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The Coal Strike in South Wales

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THE COAL STRIKE IN SOUTH WALES.

ON Thursday, July 15th, the whole of the miners engaged in the coalfields of South Wales and Monmouth came out on strike in direct defiance not only of the stringently penal clauses of the Munitions Act (under which the coalfield had been "proclaimed" on July 13th), but also in direct defiance of the instructions of the Executive Committees of the South Wales Miners' Federation, and of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain. Moreover, the strenuous eleventh hour efforts made by the Government through the Board of Trade to settle the differences between the colliery owners and their employees had failed utterly.

By Saturday, July 17th, at least 200,000 colliery employees were idle, the production of the world-famous Welsh steam coal, essential for the Navy and the Merchant Marine, had ceased, and vitally important munition factories, iron, steel, and tinplate works, foundries, fuel factories, and bye-product coking plant were ready to close down.

During the week end the dislocation spread to the railways and docks of South Wales. Government transports and hundreds of other vessels were held up in port for lack of cargo and bunker coal. Fears were expressed as to the supply of coal for munition factories in France and Italy, and even for the vessels of the Allied nations, naval and merchant. Within the coalfield areas the number of unemployed workmen rapidly approached half a million, and the extreme gravity of the situation in its economic, military, political, and naval aspects was fully realised by Monday, July 19th.

The Board of Trade had been trying to settle the differences between the colliery owners and their employees since the beginning of July. The efforts of Mr. Runciman were redoubled after the stoppage of work, but they could not prevent a deadlock in the negotiations. The proclaiming of the coalfield under the terms of the Munitions Act only aggravated the situation. In

fact, this became a most dangerous factor, since the men greatly resented the coercion involved thereby. Some of their leaders openly declared that the primary consideration then became the withdrawal of the provisions proclaiming the coalfield as an essential preliminary to the resumption of negotiations. The miners of South Wales have an inherent objection to every form of coercion bearing upon questions at issue between them and their employers, as has been proved by their stubborn resistance in scores of strikes and lockouts, to employers, police and military forces, and the economic pressure of want. In fact, they ridiculed the suggestion that troops should be used to enforce the Munitions Act and compel a resumption of work; and this, despite the fact that almost every one of the strikers had a son, a brother, or a father in the Army or Navy. Truly the psychology of the miner, the South Wales miner in particular, is a puzzle. For while fiercely opposing the masters' terms, rejecting Mr. Runciman's offers, despising the threats of the Munitions Act, most of the men were sorry they had been "jockeyed" into an actual strike, and anxiously hoping that they could get back to work as they all believed would be done "if only Lloyd George would come down to Cardiff." It was this loophole that gave the only prospect of issue from the *impasse*, and on the evening of Tuesday, July 20th, the joint efforts of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Runciman, and Mr. Henderson succeeded in carrying through the terms of settlement under which work was to be fully resumed by Thursday, July 22nd.

The crisis disappeared as quickly as it had arisen, but the effects of the strike, which was certainly unique in many of its circumstances, and its causes are of profound importance.

It is hardly necessary to deny emphatically that the strike was the result of German bribery or intrigues, as some sections of the Press hastened to assert. The greatly placarded fact that Hugo Stinnes, the millionaire coal-owner of Westphalia, had bought up many coal properties in South Wales cannot be considered of any more significance than similar purchases in South Yorkshire, Immingham, or the coal deals of South Wales colliery owners in the United States. Neither was the strike entirely the result of Syndicalist efforts to realise their policy of "the Mines for the Miners"; nor was it the outcome of Socialists' efforts to force the Government to nationalise the steam coal collieries as the first step towards nationalisation of the coal industry as a whole. The usual efforts to attribute the strike to the "irritation strike" policy of the Syndicalists fall short of the mark. The

prevailing local conditions of the coalfield must be understood in order to appreciate the causes and effects of this unique strike.

The strike was in a large measure the normal consequence of the very unsatisfactory relations which have grown up between Capital and Labour in South Wales, ever since that area became the cockpit for conflicts between colliery owners and their employees. The rapidity with which the South Wales coalfield has developed is unparalleled. During the last twenty-five years teeming centres of population have sprung up in the mining valleys and along the seaboard upon which these valleys converge. This rapidly increasing population has been recruited from all sources, and in many cases has been housed under extremely unsatisfactory conditions. Despite the enormous growth of material prosperity in every area within the coalfield, the development of social life and intellectual activity in the best directions has been greatly neglected. The unsatisfactory social conditions have proved a fertile soil for the propaganda work of socialistic organisations; and in the centre of the coalfield—the steam coal producing Rhondda valleys—the Syndicalist movement has secured a firm hold under the leadership of a group of Ruskin College students. One of the most extreme of the latter was author of some remarkable booklets on the economic policy of the miners' organisations. This group advocated the policy of "the mines for the miners," and the profit-destroying "irritation strikes" to occur at regular intervals so as to render the mines unprofitable to the owners, after which the miners could enter into possession. "The Miners' Next Step" was a booklet circulated by the thousand by this group, advocating their policy, and strengthening the propaganda work carried out on general lines by the socialist and labour organisations. These greatly increased the natural democratic tendencies of most South Welshmen, and the progressive section among the miners and their leaders utilised the labour organisations to develop a very aggressive policy in their relations with the colliery owners; the latter naturally resisted this with equal force. The influx of cosmopolitan elements into the population further complicated matters. Ever since the expansion of the coal production of South Wales after the 'eighties there has been constant guerilla warfare between the organisations representing the employers and the employees respectively, interrupted by many strikes and lockouts of a long and bitter nature. The employers sought to protect themselves by close organisation to deal with labour difficulties; the colliery employees organised with equal success

their own trade union organisations, and waged war upon the non-unionists with as much bitterness as upon the employers. The "union colliery" became a definite feature of their policy, and strikes to oust the non-unionists were of weekly and sometimes *daily* occurrence; often employers provoked disputes.

The whole industrial situation in the South Wales coalfield has been dominated by the above conditions, which produced extremely unfortunate relations between the employers and the miners—mutual suspicion, and hostility. It is certainly a tribute to the efficiency of collective bargaining that agreements could be made periodically, and on the whole faithfully observed, for carrying on work at the collieries. In fact, it was the normal expiration of such an agreement that caused the occasion for the disagreements leading up to the strike.

Previous to 1902 the miners' wages were adjusted by means of a Sliding Scale which proved so unsatisfactory that on July 1st, 1902, the miners' representatives gave notice to terminate work under the system on January 1st, 1903. On March 31st, 1903, a new agreement was established to apply until December 31st, 1905, with a Conciliation Board representative of masters and men as means of settling current differences and adjusting percentages. This agreement was set aside for another to apply until April 8th, 1910, which was subsequently renewed with modifications until March 31st, 1915.

During the period covered by these agreements the local arrangements between masters and men in South Wales had been modified to suit the new conditions established by the Eight Hours Act, and the Minimum Wage Act, 1912. Both these Acts were forced into the programme of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain by the progressive agitation of the South Wales representatives.

It must be noted that despite the various changes made in the rates of wages, hours, and methods of wages settlement under the periodical agreements from 1902–15, and the Statutes mentioned, the *basis* or *standard rate* of wages was retained as fixed in 1879 for most of the collieries, and as fixed in 1877 for the other collieries. The Conciliation Board representing the masters and their employees, together with an independent chairman, adjusted the maximum, minimum, and current rates of percentage to be added to the standard wage rates according as the selling prices of coal f.o.b. fluctuated within defined limits. For example, under the agreement made in 1910 (April) to apply until March 31st, 1915, the Conciliation Board determined the percentage rates

three months in advance, payable on the standard wage rates of 1877 and 1879, and on the wages awards, made by the Joint District Boards, acting under the Minimum Wages Act. When the average price of coal was 12s. 5d. per ton f.o.b. the minimum percentage on the standard was 35 per cent., increasing to 50 per cent. when prices increased to 14s. and 14s 9d. f.o.b., and reaching a maximum of 60 per cent. on the standard when average prices were over 14s. 9d. per ton f.o.b.

These arrangements were obviously very complicated and unsatisfactory in view of the changing conditions of the coalfield. The standard wage rates of 1877 and 1879 were quite out of date, the maximum percentage of 60 prevented the colliery employees from deriving any benefit, beyond local grants of war bonus, from the enormous increase of the selling prices of coal which followed the outbreak of war. It was further stated that the minimum percentage rate was too low to suit the greatly increased cost of living and strain of work.

The enormous wave of enlistment which passed over the coalfield greatly depleted the numbers of the colliery employees, and increased the burden of work and strain thrown upon those remaining at the mines. Despite the decrease of total production it is stated that the output per man increased in a manner which showed that all were doing their best to maintain production. High wages were certainly being earned, but the dissatisfaction of the miners with the maximum rate of percentage, the standard wage, and the problem of the non-unionists increased rapidly. At the same time the progressive sections of the miners laid stress upon the enormous increase of selling prices of coal, colliery profits, and costs of living. General resolution developed to utilise the termination of the five years' agreement on March 31st, 1915, as an opportunity for securing a complete revision of the conditions of employment. Notice was given and negotiations began accordingly. The demands of the men were briefly :—

(1) The abolition of the standard rates of 1877 and 1879, in favour of new 1915 standard rates merging 35 per cent. on the 1877 standard, and 50 per cent. on the 1879 standard; excepting in the anthracite coalfield of Western areas where the 1879 standard was to apply subject to arrangement.

(2) In calculating the rates of day wage workmen fractional parts of a penny under a half-penny should be considered a half-penny, and fractional parts above a half-penny should be considered a penny.

(3) The determination of the 1915 standard for underground

day wage men should be made by the addition of 50 per cent. to the several rates of the General District Minimum Wage Award except in any colliery where by adding 35 per cent. to the 1877 rates or 50 per cent. to the 1879 rate the new standard would be higher than the rate of the Minimum Wage Award; excepted collieries were to be considered separately.

(4) The surface workmen's 1915 standard rate should be fixed by adding 50 per cent. to 3s. 4d. per day, except at any colliery where by adding 35 per cent. on the 1877 standard, or 50 per cent. on the 1879 standard, the new standard would exceed 3s. 4d. plus 50 per cent.; such collieries to be treated separately.

(5) All workmen employed on afternoon and night shifts should be paid on the 1915 standard at the rate of one turn and a fifth for each shift worked.

(6) All hauliers employed on night and afternoon shifts to be paid the same rates as those employed on the day shift.

(7) All classes of workmen at the collieries to be covered by the wages agreement, provided they were members of the Miners' Federation of South Wales and Monmouth.

(8) The agreement should terminate in June, 1918, the same time as those in the English coalfields.

In order to estimate the extent of the rates required, the General District standard rates of day wages applying under the Minimum Wages Award may be indicated (less the percentage, not over 60 per cent., added quarterly under the Conciliation Board arrangements):—

Class I.—Over 21.				Class II.—Boys under 21.			
	s.	d.			s.	d.	
Coal getting colliers,	4	7	per day				
regular piece workers	4	7		Under 15	16	1	6 per day
Other colliers	4	3	"	Over 15 and	16	1	9 "
Timbermen on regular				" 16	" 17	2	0 "
piece work	4	7	"	" 17	" 18	2	3 "
Rippers	4	0	"	" 18	" 19	2	6 "
Assistant roadmen	3	7	"	" 19	" 20	2	9 "
Hitchers	3/6—3/10		"	" 20	" 21	3	0 "
Ostlers and labourers	3	2	"				
Underground me-				Class III.			
chanics	3/2—3/4		"	Hauliers over 18	{ day	3	11 "
Shacklers	3	2	"		{ night	3	8 "
Coal cutter men	4	3	"	Tonnage hauliers over 18		4	2 "
Timber drawers and				Riders over 18		3	3 "
airway men	3	10	"	Trammers over 18		3	3 "

In normal times the average prices of good steam coal ranged from 9s. 11d. to 18s. 1d. per ton, and of bituminous coal from 9s. to 12s. 5d. per ton. After the outbreak of war even a large buyer like the Admiralty paid 25s. a ton for Welsh steam coal,

other buyers were paying higher prices, and bituminous coal used for local domestic consumption was sold at 27s. 6d. in many South Wales areas. If the Board of Trade estimate of 4s. per ton be taken as a fair allowance for the increased costs of production due to shortage of timber, stores, labour, etc., it is clear that the colliery proprietors secured a considerable margin of war profits. Those of coal owners and others entering the distributing trade as dealers were enormously greater, as a scrutiny of the prices paid in any large centre of consumption during 1914-5 will indicate; 30s. per ton was quite a common figure, 36s. 8d. per ton being reached in many cases.

The foregoing seems to indicate that the men's claims were not unreasonable, and their procedure for enforcing them after the due termination of their agreement was quite regular up to the fourteenth of July. Negotiations were continued during the period of notice and while work was being carried on from July 1st under day to day contracts.

The mistake of the Government was to neglect the opportunities presented for conciliatory intervention during this period of negotiation and notice. The Executive of the South Wales Miners' Federation and that of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain had decided against a policy of actual strike and were prepared to continue negotiations. The mass of the South Wales miners were in favour of such a policy although anxious not to let slip the favourable opportunity for renewing their wages agreement on good terms while prices were high, production and supply of labour scarce, and demand for coal unlimited.

The employers were content to mark time and to adopt a stubborn policy, and while resisting the men's demands, kept the way open for Mr. Runciman to suggest terms acceptable to the men. The proposals put forward by Mr. Runciman at the beginning of July were roughly :—

(a) That the wages of surface men should be increased to 3s. 4d. as a standard day rate.

(b) That night men should be paid six turns for five turns worked.

(c) That hauliers employed on afternoon or night shifts should be paid the same rates as hauliers on day shifts.

(d) That the standards of 1877 and 1879 should be displaced by a new standard, viz., 100 plus 36 per cent. on the 1877 standard and 100 plus 50 per cent. on the 1879 standard.

(e) Maximum and minimum percentages to be abolished.

The difficult problems of the non-unionists, the term of the

new agreement, and the immediate additions on the minimum and standard percentages could not be settled.

As the discontent developed the progressive or aggressive sections of the miners saw their opportunity to *bolt* the Miners' Monthly Delegates' Meeting and force an issue. It is probable that several motives were at work, *e.g.*: (1) a desire of some of the leaders to secure prestige by utilising the favourable conditions in order to make an advantageous agreement; (2) the belief that Government intervention would be inevitable either (a) to take over the mines of South Wales producing steam coal, which would serve as a prelude to the socialist miners' desire for the nationalisation of the nation's coal industry, or (b) to control the distribution and selling prices of coal, or (c) to force to an issue the taxation of the war profits of colliery owners and coal dealers; (3) the belief that the Government would be compelled to bring pressure to bear on the coal owners to concede their men's demands as fairly as did English owners.

By securing control of the Monthly Delegate Meeting, the advanced section of miners were able to direct the whole policy and resources of the miners' organisation. This meeting comprised some 300 delegates sent by the various local "Lodges" throughout the coalfield to vote according to mandate, and thereby control the policy and action of the Executive Committee comprising the permanent officials or agents. Each of these monthly delegates has a card vote for every fifty members of the Lodge he represents, and thus by getting control of the Lodge voting, any party can force its policy on the Executive and the Federation, through the monthly meeting of delegates. As a result of enlistment the attendance at Lodge meetings has been greatly reduced, and the advanced sections of the miners utilised the opportunity to attend the Lodge meetings in force, capture the Lodge votes and thereby elect delegates enabled to utilise the full voting strength of the Lodges at the Delegate Meeting, despite the fact that they were elected and given a mandate to vote for immediate "down tools policy" by only the minority of the Lodge members attending the election. Hence the Delegate Meeting voted for an immediate strike in opposition to the decisions of the Executive Committee, and probably contrary to the miners' wishes as indicated by General Ballot, which the delegates refused to allow.

The colliery owners naturally saw the chance of placing a strike at such a time and in a "munitions industry" under censure of Government and public opinion. After the strike began most

of the men felt that a grave tactical blunder had been committed by forcing the issue in a way contrary to national interests and war exigencies, and by substituting an actual strike which violated public opinion and the purposes of the Munitions Act in place of a policy of threatened strike constantly hanging over the coal owners, the coal consumers, and the nation like the sword of Damocles. The latter policy could have been pursued while retaining the moral support of public opinion and the advantages of a favourable industrial conjunction.

But the aggressive or progressive section rushed the situation utilising the motives and circumstances indicated, and the feeling of irritation at the *non possumus* attitude of the colliery owners. Once the strike policy was declared by their representatives, the whole of the South Wales miners obeyed with their characteristic promptitude, and from the outset the strike was general and the stoppage of production complete.

Yet, curiously enough, almost every man regarded it as a foregone conclusion that the strike would be short lived, in fact, a holiday rather than a strike. No strike pay was arranged for, nor could it have been legally dispensed by the Union under the terms of the Munitions Act's ban. The general feeling among the men after the strike had begun and its consequences became realised was one of regret, but belief that the intervention of the Government, the Munitions Minister in particular, would end the crisis by taking control of production and distribution, or by restricting prices and war profits, or by offering terms acceptable to the men and their employers.

The dangerous element in the situation was the fact that the men almost without exception keenly resented the implication of disloyalty suggested by the proclaiming of the coalfield. None had a deliberate intention of hampering the Government, and suggestions were made as to maintaining the Navy coal supply; most of the strikers had near relatives serving with the Forces. The *psychology* of this strike was unique, and the nearest explanation is that it was caused by complex and conflicting motives—irritation at the tardy progress of negotiations with the masters and their *non possumus* attitude; the desire to utilise the opportunity to renew the agreements on favourable conditions; the sectional motives of the Syndicalists and the nationalising Socialists; the belief that the Government would take control of the situation; miners' inveterate suspicion of and hostility to the employers, who gained by delaying pre-strike negotiations.

Once the employees, the employers, and the Cabinet grasped

the situation, the case for intervention by responsible Ministers was obvious if the opportunity for settlement was to be seized and dangerous complications avoided. The personal power of Mr. Lloyd George over his fellow countrymen was an invaluable asset in facilitating a settlement. Terms were offered to the men which conceded their principal demands, and then subject to their acceptance by the men the Government representatives undertook to get them conceded by the masters. After considerable opposition from the more aggressive of the men's leaders these terms were accepted on Tuesday night, July 20th, and endorsed by specially summoned mass meetings of the men on the following day. The chief points of the settlement were:—

(1) No person to be penalised for the part taken by him in the dispute, and all parties to agree to maintain output at a maximum. The proclamation of the coalfield was withdrawn and the penalties connected therewith.

(2) The terms "able bodied workman" to be omitted from the texts of the agreement in order to prevent discrimination against the older men.

(3) An accident sustained by a workman in the course of his employment shall not debar him from benefiting by the bonus turn given for nightwork in six turns for five nights' work.

(4) Standard rates for underground day wage men, at present paid less than 3s. 4d. per day, to be advanced to 3s. 4d. per day plus 50 per cent. The new standard rate for other underground day wage men to be either their existing rate or the rate applicable to them under the Minimum Wage Act whichever are the higher, plus 50 per cent., provided that such new rates are determined by reference to a rate fixed under the Minimum Wage Act, which shall be specially applicable to such rate pending the decision of an arbitrator appointed by the Board of Trade; 10 per cent. on the new standard to serve as a minimum.

(5) The fixed equivalents of selling prices and percentages to be abolished and fair equivalent prices and percentages for minima to be fixed by an independent chairman.

(6) The new rates and conditions to apply as from the resumption of work.

(7) The question of wages in the anthracite collieries to be the subject of separate inquiry, and certain general matters in dispute to be referred to the Board of Trade as final arbitrator.

(8) The agreement to remain in force until six months after the end of the war, and then until three months' notice given by one of the parties to terminate it have expired.

(9) The agreement to apply only and to all colliery workmen members of the South Wales Miners' Federation.

It will be seen that the strike was settled only by conceding all the chief demands of the men, and both the nature and circumstances of the settlement are of vital significance, *e.g.*—

(a) Thus it is generally recognised that the Government was powerless to enforce the penal and coercive provisions of the Munitions Act. The men claim that their complete organisation utilising favourable conditions enables them to dictate the terms upon which they will work, and that they are subject only to the economic pressure of sheer necessity and the moral pressure of the justice or injustice of their claims. Not only did they challenge the efficiency of coercive measures enforced by the State, but pointed out the moral as regards the proposals of various parties to coerce or "conscript" labour either for increasing the supply of munitions or any other purpose. In fact, many men assert that the strike was justified if only to assert the necessity for keeping hands off the voluntary system as applying to industry and commerce, and also as an answer to Mr. Lloyd George's threatening "waving of penal clauses of the Munitions Act, and his powers of compulsory requisitioning of labour, etc.," at Manchester last June.

(b) Whatever the attendant circumstances of this strike its issue must be regarded as the third consecutive victory for organised labour in the coal industry, the Government being compelled to intervene in each case in order to secure industrial peace by obtaining the concession of the men's demands. In the case of the Eight Hours Act and the Minimum Wages (Coal Mines) Act special legislative enactments were necessary to give effect to the men's demands. The enormous power wielded by the Miners' Federation is highly significant from a national and politico-economic point of view. The railwaymen's trade union exercised a similar power in 1912, and the recent agreement between the unions representing the railway workers, colliery workers, and general transport workers as to joint action is highly important in case conflict with the national interests and the Government should arise again. The only resorts of the Government in the recent strike seem to have been the concession of the men's demands, and nationalisation of the mines.

(c) The clause whereby the benefits secured are to be restricted to the members of the miners' union is of immense importance. In practice it means the exclusion of the non-unionist from the mines—a policy which the miners' unions have

vainly tried to force upon their employers for a long period. It is probable that this condition will be inserted in most of the agreements made when the trade union workmen are in the majority. The strong argument of the latter is that since the benefits of better conditions are obtained at the expense of and through the efforts of their trade unions, all the workmen securing these conditions should be compelled to contribute towards the union funds or to go without the concessions obtained thereby. The policy of excluding the non-unionists from the results of collective bargaining between the employers and the men's representatives was begun by the Northumberland miners; and its adoption in South Wales marks an important step towards solution of the constantly present difficulties of employing non-unionists in mines or elsewhere where the trade unionist element predominates.

(d) Important questions of trade union organisation are involved in the proven powers of the delegates' meeting and the direct mandate of the members to override the policy of the Executive Committee. The miners' unions seek to preserve this power of direct action on the plea that it ensures a democratic policy; it is clear, however, that its exercise may be abused when a faction desires to gain certain ends.

(e) Many of the miners believed that a strike would be a means of bringing into prominence certain questions of national importance, such as the nationalisation of coal supplies, and in particular, of steam coal, the control of the distribution and prices of coal, the taxation of war profits, the adjustment of earnings to the costs of living. It is probable also that the Syndicalist miners and their leaders sought an opportunity to advance their own policy and increase the prestige thereof, as against that of the older leaders considered members of the "old gang" of Trade Unionists.

(f) The strike has served to bring into prominence the defects of the social and industrial system in a typical area where material prosperity and population have increased by leaps and bounds without any corresponding development of the social and personal factors of life. It has been realised that the "personnel" needs as much consideration as the mechanical elements of the industry, if stable and satisfactory forms of industrial and social organisation are to be evolved.

(g) This strike showed that, however strongly organised a body of workmen may be, and whatever the local circumstances, the strikers recognise the force of public opinion compelling them to adjust their policy to national considerations. It was quite evident

that the whole of the miners felt keenly the ignominy of the position when even a Socialist leader like Hervé condemned the policy of "down tools" as quite indefensible. On this score alone it is probable that but for the circumstances indicated, a strike would never have taken place at all.

Although the crisis is now over the results of the contest will be evident for a long period not only in South Wales but for the nation generally.

G. R. CARTER

NOTE.—It should be observed that, in the arrangements for applying the terms of settlement to current working agreements, discussed since the settlement up to the time of writing (August 14th), several new factors have become evident which strengthen the miners' position. In particular, the colliery employers have tried to argue that the settlement terms granted through Mr. Lloyd George at Cardiff are subject to certain working arrangements in former agreements; while the men's leaders maintain that the new Cardiff settlement and the 1915 agreement entirely supersede all former agreements, and, subject to appeal to the Board of Trade to enforce the Cardiff Settlement, they threaten another strike to defeat the "quibbling and provocative" attitude of the employers. The further increase of prices has led the men to claim an additional advance of 5 per cent. under the Conciliation Board arrangements, and in this they have public opinion behind them.

There is left a feeling of suspicion among the miners that they can expect little help from the Government to support their case, on the ground that the Cabinet ignored the situation until it became acute, that it put no pressure on the employers to hasten negotiations, and that the proclaiming of the coalfield was unfair, unconstitutional, and technically incorrect, since work was carried on from July 1st not under any agreement, but only on day to day contracts granted by the men as a concession to national interests. In any case the *immediate* aftermath of the strike is increased hostility and suspicion between the employers and the employees, increased strength of the miners' unions and the "progressive sections" within it, and increased suspicion of measures of Government intervention.

NOTE BY EDITOR.—The dispute as to the proper interpretation, on certain points, of the terms of settlement, culminated in the last days of August in a brief further strike involving some 25,000 men. The matter was finally settled on the evening of August 31st, the view of the men, which is to be embodied in a supplemental agreement, being in effect conceded.