

Chapter 8

The Postmodern Reconstitution of an Islamic Memory: Theory and Practice in the Case of Yusuf al-Qaradawi's Virtual *Umma*

Uriya Shavit

Yusuf al-Qaradawi's rise to prominence began in 1961, when he was invited to teach at Qatar's newly established College for Higher Education. At that time Qaradawi, born in 1926, was a little-known religious scholar at al-Azhar and a member of the Muslim Brothers, then effectively suppressed. The tiny Gulf emirate was a safe haven for the intellectually promising young Islamist, who had just published his book on *al-Halal wa'l-Haram fi al-Islam* (*The Legal and the Prohibited in Islam*), a guide on religious law directed to Muslims living in the West.¹

In the half century to follow, Qaradawi's list of accomplishments has been exceptional: *al-Halal wa'l-Haram* became one of the most popular publications in its genre, and was followed by dozens of other books; Qaradawi established the faculty for Shari'a and Islamic studies at Qatar University; became a spiritual leader of Muslim Brothers movements all around the world, albeit rejecting an official role in them; was recognised as the leading scholar of the socio-legal Islamic school *Wasatiyya*; established in 1997 the European Council for Fatwa and Research (*al-Majlis al-Urubbi li'l-Ifia' wa'l-Buhuth*), which he has headed ever since; and initiated in 2004, again heading it ever since, the International

¹ On al-Qaradawi's early career, relations with al-Azhar and with the Muslim Brothers, see Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, 'Yusuf al-Qaradawi and al-Azhar', in Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds), *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi* (London, 2009), pp. 27–53; Husam Tammam, 'Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The Nature of a Special Relationship', in *ibid.*, pp. 55–83; Samuel Helfont, *Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Islam and Modernity* (Tel Aviv, 2009), pp. 35–8; Akram Kassab, *al-Manhaj al-Da'wi ind al-Qaradawi* (Cairo, 2006), pp. 281–4.

Union for Muslim Scholars. Following the ousting of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Qaradawi returned to Egypt and gave a Friday sermon on 18 February 2011 to hundreds of thousands of supporters who gathered at Tahrir Square, the heart of the Egyptian revolution. The speech signified his special moral status in Egypt, and in the Arab world at large.

Notwithstanding all these achievements, arguably one of Qaradawi's lasting legacies will be his conceptualisation and utilisation of advanced media technologies in promoting the resurrection of a universal Muslim nation, or in striving to transform the myth of the *umma* into reality. The *umma* is, of course, not a myth in the narrow sense of the word; while often idealised by some Muslims, it nevertheless belongs to history rather than to legend. I apply the term here in a broader sense, implying 'ideology in narrative form'.²

Since the mid 1990s, Qaradawi has been involved in a variety of satellite-television and internet operations. These are not appendices to his mission; rather, they are part of a broader approach, which is pioneering in its comprehension of the merits which advanced media technologies provide for the Islamist religious-political vision, and in particular for its ambition to constitute the mythicised *umma* as a viable – even if imperfect and only gradually evolving – political force. As such, they add another layer to the tangled Islamist correspondence with modernity.

The Muslim Brothers movement was founded in 1928 as a response to the modernist project that the West had introduced into Muslim societies from the late eighteenth century onwards. Modernisation of Middle Eastern societies involved four main transformations: a) substituting the political framework of the Ottoman Empire, which was based on religious affiliations and represented an ambition for Islamic global hegemony, with nation-states based on territorial affiliations; b) substituting religious law and religion-based social organisations for non-religious laws and organisations; c) substituting the principle of God's sovereignty for that of the People's sovereignty and d) substituting metaphysical scholarship for empiricism and rationalism.

Hasan al-Banna, the founder and first leader of the Muslim Brothers, challenged the modernist project by basing his agenda on the call for the reconstitution of religious-political Muslim unity and of Islam as the sole framework for all aspects of life.³ However, he did not reject modernity, or the

² Bruce Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth* (Chicago, IL, 1999), p. 207.

³ Hasan al-Banna, 'Bayna al-ams wal-yawm', in *Majmu'at Rasa'il al-imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna* (Beirut, 1965), pp. 220–55; 'Risalat al-mu'tamar al-khamis', in *ibid.*, p. 244; 'D'awtuna fi tur jadid', in *ibid.*, p. 73.

West, at large, but rather attempted to assimilate some of its technical aspects into his programme. Following the road taken by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh's reformism (and continued by al-Banna's mentor on Muslim–Western relations,⁴ Muhammad Rashid Rida), al-Banna Islamised scientific and technological advancements using theological as well as historical arguments that were based on idealisations of the Muslim past;⁵ he believed that interpretations of the meaning of the Qur'an must be linked scientifically, socially and morally to aspects of modern life.⁶ The modernist aspect of his approach also manifested itself in his modified acceptance of Western political norms and institutions and in his belief in mass, popular mobilisation as the means to enhance a complete transformation from a broken, harsh reality to an ideal, Islamic one. S.N. Eisenstadt further argues that the crucial aspect that makes this type of fundamentalism a product of modernity is its appropriation of some central aspects of the political programme of modernity, particularly of various – especially Jacobin – participatory, totalistic and egalitarian orientations.⁷

At the core of the Islamist idea is a belief that the modernist order can be challenged through reinterpreting modernity. Yusuf al-Qaradawi's activities during the past two decades suggest a new type of correspondence with modernity: he challenges the modernist order by reinterpreting postmodernist innovations. Qaradawi has become the conscious standard-bearer of an Islamist appreciation that, just as agents of modernity can be interpreted and applied in multiple ways other than the Western ones, so can agents of postmodernity. This appreciation rests on analysis of global media as crucial components of Islamic resurrection and universalism. Qaradawi, who distinguishes between Islamic universalism as a desired objective and Western globalisation as an enemy, believes that advanced media technologies are the most useful tool of our times in promoting the resurrection of the Muslim nation and in bringing non-Muslims to Islam. He regards satellite television and the internet as the pillars of the Muslim past's desired return to the future.

This chapter explores the relation between Qaradawi's vision, the modern nation-state and postmodern advanced media technologies. Its first section deals with Qaradawi's ideology; the second analyses his interpretation and facilitation

⁴ Hasan al-Banna, *Mudhakarāt al-da'wa wa'l-da'iya* (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab), pp. 49–50; Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York and Oxford, 1993), p. 5.

⁵ Al-Banna, 'Bayna al-ams wal-yawm', pp. 218–19.

⁶ Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–1942* (Reading, UK, 1998), p. 76.

⁷ S.N. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 91.

of satellite television and the internet; the third (based in part on a one-year field study in five Arab mosques in Frankfurt am Main, Germany) analyses some limitations that Qaradawi's ambitions to transform a myth of the *umma* to a political reality encounter.

Yusuf Qaradawi's Religious-Political Programme

The distinction between radical and moderate Islamists, when applied in broad brushstrokes, oversimplifies the religious-political programmes of movements and individuals. Qaradawi is one example. An understanding of his ideas and activities calls for a distinction between a) Qaradawi the Islamist intellectual; b) Qaradawi the political leader and c) Qaradawi the religious-legal authority.

Qaradawi the intellectual echoes the main concerns of Hasan al-Banna, who was, according to Qaradawi's own testimony, his teacher in his first year at university and the source of the inspiration for his joining the Muslim Brothers.⁸ As did al-Banna, Qaradawi emphasises in his writings the need for the re-establishment of an Allah-abiding united religious-political community, with a united leadership, in which Islam will be the comprehensive framework for all aspects of life; he accepts that in contemporary times the myth of the ideal, united *umma* can be realised in different ways; a federation, a confederation and a commonwealth.⁹

Directly inspired by al-Banna,¹⁰ Qaradawi asserts that the Muslim world is a victim of a well-planned and collective Western socio-cultural attack, far more dangerous than any military or political campaign. This attack is aimed at stripping Muslims of their faith and their appreciation of Islam's all-encompassing nature. It is an attack which has been using a variety of means, from orientalist and missionaries to Western-oriented schools and mass media.¹¹ According to Qaradawi, the triumph of the attack over the Muslim mind is the primary explanation for the failures of the Muslim nation, including the Arab defeats against Israel, for it had distanced Muslims from what had granted them victory in the past – their faith in Islam, their acceptance of God's laws as a sole

⁸ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Nahnu wal-gharb: as'ilah sha'ika wa-ajwiba hasima* (Cairo, 2006), p. 124.

⁹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Ummatuna bayna al-qarnayn* (Cairo, 2000, repr. 2002), pp. 148–51.

¹⁰ Al-Banna, 'Bayna al-ams wal-yawm', pp. 218–25.

¹¹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Al-hulul al-mustawrada wa kayfa janat 'ala ummatina* (Beirut, 1971, repr. 1974), pp. 15–46; *idem*, *Ummatuna*, p. 77.

point of reference, and their unity with other Muslims.¹² Therefore Qaradawi believes that a Muslim renaissance requires a re-Islamisation of Muslim societies. Secular and infidel notions that became hegemonic must give way to Islamic principles and Islamic laws. A true Muslim state must be established. This state will have the Qur'an as its constitution and will be universal.¹³ It will be led by a *khalifa*, a second Salah al-Din, an able leader whose primary goal will be to lead the united nation in *jihad*.¹⁴

How is the objection to Western hegemony reconciled with the quest for Islamic world domination? In one of his explanations, Qaradawi distinguishes between two terms: Western *'awlama* (globalisation) and Islamic *'alamiya* (universalism). The former is a coercive process in which the United States aims to force on the world its political, economic, cultural and social hegemony. The latter sees all human beings as equals and distinguishes between them only in relation to their piety.¹⁵

While his writings clearly define him as al-Banna's student and admirer, Qaradawi does not follow him blindly, openly declaring that he is not committed to the former's opinions.¹⁶ In relation to parliamentary democracy, for example, he follows his own path. Al-Banna responded to a broken liberal-democratic political reality, which he did not utterly reject, but was deeply suspicious of, while Qaradawi has responded from the 1960s onwards to autocratic political realities, amidst speculation that fair and secret ballots will lead his camp to power. Therefore, while carefully distinguishing the Islamic conception of electoral politics from the Western, Qaradawi puts great emphasis on Islam's democratic underpinnings, manifested by the principle of *shura* (consultation).¹⁷ He overrules al-Banna's rejection of political parties, possibly because of his understanding that this could weaken the Brothers' political leverage. He strongly defends this position, contending it has foundations in the times of the righteous *khulafa* as well as in the reality of contemporary Muslim societies. He compares a plurality of parties in politics to the plurality of schools in Islamic law; but he also cautions that embracing plurality does not imply embracing disputes and contradictions, and that plurality is legitimate so long as the people

¹² *Idem*, *Durus al-nakba al-thaniyya: limadha in hazamna ... wa kayfa nantasiru* (place of publication not mentioned, repr. 1969), pp. 30–40; *idem*, *Ummatuna*, pp. 131–3; *idem*, *Ta'rikhna al-muftara 'alayhi* (Cairo, 2005, fourth repr. 2008), pp. 15–25.

¹³ *Idem*, *Min fiqh al-dawla al-muslima* (Cairo, 1997, third repr. 2001), pp. 30–4, 90.

¹⁴ *Idem*, *Durus*, pp. 112–15; *idem*, *Ummatuna*, pp. 148–51.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 229–38.

¹⁶ *Idem*, *Nahnu wal-gharb*, p. 125.

¹⁷ *Idem*, *Durus*, p. 107; *idem*, *Min fiqh*, pp. 35–7.

stand as one in regard to crucial issues such as Muslim existence, Muslim faith, Muslim law and the Muslim nation.¹⁸

In Qaradawi's capacity as a political leader, his actions fail to match his rhetoric. While he did not plan on settling down in Qatar when he sojourned there in the 1960s,¹⁹ the oil emirate has become his refuge, and allows him a great measure of freedom in writing and preaching. But this comes at a price: Qaradawi is banned from harming the emirate's strategic interests. This explains why, throughout most of his career in Qatar, much of his writing in relation to the required political revolution in the Muslim world has been abstract, avoiding reference to specific conditions or leaders; it also explains why his support for the uprisings in the Arab world during 2010 and 2011 fell short of an endorsement of political reforms in Qatar, one of the Arab world's most autocratic countries. Qaradawi's very presence in Qatar has given the emirate legitimisation which, judging from his own ideology, it is unworthy of. Qatar does not apply the principle of *shura* as Qaradawi demands; it is as distant from the Islamic principles of social justice which Qaradawi endorses as any country can be; it is a strategic ally of the United States, and is deeply influenced by Western culture; and it has normalised relations with Israel more than any other Gulf state, a normalisation which Qaradawi strongly opposes. It is not clear how influential Qaradawi is within Qatar's circles of power, but it is clear that he has not been able to turn even his own direct sphere of influence toward his religious-political goals. The failure on May 2012 of the independent Islamist contender for Egypt's first free Presidential elections, 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futuh, whom Qaradawi supported, demonstrated that Qaradawi's direct political influence is also perhaps more limited in Egypt than he would like to believe.

Qaradawi attempted to institutionalise his call for Muslim unity by establishing, on 11 March 2004, the pan-Muslim International Union for Muslim Scholars. The major objective of this organisation is to 'persistently strive to preserve the Islamic identity of the Muslim *umma* so that it retains its *wasati* stance and lofty goals of enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil'. Among the Union's minor objectives are to 'alert the whole *umma* to the new weapons being used under the guise of carefully-tailored terms like globalization and modernity' and to 'unify the ranks of Muslim scholars'.²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 151–60.

¹⁹ *Idem*, *Nahnu wal-gharb*, p. 124.

²⁰ International Union of Muslim Scholars: Union Goals (n.d), at http://iumsonline.net/english/topic_04.shtml, last accessed 1 May 2007.

Since its establishment, the Union has exemplified the prospects for Shiite–Sunni cooperation, but it has not become an independent force to be politically reckoned with.

Qaradawi, a veteran of Nasser's jails and an admirer of Sayyid Qutb's earlier writings, knows all too well the price that can be paid for upsetting those who hold a monopoly on the use of force, and is thus in opposition to Qutb-inspired Islamist *jihadism*.²¹ In attempting to reconcile the gap between his radical rhetoric and moderate political actions, he explains that a quest to replace a corrupt government by force is justified only if the challengers can prevail. If they cannot, they should remain patient and wait until they muster sufficient power, and in the meantime should advocate change by speaking and writing.²² This explanation vindicates Qaradawi's practical cooperation with the Qatari and other regimes, but creates a paradox: the Islamic revolution can only take place when the time is right, but how will the time ever be right, if one has to wait for it to be so?

Thirdly, as a religious-legal authority Qaradawi has become the champion of the socio-legal school of Wasatiyya (the harmonising middle path approach). Wasatiyya, which is a general approach to the essence of Islam applied in the field of jurisprudence, suggests that Islam is a golden mean, bringing notions into harmony which are seemingly contradictory: rights and duties; continuity and change; materialism and spiritualism; revelation and rationalism; communalism and individuality; private ownership and public ownership. Wasatiyya holds Islam to be a religion of firm principles, but also one that leaves much leverage for addressing changing realities. It seeks to find, where possible, practical and flexible solutions to problems faced by Muslims, to make their lives easier, and to make them fond of their religion. To achieve these goals, Wasati scholars do not commit themselves to any one of the four religious-legal schools (*madhhabs*). They also resort in generous measure to the loosely defined principle of *maslaha* (safeguarding a principle objective of the shari'a).²³

Wasatiyya's main adversaries in Muslim-Arab societies are religious scholars who are contemporarily referred to as *salafis* – that is, scholars who endorse

²¹ Al-Qaradawi, *Nahnu wal-gharb*, p. 125.

²² *Idem*, *Min fiqh*, pp. 118–28.

²³ *Idem*, *Al-Halal wal-haram fi al-islam* (Beirut, 1973), pp. 17–39; *idem*, *Ummatuna*, p. 171. For an overview of Wasatiyya, see Sagi Polka, 'The Centrist Stream in Egypt and its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping of the Country's Cultural Identity', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 39/3 (July 2003), pp. 39–64; Bettina Gräf, 'The Concept of Wasatiyya in the Work of Yusuf al-Qaradawi', in Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds), *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi* (London: 2009), 213–38.

complete devotion in religious practice and a literal reading of the Qur'an and the *hadith* in establishing religious law. *Salafis* are less inclined to assimilate aspects of modernity into Muslim societies.²⁴ Being the chief protagonist of Wasatiyya, Qaradawi is thus, among those advocating practical and modern religious-legal decisions, the leading voice in the Arab Sunni world.

The multiple dimensions of Qaradawi's message – the radical intellectual, the pragmatic politician and the moderate jurist – are all combined in his approach to the Muslim minority in the West. Qaradawi is the single most influential Arab scholar in addressing the cultural and religious-legal challenges Muslim immigrants face (while, as will be demonstrated below, his influence is narrower than his ambitions).

In terms of ideology, Qaradawi has been the leading voice in a broad agreement reached in Islamic-Arab jurisprudence during the past 30 years as to the identity and duties of Muslims living in the West. This broad agreement aims to actualise the myth of the *umma* in the lives of Muslim minorities. It involves five points: first, a greater Islamic nation exists of which Muslims are members wherever they live; secondly, while living in a non-Muslim society is undesirable, it might be legitimate on an individual basis if the immigrant acts as a model Muslim; thirdly, it is the duty of a Muslim in the West to reaffirm his religious identity and to distance himself from anything contrary to Islam. Hence, he should help establish and patronise mosques, Muslim schools, cultural centres and shops; he must also unite with his fellow Muslim immigrants, regardless of ethnic, national and linguistic affiliations. Fourthly, Muslims in the West should champion the cause of the Muslim nation in the political as well as the religious sphere, for there should be no distinction between the two; and lastly, Muslims

²⁴ The contemporary usage of the term 'Salafiyya' is confusing as a description, since it is ascribed to various groups, including several contesting ones; see Thomas Hegghammer, 'Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism', in Roel Meijer (ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (London, 2009), pp. 248–51. In contemporary academic scholarship it is commonly used to describe 'imported wahhabiyya', e.g. individuals or groups outside Saudi Arabia directly or indirectly inspired or financed by Saudi organisations; Muhammad Ali Adraoui, 'Salafism in France: Ideology, Practices and Contradictions', in *ibid.*, p. 369; Hasan b. 'Ali al-Saqqaf, *al-Salafiyya al-Wahhabiyya* (Beirut, 2005), pp. 13, 19–20; Juan Jose Stemman, 'Middle East Salafism's Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 10/3 (September 2005), available at http://www.e-prism.org/images/MIDDLE_EAST_SALAFISM_-_1-9-06.pdf, last accessed 19 February 2014; Febe Armanios, 'The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya', *Congressional Research Service Reports* (December 2003), available at <http://fas.org/irp/crs/RS21695.pdf>, last accessed 19 February 2014.

in the West should spread Islam in the declining, spiritual void of Western societies.²⁵ Regarding this final duty, Qaradawi elaborates:

Muslims in the West ought to be sincere callers to their religion. They should keep in mind that calling others to Islam is not only restricted to scholars and *shaykhs*, but it goes so far as to encompass every committed Muslim. As we see scholars and *shaykhs* delivering *khutbas* and lectures, writing books to defend Islam, it is no wonder to find lay Muslims practising *da'wa* while employing wisdom and fair exhortation.²⁶

Qaradawi sought to institutionalise his call for Muslim migrants' unity in purpose and action by establishing, in London on 29 March 1997, the Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research. The council's mission is to address in uniformity questions relating to Muslims in Europe²⁷ – and thus to encourage uniformity in their conduct. Following Qaradawi's Wasati orientation, the council has introduced practical solutions to a variety of dilemmas faced by migrants. The most controversial of these, which caused an outcry even among some Wasatis, was the decision to allow Muslims in the West who do not own a home to take out mortgages, although both charging and paying interest are forbidden in Islam. This decision, which considered mortgages in the context of living in Europe a need (*haja*) that can be regarded as a necessity (*darura*), exemplifies Qaradawi's sensitivity to the special conditions of migrants.²⁸

The New Imagined Community and the Universal *Umma*

The main tools through which Qaradawi has diffused his agenda since the mid 1990s are his weekly television show on the Qatari al-Jazeera news channel, *al-Shari'a wa'l-Haya*, and the internet portal which he supervised (until his dismissal by the board of directors in 2010), IslamOnline.net. Though he already

²⁵ For an overview, see Uriya Shavit, 'Should Muslims Integrate into the West?', *Middle East Quarterly*, 14/4 (autumn 2007), pp. 13–21; Uriya Shavit, 'The Wasati and Salafi Approaches to the Religious Law of Muslim Minorities', *Islamic Law and Society*, 19/4 (autumn 2012), pp. 416–33.

²⁶ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 'Duties of Muslims Living in the West' (7 May 2006), available at <http://www.quranforall.org/fatawaa/duties.htm>, last accessed 19 February 2014.

²⁷ *Idem*, 'Taḡdim', in *Qararat wa-Fatawa al-Majlis al-Urubbī lil-Ifṭā' wal-Buhūth* (Cairo, 2002), pp. 5–10.

²⁸ *Idem*, *Fi fiqh al-aqalliyyat al-muslima* (Cairo, 2007), pp. 154–90.

enjoyed a formidable scholarly stature before the 1990s, it is his media operations that have elevated him to the rank of a world-renowned religious authority. The initiation and use of these media operations are not incidental – rather, they reflect Qaradawi's articulated proposition that advanced media technologies should be interpreted and facilitated as agents for challenging the premises of the modern nation-state and for promoting the rise of a united Muslim nation and an Islam-based society.

An appreciation of Qaradawi's theory and practice in the field of global media calls first for an analysis of the challenges satellite television and the internet pose to modern nation-states at large. To do so, Benedict Anderson's theory of modern nation-states as imagined communities will be of use.

In analysing the gradual development of national consciousnesses in the Spanish-administered regions of South America, Anderson suggested that a role was played by gazettes distributed in these regions and which first appeared as mere appendages of the market. According to Anderson, it was through these gazettes that large groups of people gradually developed a sense of familial belonging, a mutual belief in common political fates that in time turned into conceptualisations of themselves as nations.²⁹ Anderson's imagined national communities are the result of an affinity between territories and media contents absorbed simultaneously, primarily and on an ongoing basis by people residing in these territories – and *only* by them. They are inseparable from a benchmark of modernity: the development of mass media which, while massive, has nevertheless been limited in its geographical scope. While Anderson focused on print media, the introduction in the twentieth century of terrestrial television broadcasting fits well with his theory: until the beginning of the 1980s, these broadcasts, numerous as they were, largely coincided with national boundaries.

The rise of advanced media technologies broke the almost exclusive affinity between territorial boundaries and mass-media consumption that was at the heart of Anderson's theory. Satellite television and, later, the internet, reached a global potential audience. During the 1980s and 1990s, theories of media globalisation suggested that global media networks such as CNN International (launched in 1985), which produced 'global' news and aspired to a global audience, constructed a global sphere which replaced, at least to some extent, national spheres, and thus potentially shattered national identities.³⁰

²⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London and New York, 1991), p. 62.

³⁰ Stig Hjarvard, 'News Media and the Globalization of the Public Sphere', in Stig Hjarvard (ed.), *News in a Globalized Society* (Gotborg, 2001), p. 20.

However, from the 1990s onwards the endurance of national imageries in a global, postmodern reality became questionable. The strong national affiliations of media organisations which claimed to be global were exposed and debated, while audiences around the world demonstrated a desire to consume news and entertainment along the national lines they were accustomed to. Rather than appeal to a 'global' audience as CNN International continues to do, media organisations have been increasingly focusing since the late 1980s on localised global operations. The British Sky network, established in 1989, is an early example for what later became a trend: while broadcasting via satellite to a potentially global audience, its content and orientation are firmly based on the imagined British community. Becoming a global phenomenon in the mid 1990s, most of the internet's operations also focused on national audiences, albeit using a global tool.

This transformation in the application of advanced media technologies dissipated the 'global' assault on the modern nation-state, but also created new challenges: imagined communities are today extended outside their territorial boundaries. For the first time since the rise of modern nationalism much of the images and texts crucial to the imagination of communities as nations can be consumed far away from the homeland, almost as if consumed in that territory. There is no longer a need to reside in the geographical realms of one's nation-state in order to consume much of its media: one can do so simultaneously, primarily and on an ongoing basis, with one's compatriots while residing thousands of miles away. Thus, rather than a global village created by satellites and the internet, there are many contesting national villages which operate on a global scale. This development poses far-reaching challenges to traditional concepts of nationhood, and particularly to the relations between immigrants and both their original and new nation-states. It complicates already complex concepts such as integration, dual citizenship and transnationalism.³¹

The potential of global media operations to encroach on traditional territorial limitations, and the prospect of their redefining nationality, was not lost on some Islamic scholars; but they interpreted global media in a very different context. From the 1990s onwards, some Muslim scholars realised that advanced media technologies allowed them to appeal to potentially any of their co-religionists wherever the latter were living in the world, or (in even more ambitious terms) any person anywhere in the world. The resurrected *umma* they

³¹ For a discussion of these issues, see Uriya Shavit, *The New Imagined Community: Advanced Media Technologies and the Construction of National and Muslim Identities of Migrants* (Brighton, Portland, OR and Vancouver, 2009), pp. 1–97.

had long envisioned, that is, the myth of a united Muslim nation, encompassing all Muslims wherever they lived, was no longer a purely theoretical concept. Through advanced media technologies, a sermon given in Mecca or an edict issued in Riyadh could immediately and simultaneously be read in Ottawa, London, Cairo and Karachi. For a Muslim nation which does not recognise the territorial boundaries of nation-states, the internet and satellite television meant indifference to boundaries; for a nation seeking to resurrect a memory of unity and to join all its members into one dedicated religious-political community, modern telecommunications systems provided Muslims everywhere with the same imagery, simultaneously and on a daily basis.

Religious scholars have become aware of the parallelism between the conceptualised universal *umma* and the global reach of advanced media technologies. In the most radical interpretation, such technologies were regarded as proof of Islam being the true religion. The logic was simple: if the nation of Islam was meant to be universal, then the appearance of universal media could not be a coincidence. Thus advanced media technologies were perceived as Allah's gift to the *umma* – a means designed to connect all believers, and to enhance the spread of Allah's word. Ja'far Shaykh Idris (b. 1931), a Sudanese scholar who was involved in *da'wa* activities in the United States between 1974 to 2004 on behalf of Saudi Arabia, wrote that only Allah could have known that a time would come when the world would be turned into a single global village. Therefore, only Allah could have known that there was no need to send many prophets out to many peoples – one final prophet, bringing his message to all humanity, would suffice. Ever since Muhammad began his prophetic mission, countries have come closer together, a process that has reached its peak in our times, and this development could only be interpreted as corresponding with the heart of Muslim belief.³²

The internet had one more specific merit that raised its appeal for religious scholars and preachers of all trends: it empowered them on an individual basis. On internet sites, a whole world could revolve around scholars where their biographies, sermons, religious edicts and reflections on current affairs could reach the public with immaculate cohesion and order. Websites dedicated to the life and works of individual religious scholars include those who held a formidable status before the internet ever existed (for example, the Saudi 'Abdallah ibn Baz), but also scholars of a less formidable stature (for example, the abovementioned Idris).

³² Ja'far Shaykh Idris, 'al-Da'wa wa wasa'il al-ittisal al-haditha', *al-Bayan*, 148, available at <http://www.jaafaridris.com/Arabic/aarticles/dawa.htm>, last accessed 10 April 2006.

Qaradawi is an example of a scholar who was well-known and influential before the time of advanced modern technologies, only to have become more prominent and influential by utilising the new media. No single scholar has done more than he to Islamise, in theory, advanced media technologies and effectively to use them as agents for his ideas. His weekly television show *al-Shari'a wa'l-Haya*, in which he discusses questions relating to diverse aspects of Islamic law, has been broadcast since the early days of al-Jazeera, which was launched in November 1996. Millions of Muslims around the world watch the programme. According to Qaradawi himself, it is broadcast on Sundays, at 19:05 GMT, because that is the most convenient time for Muslims living in Western countries.³³ On the internet, Qaradawi operates a personal site; the European Council for Fatwa and Research and the International Union of Muslim Scholars also maintain sites. Qaradawi's major online operation was the portal IslamOnline.net, established in June 1997 by the al-Balagh Cultural Society. According to Gräf, the idea of constructing the portal was initiated by Maryam al-Hajari, an information technology specialist who in 1996 attended a course given by Qaradawi on alms tax (*zakat*); Qaradawi gave the portal his endorsement and agreed to serve as chairman of al-Balagh and head of IslamOnline.net's supervising committee. After IslamOnline.net was established, he promoted it in his televised appearances. While his role in the portal was largely honorary,³⁴ it still represented his views and chronicled his activities with great respect. On March 2010, a dispute between al-Balagh and the portal's Egyptian office, which latter had produced most of its contents, led to Qaradawi's dismissal from the board of directors. Egypt-based workers argued that the Qatari management was seeking to transform the portal from wasatiyya to salafiyya, and to curb its strong anti-Israeli agenda. On August 2010, former members of IslamOnline.net launched, with the endorsement of Qaradawi, a new portal, with a very similar name, structure and contents to those of IslamOnline.net – onislam.net; ranking data, provided by Alexa.com, an internet ranking company, on 1 February 2013, suggests it has become more popular than IslamOnline.net, but also that none of them match the popularity attained by IslamOnline.net before Qaradawi's dismissal.

Under Qaradawi, IslamOnline.net had a small administrative office in Qatar's capital, Doha; its content was managed from Cairo, where some 100

³³ Ehab Galal, 'Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the New Islamic TV', in Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen (eds), *Global Mufti*, p. 158.

³⁴ Bettina Gräf, 'IslamOnline.net: Independent, interactive, popular', *Arab Media & Society* (January 2008), available at <http://www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article=576&printarticle>, last accessed 19 February 2014.

employees worked full-time. IslamOnline.net's declared mission was to 'create a unique, global Islamic web portal'; its goals were to 'work to uplift the Islamic nation specifically and humanity in general', 'to reinforce values and morals on the individual, family and community levels', and 'to expand the circle of introducing Islam'. Its content was presented in both Arabic and English.³⁵

Qaradawi theorised on several occasions on the relations between advanced media technologies and the diffusion of his interpretation of Islam as a universal religion. Speaking about the success of his satellite television show, he said:

No one imagined that it [the *al-Sharī'a wa al-Haya* weekly programme] would be as popular as it is, but Allah willed that it be a run-away hit, and people from all over the world watch it. Anyone who understands Arabic watches – East or West, in places like America, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, all of these countries, and of course the Arab world ... Al-Jazeera has provided me with millions of viewers; where my audience was once numbered in the thousands or tens of thousands, they are now in the millions. I never go to a country now where people do not know me through Al-Jazeera ... Books allow you to delve deeply into an idea, to organize things and place them in sequence, and so on. But how many people read books? They have a limited audience. Meanwhile, the mass media have a very wide audience.³⁶

Qaradawi's writings about the internet are even more audacious – he suggested that it and satellite television allow Muslims to turn Islam's conceptual universality into reality,³⁷ and described his portal IslamOnline.net as the 'jihad of the era', which enables Muslims to promote *da'wa* globally without relying on armed force,³⁸ and without enjoying the cooperation of governments.³⁹ Qaradawi praised web activities as the most important contemporary agent for promoting the global ascendance of Islam. The mission of Islam, he wrote,

³⁵ IslamOnline.net, 'About Us' (n.d), available at <http://www.islamonline.net/English/AboutUs.shtml>, last accessed 1 May 2007.

³⁶ 'Abdallah S. Schleifer, 'Interview with Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi', *Transnational Broadcasting Studies*, 13 (Fall 2004), available at <http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall04/interviewyusufqaradawi.htm>, last accessed 19 February 2014.

³⁷ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Hajat al-bashriyya ila al-risala al-hadariyya li-ummatina* (Cairo, 2004), p. 85.

³⁸ *Idem*, *Ummatuna*, p. 172.

³⁹ Imam Muhammad Imam, 'Khidmat al-islam 'ibr al-intarnat ... jihad hadha al-'asr' (interview with Yusuf al-Qaradawi), *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 12 November 1999, p. 18.

is universal. It is a mission that is relevant to all the nations in the world. It must be brought to all of humanity in the language of the day and not in the languages of the past, so that Muslims can justify themselves before God when their time comes. In order to do so, there is a need to use all the tools of our times – from print to radio to satellite television to the ‘great modern tool called [the] internet’, so that Islam can be brought to non-Muslims and so that Muslims can be taught the right Islam. That, he concluded, was the reason behind the initiation of IslamOnline.net.⁴⁰

Qaradawi’s assimilation and conceptualisation of new media is all the more impressive when taking into account his poor childhood in the 1930s in the Egyptian Nile Delta village of Saft Turab, as described in his autobiography. There was no running water, no electricity. Only one newspaper, the government’s *al-Abram*, was available. Life centred on the village’s five mosques. When radios were first introduced they were greeted with excitement, but most villagers were too poor to purchase one. To listen to the news or readings from the Qur’an, villagers would gather in the local café.⁴¹ Yet perhaps it was in that café that Qaradawi first appreciated the power of the media to unite people into one community with a shared political consciousness.

Qaradawi’s combined advanced media operations allow his speeches, initiatives and articles to reach a global audience immediately. Also available globally are any legal opinions he issues, or that are issued by the councils he heads. Muslims anywhere in the world can simultaneously access any *fatwa* that has been issued, as long as they have an internet connection. The accumulation of *fatwas* is building up a comprehensive guide for Muslims, exemplifying the notion that no aspect of life is outside the jurisdiction of the shari’a. The questions they answer relate mainly to everyday life. Is a Muslim allowed to participate in fancy-dress parties? Can a Muslim go to a mixed summer camp? What can a person do to control sexual desires when away from his wife? How much nudity is allowed during intercourse between a husband and wife? Does Islam allow surrogate mothers? What can one do to give up homosexuality? Must diabetics fast?

One intriguing aspect of the legal opinions expounded on IslamOnline.net (and also those issued by the European Council for Fatwa and Research) was the mention of the inquirer’s first name and country of origin. Localities stretched from the United States to Germany and from Egypt to Fiji. While the very rationale of the council and of Qaradawi’s school is the adaptation of rulings to

⁴⁰ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Ummatuna*, p. 172.

⁴¹ *Idem, Ibn al-qarya wal-kuttab* (Cairo, 2002), pp. 15–30, 84–90.

localities, a Muslim reading the opinions can realise that the dilemmas he faces are shared by other Muslims too. The Muslim nation gained validity as a binding legal-religious entity. A similar effect resulted from the forums taking place on IslamOnline.net, where users worldwide address questions to an invited scholar on a certain issue.

One other common quality of these legal opinions was that, when relating to everyday problems, they were enhanced by human interest. Users got fascinating glimpses into human weakness, confusion, misfortune and redemption. In this respect they are no different than the 'Dear Abby' personal advice columns in Western newspapers, only here the fabric of society is not of a nation-state, but of the Muslim nation.

While the *fatwa* bank and other Islamic indoctrinations featured in the portal can be regarded as postmodern transformations of traditional *da'wa*, perhaps the more innovative aspect of IslamOnline.net (which onislam.net has continued) was its concept of covering world news from the perspective of the *umma*. While most news websites maintain the customary hierarchies of national and international news, Qaradawi's portal evaluated and mediated news in terms of each item's perceived importance to his concept of the global Muslim nation. This editorial decision manifested Qaradawi's belief in the universality and viability of the *umma*, and constituted an attempt to reestablish it as a community imagined by its members through global media.

News stories in IslamOnline.net under Qaradawi were concerned with Muslim states, Muslim minorities and Islam in general. For example, on 9 January 2007, its reports highlighted the growing number of Indonesian provinces and districts adopting new regulations for the implementation of shari'a; American strikes on al-Qaeda targets in Somalia; and new awareness training for US airport officials on how to approach Muslims travelling to Mecca for the *hajj* pilgrimage. To use Anderson's terminology on the role of gazettes in constructing national sentiments, what connects these Indonesian provinces, American attacks and new airport regulations is that they all concern members of the *umma* in different parts of the world. The aim is to infuse Muslims with a sense that they share a common fate. An unfolding sphere of events is created in which Muslims all over the world can share simultaneously.

This sphere was not restricted to religious-political issues. IslamOnline.net's news pages also covered culture, science and sports in Muslim societies around the world. In these pages, what connected a certain exhibition, book and football club was that they were perceived to be reflective of, or of interest to, the

umma as a whole. For example, when the site featured a 10-year-old Turkish wunderkind playing football for Barcelona, the purpose was not to headline a world sporting event, something the site did not routinely cover, but to stress the boy's Muslim identity.⁴²

Qaradawi's internet portal paid special attention to issues which reflect the unity of Muslims. For example, the site picked up a story from the American press concerning the Sunni–Shiite Montgomery Muslim Community School in Montgomery, Washington. There, 125 students from 18 countries were 'bridging a divide fuelled by the violence in Iraq', which is seen as evidence that Muslim Shiites and Sunnites in fact share the same morals and values, and therefore separation and antagonism is senseless. In this context the report mentioned a 'high-profile meeting between the Sunni and Shiite scholars, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, president of the International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS), and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of Iran's influential Expediency Council', in which the two 'recently urged Muslims world-wide to act in unison to face the challenges ahead'.⁴³

The portal's news coverage and Qaradawi's activities complemented each other. Qaradawi graced the portal with his prestige and authority, and the portal magnified him by characterising his words as representing the Muslim world – a characterisation whose purpose was to create a reality rather than reflect it. For example, in September 2006 the Danish *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper published cartoons of the Prophet, and a Norwegian paper reprinted them, eliciting protests and threats of retaliation in Europe and Muslim countries. The portal highlighted Qaradawi's International Union's statement demanding that officials in both countries take a firm stand 'against these repeated insults to the Muslim nation and the Prophet followed by 1.3 billion people across the globe', or it would 'be forced to urge millions of Muslim across the world to boycott all Danish and Norwegian products and activities'.⁴⁴

⁴² Al-Amin Andalusi, 'Turkish Muhammad ... Next Ronaldinho' (27 March 2007), available at http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1173087915142&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout, last accessed 27 March 2007.

⁴³ IslamOnline.net staff, 'US School Bridges Sunni-Shiite Divide' (8 March 2007), available at http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout&cid=1173364084003, last accessed 8 March 2007.

⁴⁴ Adel Abd al-Halim, 'Scholars Threaten Boycott over Anti-Prophet Cartoons' (21 January 2006), available at <http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2006-01/21/article06.shtml>, last accessed 21 January 2006.

Is the *Umma* Being Resurrected?

In an interview he gave for the German news magazine *Der Spiegel* on September 2005, Qaradawi was asked whether Muslims need a central authority such as the Catholic Pope. He answered that in Islam there was no pope, but did not neglect to mention that '[m]ost Muslims would like such a central authority, to avoid constant debate over contradictory and extremist scholarly opinions'.⁴⁵ An exploration of Qaradawi's ideology and activities reveals not only that the unity of the nation, the spread of Allah's final revelation and the constitution of religion as the sole framework of life are at the core of his agenda, but also that Qaradawi seeks for himself a pivotal role in enhancing this agenda, and that he considers advanced media technologies as his most effective weapons.

To what degree has Qaradawi been successful? While a period of less than two decades of using such technologies is too short a time to pass judgment, three inherent limitations can be identified.

First, while Qaradawi addresses a global audience, his media operations still function from a clearly defined national/territorial basis. To appear on al-Jazeera, Qaradawi cannot cross red lines set down by the Qatari regime. There are few limitations on what Qaradawi can say, but his capacity for political recruitment and mobilisation is restricted mainly to rhetoric. Furthermore, his dramatic dismissal from IslamOnline.net demonstrated that, despite his personal popularity and the success of the portal, the final word in any business initiative is reserved to the shareholders rather than the employees.

Second, while media can be an effective tool for political mobilisation, they are not sufficient in and by themselves. In the affair of the Danish cartoons, for example, Qaradawi was vociferous in regarding the controversy as an opportunity to unite the *umma*, in rejecting appeals for dialogue so long as an explicit apology from the Danish government was not forthcoming, and in attacking Muslims (such as the popular satellite preacher 'Amr Khaled) who dared to suggest otherwise.⁴⁶ His anti-Danish crusade, channelled through his various media, gained much publicity; but Qaradawi was in no position to transform his popularity into binding political decisions, or even long-term

⁴⁵ Volkhard Windfuhr and Bernhard Zand, 'God Has Disappeared' (interview with Yusuf al-Qaradawi), *Der Spiegel*, 27 September 2005), available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel-interview-with-al-jazeera-host-yusuf-al-qaradawi-god-has-disappeared-a-376954.html>, last accessed 19 February 2014.

⁴⁶ Lindsay Wise, 'Amr Khaled vs. Yusuf al Qaradawi: The Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Clash of Two Islamic TV Titans', *Transnational Broadcasting Studies* 16, 2006, available at <http://www.tbsjournal.com/wise.htm>, last accessed 25 February 2014.

popular protests. The crisis illustrated the power, but also the limitations, of calling into being, through global media, a conceptualised political community which has no territorial base and holds no actual governing power.

Third, there is reason to doubt the extent to which Muslim media consumers develop a sense of sharing their political fate with an *umma* created in the virtual sphere. This doubt draws on a year's field research I conducted during 2007 in five mosques in Frankfurt am Main on the impact of advanced media technologies on the construction of Islamic identities. The five mosques were the Islamische Information und Serviceleistungen, which is German-speaking and serves many second-generation migrants, and the North-African-dominated and Arab-speaking Abu Bakr, Tariq Ibn Ziyad, Taqwa and Bilal mosques. I interviewed 17 first- and second-generation migrants and conversed in a less formal manner with several dozen others. My interviewees and partners in conversation originated from Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority territory and Tunisia. Interviews were conducted in English, German or Arabic, and at times in a combination of all three.

In the interviews I found that Islamic global media operations, including those of Qaradawi, have an effect in enhancing feelings of pride in Islam as a universal, powerful religion. One of my interviewees, Hasan, a 20-year-old high-school student and a second-generation migrant from a Moroccan family, who testified to having discovered his Islamic roots in the months before the interview through searching Islamic websites, said the following:

Life here is hectic. There is so much to study, so much work. Then there is the time that we sit together in the living-room and watch Iqraa [a satellite religious channel, part of the ART network] during Ramadan. It's a special feeling – a feeling that we are all together, as a family, but also part of 1.2 billion Muslims all around the world.

While advanced media technologies promote a sense of Islamic universalism, I found no evidence that a sense of belonging to a global, viable, religious-political *umma*, imagined through the internet and satellite television, was evolving among any of my interviewees. More specifically, my field study did not suggest that Qaradawi's advanced media operations effectively promote either his vision for a resurrection of a united *umma* or his vision of providing a role for Muslim migrants in that *umma*.

Several limitations count against Qaradawi's ambitions. Some second-generation Muslim immigrants with whom I spoke, including the

above-mentioned Hasan, had no idea who Qaradawi was. A serious obstacle is the language gap: Qaradawi's message is spread mainly in Arabic and English, two languages many of them do not speak.

Older, first-generation migrants, fluent in Arabic, presented ideological concerns about Qaradawi's project. They told me of the great respect they have for the Qatar-based scholar, but expressed resentment at his political interpretations of Islam and objected to the prospect of non-local jurists impacting their communities; they consider Qaradawi's concept of the *umma* as unrealistic, as well as undesirable in terms of their interests as Muslims in Germany. While some of the first-generation interviewees reported using IslamOnline.net as a source for learning of events in their homelands and the Arab world at large, none defined the portal as recounting the chronicles of 'the *umma*' and none hinted at sharing a political fate with Muslims worldwide.

Ahmad, a 44-year-old Moroccan school teacher, one of the community leaders in the Abu Bakr mosque, said:

What is the *umma*? It doesn't mean much to me. There are states. There is Sudan. There is Saudi Arabia. There is Kuwait. If I want to visit Saudi Arabia, I need a visa. I cannot define the *umma*. I am a Muslim with German citizenship. I have my duties and my rights as a German. I never had a conflict between these duties and rights and being a Muslim.

Several first-generation migrants said that they reject the use of the internet for Islamic education, fearing it could misguide the young and undermine the authority of local community leaders. 'Abdallah, a 59-year-old unemployed Egyptian-German who was one of the founders of the Islamische Information und Serviceleistungen mosque and organises religious seminars for second-generation migrants seeking to learn more about their religion, argued:

There's a difference between information you can trust and information you can't trust. Books, you know who wrote them. What's on the internet – you don't know who wrote it. How can I know if Qaradawi really controls his site? When you buy a book, you know whom you buy it from. And there's so much information on the internet, I don't like that. Also, I don't like to read on a screen.

Not only ideology matters; boredom is another reason for the limited effect of Qaradawi's global media. Qaradawi's – and others' – advanced media operations

offer mainly 'heavy' religious and political content; the community they encourage to imagine provides very little relaxation. Several of my interviewees expressed their desire, after a hard day's labour, to watch television or read more entertaining online content. Satellite dishes provide ample alternatives, including some in Arabic – from cartoons to pornography; so does the internet. Muhammad, an unemployed 44-year-old and al-Azhar graduate who has lived in Germany since 1985, used to watch Qaradawi's television show frequently (on al-Jazeera), but in time lost interest. He explained:

They speak about the same things. They now have nothing to attract you. For me, it is interesting to get Muslims to be active, to get them to return to morals, that they don't cheat. But it's not interesting to discuss whether I should or I shouldn't shake a woman's hand. That's not important.

Conclusion

A clear distinction should be drawn between imagined communities and the concept of a Muslim nation imagined globally through the media. Anderson's nation was an imagined community based on an affinity between territory and mass media. Advanced media technologies allow for modern imagined national communities to extend to some degree beyond their traditionally defined boundaries. However, the *umma* mediated through advanced media technologies is neither a modern imagined community nor an extended, postmodern, new imagined community. In fact, it is not an imagined community at all, but a *virtual* community. The two should not be confused. Qaradawi's *umma* does not have a territorial basis, nor even a symbolic one. There exist no government of the *umma*, no central bank, no military, no football team. Being a mere abstract manifestation of a religious-political ideology that finds its way to a global audience through global channels, this 'nation' can attract interest and emotions, and to some extent reinvigorate the myth and memory of Islamic unity. But the imagined Muslim *umma* lacks an essential linkage between the tangible and the imagined, without which an imagined community cannot be transformed into a politically viable force. Thus, while advanced media technologies endow Qaradawi with greater respect and influence, they fall short of enhancing his religious-political hope of meaningfully promoting global Muslim unity. The contribution of these media to diffusing religious law globally should also not be overstated.

Hasan al-Banna attempted to challenge the modern political order through modernist means. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the most renowned of his disciples, found shelter in Qatar as a result of the failure of that challenge. For the past two decades Qaradawi has been attempting to challenge the modern political order through postmodern means. Ambitious and even resounding as his endeavours have been, in the final account they too may fail to transform myth and memory into reality.

Islamic Myths and Memories

Mediators of Globalization

Edited by

ITZCHAK WEISMANN

Haifa University, Israel

MARK SEDGWICK

Aarhus University, Denmark

ULRIKA MÅRTENSSON

Norwegian University of Science and Technology,

Trondheim, Norway

ASHGATE

© Itzhak Weismann, Mark Sedgwick and Ulrika Mårtensson 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Itzhak Weismann, Mark Sedgwick and Ulrika Mårtensson have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work.

Published by

Ashgate Publishing Limited
Wey Court East
Union Road
Farnham
Surrey, GU9 7PT
England

Ashgate Publishing Company
110 Cherry Street
Suite 3-1
Burlington, VT 05401-3818
USA

www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:

Islamic myths and memories : mediators of globalization / edited by Itzhak Weismann, Mark Sedgwick and Ulrika Mårtensson.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4724-1149-5 (hardcover) – ISBN 978-1-4724-1150-1 (ebook) – ISBN 978-1-4724-1151-8 (epub) 1. Globalization–Religious aspects–Islam. 2. Islam–Historiography. 3. Islamic sociology. I. Weismann, Itzhak. II. Sedgwick, Mark J. III. Mårtensson, Ulrika.

BP190.5.G56I85 2014

297.2'7–dc23

2013051040

ISBN 9781472411495 (hbk)

ISBN 9781472411501 (ebk – PDF)

ISBN 9781472411518 (ebk – ePUB)