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Prejudice and the Brexit Vote

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In case you missed it...

- ▶ 23rd June 2016
- ▶ Binary vote question
- ▶ “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”
 - Remain a member of the European Union **48%** **(16,141,241)**
 - Leave the European Union **52%** **(17,410,742)**
 - Turnout = 72.2%
 - Leave: England **54%**
 - Leave: Wales **52.5%**
 - Leave: Scotland **38%**
 - Leave: Northern Ireland **44%**

- Source: Electoral Commission (2016)

Reasons for Voting for Brexit (2016)

▶ At an individual level

- Migration
- Economy
- Sovereignty

- ▶ 'Highest Brexit support in struggling areas where average incomes, education and skill levels are low and there are few opportunities to get ahead' (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016).
- ▶ Recent change in area prosperity not correlated with Brexit vote (Resolution Foundation, 2016) but 'long-term entrenchment' may play a role (JRF, 2016)

Reasons for Voting for Brexit (2016)

► Immigration

- Did migration to a specific area lead to higher Brexit voting in that area?
 - No correlation (Colantone & Stanig, 2016)... but 'Import shock'
 - Sudden influx (5 – 10% of specific population change in last 10 years) more likely to vote leave (JRF, 2016)
- As number of foreign immigrants increases, correlation with respondents saying 'immigration is one of most important issues facing the country' increases (Ipsos, 2016)

Reasons for voting for Brexit (pre-2016)

- ▶ Attitudes toward Legal Immigrants in 2005 National Survey (Abrams & Houston, 2006)
 - 17% Negative
 - 35% Neutral
 - 48% Positive
 - ▶ Migration Observatory 2014 Survey: Perceived costs and benefits of migration (EU and non-EU workers)
 - 53% Negative
 - 20% Neutral
 - 21% Positive
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
Prejudice Data

- ▶ British Social Attitudes Survey 2002/2011
 - People self-reporting as having prejudice toward ethnic out-groups
 - 2002 = 36%
 - 2011 = 38%
 - Our data from psychological studies with students was consistently at 35 – 38%
 - So fairly robust findings from experimental methods


Reasons for Voting for Brexit (2018)

- ▶ Studies on Brexit and prejudice/nationalism
 - Concern about immigration
 - 73% voted Leave (British Social Attitudes Survey, 2017)
 - Self-report prejudice
 - 26% (NatCen, 2017)
 - RWA, SDO, and Narcissism link to immigration attitudes and Brexit (de Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, 2017)
 - Cognitive inflexibility linking to nationalism, authoritarianism and conservatism linked to vote (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2018)
 - Islamophobia, integrated threat and conspiracist beliefs shaping voter intention (Swami, Barron, Weis, & Furnham, 2017)



Our study

- ▶ Did people differ on voting behaviour in accord with their prejudice sub-type classification?
 - ▶ How do these prejudice sub-type classifications relate to political party affiliation?
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- ▶ Online study – SurveyGizmo and Inquisit (March – May 2017)
 - Measure implicit prejudice (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998)
 - Measure explicit prejudice (EPQ; adapted from Lepore & Brown, 1997)
 - Voting behaviour in EU Referendum
 - Political party affiliation

 - ▶ 226 participants (all UK nationals, residing all over UK)
 - 290 took part, 64 excluded from analysis as did not vote (chose not to/ineligible to vote)
 - Asked how they would have voted
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
Implicit Association Test (IAT)




Disease

Honour

Critical Trial 1




Disease




Honour

Critical Trial 2



Honour



Disease

IAT (d' calculation) based on RT difference
between responses to critical trials 1 & 2

More negative d' = higher prejudice

Explicit Prejudice Questionnaire (EPQ)

▶ 15-item questionnaire


- *If people move to another country they should be allowed to maintain their own traditions*
- *Those immigrants who do not have immigration documents should be sent back to their countries (Reverse scored)*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Agree Disagree

Higher score = higher prejudice

Son-Hing et al. (2008) dual-process model

- ▶ Interaction between implicit and explicit prejudice
 - Low implicit/Low explicit = Egalitarian/Truly Low Prejudice
 - High implicit/Low explicit = Aversive racist
 - Low implicit/High explicit = Principled conservative
 - High implicit/High explicit = Modern racist



- ▶ 226 participants (127 Female; 97 Male; two Other, $M_{\text{age}} = 37.17$ years, $SD = 12.45$ years)
 - No sig diff between Leave/Remain voters on age
- ▶ IAT d' dichotomous split at $-.47$
- ▶ EPQ dichotomous split at 50

Table 1. Prejudice type categorisation; number of participants (percentage of the sample in parentheses).

	Egalitarian	Aversive Racist	Principled Conservative	Modern Racist
n	57 (25.2%)	59 (26.1%)	49 (21.7%)	61 (27.0%)

How did they vote?

- ▶ 226 participants
 - 151 Remain
 - 75 Leave

Table 2. Prejudice type categorisation and vote; percentages of categories (number of sample participants in parentheses).

	Egalitarian	Aversive Racist	Principled Conservative	Modern Racist
Leave	9.3% (7)	10.7% (8)	30.7% (23)	49.3% (37)
Remain	33.1% (50)	33.8% (51)	17.2% (26)	15.9% (24)

Vote by Prejudice Type




Table 3. Prejudice type and voting behaviour; percentage of categories (number of sample participants in parentheses).

	Egalitarian	Aversive Racist	Principled Conservative	Modern Racist
Leave	12.28% (7)	13.56% (8)	46.94% (23)	60.66% (37)
Remain	87.72% (50)	86.44% (51)	53.06% (26)	39.34% (24)

Sig relationship between prejudice sub-type & voting behaviour:

$$\chi^2 (3, N = 226) = 49.14, p < .001.$$


Association was of moderate strength: $\Phi = .49$, prejudice type accounted for 24% of the variance in the voting behaviour of this sample.

At individual level the only cell to show a significant difference at $< .05$ was the Modern Racist Leave vote, $\chi^2 (3, N = 226) = 14.89, p = .002$.

Who do they vote for?


Seven political preference categories analysed: *Conservative Party* ($n=46$); *Labour Party* ($n=60$); *Liberal Democrats* ($n=31$), *Green Party* ($n=22$), *UK Independence Party* (*UKIP* [$n=12$]); *No political preference* ($n=36$); and *Other* ($n=19$).

Political affiliation by Prejudice sub-type



Sig relationship between prejudice sub-type & political party preference:
 $\chi^2(18, N = 226) = 42.0, p=.001$.
Association was of moderate strength: $\Phi = .43$, prejudice type accounted for 18% of the variance in the political preference of this sample.
At individual level no cells showed a significant difference at $<.05$.

Which way did party pref vote in EU Referendum?



Sig relationship between political party preference and voting behaviour:

$$\chi^2(6, N = 226) = 40.07, p < .001.$$

Association was of moderate strength: $\Phi = .42$, party allegiance accounted for 18% of the variance in the voting behaviour of this sample.

At an individual level no cells showed a significant difference at $< .05$.

Overall findings:

- ▶ Prejudice type appears to have played a significant role in EU Referendum voting behaviour
 - Particularly explicit prejudice
 - 80% of Leave voters in this sample scored high on explicit prejudice (PCs & MRs)

- ▶ Prejudice type also appears to play a significant role in political party affiliation
 - The strange case of the Aversive Racists...
 - Cf many job-hiring studies that find them behave differently in ambiguous situations
 - Not an ambiguous situation to them? Need to explore further

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**Yr Athrofa, Seicoleg
Prifysgol Cymru Y Drindod Dewi Sant**

