To what extent did Spartan military failures and success affect the Peloponnesian League and their allies view of the Spartans Ozzie Major From 431 to 404 B.C Sparta and her allies, the Peloponnesian League were plunged into the Peloponnesian war fighting against the Delian League led by Athens. The war began well for Sparta up until the battles of Pylos and Sphacteria where they received a crushing defeat at the hands of the Athenians in 425 B.C[1]. Seven years later in 418 B.C the Spartan army fought the Athenians once more, this time, gaining the upper hand by defeating the Athenians and Argives in battle at Mantinea[2]. Following the different outcomes of each of these engagements, the opinion of certain poleis within the Peloponnesian League’s view of Sparta changed, but to what extent did the view of Peloponnesian League and her allies on Sparta’s role at the head of the League change following military defeats and victories. Following the Athenian victory over the forces of the Lacedeimonians at Pylos and then Sphacteria, the Athenians were able to take the Lacedeimonian forces prisoner[3]. Kagan states that the Spartans lost 420[4] men to their Athenian captors, however, Thucydides numbers the amount of actual Spartiates captures at Sphacteria at 120 men[5], and the overall loss of life combined with the captured at 420 men[6]. Hornblower also claims the capture of the 120 Spartiates also led to a depression of Spartan morale[7]. It is highly likely that Kagan has misinterpreted Thucydides due to the fact he gives us the exact numbers. The capture of the Lacedeimonians at Sphacteria then gave the Athenians bargaining chips to use against the Spartans. It allowed the Athenians to peruse a temporary peace on the threat of the executions of the hostages [8], this combined with Brasidas’ campaigns in the Chalcidice and the capture of Amphipolis[9] eventually leading to the peace of Nicias[10] in 421 B.C[11]. However, Kagan has argued that the Athenians may not have gained that much from a temporary peace accord with Sparta, but by pressing their advantage after Sphacteria may have given them the chance to gain better terms in a future agreement [12]. Contrary to Kagan’s argument, Marshall states that the “Success of Sphacteria was the highest point of Athenian fortune during the Archidamian war[13].” It is likely that even if the Athenians and the Delian league had pressed the advantage, Brasidas still would have continued his campaigns in the Chalcidice, leaving Athens in the same place. It would be a fair argument to say that Marshall has the better claim over Kagan’s. It is a possibility that the Athenians may have used the idea of a ceasefire with the Peloponnesian League in an attempt to undermine the Spartan leadership over the League. Following the Spartan defeat at Sphacteria the Spartans summoned their allies to vote on the constraints of the Peace of Nicias. Thucydides tells us that Elis, Megara, Corinth and Boeotia all refused to vote on the issue[14]. Capreedy claims that the allies of the Spartans began to doubt Sparta’s leadership: “Their insubordination was a sign that Sparta’s position as leader in the Peloponnese was threatened, yet Sparta refused to alter the initial terms and instead concluded an alliance with Athens[15]”. The evidence shown to us by Thucydides does back Capreedy’s claim up well.[16] This shows us that the idea that the Spartan army losing was not a theoretical the other Greek poleis had thought of. It is clear to see that the League believed so heavily in the Spartans ability to win battles that their leadership directly correlated with it. Seagar claims that “If the war with Athens was not brought to an end, Argos might join forces with Athens, taking the malcontents with her.[17]” Seagar then goes on to argue that Sparta accepting the peace may have had the ulterior motive of appeasing the Argives[18]. This shows us that the Spartan loss at Sphacteria weakened their position as head of the Peloponnesian League and eventual loss of the Argives, Elisions and the Mantineans[19]. The loss at Sphacteria, would then lead to the Argives and Mantineans taking up arms against their previous Spartan allies at the first battle of Mantinea. The battle of Mantinea was one of the largest land battles fought during the Peloponnesian war, the battle ended with an overwhelming victory for the Spartan forces and her allies over the Argive alliance and the Athenians[20]. Hornblower claims that “Spartan military supremacy was re-established in a convincing manner, and doubters and scoffers were silenced[21]” This can be seen in the work of both Thucydides and Hornblower. Prior to the battle of Mantinea, Hornblower tells us that the Corinthians had been acting in an anti-Spartan manner[22]. It is possible that this aggression was in response to the Spartan failures at Pylos and Sphacteria, Thucydides believes it came from the failure of Athens to return Solium and Anactorium to them[23]. Seager states that the Spartan victory had changed the views of her allies, “Corinth’s position was now one of wholehearted support for Sparta[24]”. Seager’s statement shows us that Corinth recognised Sparta as their ally again after hearing of their crushing victory over the Argives and Athenians. As we can see, through the first half of the Peloponnesian war, Sparta’s role as the head of the Peloponnesian League was not always cemented. It is apparent that the Peloponnesian League’s view of the Spartan leadership was heavily based on how the Spartan army fared in battle. Following the outcome of the battle of Sphacteria, we saw the Peloponnesian League’s view of the Spartans deteriorate rapidly to the point where it caused the defection of her own allies. As previously outlined, the aftermath of the battle of Sphacteria left the Spartans with a depleted force, a loss of morale, the weakening of their allies resolve and the eventual loss of Argos, Elis and Mantinea. However, after the first battle of Mantinea, Sparta’s role as the head of the Peloponnesian League was cemented thanks to her military victory. [1] Hornblower. 2012 [2] Hornblower. 2012 [3] Thuc. 5.15 (Trans Jowett) [4] Kagan. 2003 [5] Thuc. 4.38 (Trans Jowett) [6] Thuc. 4.38 (Trans Jowett) [7] Hornblower. 2011 [8] Thuc. 5.15 (Trans Jowett) [9] Thuc. 4.102 (Trans Jowett) [10] A peace treaty lasting from 421 to 414 BC between the Athens and the Sparta. [11] Thuc. 5.18 (Trans Jowett) [12] Kagan. 2003 [13] Marshall. 1984 [14] Thuc. 7.17.1 (Trans Jowett) [15] Capreedy. 2014 [16] Thuc. 7.17.1 (Trans Jowett) [17] Seagar. 1976 [18] Seagar. 1976 [19] Capreedy. 2014 [20] Hornblower. 2011 [21] Hornblower. 2011 [22] Hornblower. 2011 [23] Thuc. 5.30.2 (Trans Jowett) [24] Seagar. 1976