

Photo 5.3. Shanghai Militia members uncover a "class enemy" during the Cultural Revolution. Painting is by militiamen from two Shanghai factories. Taken from Shanghai minbing meishu zuopinxuan *[Artwork of the Shanghai Militia] (Shanghai: Shanghai Militia Command Post, 1975).*

Public Security Operations

Over the course of the CR decade, the Shanghai Militia took on an increasingly prominent public security role. The Red Thread Factory was chosen as the site of a "labor education class" for wayward women (*nü liufei*), conducted by the Municipal Militia Command

Post. Charging that the PSB was remiss in its handling of such matters, the militia touted its own intervention as "the working class occupying the legal arena." Entire cases, from arrest to prosecution and punishment, were now processed by the militia. In some instances, the Red Thread Factory—with the encouragement of the militia command post—overturned court verdicts in favor of its own sentences. Dozens of provinces and cities sent delegations to the Red Thread Factory, to learn from its "new experience."[91]

Impressed by the militia's abrogation of procuratorial responsibilities, Wang Hongwen suggested that all criminals serving sentences of less than fifteen years should be sent to factories for labor reform under militia supervision. Eighty men and ninety women were thereupon transferred from the Shanghai Municipal Prison to the East Shanghai Shipyard and the Number Twelve Cotton Mill. The criminals were dispersed among various workshops. Shanghai's party secretary, Ma Tianshui, touted the measure as "a new pattern of relying upon the broad militia and masses to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat."[92]

A major focus of security efforts for the Shanghai Militia was the railway depot. Thanks to the huge surge in passenger traffic during the early years of the CR, as millions of student Red Guards traveled freely throughout the country, the Shanghai train station had become a magnet for crime.[93] The militia was credited by its defenders with restoring order and a sense of public safety to this otherwise dangerous venue. After the death of Zhou Enlai and the popular protests that erupted to commemorate him and condemn the radicals, the railway militia then shifted its attention from capturing thieves and other petty criminals to more political concerns. Plainclothes investigators circulated among passengers, to gather "enemy intelligence" and rumors. Train conductors were mobilized by the militia to listen in and report on conversations, especially among travelers from the North.[94]

To enlarge yet further the jurisdiction and authority of the Shanghai Militia, Wang Hongwen proposed a trinity (*sanwei yiti*) of militia operations that included firefighting and surveillance of the "four categories" (landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements), in addition to routine security work. The trinity concept became the standard for promoting the Shanghai Militia as a national model.[95]

The closing years of the CR saw the Shanghai Militia extend its reach into the surrounding countryside. In October 1973, a leader of the Shanghai Militia ventured to Shanghai County to set up a militia test point with the message, "This is a directional issue that Vice-chairman Wang [Hongwen] has been contemplating for a long time. It carries the meaning of the Paris Commune." In a reversal of the pre-CR pattern, in which urban militias had striven to emulate their rural counterparts, Shanghai County was designated a model of "the countryside learning from the cities." Unfortunately, the main lesson that seems to have been conveyed was in techniques of detention and punishment. In their three years of operation, the various "control and educate centers" in the county imprisoned nearly ten thousand local residents.[96]

Grassroots Power: The Case of Putuo District

As a result of its various extrafactory initiatives, the Shanghai Militia grew to become a significant grassroots political presence over the course of the CR. A top-secret report on the militia in Shanghai's Putuo District, published in September 1974, indicates the broad scope of the militia's activities at the local level. An industrial area of the city, Putuo at that time had enrolled more than 100,000 militiamen—equal to 45 percent of its workforce—of which more than 20,000 were classified as core (*jigan*). The district included 176 companies (*lian*), 62 battalions (*ying*), 31 regiments (*tuan*), and 7 platoons (*pai*). It boasted seven crack combat squads, five antiaircraft units, and a motorcycle brigade. Additionally, 276 work units in the district (mostly factories) had established their own militia groups. The staff of the Putuo District Militia Command Post numbered ninety-seven people, of whom two-thirds were workers. Thanks to this composition, the classified report on the Putuo Militia touted the organization as "the embodiment of the principle of taking the working class as the mainstay."[97]

An agency of the District Party Committee, the Putuo Militia Command Post was composed of five departments. The Training Department—with a staff of twenty-four—was responsible for providing military instruction and maintaining contact with the field battalions, as well as keeping tabs on weaponry. The Combat Department—staffed by thirty-five people—was in charge of attacking, interrogating, and punishing hoodlums and dandies (*liumang afei*), as well as maintaining social order through night patrols, receiving foreign visitors, providing security on holidays, and handling letters and personal requests from the masses. The Political Work Department—with a staff of seventeen—was responsible for carrying out political education during the course of military training programs, summing up and disseminating militia work experiences, organizing bulletins and reports, and handling the evaluations of militia cadres. The Logistics Department—whose staff numbered eleven people selected from the accounting departments of major companies—took care of finances. The General Office—with six staff members—drafted work plans, prepared work summaries, and managed documents.[98]

The greatest concentration of manpower and activity rested with the Combat Department, whose nightly patrols constituted the heart of the Putuo Militia's operations. Each street office in the district was assigned one or two patrols of eight to twelve people per shift. The district also organized a bicycle patrol of fifteen people who made two rounds each night. The motorcycle brigade of thirty motorcycles, issued to the district by the Municipal Party Committee, conducted irregular surprise raids.[99] Some of the various patrols were carried out openly, others secretly. Some were precautionary, whereas others were focused on predetermined targets. (Before embarking on patrol duties, militia members were supposed to receive instruction in the difference, for example, between normal courtship and hooligan activities, and between mere arguments and physical brawls.[100] If later accounts are to be believed, however, such distinctions were often honored in the breach as the poorly trained patrols muscled their way around the city.)

Within Putuo District, ten united defense sites (*lianfangkuai*) were established as liaison points from which to communicate higher-level directives. Each site had two staff members, selected from among militiamen at nearby factories, who shared responsibilities for answering the phone and delivering messages. The sites were located within factories, and rotated every couple of months. When the district convened meetings of all factories within its jurisdiction, word went out through this means. A visit by the president of Mexico to Shanghai put the united defense sites on special alert to handle security.[101]

The Putuo District Militia Command Post processed each day anywhere from a handful to dozens of cases brought to its attention by ordinary citizens.[102] Victims seized in these initiatives would be publicly criticized, either at the scene of their alleged crime or else at a school, vegetable market, or other public venue. The main targets of the public criticisms were said to be "murderers, thieves, rapists, and those who repeatedly instigate group brawls." A typical day would find a hundred or more such individuals languishing at the district jail.[103]

Prior to holidays (e.g., Labor Day, National Day, Chinese New Year), the Putuo Militia prepared the ground for major offensives by mass campaigns designed to encourage ordinary people to report suspicious behavior to the authorities. The resulting barrage of accusations was reviewed by the District Militia Command Post, which then applied to the District Party Committee for search warrants in those cases deemed serious enough to merit militia action. The militia's methods of handling such matters ranged from "rocking the nest" (house searches conducted without warning in the middle of the night) to "collective assaults" (attacks staged in conjunction with factory mass meetings).[104]

Additionally, as part of the campaign to "occupy the neighborhoods and grasp class struggle," factories in Putuo transferred small detachments of militia to nearby neighborhoods to serve for indefinite periods of time. Through this means, more than a hundred militia members were relieved of their factory jobs in order to ferret out class enemies, conduct education for young people, and undertake various forms of neighborhood security. These special forces, operating under the direction of local party branches, were credited with breaking thousands of criminal cases in Putuo during their first few years of existence.[105]

NAME GAMES: THE POLITICS OF REVOLUTIONARY CITIZENSHIP

The success of the militia in taking charge of city streets encouraged the rebels to envision an even more prominent political role for their

proletarian patrols. An Englishman who lived in China for several years during the CR underscores the connection between the exalted political status of the proletariat and the worker militia's assumption of police work in the campaign to "occupy the neighborhoods":

> China's workers have a very prestigious social position. Being the proletariat, they are looked upon as the exemplary revolutionary class. This is so even though the revolution was built in the countryside on the basis of mass peasant support. Political discussion in China always stresses that the workers lead the peasants. In books, newspapers and on the stage, they are praised for the virtues of industriousness, self-sacrifice and commitment to communism. This theoretical status is reflected in practical ways. Workers' income, standard of living and welfare benefits are better than those of peasants. They participate in the revolutionary committees that run factories, schools, universities and local governments. They also form the units of militia that take part in urban police work.[106]

As China's premier revolutionary citizens, workers were uniquely positioned to lay claim to Lenin's oft-repeated injunction: "Revolution is the proletariat destroying the administrative agencies and the entire state apparatus, substituting for them a new structure of armed workers' organizations."[107] But such ambitions (whether harbored by workers themselves or by their nonworker patrons) came into conflict with an alternative conception of the militia, also familiar from pre-CR days, which pictured it more as a military than as a political institution.

The idea that militias should operate under tight military control was a powerful legacy of China's wartime resistance to the Japanese invasion, an idea that, as we have seen, was reactivated during subsequent periods of international tension. As in 1958 when the Taiwan Straits Crisis prompted Mao Zedong to launch a universal militia recruitment drive under PLA command, so a decade later the border conflict with the Soviet Union rekindled the Chairman's interest in mass militia conscription to enhance the national defense. After the Zhenbao Island Incident of March 1969, Mao personally promoted militia expansion under the slogan "We must prepare for war." If national security rather than class struggle was of paramount concern, then the boundaries of militia participation could be expanded from the proletariat to the

people. A national military conference on militia work, held in August 1970, stressed the primary importance of patriotism (as opposed to class conflict) in the militia's training curriculum.[108] It was in this charged atmosphere of military emergency—under the overall supervision of Chairman Mao and Defense Minister Lin Biao—that the Attack–Defend was required, against its will, to become the Shanghai Militia.

When Shanghai was ordered by Party Central in 1970 to change the name of its force from Attack–Defend (*wengong wuwei*) to "militia" (*minbing*), in order to be in step with national nomenclature, the rebels went to some lengths to underscore the distinction between their "newborn thing" and the pre-CR militia. The key differences, they emphasized, lay in the proletarian composition of their force and its engagement in extrafactory class struggle. Regardless of any name change, they insisted, these defining features of revolutionary citizenship would remain intact.[109] As Zhang Chunqiao put it, "The Attack–Defend is still the Attack–Defend. Although we consider it important to be in tune with national policy, the name change won't affect the content. They will still participate in class struggle."[110] Tellingly, for several years both the Municipal and the District Command Posts of the Shanghai Militia continued to hang "Attack–Defend" signboards outside their offices.[111]

By underscoring the special class character of their worker militia, rebels were making a political point that held not only ideological but also bureaucratic implications. Wang Hongwen stressed that his WGH—not the military—would continue to play the leading role: "Some comrades imagine that after the name change, it will be the concern of the People's Armed Forces departments whereas those of us who wear blue uniforms [i.e., workers] can return to the factories to grasp revolution and promote production. Comrades, this line of thinking is incorrect. A change in name does not mean a change in the nature and mission of this workers' armed force."[112] In championing the privileged political position of the urban proletariat, the Shanghai radicals were in effect challenging a competing model of military-controlled militias that had developed out of the rural wing of China's revolutionary tradition.

Even well after the name change had taken place, Wang Hongwen continued to stress the special importance of an armed proletarian force. At a meeting of the Central Military Commission in the fall of 1974, Wang praised the workers of Shanghai as exemplary revolutionary citizens capable of waging class struggle without direction from either the PSB or the PLA:

> I believe it is a good idea to turn over antiaircraft artillery to the workers. There are workers and there are peasants. I think the workers do better . . . In the past year it's become clear that relying on the workers can resolve problems . . . The cities need to learn from Shanghai, where the militia conducts street patrols, maintains social order, enters the neighborhoods, educates the young people, keeps order on buses—all work that the Public Security Bureau doesn't handle well. The activism of factory workers is high. For workers to engage in class struggle is an education . . . If the militia discovers enemy activity along our coastline, and cannot handle it without reporting to higher levels for permission, this is tantamount to preventing the militia from grasping class struggle.[113]

The wide-ranging social role of the Shanghai Militia was justified theoretically by reference to the writings of Marx and Lenin on the Paris Commune and the dictatorship of the proletariat,[114] but the pivotal issue was one of political power more than of ideological purity. Whereas the PRC's pre-CR militia had been under the command of the PLA, the new organization was controlled directly by the rebels who had ruled Shanghai since the January Revolution of 1967.[115] The Shanghai radicals were able to challenge such powerful interests as the PSB and the Garrison Command precisely because their militia could boast a firm social base in the Chinese working class. For a movement called the Great *Proletarian* Cultural Revolution, the claim carried special weight.

Mounting a Military Challenge

Unlike factory militia before the CR, the Attack–Defend and its successor the Shanghai Militia operated under the aegis of the WGH and reported to the SRC (later the SPC or Shanghai Party Committee), rather than to the army. Because the rebels had taken charge of the municipal party and government in the January Power Seizure of 1967, control by the SRC meant in essence control by Zhang

Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen. In September 1967, Zhang and Wang abolished the 657 grassroots People's Armed Forces departments (the lowest rung of the military hierarchy) in the city and ordered that the 822 full-time Armed Forces cadres who staffed these departments be relieved of their posts.[116] The following February, Zhang, Yao, and Wang drafted a directive in the name of the SRC, stipulating that all levels of the Attack–Defend force, and all individuals serving in it, must obey orders from Zhang and Yao. Deployment of even a single member of the force required SRC approval.[117] In September 1969, the three rebel leaders coauthored a report to Chairman Mao, in the name of the SRC, outlining their plan for a unified militia leadership structure in which rural counties would be relieved of military supervision and reorganized along the lines of the urban Attack–Defend command posts. [118]

After Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan departed for Beijing toward the end of 1969, Wang Hongwen assumed direct supervision of the force. A few years later, with Wang's own promotion to national leadership, day-to-day command of the Shanghai Militia passed to Wang's trusted associates in the WGH. All militia cadres at the brigade level and higher had to be "old rebels" (*lao zaofan*) who had stood by Wang Hongwen's side from the very start of the CR.[119] Shortly after his transfer to Beijing, Wang Hongwen advised his closest comrade in Shanghai, Wang Xiuzhen: "You should make good arrangements for the militia. The Shanghai Militia has a capacity for warfare . . . The army is unreliable and cannot lead the militia. The militia leadership authority must be vested in the Municipal Party Committee."[120] But important decisions were always cleared with the radicals who had created the force in the first place, even after their promotions to Party Central. Referring to their organizational model as a vertical dictatorship (*tiaotiao zhuanzheng*), the rebels insisted on a direct line between the Shanghai Militia and Beijing. To call up a battalion required permission from Zhang Chunqiao; to call up a company required the approval of Wang Hongwen.[121]

As with Zhou Enlai's pickets in the 1920s, an armed working-class unit that was publicly touted as the dictatorship of the proletariat served as a political pawn for nonworker revolutionaries. The operations of the worker militia, as had been the case for Communist-

sponsored pickets in the 1920s and again in the 1940s, were directed both against designated class enemies and against rival military contenders. But unlike the earlier eras when the military targets were warlord armies, Japanese invaders, or Nationalist forces, now the chief competitor was none other than the PLA. Under these changed circumstances, experiments in institutional inversion had serious implications for state power.

In 1970 Wang Hongwen set an ambitious goal for his proletarian patrol: "The Shanghai Militia must be well provisioned so that it reaches a level where it can challenge the PLA."[122] Procuring weaponry was, however, as much a problem for Wang Hongwen as it had been for Zhou Enlai forty years before. At the very start of the CR, the Shanghai Party Committee issued a directive demanding that all guns assigned for factory security be turned over to public security authorities, to avoid falling into unauthorized hands.[123] The following year, in June of 1967, the Central Military Commission issued a regulation specifying that the weapons and ammunition of the militia could not be used by anyone for any purpose without the express permission of higher-level military authorities.[124] As a result of such restrictions, the equipment available to the Attack–Defend was initially far from impressive. Along with badges and wicker hats, new recruits were issued only clubs and spears with which to conduct their operations.[125] Over the course of the CR, however, the militia's stockpile of weapons increased exponentially, and by the end of the decade it was indeed able to present a worrisome competition to the regular military.

Under the rubric of establishing a "small third front" (*xiao sanxian*), several Shanghai factories served as arsenals for Wang Hongwen's patrols.[126] The Shanghai Cable Factory put its spare parts to use in assembling semiautomatic firearms for the militia. A motorcycle factory earmarked a certain number of special-order models to outfit a militia motorcycle brigade. In 1973 the New China Machine Factory was converted into a factory dedicated to the production of weaponry for the Shanghai Militia. This meant that Wang Hongwen and his associates could order equipment without going through either the State Planning Commission or the PLA. Between 1974 and 1976, the Shanghai authorities approved local expenditures of 32 million yuan to supply its militia.[127] Wang evidently took a personal

interest, and considerable pride, in the hardware that Shanghai was producing for the use of its own armed force. In a speech to the Shanghai Militia Command Post in the fall of 1975 he stated, "Shanghai needs to be self sufficient. As for the '130 tank,' Comrade Chunqiao and I discussed this in the past and decided to manufacture it ourselves. Now it seems that the new 85 works just fine, better than the 100 and three tons lighter. What I most appreciate about the new 85 is that it was home-designed and home-produced, making it far superior to the 100."[128]

Although economic self-reliance was indeed a major goal of the CR, harking back to the wartime base areas tradition, in this case local autarky presented certain obvious political dangers. Testifying at the trial of the Gang of Four in August of 1980, Wang Hongwen confessed, "In August–September 1975, I authorized the issuing of guns to the militia. In early 1976, I urged that these guns be distributed. The materiel, equipment, and know-how for an armed uprising by the Shanghai Militia had been created."[129]

By the close of the CR, the Shanghai Militia Command Post was in charge of 9 divisions (*shi*), 602 regiments (*tuan*), 1,287 battalions (*ying*), 18,700 companies (*lian*)—and approximately three million troops. This impressive force actually represented only a modest increase in size over the militia that had been in place in the city prior to the CR (see appendix), but in stark contrast to its predecessor, it was not under military control. In addition to infantry, the rebel militia boasted specialized motorized, aquatic, antiaircraft, antichemical warfare, communication, and construction forces. Its weaponry included more than 200,000 guns, 1,900 cannons, 2,600 bazookas, and 500 vehicles of various sorts, as well as the notorious Battleship 101 that had been built at a cost of over one million yuan.[130] An elite unit of the Shanghai Militia, consisting of about 10,000 individuals handpicked from twenty work units across the city, served as a special secret service at the beck and call of the rebel leadership in the city. Among them, a mobile force of about 120 militiamen, equipped with fifty-four motorcycles, stood guard around the clock.[131]

The Shanghai Militia developed its own regimen of military instruction for core members, supplanting the standard program prescribed by the PLA for local militias. A report on one Shanghai factory noted that in 1973, a full 98 percent of the more than two thousand militiamen at the factory were engaged in regular military training. Most of the exercises were conducted with live ammunition.[132]

In the summer of 1975, Wang Hongwen's return to Shanghai afforded an opportunity to oversee the strengthening of military instruction; in Shanghai, he personally engaged in target practice with the heads of the municipal, district, and county command posts.[133] Despite the harsh condemnation of "bourgeois Western culture" that prevailed in China at the time, Wang made special arrangements for rebel leaders from his WGH to view a popular American movie about urban street fighting, in order to gain new insights on militia training. Wang Xiuzhen, one of those who attended the screening, recalled:

> Wang Hongwen said, "The hero is very brave. Take a look at how one person beats up so many other people. If war breaks out in Shanghai, this is how to fight. Shanghai has many tall buildings. We can fight inside all of them." Wang Hongwen also introduced this American movie to the militia leaders as an example of how to conduct urban warfare.[134]

Army commanders were not happy about the abrogation of their authority, of course. They condemned the Shanghai model for violating the orthodox "triple combination" structure that subsumed the militia under regional and field armies.[135] And they launched a propaganda offensive of their own, which recalled the Everyone a Soldier Campaign of the late 1950s. In direct contrast to the Shanghai Militia model, military publications stressed people's war over class struggle.[136]

Clashing with the PLA

From the start, the Shanghai Garrison opposed the idea of a separate Attack–Defend force, preferring instead to reaffirm and reform the extant militia system under its own control.[137] Powerless to prevent the emergence of this unwelcome competitor, in light of its highly placed patrons, the garrison nevertheless pointedly refrained from recognizing its authority. The tension between the military and the Shanghai rebels first came to a head in the summer of 1969, when Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen attended a work conference

of military forces stationed in Shanghai. Wang lashed out at the Garrison Command for having excluded Attack–Defend cadres from military intelligence briefings. And Zhang went further:

> The Garrison Command is in anarchy! . . . Why don't you recognize the Attack–Defend? Some of you even say that it is Zhang Chunqiao's personal militia. This was approved by the Chairman. The Chairman agreed to create a test point in Shanghai, notifying Vice-Chairman Lin [Biao] of this . . . When the Chairman was in Shanghai, I proposed two things. First, recruit tens of thousands of people. Second, don't issue guns. After reorganization, this point can be reconsidered. In the past, the militia was formed in the course of struggles; the armed workers of the Soviets were also formed in the course of battles! Now we have recruited tens of thousands in the course of struggles. The Chairman approved. The Chairman also said not to issue guns; clubs were good enough. At the Ninth Party Congress, the Chairman asked me if we'd issued guns yet. I said we hadn't; I certainly would have notified the Chairman if we had issued guns.[138]

As the debate progressed, however, Zhang's position on arming the workers became more militant:

> You talk about defending Shanghai to the death. Whom will you depend upon for this defense? Defense rests on arming some of the workers, and I believe in future it will still depend on workers. The Battle of Stalingrad hinged on workers converting a tractor factory into a tank factory. On questions of line, we must rely on the Shanghai workers. On this we can make no mistake. To arm the workers is the greatest military preparedness.[139]

Naturally enough, PLA commanders had a different view. At a chiefs of staff meeting in 1970 on militia work, the vice-commander of the Nanjing Military Region (which included Shanghai) proposed abolishing the Attack–Defend Command Post and returning control of the militia to the PLA's Armed Forces departments. Acknowledging that it was difficult for either the Nanjing Military Region or the Shanghai Garrison to take the lead in dismantling the Attack–Defend, he called upon Party Central to express its opinion.[140] Continued

complaints from the military, combined with the Sino-Soviet border crisis, prompted Mao's decision to rename the Attack–Defend as the Shanghai Militia. The result was not entirely to the military's liking, however. With the PLA's political standing seriously undermined by Defense Minister Lin Biao's alleged coup attempt in the fall of 1971, the radicals moved to take advantage of the situation. The following September, Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen—without the consent of the Nanjing Military Region—unilaterally amalgamated the field army command post of the Shanghai Garrison and the Attack–Defend Command Post, formally renaming the joint headquarters the Shanghai Militia Command Post.[141]

By 1973, the restored SFTU (which was in fact simply an offshoot of Wang's rebel organization, the WGH) had assumed charge of the day-to-day operations of the militia. Members of the standing committee of the union became top leaders in the Militia Command Post. At this time, remnant military men who were considered unreliable by the rebels were assigned to other positions so as to further reduce the presence of the military within the militia. The head of the Militia Command Post, Zhou Hongbao, recalled:

> Ye Changming [director of the union] said that there were too many military people among the staff of the Militia Command Post and that we should reassign militia cadres and demobilized soldiers so as to reduce the number of military personnel. Ye pointed out that during the Cultural Revolution the Shanghai Garrison has not been supportive of either the rebels or the Attack with Words–Defend with Weapons force.[142]

The summary dismissal of military cadres in favor of rebels was explained as the militia's commitment to "take industrial workers as its mainstay."[143]

Through such maneuvers, the rebels—in Shanghai and several other major cities—were able to avoid military domination. This achievement was not simply a reflection of skillful tactics on the part of the CR radicals. The special standing of the militia was undoubtedly facilitated by Chairman Mao's suspicions of the regular military as a consequence of its involvement in the Lin Biao affair.[144] The revised State Constitution, promulgated in January

1975, promoted the militia to "the status of an armed force equal to but separate from the regular forces of the PLA."[145] That summer, PLA commanders again tried to reassert control by decreeing at an expanded central military conference that field armies, local forces, and militia were all part of one unified military system. Aware that this was an effort to limit the independence of his militia, Wang Hongwen was determined to resist. During a four-month return to Shanghai, Wang proclaimed at a militia work meeting, "Now the Central Military Commission wants to put the militia under the control of the military. I disagree. As long as I remain alive, twenty years from now I'll still want to keep this force separate."[146] Sensing a showdown looming, Wang warned the Militia Command Post leadership, "We need to prepare psychologically. They [the PLA] have punched us with one fist to see if we're able to remain standing."[147] While in Shanghai, Wang Hongwen ordered that militia weapons be removed from the control of military districts—a step that elicited a Central Commission directive instructing the militia to return all heavy weapons to army arsenals.[148]

The competition that developed between the urban militia and the army was not unique to CR China. Eric Nordlinger has written of such situations more generally, "The establishment of a sizable popular militia calls into doubt the military's adequacy and reliability as guarantors of national security . . . It also represents a clear signal to the military: the armed forces are replaceable."[149] In the case of the CR, notes Alan Liu, "the PLA High Command and much of the officer corps resisted the radicals' new militia every step of the way."[150] As both parties recognized, the stakes were high, and the cost of failure was potentially fatal.

Extending the Shanghai Model

To enhance the capacity of their proletarian patrols to challenge recalcitrant institutions such as the PLA, Wang Hongwen and his associates were anxious to expand their model well beyond the environs of Shanghai. Over the course of the CR, the radicals launched two national Learn from Shanghai campaigns. The first, in 1968, showcased the experience of the Attack with Words–Defend with Weapons force. Delegations from thirty-seven provinces,

municipalities, and districts visited Shanghai in conjunction with the campaign. The second, in tandem with the Arm the Working Class, Establish Urban Militias movement of 1973, drew forty-nine delegations to Shanghai from all parts of the country except Tibet.[151] The announced agenda of both movements was to promote Shanghai's advanced experience in reforming its worker militia so as to assume a greater role in grasping class struggle. Whereas the first campaign had occurred in the context of a military takeover of revolutionary committees around much of the country, the second took place in the midst of a massive rehabilitation of pre-CR cadres. In both cases, urban militias were promoted by radicals as an attempt to stem the national tide. Touting worker militias as an alternative to the conservative PLA, Wang Hongwen and his colleagues saw their own institution as a means of preventing rival political elites (whom they denounced as capitalist roaders and revisionists) from assuming or resuming positions of power. This in essence was what they meant by encouraging the urban militias to engage in class struggle.

In August 1973, not long after Wang Hongwen had returned to Party Central in Beijing, a laudatory account of the Shanghai Militia—entitled *Arm the Working Class, Consolidate the Urban Militia—An Investigation of the Shanghai Militia*, complete with eight appendixes—was approved for national distribution. The report characterized the Shanghai Militia as a "nonuniformed people's liberation army," an "unmarked police station," and the "iron fist of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Soon thereafter a raft of novels, films, exhibits, essays, picture books, and songs appeared, extolling the virtues of the Shanghai Militia.[152] The radicals' renewed attention to the political role of the militia was in part a reaction against the rehabilitation at this time of many cadres who had been purged at the outset of the CR. In the wake of the jarring Lin Biao incident, numerous "old cadres" (including, most dramatically, Deng Xiaoping) were returned to military and civilian posts as part of a centrally authorized effort to stabilize the situation. In promoting urban militias as a counterweight to the PLA, the Shanghai radicals hoped to blunt the effects of this restoration process.

Outside observers of the urban militia campaign of 1973 were struck by the differences with the Everyone a Soldier Campaign

fifteen years before, when rural militias under PLA supervision had been promoted as the model for national emulation:

> Virtually all the reports are strong in political content and in linking militia building to party control. This is something of a departure from the 1958 campaign, when the militia was regarded as an adjunct to the PLA, under PLA direction. The current effort, with its focus on an urban militia, also differs from the earlier drive in that rural militia work was emphasized in 1958. Moreover, in the current drive, Shanghai, the stronghold of China's radical leadership, has been setting the pace.[153]

During the 1973 campaign and its aftermath, Marxist arguments about the dictatorship of the proletariat were cited with increased urgency to buttress the Shanghai Militia's claim to a place on the national stage.[154] Encouraging urban militias to set their political sights higher than the task of combating local crime, the movement (which was soon linked to the Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign) advocated that "the main object of the militia should be to remove capitalist roaders within the party"; "seizing petty hoodlums is not the principal task of the militia"; and "capitalist roaders in the party are the chief danger and demand the militia's vigilance." Within the ranks of the militia, "theory discussion groups," "counterattack rightist reversal forums," and "study groups to research capitalist roaders" were established to promote its enlarged political mission.[155]

The growing politicization of the Shanghai Militia was emulated in other parts of the country.[156] The municipalities of Beijing, Canton, and Tianjin all followed Shanghai's lead in establishing General Command Headquarters for Worker Militias under trade union auspices.[157] In the northeast, where Mao Zedong's nephew was highly influential, the "Shanghai experience" was avidly adopted, and military leadership was replaced by militia command posts in urban and rural areas alike. Command posts in Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang provinces directed their energies against capitalist restoration; that is, in opposition to the return of more moderate cadres after Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation in April 1973.[158] Closer to home, Zhejiang Province established urban militias in all counties and municipalities

in direct imitation of the Shanghai model. The Hangzhou Militia, nominally fifty thousand strong, operated several detention centers for the confinement and torture of class enemies; during its twelve-month existence, the Hangzhou Militia is said to have imprisoned some one thousand people.[159] As in Shanghai, militia command posts in Zhejiang were placed under union leadership and were ultimately responsible to party—not military—oversight.[160] Radical leaders in Zhejiang "asserted that the PLA was politically unreliable and that the urban militia would be used to put down a military insurrection."[161] After a series of armed clashes involving rival militia units in several major cities, however, the Central Committee ordered the disbandment of the urban militia in Zhejiang in early 1975.[162]

The April Fifth Tiananmen Incident

In Beijing, a Capital Militia Command Post (dubbed derisively the "Cudgel Corps" by ordinary citizens) was established under radical sponsorship in the spring of 1975.[163] Ma Xiaoliu, the notorious deputy commander of the Capital Militia, later recalled, "I went to the Capital Militia Command Post in May of 1975, right after it had been established. The Gang of Four called on us to study the so-called innovative experience of Wang Hongwen in Shanghai. We were supposed to wear wicker hard-hats, carry wooden staves, and venture forth into society."[164] A skilled worker and labor model at the Capital Iron and Steel Works, Ma Xiaoliu had been active in militia work since the 1950s. As a "five-good militiaman" and an "advanced producer," he had been received by Chairman Mao on several occasions. But it was during the CR, and in particular the Tiananmen Incident of April 5, 1976, that Ma's star rose to new heights. Inspired by public mourning in Nanjing over the recent death of Premier Zhou Enlai, people in Beijing thronged to Tiananmen Square to lay commemorative wreaths at the Monument to the Martyrs. After thousands of wreaths—many of which contained oblique criticisms of Jiang Qing and her radical colleagues—were removed by worker militiamen, the crowd (singing "The Internationale") marched on the Militia Command Post in the corner of the square and set it on fire (see photo 5.4).[165] To quell the unrest, Jiang



Photo 5.4. Protesters at Tiananmen Square on April 5, 1976, march on the headquarters of the Capital Militia, singing The Internationale. Taken from Zhongguo gongchandang 70nian tuji, *Volume II, page 445.*

Qing proposed sending in soldiers and tanks from the Beijing Garrison Command, but Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen opposed this idea—preferring to rely instead upon worker militias (augmented by policemen posing as militiamen).[166]

At a Politburo meeting on April 5, a consensus was reached among the top leaders that the Capital Militia, if permitted to strike back at the demonstrators, was fully capable of suppressing the protest.[167] Wang Hongwen, aware that the Politburo decision reflected Mao's own view, advocated calling up 100,000 of the Cudgel Corps. Knowing the ruthlessness of the Capital Militia and fearing a bloody confrontation in the square, however, local officials were at first slow to implement the orders. The mayor of Beijing, Wu De, countered with the argument that Beijing's militia wasn't as well trained as Shanghai's. Mayor Wu stalled for several hours, pointing out that the workers had only just gotten off work and that most of

those who had reached the square were women militia members who were unsuited to the mission at hand.[168] Eventually, however, tens of thousands of militiamen were dispatched to arrest hundreds of protesters.[169] Wang Hongwen, upon discovering that Ma's Cudgel Corps had been beating people, cautioned restraint,[170] but the suppression was by all accounts heavy handed.

Briefed regularly by his nephew on developments in the square, the ailing Mao Zedong reached a fateful verdict: the Tiananmen Incident was a counterrevolutionary rebellion.[171] Five days after the confrontation in the square, an editorial in the *People's Daily* praised the "heroic Capital Worker Militia" for having "imposed proletarian dictatorship against a handful of class enemies."[172] Two weeks later, Yao Wenyuan summed up the Tiananmen Incident as counterrevolutionary violence whose suppression had been personally overseen by Mao Zedong: "When the Chairman saw [the militia] entering Tiananmen Square carrying wooden cudgels, the Chairman declared "Good! Good! Good!"[173]

Wang Hongwen took a close interest in the operations of the Capital Militia, anxious to apply its lessons to Shanghai. But Wang was not overly impressed with what he witnessed in Beijing. He concluded that more preparations were required if Shanghai were to avoid similar troubles. A worker rebel in Shanghai recalled:

> After the Tiananmen Incident, Wang Xiuzhen said: "At first they tried to deploy several militia outfits but they didn't respond, didn't obey orders. Only after Wang Hongwen led some militia from factories with a good foundation was the situation resolved. Hongwen directed things on the spot. He wore ordinary clothes and people didn't recognize him so he was able to mingle among the masses at the square." Wang asked Shi [director of the Shanghai Militia]: "What about the Shanghai Militia? When the time comes, will they disobey you just like the Beijing Militia? I think it's hard to say. Based on the Beijing experience, we need to control several reliable big factories with a good foundation. We can't let things get too dispersed or when the time comes we won't be able to respond." He further said to Shi: "You should pay attention to those army people in the Command Post. Their situation should be reported at once to the Garrison. You should be careful."[174]

While the Tiananmen Incident was unfolding in Beijing, Wang Hongwen maintained daily phone contact with his closest comrades (Wang Xiuzhen and Ma Tianshui) in Shanghai, urging them to "promote the militia to prevent Shanghai's experiencing something like the Tiananmen Incident."[175] Wang Xiuzhen later recalled,

> After the Tiananmen Incident was suppressed, around 3 a.m. on April 8, Wang Hongwen called me to inquire about the Shanghai situation . . . Over the phone he criticized the Capital Militia, saying "Some units had militiamen and no vehicles; others had vehicles and no militiamen. It wasn't coordinated. And Beijing has one-way streets, so it took a long time . . . The Shanghai Militia has combat experience, but it must absorb this lesson. The Militia Command Post needs to make preparations. Convey my ideas to the Command Post." The next day I went to the Command Post to share Wang Hongwen's instructions.[176]

In response to Wang Hongwen's admonition, Wang Xiuzhen convened a top-secret meeting of militia, public security, and union leaders in Shanghai to draft a plan for dealing with a counterrevolutionary disturbance in the city. Known as the Attack One-Two-Three Plan, it outlined three protest scenarios—varying in geographical spread—each of which would trigger a different mixture of militia and public security action. At this time, more than ten thousand militiamen were told to await combat orders. Nighttime training sessions were staged across the city.[177]

The experience of the Capital Militia in suppressing the April 5 protest reinforced Wang Hongwen's desire to develop a nationwide system of worker militias, free from PLA supervision. But Wang's persistent efforts to establish a national militia command, beyond the purview of either the Central Military Commission or local military authorities, met with repeated rejection by Party Central.[178]

Shortly before his death, Zhou Enlai had expressed adamant opposition to Wang's proposal. Although fifty years earlier the young Zhou Enlai had praised the precedent of the Paris Commune—with its autonomous National Guard—when he organized a separate picket command, in the spring of 1975 the aged Premier Zhou argued forcefully against an independent command. Holding that the regular military should control the militia, Zhou exclaimed, "We have military regions and Armed Forces departments. So what's the point of a Militia Command Post!"[179] And soon Wang Hongwen's aspirations were dashed forever by the bold move of Zhou's successor, Hua Guofeng, against the so-called Gang of Four. Decrying the danger of an independent armed worker militia in Shanghai, Premier Hua—like Chiang Kai-shek a half century earlier—decided to reverse course by means of a right-wing coup.[180]

PREPARING FOR ARMED ACTION

Mao Zedong's death on September 9, 1976, followed by the arrest of the Gang of Four a month later, triggered fitful preparations for an armed response by the Shanghai Militia. On the day of Mao's death, Wang Xiuzhen ordered Shanghai's municipal, district, and county militia to strengthen their combat readiness. The next day, the Municipal Command Post issued ammunition to lower units. At this point the Shanghai Militia was apparently anxious to prevent a repetition of Beijing's recent Tiananmen Incident, in which mourning for a deceased leader had turned into a massive popular protest that questioned the rationale of the CR itself. Wang Xiuzhen went in person to several factories to warn the militia of an impending battle against counterrevolution and to advise them (in words reminiscent of Zhou Enlai after the Third Armed Uprising of 1927) under no circumstances to lay down their arms.[181]

According to Wang Xiuzhen's subsequent confession, plans for armed action in Shanghai had been authorized by Wang Hongwen:

> When Chairman Mao was gravely ill, Ma Tianshui [Shanghai party secretary] told me that Wang Hongwen had called him and urgently pressed him to issue guns. Wang Hongwen was deeply interested and concerned about the "small third front" weapons production. He said, "if fighting breaks out in Shanghai, the small third front can aid Shanghai. We must figure out how to evacuate the Shanghai population. The Number Seventeen Cotton Mill can serve as an evacuation site . . . In the event of combat, workers would remain at their jobs to carry on production; the

> elderly and weak would move out of their families to assigned places." Wang Hongwen also wanted the Shanghai Public Security Bureau to establish military prisons at two labor reform state farms. He said that when hostilities start, all important criminals should be transferred to these military prisons . . . He told the Shanghai Party Committee to use local funds to build these, and several times inquired about their construction.[182]

While Wang Hongwen was trying to direct matters from Beijing, Wang Xiuzhen oversaw local arrangements for armed action by the militia. Shi Shangying, director of the Shanghai Militia, remembered:

> At a September 9, 1976 [the day of Mao's death], meeting at the Militia Command Post, I reported on strategic planning to Wang Xiuzhen. She approved everything except for the selection of the Number Seventeen and Number Thirty-one Cotton Mills as combat command sites. She said these were too big as targets. She wanted us to find another factory in Yangpu District to serve as a command site. We therefore chose the China Textile Machinery Factory as our other site. We took pistols and boxes of documents to the Jiangnan Shipyard and the China Textile Machinery Factory.[183]

Passwords were required for entry to the command sites and numbered badges and armbands were prepared so that on-duty militia could readily distinguish between themselves and the enemy.[184] Less than a month later, however, the stunning arrest of the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen) shattered Shanghai's ties with the CR clique in Beijing. When rumors of the arrests reached the city, the Shanghai Militia was put on alert and special forces were dispatched to guard the newspaper offices, broadcast stations, and party archives.[185] As Wang Xiuzhen framed the issue for the directors of the militia: "Shanghai was the birthplace of the January uprising. We have a flesh and blood relationship with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. If the Center goes revisionist, we must resist. Even if we die, we must educate later generations by letting the whole country know."[186]

In frenetic—albeit ultimately futile—discussions among the militia leadership, the symbol of the Paris Commune was frequently invoked. Echoing the organizers of the Shanghai Workers' Armed Uprisings half a century earlier, one advocate of armed struggle put it, "Even if we're beheaded, we can educate later generations with our fresh blood—just like the Communards." Another argued, "We must prepare to fight, to create a Paris Commune; we can hold out for at least several days and let the whole world know."[187] Yet another claimed that "Before the Paris Commune uprising, Marx and Engels didn't approve of it. But once the uprising began, Marx and Engels supported it. Because of insufficient preparation, it failed. But it left the world the famous legacy of the Paris wall."[188]

The parallel between Chiang Kai-shek's coup against the Communist pickets on April 12, 1927, and Hua Guofeng's coup against the Gang of Four on October 6, 1976, was not lost on the Shanghai radicals. A leading member of the Shanghai Writers' Group exclaimed at a hastily called planning meeting: "The situation has changed. Wang, Zhang, Jiang and Yao have been captured. Now the overall trend has been decided and we have lost; a right-wing coup d'état has occurred . . . Superficially, this is being handled by the government. If the military were to handle it, it would definitely be an April 12th massacre."[189] The resemblance between the two periods went beyond the hostile actions of government authorities. In both cases, radical worker militias—weakened by disciplinary difficulties—proved no match for their opponents. As had been true in 1926–1927 at the time of the Three Workers' Armed Uprisings, Shanghai's effort to create a unified proletarian force in the name of the Paris Commune was more impressive on paper than in practice. In the midst of the preparations for armed action in October 1976, the vice-chair of the SRC remarked, "Today I asked about the militia situation. It's in disarray, with the 2,500 on active duty spread out across many factories. An additional 31,000 militia members (the real figure is closer to 11,000) are supposedly on call at home. The leaders don't know their soldiers, and leaders at different levels don't know one another. They aren't actually under control."[190]

Despite such indications of disorganization, members of the SRC enjoined the militia to prepare for a general strike.[191] The two combat command posts—one at the Jiangnan Shipyard and the other at the China Textile Machinery Factory—were supplied with transmitters, motorcycles, and revolvers. Battleship 101, equipped with

antiaircraft missiles, was readied for combat.[192] The leaders of the Shanghai Militia characterized the anticipated confrontation as the ultimate martyrdom of the CR. Unsuccessful as their undertaking might prove in the short run, in the long run it would be seen as a supreme act of sacrifice by the faithful guardians of Mao Zedong Thought. A battle cry proposed for the upcoming struggle was: "Heads may roll, blood may flow; Mao Zedong Thought must not go!"[193] Such declarations of devotion notwithstanding, plans for armed action were put on hold when Shanghai's top rebel leaders were suddenly summoned to Beijing. Their return to Shanghai was made contingent upon an agreement that they persuade their fellow radicals of the need to accommodate to the new post–Gang of Four order. If their efforts at persuasion left any doubts in the minds of ordinary militiamen, PLA troops under the Shanghai Garrison Command quickly settled the issue by confiscating the militia's weapons and placing the city's factories and unions under military control.[194]

CONCLUSION

What lessons are to be drawn from this ill-fated experiment in revolutionary citizenship? Justified by their founders as the fulfillment of Marx and Lenin's mandate for the working class, the urban militias of the CR were in fact far from an unsullied expression of proletarian politics. A notable aspect of the Shanghai Militia was the central role of politically ambitious nonworkers. It may be tempting therefore to dismiss the whole venture as nothing more than an instrumental ploy on the part of these radical organizers, seeking the political capital and social base with which to pursue their own otherwise unattainable objectives.

And yet, despite the importance of outside patronage, it is also quite clear that many ordinary workers themselves embraced the political opportunities afforded by the CR. Wang Hongwen, the former cotton mill worker, was the most obvious beneficiary of the CR—rising from obscurity to rank above everyone but Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the leadership hierarchy. More than a few workers in Shanghai and elsewhere were undoubtedly cheered to see

a young worker catapulted to the commanding heights of power.[195] During the Campaign to Criticize the Gang of Four, which got underway soon after the conclusion of the CR, many Shanghai workers were reluctant to cast stones at Wang Hongwen.[196] Even though Wang had never really championed working-class issues,[197] his meteoric ascent from anonymity to national prominence remained a source of pride to his fellow proletarians.

Wang Hongwen was certainly not alone in embracing the possibilities for personal political power afforded by the CR. Consider the testimony of Ye Changming, another former worker who headed Shanghai's reconstituted trade union during the latter years of the CR. In explaining his initial motives for "rebellion" to police interrogators, Ye recalled:

> Seeing that other units had already spontaneously sprouted mass struggle groups and other organizations, I wanted to start up an organization at my work unit, too. So after consulting with some other people, I founded a battle group [*zhandou zu*]. I was prompted mostly by dissatisfaction in belonging to a powerless "CR committee." I wanted a group under my own control, so I got together with some other workers to kick aside the CR committee and then replace the party committee. My ambitions were amply revealed in my "battle manifesto."[198]

The institutional inversion of the CR, which invited ordinary workers to "kick aside" state-sponsored organizations in favor of their own militant alternatives, offered a welcome opportunity for those with political ambitions.

That their response was more than simple opportunism, however, is suggested by the continuing commitment of rebel workers up to the very end of the CR. Even after they had been deprived of their patrons by the arrest of the Gang of Four in October 1976, rebel leaders in Shanghai were determined to soldier on. At an emergency meeting called to decide upon the response of the Shanghai Militia to this unexpected turn of events, emotional outbursts by the militiamen underscored their personal identification with the CR. One militia leader, in words redolent of Patrick Henry, exclaimed, "Give me revolution or give me death! Everyone should swear an

oath. Who wants to be a traitor, damn it?!" Another, invoking the CCP's own early terrorist tradition, continued, "Right! Whether or not we swear an oath, I'm organizing a dog-beating brigade!" Yet another sobbed, "From my childhood I had to beg and go to work to make ends meet. It was the CR that liberated me. I'm going to carry through no matter what the consequences."[199] Even an elderly union cadre who had been kidnapped and dragged around the city by these same militiamen only two years earlier, had grown to develop a genuine admiration for the devotion of his former torturers: "These young people [the worker rebels] are really praiseworthy . . . They harbor deep emotions about the Cultural Revolution . . . They are unafraid of death."[200]

Intervention by nonworkers had not impeded workers' own dedication to the cause. In view of the significance that alliances between workers and outsiders have historically played, both within China and elsewhere in the world, it may be worth reflecting on the Shanghai Militia from this perspective.[201] Many of the milestones of contemporary Chinese history can indeed be traced to cross-class combinations in which workers acted in concert with other social forces to promote wider political causes. The May Fourth Movement of 1919, the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925, the Hong Kong–Canton Seamen's Strike of 1925–1926, the Three Workers' Armed Uprisings of 1926–1927, the Civil War protests of the late 1940s, and (shortly after the CR) the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978–1979 all exhibited such interclass cooperation. However, in each of these cases participants raised their demands less as members of a particular class than as patriotic citizens concerned with the greater good of their community and country.[202]

The urban militia experiment of the CR, while in reality a cross-class effort built upon pre-CR institutional foundations, was promoted as a novel expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[203] The Shanghai Militia, in venturing out of the factories and into the neighborhoods, justified its actions in terms of class struggle. Aside from increasing the numbers of workers actively involved in surveillance and security duties, however, the Shanghai Militia did little to advance the concrete interests of workers qua workers. The "nonuniformed liberation army" represented an impressive accretion of proletarian power, which propelled a number of former workers to new political heights, but the militia was not deployed to ameliorate either the working or the living conditions of ordinary workers in that city or elsewhere.[204] In this context, class struggle meant attacking rival claimants to power—rather than liberating the proletariat from exploitation and oppression. Compounding the complexities of the CR was the fact that radicals like Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan were not powerless outsiders; through Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong, and the Cultural Revolution Small Group, they enjoyed ready access to instruments of central state control. As a result, their alliance with rebel workers had serious political consequences.

Although the leaders of the Attack–Defend and the Shanghai Militia promoted these armed forces as revolutionary vehicles of the proletariat, their actual mission was at once subversive and supportive of state power. Urban militias assumed military and police prerogatives—thereby challenging the authority of both army and public security agencies. But militias also enjoyed the approval of top party and state officials, and worked closely with local cadres. The ambiguities evident in the militias of the CR era exposed contradictions that could be traced back to the earliest theories and practices of revolutionary struggle. The ways in which these tensions unfolded varied greatly from place to place, depending upon particular personalities and power configurations. Yet the ubiquity of the conflicts bespoke deep divisions within state and society alike.

Clashes involving armed militias affected peasants as well as workers. In more than a few locales, rural militias—ordered into the fray by their commanders—were responsible for wholesale massacres of urban rebels.[205] Jonathan Unger explains,

> The state of mind that lent itself to killing of bad-class people also ultimately contributed to the slaughter of urban people by rural militias during the final stages of the Cultural Revolution fighting . . . The Conservative faction's membership tended to come from among those people in the county towns who had been politically favoured prior to the Cultural Revolution . . . Their loyalty to their pre-Cultural Revolution superiors often appears to have remained informally intact. In many cases, such feelings of loyalty linked the communes' militia commanders, the county

> militia headquarters, and the county's Party and government leadership . . . When the rural authorities received urgent calls to come to the aid of embattled county and prefectural leaders or flagging county-town or prefectural-city Conservative factions, the militia corps of farmers were ordered out of the villages and dispatched to do their duty . . . The peasant militiamen who rallied to attack county and provincial capitals sometimes appear to have perceived the besieged urban population as "Others," beyond the pale of compassion.[206]

As Unger's description of militia assaults suggests, the violence of the CR is not purely attributable to either state instigation or societal inclination;[207] it was a volatile mixture of both. Local officials directed their subordinates to engage in armed combat, but underlings often responded with a shocking degree of enthusiasm.

The conflicts in which the CR militias became embroiled pitted workers against peasants, so-called good classes against bad classes, rebels against conservatives, the proletariat against capitalist roaders, locals against outsiders, unions against military and public security organizations, leftists against rightists, and zealous defenders of Mao Zedong Thought against revisionists. Rather than see such antagonisms as the product of either societal or state initiatives, it is perhaps more fruitful to view them as combined claims to political inclusion and exclusion on the part of some officials and some elements of the populace alike. The ways in which these various battles played out had obvious immediate consequences for the contestants, but they were also rooted in longstanding differences over the contours and institutional configuration of revolutionary citizenship.

The brutality of this period was an outgrowth of escalating tensions whose complex origins stretched back to the earliest days of the Chinese Revolution. This is by no means to suggest that the Cultural Revolution was an inevitable result of China's revolutionary heritage. Without the mercurial machinations of Chairman Mao, not to mention the active yet erratic involvement of millions of other Chinese, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution would never have erupted—let alone endured for a decade. That it unfolded with such savagery and stamina, however, cannot be understood apart from a myriad of contradictions that had been brewing and building for generations.

NOTES

1. Tang Tsou, "Back from the Brink of Revolutionary-'Feudal' Totalitarianism," in *State and Society in Contemporary China*, ed. Victor Nee and David Mozingo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 53–88; Helen F. Siu, *Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).

2. Stanley Rosen, *Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun, *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997).

3. "Urban Militia—A New Force?" *Current Scene* 12, no. 1 (December 31, 1974): 21–24; David Bonavia, "New Role for the Militia," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (July 30, 1976): 29–30; James C. F. Wang, "The Urban Militia as a Political Instrument in the Power Contest in China," *Asian Survey* 18, no. 6 (June 1978): 541–59.

4. Qinghai Military Region Political Department, ed., *Renzhen zuohao chengshi minbing gongzuo* [Earnestly conduct urban militia work] (Qinghai, 1974), 6–8.

5. Alan P. L. Liu, "The 'Gang of Four' and the Chinese People's Liberation Army," *Asian Survey* 19, no. 9 (September 1979).

6. On competing interpretations of *class*, see Richard C. Kraus, *Class Struggle in Chinese Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

7. "Zhou Enlai jiejian Beijing sanshiyi zhong 'qiyi' chiweidui duiyuan de tanhua" [Premier Zhou's conversation while meeting with "July First" Red Guard ranks from Beijing's Number Thirty-one Middle School], in *Wuchan jieji wenhua dageming cankao ziliao* [Reference materials on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution] (Beijing, 1967), 93.

8. During the CR, more than 75 percent of the cadres in the SFTU were attacked as traitors, secret agents, or scabs. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions, ed., *Shanghai gongyunzhi* [Gazetteer of the Shanghai labor movement] (Shanghai, 1996), chap. 5.

9. At the start of the CR, Zhang Chunqiao was a secretary with the Shanghai Party Committee and responsible for propaganda work, while Yao Wenyuan was a staff writer for the *Liberation Daily* in Shanghai. The other two Gang of Four members were Wang Hongwen, a Shanghai cotton mill worker who would assume command of the Shanghai Militia and eventually rise to the third place in the national leadership lineup, and Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's powerful wife. All four became key figures in the Cultural Revolution Small Group that set the direction of the unfolding mass movement. For a general discussion of the political strategies and eventual demise of the Gang of Four, see Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the 'Gang of Four,'" *World Politics* 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 26–60.

10. That the Paris Commune would serve as a key model for the CR was anticipated by a much publicized editorial in the CCP theoretical journal, *Red Flag*,

which appeared on the ninety-fifth anniversary of the Commune in March 1966. Zheng Zhisi, "Bali gongshe de weida jiaoxun" [The great lesson of the Paris Commune], *Hong qi* [Red Flag], no. 4 (March 1966).

11. Shanghai Garrison, ed. *Shanghai minbing douzheng shiziliao* [Historical materials on the struggles of the Shanghai Militia], bk. 3, no. 16 (Shanghai: 1981), 7–8. Hereafter cited as *Shanghai minbing*.

12. Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), 629.

13. On the role of military takeovers in the CR, see Frederick C. Teiwes, *Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974); and Ralph L. Powell and Chong-Kun Yoon, "Public Security and the PLA," *Asian Survey* 12, no. 12 (December 1972): 1082–1100.

14. See, for example, Byung-joon Ahn, *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976); Jürgen Domes, *The Internal Politics of China* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, vols. 1–3 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, 1983, 1997).

15. Michael Schoenhals, "Why Don't We Arm the Left?" *China Quarterly*, no. 182 (June 2005): 277–300.

16. On the CR as a struggle over revolutionary legitimacy and legacy, see Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1968).

17. See, among many others, Rosen, *Red Guard Factionalism;* Gordon Bennett and Ronald Montaperto, *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Xiaoai* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1980); Gao Yuan, *Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press); Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, *Son of the Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1984); Anita Chan et al., "Students and Class Warfare: The Social Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou," *China Quarterly*, no. 83 (September 1980): 397–446; Andrew G. Walder, "Beijing Red Guard Factionalism: Social Interpretations Reconsidered," *Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 2 (May 2002): 437–72.

18. For Hangzhou, see Keith Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province: Zhejiang, 1966–1979* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); for Wuhan, see Wang Shaoguang, *Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); for Shanghai, see Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power.* As Gang of Four member Zhang Chunqiao put the matter, "The two million industrial workers of Shanghai are our base. The Shanghai working class must control the Shanghai scene. The labor movement must not be manipulated by [student] Red Guards, especially students from other places." Quoted in Xu Jingxian, *Shinian yimeng* [Ten years one dream] (Hong Kong: Times International Press, 2004), 30.

19. The term *chiweidui* is usually translated into English as "Scarlet Guards" when referring to conservative workers in Shanghai during the CR, but it is the same Chinese term that was used for the Russian Red Guards as well as for the CCP's own Red Guard militias (in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Hailufeng Soviet, the Canton Commune, and the rural base areas) from the summer of 1927 through the War of Resistance and Civil War. For an early Chinese history of the Russian Revolution that uses the term to refer to the workers' militias in the October Revolution, see Gao Lao, *Eguo dageming jilue* [A short history of the Russian Revolution] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1923), 33. On the general use of the term *chi* to refer to Communist "redness" in the 1920s, and its subsequent replacement by the term *hong*, see Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "The First Chinese Red Scare? 'Fanchi' Propaganda and 'Pro-red' Responses during the Northern Expedition," *Republican China* 11, no. 1 (1985): 45n2. The appellation that student Red Guards used in the CR—*hongweibing*—was adapted from the pen name of a Beijing high school student, and apparently had no roots in revolutionary history. See Liang Liang, "Yige hongweibing faqizhe de zishu" [The personal account of a founder of the Red Guards], *Zhongguo qingnian* [China Youth], no. 10 (1986): 66–67. In a meeting with Beijing middle-school students in August 1966, Zhou Enlai expressed his own preference for the term *chiweidui* over *hongweibing*, on grounds that the former was an indigenous name whereas the latter was a foreign import, but for reasons that are obscure the latter nevertheless became the standard appellation for the student movement during the CR. See *Wuchan jieji wenhua dageming cankao ziliao*, 93.

20. This was the case not only in Shanghai. In Jiangxi Province as well, worker Red Guards (*gongren chiweidui*) were closely connected to the provincial authorities. Established after the provincial leaders had dispatched workers to protect the provincial party committee, the Jiangxi worker Red Guards (190,000 strong) reported to a political commissar who was also the director of the provincial trade union. See "Wang Dongxing Tao Zhu jiejian Jiangxi fujing daibiaotuan de jianghua" [Remarks of Wang Dongxing and Tao Zhu while meeting with a delegation from Jiangxi to the capital], December 17, 1966.

21. Workers' General Headquarters, ed., *Chouming zhaozhu de Shanghai chiweidui* [Notorious Shanghai Red Guards] (Shanghai: October 1968).

22. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions' Writing Group on the History of the Worker Red Guards, *Zhongcheng yü dang de Shanghai gongren chiweidui* [Loyal to the party: The Shanghai worker Red Guards] (Shanghai: September 1983).

23. Zhang Chunqiao expressly warned against repeating the mistakes of the 1920s: "The labor movement has risen up; we must not be like Chen Duxiu! Chen Duxiu back then was a right opportunist who squashed the labor movement." Quoted in Xu Jingxian, *Shinian yimeng*, 33.

24. SMA, Pan Guoping, testimony, April 24, 1979.

25. SMA, Ma Zenlong, interrogation transcript, April 28, 1982.

26. For a detailed discussion of both rebel and conservative forces, see Li Xun, *Dabenkui: Shanghai gongren zaofanpai xingwangshi* [The great collapse: The rise and fall of Shanghai's worker rebels] (Taipei: Times Cultural Press, 1996); and Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power.*

27. For example, Ma Ji, one of the commanders of the conservative Red Guards who had been a cadre in the same Number Seventeen Cotton Mill where rebel

Wang Hongwen worked, had gained standing as a labor activist because of his participation in picket work following the February 6, 1950, shelling of Shanghai. Ma Ji interview with Li Xun, (Shanghai), July 6, 1989.

28. Shanghai Party Committee Cultural Revolution Materials Small Group, ed., *Shanghai "wenhua dageming" shihua* [Historical narrative of the "Great Cultural Revolution" in Shanghai] (Shanghai, 1992), 205. This three-volume internal circulation report provides a detailed and authoritative history of the CR in Shanghai. Although published some years after the conclusion of the CR, it is based upon unrestricted access to archival sources, personal papers, and in-depth interviews with key participants. Hereafter cited as *Shanghai shihua*.

29. When Zhang Chunqiao met with a delegation of worker rebels in December 1966, he asked them who was actually stirring up the factional fighting in Shanghai. The rebels responded, "This is very clear; the instigator is Zhang Qi, the director of the trade union." See "Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan jiejian Shanghai gongren geming zaofan silingbu fujing daibiaotuan de jianghua" [Remarks of Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan while meeting with a delegation to the capital of Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters], *Red Guard Publications*, suppl. no. 1, 8:54.

30. Andrew G. Walder, *Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1978).

31. On the nature of this party patronage system within state-owned factories, see Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

32. Shanghai Party Committee Party History Research Office, ed., *Zhongguo gongchandang zai Shanghai* [The Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991), 561.

33. *Guojia shi womende, zhengquan shi womende* [The country is ours, political power is ours], handbill of the Shanghai Workers' General Headquarters, February 6, 1967, in SMA.

34. Stuart Schram, ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to the People* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 278.

35. Quoted in Xu Jingxian, *Shinian yimeng*, 85.

36. On efforts to apply the Paris Commune model to China during the CR, see John Bryan Starr, "Revolution in Retrospect: The Paris Commune Through Chinese Eyes," *China Quarterly*, no. 49 (January–March 1972): 106–25; Barrett L. McCormick, *Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 35–44; Shaoguang Wang, "'New Trends of Thought' on the Cultural Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary China* 8, no. 21 (1999): 197–217; Wang Li, *Wang Li fansi lu* [Reflections of Wang Li] (Hong Kong: Star North Press, 2001), 1150–55; Elizabeth J. Perry, "From Paris to the Paris of the East—and Back: Workers as Citizens in Modern Shanghai," in *Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China*, ed. Merle Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 144–51.

37. The use of athletes for patrol duty was also a Shanghai tradition of sorts. Wasserstrom notes the important role that sports teams served in providing student pickets to keep order during the demonstrations of the Republican era. See Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Student Protest in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 142.

38. *Shanghai shihua*, 490–93.

39. SMA, Hu Yongnian, confession, April 21, 1977.

40. *Shanghai shihua*, 494. Among these unfortunate victims was the daughter of Zheng Nian, whose death (initially reported as a suicide) was apparently a murder carried out by *Shangtisi* in retaliation for the young woman's refusal to denounce her mother. See Nien Cheng, *Life and Death in Shanghai* (London: Collins, 1986).

41. *Shanghai shihua*, 502–03.

42. *Shanghai shihua*, 539; Sima Buping, *Wang Hongwen yu Shanghaibang* [Wang Hongwen and the Shanghai Gang] (Hong Kong: Literary Books, 1978), 46–49.

43. Liu, "'Gang of Four' and the Chinese People's Liberation Army," 829. At the time, Zhang's concern about the PLA was apparently shared by other civilian leaders. On July 30, 1967, Premier Zhou Enlai criticized the military for having issued guns to conservative organizations in the name of the core militia, thereby encouraging factional conflict. "Zhongyang shouzhang di baci jiejian Henan fujing daibiaotuan jiyao" [Summary of minutes of central leaders' eighth meeting with Henan delegations to the capital], July 28, 1967, in Song Yongyi, ed., *Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku* [Chinese Cultural Revolution library] (Hong Kong: Chinese University China Research Services Center, 2002).

44. *Shanghai minbing douzheng shiziliao*, bk. 3, 17:3. Hereafter cited as *Shanghai minbing*.

45. Zhang Chunqiao, "Wuzhuang minzhong" [Arm the masses], in *"Sirenbang" ziliao huiji 1932–1946* [Collected materials on the "Gang of Four" 1932–1946] (Beijing: 1976), 306. My thanks to Michael Schoenhals for sharing this source.

46. Wang Li, *Wang Li fansi lu*, 1:251; 2:1012.

47. Schoenhals, "Why Don't We Arm the Left?"

48. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2:2–3.

49. *Shanghai shihua*, 539–40. On Xu and the Writers' Group, see Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*, 14ff.

50. *Shanghai dangshi* [Shanghai Party history] vol. 91, no. 10:31.

51. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:17.

52. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:4–6.

53. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:7.

54. For more on the competition between the Shanghai radicals and the PLA, see Liu, "'Gang of Four' and the Chinese People's Liberation Army," 817–37.

55. Schoenhals, "Why Don't We Arm the Left?"

56. *Wuchanjieji wenhua dageming wenjian huibian* [Compilation of documents from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution], 1:500–05. Cited in Schoenhals,

"Why Don't We Arm the Left?" As Wang Shaoguang notes, however, many weapons remained in rebel hands. Wang, "New Trends of Thought," 204.

57. Canton was also allowed to retain its Worker Picket Corps, but the following year the Canton Corps was severely criticized for abuse of power. Powell and Yoon, "Public Security and the PLA," 1093; *Current Scene* (December 6, 1968): 13.

58. *Shanghai shihua*, 540–41; *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:3.

59. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:3.

60. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:46. At this time, demobilized soldiers accounted for 28 percent of cadres at company level and above.

61. Li Jiaqi, ed., *Shanghai gongyunzhi* [Shanghai labor movement gazetteer] (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1997), 348. See appendix.

63. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:4. The standard description in publications about the Shanghai Militia is that it "took industrial workers as the mainstay" (*yi chanye gongren wei zhuti*).

64. Shanghai Militia Command Post, ed., *Senyan bilei zhongzhi chengcheng: Qianjinzhong de Shanghai minbing* [Strongly fortified, unity is strength: The Shanghai Militia marches forward] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1975).

65. Shanghai Militia Command Post, ed., *Shanghai minbing meishu zuopin xuan* [Selections of art work of the Shanghai Militia] (Shanghai, 1975).

66. Li Jiaqi, *Shanghai gongyunzhi*, 376; SMA, C1-2-4414.

67. During the Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign, Wang Xiuzhen made repeated trips to the Municipal Militia Command Post, stressing that the campaign was directly led by Jiang Qing and that it must be closely linked with militia work. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:13. Like Wang Hongwen, Wang Xiuzhen hailed originally from the Northeast and had been working in a Shanghai cotton mill at the start of the CR. For biographical information, see Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*, 47–49. On gender relations in the CR, see Emily Honig, "Maoist Mappings of Gender: Reassessing the Red Guards," in *Chinese Femininities/Chinese Masculinities*, ed. Susan Brownell and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 199–268; and Elizabeth J. Perry and Nara Dillon, "'Little Brothers' in the Cultural Revolution: The Worker Rebels of Shanghai," in Brownell and Wasserstrom, *Chinese Femininities/Chinese Masculinities*, 269–86.

68. In August 1969, a survey revealed that of work units with Attack–Defend forces, more than 80 percent of the former core militia had joined the new organization. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:42.

69. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:44.

70. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:59.

71. *Gongren zaofanbao* [Worker Rebel], March 23, 1969.

72. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:37.

73. *Shanghai shihua*, 549–50.

74. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:38.

75. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 18:54.

76. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 18:57–58.

77. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 18:49.

78. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:19.

79. *Shanghai shihua*, 550–51.

80. SMA, Q169-1-36.

81. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:43.

82. Fan Wenxian, "Shanghaishi zonggonghui beiza jishi" [Annals of the assault on the Shanghai Federation of Labor], *Shanghai gongyun shiliao*, no. 5 (1986): 1–6; "Zhengzheng tiegu chuiqing shi" [In appreciation of martyrdom], *Shanghai gongyun shiliao*, 13–22; *Shanghai shihua*, 395.

83. SMA, Militia Command Post Archive, #105 of the Political Section of the Shanghai Garrison; *Shanghai shihua*, 548, 556.

84. *Shanghai shihua*, 552, 554.

85. *Shanghai shihua*, 501–02.

86. *Shanghai shihua*, 326.

87. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:20; 18:69.

88. A rash of pamphlets, newspaper editorials, and other treatments of the Paris Commune were published in China in 1971. See, for example, "Jinian bali gongshe yibai zhounian" [Commemorating the centennial of the Paris Commune], *Renmin huabao* [People's Pictorial], no. 3 (March 1971): 2–11; and the joint editorial in *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily*, March 18, 1971, translated in *Peking Review* 14, no. 12 (March 19, 1971): 3–16.

89. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:5; *Shanghai shihua*, 553–54.

90. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:20.

91. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 21:45–50.

92. *Shanghai shihua*, 554–55.

93. In 1971, more than thirteen hundred serious cases ranging from armed robbery to rape were reported at the station. Shanghai Railway Station, ed., "Guanyü zuzhi minbing weihu chezhan zhian qingkuang" [On the situation of organizing the militia to maintain order at the train station], in *Xuexi Shanghai minbing gongzuo jingyan cankao cailiao* [Reference materials to study the work experience of the Shanghai Militia], no. 3:1–9.

94. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 21:56–57.

95. *Shanghai shihua*, 545–46. Opposition by public security forces and grassroots cadres delayed implementation of this ambitious initiative even in Shanghai, however. By the end of 1973 less than 10 percent of the more than three thousand factories in Shanghai with militia organizations had been converted into the sort of trinity operation advocated by Wang Hongwen. Displeased by the lethargic response, Wang reminded party leaders in the city that the trinity had first been proposed in Shanghai and that the whole country was in the throes of learning from Shanghai, yet Shanghai itself was in no position to sum up its experience and explain the policy. Thereupon Wang's associates in Shanghai pressured the grassroots cadres to implement the trinity. *Shanghai shihua*, 547.

96. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:15, 21–22; 18:73. For the most part, however, the rural militia remained quite insulated from the experiments occurring in the

cities. See Victor Nee, "Between Center and Locality: State, Militia, and Village," in Nee and Mozingo, *State and Society*, 223–43.

97. "Shanghaishi Putuoqü minbing zhihuibu qingkuang" [The situation of the militia command post in Shanghai's Putuo District], in *Xuexi Shanghai minbing gongzuo jingyan cankao cailiao* [Reference materials for studying the work experience of the Shanghai militia], no. 1:1.

98. "Shanghaishi Putuoqu," 2.

99. "Shanghaishi Putuoqu," 4.

100. "Shanghaishi Putuoqu," 4.

101. "Shanghaishi Putuoqu," 3.

102. "Shanghaishi Putuoqu," 5.

103. "Shanghaishi Putuoqu," 4.

104. "Shanghaishi Putuoqu," 3.

105. "Shanghaishi Putuoqu," 5.

106. Andrew J. Watson, *Living in China* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975), 104.

107. V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932).

108. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, 66.

109. See Wang Hongwen's general report on the Attack-Defend: "Wuzhuang gongren jieji, gaizao chengshi minbing" [Arm the working class, reform the urban militia], *Gongren zaofan bao* [Worker Rebel], March 23, 1969.

110. *Shanghai shihua*, 542.

111. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:5.

112. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:15.

113. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:58.

114. Chen Shuping, *Bali gongshe yu zhongguo* [The Paris Commune and China] (Beijing: People's University Press, 1988), 184–85.

115. As John Gittings points out, however, the actual degree of military control over the militia fluctuated during the pre-CR period. See John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 201–24. On rebel control during the CR, see *Shanghai shihua*, 540–41.

116. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:11.

117. *Shanghai shihua*, 542.

118. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:11.

119. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:6.

120. SMA, Wang Xiuzhen, confession.

121. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:9–10.

122. Gao Ji, "Mori fengkuang" [Final days of frenzy], in *Lishi zai zhili chensi* [Meditations on history], ed. Zhou Ming, 318. Detailed testimony concerning Wang Hongwen's ambitions vis-á-vis the PLA can be found in the confessions of former militia leaders. See *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 18:21–37.

123. SMA, G22-2-436. By July 9 of 1966, sixty-six units had turned in nearly 250 guns to the PSB.

124. "Zhongyang junwei guanyü minbing wuqi guanli de guiding" [Central Military Commission regulation concerning the management of militia weapons], in *Wuchan jieji wenhua dageming youguan wenjian huiji* [Compendium of documents concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution], 31.

125. *Shanghai shihua*, 542.

126. The Third Front was a CR program to relocate industrial enterprises from the coastal provinces to the interior, to render them less vulnerable in the event of war. See Barry J. Naughton, "The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," *China Quarterly*, no. 115 (Autumn 1988): 351–86. By contrast, Wang Hongwen's small third front strengthened strategic industrial capacity in the militarily vulnerable coastal city of Shanghai.

127. *Shanghai shihua*, 563–64.

128. Special Case Group for Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao, ed., *Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng* [Criminal evidence of the Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan antiparty clique], vol. 1 (Beijing: Party Central Office, December 1976).

129. *Shanghai dangshi* [Shanghai party history], vol. 91, no. 10:31.

130. *Shanghai shihua*, 544.

131. *Shanghai shihua*, 559–60.

132. "Shanghai sibalingwu chang dangwei guanyu dang guan wuzhuang de qingkuang jieshao" [Introducing the Shanghai 4805 Factory Party Committee's regulation of armed forces], in *Xuexi Shanghai minbing gongzuo jingyan cankao cailiao* [Reference materials for studying the work experience of the Shanghai Militia], no. 5:2.

133. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:8.

134. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:71.

135. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:54.

136. See, for example, *Anzhao Mao zhuxi geming luxian jiaqiang minbing jianshe* [Strengthening militia construction according to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line] (Beijing: People's Press, 1972), a publication by the military that omits any mention of the contributions of the Shanghai model. In a blunt refutation of the rebels' preference for a militia based exclusively on the working class, rather than on the masses as a whole, the volume states that "The question of whether the militia should rely on the masses or whether it should rely only on a minority reflects two ways of thinking about militia construction, a two-line struggle" (31). The quotes from Chairman Mao chosen for the frontispiece of the volume emphasize protecting the motherland (*zuguo*) and serving the people (*renmin*), and make no mention of the proletariat or class struggle; the song with which the volume concludes equates China's revolutionary tradition (*geming chuantong*) with people's war (*renmin zhanzheng*), again saying nothing about class or class conflict.

137. At a meeting of the garrison's Political Department on September 15, 1967, a decision was made to oppose the formation of the Attack–Defend. See *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 20:2–3.

138. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:55.

139. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:55.

140. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 18:9.

141. *Shanghai shihua*, 542.

142. SMA, Zhou Hongbao, confession, December 15, 1977; *Shanghai shihua*, 543.

143. *Shanghai shihua*, 563.

144. On the role of the military in Lin's alleged coup attempt, see Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution* (London: Hurst, 1996); and Qiu Jin, *The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).

145. Thomas C. Roberts, *The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of People's War* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983), 69.

146. *Shanghai shihua*, 560.

147. *Shanghai shihua*, 561.

148. *Zhonggong yanjiu* [Studies in Chinese Communism], vol. 10, no. 1 (January 1976): 36; vol. 12, no. 9 (September 1978): 160–61.

149. Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 48, 75.

151. Liu, "'Gang of Four' and the Chinese People's Liberation Army," 832.

151. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:17.

152. *Shanghai shihua*, 558. A joint editorial in *People's Daily* and *Liberation Army Daily* on September 29, 1973, entitled "Handle the militia well," stressed the importance of urban militias in arming the working class in major cities. Song Yongyi, ed., *Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku*. On November 19, 1973, a joint State Council and Central Military Affairs Committee document (no. 162) was issued under the title of "Arm the working class; establish urban militias: Investigation of the Shanghai Urban Militia." Militia Editorial Department of *Contemporary China*, ed., *Jianguo yilai minbing jianshe dashiji* [Annals of militia construction since the country's founding] (Beijing: 1985), 95.

153. "Urban Militia—A New Force?" 24.

154. For example, the Shanghai Red Thread Factory—site of the labor reform program for wayward women—was designated as a model unit because of the educational efforts of its 333 militia members (out of a work force of 770). The militia at this factory was praised for its study of Lenin's *State and Social Revolution*, along with other Marxist-Leninist-Maoist works that highlighted the political mission of the working class. (Shanghai Red Thread Factory Militia Battalion, ed., "Renzhen gongdu MaLie buduan tigao minbing zhixing Mao zhuxi geming luxian de zijuexing" [Earnestly study Marxism-Leninism and constantly raise the self-consciousness of the militia in carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line], in *Xuexi Shanghai minbing gongzuo jingyan cankao cailiao* [Reference materials for studying the work experience of the Shanghai militia], 2:1–11.

155. *Shanghai shihua*, 557.

156. Internal-circulation sources from Tianjin and Henan, for example, emphasize the importance of the Shanghai model. See Tianjin City Militia Department for Studying the Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship, ed., *Yao renzhen banhao minbing* [Earnestly establish militias] (Tianjin, July 1975); and *Chongfen fahui minbing de zhandou zuoyong: xuexi Shanghai minbing jianshe de xinxian jingyan* [Fully develop the militia's combat functions: Study the fresh experience of Shanghai militia construction] (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1975).

157. *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], September 27, 1973, p. 4; September 29, 1973, pp. 1–2; October 8, 1974, p. 1; *Peking Review*, no. 40 (October 5, 1973): 6.

158. Roberts, *The Chinese People's Militia*, 53.

159. Keith Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province: Zhejiang, 1966–1976* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 109, 154.

160. Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, 152.

161. Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, 162.

162. Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, 187. Mao Zedong, noting the involvement of militias in factional battles in Zhejiang, Hunan, and Yunnan provinces, decreed in early 1975 that militias must not interfere in local factionalism. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing* [Militias in contemporary China] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1989), 62.

163. An earlier permutation of the Capital Militia dated back to the Everyone a Soldier Campaign of 1958, when it had been established under military auspices to include both workers and students. Interview with Zhang Qiusheng, Beijing Federation of Trade Unions, November 4, 1998.

164. Fang Shike and Ruan Shengji, "Emeng xinglai" [Awakened from a nightmare], in *"Wenhua dageming" fengyun renwu fangtan lu* [A record of interviews with "Cultural Revolution" notables], 382.

165. *Dangdai Beijing jianshi* [A brief contemporary history of Beijing] (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1999), 237; Jin Chunming, "Siwu yundong shuping" [A critical narrative of the April Fifth movement] in *Huishou "wenge": Zhongguo shinian "wenge" fenxi yü fansi* [Looking back at the "Cultural Revolution": Analysis and reconsideration of China's ten-year "Cultural Revolution"], ed. Zhang Hua, et al. (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2000), 1241–42.

166. Xia Chao and Yang Fengcheng, *Zhongguo 1976 nian jishi* [Annals of China in 1976] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Press, 1994), 150.

167. "Zhongyang zhengzhiju siyue wuri huiyi jilu" [Transcript of the April fifth meeting of the Central Politburo] (April 5, 1976) in Song Yongyi, ed., *Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku* [Chinese Cultural Revolution library] (Hong Kong: Chinese University China Research Services Center, 2002).

168. Zhu Yuanshi, ed., *Wu De koushu: shinian fengyü jishi—wo zai Beijing gongzuo de yixie jingli* [Wu De's oral history: Annals of a decade of turmoil—some of my experiences working in Beijing] (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 2004):214–16.

169. Fang and Ruan, "Emeng xinglai," 385–87; Jin, "Siwu yundong shuping," 1242.

170. For a discussion of Wang Hongwen's role in restraining militia violence, see Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, "The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era," *Pacific Affairs* 77, no. 2 (Summer 2004).

171. Jin, "Siwu yundong shuping," 1246.

172. April 10, 1976, *People's Daily* in Jin, "Siwu yundong shuping."

173. "Yao Wenyuan dui *hongqi* zazhi bianjizu zhaojiren de tanhua" [Yao Wenyuan's talk with members of the *Red Flag* editorial department] (April 26, 1976) in Song Yongyi, *Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku*.

174. SMA, Huang Jinhai, confession, June 9, 1977.

175. Gao Ji, "Mori fengkuang," 320.

176. SMA, Wang Xiuzhen, confession, November 22, 1976.

177. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:25; 18:62.

178. Chao Feng, ed., *"Wenhua dageming" cidian* ["Cultural Revolution" Dictionary], 117; SMA, Wang Xiuzhen, confession.

179. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:14; *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing*, 62.

180. On the role that the Shanghai Militia played in Hua's charges against the Gang of Four, see Andrẽs D. Onate, "Hua Guofeng and the Arrest of the 'Gang of Four,'" *China Quarterly*, no. 75 (September 1978): 540–65; and Keith Forster, "China's Coup of October 1976," *Modern China* 18, no. 3 (July 1992): 263–303.

181. *Shanghai shihua*, 909–10.

182. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 17:70–71.

183. SMA, Shi Shangying, confession, December 12, 1978.

184. SMA, A88-2-460.

185. PLA Shanghai Garrison Command, ed., *Sirenbang zai Shanghai jingying dier wuzhuang shimo* [The saga of the Gang of Four's operation of a second military force in Shanghai] (1988). Xu Jingxian, who as mayor signed the order to call up the Shanghai Militia, claimed that he was acting on the basis of (1) a September 28 message from Zhang Chunqiao to rely upon the militia to oppose anyone trying to tamper with the policies of the CR, and (2) the conclusion of Yao Wenyuan after the Tiananmen Incident that revolutionary violence should be employed to suppress counterrevolutionary violence. Nevertheless, Xu writes in his memoir that "I was the principal organizer and commander of this counterrevolutionary armed rebellion." Xu Jingxian, *Shinian yimeng*, 419, 423.

186. *Shanghai shihua*, 933.

187. Chen Shuping, *Bali gongshe yu zhongguo*, 185; SMA, Zhu Yongjia, confession, November 5, 1976. See also Xu Jingxian, *Shinian yimeng*, 419.

188. SMA, Zhang Jingbiao, confession, January 7, 1977.

189. *Shanghai shihua*, 947.

190. *Shanghai shihua*, 924.

191. *Shanghai shihua*, 925–26.

192. *Shanghai shihua*, 938; *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 3, 16:30–31.

193. SMA, Party Archives #88-2-460.

194. Chiu Kung-Yuan, "The October Coup and its Aftermath," *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* 19, no. 16 (December 5, 1976): 8–9.

195. Teiwes and Sun, "The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited," point out that popular attacks on the radical leaders from the time of Zhou Enlai's death through the weeks following the April fifth crackdown were directed solely at Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, and avoided mention of Wang Hongwen.

196. Interviews with Shanghai workers, 1979–1980.

197. When Wang was sent to Hangzhou to settle a series of industrial strikes that had erupted in that city toward the end of the CR, for example, his response was to throw the economistic strikers in jail. Lowell Dittmer, *China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949–1981* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 165–66.

198. SMA, Ye Changming, testimony, August 26, 1977.

199. *Shanghai shihua*, chap. 36.

200. *Shanghai shihua*, chap. 36. The elderly cadre was Zhang Jiangbiao; his case is discussed in Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*, 181, 186.

201. For Republican China, see Ming K. Chan and Arif Dirlik, *Schools into Fields and Factories: Anarchists, the Guomindang, and the National Labor University in Shanghai, 1927–1932* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991); and Daniel Y. K. Kwan, *Marxist Intellectuals and the Chinese Labor Movement: A Study of Deng Zhongxia, 1894–1933* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). For other settings, see Hagen Koo, *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001); Robert M. Fishman, *Working-class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Sidney G. Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

202. On the role of nationalism in the early Shanghai labor movement, see S. A. Smith, *Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai, 1895–1927* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002). On the Civil War protests, see Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). On the Democracy Wall Movement, see Merle Goldman, "The Reassertion of Political Citizenship in the Post-Mao Era: The Democracy Wall Movement," in Goldman and Perry, *Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China*, 159–86.

203. The worker patrols were one of several efforts to raise the status of the Chinese proletariat at this time. Of the four constitutions promulgated under the PRC, only the 1975 version—drafted during the period of the CR—granted to workers the right to strike, along with other prerogatives.

204. The economic welfare of the working class was not a priority for the rebel leadership. Although, prior to the CR, permanent workers at state-owned enterprises already enjoyed a standard of living well above that of peasants (as well as that of temporary and contract workers), there is little indication that the CR brought further material benefits. Nonetheless, symbolic improvements in the status of the

working class—exemplified by much-touted programs like the Worker Propaganda Teams, Worker Theory Troops, and Worker Ambassadors—do seem to have encouraged a general belief among industrial workers that, at last, the PRC was trying to live up to its pretensions as a proletarian state. On these other initiatives, see Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*, chap. 6.

205. For a description of militia involvement in these massacres of rebels, see Song Yongyi, ed., *Wenge da tusha* [Massacres during the Cultural Revolution] (Hong Kong: Open Press, 2002). In one confrontation in Shanxi's Pingyao County, six thousand militiamen from four surrounding counties were mobilized by local military leaders and were issued guns to suppress rebel forces. "Kang Sheng jiejian Henansheng junqü ji zhujun fuzeren de jianghua" [Talk by Kang Sheng while meeting with military leaders from Henan Province], August 14, 1967, in Song Yongyi, ed., *Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku*.

206. Jonathan Unger, "Cultural Revolution Conflict in the Villages," *China Quarterly*, no. 153 (March 1998): 100–02.

207. For a statist explanation of CR violence, see Gong Xiaoxia, *Repressive Movements and the Politics of Victimization*, (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1995). For a societal approach, see Wang Youqin, "1966: Xuesheng da laoshi de geming" [1966: The revolution in which students beat up teachers], *Ershiyi shiji shuangyuekan* 31 (August 1995). A synthetic work that portrays the violence of the CR as a reflection of societal contradictions born of state policies under the PRC is Lynn T. White III, *Policies of Chaos: Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).

6

PATROLLING THE POST-MAO REFORMS

The post-Mao state, in terms of societal reach, is generally portrayed as a pale shadow of its Maoist predecessor. David Shambaugh observes: "If one of the hallmarks of the Maoist state was the penetration of society, then the Dengist state was noticeable for its withdrawal. The organizational mechanisms of state penetration and manipulation were substantially reduced or dismantled altogether."[1] With the Chinese state ostensibly attempting to retreat from its former project of social mobilization, it seemed likely that militias, and worker militias in particular, would be among the first casualties of the post-Mao reform era. Surely Deng Xiaoping's bold decision in 1979 to abolish class labels undercut the rationale for an institution so deeply rooted in the doctrine of class struggle.

If militias were to have any place at all in the post-CR order, one might have predicted that they would be strictly limited to that of an auxiliary military force under tight PLA supervision. The doctrine of people's war was not a dead letter in military circles, suggesting that community-based militias (especially in rural areas) might still be permitted to function under the auspices of their local People's Armed Forces departments. But the transgressions committed by worker militias in the CR—operating in the name of the proletariat and independently of PLA control—would seem to have foreclosed the desirability of resurrecting this particular revolutionary institution.

Moreover, popular resentment against the urban militias was palpable. When Ma Xiaolu of Beijing's Capital Militia (see chapter 5)