

1

PEACE AND THE IDEALIST TRADITION

Towards a liberal peace

Introduction: idealist utopias?

This chapter examines the idealist aspect of the first 'great debate'¹ in IR in which idealism and liberalism opposed realism and its inherency orientation that war and violence are intrinsic to human nature, society, the state, and the international system. Idealism was to offer an ambitious, ethically oriented account of peace through liberal-internationalism and governance, as most famously argued by US President Wilson:

The day of conquest and aggrandisement is gone by.... The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this....²

This approach focuses on a discussion of ethics, interdependence, and transnationalism: "...peace as well as war, requires preparation..."³ It pointed to the blurring or domestication of international politics, though this rests on what occurs inside states.⁴ Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, liberal thought represents one of the largest bodies of work on peace that exists in IR theory, drawing on earlier idealist thinkers such as Zimmern, Bailey, Noel-Baker, and functionalists and pluralists such as Mitrany, Burton, and most famously, the approach of Woodrow Wilson at Versailles after WWI, as well as that of famous advocates such as Einstein and Bertrand Russell.⁵ Normative positions on state behaviour in an international context, as opposed to interest- and power-oriented ontologies, point to an ambitious peace, which is universal though perhaps unachievable.

The terms 'utopian' and 'idealist' are often used from a realist perspective to cast aspersions upon the claims of the thinkers in this broad area.⁶ Indeed, the so-called idealists who called for disarmament, the outlawing of war, adopted a positive view of human nature and international capacity to cooperate, were

often accused of being unable to focus on facts, understand power, or see the hegemonic dangers of universal claims⁷ (despite the fact that realism itself makes a universal claim of being able to expose objective truths). Yet, the idealist tradition is often taken to be the founding tradition of IR (though long refuted).⁸ Many thinkers of the day, and some more recently, saw elements of this group's work – such as supporting and developing the League of Nations, international courts and law, other international organisations, or Mitrany's work on functionalism – as pragmatic rather than utopian⁹ and certainly far more so than realism. Idealist thought offered the possibility of a single global peace (under a single world system of government) in which all conflict would end. Liberalism, by extension, offered the possibility of linear and ineluctable progress that would lead to the achievement of this peace, eventually.

Idealist approaches have lost their currency partly because they are linked to a discredited absolute form of pacifism and the failed Treaty of Versailles in 1919 (and the subsequent League of Nations). Pluralist approaches are often ignored in the disciplinary orthodoxy that is deemed to be the 'mainstream.' However, after the Cold War, liberal approaches drawing on thinkers such as Kant, Locke, Paine, Bentham, and others who added variants to this debate became an orthodoxy of the discipline. They represented a new form of epistemic imperialism, in which norms, institutions, and systems of governance and production were disseminated, particularly from the US. It used straightforward and more complex, hidden, frameworks of intervention to police this system, from peacekeeping to development. The European peace project intersected with this later permutation of liberal internationalism, solidarity or pluralism, and functionalism.

The view of peace from the context of the so-called the first 'great debates' in IR contains both major contrasts and elements of hybridity in its evolved, liberal, guise. Idealist contributions to the debate on peace were altogether more ambitious than those in the realist tradition, and much more nuanced and pragmatic than often thought. Pluralist and liberal contributions combined realist frameworks as the discipline moved into a second 'great debate' with the aim of both proving the existence of an 'international society,' functional networks, or transnationalism, derived from the inherently positive nature of humans, and of building a peaceful international system on its basis. Yet, this is also underpinned by defensive military might (easily translatable into offensive force). Idealism, pluralism, and liberalism, by contrast, have endeavoured to develop an alternative and pragmatic approach to creating peace in opposition to the tragic and often flimsy intellectual claims of realism (and its excuses for power and privilege). Indeed, these agendas emerged partly as a reaction to the bleak realist conceptualisation of peace, partly in tandem with them, and partly because of other more humanistic agendas.

Idealist and liberal agendas for peace

Idealist thinking about IR rested upon various notions of internationalism and interdependence, peace without war, disarmament, the hope that war could be

eradicated eventually,¹⁰ the right of self-determination of all citizens, and the possibility of world government or a world federation. In this sense, it saw itself as eminently practical rather than utopian, reflecting an ontology of peace, cooperation, and harmony in world politics as opposed to enmity and competition. The international organisation of sovereign states, in this case, the League of Nations, was central to the idealist agenda, though it was also recognised that the spirit of international organisation (internationalism, democracy, and trade) might be more important than an actual organisation itself.¹¹ Underpinning this was the optimistic argument that human nature is not intrinsically violent, and even if it is, social and political norms, regimes, and organisation can prevent violence. By the early 1930s, the optimism of these idealist agendas was replaced with concern over the rise of Fascism and Nazism.¹²

This idealist agenda drew on and reflected early liberal thinking of which there emerged three main strands. Locke focused on individualism and Bentham on utilitarianism: Adam Smith provided the foundations for the arguments for free trade and pacifism; and Kant developed a Republican internationalism.¹³ These provided the foundations for human rights and international law, though these were disputed amongst these thinkers. The core liberal assumptions are of universal rationality, individual liberty, connected with the idealist possibility – if not probability – of harmony and cooperation in domestic and international relations, and of the need for enlightened, rational, legitimate domestic government and international governance. There, latter conditions were tempered, of course, by the Millian understanding that government was a necessary evil.¹⁴ Idealists and liberals assume that war is of no interest to peoples who operate under the assumption of harmony and cooperation, and that political pluralism, democracy, and a broad distribution of rights and responsibility are crucial to peace in IR. Incorporated into this are ideas associated with economic liberalism, derived from Adam Smith.¹⁵ The notion of free markets and trade as a ‘hidden hand’ that would build up irrevocable and peaceful connections between states also became part of the liberal agenda for peace through interdependence. Effectively, liberalism developed a moral account of free individuals in a social contract with a representative and benevolent government, framed by democratic and transparent institutions that reflect these principles. There would be no arbitrary authority, and there should be a free press and free speech, legal equality, and freedom of property. Social and economic rights of welfare are also a concern, though this is balanced by a tendency to avoid highly centralised states.¹⁶ The implication of this is that individuals prefer peace, freedom, rights, and prosperity, and that IR is, or should be a zone of peace. Idealists, liberals, and pluralists concur on this, and offer a positive epistemology of peace¹⁷ as well as institutional support and normative concurrence for liberals, together with scientific proof on the part of pluralists.

Aristotle wrote that we may have to “... make war that we may live in peace.”¹⁸ Spinoza argued that “[p]eace is not an absence of war; it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, and justice.”¹⁹ These views help

frame the liberal dilemma: in order to attain an approximation of an idealist view of peace that would provide peoples and states with rights, security, prosperity, and lead to disarmament, there first has to be a suitable foundation. This can be a clean slate (*terra nullis*), a victory, an agreement, cease-fire, or treaty. In other words, violence often precedes peace, and indeed provides a foil for an ensuing peace that can then be created with liberal and pluralist tools. This creates a significant doubt about whether the specific idealist-liberal-pluralist approach to peace masquerades as an ideal. It is based upon the 'enforcement' of supposedly universal political norms, appeals to a limited pluralist theoretical scientific approach based on human needs and transnationalism, and in fact shares some characteristics with a realist version of peace (though it offers a much more developed account).

Erasmus rejected war in his famous text, *The Complaint of Peace*.²⁰ For him, war was to be avoided at all costs as it provided pretexts for crime, murder, brutality, and self-interest. Yet, peace was ignored. He helped establish a genre of peace plans, and from Erasmus onwards, there was a long line of similar writings (including those of Emeric Cruce, the Duc de Sully, and William Penn, Abbé de St Pierre, Rousseau, and, of course, Kant) aimed at avoiding war in Europe. They often rested on the creation of a federation of states with a federal council that would act to prevent war between its members, as well as to promote free trade.²¹ These were seen as idealistic plans, though their authors regarded them as pragmatic.

Locke, one of the fathers of modern liberalism, saw human reason as the key to controlling the state of nature. What was crucial for him was the development of a social contract through which subjects and rules developed mutual constitutive roles in order to protect life, liberty, and private property (this influenced Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence).²² This, combined with Bentham's view of the need for liberal institutions as opposed to imperialism and competitive tariffs, led into a discussion of the qualities of the liberal state,²³ which many idealists saw as the basis for an international peace.

The Kantian 'Perpetual Peace' is perhaps the archetypal version of these agendas, and their influential status in IR and in thinking about world politics and peace more generally. It is indicative of a common impetus, shared by idealist, liberal, and pluralist approaches to overcome the negative epistemology and ontology of realism, which at best provides for a domestic and international peace that is subservient to defensive requirements and preparedness against potential threats. In the post-Enlightenment world, however, the major agenda for a new peace came to be associated with overcoming these 'primitive' notions of peace in IR, through liberal internationalism, liberal institutionalism, and the modernist era, through what were supposed to be more scientific forms of pluralism. Where realism presents war as part of the 'fall' of humanity, and a necessary stabilisation mechanism for international order, idealism and liberalism see 'fallen man' as retrievable through suitable planning and organisation. This involves the rejection of the negative epistemology and ontology in realist IR. Idealists,

liberals, and pluralists concur on the creation of institutions and safeguard to protect key norms and to provide for individuals, so cementing a social contract which preserves the polity.

Kant presented perhaps the most comprehensive representation of a liberal and some would argue, idealist, understanding of an international order which could be termed peaceful in liberal normative terms. He developed an account of peace that rested upon his belief that a 'categorical imperative' existed as an innate and universal moral law, specifically at three levels: domestic, international, and cosmopolitan.²⁴ As Geuss has pointed out, this was little more than a '...half-secularised version of ... theocratic ethics.'²⁵ This dictated that human beings should be treated as ends rather than means, and required just laws that would be reflected in a republican political order, which would also extend to international relations.²⁶ Kant argued that war was brought about by the absence of an international rule of law and democracy, and that trade enabled peaceful relations. Accordingly, there was a general will to adopt codes of conduct that minimised violence, creating a 'law of peoples.'²⁷ This system was preferable to world government (which might lead to despotism).²⁸ Kant believed that there were acceptable limits for behaviour established by the categorical imperative, but also that the international system should not be made vulnerable to despotism by imbuing it with the tensions inherent in the existence of autonomous governments for separate states, all controlled by a common normative system. Consequently, *Perpetual Peace* established a vision of a liberal order, rested upon the notion that human behaviour is motivated by social learning rather than merely nature and that peace did not preclude defensive wars, which was later to be repeated in UN Charter. The only universal rule was one of hospitality to others, and war came about because of the failings of non-'Republican' states.²⁹ Kantian strands of liberalism also gave rise to the contemporary 'democratic peace' thesis, as well as the concept of human rights.³⁰ As already alluded to, Kant also pointed to a significant problem inherent in these more idealist readings of peace: 'peace' might be used to disguise domination or hegemony.³¹

Kantian thinking represented an emerging cosmopolitan ethic³² forming the basis of a number of European peace projects.³³ The most well-known influence on Kantian thought, for example, was the *Project for Perpetual Peace* developed by Abbé de St-Pierre (1713).³⁴ This was followed by many others, including those of Kant, Rousseau, Bentham, Penn, and others. They all sought to establish a pragmatic process by which political relations in Europe were pacified. These often drew upon (or in the case of Rousseau, critiqued) Abbé de Saint-Pierre's peace plan, which had argued in what now seem very familiar terms for a European treaty leading to a federation of states, based upon justice, equality, and reciprocity between both Christian and Muslim sovereigns. This federal organisation would not intervene in the affairs of member states but would have intelligence and self-defence capacities, and would be able to militarily intervene in other states if it was necessary to preserve the peace.³⁵ This version of peace represented

a consensual order between states mature enough to be able to see that cooperation was a viable expectation and that conflict led to more conflict. Via other additions to this genre of European peace projects, it was a short step to the idea of an embryonic European parliament.³⁶ In a prescient work, Penn demolished a key classical realist assumption that international organisation would undermine the sovereignty of princes. In stating the obvious – that peace would prevent bloodshed, save the reputation of Christianity ‘in the sight of infidels,’ save money, preserve cities and towns, allow movement, and create friendship³⁷ – he made an important connection between peace and liberal governance (this has become the core assumptions of the contemporary liberal international order).

Even so, it still proved intellectually difficult to resist realist assumptions about the nature of state interests, power, and the resulting international system, mainly because of their simplicity in determining states as unitary actors, with simple interests, determined by the collective capacity to act upon them from which would emerge a limited peace. By contrast, liberal thinking represented a much more complex peace system requiring social, political, and economic organisation, across several levels of analysis. John Stuart Mill conceded, for example, that a ‘Leviathan’ was still required, though it should be legitimate (meaning it should draw on a broad consensus) and protect individual freedoms.³⁸ Jeremy Bentham similarly argued that peace would need to be constructed partly through disarmament³⁹ but also through state maximisation of the interests of its citizens.⁴⁰ This genre of peace plans was essentially based upon a Christian, liberal ethic and set of norms, and offered liberals and idealists alike hopes of a sophisticated, sustainable, form of peace. A significant contribution to this emerging discourse on peace was Grotius’ notion of natural law, founded in the right of self-preservation and private property, which are extended to states that protect themselves in the context of norms and rules. This pointed to the morality of coexistence and non-intervention, resting on states’ rights of self-defence and the concept of ‘just war.’⁴¹

The conduct of the Napoleonic wars was indicative of realist order as inferred by Machiavelli and Hobbes, but the ensuing Congress of Vienna of 1815 was an attempt to develop a formal liberal international order.⁴² Fixed meetings between representatives of the ‘great powers’ were to be instituted on a regular basis in what came to be known as a ‘conference system,’ which would be “...most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.”⁴³ Of course, this was also underpinned by a reconstituted balance of power and mutual guarantees between its proponents. In essence, this version of peace rested upon the capacity to intervene, or refrain from intervening, in the affairs of other states as well as cooperation in order to continue the pre-war notion of peace which the victors of the Napoleonic Wars had aspired to.⁴⁴ It was indicative of the conservative and liberal debates of this era about peace and war. For conservative thinkers, peace lay in the preservation of the existing order, perhaps through the use of war. For liberal thinkers, peace would arrive via a transformation brought about by economic and social progress, which idealists

might extend into the realms of a more comprehensive outcome of a common and unitary system of cooperation and government.

Obviously, the development of international norms, cooperation, and organisation could not be unilaterally undertaken, and would require some form of international organisation and law whereby the interests inherent in the international may outweigh those of the parochial (as formulated by Grotius work on natural law, based upon human sociability and international norms guaranteeing self-preservation).⁴⁵ Yet, in a common counter-argument, the romanticism of political community described by Herder⁴⁶ indicated the danger that nationalism posed towards such liberal-internationalism, especially in the expression of self-determination symbolised by the French and American Revolutions.⁴⁷ Ironically, self-determination, originally a prescription for liberal freedoms and associated with the idealism of a common community, was to give rise to conflicting claims over territorial sovereignty – in other words inter-state or anti-colonial conflict.

Self-determination aimed at constructing a just peace but instead, it underlined the impossibility of a type of justice built upon the redistribution of territory and sovereignty according to [ethno] national identity. Yet, it rapidly became an antidote to imperialism and colonialism. This version of peace rested upon rampant self-determination, and nationalism, and was in fact no peace at all. Early attempts at self-determination, which appealed to such contradictory idealist and liberal sentiments, such as that of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, strove to create a 'peaceful' nation-state through violence. By 1871, this was the order of the day in Europe, in combination with the frantic search for empire. Nationalists took control of this agenda, which for conservatives was to preserve their wealth and power, and for liberals, had become a civilising mission.⁴⁸ These two aims combined in a tumultuous period during the 19th and 20th centuries, during which nationalism, imperialism, and industrialisation appeared to combine to offer a future, utopian peace in the minds of many – a new peace.

Liberal imperialism softened the notion that profit could be made from virgin territories, supposedly establishing a responsibility through which the imperial or colonial power should aid in the development of that territory and its peoples. For example, in the late 19th century British Prime Ministers, Disraeli and Gladstone, had opposed each other on the 'peace project' that was derived from British imperialism, with Disraeli believing that the empire only had responsibility towards itself (meaning Britain itself), while Gladstone had a vision of liberal imperialism through which the empire spread the 'benefits of peace' to its subjects. Formal and informal colonial rules continued this trend towards a basic consideration of the legitimacy of such adventures. But there was a growing tension between occupier and local inhabitants over whether this could be termed 'peace' given the cultural and racial attitudes of superiority normally adopted by the coloniser, such as in 'British India' and in the light of the political developments outlined earlier, imperialism and colonialism lost their legitimacy amongst both the states and peoples of the world in the 20th century.

The impact of idealism

Idealism provided the basis for thinking about an embryonic liberal ‘international community.’ This was established within a more sophisticated notion of peace, in which a Grotian discourse on natural law began to emerge, indicating a right of self-preservation and to own property on the part of the individual, which could be extended to states.⁴⁹ This allowed for a framework of norms and rules to emerge to provide the conditions for a norm of coexistence and non-intervention to be adhered to by states. *In extremis*, this also allowed a secular ‘just-war’ in which war could be used legitimately in order to defend this order.⁵⁰ It required that a commonly agreed liberal peace between states be negotiated, which, in the worst case scenario, could then be defended or extended through the use of force. This rested upon universalism, and the belief that a specific liberal order was of more significance than other orders.⁵¹ As Guess has argued, this was later regarded as a form of liberalism:

Ex poste, a legitimising prehistory of liberalism is constructed in which Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and others are made to feature prominently as theoretical precursors.⁵²

As a result, idealist and liberal versions of peace coexisted somewhat uncomfortably in a space somewhere between nationalism, liberal imperialism, and liberal-internationalism (in other words, influenced by realism). In practice, nationalism and imperialism were rife, as were economic protectionism, and discriminatory practices in civil society, institutionalised by state and society, especially with respect to issues like identity, gender, and class. Concurrently, the balance of power still drove many state relations and geopolitics and economic acquisition drove imperialism. Much of the liberal and idealist thinking of this era revolved around the ‘restoration’ rather than creation of peace,⁵³ framed in the context of preserving existing power relations, or perfecting and sharing a western value system.

The development of a liberal concept of peace was a compromise between *realpolitik* and idealism but progress was being made. For example, the French and American Revolutions highlighted rights, self-determination, and the franchise. The British attempt to end slavery and the formalisation of international humanitarian law by the Geneva Convention of 1864 followed. The Geneva Convention irrevocably delineated what was lawful in war and led to the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), founded to care for war victims. The ICRC, the oldest humanitarian organisation, now became the guardian of international humanitarian law by international treaty. These developments continued with the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, which led to the establishment of the International Court of Justice and, later, of course, to the League of Nations. Norms, regimes, law, and institutions were to be the reality of the new liberal version of peace, though in practice this was led

by the dominant actors of the international system, and was based upon the western and supposedly secular norms of the then imperial powers. Yet, the idealist inspired, liberal version of peace had captured the imagination of many groups around the world, and inspired civil society actors to attempt to resist the reborn ideologies of power. In 1910, a Universal Peace Congress examined the need for international law, self-determination, and an end to colonialism and in 1913 another focused on disarmament to mark the opening of the Peace Palace in The Hague.⁵⁴ However, liberal approaches abandoned the notion of a world government or federation in favour of liberal constitutional frameworks for states. They also modified the positive epistemology and the ontology of peace that idealism had offered, indicating that these were possible but only within geopolitical limits and following the rationale of intervention and institution building carried out by liberal states. By the end of the 20th century, liberalism had been replaced by neoliberalism and by 'global governance.'

Simultaneous to these developments were the growth of social and advocacy movements, peace and disarmament movements, and resistance movements, which generally emphasised elements of liberalism in their campaigns from one ideological standpoint or other (rights, democracy, pluralism, free speech, free media, trade, etc.). These movements may have been religiously inspired, or liberal-internationalist, associated with cosmopolitan movements, disarmament, democratisation, or campaigns against conscription, ideological, and feminist movements against war. Later, similar campaigns for nuclear disarmament, and environmental reform would follow.⁵⁵

Such developments also had an impact on the conduct of imperialism, which, in the early 20th century, endeavoured to take on a more humanist,⁵⁶ liberal of benevolence towards the colonised subject.⁵⁷ This was reflected in the Mandate System, which, after WWI, tried to devolve power to local governments and inhabitants.⁵⁸ Liberal thinking brought together the components of self-determination, international organisation, and human rights to form an orderly international system, in which the liberal peace was now recognisable after the end of WWI, if only in theory and doctrine. It was recognisable in different strands of idealism, in internationalism and international law,⁵⁹ and increasingly it was recognisably liberal in its Lockean and Kantian aspirations.

Perhaps the most prominent contribution of liberal thought to the contemporary conceptualisation of peace lay in the development of a human rights discourse,⁶⁰ which after the end of the Cold War came to be vital to peace and justice.⁶¹ This became directly related to the understanding of peace as universal natural law tradition, and as a particularistic, contractual, and legal framework.⁶² Nevertheless, the weak universality of such logic was exposed quickly, both conflict-affected countries around the world and in the political will of core states including the US and UK after the dawn of the "War of Terror" in 2001. This ultimately left to a shift to another element of liberalism – from human rights to free trade, meaning neoliberal statebuilding displaced what had come to be known as liberal peacebuilding.⁶³

During the period leading up to WWI, international actors, ranging from multilateral organisations to advocacy movements formed networks, focused upon collective security, international law, democracy, and free trade within some states. Non-state actors were increasingly becoming involved in campaigning for self-determination, an expanded franchise, an end to slavery, children's rights, the development of international law, disarmament, and, of course, world peace. These developments engendered some important changes in assumptions of peace, indicating a more far-reaching and ambitious concept than realist approaches could countenance. Many of these developments had important consequences for sovereignty, especially in its Westphalian form. Equating justice, humanitarianism, disarmament, and intervention, with world peace meant that Westphalian sovereignty was being modified towards an interdependent framework based upon collective security and cooperation, rather than upon domination and hegemony. However, the line between these two sets of competing concepts soon came to be seen as rather more indeterminate than often thought.

These dynamics were seized upon by idealists, who were keen to contest realism (and fascism) in the interwar period. Norman Angell had argued in 1912 that a growing interdependence meant that war would now only despoil all. Even the victor's in war in his view would now bear its costs, and would be unable to profit from territorial or material gains formerly associated with war.⁶⁴ As Hedley Bull pointed out, idealist thinkers such as Zimmern, Noel-Baker, and Mitrany were not necessarily insistent upon a moral dimension in IR, but did focus on progress that would lead to the progressive transformation of the international system into a peaceful and just world order.⁶⁵ Indeed, Ashworth has argued that idealism shared much with realists in these areas.⁶⁶ Democracy, internationalism, and the emergence of the League of Nations were all indicators of such progress. Zimmern made such an analysis in his work, arguing that the pre-WWI system had to be consigned to the past and replaced with a progressive system revolving around the League.⁶⁷ This was also reflected in Thompson's much later argument that idealism rested upon institutionalism as a way of changing people's behaviour, and provided justice and the ability to distinguish between good and evil.⁶⁸

Connections with pacifism

Pacifism is a strong underlying influence for idealist thinking,⁶⁹ and also plays a moderate role in liberal thinking. In its most basic form, pacifism is defined by opposition to war and other forms of violence. Paradoxically, this has done much to discredit pacifism in IR because of its tendency towards an acceptance that violence is endemic. Indeed, it is now noticeably absent from teaching in universities and from academic orthodox and mainstream discourses. In the contemporary, implicit debates about peace, moderate forms of pacifism are linked to aspects of the liberal peace and its attempts to restrain violence. Pacifism is closely associated with idealist notions such as internationalism, anti-war, and disarmament sentiments, advocating for international governance (for idealists

via the League of Nations), more ambitiously, world government. This was eventually displaced by liberal approaches which focus on pluralism, transnationalism, human rights, the rule of law, the possibility of a form of global democracy, and global governance. Indeed, one might make a strong argument now that the liberal international community has generally accepted a pragmatic form of pacifism as one of its integral norms, and finds questions related to military intervention very difficult to handle.

Pacifism is believed to be morally desirable, and conducive to human welfare, as opposed to the use of violence which is neither. It is most widely known as an absolutist condemnation of any form of war or violence, but it is rather more complex and nuanced than this.⁷⁰ It is associated with a moral repugnance of war, killing, and other forms of violence. In intellectual terms, pacifism can be divided into principled and pragmatic, or radical versions.⁷¹ An overt and principled stance against violence combined with an acknowledgement that it may at times be necessary is very common. It is relatively rare though to find radical pacifism where proponents argue against the use of violence under any conditions, even those associated with an extreme threat. However, an ideal form of peace is generally seen to be plausible by pacifists, given the proper circumstances, and war is seen to be abnormal and unnecessary. Peace is also seen to be universal both in aspiration and in ontology. Generally, pacifism indicates that communication should be used to deal with conflict leading to compromise and that there should be a general 'moral renunciation of war.'⁷² As Attack argues, this position can also be connected to Kantian or cosmopolitan theory because it envisages the replacement of the Westphalian sovereign system with cosmopolitan democracy and global citizenship,⁷³ and accepts the use of force under very specific circumstances.

The key aims of pacifism have generally been to stop or prevent war through the creation of a climate favourable to peace, and dealing with the potential causes of conflict inherent in factors such as socio-economic competition, ethnic identity, religion, culture, the quest for power, and fear of foreign domination. Means for the settlement of disputes must be provided, and ways must be found to ensure observance of the settlements that are made. It was aimed at these objectives that the likes of Penn, Abbé de St Pierre, and Kant developed their peace proposals. Pacifism became associated with organised peace movements and civil society advocacy and actions. The development of ideological and social movements in the 19th century, as well as industrialisation, social problems, and the emergence of anti-colonial movements also drew on pacifism as a form of resistance. In the years running up to the First World War, civil disarmament movements developed in response to the threat increasingly perceived from newly industrialist states pursuing territorial expansion and the domination of others through military preponderance. The emergence of new forms of communication and transportation allowed such movements to become transnational and far more effective in their advocacy. After the First World War, pacifist sentiment became not just a popular civil sentiment but also entered into the

realm of international relations, though fascist and communist states such as Italy, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany endeavoured to ban it on the grounds of the Hegelian argument that individuals found their fulfilment in war. The idea that states did not have to conform to the personal ethic of non-violence on the grounds of national interest, its sole control of the means of violence, and survival, even through just war approaches, as Wight argued, meant that a 'double morality' was strongly critiqued by pacifists.⁷⁴ Many emerging civil society actors and advocacy groups now saw war as another expression of class oppression and elitism, especially after the experience in the trenches of WWI.

Increasingly, pacifism was associated with radical movements and issues, such as the suffragettes, or intellectuals responding to the post-war crisis of idealism, such as Virginia Woolf or Aldous Huxley. Pacifism now came to be associated with conscientious objectors who refused to fight in particular wars (from the First World War to the Vietnam War). Pacifism also, of course, became associated with the idealist development of a system of collective security, through the League of Nations. This was followed, in turn, by the establishment of the UN, with its much more elaborate institutional machinery for keeping the peace. By the advent of WWII, it had become clear that pacifism was unsustainable in the face of a determined enemy which had little compunction about their aggression. Neville Chamberlain's 'Peace in Our Time' famously proved not to be the case and it was not until the 1960s, in particular influenced by the nuclear standoff between the US and the USSR, and by US experiences in Vietnam that pacifism again became influential. It was apparent, however, that a majority would not be in opposition to a war they deemed to be justified – for example, the Second World War. However, in the more recent case of the war in Iraq, major public demonstrations, indicative of a pragmatic or relative pacifism at the very least, in many of the capitals of the world involving millions of people, seem to have had a little effect on the decisions of some western governments to invade Iraq in 2003 and depose the Baathist regime.

Pacifism has always been a concept easily associated with idealism and liberalism, and undermined by the discursive practices of realism. For example, some have argued that an unwillingness to countenance war means that the individual and the states are left at risk by the pacifist. Tolstoy, a Christian pacifist who was influenced by Thoreau's work on civil disobedience, argued that pacifism and anarchism were intimately connected because the state was often the source of violence.⁷⁵ The most famous exponent of non-violent resistance, Mahatma Gandhi, drew on this idea in his own campaign against British imperial rule in India in the 1930s.⁷⁶

A liberal compromise?

Even during the early 20th century, an idealist or liberal-internationalist world peace looked unlikely as nationalism, authoritarian, and fascist dictatorships began to emerge. Certainly, the dream of a world federation and disarmament,

which had been the focus of many early liberal-internationalists, was by 1914 little more than an aspiration. Though many states, such as Germany, Japan, and Italy, were to ignore the liberalisation of international relations for reasons of expediency vis-à-vis their leaders' definition of their national interests, there is little doubt that this modified the discourse of peace. It suggested that an ideal form of mutual international cooperation following liberal norms was a viable alternative to *realpolitik*. However, though discussions of international social, economic, and political systems had highlighted the need for prosperity, political representation, and an embryonic form of human rights, these were not as yet widely adopted in practice. Such ideals had first to encounter and overcome pre-existing political, economic, and social systems that favoured certain elites over the vast bulk of the population, historical enmities between states and peoples, and the imperial race for territory. The wide circulation of the resulting aspirations for a supposedly utopian or ideal form of peace through liberalism clashed with such elite-driven sentiments of *realpolitik* that soon was associated with the extreme ideologies of fascism, Nazism, and communism, which, in practice, saw 'might as right' and sidestepped the development of liberal aspirations for a peaceful international order. Yet, it was clear even at the time liberal and idealist aspirations were the foil by which such extremist ideologies were to be judged, and by which realism comprehended its own tragic dimensions.

WWI made it clear that large-scale industrialised war could not be won decisively without incurring such costs, as Angell had argued, as to make a victor's peace unattainable and unprofitable. It also highlighted major problems with the sustainability of the victor's peace as the Versailles settlement and the associated League system illustrated. However, this move towards international organisation survived the failure of the League system and eventually mutated into the production and reproduction of a liberal international system, with the creation of international organisations and the recognition of self-determination as a limited right.⁷⁷ The end of WWI saw a general liberal agreement that democracy could be extended and a new international order created, though many states were reluctant to see this extended as fully as US President Wilson's Fourteen Points indicated.⁷⁸ The new peace was idealistic in its aspirations – especially for self-determination – though it very soon became clear that it was vague, untested, and lacked any guarantees, from the US in particular. The importance of US President Wilson's Fourteen Points at Versailles in 1919 cannot be underestimated as idealist versions of peace made the transition into liberal versions of peace, however. This phase of thinking about IR offered a notion of peace that rested upon a neo-Kantian, 'liberal, reformist zeal.'⁷⁹ The most important twist to the new version of peace was that territorial adjustments should be via the principle of self-determination, which soon led to the territorial self-determination of former colonial units (regardless of the artificiality of their boundaries and the broad range of identity groups contained within them). Within this package lay the liberal rights and constraints of the new peace.

In addition, Wilson believed that peace would be organised and enforced by a community of states.⁸⁰ It would be a liberal peace in the image of the states that had imagined it, though he argued that this did not mean it was a victor's peace or indeed that it was idealistic.⁸¹ In this way, utopian thought on an ideal form of peace was overtaken by the liberal peace which would in theory and practice rested on a set of common pragmatic elements and institutions. It required a hegemon who would construct the peace in its image: rights for all of its actors would be delineated, provided, enforced, and patrolled, according to a set of core values, based on just war thinking, self-determination and democracy, international law and an embryonic form of human rights, and the norms of cooperation and consent. Realists scoffed that even this liberal version was a utopian peace, but in practice, this is what the 'long twentieth century' gave rise to.

This type of peace did not preclude domination, structural violence, and hegemony. However, liberal democratic states, which provided rights for their inhabitants, and conducted 'peaceful' international relations as a result for the reasons Kant famously outlined, would be the only choice for the structure of international relations. Once this had been accepted, all other reasonable rights would follow. Because this was a universal norm anyway, there were apparently no other voices to learn from. For the time being, self-determination and its problems would be the major architects of the new international system. This was based upon the core assumptions of liberal thought – rationality, a belief in progress, liberty, and the checks and balances on otherwise unchecked power. The notion of universal human rights, later enshrined in the UN framework, made it clear that peace did not just belong to or result from states, but also to individuals. States now had responsibilities to individuals, who had rights and agency.

The most sophisticated of these debates developed the various formulations of liberal-internationalist and liberal-institutionalist debates, in which nationalism was rejected in favour of internationalism and transnationalism as the basis for international order, and through which international institutions would be developed to create consensus. For example, Wright sought to develop an internationalist project for peace, which aimed at a multidimensional understanding of war and therefore to open up a debate on how it could be realistically abolished. Wright argued that war was *not* an inevitable dimension of history and that peace represented an equilibrium of many different forces.⁸² Others, such as Mead, saw war as a social invention.⁸³ Mitrany's work on a 'Working Peace System' was indicative of liberal thought in that he saw what he called functional institutions as vital in contributing to a broader and sustainable peace in the international system.⁸⁴ Mitrany argued that the development of international administration, such as embodied early on in the International Postal Union, and the Hague Conference constituted the system required for a sustained peace.⁸⁵ In addition, any peace needed to be a 'working' peace and not 'protected,' by which he meant that peace should be self-sustaining.⁸⁶ His argument was also that peace should also be universal in nature.⁸⁷ As with Galtung later on, he began to distinguish

between a positive and negative peace,⁸⁸ the former which was to be built by the UN, political actors, and also of social and economic agencies. Mitrany is just one of several scholars who through a liberal lens was able to construct an argument in which a very sophisticated version of peace was seen as an ambitious though viable project, which did not, as Marxists and their followers suggested, require a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, but rather additional layers added to the already existing international system. Mitrany was prescient in his understanding of the development of an elaborate intellectual and policy framework to preserve and protect peace.

These liberal debates were effectively about domestic and international governance, and about which forms of governance might be the most peaceable and sustainable, untainted by war and self-interest. This implies that a liberal peace could be engineered and brought to all requiring the construction and socialisation of the state and its international relations. This formed the basis for the liberal peace that emerged after WWII and was consolidated after the end of the Cold War, which, as Clark has argued, became both a regulative and distributive hegemonic peace.⁸⁹ These strands allowed for the development of an institutional approach to peace, whereby international organisations could construct peace from the 'top down,' and also to a civil understanding of peace, whereby the consideration of the human subject was necessary if peace was to be successfully created. The creation of international architecture aimed at keeping the peace and guaranteeing security amongst states paralleled the emergence of non-state, non-governmental actors and social movements developing a specific agenda that would, it was hoped, lead to a sustainable peace not resting on the presence of the threat of force. By the founding of the UN, the liberal paradigm of top-down governance defining the limits of good behaviour in a legitimate contract with citizens was now being widely adopted in IR theory as providing the underlying theory, ontology, and epistemology of peace. This could be seen in its key international elucidations, which included the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the establishment of international organisation and international financial institutions, and in the emerging Cold War bipolarity between the US and the USSR. The creation of security, political, and economic arrangements amongst the core Western industrial countries and their protégés was also significant in elucidating what appeared to be a zone of liberal peace.

The UN system became by far the most significant (and maligned) mechanism of this liberal peace as it developed after WWII, via the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat, international agency, and international financial institutions. Indeed, the tension between utopian hopes for a ideal form of peace in the future, liberal notions of limited and regulated freedoms, and realist concerns with the need for a strong security architecture are all part of the UN framework, as is immediately obvious from the UN Charter, and the roles of its institutions and agencies.⁹⁰ Effectively, the liberal peace required governance at a global and local level, and this is what the UN was tasked to do, because of

its universal membership and claims to represent universal norms, but of course without over-riding the sovereignty of its member states. Very quickly, however, it became clear that this broader notion of peace now being represented by the UN system had even broader implications. If inter-state war had been rejected, so should civil war and imperialism. If poverty, development, and human rights were to be on the agenda, then they should not just be identified and discussed, but also ameliorated. In this sense, with an increasingly identified 'right' to peace also came the responsibility to create and support it. This represents the classic liberal conundrum – in the light of a failure to discover a universal consensus, a more limited consensus must be found on the basis of a peace for most, which will be imposed on those at the margins who may resist it.

The Bretton Woods system was also developed with this in mind. Its aim was to facilitate economic growth development and trade after WWII, based upon the assumption that a stable economic order was necessary if there was to be a sustainable peace. 'Embedded liberalism'⁹¹ became a core assumption of the varieties of liberal thinking that now moved to the forefront of IR's offerings for a concept and theory of peace. This projection and consolidation of liberal values is exactly what the UN system was intended to do: both negotiate and represent a universal consensus for peace, as well as patrol it and fulfil the non-military tasks for its construction. Liberal thinking about IR now came to be represented by a debate on how to create a rule-dominated, ordered, liberal society, resting on an "entrenched multilateralism."⁹²

From the realms of peace research and conflict studies (influenced by structuralism), Galtung provided liberal thinkers with an explicit statement on negative and positive peace. This was adopted by liberal thinkers to represent the divide between realist and liberal versions of peace. Indeed, his argument that a positive peace existed when structural violence was removed has been deployed to legitimate liberal approaches to peace.⁹³ From the realms of conflict studies, Burton's work on pluralism added substance to this move with his work on human needs and the 'cobweb' model of IR, which depicted the complex interdependence which was increasingly being recognised by the second half of the 20th century. Human needs effectively depicted a liberal view which motivates complex interdependence at its most basic level, the denial of which was the main obstacle to a broader peace – which he saw as a 'world society.'⁹⁴ This recognised both the diffusal of power in the international system and the growing role of multiple non-state actors. Though this version of pluralism was supposed to be empirically based rather than normative, it did clearly share much with the liberal value system, and was successful in challenging realism and formed one part of the so-called inter-paradigm debate of the 1980s.⁹⁵

Transnationalism, non-state actors and fragmented states, and a growing interdependence and the concept of the 'global commons'⁹⁶ were now increasingly taken to be the dominant dynamics of IR by those who opposed the claims and limitations of realism and aimed at the construction of an inclusive and sustainable world society.⁹⁷ What would eventually become constructivist thought took

liberal norms (expanded versions in some cases) and looked at how they shaped the state and international systems through their epistemic engagement.⁹⁸ These now offered a broader, not necessarily easily manageable, but more dynamic view of the causes of conflict, and the positive, peaceful possibilities that IR could offer. As Little has made clear, such dynamics, and in particular the impact of pluralism upon the so-called idealist, and later the liberal debates, have been far greater than often thought.⁹⁹ However, the different strands of thought represented here also raised doubt about the 'governability' of the international system in that interdependence, transnationalism and the fragmentation of states, and the counter-reaction of states, attempting to reassert themselves, produced an unstable system. Liberals, pluralists, and constructivists might have to accept a required benevolent hegemon to govern, according to broadly shared interests, but to the benefit of the hegemon.¹⁰⁰ This was some way from the idealism of earlier approaches. Rosenau, for example, argued that both a state-centric realist environment and a bi-furcated, multicentric environment of pluralist mould now coexisted.¹⁰¹ Rosenau was now concerned about the viability of any future emergence of a world society. Keohane and Nye likewise had tried to offer a synthesis of realism and pluralism in their work on complex interdependence and the development of regimes that modified state behaviour.¹⁰²

The legacy of idealism, however, was a more ambitious version of peace. This drew the discipline, and indeed policy, away from narrow and extreme forms of tragic realism, and instead offered rational approaches to the construction of a liberal peace. This expansion drove the inclusion (and some would argue, co-option) of public and private issues and actors and the emergence of a positive epistemology in which the root causes of conflict had to be addressed if a sustainable peace was to be created.¹⁰³ It represented an important move away from the realist position that conflict was inevitable and immutable, and also implied a break with the implication that peace could only exist as an ideal form, and was therefore unlikely ever to exist at all. The implications of these new debates and practices were that peace could be constructed, albeit in a reasonably limited, but cosmopolitan form, according to law and institutions or through social construction. What was required was a scientific understanding of the structures, agents, and methods of peace, allied with a universal normative understanding of its commonality and applicability across humanity. Peace could be constructed by those who had the material resources, and normative legitimacy. Indeed, the resources necessary for waging war could also now be transmuted into the creation of the new peace, as pluralist, liberal, constructivist, structuralist, and realist thinking increasingly began to point to.

Much of the focus in these debates was upon how a positive peace might be achieved, rather than explicitly stating its nature, dimensions, and implications, which was assumed to rest upon liberal norms and social justice. Indeed, this underlying liberal consensus on peace was to condition the shift of the discipline towards a positive epistemology of peace. This was the underlying theme of Hinsley's contribution, which envisioned peace through political theory and

political philosophy¹⁰⁴ as well as Aron's conceptualisation of three types of peace, ranging from equilibrium, hegemony, and empire.¹⁰⁵ This was also reflected in Ceadal's contribution, which associated peace with defencism, pacificism or pacifism, militarism, and crusading.¹⁰⁶

It was through liberal and idealist contributions to thinking about peace that three conceptualisations arose of a liberal peace. The most important of these was the constitutional peace, derived from Kantian thought, and based on democracy, cosmopolitanism, and free trade. Indeed, in its North American theoretical guise, during the Cold War, liberal democratic peace theory (also taken up by many peace researchers) posed a major challenge to realist thought. Furthermore, the emerging human rights discourse was related to the civil peace and gave individuals both rights and agency, through advocacy, campaigning, social movements, self-determination, and democratisation. Finally, and perhaps the most ambitious was the attempt to construct an institutional peace, through the construction of international frameworks, legal, normative, and organisational, including the League of Nations, later the UN family, and, of course, the development of international law.

Conclusion

Given that idealism made such grand ontological claims, it was relatively easy to denounce, given the failure of the Idealist-influenced Versailles settlement in 1919 and the outbreak of WWII – a war it was supposed to prevent. This catastrophic event decisively put an end to the first great debate IR, over whether peace rested upon a negative or positive epistemology, in favour of realism. This was determined by the context of the day – the advent of WWII – rather than a far-reaching intellectual victory. Yet, idealism and liberalism were gradually to come together to form a hybrid, which also incorporated elements of pragmatic forms of pacifism. This also influenced the development of constructivism, and certainly was significant for critical theory. Idealism provided the foundation for these dynamics, some of which came to be enshrined in the liberal international system that emerged after the Congress of Vienna at an institutional level and influenced the emergence of international law and human rights. Idealism offered the intellectual ideal of a form of peace, which liberalism enshrined in a Lockean social contract and a Kantian international system of peace. After WWI, idealism's legacy continued in the form of the more moderate approach of variants of liberalism, which is generally associated with individualism, liberty, and generally agreed restraints, defined and policed by benevolent hegemonies in a hierarchical system. These elements coexist in liberalism's IR guise, where like realism, it depends upon the state as the organising unit of the international system and as a shell for the government of a specific territory in a consensual contract with its peoples. These agendas have contributed to liberal peace agenda – a grand narrative that offers a self-governing form of peace within and between states. Idealism leads to liberal readings of international politics, and liberalism's vision of peace claims to approximate the utopianism

inherent in idealist understandings of peace, while recognising the dangers of war and aggression. Indeed, this mode of thinking also addresses some of the dynamics and issues derived from Marxist, and later critical, themes and in particular the problem of social, political, and economic systems and their relationship with power, knowledge, rationality, and justice. From this emerging synthesis, as later chapters attest, critical approaches drawing on social theory emerged in IR theory.

The ontology offered by these debates indicated that there was a human and social potential for a more sophisticated peace, though Kantian-derived approaches also indicated an often violent tension with non-liberal states and systems that implies a liberal imperialism.¹⁰⁷ An epistemology of this peace was required which could be engineered in a pragmatic manner, resting on the normative foundations offered by liberalism. This can be found in the literatures that emerged on international organisation, internationalism, and functionalism, as well as on norms, regimes, and global governance. This fertile ground for thinking about peace has been one of IR's strongest influences, despite the common focus on *realpolitik*. This infers an ontology in which governance and international organisation can be used to develop peace as a common good for all, through which a specific epistemology and methods can be practically deployed to create progress towards an ideal of peace. This process depends upon a peace that can be created by those with specialised capacities suitable both for themselves and for others. Peace is represented as both process and outcome defined by a grand theory resting upon territorial sovereignty and international governance, which every theoretical and conceptual stage should work towards in a linear and rational fashion, offering the liberal claim of a 'peace dividend.' All of this is strongly influenced by a mixture of western cultural and historical normative frameworks, which claim some degree of universality. Its normative underpinnings dictate inclusivity, equality, and pluralism, while at the same time recognise difference, within the confines of an imagined ideal state of IR, a standard that automatically delineates the limits of its pluralism.

Yet, it is clear that the hybrid of idealism, pacifism, and liberalism (and later, critical theory and constructivism) has offered a formidable, progressive framework for peace. This unashamedly aspires to offer a positive epistemology of peace – even if there is an internal tension over the plausibility of an ontology of peace – which has been adopted, in ideological, methodological, and epistemological terms, by many contemporary states (particularly in the West), donors, international organisations, agencies (such as much of the UN family, the EU, and the World Bank), and officials. It is able to see beyond the tragedy of a state of nature, and has been able to engage with context and the need for planning and practical solutions to the problems of IR. This account of peace offers a practical and ontologically positive version. However, this is not been unproblematic, as later chapters attest. In the following chapter, for example, the relationship between this emerging liberal version of peace and realist debates on power, state-centricity, and violence, as well as ontological and methodological similarities will become apparent.

Notes

- 1 Even the existence of this debate is contested in that 'idealists' were rather more pragmatic than realists often argued, and realists more interested in norms than often idealists thought. See, for example, Peter Wilson, "The Myth of the First Great Debate", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, 1998, pp. 1–16; Lucian M. Ashworth, "Where Are the Idealists in Interwar IR?", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2006, p. 291.
- 2 US President Wilson's address to Congress outlining his famous 14 points, 8th January, 1918. This speech is often taken the key expression of idealism, drawing on Kant's framework for 'perpetual peace.'
- 3 Bertrand Russell, "War – the Offspring of Fear", P. Stansky (ed.), *The Left and War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 103.
- 4 See, for example, Ernst Haas, *Tangle of Hopes*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969; Richard Little, "The Growing Relevance of Pluralism", in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 66.
- 5 Key contributors to the idealist canon include amongst many others: Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, London: Heineman, 1910; P.L. Noel-Baker, *The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes*, London: King and Son, 1925; A. Posonby, *Now Is the Time: An Appeal for Peace*, London: Leonard Parsons, 1925; L. Woolf, *The Framework of a Lasting Peace*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1917; Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law*, London: Macmillan, 1936; H.N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of Armed Peace*, London: Routledge, 1998 [1917]. See also Andreas Osiander, "Rereading Early Twentieth Century IR Theory: Idealism Re-visited", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1998, pp. 409–432; C. Sylvest, "Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 409–432.
- 6 Lucian M. Ashworth, "Op. Cit.", p. 293.
- 7 For more on this see Peter Wilson, *International Theory of Leonard Woolf*, New York: Palgrave, 2003, p. 20.
- 8 R.B.J Walker, *Inside/Outside*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- 9 Lucian M. Ashworth, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 304–308.
- 10 Norman Angell, *The Fruits of Victory*, London: Collins, 1921; L. Woolf, *International Government*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1916, p. 8.
- 11 Alfred Zimmern, *Op. Cit.*, p. 327.
- 12 For an interesting discussion, see C. Sylvest, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 417–425.
- 13 Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, London: Norton, 1997, p. 206.
- 14 See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1859].
- 15 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, London: Dent, 1910; See also David Ricardo, *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.
- 16 Michael Doyle, *Op. Cit.*, p. 207.
- 17 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The West, Civil Society, and the Construction of Peace*, London: Palgrave, 2003, p. 113.
- 18 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book X, Mineola: Dover Publications, 1998.
- 19 Benedict D. Spinoza, "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus", in E. Curley, *A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994 [1670].
- 20 Desiderius Erasmus, *Querela Pacis [Complaint of Peace]*, Chicago: Open Court, 1917 [1521].
- 21 See Emeric Cruce, "Discourse on the State", Duc de Sully, "Le Grand Dessein" cited in Grace Roosevelt, *A Brief History of the Quest for Peace*, www.globalpolicy.org; See also, William Penn, "An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe", *The Peace of Europe*, London: Everyman, 1993 [1693], pp. 5–22.

- 22 John Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*, P. Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1690].
- 23 J. Bentham, *Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace*, in H.P. Kainz (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives on Peace*, London: Macmillan, 1987 [1789].
- 24 Iain Attack, *The Ethics of Peace and War*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, p. 3.
- 25 Raymond Geuss, "Liberalism and Its Discontents", *Political Theory*, Vol.30, No. 3, 2002, p. 329.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 44.
- 27 Iain Attack, *Op. Cit.*, p. 45.
- 28 Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power*, London: Altantic Books, 2003, p. 58.
- 29 Thanks to Nick Rennger for these important points.
- 30 Iain Atach, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 40–49. For an excellent discussion of Kant, and of the development of the democratic peace argument, and empirical testing see Michael Doyle, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 251–300.
- 31 Robert Kagan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 58.
- 32 Chris Brown, *Op. Cit.*, p. 41.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- 34 Patrick Riley (ed.), "On the Works of the Abbé de St Pierre", in *Leibniz: Political Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 121–145.
- 35 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe*, 1714–1738. Rousseau also took up these themes. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe*, C. E. Vaughan (trans.), London: Constable and Co., 1917.
- 36 William Penn, "An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe", *The Peace of Europe*, London: Everyman, 1993 [1693], pp. 5–22.
- 37 *Ibid.*, pp. 17–22.
- 38 John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, (ed. John Gray) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 (1859), esp. Chapter 1. Mill also famously advocated imperialism. *Ibid.*, p. 454.
- 39 Jeremy Bentham, "A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace", in "The Principles of International Law", Essay IV, *The Collected Works*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1996.
- 40 See Jeremy Bentham, *Op. Cit.* Cited in Chris Brown, *Op. Cit.*, p. 47.
- 41 Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- 42 See Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 239.
- 44 Article V of the Treaty of Chaumont, 1 March, 1814. Cited in G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 104.
- 45 Richard Tuck, *Op. Cit.*
- 46 See *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 48, John Stuart Mill, *Op. Cit.*, esp. Chapter 1.
- 48 Michael Howard, *Op. Cit.*, p. 50.
- 49 Richard Tuck, *Op. Cit.*
- 50 Michael Howard, *Op. Cit.*, p. 3.
- 51 Chris Brown, *Op. Cit.*, p. 25; see also E. de Vattel, "Just War: In a doubtful cause", in Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (eds.), *The Law of Nations*, Indiana: Liberty, 1975, § 38.
- 52 Raymond Geuss, "Liberalism and Its Discontents", *Op. Cit.*, p. 322.
- 53 See, for example, statement by William Pitt in January 1805 about the 'restoration of peace' through a concert of powers. Cited in G. John Ikenberry, *Op. Cit.*, p. 99. For an interesting account, see Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*, New York: Viking, 1961.
- 54 For more on these developments, see Elise Boulding, *Cultures of Peace*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

- 55 For more details on these movements, see Nigel Young, "Peace Movements in History", in S. Mendlovitz and R.B.J. Walker (eds.), *Towards a Just World Peace*, London: Butterworths, 1987, pp. 137–69.
- 56 As Tuck argues, the early humanist impulse was that there was an entitlement to conquer with the intention of civilising the less civilised. Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 45.
- 57 Martin Shaw, "Post Imperial and Quasi Imperial", *Millennium*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2002, p. 330.
- 58 See Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- 59 See Iain Attack, *The Ethics of Peace and War*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, esp Chapter 3. For an excellent exposition, see also Shirley Scott, *International Law in World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.
- 60 David Barash, "Human Rights" in David Barash (ed.), *Approaches to Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 149–151.
- 61 Christine Bell, "Human Rights and Minority Protection", in John Darby and Roger MacGinty (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking*, London: Palgrave, 2003, p. 161.
- 62 Chris Brown, *Op. Cit.*, p. 118.
- 63 Oliver P. Richmond, *Failed Statebuilding*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.
- 64 Norman Angell, *Op. Cit.*, p. 12.
- 65 Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics", Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 35.
- 66 Lucian M. Ashworth, *Op. Cit.*, p. 292.
- 67 Alfred Zimmern, *Op. Cit.*
- 68 Kenneth W. Thompson, "Idealism and Realism", *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, 1977, pp. 199–209.
- 69 A Ponsonby, *Op. Cit.*
- 70 A.J. Coates, *The Ethics of War*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 78–79.
- 71 For an excellent survey, see Iain Attack, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 76–88. See also P. Brock, *Varieties of Pacifism*, *Op. Cit.*
- 72 *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- 73 Iain Attack, *Op. Cit.*, p. 86.
- 74 Martin Wight, *International Theory*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994, p. 255.
- 75 Iain Attack, *Op. Cit.*, p. 85.
- 76 See also P. Brock, *Varieties of Pacifism*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999, p. 90.
- 77 Andrew Williams, *Failed Imagination: New World Orders of the Twentieth Century*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998, pp. 23–26.
- 78 Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. 3, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928, pp. 323–339.
- 79 Jim George, *Op. Cit.*, p. 75.
- 80 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to the Senate, January 12th 1917", in Arthur S. Link et al. (eds.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Vol. 40, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. 536–537.
- 81 Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate, 22 January, 1917, in Arthur S. Link, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. 40, p. 539.
- 82 See Quincy Wright, *The Study of War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, esp. p. xiv.
- 83 Margaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only an Invention-Not a Biological Necessity", in Douglas Hunt (ed.), *The Dolphin Reader*, (2nd ed.), Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990 [1940], pp. 415–421.
- 84 See for example, David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, p. xi.

- 85 David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932, p. 90.
- 86 *Ibid.*, p. 121.
- 87 *Ibid.*, p. 174.
- 88 *Ibid.*, p. 180.
- 89 Ian Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 248.
- 90 For more on this, see Paul Williams, "Peace Operations and the International Financial Institutions" in Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, "Peace Operations and Global Order", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2004, p. 103.
- 91 John G Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order", *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982, pp. 379–415.
- 92 Paul Taylor, "Developing the Role of ECOSOC", in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds.), *The UN at the Millennium*, London: Continuum, 2000, p. 122. By the 1990's the major proportion of spending by international institutions was aimed at governance activities, including UNDP, the World Bank, USAID, DFID, and other international institutions and agencies, and not to mention the obvious case of the development of the EU and the pacification of Europe. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
- 93 Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, London: Sage, 1996, p. viii.
- 94 John Burton, *World Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- 95 This debate effectively posited incommensurability between the three main paradigms of IR, which were now equally weighed, but also were indicative of the hybrid that was by then emerging in theoretical and practical terms. See, for example, Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate", in M. Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds.), *International Relations. A Handbook of Current Theory*, London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. 7–26. When I was a post-graduate student working under the supervision of AJR Groom at the University of Kent, he made much of this hybrid version as a natural evolution of the inter-paradigm debate in his IR theory lectures.
- 96 John G. Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Cooperation", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66, pp. 874–893.
- 97 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971; James Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence*, London: Frances Pinter, 1980.
- 98 Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 2.
- 99 Richard Little, "The Growing Relevance of Pluralism", in Steve Smith, et al. (eds.), *Op. Cit.*, p. 72.
- 100 *Ibid.*, p. 79.
- 101 James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, p. 11.
- 102 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (2nd ed.), Boston: Little Brown, 1989, p. 4.
- 103 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *Op. Cit.*, p. 112.
- 104 F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.
- 105 Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, London: Transaction, 2003 [1966], p. 151.
- 106 For more on these conceptualisations see, Martin Ceadal, *Thinking about Peace and War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 4–5.
- 107 Beate Jahn, "Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs", *International Organisation*, Vol. 59, (Winter), 2005, p. 177. Beate shows how liberal projects in IR rarely engage with the consent of target or local peoples. *Ibid.*, p. 18v5.