
8. Non-UN peacekeeping

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INTRODUCTION

The practice of peacekeeping is strongly associated with the United Nations, and mention of peacekeeping usually conjures up images of blue helmets, the hallmark of UN personnel on the ground. The UN, however, has never been the only actor who deploys impartial forces to maintain or restore peace between conflict parties. Ever since the UN's existence, regional organizations, coalitions of states or even individual states have practiced peacekeeping independently or in cooperation with the UN. In fact, non-UN bodies have deployed more peace operations than the UN each year since the turn of the millennium (Bara and Hultman 2020).

This chapter offers an overview of what we know about these non-UN peace operations, with a focus on scholarship that systematically compares UN and non-UN peacekeeping. In the following section, I describe what I mean by non-UN peacekeeping and discuss why it can be harder to distinguish between peacekeeping and one-sided military intervention if a mission does not operate under the UN flag. I then review existing research on non-UN peacekeeping as an *explanandum* and an *explanans*: What factors influence the deployment of non-UN missions, and what impact do such missions have on peace and stability in conflict environments? The latter question on the effectiveness of non-UN peacekeeping has received particularly little attention in comparative research due to a lack of data. I therefore make use of a new dataset by Bara and Hultman (2020) to assess whether some of the most prominent findings on the impact of UN peacekeepers can be extended to non-UN missions. Finally, I propose a number of research avenues relating to non-UN peacekeeping that would strengthen our knowledge of peacekeeping more generally and overcome the near-exclusive focus on the UN in the existing quantitative-comparative scholarship.

DEFINING NON-UN PEACEKEEPING

Non-UN peace operations are peace operations that are conducted by actors other than the United Nations.¹ They are often mandated or at least expressly welcomed by the UN, but they are not managed by the UN at an operational level (Bellamy and Williams 2015). Scholars frequently use the term regional peacekeeping operations, but this term is ambiguous. Some regional organizations, such as NATO or the EU, operate well beyond their own neighborhood, and not all non-UN missions are run by regional organizations (Williams 2017, p. 124). Instead, regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions of states, and even single countries run these operations. Among regional organizations, the EU and the AU (and its predecessor, the OAU) have conducted the most non-UN peace operations in the post-Cold War period, but ECOWAS and NATO have also been active peacekeeping actors. The USA and Australia have led multiple coalitions of states in making or keeping the peace, for example in Haiti, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea. France, on the other hand, stands out as the country with

most single-state operations in parallel or in support of UN missions, such as in Côte d'Ivoire (Operation Licorne) or the Central African Republic (Operation Sangaris).²

Beyond this simple definition, the challenge lies in deciding when a non-UN mission is really peacekeeping as opposed to a one-sided military intervention with the aim of supporting one of the conflict parties.³ Peacekeeping is generally defined as the deployment of uniformed personnel by a third party with the aim to keep or restore the peace (for example, Rost and Greig 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2015). UN peacekeeping missions specifically are distinguished from military interventions by the three principles of consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense (or in defense of the mandate), whereas military interventions take place against the will of the belligerents, take sides, and are barely restricted in their use of force (Howard 2019, p. 129). Even if these peacekeeping principles are increasingly stretched in newer UN missions (de Coning et al. 2017; de Coning 2018), there is a second element that endows these missions with legitimacy: a mandate by the UN Security Council. This is because the Security Council is conservative: Single states or coalitions can at best veto peacekeeping missions but cannot get them authorized without the consent of most members and all permanent members of the Council. This is a safeguard against regional powers militarily intervening in a country under the guise of "peacekeeping."⁴ By extension, this legitimacy is also bestowed upon the many non-UN missions that receive a Security Council mandate.

When this safeguard is missing in the case of non-UN operations that are not authorized by the UN, the purpose of the mission and its adherence to the peacekeeping principles comes under scrutiny, and the line between peacekeeping and biased military intervention can become a thin one. Operation Boleas in Lesotho by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an example. In this operation in 1998, South Africa and Botswana deployed their militaries to prevent a coup, with South Africa's desire to secure strategic resources as a possible ulterior motive (Likoti 2007). Some datasets (Mullenbach 2013; Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020) include this as a peace operation, following South Africa's claim that it was conducted on behalf of a multilateral body (the SADC), and only after having been invited by the host state.⁵ Others (Coleman 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2015) consider this a one-sided military intervention to help the host state suppress an insurgency.⁶ As such, it violates the peacekeeping principle of impartiality.

Two additional factors complicate the assessment of whether a non-UN mission should be considered peacekeeping. The first is that ulterior motives by the deploying body are not enough to disqualify an operation as a peace operation, as there is always a modicum of self-interest in the decision to contribute to peacekeeping, also in UN missions (Neack 1995; Sandler 2017). The second is that a violation of peacekeeping principles is not always by design. Missions at times turn awry and peacekeepers are drawn into a war against one side, losing their status as an impartial arbiter. Again, this is a risk that UN missions face as well (Bullion 1994, p. 155).

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990 illustrates some of these challenges. Most datasets include the IPKF as a peace operation (Mullenbach 2013; Bellamy and Williams 2015; Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020). Though India pursued strategic and political interests by intervening in Sri Lanka, the mission was initially deployed to implement an accord expected to resolve the war (Bullion 1994; Crenshaw 2000). However, the accord that arguably made this a consent-based operation was never signed by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), and it was surmised that India would guarantee the Sri Lankan regime's survival, which would question the impartiality principle (Pfaffenberger

1988; Rupasinghe 1988). Eventually, the IPKF was drawn into a war with the LTTE, dropping both the principles of impartiality and minimum use of force (Bullion 1994).


These examples are not meant to suggest that non-UN peace operations are always concealed military interventions. Most non-UN missions have an unambiguous peacekeeping character, and the vast majority of them are authorized or at least recognized by the UN (see Bellamy and Williams 2015). But the difficulty in distinguishing peace operations from military interventions when there is no UN mandate explains why lists and datasets of non-UN missions differ between sources. It also means that disagreements on border cases will be an inherent aspect of the study of non-UN peacekeeping.

EXPLAINING NON-UN PEACEKEEPING

Since the early 2000s, non-UN peace operations account for the majority of missions globally (Diehl 2014, pp. 485–6; Bara and Hultman 2020). Figure 8.1 (left-hand side) shows that while the number of UN missions has remained relatively stable since the end of the Cold War, the number of non-UN missions has gradually increased. The many missions by the EU since the launch of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 explain part of this trend. If we look beyond the number of missions and take into account their size (Figure 8.1, right-hand side), a more nuanced pattern emerges. In terms of people on the ground, non-UN bodies already carried a heavy peacekeeping burden during the 1990s, when UN peacekeeping went through a crisis after a series of failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia (Cottey 2008; Fortna and Howard 2008, p. 284). When the UN began to increase its peacekeeping commitments again, the number of non-UN peacekeepers declined.⁷ Apart from the enormous number of NATO troops in Afghanistan, the UN has been the dominant peacekeeping actor in terms of people on the ground for quite a while, even as non-UN bodies deploy more missions. This is because UN missions are on average larger than non-UN missions: The median UN mission has three times as many people on the ground as the median non-UN mission (Bara and Hultman 2020, p. 353).

The observation that non-UN bodies now deploy more missions at the same time as the UN remains the key provider of peacekeeping raises a number of questions. The first is about the time trend: What explains why regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions of states increasingly deploy peacekeeping missions of their own? The second is about the decision to provide peacekeeping: What explains whether a conflict receives a UN or a non-UN mission, or no mission at all? And finally, the third question is about whether UN and non-UN missions differ in terms of states' willingness to contribute to these missions financially and with troops.

To explain the increase in non-UN missions over time, a common argument focuses on the supply side.⁸ The end of the Cold War forced states and regional organizations to reshape their international security strategy and find a new role in the changed international scenario (de Guttery 2011). NATO, for instance, transformed from a Cold War defense alliance to a collective security organization with peacekeeping as one of its central tasks (Cottey 2008, p. 440). However, non-UN peacekeeping is *not* just a post-Cold War phenomenon as has been suggested (for example, Koops and Tardy 2015, p. 61). Of 47 pre-1990 peacekeeping missions listed by Bellamy and Williams (2015), more than half were non-UN missions, and most of these were neither authorized nor recognized by the UN. What changed since the end of the Cold War is the sheer number of different actors active in peacekeeping, their ambition



Source: Created by author using data from Bara and Hultman (2020).

Figure 8.1 Number of UN and non-UN missions vs number of personnel deployed

in terms of mission complexity, and the fact that more non-UN missions are authorized by the UN (Bellamy and Williams 2015). This last point touches on the demand-side explanation for the increase in non-UN missions, namely that the UN *needed* regional organizations to step up and help carry an increasingly heavy peacekeeping burden created by multiple simultaneous civil wars that required a robust peacekeeping response (Barnett 1995; Heldt 2004; Koops and Tardy 2015).

As the UN and other actors are increasingly sharing the peacekeeping burden, questions about the determinants of peacekeeping gain new relevance. What explains whether a conflict receives a UN or a non-UN mission? Specifically, is there evidence that non-UN missions deploy to different types of conflicts than UN missions? From research so far (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004, 2008; Mullenbach 2005; Hultman 2013), we know that UN missions are usually sent to particularly difficult cases – wars with high death tolls and atrocities against civilians, long wars, and complicated wars with many factions. We know less about whether this is also the case for non-UN peacekeeping. Descriptive statistics in Bara and Hultman (2020) show that UN missions on average enter into more violent contexts in terms of battle fatalities and civilian targeting than non-UN missions, even though non-UN peacekeepers are often deployed as first responders before a UN mission takes over. Fortna (2004) and Mullenbach (2005) are two studies that systematically compare the determinants of UN and non-UN missions. They test different explanations and are rather dated (the analyses end in 1999 and 2002, respectively), but the general conclusion one can draw from these two studies is that there are more differences than similarities between UN and non-UN missions with regard to the factors that influence whether or not a peacekeeping mission is established.

Another strand of peacekeeping research, the scholarship on burden-sharing (for a review, see Sandler 2017),⁹ only indirectly touches on the question why UN and non-UN missions deploy to some places but not others. Instead, burden-sharing scholars examine the conditions

that influence states' financial and troop contributions to missions. This research offers the most systematic comparisons of UN and non-UN missions in quantitative peacekeeping research. The theoretical premise is that peacekeeping yields three different types of benefits (Shimizu and Sandler 2002; Ward and Dorussen 2016): First, pure public goods in the form of global peace and human security; second, impure public goods that benefit some nations more than others (for instance neighboring states who are more affected by conflict externalities); and third, private benefits such as the compensation a country gets for sending peacekeepers, or the in-field experience the deployed troops gain. Because financial and troop contributions are organized differently in UN and non-UN missions, the distribution of benefits for a participating country also differs between UN and non-UN missions.

In the case of the UN, all member states have to pay for peacekeeping based on their income, while troop contributions are voluntary and are financially compensated. For burden-sharing scholars, this cost structure yields two expectations (see Gaibullov et al. 2009): First, UN missions will be more likely where need is greatest, that is, authorized according to the logic of public benefits. This is because the mandatory payments by member states make the UN less dependent on states' national interests to authorize a mission. Second, troop contributions to missions follow the logic of private benefits. Poorer countries, especially those with large militaries, have an incentive to send troops to UN missions as they make a net financial gain from this contribution (Gaibullov et al. 2015; Ward and Dorussen 2016; Sandler 2017). While this latter proposition has been widely accepted (but see Coleman and Nyblade 2018), scholars disagree more strongly on whether public benefits are really the driver of UN action. Skeptical voices (for example, Neack 1995; Boulden 2006) contend that the interests of the most powerful states – especially the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council – are decisive in whether the UN sends a mission to a conflict. Most empirical analyses, however, suggest that while the interests of the P-5 certainly matter, public benefits in the form of reduced human suffering and global peace drive the UN's decision to authorize missions as much, if not more (Jakobsen 1996; Fortna 2008; Gaibullov et al. 2009; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012).

In the case of non-UN missions, both financial and troop contributions are voluntary, and those who send troops usually pay for them, with the exception of some ECOWAS and AU operations for which the US and EU partially reimburse participation costs (Tardy 2013; Sandler 2017).¹⁰ Because of this, burden-sharing scholars envision that self-interest plays a greater role in the decision to deploy a non-UN mission than it does for UN missions (Sandler 2017, p. 1888). Regional stability in particular is an impure public good that benefits some nations more than others; hence states will be more likely to burden the costs of financing and contributing to a non-UN mission if a conflict is a national security or economic concern to them. Empirical evidence indeed shows that states are ready to pay for (and thus enable) non-UN missions if they are closer to the conflict region, or if states have trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) interests in the conflict region (Gaibullov et al. 2009). For peacekeeping by single states or ad hoc coalitions of states – that is, working outside international or regional organizations – Rost and Greig (2011) show that trade ties, but also ethnic and colonial links, are important in determining whether countries send peacekeepers. In line with these findings, there is some evidence that richer industrial countries are more likely to deploy troops to non-UN missions – missions which tend to take place where these countries have strategic and economic interests (Gaibullov et al. 2015).

These differences in the determinants of financial and troop contributions to UN and non-UN missions suggest that it is not equally likely that a conflict or country will receive

a UN or non-UN mission. The implications of this are disputed. Scholars of peacekeeping burden-sharing point out that as rich countries increasingly deploy their troops in NATO or EU missions, their troop contributions to UN peacekeeping decline (Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Sandler 2017). This then leaves lower-quality UN troops to deal with conflicts in which rich Western countries have no stakes. Others argue the other way around, namely that if the UN selectively leaves some conflicts to regional organizations to solve, these conflicts may get lesser-quality (regional) peacekeeping, or no peacekeeping at all (see Bellamy et al. 2010; Gizelis et al. 2016). The latter is particularly likely in regions that have no organizations willing or able to conduct peacekeeping operations, such as Asia.¹¹ Behind these differing assessments appears to be the question to which the next section turns, namely whether non-UN missions are equally, less, or even more effective in keeping and restoring the peace than their UN counterparts.

EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-UN PEACEKEEPING

How effective are non-UN peace operations in keeping or restoring peace? For UN missions, there is a wealth of research showing that they are on average effective in keeping the peace once obtained and in mitigating multiple forms of violence during and after war (for a review, see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017).¹² The question of whether the same is true for non-UN peacekeeping has received little attention. In their review of the literature on non-UN peacekeeping, Bara and Hultman (2020, pp. 344–5) discern three sets of arguments on the relative effectiveness of UN and non-UN (mostly regional) peacekeeping.

A first set of arguments focuses on the cultural and political closeness of regional missions to their host countries. Shared languages, cultural, or political experiences may entail advantages in engaging with the conflict parties, who in turn may be more willing to cooperate with regional peacekeepers than outsiders interfering in their own region (Diehl 2007, p. 541). Those that are more skeptical about such arguments point out that the homogeneity of regions tends to be overestimated and that regional peacekeepers may be perceived as less impartial about conflicts taking place in their own backyard (Heldt 2004; Heldt and Wallenstein 2007). A second set of arguments centers on efficiency and risk tolerance. It has been argued that non-UN operations can deploy more quickly than UN missions, which are slowed down by their organization's bureaucracy, and that regional peace operations also deploy to areas where the UN does not let their peacekeepers go (Bellamy and Williams 2005, p. 195; de Coning et al. 2016, p. 2; Lindberg Bromley 2018, p. 128). However, rapid deployment and an offensive posture in contested areas bear risks for peacekeepers. If they are attacked and drawn into violence with the warring parties, this has consequences for their ability to fulfill the mandate and protect civilians in the affected areas (Akpasom 2016, p. 112; Fjelde et al. 2016, p. 621).

The third set of arguments presented in Bara and Hultman (2020, pp. 344–5) pertains to capacity. Regional organizations cannot match the UN's experience, organizational processes, equipment, training, financial capacities, and logistics for peacekeeping (Lotze 2016; Williams 2017, p. 128). Missions by NATO or coalitions of states led by some of the world's powerful militaries form an exception, at least in terms of military capacity. However, given their multidimensional mandates, UN missions are more diverse in terms of personnel deployed. Especially large non-UN missions consist mainly of troops, while even large robust UN missions usually have sizable police contingents (Bara and Hultman 2020, p. 354). UN

police, in turn, have been shown to mitigate certain types of war and postwar violence that military troops have difficulty containing (Bara 2020; Di Salvatore 2019).

This capacity differential between the UN and most regional missions is so widely accepted that many scholars have a clear expectation that UN missions should be more effective in mitigating war violence than non-UN missions. This, however, has rarely been systematically tested. There are case studies on individual non-UN missions that offer detailed accounts of particular operations and sometimes of their achievements and failings (examples are Bullion 1994; Freear and de Coning 2013; Smith and Jarvis 2018), but such case studies lack a counterfactual of what would have happened if no mission had been present, or if a UN mission could have achieved more (or less). There is also research on the various organizations that now conduct peacekeeping missions (examples are Mackinlay and Cross 2003; Francis 2009; Keohane 2011; Tavares 2013; de Coning et al. 2016), but rarely with a systematic focus on comparing the relative effectiveness of missions by different actors.

In terms of quantitative comparisons of the effectiveness of non-UN missions compared to UN missions, there are a few older studies that found either no difference in effectiveness, or that only UN missions mitigate violence (Heldt 2004; Heldt and Wallenstein 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2007; Fortna 2008, 2004; Nilsson 2008; Hultman 2010). These studies base their findings on simple binary variables of peacekeeping presence and absence and do not account for the size and strength of missions. However, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2007) make the argument that all types of peace operations should have a positive effect if they have sufficient capacities to respond to the challenges of the conflict context. Until recently, it was not possible to test this general argument due to a lack of detailed data on non-UN missions. While scholars of UN peacekeeping have long had access to monthly data on the amount of troops, police, and observers deployed to any mission (Kathman 2013; International Peace Institute 2019), available datasets on non-UN peace operations (Mullenbach 2013; Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020) did not contain such information.

A recently published dataset by Bara and Hultman (2020) enables scholars to systematically compare whether UN and non-UN missions are equally effective *at comparable strength and personnel composition*. The dataset reports the approximate monthly number of troops, police, and observers deployed by the UN, regional organizations, and coalitions of states to civil conflicts globally between 1993 and 2016. These data are compiled and consolidated from annual numbers provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2020) and then interpolated to generate monthly estimates. In an application of the new data, Bara and Hultman (2020) show that a greater number of troops and police in *both* UN and regional missions is associated with lower levels of violence against civilians by governments during war. However, when it comes to rebel one-sided violence, only UN troops and police are associated with fewer civilian fatalities, while regional peacekeepers have no observable effect. This differential ability to influence the behavior of governments and rebels, respectively, is a finding in need of an explanation, with the authors offering some first thoughts on the possible sources of this difference for further research.

GENERALIZING FINDINGS OF UN PEACEKEEPING EFFECTIVENESS

This section expands on the analyses in Bara and Hultman (2020) to take a first cut at the question of whether conclusions drawn about the effectiveness of UN operations are applicable to those organized by other actors. Looking at a broad set of effectiveness measures including war and peace duration, battle intensity, and the levels of postwar and criminal violence, three questions are asked: First, do previous findings on the effectiveness of UN missions still hold when we control for non-UN peacekeeping? Second, do the findings extend to all peacekeeping operations independent of the organizing body? And third, do non-UN peacekeepers have the same effect as UN peacekeepers?

To answer the above questions, findings from six studies on the effectiveness of UN missions studying diverse outcomes are replicated, adding information on the number of non-UN troops, police, and observers to the original models.¹³ These are exact replications, that is, no changes are made to the authors' original data and models except adding the non-UN variables. In some cases, the time period under study is shortened because the Bara and Hultman (2020) data is only available from 1993 onwards.¹⁴ In all replicated studies, the original results hold for the shortened time period. Table 8.1 reports the findings of these replications. A "SAME" effect indicates that the findings are statistically significant and go in the same direction as in the original study, though the strength of the relationship may differ. An "UNCERTAIN" effect simply means that unlike in the original studies, the estimates on non-UN personnel are not statistically significant (and may or may not go in the same direction).

The first question is whether previous findings change when we account for the total number of non-UN peacekeepers present in conflict contexts. In about a third of peacekeeping cases, a UN and non-UN mission are present in the same conflict at the same time (Bara and Hultman 2020, p. 355). Examples are the EU force in Chad/Central African Republic deployed to protect civilians alongside MINURCAT, or the NATO SFOR mission deployed at the same time as UNMIBH in Bosnia. Failing to account for these non-UN missions could lead to biased estimates of the UN's effectiveness. We may mistakenly attribute effects stemming from non-UN (or joint) peacekeeping to the UN alone, especially if the non-UN mission is much stronger and more robust than its UN counterpart. The NATO SFOR mission in Kosovo, for instance, numbered tens of thousands of troops, while the UN Mission in Kosovo had no troops but a few thousand police. As the fourth column in Table 8.1 shows, however, none of the UN findings change if we account for non-UN peacekeeping. Ignoring non-UN peacekeeping in previous statistical analyses has therefore not been much of a problem in terms of biased UN estimates on the effectiveness of UN personnel.

The second question is whether we can generalize findings generated by studying UN missions to say something about the effectiveness of peacekeeping overall. Are the results the same if we include all peacekeeping personnel in our models, without distinguishing between UN and non-UN missions? The fifth column in Table 8.1 shows mixed results. Specifically, the finding that peacekeeping troops mitigate civilian targeting in the postwar period (Kathman and Wood 2016) and that peacekeeping troops speed up the time to a negotiated settlement (Kathman and Benson 2019) is only significant for UN missions, not for all missions. Even in cases in which the original studies (UN) and the replications (all missions) produced comparable findings, this does not necessarily mean that non-UN peacekeeping has similar effects but

Table 8.1 *Replication results*

Original finding	Authors	Time period (shortened)	UN effect controlling for non-UN personnel	Effect of all missions	Effect of non-UN missions
UN troops reduce risk of war recurrence (in Africa)	Hultman et al. (2016) (Table 2, Mod. 2)	1989–2010 (1993–2010)	SAME	SAME	SAME
UN troops reduce battle deaths during ongoing war (in Africa)	Hultman et al. (2014) (Table 1, Mod. 1)	1992–2011 (1993–2011)	SAME	SAME	UNCERTAIN
UN police reduce postwar violence generally (old and new actors)	Bara (2020) (Table 1, Mod. 1)	1991–2016 (1993–2014)	SAME	SAME	UNCERTAIN
UN troops increase homicide levels in war and postwar countries	Di Salvatore (2019) (Table 1, Mod. 3)	1995–2012	SAME	SAME	UNCERTAIN
UN police reduce homicide levels in war and postwar countries	Di Salvatore (2019) (Table 1, Mod. 3)	1995–2012	SAME	SAME	— ^a
UN troops reduce postwar OSV ^b (in Africa)	Kathman and Wood (2016) (Table 2, Mod. 2)	1992–2010 (1993–2010)	SAME	UNCERTAIN	UNCERTAIN
UN troops shorten war duration to negotiated settlement	Kathman and Benson (2019) (Table 2, Mod. 1)	1992–2014 (1993–2014)	SAME	UNCERTAIN	UNCERTAIN

Note: ^a No estimate, as non-UN police were omitted from the replication model, likely due to the small number of observations with non-UN police, among which there was not much variation in terms of the numbers deployed. ^b OSV stands for 'one-sided violence'.

could indicate that UN missions might be driving the results. Generalizing from UN findings to peacekeeping by all organizations is thus not warranted.

The third question, then, specifically asks whether non-UN peacekeeping has similar or different effects as UN peacekeeping. To answer that, the UN variables in the original models are replaced with information on non-UN troops, police, and observers, while controlling for the total number of UN personnel. As the final column in Table 8.1 shows, the data do not support the conclusion that non-UN personnel have similar effects as UN personnel. The results do suggest that both UN and non-UN troops reduce the risk of war recurrence if deployed to a postwar context. For all other findings, the estimates on the equivalent personnel type (troops or police) in non-UN missions were not statistically significant.¹⁵

Is non-UN peacekeeping therefore less effective than UN peacekeeping? We cannot conclude that, for three reasons. First, the results on non-UN peacekeeping were not statistically significant. The only conclusion the data supports at this stage is that we have to remain uncertain about how effective non-UN personnel is with regard to the tested relationships.

Second, the original studies were designed to permit causal inference on UN missions, not on missions by other organizations. The original authors accounted for factors that shape whether a conflict receives a UN mission and that may at the same time influence the outcome studied. If non-UN missions go to different types of conflicts – and the review of existing research in this chapter suggests they do – scholars need to account for that, or else results on non-UN peacekeeping will be biased. Third, and with this point firmly in mind, the replications did reveal statistically significant violence-mitigating effects for non-UN missions, but primarily for non-UN police.¹⁶ This is not reflected in the table, because the focus was on replicating previous significant findings on UN missions. It is a surprising result because the number of police in non-UN missions is usually low, but the EU has several dedicated pure police missions, whose effect may defy their numbers. This points to one area of future research, with further research avenues on non-UN peacekeeping outlined in the following section.

THE WAY FORWARD

The analyses above have demonstrated that we cannot just infer from what we know about UN peacekeeping to peacekeeping by other actors. Instead, more research is needed about missions by regional organizations, coalitions of states, and single states. With new data on the personnel strength and composition of non-UN missions, there is now a unique chance to catch up on this front. The analyses in the previous section are a first cut at the question of how effectively non-UN missions contain violence compared to UN missions. In moving forward, however, scholars should resist the temptation to simply “add non-UN missions and stir.” Non-UN missions ought to be studied in their own right and with research carefully designed to permit causal inference on such missions. Specifically, we need to know more about the factors that shape whether a non-UN mission is deployed to a conflict. This is valuable knowledge on its own, and crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of these missions. Such an effort to systematically analyze the determinants of non-UN peacekeeping is also a chance to re-examine the dominant assumptions about where UN missions go, which are based on few and by now quite dated studies (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008).

Importantly, future empirical work comparing UN and non-UN peacekeeping would profit from more solid theoretical foundations. What Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl have noted in 2007 is still true, namely that there is a dearth of arguments specifying exactly why and how non-UN missions should differ from UN missions, followed by systematic tests of these arguments. This theoretical groundwork will have to grapple with the heterogeneity of non-UN missions (see Bara and Hultman 2020, p. 363). Of course, UN missions are likewise diverse and range from small observer missions like UNMOT in Tajikistan to massive and robust stabilization missions such as MINUSMA in Mali. And yet this diversity is nowhere as large as among non-UN missions. This raises the question of whether small and specialized EU missions that deploy primarily non-military staff such as police, border guards, monitors, judges and administrators (Keohane 2011) are even comparable to missions like the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan with more than 100 000 troops on the ground.

As of now, non-UN missions are defined by what they are not (not UN), but this may not be their most distinguishing feature. The dataset by Bara and Hultman (2020), for instance, also distinguishes non-UN missions by whether they are regional or international missions.

Missions are defined as regional if they are either run by a regional organization in their own region, or by an ad hoc coalition of states primarily from the region. International missions are missions run by regional organizations or state coalitions outside their region (such as the EU in Africa or NATO in Afghanistan). This allows scholars to contrast regional missions on the one hand to UN and international missions on the other hand and study whether peacekeeping by “neighbors” differs from peacekeeping by “outsiders” (Bara and Hultman 2020). Another research avenue is to start distinguishing missions by their mandate and scope again, independent of or in addition to distinguishing between UN and non-UN missions. This was common before the arrival of ever more detailed peacekeeping data (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008), but has gone out of fashion since.

If we stick to the binary distinction between UN and non-UN missions, one of the most important research avenues to study is how they *together* manage to keep or restore the peace. A 2015 UN Secretary General report describes partnership peacekeeping – the engagement of regional partners in peacekeeping alongside UN operations – as crucial to respond to the “challenging crises of tomorrow” (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015). Partnership peacekeeping is usually either sequential, in which case a UN mission takes over after a non-UN mission or vice versa, or parallel, in which case UN and non-UN missions are deployed at the same time, often with a certain division of labor (Brosig 2010). While there is value in studying how effective UN and non-UN missions are on their own, the implicit hope in partnership peacekeeping is that the collaboration of UN and non-UN missions is more than the sum of its parts. An empirically challenging but fundamentally interesting research avenue would therefore be to study whether UN and non-UN missions enable each other to achieve more than what one alone could achieve.

NOTES

1. In the last section, I problematize the negative term “non-UN peacekeeping” as a residual category of everything the UN is not, but the chapter adopts the term to reflect common usage (for example, Fortna 2004; 2008; Heldt and Wallensteen 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2007; Gaibullov et al. 2015; Bara and Hultman 2020).
2. Based on data in Bara and Hultman (2020). For France’s role in UN peacekeeping, see also Tardy (2016).
3. See also Heldt and Wallensteen (2007, pp. 9–11).
4. See also Rost and Greig (2011, p. 173).
5. Though at the time of deployment the intervention was not even consistent with SADC rules; see Likoti (2007).
6. See Coleman (2011) on the tradition of such solidarity deployments in sub-Saharan Africa.
7. Around the same time, the UN started the practice of re-hatting, that is, the transfer of personnel from a non-UN mission to a succeeding UN mission. Some of the trend in Figure 8.1 (UN personnel increasing at the same time as non-UN personnel is decreasing) reflects the fact that the UN took over responsibility from regional missions and re-hatted some of their personnel into UN peacekeepers. Examples are the re-hatting of ECOWAS troops in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire into UN missions, or the transition from INTERFET (International Force East Timor) to UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) in Timor-Leste. See UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2018); UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations et al. (2005).
8. See also Meiske and Ruggeri (2017).
9. See also Chapter 3 (Coleman) in this *Handbook*.
10. See also Dorussen et al. (2009) on cost sharing in the EU’s security governance, including EU peace operations.

11. For Asia, Bellamy and Williams (2005) argue that the relative paucity of peacekeeping missions is not only due to weak regional arrangements, but also the region's commitment to the principle of non-interference; hence, both UN and non-UN missions are unlikely in this region.
12. Since the "third wave" of peacekeeping research (Fortna and Howard 2008), this research has been predominantly quantitative-comparative.
13. The criteria for selecting these studies were that they use UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) data to make them compatible with the new non-UN dataset, and that the number of UN troops, police and/or observers were the main explanatory variables of the original studies. The code for the replications is available on the author's website: <https://www.corinnebara.net>.
14. Also, from 2015 onwards, SIPRI does not distinguish between troops and observers, but combines both personnel categories into a "military" category. To compare to previous results on UN studies that make this distinction, I use data only until 2014.
15. The direction of the estimated effects was the same as in the original studies for the claim that troops reduce battle deaths during ongoing war (Hultman et al. 2014), but increase homicide levels (Di Salvatore 2019). It was in the opposite direction for the claim that police reduce postwar violence (Bara 2020), and that troops reduce postwar civilian targeting (Kathman and Wood 2016), and time to negotiated settlement (Kathman and Benson 2019).
16. Specifically, non-UN police were associated with a decrease in battle deaths during war, a reduction in postwar civilian targeting, and a shorter time to negotiated settlement.

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