from an understanding of the divine nature different from theirs. They, like the Achaeans at the outset of the *Iliad* who sought relief from plague in the appeasing of Apollo, believed that certain illnesses arose from the specific actions of specific deities who were expressing their displea-

sure at those they afflicted; while he, instead of looking for and trying to appease or control individual divine wills, scrutinized the regular and uncapricious workings of a divine nature which governed the whole for good, rather than for malevolent purposes, and saw in an understanding of the whole the possibilities of individual relief.³² His power lay in his cosmology. But it derived from Asclepius and was protected by him. Furthermore, man's physiological condition was not to be separated from his psychological processes. The soul was spread throughout the body which it moved and whose environment it interpreted. All cures would affect it; but affecting it directly (θέλγειν), if one could, might be the most effective cure of physical ills.³³

It should not surprise us, then, that the cult of Asclepius, the divine healer, grew to maturity in the late 6th and 5th centuries together with Greek cosmology.³⁴ His methods and his power, whatever the power the mortal Asclepiadae pretended to in his name, belong, like all divine power, to the realm of the marvelous, the magical. It was from their

³² Hipp. *Aër.* 1, 22; *Morc. Sacr.* 21. For a treatment of this subject from a purely medical point of view see Ludwig Edelstein, "Greek Medicine in Its Relation to Religion and Magic," *Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine* 5 (1937) 201–246; rpt. *Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein* (Baltimore 1967) 205–246, especially his discussion of divine and natural causes and those who, like the author of the *Sacred Disease*, stood against the use of magic in medical practice (212–219), and his discussion of music as a healing device (235–239). More recently, from a broader perspective, see Lloyd (above, note 27) 10–58.

³³ See, e.g., Empedocles, frs. 105, 107 & A86 (Theophr. *Sens.* 9–10).

³⁴ The influence of the 6th century foundation or enlargement of the Asclepius cult at Epidaurus on the next generation must have been profound, although the 5th century literary and epigraphical record, too scanty for these decades, would appear to prove that the great blossoming of the cult began in the latter half of the 5th century. For this viewpoint see Edelstein (above, note 29) ii 98, 245 ff. The cult at Aegina mentioned in Aristophanes (*V.* 122–3) might have been established long before, its foundation possibly having some connection with the patrons of *N.* 4. I am not convinced by the Edelsteins (ii 66) that Pindar's heroic rather than divine treatment of Asclepius in *P.* 3 has much significance in defining his conception of the demigod or the way this conception influenced his poetic imagination. When poets treated the legends of Heracles, they did not make him divine, yet temples were raised in his honor. Historical wise men were conceived at times to have reached the status of *daimones*, or even gods, after death, yet this immortality does not cast a very long shadow upon the telling of their human lives, except to show that by their extraordinary powers they merited their elevation. C. Kerényi from another perspective than mine has effectively argued against the Edelsteins' view in his *Asklepios: Archetypal Image of the Physician's Existence*, tr. by Ralph Manheim (New York 1959) xiii–xxv.

lord's power, through his grace in them, that mere mortal physicians derived their sometimes seemingly miraculous cures from apparently mundane procedures. But why should the desperately ill not dispense with his intermediaries and seek help from the god himself? In Asclepius' godly ability to cure all illnesses, whether of the living or the dead (*P.* 3.55–58; cf. *A. Ag.* 1019–1024), the ancients found the potent magic that gods, demigods and proficient heroes regularly exercise within certain spheres of influence and expertise.³⁵ Openly, in their invocations to him, they acknowledge that magic. From earliest times Aesclepius is κακῶν θελκτὴρ ὀδυνάων (*h. Hom.* 16.4).³⁶

Surely for the poet of *Nemean* 4, who is dealing not in the technicalities and disputations of medicine, but with its image and myth, the association of healing with divine proficiency is a proper part of his universe of discourse, and even more so in this particular context which points directly to divine influence. Although we may not be willing to accept the deification or “Hesiodification” of the Grace Euphrosyna in the first line of the ode (above, pp. 118–119), we cannot deny the presence of the Muses and their skillful daughter-songs as the subject of θέλγειν in the second and third lines. Pindar's method of presenting his own craft is to honor its power in the gods who promote and protect

³⁵ Divine souls, like Eros, control lesser souls by an irresistible magic (e.g., *Pl. Smp.* 197E). So too do lesser powers like the Sirens and other spellbinders of myth (Circe, Calypso, Medea, Orpheus, etc.). Men deemed to possess extraordinary knowledge approaching to the divine were seen to be great magicians (E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* [Berkeley 1951] 143–146, and e.g. Lloyd [above, note 27] 33–35, 51).

³⁶ This Classical occurrence of the genitive of a word for illness accompanying the agent noun θελκτὴρ is not a violation of the rule that θέλγειν does not take such words as grammatical objects. A similar construction is found in this period with derived adjectives (and neuter nouns) of instrumentality (θελκτήριον, e.g., πόνων θελκτηρία, *A. Ch.* 670). Both constructions seem to be transformations, not of the verb θέλγειν with a direct object, but of θέλγειν with an infinitive object or of locutions like κάκει δικαστὰς τῶνδε καὶ θελκτηρίους / μύθους ἔχοντες μηχανὰς εὐρήσομεν / ὥστ' ἐς τὸ πᾶν σε τῶνδ' ἀπαλλάξαι πόνων (*A. Eu.* 81–2), in which the result of charming someone is the removal of his pain. The genitive is not objective but ablative, a genitive of separation. It is the patient, not his illnesses, who is charmed and so made free of pain. The magic of θέλγειν worked by its effect on souls and removed pains by this means, not by persuading or forcing the illnesses conceived as demons to quit the body. In this regard several lines from Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* are helpful. The chorus believe that Orestes' vision of the Furies results from a disturbance of the *phrên*, caused by the fresh blood on his hands (ποταίνιον γὰρ αἱμά σοι χεροῖν ἔτι· / ἐκ τῶνδ' εἰς ταρμὸς ἐς φρένας πίτνει [*A. Ch.* 1055–1056]), and they suggest that Apollo will purify him at a touch: εἷς σοι καθαρμοῖς· Λοξίας δὲ προσθιγὼν / ἐλευθερόν σε τῶνδε πημάτων κτίσει (1059–1060).

it. Nor in the comparison of the art of poetry to the art of medicine that his “iatrification” of Euphrosyna implies would he be able to dissociate himself from this realm of thought. By laying claim to songs as the proficient daughters of the Muses, Pindar implicitly evokes in the aesthetic apprehension of his listeners a comparable healing image—perhaps cures as the offspring of Asclepius, who by their skill call up as if by magic the iatric graces which attend him: Epione, usually his wife, and his daughters, Panacea, Aceso, Iaso, and above all Hygieia.³⁷ In pursuing this line of thought, it is already possible to see how the Grace Euphrosyna, a divine intermediary, might be a proper antecedent of *viv*, even though as a demonic power she is a natural subject of *θέλειν*, and how the claim that she is the best healer counters the claims of the physicians who may produce health, but no happiness.³⁸

By realizing the presence of the divine in Pindar’s “iatrification” of the proem to *Nemean* 4, we can more readily grasp his pregnant use of *ἄπτεσθαι* at the end of line three. The word has what we might term its purely physical aspect in the concrete image of touching, joining, or fastening, and this image is frequently applied in contexts of healing. Although the prescribing word of Asclepius is often the means of effecting magical deliverance from disease and pain, his hands are his primary curative instruments. With them he examines the body, attaches various *pharmaka*, repairs injured limbs, removes and readjusts diseased parts, bathes, and anoints.³⁹ Indeed, so vividly does the

³⁷ Edelstein (above, note 29) ii 85–91. In *Plutus* 701 ff. Iaso and Panacea accompany him, as do his divine snakes, who cure Plutus by magically licking (touching) his eyes. His appearance is often recorded in later remembrances or accompanying thank offerings, or depicted in cult statues and dedicatory images. What we aim to get hold of is the structure of possibilities in the collective mental experience or common culture of the ancients, which lies behind these appearances. But I do not wish to go so far as to assert that the image of Asclepius which adorned his temples and the hearts of his worshippers was consciously used by Pindar as an analogue to his thought. Rather I would propose that it effectively suggests to us and to some degree accurately reflects one of the complexes of ideas out of which the imaginative comparison of medicine and poetry in the proemium to *Nemean* 4 arose. For an account of the mythic complexities of this image of Asclepius, see Kerényi (above, note 34). The Edelsteins see nothing holy in the hero of *Pythian* 3 (above, note 34) and conclude, erroneously, that it did not exist. Although the interaction of cult and myth in Greek poetry is difficult to apprehend, it should not be dismissed. The reason proposed for the theme of *P.* 3, the illness of Hieron, is rhetorically fitting. The reason for the introduction to *N.* 4 is obscure, possibly the death of the victor’s father (line 14), possibly the worship of Asclepius in Aegina (above, note 34).

³⁸ Cf. the pairing of the iatric and musical graces at *Pythian* 3.72–73.

³⁹ For the evidence and an account of Asclepius’ cures by touch see Edelstein (above,

merciful hand of the god inform the visual imagination of the ancient Greeks, that it is honored not only in Pindaric epithet (τὸν φαρμάκων ... μαλακόχειρα νόμον, *N.* 3.55) and metaphor (Χρὴ μαλακὰν χέρα προσβάλλοντα τρώμαν ἔλκεος ἀμφιπολεῖν, *P.* 4.271 [a metaphor for the art of governing]), but in prayers,⁴⁰ dedications,⁴¹ and images of the god.⁴² Sometimes in epiphanies or cult statues of the god it appears leading forth or holding his esteemed daughter (sometimes his wife, always his grace or benefit), Hygieia (Herod. *Mim.* 4.4–5). The efficacy of the divine touch is emulated by mortal physicians when they minister with their hands to the sick (τὸν δὲ κακαῖς νοῦσοισι κυκώμενον ἀργαλαῖς τε / ἀψάμενος χειροῖν αἴψα τίθησ' ὑγίῃ, Sol. fr. 13.61–62).

In a world where the corporeal and spiritual are inextricably intertwined the divine touch of Asclepius and his minions includes what we might call the transfer of psychic or animating energy, and its effects are at once physical and psychological, purifying the spirit-man.⁴³ So potent is the notion of corporeal psychological touching that, beyond its uses in contexts where the notion of observable physical contact is present, ἄπτεσθαι can be found as a term for describing the specifically physio-psychological experience of the sensual perception of visual and auditory phenomena, and the emotional and mental processes dependent on these. It becomes a metaphor for expressing unseen events and relations,⁴⁴ and in this capacity it particularly suits the context of *Nemean* 4.

This suitability can be illustrated by a less compressed prose encomium, Agathon's praise of Eros from Plato's *Symposium* (194E–197E), where unexpectedly we find a structure of thought and diction similar to Pindar's in *Nemean* 4.1–3. Here the frequent image and idea of ἄπτεσθαι is conjoined to the notion of wisdom

note 29) i 212 ff., ii 153–154. The earliest description of such a cure is Ar. *Pl.* 633–747.

⁴⁰ ἱητρα / νοῦσων ἐποιεῖμεσθα τὰς ἀπέψησας / ἐπ' ἡπίας σὺ χεῖρας, ὦ ἄναξ, τείνας (Herod. *Mim.* 4.16–18).

⁴¹ E.g., μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸν θεὸν ἄψασθαί οὐ τᾷ [χ]ρὶ' (I.G. IV²1.122–62 [Edelstein (above, note 29) T. 423.31]).

⁴² E.g., Edelstein (above, note 29) i 262–3 (T. 456, from Suidas, *Lexicon*, s.v. θεόπομος).

⁴³ Cf. A. *Ch.* 1055–1056, 1059–1060 (above, note 36).

⁴⁴ In Plato the verb operates as an unmarked relational term for touching in general or mathematically (e.g., *Parm.* 138A, 148–149), mental processes (*Parm.* 133A, *Ph.* 65A), and the mechanism of sense perception (*Ph.* 65B).

(σοφός/σοφία), especially in regard to poetry (196D–197B), but also other arts, including medicine (197A), and the whole argument culminates in the magical figure of Eros, the leader of the chorus, charming with his song the thought of gods and men (θέλων πάντων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων νόημα [197E]).

Ἄπτεσθαι is first introduced by Agathon as an image to characterize the joining of a divine power to the receptive souls of men and gods (ἀπτόμενον οὖν αἰεὶ καὶ ποσὶν καὶ πάντῃ ἐν μαλακωτάτοις [ἤθεσι καὶ ψυχαῖς] τῶν μαλακωτάτων, *Smp.* 195E) and then applied in various ways to describe divine causation, on the principle of “like to like,” in the complex process of soul transformation (196C, 196E, 197A [ἐφάπνεται]). Had he been reading *Nemean* 4, Plato’s Agathon would not have been frustrated by the scholiast’s dilemma about the charming of the charming Euphrosyna, for in asserting that force does not fasten itself to Eros (196C), he reflects a common antique perception, that the effect of divine agency is attributable to the character of the divine agent and is produced in him as he produces it (inspires [“κἂν ἄμουσος ἢ τὸ πρῖν,” οὗ ἂν Ἔρως ἀψεται, 196E], teaches [ὁ θεὸς σοφός ... διδάξειε, 196E–197A], charms it into being [θέλγειν 197E]) in others.

The reciprocity of this relation of cause to effect is especially pronounced and intellectually provocative when the name of the acting deity is the grammatical nominalization or personification of the action or state he governs, as is the case with Eros in the *Symposium* and Euphrosyna in *Nemean* 4. Under this line of reasoning, it is difficult to imagine how Εὐφρόσυνα ἱατρός, as the simultaneous expression of a divine cause and effect of both song and healing, is not the antecedent of νῖν in *Nemean* 4.3. Divine songs, the daughters of the Muses (not some other iatric powers), are the proficient causes of the joyful healing power of Euphrosyna. They bring her into being by invisibly attaching⁴⁵ themselves to her *phrên* (and ours) to make her (and us) εὐφρων

⁴⁵ Although the verb ἄπτεσθαι is not used elsewhere in Pindar in precisely this psychological sense—after all where else in Pindar is this particular structure of terms duplicated?—nevertheless it appears regularly in the sense of reaching or attaining to a goal, in both a concrete and figurative sense (*P.* 10.29, *I.* 4.12; *O.* 3.43), and this sense is by no means alien to the use of ἄπτεσθαι at *N.* 4.3, that is to say, the Muses daughters aim at producing the effect of εὐ-φρο-σύνᾱ. Twice Pindar uses the verb in the abstract moral sense of having to do with something or someone (*P.* 3.29; *N.* 8.22); but these contexts in no way imply that the joining expressed by the verb is for the purpose of removal. Quite the contrary, the verb expresses engagement either for good or bad ends. Indeed outside Pindar the verb does not take as its object (regularly expressed as a partitive genitive) that which is removed by touch. Even though the verb can express the hostile inten-

and so transform our *phrenes* from states of un-wellness (sorrow, tension and strife, fatigue, unkindliness, vice and ignorance) into a state of wellness (happiness, ease, beneficence,⁴⁶ virtue and knowledge) more effectively than the nostrums of an artful doctor.

Like Plato in the *Symposium*, Pindar at *Nemean* 4.2–3 typically links the magical power of *mousikê* not just with pleasure, but with learning. Yet, as in countless other instances, the attempt to paraphrase Pindar's meaning encounters difficulties. The Muses are, assuredly, the divine conduits of knowledge in others, either through their own songs, which are wise (σοφαί) as the Muses are wise, or through the songs of those whom they have schooled. But whose songs are the Muses' daughters, the Muses' own or the poet's? And whose *phrenes* are they transforming? If the songs are those the poet sings, then the *phrenes* they affect are those of the victor and his fellow celebrants, as well as the generalized *phrenes* of audiences everywhere and throughout time. The poet's songs enlighten them, turning them from enfeebling fatigue and misery to healing joy, from spitefulness to amiability, from infirmity to strength, from ignorance to understanding, from vice to virtue. But if the songs are the ones the Muses themselves sing, then among humankind the *phrenes* they affect are the *phrenes* of the poets. Their songs are the teachers of teachers, the divine instruments of empowerment. To experience the blessedness of hearing the Muses themselves singing *in propriis personis* is a divine prerogative seldom shared by mortals (e.g., Hes. *Th.* 34–39; cf. Pi. *P.* 3.89–96), save one kind, the wise man (wise prince [*Th.* 79–97], especially the wise poet [*Th.* 22–35]). For on Olympus the Muses sing primarily for the gods, to turn their grief to

tions of the subject, in contexts of health and disease, the subject is the illnesses themselves and the object the person or the part of the person attacked. In none of these instances would the *ρόνοι* of *N.* 4.1 be a suitable object.

⁴⁶ The magical effect of song on the will is found in another medical context in Pindar. The would-be aim of the poet of *Pythian* 3 is to persuade Chiron, who exhibits Promethean benevolence—νόον ἔχοντ' ἀνδρῶν φίλον (*P.* 3.5)—to act favorably on behalf of the sick: εἰ δὲ σώφρων ἄντρον ἔναι' ἔτι Χίρων, καὶ τί οἱ / φίλτρον ἐν θυμῷ μελιγάρυες ὕμνοι / ἀμέτεροι τίθεν, ἰατῆρά τοί κέν νιν πίθον / καὶ νυν ἐσλοῖσι παρασχέιν ἀνδράσιν θερμᾶν νόσων / ἢ τινα Λατοῖδα κεκλημένον ἢ πατέρος (63–67). “But if *phrên*-preserving Chiron still inhabited his cave and somehow our honey-sweet-voiced hymns had placed a potion in his heart (made him εὖφρων or well-disposed towards us [cf. Pi. *O.* 2.14, 4.12, 7.63; A. *Pers.* 77; S. *Aj.* 705]), assuredly I would have persuaded him even now to provide noblemen with a healer of hot illnesses, either someone like the one called the son of Leto's son or one like the son of the father.”

joy (Hes. *Th.* 36–74), but among men, who do not have the immediate access to the nature of things accorded the immortals, these songs, should they be heard, are more than entertaining, they are creative.⁴⁷ They make the poet's *phrên* capable of song. They give him well-ordered profound content, and they make him want to give it to others. It is surely not accidental that Pindar rounds out this introductory strophe with an allusion to the power of the proficient poet's *phrên* when in the moment of composition he has met with the Graces. Pindar's final object is, to be sure, the character-nourishing pleasure of his patrons, and he will attain his end, if, in the act of singing, his own heart is so endowed with the graces that they are able to charm forth these graces in others.⁴⁸

Rhetorical evidence, the focus of Bundy's analysis, supports, rather than undermines, this interpretation of the structure and meaning of *Nemean* 4.1–3. Bundy saw in the opposition between εὐφροσύνα and αἰδοῖν a topical convention which he thought Pindar's audience would immediately recognize, the notion that the lasting effect of song is superior to the transient effect of the symposium.⁴⁹ No one would

⁴⁷ See Pi. fr. 31 for another presentation of this idea.

⁴⁸ A different, darker perspective on the empowering of the poet is offered later in the ode in the enigmatic lines about the *iunx* (33–47) where the theme of magic is reintroduced (35).

⁴⁹ Bundy (above, note 2) 2. In my own reading of Pindar I do not find the theme of the opposition between the durability of song and the fleeting nature of the symposium in those other places where Bundy finds it. At *N.* 9.1–3 κωμάσμεν includes the idea of song, and the ἀλλ' is assentient, "But come now, don't delay, strike up the song." It is the means by which the κωμάζειν will take place. Later at *N.* 9.48 ff. there is no balanced opposition between music and the symposium as such, but rather a progression to the effect that the pleasure of celebration following upon victory is increased by song, and the power of song is in turn increased by wine. At *P.* 10.34–36 good times and good words are presented as different aspects of sacrifice and in both of them does Apollo find pleasure. If there is in their union an implied contrast between the pleasures of the moment and enduring pleasures, I do not see it. Nor do I see it a few lines later (38–40) where the whirling choruses are presented as a primary aspect of pleasurable feasts (εἰλαπινάζουσιν εὐφρόνως). Just those aspects of music which are most fleeting are presented, not the words, but the music and the dance, the spectacle, not the meaning. A contrast between transience and stability may well lie behind the pairing of εὐφροσύνα and δόξα in *P.* 11.45; but here εὐφροσύνα stands for nothing concrete in Bundy's sense, but for the idea of pleasure in contrast to reputation, and nowhere is that pleasure to be associated with the symposium more than with the songs sung at the symposium. Songs produce both pleasure and glory; but the victory is the primary cause of both these effects. Song is merely a vehicle.

argue that the lasting or monumental effect of song—the fame (κλέος, δόξα) that it confers and the glory (κῦδος) and honor (τιμή) that it celebrates—is not an important theme in ancient poetry from Homer to Pindar and beyond; nor that this godlike durability was not more highly to be prized than the fleeting pleasures of the symposium, which serve merely as adornments to the lasting achievements commemorated in song. Pindar himself assumes this view both in the closing lines of the strophe (6–8) and near the close of the ode in the image of the stele (79–85). But one can argue that εὐφροσύνη, even when referring to the festivities of the symposium in general (instead of the feeling such festivities produce),⁵⁰ never excludes from its associated semantic fields the pleasure produced by song, and usually includes it.⁵¹ So closely connected with the effect of music is the well-being described by εὐφροσύνη, that Plato in the *Timaeus* (80B) specifically associates it with the highest pleasure to be derived from music.⁵² In the *Cratylus*, thinking along these same lines, he etymologizes εὐφροσύνη from εὐ-φέρεσθαι, singling it out from among other Greek words for pleasure (419B–D) as a term especially to be associated with the well-ordered motion of the soul, an effect produced by music of certain kinds, but not perhaps by wine or sex or the other less intellectual pleasures of the symposium.⁵³

⁵⁰ Usually found in the plural, e.g., H. *Od.* 6.157, B. 10.9–14. Εὐφροσύνη can be used without the idea of feasting in the context. At *Od.* 23.52 it is simply the opposite of suffering.

⁵¹ Song is not mentioned by Circe at *Od.* 10.460–5 or Eurycleia at *Od.* 20.8, but the reasons are circumstantial, not essential. Musical entertainment is the main feature of the Phaeacian feast (*Od.* 9.6), where the beauty of a child dancing is the centerpiece of Odysseus' compliment (*Od.* 6.156). Wine is the immediate producer of joy in Xenophanes 1.4, but the description of the symposium as a whole includes music. Usually music is more central in Archaic poetry, e.g., Sol. 20, Anacr. *el.* 2, *h. Merc.* 4.483.

⁵² I.e., the point at which the motions (φοραί) of wise and intelligent souls (ἔμφορονες) imitate the divine harmony produced by the motion of the heavenly spheres: ἡδονὴν μὲν τοῖς ἄφροσιν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ τοῖς ἔμφοσιν διὰ τὴν τῆς θείας ἁρμονίας μίμησιν ἐν θνηταῖς γενομένην φοραῖς παρέσχον. The use of ἄφροσιν/ἔμφοσιν implies Plato's awareness of the root configuration of the word.

⁵³ “Εὐφροσύνη” δὲ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ῥηθῆναι· παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν συμφέρεσθαι τοῦτο ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα, “εὐφεροσύνην” τό γε δίκαιον ... (419D). Plato's ruminations on the special character of εὐφροσύνη (how would he have read the opening of *Nemean* 4?) no doubt reflect already well-established ideas, descended from archaic physiological theories, such as those of *crasis* and *isonomia*, about the nature of pleasure, or health, and pain in the soul and body. Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1369b 33–34.

As regards pleasure, music indeed has a complex character. The performance of music (meaning, sound, spectacle) may in the first instance be compared equally with the other principle ingredients of the symposium—a satisfied appetite, intoxication, good fellowship and conversation, sexual arousal, and, if followed by a good ending, sexual fulfillment and an undisturbed sleep. From this point of view the pleasure produced by music is as transient as that produced by the symposium as a whole and is indeed but a part of that pleasure. Yet there is another way of looking at the particular grace (χάρις) that accompanies music. The beauty and wisdom and the beneficial reordering that it produces in the soul are recollectible, reproduceable, and above all heightening in an absolute sense. One might say that the experience of music is like the experience of the victory which it celebrates, the pleasure of realizing in thought and action a divine state. Such χάρις has a permanent effect, in that through it the soul itself is changed, not just entertained.

In truth, if we take εὐφροσύνα as the antecedent of νιν, it is about music's superiority in eliciting this second kind of pleasure, εὐφροσύνη in the highest and most potent and durable sense, that Pindar can be seen to be arguing in the opening lines of *Nemean* 4. Moreover his language (and the language of Plato after him) reflects precisely the kind of rhetorical and philosophical commonplace that Bundy himself has taught us to expect in the epinicians of Pindar. The broadest formulation of this topos uses the same kind of reasoning that informs much deliberative and deictic oratory, and indeed ethical and psychological theory, and, finally, much didactic and rhetorical poetry. What are the sources of our pleasures?⁵⁴ What things are more/most pleasurable? (τὴν γὰρ ἡδονὴν πάντα διώκει, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἡδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ὥρισται δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος [Arist. *Rhet.* 1364B 23–25]). The rhetorical opposition between music and the feast (the occasion for music) does indeed exist in *Nemean* 4.1–3, but it lies not in the contrast between εὐφροσύνα, as the victory feast, and αἰδαί. Rather it is included among the traditional questions implicit in the bold declaration that songs, and not something else, produce a panacean enchantment (αἰδοὶ θέλξαν νιν [εὐφροσύναν] ἀπτόμεναι). What is it that engenders fatigue-banishing, soul-healing joy? Is it

⁵⁴ Cf., e.g., Pindar's concern with the problematic nature of love, *N.* 8.4–5 and *N.* 11.48.

music or other traditional sources of pleasure (e.g., wine, love, sleep)? Or more specifically, under the present circumstances, is it the victory song or the victory itself? Or is it the victory song or the other pleasures of the victory celebration? Or, from a different point of view, is it songs or other more usual means of healing pain or eliciting a healer of pain? Pindar's declaration is a traditional⁵⁵ answer to questions like these, in effect an argument that song is superior to all other means of making hearts glad.

Nothing in the epic or lyric tradition gainsays this reconstruction of the traditional structure of thought behind these lines, whereas Bundy's view of the opposition between pleasure and song requires a certain amount of special pleading. The impulse in archaic and classical poetry is everywhere for the linking, not the separation, of the two concepts. Where the idea of pleasure is specifically expressed as εὐφοροσύνη (rather than τέρψις, χαρά, etc.), there we find the idea of music and the idea of pleasure even more closely joined, for music, second only to love in uniting Πειθώ and Χάρις (Pi. fr. 123.14; also Hes. *Op.* 73), is a most potent means of affecting (θέλγειν) the φρήν.⁵⁶

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⁵⁵ E.g., H. *Il.* 9.185–189, Hes. *Th.* 36–74, 94–103; H. *Merc.* 416–503. At the end of *Odyssey* 8 and the opening of *Odyssey* 9, where Odysseus' reaction to hearing the tales of Troy represents a miscarriage of music's normal restorative power, it is important for the recognition scene that Demodocus' singing be seen to have the opposite effect upon Odysseus from the one intended by the singer and expected by his audience. The Nurse's well-known speech in Euripides' *Medea* (190–230) controverts the topic, her point being that since the occasions for song are themselves bringers of pleasure, what is gained by the addition of joy-bringing songs which are wholly ineffectual when hearts are truly grieving in joyless times?

⁵⁶ The *locus classicus* is surely *Od.* 12.39–45, the Sirens' song. Pindar himself elsewhere exemplifies the theme, cf. *P.* 1.12. In the archaic tradition the thesis of music's power to affect the φρήν/φρένες finds its most complete expression in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* (416–503), where Pindar's diction in its non-therapeutic aspect is even more clearly anticipated than in the opening of the *Theogony* (above, p. 118). Like other archaic commonplaces, the idea of the effect of music on the φρήν (ψυχή) nourished Greek speculative thought, cf. *Pl. Lg.* 649 ff., 790C–791B. For contemporary scholarship touching on this subject, see, e.g., W. B. Stanford, *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions* (London 1983) 1–10, 164–168; J. de Romilly, *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, Mass. 1975); Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Emotions," *CP* 33 (1938) 390–404; George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 63, 78–79; P. Lain Entralgo, *The Therapy of the Word* (Yale 1970); R. G. A. Buxton, *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy: A Study of Peitho* (Cambridge 1982) especially pp. 51–57 on the synonymy of θέλγειν and πείθειν; and G. W. Walsh,

The Varieties of Enchantment (Chapel Hill 1984). Among recent accounts of the topoi of Greek poetry see especially William G. Thalmann, *Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry* (Baltimore 1984) 130. For θέλγειν as a synonym of πείθειν see *Od.* 9.25–33 and the summary line 33: ἄλλ' ἐμὸν οὐ ποτε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔπειθεν. The grammatical structure of both verbs is similar, in that one can persuade or charm another soul or ensouled being to do something. In *Pi. P.* 3.63–68 these ideas are conjoined in a context of healing, where songs are the means of such action.

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