

integrity and oneness of the God. Both attracted to and shrinking from dualism, the thought of the Israelites manifests an ambivalence that persisted into Christian thought.

The Hebrew position stands between the monism of the Hindus and the dualism of the Zoroastrians. It refuses to acquiesce in the idea that evil as well as good proceeds from the divine nature; on the contrary it shuns and fiercely rejects evil. But it also declines to adopt the severing of the two principles, equally fiercely insisting that one god and one god alone can be worshiped and that one god and one alone exists. It may be that the confusion and ambiguity of the Hebrew position, rather than being inferior to the clarity and consistency of the other two, mark it as superior, because it is founded in a creative tension. It allows us to sense the hidden harmony of the cosmos while urging us at the same time to spurn the blandishments of evil. That myth may be most true which presents reality under a number of aspects at one and the same time.

The movement of Hebrew thought was an effort to obtain a satisfying theodicy. So long as the evil principle was dependent upon the divine nature, the God was in some way responsible for wars, plagues, and tortures. And when the good Lord is confounded with the God, theodicy buckles under the strain. So long as the inherent inconsistencies were expressed mythologically and taken mythologically, the problem was not acute. With the efforts of Christian and Rabbinic theologians to elucidate it rationally, it became unmanageable.

6 The Devil in the New Testament

Yet there is One who holds all this falling in his hand, gently and without end.

—Rilke

The ideas of the New Testament derive in part from Hellenistic thought and in part from that of contemporary Judaism, especially the Apocalyptic and Rabbinic traditions.¹ Christianity synthesizes Greek and Jewish concepts of the Devil, and the New Testament's diabolology and demonology are essentially those of Hellenistic Judaism. The New Testament was composed by a number of writers over a period of half a century, and its point of view is not homogeneous. I shall point out differences between the synoptic, Pauline, and Johannine interpretations of the Devil. These variations are not great; as always, the motion of the development is what is essential.²

1. It is generally recognized that the earliest Christian writings as we now have them spring from even earlier oral, and possibly also written sources. The books of the New Testament were written over a period from about 50 to about 100 A.D. Those of the Christian Apocrypha are of diverse origin and chronology, some originating as early as the second century and some dating as late as the fifth.

2. The dominant thrust of biblical criticism in the past half-century has been to scrutinize the New Testament with the tools of historical criticism in order to discover the historical Jesus. The success of this enterprise is open to question, considering the vast disagreement in which the critics find themselves. It is the thrust and motion of the concept, its development, that constitutes reality for the historian, who feels puzzlement at the assumption that the truth about Christianity is to be found only in its most primitive origins. Rather, the truth about Christianity is the history of Christianity. And so with the Devil. The "demythologizing" of Scriptures, which has yielded a Jesus who did not consider himself divine, has left critics in a curious posture.

Christian theodicy posed the question of evil and of the Devil more sharply than ever before. The figure of Satan in the New Testament is comprehensible only when it is seen as the counterpart, or counterprinciple, of Christ. Generations of socially oriented theologians dismissed the Devil and the demons as superstitious relics of little importance to the Christian message. On the contrary, the New Testament writers had a sharp sense of the immediacy of evil. The Devil is not a peripheral concept that can easily be discarded without doing violence to the essence of Christianity. He stands at the center of the New Testament teaching that the Kingdom of God is at war with, and is now at last defeating, the Kingdom of the Devil.³ The Devil is essential in the New Testament because he constitutes an important alternative in Christian theodicy.

Christianity posits a God who is One, omnipotent, and wholly good. These attributes derive in part from Hellenistic thought, which assigned ontological and moral perfection to the One, and denied evil ontological existence or attributed it to the lowest level of being. They derive in part also from Judaism, which had separated the good from the evil element in the God, calling the good aspect the Lord and identifying it with Yahweh, and demoting the evil aspect, which it called the Devil, to the status of an inferior being or angel. The original figure of the God had been wrenched apart. But at the same time the essential unity and totality of his being was strictly affirmed. How then could evil be explained?

This has always been the weakest seam in Christian theol-

If Jesus is not divine, and if we can know as little about him as the mythologizers claim, their own attention to Jesus is surprising, for his thought is then much less important or interesting than that of Paul, not to mention Philo or Plotinus. Most recently, students of Christianity have turned back in the direction of the study of myth, an approach that is proving much more fruitful.

3. A forceful statement of this argument is Richard H. Hiers, "Satan, Demons, and the Kingdom of God," *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 27 (1974), 35-47. Also see Morton Kelsey, *Encounter with God* (Minneapolis, 1972), pp. 242-245. Kelsey notes 568 references to demons and the Devil in the New Testament as compared, for example, to 340 to the Holy Spirit and 604 to miracles.

ogy, the spot at which generations of atheists have forcefully struck.⁴ Their argument usually runs something like this: (1) If God exists, he is all good and all powerful; (2) such a God could have no morally sufficient reason to allow evil; (3) but there is evil in the world; (4) therefore God does not exist.⁵

The objections to the Christian definition of God are older even than Christianity, for philosophers had raised them against the Jewish and Hellenistic definitions. Over the centuries, Christians have evolved a number of responses. I offer some of them here with some of the basic arguments for and against them. As I indicated in Chapter 1, I do not think that the traditional separation of natural from moral evil has ultimate validity, since natural evil can be perceived as the God's choice to inflict suffering upon his creatures.

(1) The first argument is similar to that of monism: what is perceived as evil is necessary for the greater good. Beyond the apparent discords of the universe is a hidden harmony directed by Providence. Human criteria of good and evil cannot be applied to God. If one only knew enough, one would perceive that what one assumes to be evil is part of a benevolent divine scheme. Bertrand Russell once contemptuously suggested that this argument be presented to a mother whose child is dying of leukemia. But Russell's reply is not preemptive: would you prefer to tell the mother that the child's suffering is meaningless, that there will be in all eternity no reward or justice for her child, or for her, or for any human being, because the universe is gratuitously cruel? The point is that the horror of the evil of the universe is not removed, or even palliated, by the abolition of the concept of God. Camus and other sincere athe-

4. See for example Wallace I. Matson, *The Existence of God* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1965).

5. This argument works, if it works at all, against the idea of the Christian God, but not against a monist God, from whose being evil is not excluded. Some atheists address themselves, rather reluctantly, to the problem of monist theodicy, but most have paid Christianity the curious compliment of insisting upon a Christian definition of the deity. Matson, for example, dismisses unorthodox theism as a refusal to play by the rules of the game. The rules of the game, as Matson sees them, consist in defining God in such a way that Matson will be able to disprove his existence.

ists have admitted this: facing the problem of evil squarely is as difficult for the atheist as it is for the Christian.

(2) Evil is real, but it is the necessary by-product of the creation of an essentially good universe. Since the finite cannot be perfect, God is obliged in creating a finite world to render it imperfect. This is the best of all possible worlds, in the sense that it is as perfect as God can make it. (The unsophisticated objection that if God is all powerful there is nothing he cannot do is specious: God cannot do or be that which is self-contradictory; he cannot and will not break his own rules.) In this argument the cosmic harmony overwhelms the discords of evil. The corollary is that the world could be much worse than it is; it could, as one writer put it, be Lovecraftian. The question is not why is there evil, but rather, why is there good? The existence of any goodness at all implies a benevolent Providence. (3) A variant of (2) is the argument that evil has no ontological existence. Evil is nonbeing. It is mere privation, privation in the universe being necessary for the plurality of forms. The world is perfect insofar as it has being, but it is necessarily laced with pockets of nonbeing, as the Swiss cheese is laced with holes. Again, this is the best universe that God could make, for there was no way he could create a differentiated cosmos without these pockets of nonbeing. The good outweighs the evil. To both these arguments an atheist can grant the premise that some evil may be necessary but then go on to ask why there needs to be as much as there is. Suppose God could not make a cosmos without a certain amount of evil in it; still, the amount and intensity of evil seem to exceed that which can be reconciled with a perfectly good and omnipotent creator. Suppose, for example, that change, dissolution, and death are necessary. Need they entail so much pain? A possible response is that if the amount of evil of which we are capable were limited, the amount of good might be also. This response argues that goodness is greater to the degree that it rises above the evil.

(4) A recent theodicy has arisen from process theology: granted that the universe is imperfect, God is drawing it toward perfection. God could not have made a better world, for

God is himself in the process of development toward perfection. God does not want stasis, and change implies passage, transfer, and death. Whether this new theodicy will last remains to be seen; it stands so far outside the lines of tradition that it does not enter into this history of the Devil.

(5) Another recent argument, one with deep roots extending as far back as medieval nominalism and even the Greek Skeptics, argues that the question of theodicy is semantically meaningless and that it is therefore a pseudoquestion. This position, however, also excludes as meaningless any discussion of God, the Devil, or evil itself. Such flights of intellect, however exciting to philosophers, will satisfy neither the historian nor anyone who is aware of the suffering he encounters in life. This response is an evasion. (6) Equally an evasion, and a simple-minded one at that, is the old parry of Christian theologians backed into a corner: the existence of evil is a mystery, shrouded forever from human understanding. In one sense, of course, everything is a mystery, for we can know nothing with certainty. But if life is to be meaningful at all, we must investigate everything to the best of our ability to do so. The only thing that ennobled this evasion was the idea that God himself on the cross participated with us in a suffering whose ultimate meaning we do not know.

To an extent, all the preceding answers, or pseudoanswers, are evasions, because none of them faces the existential reality of a universe in which a soldier shoots the head off a baby or a little girl is disfigured for life by napalm dropped on her from an anonymous airplane. Once the suffering of that little girl is immediately felt and intellectually grasped as real, once her suffering becomes our suffering, once we really face up to the monstrosity of this world in which we exist, we are bound to dismiss these answers as intellectual games.

The answers that follow face suffering squarely. (7) Suffering is terrible, but it is necessary to test us, to instruct us, to permit us to mature. Without suffering we would be spoiled children, selfish, insensitive, and irresponsible. Through suffering, through our "fortunate fall" from grace, we acquire wisdom

and maturity. Very well, but what price wisdom and maturity? Dostoevsky asked whether it might be better for the whole world not to exist than for that one innocent child to suffer. Or, again, if some evil, some suffering, is necessary, why so much? Can there be any sufficient moral reason for the abundance of evil, the intensity of suffering? (8) Suffering exists to punish us for our sins. It is possible that our sins do in fact merit such punishment, though the argument has always been difficult to apply to infants. But in any event the inevitable question is why God permitted sin to enter the world to begin with. (9) Evil is the result of sin, and sin proceeds from free will. The postulate is that God creates the world in order that a moral goodness other than his own should exist. Two things are requisite for an act of moral goodness: the existence of a real choice between good and evil, and real freedom to choose between them. It is true that God might have created a world in which no person was allowed to wish to hurt another person; but in that event we would be robots programmed to do no wrong, our actions would have no moral value, and goodness would not have been increased. Or God might have created a world in which an external force always frustrated our intentions to hurt; but in that event, no real alternative would be presented to us. We would have no perception of the effects of an evil act since none would ever have occurred. The point is that God cannot create a world in which human beings are truly free to choose evil and at the same time prevent evil from happening. The evil that exists in the world is not God's fault but ours. The objections to this argument are two. (a) Again, why is the degree of suffering so great? Would it not be sufficient to God's purpose to allow us to slap or kick one another without using knife and napalm? (b) It leaves untouched the question of natural evil, of tornadoes, of cancer. (Natural phenomena such as storms on Venus or rocks exfoliating in a remote mountain valley are processes of change and dissolution that cannot be considered in any sense evil. Natural evil is the pain inflicted upon sentient beings by natural processes.) The traditional argument that natural evil entered the world consequent upon

the fall of Adam and Eve enjoys some tenuous scriptural underpinnings but carries little weight. However the story of the fall is interpreted, the notion that the activity of storms and bacteria, not to mention stellar disturbances, results from any deeds of human beings on this planet is completely at variance with current understanding of the enormous size, age, and complexity of the cosmos; it is a quaint, metaphorical relic of an anthropocentric age. In only one way does the argument still have validity: as a result of our vast numbers, our advanced technology, and our contempt for the earth, we can and do inflict great destruction upon other living things.

The last argument, in one form or another, is common in Christian tradition. Evil entered the world through freedom of the will. Evil results each time that individual human beings freely elect evil over good. It also comes about through the free will of intelligent beings other than humans; in traditional Christian terms this meant the angels. Evil is the fault partly of fallen man and partly of fallen angels. To the extent that the fallen angels, and their chief, the Devil, are responsible for evil, the Devil plays an important, but not necessarily essential, role in Christian theodicy. Man might have fallen without any help from the Devil at all.

This view ignores a central thesis of the New Testament, which is that the powers of darkness under the generalship of the Devil are at war with the power of light. In other words it ignores the dualist element in Christianity. Ever since the suppression of the Albigensians, indeed since the rejection of the Gnostics, Christians have been at pains to deny, or at least to minimize, the dualist element. There is but one God, the argument goes, and therefore but one principle. The argument fails. It fails because Christianity has the virtue of taking the problem of evil seriously. The hidden harmony theme is decidedly minor in Christian tradition. The conflict between good and evil stands at the center of New Testament Christianity. The argument also fails because traditional monotheist theodicy has proved gravely unsatisfactory: how indeed can there be one, all-powerful, perfectly good creator who allows the abundance of

evil and the intensity of suffering that we perceive in the world? Finally, it fails because it leaves the conception of the God incomplete. The God has been divided in two: the good Lord and the evil Devil. If the Devil is dismissed, the deity is left unbalanced, and the concept of the good Lord loses identity through the abolition of its antithesis. *Sine diabolo nullus Dominus*.

Other Christian theodicies have existed and will exist, but no theodicy that does not take the Devil fully into consideration is likely to be persuasive. In spite of the efforts of generations of theologians to reduce or abolish the role of Satan, the concept of the Devil has persisted. Christianity is in fact a semidualist religion. On the one hand it rejects the full dualism that asserts the opposition of two eternal cosmic principles. But it has also generally rejected the monist complacency of the hidden harmony. The tension between monism and dualism has led to inconsistencies in Christian theodicy. But the tension is also creative. Creativity arises whenever meaning strains against the bounds of form, when novelty strains against the strictures of tradition. Water is drinkable only when held in a container. Precisely in its willingness to confront the problem of evil without recourse to the simpler solutions of either dualism or monism, Christianity advanced the motion of the concept of the Devil creatively.

The New Testament inherited several concepts of the Devil. The Devil is a fallen angel. The Devil is the head of a demonic host. The Devil is the principle of evil. Evil is nonbeing. These and other elements had to be absorbed, refined, and, to the extent possible, rendered consistent. "Who say you that I am?" Jesus asked his disciples. The Devil might have asked the same question. Who, according to the New Testament, is the Devil?

The names given the Devil in the New Testament reflect the double background of Hellenism and Apocalyptic Judaism. Most often he is "Satan," or "the Devil" (*diabolos* being a translation of the Hebrew *satan*); he is also "Beelzeboul," "the enemy," "Belial," "the tempter," "the accuser," "the evil one,"

"the ruler of this world," and "the prince of demons."⁶ The Devil's connection with the demons is paralleled by his association with the fallen angels (Revelation 12:4; 12:7ff.; and Ephesians 2:1-2), which makes it clear that he is to be regarded as a spiritual being. These conceptions have their roots in both Apocalyptic and Rabbinical Judaism. Although the fallen angels are likened to fallen stars in Revelation 12:4, the name Lucifer, light-bearer, already attached to the head of the fallen angels in Apocalyptic literature, is not used in the New Testament, where the "bearer of light" is the Christ.

The function of the Devil in the New Testament is as counterprinciple to Christ. The central message of the New Testament is salvation: Christ saves us. What he saves us from is the power of the Devil. If the power of the Devil is dismissed, the Christ's saving mission becomes meaningless.⁷ The Devil occupies a central position in the New Testament as the chief

6. One Greek rendition of the Hebrew *satan*, e.g., *Satanas*, appears 33 times in the New Testament, e.g., 2 Cor. 12:7 and Matt. 12:26. *Ho diabolos* also appears 33 times, cf. Matt. 4:3 and 13:39. *Ho echthros*, "the enemy," also appears; cf. Matt. 13:25, 39; Luke 10:19. All three of the above titles appear in Jewish Apocalyptic. *Beelzeboul*, which does not appear in Jewish Apocalyptic and only once (under the less correct form *Beelzebub*) in the Old Testament (2 Kings 1), appears 6 times, e.g., Matt. 10:25, Luke 11:15. It derives from the Canaanite "Baal the prince," but its popularity in the New Testament, given the lack of contemporary Jewish references, has not been explained. *Belial*, 2 Cor. 6:15, is the Apocalyptic Belial or Beliar. *Ho tou kos-mou archōn*, "prince of this world," or similar phrases appear especially in John: cf. John 12:31; 14:30; this term reflects the great struggle between the two kingdoms. *Ho peirazon*, "the tempter," appears in Matt. 4:3 and 1 Thess. 3:5. For *Ho katēgoros*, "the accuser," cf. Rev. 12:10. *Ho ponēros*, "the evil one," cf. Matt. 13:19; 1 John 5:18, may also be intended in the Lord's Prayer (Matt. 6:13), where the Greek can be read "Deliver us from evil," or "Deliver us from the Evil One." In the New Testament both *ho ponēros* and the neuter *to ponēron* frequently appear in cases that make the distinction impossible. *Archōn tōn daimoniōn*, "prince of the demons," cf. Matt. 9:34, and the similar phrase, *Archōn tēs exousias tou aeris* (Eph. 2:2), "prince of the power of the air," bring him into close connection with the demons. Mark and Paul incline to the use of the proper name of Satan; the other New Testament writers often prefer "the Devil" or the circumlocutions.

7. Good discussions of this point are in Bendt Noack, *Satanás und Sotería* (Copenhagen, 1948) and Trevor Ling, *The Significance of Satan* (London, 1961).



Christ exorcising a demon, Coptic, sixth century. Christ's powers of exorcism were a sign of his power to replace the Kingdom of this World, which is the Kingdom of Satan, with the Kingdom of the Lord. Courtesy Trustees of the Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore, Maryland.

enemy of the Lord. For the New Testament writers, this opposition was both fierce and profound, and they never consciously perceived the underlying connection between the Lord and the Devil. For the problem of theodicy remained. If the Devil is not an absolute principle of evil—as he was not in the New Testament—then how and why does the God permit, condone, or ordain his destructive activities? To put it now, not in New Testament terms, but in the tradition of the concept:

the God has been divided into two parts, the good Lord and the evil Devil. Christ, the Son of God, is associated and identified with the good Lord. The opposition between Yahweh and Satan becomes the opposition between Christ and Satan. (But early Christian tradition frequently held to the doctrine of subordinationism, affirming that the Son was not coequal in power with the Father. A hint of this subordinationism is found in the New Testament teachings on the Devil. Then the counterpart of Christ is not Satan himself, but an inferior figure, such as Antichrist or even Judas, a servant of the Devil rather than the Devil himself.)

The essential scenario of the struggle appears something like this: The good Lord creates a good world, which is injured by the Devil and the demons, who bring disease and other ills. The world is also injured by the free choice of humanity, as represented by Adam and Eve, to do evil instead of good. The Devil may or may not have tempted Adam and Eve to their original sin; he has certainly been active in the world since. Through the activity of Satan, aided by the demons and by those human beings who fall into sin, the world has fallen under the domination of the Devil. The natural and moral evils of the world are the fault, not of the good Lord, but of these creatures. The conflict between this world, dominated by the Devil, and the Kingdom of God, now brought to earth by Christ, is an important emphasis of the New Testament.

To what extent in this scenario is the Devil the principle of evil? The origin of Satan is not discussed in the New Testament. A few texts seem to equate him with the head of the fallen angels, one of the good Lord's creatures whose sin, like that of Adam, arose from the misuse of his own free will. On the other hand, the cosmic struggle between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Satan, deriving directly from Jewish Apocalyptic and indirectly from Mazdaism, makes the Devil almost a principle of cosmic evil independent of the good Lord. Almost, because Apocalyptic Judaism and Christianity both stopped short of dualism by insisting upon the oneness of God.

The position of the Devil therefore remains anomalous in the New Testament.⁸

Nowhere is its anomalous condition more clearly seen than in the doctrine of the fall of humanity. The doctrine of original sin is not found in the Old Testament, and it rarely appears in Rabbinical literature. Apocalyptic literature gives hints of it, but even in the New Testament its development is very rudimentary. Nowhere do the gospels mention original sin. Oblique references may be found in 1 Corinthians 15:20-22 and 44-50, Galatians 5:4, Ephesians 2:3, and 2 Corinthians 11. The only direct (but still very unclear) discussion of original sin is in Romans 5:12-21, where St. Paul explains that sin and death entered the world through the sin of Adam. The Devil's role is not mentioned at all. Other passages (for example, Romans 16:20) suggest that the serpent of the Genesis story was Satan, an identification that had already been made in Apocalyptic literature. The corollary that Satan tempted Adam to sin is implicit. Satan's sin would then precede Adam's. But what the New Testament meant on this point is far from certain, and the consensus of early Christian tradition was that Satan fell after Adam. In any event, neither the New Testament nor later Christian tradition held that the Devil forced Adam's will. If Adam had not been free, he would not have been able to sin. It follows that he could have sinned without the Devil's intervention. Once again, the position of the Devil as the fount and origin of evil is restricted.

But though the fall of man is peripheral in the New Testament, the war between the worlds is central, and in that context the Devil functions most clearly as principle of evil. Two Greek words have been translated as "world" in English versions of the Bible. One is *aion*, used most frequently by Paul; the other is *kosmos*, employed most frequently in the Johannine writings. They have similar, if not identical, meanings, for they are sometimes interchanged, and the Devil is called both lord of

8. The elements of cosmic dualism in the synoptic gospels are much stronger in Luke than in Mark and Matthew, and stronger in John than in any of the synoptics.



The harrowing of hell, manuscript illumination, Germany, tenth century. During the three days between Good Friday and his resurrection, Christ descended into hell and liberated the souls of the just. Here the mouth of hell gapes open at the right, while Christ spears the vanquished Devil. Courtesy the Pierpont Morgan Library.

the *aiōn*, or "eon," and lord of the *kosmos*.⁹ The kingdom of the Devil, perceived as the world, is contrasted to the kingdom of the Lord, which is not of this world.¹⁰ The meaning of the "Kingdom of God" has exercised Christian thinkers for two millennia, and no interpretation is without difficulty. The basic thrust of the idea, insofar as it relates to Satan, seems to be as follows. From the beginning the Devil has been increasing his power over this world, until now, at this latter day, his sway is almost complete. But the good Lord sends Christ to break the power of the old eon and to replace it with the new, the kingdom of God. Although the meaning of the latter is difficult to understand, what is meant by the old eon or "this world" is easier to grasp. The terms *kosmos* and *aiōn* are used in a number of different ways. *Kosmos* can mean the natural world; it can mean the world of men; and it can mean those people who are sinners and who because of their sin are cut off from the body of Christ and have become limbs of the Devil. *aiōn* can mean the time allotted to the material world; the material world itself; or the present, sin-ridden time as opposed to the time of the God to come. The Devil is lord of the natural world in his power to cause death, disease, and natural disasters: the world has been disfigured from the outset by the action of sin. The Devil is lord of the world of men, because he roams it freely tempting those whom he pleases. And, most importantly, the Devil is lord of sinners. It is in the sense of sinful human society that the terms *kosmos* and *aiōn* are most often used, for the New Testament emphasizes the problem of moral evil more than that of natural evil. It affirms that the world was created by the good Lord for good purposes. Yet this basic teaching is obscured by what it says about the power of Satan. The good

9. 1 Cor. 1:20; 2:6-7; 3:18; Rom. 12:2; Gal. 1:4; 1 John 4:3-4; Eph. 2:2; 6:2; 2 Cor. 4:4; John 12:31; 14:30; 15:18-19; 16:11; 17:15-16. On *kosmos*, see Herman Sasse, "κόσμος," *Theologisches Wörterbuch*, 3 (1938), 867-896; on *aiōn*, see Sasse, "αἰών" *ThW* 1 (1933), 197-209. See also the translations in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1964-1973).

10. The Greek is *basileia*, which translates directly and without difficulty into "kingdom." Cf. Mark 3:24; Matt. 12:26-28; Luke 11:20.

Lord's power over the world has waned for a while; or, to put it another way, the Lord has allowed Satan temporary power over the world. Now, "The whole world lies in the Evil One."¹¹ The original Greek can mean a number of things: "the whole world" may be taken as "all mankind," and "in the Evil One" may be simply "in evil." But these refinements would be lost on the Gnostics, who insisted that the material world was irredeemably evil and had been created by an evil deity.

The association of the kingdom of Satan with the material universe led, along lines suggested by Greek Orphic tradition, to a dichotomy between spirit and body. The body, like the rest of the material universe, is the good creation of a good Lord—this is made manifest in John 1. It is the dwelling place of the spirit, and it is taken on by the Lord himself in the person of Jesus. At the end of the world the body will be resurrected. All this the New Testament affirms, yet it also affirms an opposition between body and spirit. There are two Greek words that can be rendered "body": *sarx* and *sōma*. *Sōma* is a neutral word in the New Testament, in spite of its long tradition in Orphic thought as the prison of the spirit (*sōma sēma*). *Sarx* is a complicated term sometimes used to denote the material body, flesh itself, and sometimes the whole evil eon, the corrupt world. It has some positive uses—in Jesus the Word took on *sarx*—but usually it is pejorative. The flesh, *sarx*, stands in opposition to the work of the spirit. Saint Paul says that the desire of the flesh (*sarkos*) is in enmity (*ekthra*) with God.¹² The "flesh" in the New Testament seems to be the equivalent of the

11. 1 John 5:19: *ho kosmos holos en tō ponērō keitai*.

12. Rom. 8:7. Cf. Rom. 8:5-6; John 3:6; 6:63. For the neutrality of *sōma*, see Rom. 8:10. On *sarx*, see Eduard Schwazer, "σάρξ," *ThW* 7 (1960), 98-151. The body is not pejorative in 2 Cor. 12:7 or 1 Cor. 15:39, and 1 Cor. 7:28 makes the point that the human being is composed of both *sarx* and *pneuma*. *Sarx* can mean the whole world of men (Rom. 1:3f.). But it more frequently is negative. It can mean temptation (Gal. 6:12f.); it can be equated with the Old Law (Phil. 3:3f.), and it can be associated specifically with sin: Phil. 3:3; Rom. 8:13f.; Gal. 4:23; 5:18-19. *Sarx* is opposed to the gospel, and the crucifixion of *sarx* yields life (Rom. 7:5; 8:8ff.; Gal. 5:24). In Eph. 2:2-3 the body is clearly equated with the old eon that opposes the Kingdom of God. See also John 8:15; 6:63.