

Essays:

E. 'Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of...' (Hume). What does this mean? What are its implications for areas of widespread public moral dispute?

(Suggestions: The quotation comes from the third book of Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature*. Much of the book edited by Hudson is a discussion of Hume. It has sometimes been noted that many of the most influential moral theories - Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, as well as Hume's - were developed against the background of fairly stable and uniform moral outlooks shared by most members of society. There were points of radical dissension, such as Hume's support for the moral legitimacy of suicide, but these could be argued within a framework of widespread agreement. Indeed such agreement may have been mentioned in the argument: 'We both agree on this and that; now, surely if you have these commitments, you would be inconsistent to reject the legitimacy of suicide?' The contemporary setting is one in which there are apparently deeper and more pervasive disagreements. If morality depends upon a special kind of 'moral' perception and our perceptions differ with no means of reconciling them, how should we proceed? Perhaps the consumerization of medicine has one of its roots here.

When there is no agreed 'right' or good', do health services inevitably become simply instruments for the satisfaction of consumer desires?)

F. Would it be possible for factual and evaluative vocabulary to be entirely separated?

(Suggestions: This is not an easy question, though thinking the implications through in terms of utilitarianism, as encouraged by some of the comments in this chapter, might be the most straightforward way to start. The most relevant chapter in Sterba is that by Anthony Flew, though as Flew's is a response to the piece by Searle in the same collection it would make sense to read that first. The material in Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* may be useful.)