

3 The psychology of violent radicalisation

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Introduction

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York City on September 11, 2001 (9/11) signalled a step-change in the world of terrorist research, resulting in attempts to develop comprehensive, flexible psychological, sociological and political theories capable of explaining terrorist behaviour in a number of different cultures and settings. Despite this apparent 'step change', terrorism was still primarily understood by the Western world in terms of a threat originating outside Western borders (Danieli et al. 2005; Taylor and Horgan 2006; Rogers, Loewenthal et al. 2007). The Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004 did little to alter this conception. More recently, the London bombings of 2005, the attempted London/Glasgow bombings of 2007, and White convert Nicky Reilly's detonation of a bomb in a restaurant in Exeter (UK) in 2008 cast a shadow of doubt over the level of certainty that the threat of terrorism did, indeed, originate from outside our borders in the minds of policy makers and members of the public, alike. As a result, involvement in terrorism has increasingly been seen in terms of a radicalisation process with the potential to occur within Western borders. Following from the analysis in the preceding chapter by Randy Borum, this chapter aims to provide a summary of our understanding of the motivation for joining an extremist group or taking part in terrorist activities, followed by an account of the current understanding of the process of radicalisation. The author will re-visit the question of *why* individuals are drawn to terrorist groups before exploring recent empirical evidence targeted at understanding *how* the process of radicalisation is believed to occur.

Why are individuals drawn to terrorist groups?

A growing body of research has the potential to indicate the edges of the violent radicalization puzzle (See Kushner 1996; Post 1998; Reich 1998; Crenshaw 1981, 1998a, 1998b; Silke 2006; Rogers et al. 2007; Neumann and Rogers 2008). Researchers have attempted to identify the underlying social and organizational drivers influencing the likelihood that an individual will undertake violent extremist behavior in order to better understand what drives individuals to resort to acts of

terrorism. Whilst reviewing these theories, Silke (2003; 2006) repeatedly reminds us that it is important to understand that, regardless of how successful a terrorist group appears, even the larger and more popular terrorist groups represent a minority within their communities.

One of the more popular theories centres on the concepts of grievance and threat. This theory purports that, while violent extremism has assumed many forms, all appear to be driven by a sense of grievance experienced by the individual or community at large (Kushner 1996; Silke 2006). However, grievance and threat in, and of themselves, are insufficient as primary causes, as the majority of populations and individuals experiencing real or perceived grievances and threats remain non-violent. Additionally, the list of extreme grievance and threat supported by the literature (e.g. attempted genocide, loss of land essential to identity, etc.) does not typically belong to the life experiences of individuals living in and growing up in the cities and towns of Western nations (Rogers et al. 2007).

Poverty is also cited as one of the key social drivers of terrorism. The academic evidence tends to contradict this popular belief because the majority of countries encountering suicide attacks between 1980 and 2001 are generally recognized as 'middle income societies' (Pape 2003; 2005; Moghadam 2006; Von Hippel 2002). Far from being the poorest countries in the world, general life expectancies in these countries were very close to those of the United States (Pape 2005; Moghadam 2006). Additionally, terrorists have been known to come from a variety of backgrounds, including middle to high levels of socio-economic status and education, as evidenced by the doctors involved in the attempted London/Glasgow attacks in 2007. In spite of this, there are still voices of dissent over the role of poverty in violent radicalization. Some researchers believe that the repeated focus on religious fundamentalism is often an excuse to avoid focusing on the real social issues, including the ever growing gap between groups of varying socio-economic status (Rogers 2006; Rogers et al. 2007).

If grievance, threat and poverty are unable to function as primary drivers of violent radicalisation within Western borders, how, then, do Western individuals share in the sense of injustice experienced by those living outside our borders? A number of social theories offer insight on the possible reactions to perceived intolerance of a belief system within a Western country, as well as a method for connecting with the experiences of those outside our borders, thus fostering a connection with outside issues that have the potential to shape internal Western experiences. Drawn from psychology and sociology, a number of these theories have contributed heavily to discussions concerning the origins and manifestations of violent extremism.

While the theoretical contributions of psychology are grounded in their shared scientific methodology, the general psychological schools of thought as applied to the study of terrorism are quite different in their understanding of the push/pull factors involved in the decision to join, remain in, or leave a violent radical organization. These include: 1) the Psychoanalytic approach; 2) the Cognitive approach; and 3) the Social approach. In short, the key psychological approaches have the potential to overlap and inform one another, yet the proponents of each theory

rarely agree on the key drivers of violent radicalisation. The following discussion will identify some of the key psychological and social theories and summarise their contributions to a greater understanding of the psychological and social drivers of violent radical organisations.

The psychoanalytic approach

The psychoanalytic approach is built around the premise that psychological disorder can determine or explain behaviour and motives. Given that terrorist activity can be clearly defined as a form of 'abnormal' activity, the psychoanalytic approach should have much to contribute to the understanding of violent radicalisation. Unfortunately, researchers repeatedly conclude that the majority of searches for possible psychopathology among terrorists have not been altogether systematic and are often based upon second-, third- and even fourth-hand accounts of interactions with known terrorists. Those researchers and 'experts' who suggest that terrorists are psychologically abnormal tend to be the ones with the least amount of contact with actual terrorists compared to those with direct contact who find that suggestions of abnormality do not stand up to close scrutiny (Silke 1998). In spite of this, psychoanalytic theories abound, including: 1) Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory in which individuals exhibit absolutist moral polarization, impaired assessments of reality, the belief in conspiracies of evil, and the idealization of a messianic figure (See Adorno et al. 1950; Lifton 1961; Taylor 2004); 2) Narcissism Theory, which focuses on the concept of terrorists as timid and emotionally damaged individuals; and 3) Paranoia Theory, which suggests that paranoid suspicions justify self defence, some forms of which can be extremely violent. Paranoia theory has strong links with theories of group-think, which can be created within the dynamics of an isolated, extremist group. These trends also form links with the processes of splitting and externalization, traits that are reportedly seen in higher frequencies amongst members of extremist groups, though the extent of this elevated frequency is open to debate. Splitting and externalisation describe the process by which an individual breaks his/her personality into 'me' and 'not me', resulting in a personality incapable of integrating the good and bad parts of an individual. When this occurs, all of the positive traits equated with 'me' are projected onto the self, while all of the negative traits equated with 'not me' are projected onto someone else. In turn, these tendencies contribute to an image of an injured self, or narcissistic wounds (Post 1998). Splitting and externalisation are also commonly seen in individuals who have had their personality development impacted by damage or stress during childhood, lending support to the idea that grievance and threat play a role in motivating membership in a violent extremist group (Silke 2003; Rogers et al. 2007).

The cognitive approach

The cognitive approach defines violent extremist behaviour as a logical response to the environment, or the final, rational choice in a sequence of choices (Beck

that a violent response to the environment can be founded upon rationale reasons, we will then be able to understand the reasons behind the behaviour and motives of an individual engaging in violent extremism. This understanding is driven by a number of theories, including: 1) Rational Choice Theory (RTC) (Crenshaw 1998b), which purports that if we can understand that the response to the environment as rational, we will then understand the reasons behind the behaviour and motives of an individual; 2) Humiliation-Revenge Theory (Jurgensmeyer 2000), which defines violence as stemming from anger; and 3) Terrorism as an Expression of Strategy, which suggest that terrorism follows a logical process that can be discovered and explained. RTC is one of the more popular cognitive approaches, in spite of disagreements amongst researchers about how rational and purposeful the choice to enter into violent extremism truly is. For example, Crenshaw (1998b) proposes that the use of violent behaviour by terrorist groups is a wilful choice made by the organisation in order to accomplish political or strategic objectives, while Post (1998) argues that the decision is based upon the unintended consequence of psychological or social factors driving the group towards violence (Reich 1998, pp. 7-8). Crenshaw suggests that it is also important to identify the main non-psychological contributors to terrorism by examining the way in which terrorism can be understood as an expression of political strategy.

This approach to understanding terrorism has been echoed in other disciplines, including sociology. Social movement theory, especially Political Opportunities Theory, views political violence through the lens of the environment in which social movements must operate, rather than on the internal workings of the groups, themselves. This theory argues that, 'the behaviour of social movements is influenced by the broader political context that can facilitate or hinder political violence' (Karagiannis and McCauley 2006, p. 321). Karagiannis and McCauley argue that authorities responsible for responding to social movements must note that perceived repression has the potential to create martyrs and mobilise movement supporters (2006).

The social approach

Finally, the social approach suggests that group membership and identity determine and explain the behaviour and motives of violent extremists. The social approach is built upon the concepts of ethnocentrism, or 'the view of things in which one's own group is at the centre of everything, and all others are scaled or rated with reference to it' (Sumner 1906, p. 13, cited in Hewstone and Cairns, 2001). This results in the development of biases and preference for in-group characteristics, products, customs, languages, speech styles, and more (Hewstone and Cairns 2001; Rogers et al. 2007). Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979), and Realistic Group Conflict Theory (see Brewer 1979, Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966; and Rogers et al. 2007) influence the likelihood of an individual joining a violent extremist group, as well as the potential of a group resorting to violence in the face of perceived adversity. SIT suggests that

individuals are attracted to extremist groups because group membership enables the development of a positive identity by allowing individuals to define themselves in terms of their group membership, which also enables them to assign value and emotional significance to their group membership and group goals. Because the group's social identity becomes a part of the self-concept, then a threat to the group is a threat to self (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Reich, 1998; Rogers et al. 2007). Membership in a violent radical group also has the potential to fulfil self-esteem needs, especially when new recruits find that they can influence like-minded individuals. In fact, membership in such a group might be the first time that a terrorist individual feels accepted, important or needed. The group might also address welfare needs, as illustrated by Ed Husain's experience as he trod his pathway to violent radicalisation:

My disagreements with my parents were now so deep, their revulsion for my Islamism so powerful, and my commitment to ideological so uncompromising, that my father had little choice but to give me an ultimatum: leave Mawdudi's Islamism or leave my house.

(Husain 2007, p. 44)

Ed Husain left his parents' house and was offered shelter, food and comfort by his radical friends.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RCT) suggests that group conflicts are rational because groups have incompatible goals and compete for scarce resources, resulting in a realistic conflict. In short, competition for resources, which can include power, land, natural resources and more, increases the likelihood of inter-group conflict. This approach has also been reflected in social movement theory. For example, Neumann and Rogers (2008) discuss Resource Mobilization Theory which suggests that political forms of violence are created when a group mobilizes to attack its opponent's resources, or when a group attempts to reclaim resources they believe that they have lost. Resources can be understood in terms of concrete resources such as land or space, or in terms of social resources, such as privilege. Karagiannis and McCauley (2006) summarized this dynamic thus:

The ability of a group to challenge the authorities eventually would be determined by the extent to which it is in control of normative resources (commitment of members to the group, legitimacy, and identity resources), coercive resources (means of imposing its will on opponents, material, and organizational resources); and institutional resources (access to state agencies and elites, mass media resources).

(p. 320)

It takes all sorts

When it comes to selecting one of these theories as the primary explanation of violent radicalisation, a number of issues hold each theory back. In respect to

the psychoanalytic approach, repeated attempts to identify a terrorist personality or mental disorder capable of explaining violent radical behaviour have led many researchers to conclude that terrorists are often psychologically healthier and more stable than the rest of the criminal population, or at least as no more likely to display signs of 'appreciable psychopathology' than other people (See Rasch 1979; Crenshaw 1981, 2000; Silke 1998, 2006; Lanning 2002; Ruby 2002; Atran 2003; Whittaker 2003; Ganor 2005; Rogers et al. 2007). In short:

The perils are that (a) human variation is such a there is no single, 'typical' terrorist psychology (b) many terrorists are psychologically inaccessible and when accessible often secretive and non-yielding, and (c) Western psychological concepts and assessments often are not readily exportable and applicable to cultures very different from their own.

(National Research Council 2002, p. 30)

Similarly, the cognitive approach fails to fully explain individual motivations towards violent radicalisation. In fact, the cognitive approach to understanding violent radicalisation is more appropriate when applied to group or collective objectives, rather than individual objectives, as the high cost of terrorist activity (i.e. death, injury, capture) cancels out the benefits of the behaviour (i.e. political or social change), suggesting that a rational person would not take part in terrorist behaviour unless the benefits are also psychological (Crenshaw 1998; Post 1998; Reich, 1998; Rogers et al 2007). Finally, while the social psychological approach is useful for describing individual reasons for joining a terrorist group (i.e. self-esteem) and the internal group pressures that maintain group membership and have the potential to inform more extreme beliefs and behaviour, it still fails to provide researchers with a method of truly understanding *why* certain individuals are more prone to extremist messages.

This summary of the origins and manifestations of violent extremism through the lens of the social sciences has illustrated that no single theory has proven itself to be absolutely reliable. Likewise, discussion of violent radicalisation through separate theoretical perspectives can be misleading, as no single theory or school of thought has proven itself capable of providing a 'catch all' answer. Instead, individuals tasked with providing answers to some of the questions driving the study of violent radicalisation should view the wide variety of approaches as useful tools that enable researchers to tailor their approach to specific groups operating in specific cultures and contexts. To apply a single theory to all types of terrorism, irrespective of group, place or time, is to enter into folly because terrorism has changed over time, as have the motives and causes of terrorism. Instead, a flexible, multidisciplinary approach is needed to understand violent extremism, as suggested by Cronin's (2004) conclusion:

Terrorism is a multidisciplinary challenge: The study of sources of terrorism requires the ability to translate between the fields of criminology, comparative

politics, economics, history, international relations, psychology, sociology, theology, and arguably others.

(Cited in Cronin and Ludes 2004, p. 20)

How do individuals become involved in terrorist groups?

At the very least the combination of drivers and theories mentioned in the previous section requires a group. Therefore, it is necessary to create a deeper understanding of the pathways to radicalisation, and the role of intervening factors or facilitators of radicalisation that enable individuals to engage with violent extremist groups. In doing so, the author will frame the discussion in the UK context in order to provide a snapshot of the changing trends and dynamics of violent radicalisation in a Western context. This requires a discussion of the current situation within the UK, the growing conservative trend in Western Muslims, and a discussion of community and institutional facilitators of radicalisation.

First, it is important to recognise that the author is framing this discussion within a pre-existing definition of Islamist militants:

... Islamist militancy combines a strict, literalist practice of Islam (often referred to as Salafi or Wahhabi) with a revolutionary political ideology (Islamism), proclaiming a global community of believers (the ummah) to be liberated and/or united under Islamic rule, and the belief that the most effective way of accomplishing this aim is through violence or 'armed struggle' (often referred to as jihad).

(Neumann and Rogers 2008, p. 7).

Second, it is important to recognise that all conversations about radicalisation trends for Islamist militants in the UK are complicated by the fact that the 'Muslim community' is incredibly diverse. There are approximately 2 million Muslims in the UK, predominantly of South Asian origin. This population belongs to around five or six different sects worshipping in over 1,600 mosques (Active Change Foundation, 2008). Keeping in mind that individuals willing to engage in violent acts of terrorism form a minority of any population, the search for a greater understanding of the process of violent radicalisation is akin to finding a needle in a haystack. As a result, experts are left scratching their heads over which haystacks they must search, as well as the reasons that these pointed needles made their way into the haystacks in the first place. We must begin our search somewhere.

International drivers

The roots or origins of terrorism are traditionally sought at a local rather than a global level (Sedgwick, 2007). This is a reasonable starting point, but solutions to radicalisation and extremism lay beyond the scope of the individual, group and local level. Brighton (2007) suggests that, while it is important to understand radicalisation within local politics and community relations, we must also

understand radicalisation and extremism through longer term work that addresses 'tackling inequality, discrimination, deprivation and inconsistent Government policy, and in particular, foreign policy' (p. 2). This view is shared by many, suggesting that local causes cannot provide the explanation for global waves of terrorism (Brighton, 2007; Sedgwick 2007; and Mirza et al. 2007). The apparent difficulty or unwillingness on the part of policy makers to situate Western foreign policy within an account of violent radicalization deprives us of a means of objectively assessing the contribution that Western foreign policy makes to the radicalization process. Instead, dialogues of integration and multiculturalism abound, resulting in a lack of understanding about the impact of foreign policy on violent radicalisation.

There are a number of justifications for these repeated omissions on the part of policy-makers. These include references to a pre-existing threat, as seen in the fact that Al-Qaeda and similar groups had both planned and carried out attacks on the west prior to the 9/11 attacks on American soil in 2001. The fact that America and its allies entered Iraq in response to the attack in 2001 encourages politicians to separate the London attacks of 2005 and attempted 2007 attacks in London and Glasgow from operations in Iraq. Additionally, Brighton (2007) suggests that policy makers try to exclude the London bombers of 7/7 from the concept of home grown terrorism because:

... individuals based in the UK had had links with Al-Qaeda, had been seeking to further the ideology now associated with it and had received training in camps sponsored by Al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups prior to 9/11 and the coalition response to those attacks.

(p. 3)

These arguments are strongly contradicted through the anger at British Foreign policy expressed by Mohammad Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer in their martyrdom videos made shortly before the attacks in London on 7 July 2005 (Brighton 2007; Mirza et al. 2007).

In the midst of these policy contradictions, there is an undeniable growing level of religiosity amongst the younger generation UK Muslims, many of whom are rejecting their parent's cultural traditions and expressing a more politicised form of religion (Jacobson 1997; Mirza et al. 2007; Neumann and Rogers, 2008). Far from being a new trend, this process of rejecting parental beliefs, which are viewed as becoming culturally grounded, and accepting a more universal (and sometimes extreme) identity or belief system was also illustrated in Jacobson's (1997) study with young, second-generation British Pakistanis (Neumann and Rogers 2008, p. 31). Additionally, Neumann and Rogers (2008) identified a recent UK survey in which 86 per cent of British Muslims identified religion as the most important thing in their life. In this survey, Muslim respondents identified foreign policy as the most important issue or concern for Muslims overall, yet Muslim youths expressed a low level of knowledge about international issues when questioned by Mirza et al. (2007). In this case, Muslim youths reported that they were the

angriest about foreign policy issues, but compared to older Muslims were half as likely to know the answers to policy questions. This led Mirza et al. (2007) to conclude that young Muslims were expressing emotional responses to images of victims and violence around the world rather than truly engaging with foreign policy.

These observations must be balanced by the understanding that, if foreign policy is a key contributor to violent radicalisation, it is not the only contributor. If these young Muslims are reacting to the plight of those outside the borders, how are they gaining this sense of responsibility from their life experiences inside the borders of Western countries? It is possible that, instead of experiencing a shared Islamic community tradition with their local peers, the diverse and fragmented Muslim communities in the Western world are more likely to find similarities in the global fact of an ideology that contains the concept of jihad. This provides an easily accessible, understandable, and easy to act upon ideology, regardless of location, and without the need for expert meditation or mandates delivered by higher authorities. The availability of this ideology is the secret of its success since

the movement it inspires (. . .) is composed of globally dispersed supporters who have no shared history and whose wider community, those 'oppressed' and subordinated by the West, from whom they seek 'vengeance', are people encountered almost entirely through nightly TV news bulletins.

(Brighton 2007, pp. 13–14)

Additionally, it is also likely that 'foreign' identities are being reinforced by the increasing availability of cheap travel and instant communication, resulting in a failure on the part of expectations that links between minority homelands and immigrant ethnic communities would decrease with the passing of the immigrant generation (Brighton 2007, p. 6, Mirza et al. 2007; Neumann and Rogers 2008).

Local drivers

The increasing awareness of the relationship between foreign policy and radicalisation does not mean we can turn our attention away from local issues. Durodie (2007) turned the analytical lens onto the role of the communities and society as a whole in promoting or mitigating the process of violent radicalisation. Referring to a desperate and obsessive search for meaning and identity within society, he claims:

The key is not what it is that attracts a minority from a variety of backgrounds, including some who are relatively privileged, to fringe Islamist organisations, but rather what it is about our own societies and culture that they fail to provide aspirational, educated and energetic young individuals with a clear sense of purpose and collective direction through which to lead their lives and realise

their ambitions, that they are left looking for this elsewhere, including for some, among various arcane belief systems.

(Durodie 2007, pp. 433–434)

During the course of their recent study exploring pathways into violent radicalisation, Neumann and Rogers (2008) suggested that the disconnect between young British Muslims is not simply a disconnect between the wider UK community and themselves, nor is it simply a disconnect between the first, second and third generations. Young British Muslims are also struggling with a disconnection between the cultural teachings of the mosques and their modern, Western questions and experiences. This is because the mosques tend to be culturally led and cater to the needs of the older generation, resulting in exclusion and a lack of opportunity for the younger generation, as illustrated by a British Community Leader's statement:

What you find is that a lot of mosques are culturally led. They are more interested in keeping ties of kinship and traditional values. This excludes the youth who follow in their footsteps. Many young Muslims in this country have dual identity. They are Muslim, but they are also British, with their British identity being more predominant. Their issues are not being addressed by most of the mosques.

(Neumann and Rogers 2008, p. 29)

However, these ideas are still hotly contested as evidenced by Mirza et al's. (2007) argument:

Contrary to expectations, the rising interest in religion amongst second and third generation British Muslims is not an outcome of parental or community influence. In particular, if one looks at young Muslims in the UK, they are not responding to familial or broader community pressure. They are returning to the Qu'ran and reading about religion of their own volition, often having experienced the modern, secular lifestyle available to most people of their age.

(p. 12)

Finally, community level discussions shed some light on the questions posed during the previous discussion of the role of grievance and threat in violent radicalisation. The grievances and threats might be different for Western Muslims, but they are certainly visible in the domestic community and centre on a lack of opportunity and frustrated ambition. Cronin (2004) suggests that, while the majority of a society impacted by deprivation is unlikely to resort to violence in order to address issues of grievance or threat, the extent to which societal conditions lead to a sense of indignation is a crucial factor that must be understood in order to counter violent radicalisation. 'In other words, the objective conditions that face an individual are not as important as the perceived difference between what one has and what one

deserves (in either material or political terms)' (p. 5). Cronin (2004) goes on to suggest that it is possible to view the sense of anger experienced by individuals drawn towards violent radicalisation as a result of frustrated ambition. In these instances, upwardly mobile individuals are unable to realise their capabilities in the form of political power because of a lack of opportunity or active blocking of these attempts.

Current trends in violent radicalisation

Understanding the role of society in influencing the likelihood of terrorist group membership is important, as home grown violent radicals are not growing up or living in a social vacuum. In the UK, the disparity between the choice of identities can result in young Muslims feeling caught between the Western ways at school, and culturally based practices at home. Neumann and Rogers (2008) believe that this places individuals in a position where they risk becoming more susceptible to extremist messages. Radical group members recognise this susceptibility and offer to fill the identity void through inclusion in violent radical groups. As a result, '... this has the potential to place an individual within an environment where the group processes and radicalisation messages' (...) are both introduced and reinforced' (Neumann and Rogers 2008, p. 30).

The community can act as both a social driver of and a cure for violent radicalisation. Currently, the Muslim communities are becoming increasingly aware of the threat of radicalisation, and acknowledging that they can play a role in encouraging or countering violent radicalisation. Neumann and Rogers (2008) indicated that, in the UK there is a lot of internal policing taking place, and that this involves a battle within the local communities over the way in which Islam should be defined and the role of political Islam. The question of identity feeds into this, with many individuals questioning whether they are British or Muslim, or if they can, in fact, be both. However, these internal community policing techniques are not always successful in their attempts to decrease radicalisation. For example, a community might ask a particular individual to leave because they notice that s/he is promoting extremist views. Often, this only moves the problem on, enabling a radical individual to create links and ties in another community before being noticed and moved on again. This often leads to frustration on the part of policy-makers and security experts intent on improving community engagement in order to counter radicalisation. Despite the shared interest in cooperation between Muslim community leaders and members of the security services in the UK, it is also acknowledged that there are numerous factors that inhibit people from picking up the phone and reporting suspected radicalisation (Neumann and Rogers 2008).

Other changes are also taking place. Nowadays, recruitment has either been driven underground, or into the private sphere. In response to the events of 9/11 and 7/7 in New York and London, rapid and severe police crackdowns have driven the majority of recruitment activity away from the mosques, moving the battle into new territories, including the Internet, prisons and informal gatherings. Additionally, the Government and security services are aware of the growing need to work with

the Muslim community to address the issue of violent radicalisation, as evidenced by the renewed focus on the PREVENT strand of the UK's CONTEST strategy.

In conclusion, the growth of violent extremism in the Western world must be interpreted in relation to political and social trends inside our borders, as well as in terms of the impact of our foreign policies outside of our borders. Government policies must continue to focus on the internal, community and local socio-political issues within their borders while learning to address the impact of outside policy issues on domestic life experiences, as well. This will enable them to clarify misunderstandings and focus in on the key issues fuelling the attractiveness of radical messages. A number of social facilitators aid potential recruits during their journey towards violent radicalisation. These include disillusionment with their parental form of religion, which is seen as being culturally grounded; and the cultural grounding of mosques that are seen as isolating and unapproachable by young Muslims. Communities and the security services are aware of these issues and working to address them together. In order to do so, trust must be built within the communities, between communities, and between communities and the security services (Cronin 2004; Brighton 2007; Mirza et al. 2007; Durodie 2007; Neumann and Rogers 2008).

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