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Title of extract: **The Machismo of the Athenian Empire or the Reign of the Phaulus?**

Name of Author: **Cartledge, P.**

Title/Author of book/edition (if applicable): **When Men Were Men: Masculinity, power and Identity in Classical Antiquity. Foxhall, L. and Salmon, J.B. (editors)**

Name of Visual Creator or other acknowledgement (if applicable):

Journal details –title/Vol/Year (if applicable):

Publisher: **Routledge**

Pages scanned: **54 - 67**

Course of Study (Module name and number): **Armies and Navies CLAH6003**

Name of Designated Person

authorising scanning: *E.L. Harris*

Date authorised: 21.03.17.

Moodle/Powerpoint

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The *machismo* of the Athenian empire – or the reign of the *phaulus*?

Paul Cartledge

Colonialism and imperialism

It was only a matter of time, perhaps, before specialists in ancient Greek history caught up with the palpable trend towards the study of masculinity and manhood within the burgeoning overall field of gender and sexuality studies.¹ Yet, in another sense, manhood or masculinity has always been there, right at the centre of Greek history and historiography, inasmuch as war was an inescapable and indeed desired focus of Greek civic life. For war, according to the universal Greek normative preconception, was by definition exclusively the business of men. So close was the ideological fit between the two, indeed, that war was seen as a field for the display precisely of *andreia*, that is, virility or manliness in general, and specifically the peculiarly masculine cardinal virtue of martial courage and pugnacity.² However, as the editors of a recent collection of historical studies of 'masculinities in Britain since 1800' have well expressed it, although '“Manful assertions” – whether of verbal command, political power or physical violence – have often been the traditional stuff of history, ... this truth is more often accepted than analysed' (Roper and Tosh 1991, 1).

One area in which such analysis is actually being widely applied is that of colonialism and imperialism, sometimes labelled subaltern studies. Few topics engender such vigorous debate within current literary and cultural-historical studies, and there is now nothing startlingly unusual in the mere fact of applying here a gender/sexuality approach.³ It is taking much longer for students of the ancient world to go and do likewise, although a most promising start has been made, precisely in the area of war and gender that concerns me, by Carol Dougherty's investigation of what she calls the 'colonial discourse', conducted with special reference to the tropes of rape and possession both of foreign women and of foreign land by Greek founders

and settlers during the archaic period (1993; cf. Cartledge 1995b). Contrast, however, Dougherty's pioneering work with the standard historiography of war and imperialism in the Greek world during the classical period and later. That it should be written from a gender/sexuality standpoint or even with a gender/sexuality dimension is still not exactly an *idée reçue*.⁴ The standard histories of the fifth-century BC Athenian empire, for example, seem mostly to forget or ignore the fact that imperialism is a culture and an ideology as well as a political, economic and military practice – that is, not only does imperialism affect culture but there is a culture of imperialism.⁵ Or, if they are aware at least of that, as was Moses Finley, for example, they nevertheless do not – unlike the ancient Athenians – place gender at the centre of their representations and reconstructions.

There are, however, exceptions – there are always exceptions. One is Nicole Loraux's brilliant account of Athenian attitudes to citizenship and the division of the sexes, in which she studies the representations of the imperially marked Acropolis in both the performing and the visual arts (1984/1993; cf. Cartledge 1996a). Another, yet closer to my present theme, is the work of Edith Hall, which directly applies a cultural studies-inspired concern with tropes of self-defining literary discourse to the negative representation of the oriental barbarian Other as effeminate or 'unmanned' in polar opposition to the Greeks' definition of themselves as manly and warlike in fifth-century BC Attic tragedy (Hall 1989, 1993a). Closest of all, though, is the avowedly popular work of Eva Keuls, whose *Reign of the Phallus* (originally 1985) would seem to be the only vaguely systematic treatment available. Yet for various reasons – not all of them to do with invincible masculine prejudice against, and/or reluctance to accept, some of her more exotic feminist theories – this remarkable study appears to have had little or no impact on general historiography.⁶ Still in 1989 Keuls could protest, not without justice, against the failure to acknowledge duly that 'classical Athens was a militarily aggressive, expansionist state, which treated its slaves more harshly than many other societies, enslaved its women and tyrannized its “allies”'.⁷

Too little has changed since then. Hence, in part, this present attempt to apply a gender/sexuality approach to Athenian imperialism of the fifth century BC, with respect to two questions in particular that as far as I am aware have never before been seriously raised, let alone adequately investigated. These are, first, the implications of imperialist *machismo* – insofar as Keuls was correct to claim that Athens' imperialism was distinctively phallogocratic, what would or might that have implied for relations between, not Greeks and barbarians (Edith Hall's problematic), but Greeks and Greeks, that is, the Athenians and their allies (or 'allies', as Keuls prefers)? Second, if it is uncontroversial that among the Athenian citizenry it was the 'naval mob' (*nautikos okhlos*: Thucydides 8. 72. 2; Aristotle, *Politics* 4. 1291 b 4, 5. 1304 a 22) who were chiefly responsible for acquiring, extending and

maintaining the Athenians' naval empire, how does that military prepotence square with the Athenians' moral-political ideal, or dominant military ideology, of civic masculinity – namely, that of hoplite (heavy-armed infantry) *andreia*?

Freedom and control

The metaphor of Greek colonialism as sexual domination in the form of penetration and rape has recently been thoroughly explored by Carol Dougherty, as noted above, with special reference to the commissioned odes composed by the lyric poet Pindar to celebrate victors in the four major Panhellenic – and all-male – athletics festivals. To her chosen body of textual evidence one might want to add those divine rapes of Greek myth that can be read as allegories of human conquest of foreign peoples and territories.⁸ At a more mundane level, the trope of 'spear-won' (*doriktētos*) land carried an obvious gendered overdetermination, as erect male spear penetrated yielding female earth: Alexander the Great was therefore doing nothing out of the way in making that symbolism literally explicit as he began his supposedly Panhellenic invasion of effeminate Asia in 334 with a penetrative spearcast.⁹ But may these images and insights legitimately be applied to the fifth-century BC Athenian empire? If 'to behave as a free man' necessarily involved being 'dominant and active', so that 'there was nothing shameful about conquering' (Svenbro 1988/1993, 189), was it the freedom or the masculinity that counted for more in the Athenians' and Greeks' scale of honour and shame, or did both count equally?

An earlier investigation of Greek self-identification through historiography led me to the firm conclusion that freedom was the archetypal and architectonic Greek value, the one in terms of which all others were judged and from which they were ultimately derived (Cartledge 1997, cf. 1993a). But gender or normative gendering ran freedom a close second. The combination of the two was therefore especially potent, and nowhere was it more virulently expressed than in the martial imagery of conquest by Greeks of oriental barbarian males. Since the latter were deemed to be effeminate by nature, as well as custom, it was only right and proper that they should be treated symbolically if not physically like women (of whom as a 'race' the Greek male stereotype was less than wholly flattering).¹⁰ Perhaps the *locus classicus* of the visual representation of this trope is an Athenian red-figure *oenochoe* (wine-jug) of the mid-fifth century BC, all the more telling for not being an especially glamorous or out-of-the-way object.¹¹ On one side (Fig. 2.1 (left)), a nearly naked man, a young adult Greek soldier, rushes forward holding his penis erect (or semi-erect – observers disagree) in his right – that is, the positively gendered and militarily active – hand. On the other side (Fig. 2.1 (right)), a soldier in unmistakably Persian clothes and gear submissively offers his buttocks to the approaching aggressor while raising his

hands in a feminine gesture of distress and, looking face-on to the viewer, says or rather wails (as if in a cartoon bubble) 'I am Eurymedon, I stand bent over'.¹²

The scene is unparalleled; that is, there are no other visual representations precisely like this known to be extant. Its exact significance, too, is open, as visual representations generically are, to more than one interpretation.¹³ However, the underlying ideological schema seems clear enough: the polar opposition of masculine Greek and effeminate Persian, variations on which are known to have been played in all the central and public arenas where discursive representations of Athenian identity were negotiated. And the date of the scene, besides, is utterly appropriate.

For round about the time that our *oenochoe* was painted, the Athenians made some sort of peace with Persia on behalf of their alliance, and direct hostilities between the two sides ceased for a generation. That peace or cessation of hostilities the Athenians energetically represented both visually and verbally as a tremendous victory, and the buildings on the Acropolis of Athens that we today may tend to take for granted as generically Athenian are in fact the very local and specific outcome of a sustained programme of imperial building determined upon by the Athenian Assembly under the inspiration chiefly of Pericles. They were, moreover, financed very directly from the imperial 'peace dividend' – that is, from the surplus of monies paid over in tribute since the 470s BC by Athens' allies into a central war-chest housed, since its transfer from the island of Delos in 454 BC, on the Acropolis.¹⁴ Good contemporary written evidence is lacking, as usual, but there is enough to suggest, what we might in any case have guessed, that the building programme was controversial, not so much among the voting members of the Athenian Assembly as among the allies. Hence came, in response, the construction (in more than one sense) of the Parthenon as a sort of Imperial War *Mouseion*, or shrine of the Muses: a cultural artefact, that is, designed both to illustrate and to propagate the Athenians' inclusive view of the peace as a Panhellenic victory of Greek civilization over oriental despotism. This explains, for instance, the prominent representation of defeated Amazons, a mythic foe who were not just oriental barbarians, but mannish female oriental barbarians, and, therefore, an even more formidable foe than standard-issue effeminate Persian males.¹⁵

The problem – our problem – is that the Athenians did not lord it only over the Persians and other barbarians. Suppose we now turn from Greek, or Athenian, relations with barbarians to relations between the Athenians and the other Greek members of their anti-Persian military alliance. From about 450 BC the Athenians began to speak of 'the cities which the Athenians control', meaning the Greek cities of their supposedly free allies, and to do so officially and publicly, where the allies could overhear them (Hornblower and Greenstock 1984, nos. 147–9). It must be added at once that *kratein*, the Greek verb used in this phrase for 'control', did not



Figure 2.1 Two views of the Eurymedon Oinochoe, Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe, Hamburg, inv. no. 1981.173
Source: Photo: Museum (Maria Thrun)

automatically carry despotic or tyrannical connotations – the cognate noun *kratos* was indeed the term for the power whereby the Athenians ruled or rather administered themselves democratically.¹⁶ But whereas civic, democratic self-rule at home definitionally involved both ruling *and* being ruled turn and turn about, the Athenians' control over the subject-cities was a one-way, non-reciprocal and certainly less than wholly democratic process. It was all too easy therefore for dissident allies to represent the Athenians' non-responsible rule over them as equivalent to despotism, using language that conjured up the bogey of slavery, in outright contradiction of the very ideological foundation stone of Greek identity and self-consciousness. One rather telling indication of the extent and impact of this dissident allied response is the care with which Herodotus prefaced his considered judgment that the Athenians had been the real 'saviours' of the Greeks during the Persian Wars with the admission that he knew it would be 'invidious' or 'hateful to many' (7. 139. 1, 5); another pointer in the same direction is Thucydides' admittedly rather sweeping assertion that popular opinion inclined to support Sparta against Athens at the outbreak of war in 431 BC, on the grounds that the Spartans had declared themselves to be fighting for the liberation of Greeks from the Athenians' tyrannous suzerainty (2. 8).¹⁷

It was possible, in other words, for Athenian allies to represent their political status in foreign affairs as equivalent to that of the servile subjects of an oriental despotism, and that, as we have seen, would have raised issues of symbolic gendering – passivity, penetrability – aggravated in those cases where revolted allies had been punished by the confiscation or some other perceived violation of their territory (Hornblower and Greenstock 1984, p. 145 d). Indeed, as we learn indirectly from the document that served as a 'charter' for the renewed Athenian naval alliance of the fourth century BC, it was Athenian occupation of or restraint upon allied land that had been one of the allies' main complaints against the Athenians' fifth-century BC imperialism (Hornblower and Greenstock 1984, no. 60, lines 35–48). The Athenians' response was to attempt to put clear blue water between their allies and all other Greeks with whom they dealt and *a fortiori* all non-Greeks, by upgrading the allies to the honorific status of colonists, with all the implications of genetic kinship and religious communion that this relationship traditionally bore. Henceforth, representatives of the allied cities would parade alongside Athenian citizens and other residents of Athens in the two major civic religious festivals, the annual Great Dionysia and the quadrennial Great Panathenaia. At the former, moreover, the allies' symbolic masculinity would be explicitly affirmed and reinforced through the ceremonial *phallophoria*, the carrying of model phalluses, signifying their incorporation as associate members of the Athenian phallocratic hegemony.¹⁸

However, the structural strains and tensions of an inherently unequal relationship could not be entirely eased even by this most vigorous ideolog-

ical massaging. In the first place, allied egos are unlikely to have been flattered by the fact that such participation was compulsory. Besides, allied representatives at the Dionysia had to carry, in addition to the phalluses, tokens of the money they paid over to the alliance as tribute, which had come to be viewed at least by the payers as a hated badge of their servitude. For the Great Panathenaia, moreover, there were further required contributions payable only by the allies, and not by the Athenians: a suit of hoplite armour to symbolize their military role and a heifer to sacrifice to the virgin Athena, Athenian patron goddess of the alliance in succession to Apollo of Delos.

The asymmetry between rulers and ruled was further reinforced at the Games that followed the sacrifice, and here again a gender element was centrally involved. Most of the Panathenaic events were open to all-comers – indeed, the Athenians had a stake in making the Games as comparable in their universality and prestige to the Olympic and the other three major Panhellenic games as they possibly could. But there were also in the programme Athenians-only events, organized on a tribal basis, and among these was the *euandria*, a contest of manly beauty or strength.¹⁹ Was the risk of Athenian defeat by an allied team in such an ideologically sensitive contest simply too uncomfortable to contemplate, one wonders? Or was it rather that here was another arena reserved exclusively for Athenian manhood to demonstrate its superior masculine prowess, corroborating symbolically the real *kratos* the city of Athens wielded even over its supposed 'colonists'?

Violence and power

According to an 'anthropological view' proposed by the late Ernest Gellner, violence, including martial violence, was 'the central organizing principle of society' in ancient Greece, since it was politicized violence (1991, 62). Political power, that is to say, rested on the organization of violence. Sociologically speaking, moreover, classical Athens had in the terminology of Stanislaw Andreski a high MPR or 'Military Participation Ratio': in wartime, that is, practically every available free adult male, citizen or non-citizen, bore arms – or at any rate fought in some capacity (Andreski 1968, especially 43–8). Politically, therefore, it mattered very much where the specific gravity of Athens' principal military fighting force was centred. The contemporary commentator nicknamed 'the Old Oligarch' (he was, certainly, an ideological oligarch) was characteristically frank about it: 'it is the common people (*dēmos*) who man the ships and confer power on the city – helmsmen, signalmen, captains, look-out men, and shipwrights – these are the ones who confer power on the city much more than the hoplites, the well-born (*gennaioi*) and the better class (*khrēstoi*)'.²⁰ He therefore conceded, far more controversially, that the Athenian *dēmos* deserved its political

kratos (power, sovereignty). This *de facto* congruence between military function and political clout was reaffirmed more soberly and sociologically, for the Greek city in general, by Aristotle.²¹ Nevertheless, despite the rise of the 'naval mob' to military prepotence, Athens' dominant military ideology remained a hoplite ideology. This was most obviously so among the *gennaioi* and the *khrēstoi*, the self-styled 'beautiful and good' (*kaloikagathoi*), who were to justify their anti-democratic counter-revolution of 411 BC in part on the grounds that it was they, and not the masses, who served the city best 'with both their personal resources and their bodies'.²² But it was by no means a uniquely élite ideology. Indeed, it seems that not only the hoplites themselves but some, perhaps many of the sub-hoplite thetes may have internalized it for much or most of the time.²³ At any rate, the dominance of hoplite ideology in democratic Athens is fully confirmed by examples drawn not only from anti-democratic rhetoric and political theory but also from the two main publicly approved democratic discourses of drama and oratory, as well as by visual representations both official and unofficial. In the verbal examples at least, the essential gender component of the ideology is transparently clear.

If Athenian drama was importantly the city of Athens talking to itself, then it talked to itself as an 'imagined community' not of sailors but of hoplites (Anderson 1991). Two dramatic passages will have to suffice. In tragedy, the gender dimension of the dominant male hoplite ideology is captured perfectly in the ironic transgression of it by Euripides' *Medea*, an oriental barbarian woman, who ventured to compare male claims to a monopoly of hoplite *andreia* with a woman's monopoly of the pangs of childbirth and scandalously found the former wanting: 'I'd rather take my stand behind a shield three times than bear one child'.²⁴ In comedy, the chorus of Aristophanes' *Wasps* (1060–3) invokes the well-worn Marathon theme and in characteristic comic mode makes crudely explicit the implicit gendering of the hoplite ideology: 'The prowess we showed in battle, and the superb manly prowess we showed just in precisely this [indicating their artificial comic phalluses] respect. That was of the past [the Marathon hoplite battle]'. A few lines later (1076–7) the chorus-leader picks up the refrain: 'We... are the only genuine aboriginal native Athenians, a most manly breed'.²⁵

In oratory, Nicole Loraux's study of the Athenian *Epitaphios* or Funeral Speech in both the fifth and the fourth centuries BC has demonstrated among much else how Athenians could consider someone to be less of an Athenian if he specialized in non-hoplite warfare (1981/1986, 34). A speech of Aischines, in self-defence against a charge of treason, nicely exemplifies the deployment of the *topos* of the *kinaidos* as the cultural anti-type of the normative hoplite: whereas the hoplite is the properly manly male, subduing his emotions and appetites for the sake of the group, the *kinaidos* is the womanly male, lacking above all sexual self-control.²⁶ In painted pottery for

use in symposia or as grave-goods, the hoplite is everywhere, not of course depicted in the interests of accurate military history-painting but rather in order to make a sociological point about Athenian military hierarchy: painters 'emphasize the individual role of the [hoplite] warrior in relation to other classes in the city rather than his collective activity on the field of battle' (Lissarrague 1989, 44).

So far as political theory is concerned, Plato offers particularly revealing testimony. On the one hand, being Plato, he does not shrink from questioning in the *Laches* and in the first three books of the *Laws* the standard, hoplite definition of courage, but more representative of Athenian thought generally is the passage of *Laws* (4. 706–7) in which Plato's surrogate, the Athenian Stranger, disparages the naval battles of Salamis and Artemision to the greater glory of the hoplite battles of Marathon and Plataea; this is but an unusually colourful variation on the standard upper-class denigration on moral grounds of the undeniable practical role of lower-class sailors.

Nor was the downgrading of nautical thetes confined to verbal or visual art. For example, although the navy became the city's principal fighting arm from the Persian Wars onwards, it is not certain that thetes were included in official casualty-lists.²⁷ When war-orphans brought up at state expense were paraded at the Great Dionysia on their coming of age, the military equipment with which they were endowed was that of the hoplite (just as it was a hoplite panoply that allies were required to contribute to the Great Panathenaia, above).²⁸ When in the fourth century BC Athens had forfeited naval hegemony and was forced to employ more varied and flexible military tactics and strategy, a regular 'national service' was introduced for eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds in the form of the predominantly hoplite, land-based *ephēbeia*, but it seems probable that thetes, at least half of the Athenian citizens, never became ephebes, even though 'the whole city was an agent of war'.²⁹ And so on and so forth. In short, being a man in classical Athens is being a hoplite man, the hoplite is the masculine norm (cf. in contrast, the Roman 'masculinization' of soldiers, Alston, this volume). Being a member of the class of sub-hoplite thetes whose military function was naval was to be little if at all less of an 'other' warrior in terms of the Athenian civic 'imaginary' than was being an archer or peltast.³⁰

But how does this hoplite ideology square with Athenian military-political practice? Or rather how did the nautical thetes respond to the mismatch between their *de facto* military-political prepotence and the hoplites' ideological hegemony? The many tactical innovations of the fifth and fourth centuries after Marathon and the multiple social, political and ideological tensions flowing therefrom are well brought out in Pierre Vidal-Naquet's nuanced diachronic analysis of the Athenian hoplite 'tradition'.³¹ To that analysis I would only add two glosses and one other item of evidence. The first gloss concerns the composition of an Athenian trireme crew. One trireme alone was always crewed exclusively by Athenian citizens,

namely the sacred state trireme detailed for official, and sometimes secret, business.³² The crews of the remainder always contained a strong or dominant citizen component, but rarely if ever would the citizen rowers not be accompanied by hired foreigners and, even more controversially, slaves. In one sense, the trireme was a sort of microcosm of democratic solidarity, a 'cradle of liberty'; but from another point of view it was vulnerable to the literal taint of guilt by servile association.³³

My second gloss concerns the Athenians' opening Peloponnesian War strategy. Vidal-Naquet rightly emphasized the destabilizing effects of the growth of Athenian naval power: 'the fleet was simultaneously a model and an agent of imbalance, destroying the old [hoplite] organization'; if it raised the military status of thetes, and moreover turned some of them into state-equipped hoplite marines and others into hoplite-status colonists, at the same time it 'also paradoxically mobilized the upper class' as captains and financial sponsors of trireme warships (Vidal-Naquet 1981/1986, 93). What has not always been fully appreciated, however, is the challenge posed to the dominant masculine hoplite ideal by the strategy and tactics laid down by Pericles for the conduct of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides, who supported but probably somewhat misrepresented them, noted and regretted the Athenians' decision to sue for peace as early as 430 BC in order to prevent further devastating Spartan invasions of Attica.³⁴ But he failed to bring out the ideological stigma of womanish cowardice that the Periclean strategy of sitting tight behind the city walls as the enemy plundered their fields under their very noses must necessarily have inflicted on hoplites schooled in the masculine battlefield heroics of Homer's *Iliad*.

On the other hand, Thucydides does give a hint, in a doubtless fictitious pre-battle speech that he placed in the mouth of the brilliant Athenian admiral Phormion in 429 BC, of the sort of thetic riposte that might have been made in order to counteract dominant hoplite ideology: 'Stick to your posts in your ships (*eutaktoi* . . . *menontes*), keep good order (*kosmon*), be on the alert for any word of command . . . put your trust in discipline (*sigē*, literally 'silence')'.³⁵ Phormion, in short, is here made to appropriate traditional hoplite language counterculturally to an untraditional naval and thetic context.

It is with another such presumed thetic riposte that I conclude. On a *stamnos* (wine-jar) of about 440 BC (shown in Fig 2.2) one Archenautes ('Master Mariner') is depicted in the act of sacrificing.³⁶

His name is extremely rare, even in Athens. His father, possibly one of the Salamis sailors celebrated almost uniquely in Aeschylus' *Persians* of 472 BC, was apparently proud to proclaim thereby his own nautical station – unlike Aeschylus in his own person, who fought at Salamis but whose epitaph, perhaps written by himself, tellingly mentioned only the quintessentially hoplitic Marathon.³⁷ Archenautes' father was not, one hopes, alone in being so self-consciously proud of his class's *de facto* naval reign. But the contrary



Figure 2.2 The Archenautes Stamnos

Source: Photo: British Museum

evidence of Anthemion gives one pause, and there is no gainsaying the, to us paradoxical, fact that *nautai* were – in the Athenians' conventional, moral-political parlance – *phauloi*, 'worthless', the reverse of the Old Oligarch's *gennaioi* and *khrestoi*.³⁸

Acknowledgements

It was an honour for me to kick off the 1994–5 Nottingham–Leicester Ancient History Seminar in a double act with Nick Fisher, and a pleasure to find that we are still together in print. '*Phaulus*' in my title is a derogatory Greek adjective meaning 'low-class'; it was chosen partly to pick up and respond to the title of Keuls 1993 – *The Reign of the Phallus*. For their kind invitation, and subsequent editorial labours, best thanks are owed to my friends Lin Foxhall and John Salmon. This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Ernest Gellner.

Notes

- 1 Instances of the trend are Roper and Tosh 1991; Nye 1993; Williams 1993.
- 2 Cartledge 1997, index s.v. 'bravery'; Loraux 1989/1995: *passim*.
- 3 Examples include Hulme 1985; Kabbani 1986; Hyam 1990; Dawson 1991; Greenblatt 1991. On gender and war specifically, see Cooke and Woollacott 1993; Bourke 1995; Damousi and Lake 1995; Trexler 1995.
- 4 More or less standard modern accounts and discussions of war and (Athenian) empire in English include Meiggs 1979; Rhodes 1985; McGregor 1987; Rhodes 1992; Davies 1993, especially 64–86; Mattingly 1996. (The picture would not be altered if non-English-language scholarship were included in the reckoning.) On the relevant ancient historiography: see Finley 1985b, 67–87 (chapter entitled 'War and Empire'); Wickersham 1994.
- 5 Said 1993; cf. Said 1978/1995. An exception is Finley 1985c, 76–109 (chapter entitled 'Democracy, consensus and the national interest').
- 6 Shapiro 1986; Knox 1989, 110–15.
- 7 Keuls 1989, 226; one of her specific targets was McGregor 1987.
- 8 Dougherty 1993a, especially 61–80 (chapter entitled 'The Lay of the Land'), index s.v. 'rape'; Zeitlin 1986. See also Marshall, this volume.
- 9 Diodoros Sikulos 17. 17. 1; Justin, *Philippic Histories* 11. 5. 10. On earth as gendered symbol, see further duBois 1988.
- 10 Hall 1989, 1993a; cf. Georges 1994, index s.v. 'Barbarian stereotype'. On the Greek stereotype of woman, see Cartledge 1997, 63–89; and on the 'race' of women, Loraux 1984/1993, 72–110.
- 11 Schauenburg 1975; Dover 1978, 105; Francis 1990, 39 and fig. 12; Hall 1993a, 111; Keuls 1993, 293 and fig. 261; Kilmer 1993, 264, R1155; Svenbro 1988/1993, 194.
- 12 Translation by Dover 1978, 105. Symbolism of the right hand: Cartledge 1997: 14, 67.
- 13 For a sample illustration of this general interpretative problem, see the essays collected in Goldhill and Osborne 1994; and for visual images of gendering in particular, cf. those in Kampen 1996.
- 14 Bibliography on the Acropolis building-programme and its imagery is immense; for a range of recent perspectives, see Castriota 1992, especially 184–202 ('The [Parthenon] Frieze and the Ethics of Imperialism'); Harris 1996; Spivey 1996, 123–71.
- 15 Recent discussion of the Amazons' cultural significance is cited and deconstructed in Henderson 1994, especially 135.
- 16 Moreover, the first attested appearances of the formula are in honorific, not punitive, documents. For a nuanced discussion of democratic *kratos*, see Meier 1990, index s.v. 'Power'.
- 17 On the implications of the language of tyranny in Greek inter-state discourse, see Cartledge 1997, 150.
- 18 Dionysia: Hornblower and Greenstock 1984, no. 135, line 12; Keuls 1993, 78 and fig. 71. Great Panathenaia: Hornblower and Greenstock 1984, nos. 76, lines 56–7; 85, lines 41–3; ?106, heading (lost); 135, lines 11–12.
- 19 Panathenaic Games generally: Kyle 1992; Neils 1994. *Euandria*: Crowther 1985.
- 20 Ps.-Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians* 1.2, trans. Gagarin and Woodruff 1995, 134; cf. 1.6.
- 21 *Pol.* 4. 1289 b 36–9, 4. 1297 b 12–28, 6. 1321 a 5–25.
- 22 Thuc. 8. 65. 3. *Kaloikagathoi*: 8. 48. 6.
- 23 The pride with which Anthemion son of Diphilos publicly celebrated and commemorated his rise from the thetic class to that of the Hippeis (Cavalrymen)

- with a statue and an epigram seems to indicate a strong negative attitude to thetic status: ?Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 7. 4, with Rhodes 1981.
- 24 Euripides, *Medea* 250–1, trans. Gagarin and Woodruff 1995, 61. On 'bed' versus 'war' in the Greek imaginary see Loraux 1989/1995: 23–43.
- 25 Aristophanes' comedy is stuffed to the gunwales with nautical imagery, but as Henderson 1991, 165, has noted, references to the battle of Salamis 'often come in the context of . . . the woman on top' – the world turned upside down, that is, in normative Greek gender terms.
- 26 Aischines 2. 150–1; cf. Winkler 1990a, 50.
- 27 Raubitschek 1943, 48 n. 102; cf., on the symbolic significance of casualty-lists, Goldhill 1990, 110–12.
- 28 Goldhill 1990, 106–14.
- 29 Vidal-Naquet 1981/1986, 99. The fullest study of the *ephēbeia* known to me is an unpublished 1994 Oxford doctoral thesis by H. de Marcellus, who has persuaded me that no general and integrated system of military–moral education was introduced until the mid-330s BC but has failed to persuade me that all Athenians, including thetes, were obligatorily included therein; see rather Sallares 1990, 121. On the practice and sociopolitical significance of hoplite warfare in Greece generally, from the archaic to the late classical period, see Hanson 1989; Hanson 1995, 221–89, 327–56.
- 30 Lissarrague 1988. Civic 'imaginary': Loraux 1984/1993, 3–22. On the topic of civic inequalities at Athens, both ideological and institutional, see further Raaflaub 1996 and Cartledge 1996b.
- 31 Vidal-Naquet 1981/1986, 85–105; cf. Ridley 1979.
- 32 Thuc. 8. 73. 5, with Gabrielsen 1994, 109.
- 33 Trireme as 'cradle of liberty': see Strauss 1996. For a contrary emphasis on the servile element, see Graham 1992; Hunt 1998; cf. the generally negative picture drawn by Bourriot 1972, especially 22–30.
- 34 2. 59. 2, which he immediately counters with Pericles' 'last', self-justificatory speech (2. 60–4), the message of which the historian himself endorsed (2. 65. 7–9).
- 35 2. 89. 9; cf. de Romilly 1995, 172–3, who comments in regard to 2. 89. 3 on how extraordinary it was for Phormion to discourse on the merits of education for sailors.
- 36 Osborne and Byrne 1994, 68, s.v. 'Arkhenantes (1)' (contrast the popularity of Arkhestratos). The *stamnos* (London, British Museum E455) was assigned by J.D. Beazley to his 'Polygnotus Group'; if Arkhenantes was indeed, as is possible, a *kalos* name (cf. Dover 1978, 111–24), that would probably indicate a considerable rise in the social scale for the son by comparison with his father's assumed thetic status.
- 37 Aischylos, *Persai*, especially 302–432, with Hall 1996.
- 38 Anthemion: above, n. 23. The general issue of ideological hegemony within the Athenian democracy, especially in the fourth century BC, is the subject of Ober 1989, an outstandingly original and deservedly influential book. The thrust of this paper may, however, go somewhat to qualify some aspects of Ober's more optimistic construction.