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positions, with their many minor variants, divide the modern meanings of democracy between them, but this is not usually seen as historical variation of the term; each position, normally, is described as 'the only true meaning', and the alternative use is seen as propaganda or hypocrisy.

Democratic (from eC19) is the normal adjective for one or other of these kinds of belief or institution. But two further senses should be noted. There is an observable use of **democratic** to describe the conditions of open argument, without necessary reference to elections or to power. Indeed, in one characteristic use freedom of speech and assembly are *the* 'democratic rights', sufficient in themselves, without reference to the institution or character of political power. This is a limiting sense derived from the liberal emphasis, which in its full form has to include election and popular sovereignty (though not popular rule). There is also a derived sense from the early class reference to the 'multitude': to be **democratic**, to have **democratic** manners or feelings, is to be unconscious of class distinctions, or consciously to disregard or overcome them in everyday behaviour: acting *as if* all people were equal, and deserved equal respect, whether this is really so or not. Thus a man might be on 'plain and natural' terms with everyone he met, and might further believe in free speech and free assembly, yet, following only these senses, could for example oppose universal suffrage, let alone government directed solely to the interests of the majority. The senses have in part been extended, in part moved away, from what was formerly and is probably still the primary sense of the character of political power.

No questions are more difficult than those of **democracy**, in any of its central senses. Analysis of variation will not resolve them, though it may sometimes clarify them. To the positive opposed senses of the socialist and liberal traditions we have to add, in a century which unlike any other finds nearly all political movements claiming to stand for **democracy** or **real democracy**, innumerable conscious distortions: reduction of the concepts of *election*, *representation* and *mandate* to deliberate formalities or merely manipulated forms; reduction of the concept of *popular power*, or government in the *popular interest*, to nominal slogans covering the rule of a bureaucracy or an oligarchy. It would sometimes be easier to believe in democracy, or to stand for it, if the C19 change had not happened and it were still an unfavourable or factional term. But that history has occurred,

and the range of contemporary senses is its confused and still active record.

See CLASS, COMMON, EQUALITY, LIBERAL, MASSES, POPULAR, REPRESENTATIVE, SOCIALIST, SOCIETY

DETERMINE

Determine has a complex range of meanings in modern English, and within this range there is a special difficulty when the verb is associated with **determinant**, **determinism** and a particular use of **determined**. This special difficulty is important because it bears on several significant tendencies in modern thought.

Determine came into English in C14 from *fw determiner*, *oF, determinare*, L, *rw terminare*, L – to set bounds to. Several formations with the Latin prefix *de* are complicated in meaning, but in this case the sense of 'setting bounds' is dominant in all early uses. The difficulty and the later ambiguity arose when one of the applied senses, that of putting a limit and therefore an end to some process, acquired the significance of an absolute end. There are many processes with an ordinary limit or end, for which **determine** and its derivatives have been regularly used: a question or dispute is **determined** by some authority, and from this use, and the associated legal use in matters like leases, there is a more general sense which is equivalent to 'decide': e.g. 'on a date to be **determined**'. Associated with this is the sense which is equivalent to 'settle': fixing by observation, calculation or definition. What is distinct about all these uses is that **determining** is some fixed point or act at the end of a process, and that this sense carries with it no necessary implication, and usually no implication at all, that the specific character of the ultimate decision or settlement or conclusion is inherent in the nature of the process. **Determination** resolves or completes a process; it does not prospectively control or predict it.

Yet clearly there is a possible overlap with the sense of a process so conditioned that its eventual or foreseeable **determination** can be held to define it. It is from this overlap that all the difficult modern senses derive. The main source of this emphasis is theological: God can be held (in a sense extended

from the specific decision by an authority) to have **determined** the conditions of human life, including the inevitability of death, and in this sense to have **determined** human destiny. From eC16, for example in Tyndale, we have the scriptural '**determinat** counsell and foreknowledge of God'. There were of course prolonged and intricate arguments about the degree and character of such pre-ordained ends, and about their implications and consequences. In general, in these arguments, *predestination* (with the qualifying *free-will*) was much more often used than **determination**, but at times the two words were clearly associated. This is the main source of **determination** as something absolutely settled or fixed, but the absolute sense never completely took over, even in this area of use. Yet there was, obviously, plenty of room for confusion as this argument moved between the senses of conditions defining a process and of a process conditioned by its foreseen or known end.

When **determination** began to be used in science, from mC17, a corresponding range was established. **Determination** was occasionally the final or fundamental state of some substance, but in early physics (Boyle, 1660) it was in effect a definite tendency: 'others whose motion has an opposite determination'. Clarke in 1710 wrote: 'when a body moves any particular way, the Disposition that it has to move that way, rather than any other, is what we call its Determination'. Here the definite tendency is inherent in the character of the body, and thus the **determinants** of any process are still specific. It was in the subsequent formation of general laws, whether in science or, as earlier, in versions of the laws of God or of Nature, that the sense extended to an abstract principle: from a notion of specific effects and causes to a notion of 'inevitable' **determined** process. But it is very difficult, when this abstract sense has been reached, to make clear distinctions between versions of processes 'controlled' by some general law or laws and versions of consequence which, whether derived from some inherent or, as possibly, accidental element, are seen as inevitable. The difficulty is greatly increased when we realize that **determine** is used as often in prospect as in retrospect; the sense of inevitability which can be an observed consequence of retrospect becomes something different when it is projected into future events.

For several centuries various different kinds of argument have moved, often uneasily, around these senses of **determine**: in theology, in ethics, in physics and finally in social and economic

theory. The formation of **determinism**, in mC19, gave a special twist to all these arguments. In its most widely-used sense, **determinism** assumes pre-existing and commonly 'external' conditions which fix the course of some process or event. 'External' often means only external to the will or desire of the individuals caught up in such a process; the **determining** conditions are still inherent in the general process itself. But there is also a use, derived from the scale of some of these processes, in which the external determining quality is emphasized, often very strongly. Men have 'no control' over such **determinate** processes as, at one extreme, the solar system, or, intermediately, the processes of biological evolution and inheritance, or, at the other extreme, an economic system. **Determinism**, formerly (though not named as such) a theological or philosophical doctrine, was especially applied, from mC19, to biology and to economics, though its most confident use was still in physics. In the case of physics, the most limited meaning of **determinism** – wholly predictable events from known causes – became so conventional that observations of events which were inherently unpredictable or merely probable provoked the new negative **indeterminism**, which was then, from mC20, as rashly extended to other fields as had been the simple earlier **determinism**. It was by this period evident, in popular use, that **determinism** carried the sense not only of an inevitable but of a fundamentally external cause. This is why the extension of **indeterminism** from observed specific processes to the most general conditions of life was at once so rash and so interesting.

Determinism, that is to say, in its popular modern sense, had become attached to the most general conditions of life, whether biological or economic. These general processes might be within human knowledge but beyond human control; their courses were fixed. In fact, in all the relevant arguments, careful distinctions were attempted between **determination**, however absolute, and the old irrational sense embodied in *fate* (originally a *sentence* of the gods, *rw fari* – I speak; later an impersonal determining process and from C14 a determined end; acquiring, as especially from C17 in *fatal*, disastrous implications, while other determined ends were described as *fortune* – chance specializing to good luck – or *providence* – caring and loving control). Arguments for 'rational determinism' pointed to ability to understand the most general processes and, through such understanding, to gain some control over them, however

limited. The sense is then more discriminating, in that it allows for the distinction, within general processes, between **determining** conditions or **determinants** – essential factors which, as in the earliest uses, set certain limits or exert certain pressures – and other accidental or unpredictable or voluntary factors. Most rational discussion of **determining conditions** or **determinants** depends on this distinction being made. Otherwise the observation of real determining factors – forces that set limits or exert pressures – can be quickly inflated into a *fatalism* (**determinism**) in which everything is already decided – **predetermined**, as it is often put for emphasis – and we have merely to wait for it to happen. Alternatively, a sense of the difficulties can depress us into a vague and indifferent state in which no necessary factors, not only hypothetically but practically, can be admitted to exist. This in real terms is a kind of madness, and only the specialized confidence of description of other views as **determinist** prevents its recognition. The argument has been especially important in Marxism, where absolute economic determination has often been urged, together with dependent political, social and cultural results – the laws of history and the law of *base* (the economic structure of society) and *superstructure* (all other social life) – while in other Marxist argument there has been a sense of certain **determinants** within which or in relation to which (and the distinction can be crucial) men act to make their own history. The more extreme **POSITIVIST** (q.v.) versions of a wholly or generally predictable process have produced correspondingly reductive versions of the 'play of events' which are called (with corresponding popular specialization of stricter meanings) **EMPIRICISM** or **PRAGMATISM** (qq.v.).

Matters of this degree of seriousness and complexity will not be settled by verbal definition but arguments about them can be thoroughly confused by insistent and pseudo-authoritative application of one fixed sense of this highly variable word and its derivatives. It is, after all, part of the history of the word that it contains quite another line of meaning, in which **determine**, **determined** and **determination** relate not to limits or ends, nor to any external cause, but specifically to acts of the will, as in 'I am **determined** to bring this about.' Initially this sense seems to derive from the early sense, already noted, of 'come to a decision'; several early uses are in the form of **determine** 'with oneself', as in the associated development of *resolve* and *resolution*. Perhaps nobody has yet said 'I am determined not to be deter-

mined', but this illustrates the actual range. From c16 **determine** and **determined** are commonly used in this sense of a fixed or settled resolve, upon which someone has, on his own account, decided. The common derived sense, which does not ordinarily require further definition of an action – **determined** to do or not do something – is established by at latest C19 as a general adjective for 'unwavering' or 'persistent': a sense which is certainly not unconnected with the sense of a settled and 'inevitable' process but which, in actual use, must give an opposite kind of interpretation to human actions and events. For many general purposes the effective modern distinction between **determination** and **determinism** sustains, with sufficient clarity, this range of variation and opposition, but the distinction is much harder to realize in uses of **determine** and **determined**, as we can regularly observe.

See EMPIRICAL, EVOLUTION, PRAGMATIC

DIALECTIC

Dialectic appeared in English, from C14, in its accepted Latin sense to describe what we would now call *logic*. *Dialectique*, oF, *dialectica*, L, *dialektike*, Gk, were all, in their primary senses, the art of discussion and debate, and then, by derivation, the investigation of truth by discussion. Different glosses were given by different schools, and Plato's version has an important subsequent history: *dialektike* meant the art of defining *ideas* and, related to this, the method of determining the interrelation of ideas in the light of a single principle. These two senses would later be distinguished as *logic* and *metaphysics* respectively. In early English as in general medieval use **dialectic** was the art of formal reasoning: 'the seconde science is logyke whiche is called dyaletyque' (Caxton, 1481); 'Dialectike or Logike, which is to learn the truth of all things by disputation' (1586); 'Dialectick is the Art of Discourse, whereby we confirm or confute any thing by Questions and Answers of the Disputants' (Stanley, 1656). There was an extended sense of **dialectic**, **dialectics** and **dialectical**, from C17, to relate to argument in a more general way, and this extended sense has persisted.

There was then a special and influential use of **dialectic** in German idealist philosophy. This extended the notion of contradiction in the course of discussion or dispute to a notion of contradictions in reality. Through the intricacy of many subsequent arguments, this extended sense of **dialectic** (which has some relation to Plato's sense of determining the interrelation of ideas in the light of a single principle) has passed into fairly common if often difficult usage. For Kant, **dialectical** criticism showed the mutually contradictory character of the principles of knowledge when these were extended to metaphysical realities. For Hegel, such contradictions were surpassed, both in thought and in the world-history which was its objective character, in a higher and unified truth: the **dialectical** process was then the continual unification of opposites, in the complex relation of parts to a whole. A version of this process – the famous triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis – was given by Fichte. It was then in Marxism that the sense of **dialectic** to indicate a progressive unification through the contradiction of opposites was given a specific reference in what Engels called **dialectical materialism**. Hegel's version of the dialectical process had made spirit primary and world secondary. This priority was reversed, and **dialectics** was then 'the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought – two sets of laws which are identical in their substance but differ in their expression' (Engels, *Essay on Feuerbach*). This was the 'materialist dialectic', later set out as **dialectical materialism**, and applied both to history and to nature (in *Dialectics of Nature*). The formal principles inherent in this process are seen as the transformation of quantity into quality, the identity of opposites and the negation of the negation; these are 'laws' of history and of nature.

There has been immense controversy about the relation of **dialectical materialism** to the thought of Marx, who did not use the term; to its idealist predecessors; and to the natural sciences. Some Marxists prefer the more specific *historical materialism*, not wishing to extend the **dialectical** description to *natural* processes, while others insist that the same basic laws apply to both. There are also forms of Marxist thought which reject the whole notion of **dialectical laws**, while retaining a looser sense of **dialectic** to describe the interaction of contradictory or opposite forces. This looser sense has passed into more general use, alongside the older sense of the process of argument or a method

of argument. It is not often easy to see which of these various senses is being used, and with what implications, in the course of contemporary argument.

See MATERIALISM, SCIENCE

DOCTRINAIRE

Doctrinaire is an odd word, because it is now widely used, in a political context, to indicate a group or a person or an attitude which can be seen as based on a particular set of ideas; the implication, always unfavourable, is that political actions or attitudes so based are undesirable or absurd. This is a significant shift from the original sense of the term in politics. It was introduced in French, from c. 1815, to describe a party which attempted to reconcile two extreme positions, and the contempt in **doctrinaire** was an expression of what was felt to be the merely theoretical nature of this attempt, which included no practical understanding of the real interests and ideas of the opposing parties. It could be said that the original **doctrinaires** tried to intervene and bring about a reconciliation between what would now be called **doctrinaires**. The shift, which is difficult to trace but which was established by IC19 and has been especially common in mC20, probably depended on deterioration of the sense of **doctrine**, from a body of teaching (neutral or positive) to an abstract and inflexible position (cf. the related development of **dogma**, which now has the stronger negative sense). This occurred especially in relation to theological positions, and was largely transferred to politics in the course of C19. **Indoctrinate** and **indoctrination**, which had neutral or positive senses of teaching or instruction from C17, developed their significant negative senses from eC19 and are now, like **doctrinaire**, wholly negative. It is curious to read, from as late as 1868, in Mark Pattison: 'the philosophical sciences can only be indoctrinated by a master'. A distinction is now clearly made between our *teaching*, your **indoctrination**, with an associated but not defining sense of the exertion of pressure in the negative term. Meanwhile the modern sense of **doctrinaire** depends on its often explicit contrast with the specialized (usually self-applied) terms *sensible* and *practical*, and, significantly often, **PRAGMATIC** (q.v.).